Private War: Objectivist Political Philosophy and the Privatization of Military Force

Author(s): Martin van Wetten

Source: The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies , December 2012, Vol. 12, No. 2 (December
2012), pp. 263-277
Published by: Penn State University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41717250

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Politics

Private War:
Objectivist Political Philosophy
and the Privatization of
Military Force

Martin van Wetten

1. Introduction
Recently James Pattison has raised questions about the ethical
justification of using private military forces in waging war. In two
separate articles, "Just War Theory and the Privatization of Military
Force" (2008) and "Deeper Objections to the Privatization of Military
Force" (2010), Pattison argues that using Private Military Forces (or
Private Military Companies [PMCs]) is ethically a very dubious
business if one tries to justify waging war.
Although the ethical concerns regarding PMCs are fascinating all
by themselves, I found it more relevant to discuss the issue in regard
to libertarianism generally and Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism,
specifically, which advocates laissez faire capitalism. So it should be
no surprise if libertarians such as Objectivists were eager to privatize
the armies to the last bullet, much to the horror of both the left and
the right (excluding anarcho-capitalists).
Yet the issue is hardly that straightforward. Objectivists generally
argue that the State should have a legal monopoly over the use of
force (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 178). Thus, such institutions as
the Military and the Police are separated from the market. It appears
though that the separation of the State and the Market would lead to
a ban on privatizing military force, much akin to what Pattison tries
to achieve in his article, though only so far as the ethical issues
regarding PMCs remain unresolved.
The issue of PMCs, however, remain unresolved as well, as far as

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 12, no. 2 (Issue 24, December 2012): 263-77.

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264 The Journal oj Ay n Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24)

Objectivism, and perhaps by extension other libertarian movements,

are concerned. While initially it may seem that Objectivism would
ban the privatization of military force, I will argue in this essay that
Objectivism would in fact accept the privatization of the military
business and is able to overcome the profit-motive and right intention
objections that Pattison lays out in his two articles. Since my
argument in favor of privatization of the military might lead some to
believe it will result in a form of anarchism, which Rand strongly
rejected, I will argue that the privatization of the military does not in
fact lead to such a conclusion. I will also raise the issue and possible
concerns of the threat of crony capitalism, of the State and the Market
becoming merged and consequently corrupted. My view is that the
employment of PMCs does not lead to such corruption.
In order to do that, I will first discuss the nature of the
Objectivist view of the State, which is grounded in a naturalist
conception of individual rights, which in turn is derived from ethical
and epistemological foundations. Subsequently, I will present
Pattison's main arguments against PMCs and how I think Objectivism
would answer the challenge that Pattison raises. I also reply to the
challenges of anarchism and crony capitalism.

2. The Objectivist State

2.1 Individual Rights
The base of Objectivist political philosophy is the concept of
individual rights, which "subordinate society to moral law" (165).
Moral law means that the society recognizes a fundamental moral
truth (170), which is the following: human beings lack an automatic
code of survival, therefore we need values and virtues to remain alive
(169). In other words, we need morals. Morals are therefore egoistic
in nature, because morals relate to the individual's quest for survival.
We must also be free to pursue these life-necessitating values
through our own effort. In order to do that, we need rights as the
means of protecting our freedom of effort, or more precisely, the
freedom of action (169). Only force wielded by other people can
hamper or destroy our ability to pursue our own survival, since the
pursuit requires the faculty of reason to grasp reality (Sciabarra 1995,
271), and therefore we need to be protected from violations of our
fundamental freedom of action. This is what Rand means when she

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 Wetten - Private War 265

says that rights subordinate society to a mora

precise, to a moral truth. Rights are thus def
"sanction of a positive ... of [a man's] freedom
judgment" (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 168)
I already established that human beings need
not have an automatic code of survival. In Rand's
lies the most important value of them all: reason
which requires freedom in order to functi
"designed to secure those conditions necessary
the most significant asset of human nature - the
and Rasmussen argue (169). Freedom is suc
importance of a free mind stems from the f
reason to be the tool of human survival (Sciab
which allows humans to discover the values they n
lead a proper life.
Reason is thus both a fundamental value and the means to

discover other values (such as purpose and self-esteem) and their

corresponding virtues (that is, rationality, productiveness and pride)
(243). In other words, if human beings need reason in order to
survive to discover the appropriate values and virtues for the
sustenance of human life, and reason cannot function under force,
then our freedom of action must be protected from initiations of
force. Thus, rights are required to protect our freedom to pursue our
own survival, and to pursue a life proper to human beings.
Unfortunately, the scope of this essay does not allow me to
explore what is proper to human beings or present further arguments
for the Objectivist view of individual rights, but I hope to have
covered some of the basic principles that are required to understand
an Objectivist view of the State, whose primary function is to use
force.

