Egoism

Egoism is a teleological theory of ethics that sets as its goal the benefit, pleasure, or
greatest good of oneself alone. It is contrasted with altruism, which is not strictly self-interested,
but includes in its goal the interests of others as well. According to the Webster’s New World
Dictionary, “egoism” is defined as selfishness, self-interest or conceit. The term “egotist” is often
a substitute. Egoism is also used in ethical considerations of how human beings do or ought to
live. It is thus often qualified by such terms as “ethical” and “psychological.” So what
determines the most sensible meaning of the term? It is crucial, first of all, what the ego is. If it is
the unique identity of the individual human being or self, what exactly is this? Some argue that
everyone is, to use Karl Marx’s term, a collective or specie-being. Others, in turn, hold that the
human being is first and foremost related to a supernatural God and has a body (which is of this
earth) and a soul (of the spiritual realm) combined in one person. Some others say a human being
is an integral and unique whole, comprised of many diverse facets. Egoisms differ depending on
which of these is taken to be true. Egoism has two forms both of which center around the
concept of acting in one’s own self-interest. It can be a descriptive or a normative position.
Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that people always act in
their own self-interest. In contrast to this purely descriptive thesis, ethical egoism maintains that
people should always act in their own self-interest. This is a normative claim because it tells us
how we ought to act, rather than describe what one does do.

Max Stirner was the first philosopher to call himself an egoist, it is questionable if he
wanted to install a new idea of morality (ethical egoism) or argue against morality (amoralism).
“All things are nothing to me” and “I alone am corporeal" is quoted from one of his main work,
The Ego and Its Own. Others, such as Thomas Hobbes and David Gauthier, have argued that the
conflicts which arise when people each pursue their own ends can be resolved for the best of
each individual only if they all voluntarily forgo some of their aims — that is, one's self-interest
is often best pursued by allowing others to pursue their self-interest as well so that liberty is
equal among individuals. Sacrificing one's short-term self-interest to maximize one's long-term
self-interest is one form of "rational self-interest" which is the idea behind most philosophers'
advocacy of ethical egoism. As Nietzsche (in Beyond Good and Evil) and Alasdair MacIntyre (in
After Virtue) are famous for pointing out, the ancient Greeks did not associate morality with
altruism in the way that post-Christian Western civilization has done. Aristotle's view is that we
have duties to ourselves as well as to other people (e.g. friends) and to the polis (society) as a
whole. The same is true for Christian Wolff and Immanuel Kant, who claim that there are duties
to ourselves just as Aristotle did.

Ethical egoism contrast with ethical utilitarianism, which holds that oneself should treat
themselves with no higher regard than one has for others (as egoism does, by elevating self-
interests and "the self" to a status not granted to others). However, ethical egoism does not;
require harming the interests and well-being of others when making moral deliberation. For
example, what is in a person’s self-interest may be incidentally detrimental, beneficial, or neutral
in its effect on others. Individualism allows for others' interest and well-being to be disregarded
or not, as long as what is chosen is efficacious in satisfying the self-interest of the agent. Nor
does ethical egoism necessarily entail that, in pursuing self-interest, one ought always to do what
one wants to do; e.g. in the long term, the fulfillment of short-term desires may prove detrimental
to the self. In the words of James Rachels, "Ethical egoism endorses selfishness, but it doesn't
endorse foolishness."

Ethical egoism is sometimes the philosophical basis for support of libertarianism or

individualist anarchism, although these can also be based on altruistic motivations. These are
political positions based partly on a belief that individuals should not coercively prevent others
from exercising freedom of action. Ethical egoism purports to tell us how to live. It tells us that
we should always act in our own self-interest. As such, it is a consequentiality theory, for
example, it maintains that the rightness or wrongness of acts depends on their consequences.
More specifically, it says that right actions are those which promote self-interest and wrong
actions are those which detract from self-interest.