2.2 The Role of the State

Previously I presented the bottom line of Objectivist political
philosophy: individual rights and their connection to freedom and
force. Rights protect our freedom to act on our rational judgments.
Force banishes rational evaluation altogether. But the State, according
to Objectivism, is to protect individual rights by employing the
"retaliatory use of physical force" (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984,

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266 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24)

177). It seems like there is a contradiction if the concept of individual

rights bans the initiation of force in a society, but allocates the use of
force to the State.
A careful reading of the non-aggression principle that Objectivism
advocates (Sciabarra 1994, 274) says that the initiation of force is
prohibited. The State does not initiate force. Rather, it responds to
initiations of force that occur within its borders. If someone does
initiate the use of force, the victim has the right to self-defense. But
since individuals cannot be trusted to be objective and impartial
enough concerning violations of their own rights, the State is allocated
the use of retaliatory force and punishment. The State itself does not
have the right to self-defense, instead it acts as the agent for those who
do (Den Uyl and Rasmussen 1984, 178). The distinction of 'acting on
behalf and 'having the right to act' is important, because in Rand's
thinking, collectives are not entities that choose, act, think or do
anything that individuals do, therefore collectives do not have rights as
such (171). The State, as a collective, functions to protect individual
rights from initiations of force.

2.3 Force and the State

At the very heart of every war is the use of force. But what is
force, exactly? According to Rand, force is something that violates
our individual rights and dispels our freedom to think and (conse-
quendy) to act. Physical force concerns the violent deprivation of
another human being's freedom. But then, does this mean that, in the
context of war, the State should only protect individuals from
initiations of force that are already ongoing or occurred in the past?
Rand never discussed the ethics of war. The question remains open
for others to answer.
Den Uyl and Ramussen may have given the answer between the
lines, when they discuss Rand's conception of the nature of force.
For Rand also considered a breach of contract a form of force. Also
fraud and extortion function through force. But these three are
"indirect initiation [s] of force" (178; italics added). In the context of
war, the State may use preventive force, because intended and planned
future violations of individual rights are in the same way a kind of
indirect use of force, an intended btezch. of the contract of respecting
the rights of others, conceding that rights, including his or her own,

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 Wetten - Private War 267

have no validity in the rights-violator's mind. If

properly proved, for example, by discovering
large-scale attack, then the State can use force pr
Naturally, evidence on the intentions of an
always be easy to obtain, which might lead som
State should be allowed to initiate force with inconclusive evidence.
However, if we let inconclusive evidence be acceptable as the norm,
or we reserve it for "special cases" (which are difficult to define), then
any claims for due process of the law are banished (in principle),
opening the doors (theoretically) to a totalitarian state, which can
violate individual rights based on any "suspicion" of rights violations
it deems convenient for itself. The State's "right" to use force, then,
is rather restricted. But why should the State itself own the means
through which it retaliates? Why not privatize military force in an
anarchist fashion? Rand (1964) argues that anarchy "is a naive
floating abstraction" (112) and vehemendy rejects all of its forms. I
will proceed to address the issue and Rand's motivations for rejecting
the anarchist alternative.

2.4 Ranďs Rejection of the Anarchist Alternative

While Rand advocated private ownership in all economic spheres,
she did not extend such courtesy to the armed forces, the police or
the courts, or government in general. In other words, Rand rejected
anarchism as a viable alternative for organizing a society. Her
principled stance against anarchism is clearly expressed in the
following passage:

If a society provided no organized protection against force,

it would compel every citizen to go about armed, to turn his
home into a fortress, to shoot any strangers approaching his
door - or to join a protective gang of citizens who would fight
other gangs, formed for the same purpose, and thus bring
about the degeneration of that society into the chaos of gang-
rule, i.e., rule by brute force, into perpetual tribal warfare of
prehistorical savages. The use of physical force - even its
retaliatory use - cannot be left at the discretion of individual
citizens. Peaceful coexistence is impossible if a man has to
live under the constant threat of force to be unleashed

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268 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24)

against him by any of his neighbors at any moment. Whether

his neighbors' intentions are good or bad, whether their
judgment is rational or irrational, whether they are motivated
by a sense of justice or by ignorance or by prejudice or by
malice - the use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary
decision of another. (108; italics added)

In this passage, Rand offers the following argument against

anarchism: 1) anarchism lacks the proper organization of the use of
force rendering it 2) unobjective and arbitrary, which 3) leads to chaos
and gang-rule resulting in 4) the impossibility of protecting individual
rights. In the previous sections, I described the State's function to be
limited to the protection of individual rights. Such rights protect
individuals allowing them to sustain their own lives. According to
Rand, anarchism fails to achieve the State's main function, the
protection of individual rights.
Rand argues in the above passage that anarchism cannot sustain
objectivity in decisions regarding the use of retaliatory force. In other
words, anarchism's failure is rooted in its epistemological and
metaphysical assumptions about human beings, mainly that individu-
als are not capable of objectivity in matters regarding the use of force.
An anarchist society lacks, according to Rand, the "procedural
safeguards" (Binswanger 1988, 11) that the State has at its disposal.
Walter Block (2005, 231) argues that for Rand, "anarchy is a sort of
political and ethical chaos" in which "[a]nythinggoes" and "there can
be no legitimate rules without a government." All in all, anarchism
fails to protect individual rights from aggressors, therefore it should
be rejected. In many ways, Rand's argument against an anarchist
"state" with private armed forces is a defense of the minimal state, in
which the government employs its publicly owned, non-privatized
military and police forces to protect the rights of its citizens. In the
following section, I will present the main arguments Objectivism
would offer, in theory, against the privatization of military force and
subsequently Pattison's arguments against PMCs. I will then return
to discuss the issue of anarchism and potential arguments that my
view would result in anarchism or crony capitalism.

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 Wetten - Private War 269

3. Privatization of Military Force

3.1 The Acceptability of PMCs
Previously, I laid the groundwork for an Objec
of the State, individual rights, and the use of fo
essay is to discuss the problems that war and pri
impose on Objectivist political philosophy. By
legitimate state is in the Objectivist view, I laid t
what is the only legitimate use of force - the pr
rights. A just war (Jus ad bellum) then would be
State uses force to protect the individual rights
from a domestic threat or an attack from another state or a terrorist
group, etc. The important thing is that individual rights are either
about to be violated (with conclusive evidence) or presently being
violated.

But the important question remains. How should the State

protect its citizens from violations of individual rights? How should
it organize its armies and police forces? Perhaps like they are usually
organized: the State collects taxes (for Objectivism they have to be
voluntarily collected), then funds the army by recruiting soldiers,
training them, purchasing military equipment, etc. But there is a
complication in Objectivist and other libertarian philosophies, a
complication that rises from the following crucial premises (Rand
1964, 33): (1) The State and the Market are separated (the laissez-faire
principle); (2) The State has a legal monopoly over the use of force.
If the State and the Market are to be kept separate, then it would seem
that employing PMCs to perform the State's legitimate function of
protecting individual rights in war is at odds with the said premise
because it fuses the State and the Market. Similarly, if the State has a
legal monopoly over the use of force, then allowing PMCs to use
force would contradict the monopoly principle for which
Objectivism vouches. But both of these premises can be interpreted
in favor of employing PMCs.
I interpreted the use of PMCs by the State as constituting a fusion
of the State and the Market. But the interpretation of the word
"fusion" was more intuitive than specific. My view of the matter is
that fusion , or separation, of the State and the Market, in Objectivism
refer to the presence or absence of regulatory legislation and taxation.
By regulatory legislation, I understand Objectivism to refer to the

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270 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24)

passing of laws that directly affect the markets in some way, e.g.,
antitrust laws, government subsidies, etc. (Sciabarra 1995, 334). Such
cases are instances of fusion , whereas the employment of PMCs is an
instance of interaction between the State and the Market - if, and only
if, the state does not regulate their operation in the market. This does
not mean that PMCs operate in a state of lawlessness, because the
same legislation that protects people from violations of individual
rights applies to PMCs just as it applies to any other agent that
operates in the market. The first premise has now been dealt with and
it does not compel a negative verdict on the employment of PMCs.
We are left with the second premise, which dictates that the State
is the sole employer of force. But does it mean that if the State
employs a PMC to do batde that it loses its status as the sole exerciser
of force? The answer need not be positive. The State, if it uses
PMCs, remains the sole arbiter of what constitutes jus ad bellum (just
cause for war),y/¿r in bello (just means of warfare) and jus post bellum
(just ending of war), in addition to the sole entity that decides which
PMCs wage war, for how long and in what capacity. By analogy, I
would argue that the PMCs "use" force in the same manner that a
weapon fires a bullet, while the shooter has the "monopoly" over the
use of the weapon. Consequendy, the legal monopoly principle is still
satisfied when the State employs PMCs.
Even though using PMCs is thus acceptable in Objectivist
philosophy, it is unclear whether a State should use them. Pattison
argues that employing PMCs presents a multitude of ethical problems,
revealing a deep distrust toward them. Pattison is especially worried
how to keep the PMCs under control, in case their objectives differ
from that of the State. It is time to address these concerns.