Three different formulations of ethical egoism have been identified: individual, personal
and universal. An individual ethical egoism is the prescriptive doctrine that all persons should
serve my self-interest; a personal ethical egoism is the belief that only I should act from the
motive of self-interest, nothing is stated about what motives others should act from; a universal
ethical egoism is the universal doctrine that all persons should pursue their own interests
exclusively. The relationship between individual ethical egoism and universal ethical egoism is
an interesting one. At first glance, individual ethical egoism seems implausible. Why should
everyone else act in my self-interest? That’s absurd! Yet, although universal ethical egoism
initially seems to be the more reasonable position, we can see how one arrives at individual
ethical egoism. Let’s imagine that I am following the mandate of universal ethical egoism,
looking out for my own self-interest and telling everyone else to look out for theirs. Is it then
actually in my self-interest for you to act in your own self-interest? Wouldn’t it in fact be more in
my self-interest—and hence more consistent for me—if I could convince you (and everyone else,
for that matter) to do things that will benefit me? In fact, if I were an ethical egoist, wouldn’t I
want everyone else to be altruists, especially to be altruistic toward me? Universal ethical
egoism, in other words, seems to lead to individual ethical egoism. This situation can also be
seen in sports or chess or any other type of competitive game. I will be trying as hard as I can to
win, but I also expect my competitors to do the same. Indeed, I want them to do so. Competitive
games provide a notable example of situations in which it is not inconsistent for me to try to
maximize my self-interest but also to will that you try to maximize other’s self-interest at the
same time.

Ethical egoism means to act in our own self-interest but what is meant by the "self" in
"self-interest." There are at least two concepts of the self which could form the basis for the
egoist’s concept of self interest: the hedonistic self and the rational self. Each of these yields a
very different picture of egoism. If we see the self purely as a pleasure-seeker, then the
injunction to promote self-interest will be a command to seek pleasure, to be a hedonist. This
position suffers from all of the drawbacks of hedonism generally, including that there seems to
be nothing morally admirable about it. Moreover, it is susceptible to what has been called the
hedonistic paradox: often we can best achieve pleasure by not directly aiming at it. But most
contemporary ethical egoists are not hedonistic egoists. When ethical egoists speak of self-
interest, the majority of them mean rational self-interest. The rational egoist urges us to reflect on
future alternatives and choose those which will be most beneficial to us in the long-run. The
rational egoist places no restrictions on what can count as legitimate self-interest (pleasure,
power, fame, success, etc.) except presumably self-destructive, moral, and altruistic goals do not
in principle qualify as being in one’s self-interest.
 Egoists also draw a distinction between two concepts of self-interest which again depends
on our conception of the self, but this time centers around the temporal dimensions of the self.
Self-interest can be either short-term or long-term, depending on whether we are considering
what is immediately beneficial to the self or what is beneficial over the long run. Since pleasure
tends to be immediate and calculating tends to look to the future, this distinction often parallels
the distinction between hedonistic and rational egoism. It makes a crucial difference whether we
adopt a short-term or a long-term view of self-interest. Actions such as lying, cheating, and
exploitation might be permitted in terms of short-term self-interest but prohibited if we
considered them within the context of long-term self-interest. Consider a simple example from
business. If a person has a small retail business in a local neighborhood and deals with the same
clientele year after year, it may well be in the shopkeeper’s long-term self-interest to be
scrupulously honest with customers, even though in particular cases there might be a short-term
advantage to cheating some customers. Of course, if the same person had a business on a major
interstate highway and had very few repeat customers, it might be in his or her self-interest to
gouge them whenever possible, since they are unlikely to return or to otherwise negatively affect
subsequent business from other people.

Ethical egoism has been a topic of hot debate among philosophers for several decades,
and it has generated dozens of refutations and replies to such refutations. Yet one finds a curious
gap in the philosophical literature when one looks for strong statements of the initial reasons for
accepting ethical egoism. There is no shortage of arguments against objections to it, but it is as if
ethical egoists tend to believe that the initial commitment to ethical egoism is so obvious as not
to need justification. A further contributing factor may be the fact that some form of egoism is a
prevalent premise in areas such as economics, which begin with the assumption that all persons
are self-interested actors. Some ethical egoists advance an interesting argument in support of
their position. They claim that if everyone behaved as ethical egoists, the world overall would be
a better place. Many attempts to help other people, they suggest, are misguided and ineffective.
Each person is best suited to promote his or her own self-interest, since no one else is more
familiar with our own desires and needs, and no one else is more directly in a position to act in
the situation than your own. James Rachels, who supports this ethical egoism theory, in an essay
that takes as its title the theory's name mentioned that “Each of us is intimately familiar with our
own individual wants and needs. Moreover, each of us is uniquely placed to pursue those wants
and needs effectively. At the same time, we know the desires and needs of others only
imperfectly, and we are not well situated to pursue them. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe
that if we set out to be 'our brother's keeper,' we would often bungle the job and end up doing
more mischief than good.",

Besides that, some ethical egoists advance an intriguing claim in support of their position.
They argue that ethical egoism doesn’t really result in such radically different behavior as its
critics allege and that the egoist’s perspective actually provides a unifying reason for meeting all
the different obligations that we usually meet. For example, it is in our best-interest, they argue,
to tell the truth in the long run. People are more likely to trust us and this to our advantage. We
can gain more from a general policy of truthfulness than from one of deceit. This argument
depends on three crucial assumptions. First, it presupposes some nonexclusive version of
egoism. Exclusive egoists who consider only their own self-interest and leave no moral room for
the interests of other people are far less likely to act in ways that coincide with commonsense
morality or the requirements of other moral theories. To pursue actively the interests of others is
to be officious. We should mind our own business and allow others to mind theirs. Second, this
argument takes for granted that we will consider the long-term consequences characteristic of
rational egoism. Actions such as lying, cheating, or stealing may be justified in terms of short-
term consequences but not pass the test for long-term self-interest. The intriguing part of this
argument is that it suggests that there are frequently very good self-interested reasons for being
moral; reasons that all too often are overlooked by advocates of altruistically-oriented accounts
of morality.

Seen in this light, ethical egoism can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one
hand, ethical egoists will argue that this shows that ethical egoism can replace other, competing
accounts of morality and introduce into the moral life a single principle—self-interest—on which
all moral decisions can be based. On the other hand, critics of ethical egoism can look at the
same situation and argue instead that ethical egoism simply provides a second line of defense, as
it were, for being moral. When all other reasons fail to convince people, we can often point to
considerations of self-interest. In order to help decide which of these two approaches we should
assume, let’s now consider some of the major criticisms of ethical egoism. Several main lines of
criticism of ethical egoism have crystallized in recent years. They center on few questions which
critics pose to the ethical egoist such as does ethical egoism yield consistent advice about how
we should act? Is ethical egoism a morality that its adherents can proclaim publicly? Can ethical
egoists be good friends? Are ethical egoists morally insensitive?

A theory of ethics should set forth systematically the first principles of morality and show
us how to justify these principles. As a result, it will elucidate a conception of a life of excellence
for people. Therefore, the theory should be both consistent and complete. Consistence means
there should be no contradictions or incompatible statements while completeness means there
should be no moral truth which is not provable from the basic moral principles of the theory.
Consequently, the three ways to raise objections to an ethical theory is to show that the theory
is mistaken in truth, inconsistent or incomplete.

A number of critics of ethical egoism have argued that it is essentially flawed because it
yields contradictory commands about how we should act. Brian Medlin, for example, has argued
that in any given situation ethical egoists must seek to promote their own self-interest and yet at
the same time, if they are universal ethical egoists, they must will that everyone else also act to
promote their own self-interest. We have already seen the difficulty with this: often it is in my
self-interest for other people to act against their own self-interest. If I am a salesperson, for
example, it is usually in my best interest to have other people pay full price for my products,
even though it is not generally in their best interest to do so. If I am an ethical egoist, I seem
committed to ensure both that they pay full price and that they not pay full price. Ethical egoism,
in other words, is contradictory because it allows one and the same act to be evaluated as both
right and wrong. We have already seen Jesse Kalin’s reply to this objection. There is no more
inconsistency in ethical egoism, he argues, than there is in a hard-fought game of chess in which
each opponent wants to win but also wants the other person to play as good a game as possible.
This is an interesting reply, for it may let the ethical egoist off the hook on this charge, but it
does so in a way that gives us a deeper insight into the egoist’s world. Essentially, the world of
the ethical egoist is a deeply competitive world in which each person is pitted against everyone
else. It is hardly surprising that Kalin should appeal to examples from sports and other
competitive activities.
 In The Moral Point of View, Kurt Baier objects that ethical egoism provides no moral
basis for the resolution of conflicts of interest. For example, if you take the two men fighting for
the position, it is right for the first man to stop the second man from liquidating him because it is
in his best interest but at the same time it is wrong for him to stop the second man because it
goes against the second man's best interest. Ethical egoism states that everyone should lookout
for themselves. It is like a chess game in which one person has the opportunity to block the
others check, which is in his best interest, but on the other hand it is in the others best interest to
take the king. A moral theory should set principles in order to determine what actions are right
and what are wrong and from that be able to conclusively end an argument by having the parties
reach an agreement. Egoism theory fails to give guidance when people are facing conflicts.
When there is a conflict, all parties are always looking out for their own interests and the
conflicts never cease. Party that eventually comes out on top in any given conflict will always
have committed an act that is both morally right because he has reached his best interests and
morally wrong because of its effect on stopping the other parties from reaching their best
interests. A definition of what a moral theory should do must also be given. The one person has
to look out for his best interest by blocking the other while the other has to look out for his best
interest by taking the king. Of course in a chess game a compromise can never be reached. This
is what makes ethical egoism not a valid ethical theory. Ethical theories must be able to solve
disputes and reach compromises

The ethical egoist contends that her theory, in fact, has resolutions to the conflict. The
first resolution proceeds from a state of nature examination. If, in the wilderness, two people
simultaneously come across the only source of drinkable water a potential dilemma arises if both
make a simultaneous claim to it. With no recourse to arbitration they must either accept an equal
share of the water, which would comply with rational egoism. (In other words, it is in the interest
of both to share, for both may enjoy the water and each other’s company, and, if the water is
inexhaustible, neither can gain from monopolizing the source.) But a critic may maintain that this
solution is not necessarily in compliance with ethical egoism. Arguably, the critic continues, the
two have no possible resolution, and must, therefore, fight for the water. This is often the line
taken against egoism generally: that it results in insoluble conflict that implies, or necessitates a
resort to force by one or both of the parties concerned. For the critic, the proffered resolution is,
therefore, an acceptance of the ethical theory that “might is right;” that is, the critic maintains
that the resolution accepts that the stronger will take possession and thereby gain proprietary
rights.

A third conflict-resolution entails ethical egoist could logically pursue their interests at
the cost of others. The logical extrapolation is philosophically difficult (and, hence, intriguing)
because ethical egoism is the theory that the promotion of one’s own self-interest is in
accordance with morality: doing harm to another would be to accept the principle that doing
harm to another is ethical (that is, one would be equating “doing harm” with “one’s own best
interests”). In a typical example, a young person may see his greatest good in murdering his rich
uncle to inherit his millions. It is the rich uncle’s greatest good to continue enjoying his money,
as he sees fit. The nephew would be acting ethically by killing his uncle. Although it is facile to
argue that the greedy nephew does not have a right to claim his uncle’s money because it is not
his but his uncle’s, and to claim that it is wrong to act aggressively against the person of another
because that person has a legitimate right to live in peace (thus providing the substance of
conflict-resolution for ethical egoism) but the problem of expounding this theory lies in the
intellectual arguments that “I have a right to harm those who get in my way”.

In conclusion, ethical egoism engages in a philosophically more intriguing dialogue with

protractors. Normative egoists argue from various positions that an individual ought to pursue his
or her own interest. These may be summarized as follows: the individual is best placed to know
what defines that interest, or it is thoroughly the individual’s right to pursue that interest. The
latter is divided into two sub-arguments: either because it is the reasonable/rational course of
action, or because it is the best guarantee of maximizing social welfare. Egoists also stress that
the implication of critics’ condemnation of self-serving or self-motivating action is the call to
renounce freedom in favor of control by others, who then are empowered to choose on their
behalf. Egoists ironically can be read as moral and political egalitarians glorifying the dignity of
each and every person to pursue life as they see fit. Mistakes in securing the proper means and
appropriate ends will be made by individuals, but if they are morally responsible for their actions
they not only will bear the consequences but also the opportunity for adapting and learning.
When that responsibility is removed and individuals are exhorted to live for an alternative cause,
their incentive and joy in improving their own welfare is concomitantly diminished, which will,
for many egoists, ultimately foster an uncritical, unthinking mass of obedient bodies vulnerable
to political manipulation: when the ego is trammeled, so too is freedom ensnared, and without
freedom ethics is removed from individual to collective or government responsibility. Egoists
also reject the insight into personal motivation that others – whether they are psychological or
sociological “experts” – declare they possess, and which they may accordingly fine-tune or
encourage to “better ends.” The moral life is characterized by a plurality of value. Different
moral traditions keeping each other in check, each balancing out the influence and power of the
other two. We see at least three ways in which ethical egoist serves this function in regard to
other moral traditions. It pushes us to reflect on the ways in which our moral motives often
coincide with self-interest, to question whether our moral outlook gives sufficient weight to
legitimate self-interest, and to probe the extent to which we may be more responsible for our
lives than we thought. Ethical egoism helps to keep us honest with ourselves.