3.2 Pattison's Ethical Concerns for PMCs

Pattison argues that PMCs pose multiple ethical problems. PMCs
lack the proper motives and intentions and there is a risk that PMCs
will pursue objectives that differ from the State's. According to
Pattison, financial gain is ethically dubious because such gain requires
inflicting harm on other people, even though the PMCs as enterprises
may have the right intention, that is, to fight a just war. But the
underlying motives seem troublesome to Pattison.1
The argument Pattison presents for the wrong motive concerns

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 Wetten - Private War 27 1

the ulterìor motive, such as financial gain. Patti

motive is "intrinsically problematic" (Pattison 2008
"in the context of war" (Pattison 2010, 10). He a
soldiers do not inherently possess the same motive
does not aim to make profit, but a PMC does,
soldier's motive is most likely to be high wage
wrong motive is the strongest if the private contr
PMC that is fighting in an unjust war, such as t
criminal organizations, for an immoral end. Pattiso
concerned that the profit motive is individualistic a
there are no limits to what one can do for money
The objections, in the end, concern motives
concedes that motives are of lesser importance t
still of some importance (147-48).
If intentions are of more importance, then
something ethically questionable about the int
Pattison's concerns are to carry some weight. Patti
that the intentions of PMCs may differ from the
since PMCs only answer to shareholders. The co
sign with the State are thus "unmonitored and a
and easy for PMCs to dismiss. PMCs might just
financial, and not just, causes. Pattison conclud
must possess the same just intentions that the S
State seems to run into more trouble than it can po
at least in the context of political philosophy. Patt
that the use of PMCs transfers the monopoly of usi
corporations. Additionally, private enterprises m
by contracting PMCs, possibly becoming a thr
whom the PMCs are supposed to protect (Pat
appears though as the employment of PMCs pose a
and ethical issues.

3.3 Objectivist Answers to Pattison's Concerns about PMCs

Private military companies pose ethical concerns, Pattison argues.
The first pertains to the right intention to wage war. Although not
strictly about intentions, the motivation behind the intention for a
private contractor to wage war is financial gain. Pattison clearly
professes a disdain for profit (or money), though he claims the

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272 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24)

money-making motive is immoral only in the context of war. The

negative evaluation of the profit motive obviously hits libertarians
hard, since libertarians, including Objectivists, advocate capitalism.
Yet, Objectivism would not accept the premise that financial gain is
evil in any context. As Rand (1961) put it:

So you think that money is the root of all evil? . . . Have you
ever asked what is the root of money? Money is a tool of
exchange, which can't exist unless there are goods produced
and men able to produce them. Money is the material shape
of the principle that men who wish to deal with one another
must deal by trade and give value for value. (88)

Rand clearly identifies money as a value, which embodies the

principle that people deal with each other by voluntary trade. Money
is not produced by exploitation, since it is produced by able men who
only exchange "value for value." Sciabarra discusses Rand's concep-
tion of money further, and notes that Rand considered money and
reason to be intimately linked: money is our tool of survival, since it
allows us to "purchase time for future production" (Sciabarra 1995,
290). Since Rand considered production to be the human means of
survival, money is the medium that allows individuals to buy time. In
the future, there might be times when we can produce too little to
survive; money thus enables us to accumulate the value necessary for
survival. Rand also considered reason to be the tool of human
survival. Money, for Rand, represents a multitude of things: reason,
production, and value.
Sciabarra points out that Rand did acknowledge instances in
which money can be evil: when it is obtained by force instead of
earned by productive work (290). But does war not mean that value
is obtained by force? PMCs are paid to inflict harm, after all, as
Pattison said. But the value (=money) for PMCs (or private contrac-
tors) is not expropriated from the people they must fight; the value
comes from the people who exchange value for the services the PMC
provides. Surely, the PMC operates so that inflicting harm is the
reason for people to pay for its services. But the relevant question is,
does it have a just cause to use force for financial gain? If the PMC
is acting as an agent of the State to protect the individual rights of

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 Wetten - Private War 273

innocent people against the violators of individu

fight for a just cause, and thus have forfeited the
is morally acceptable, and also honorable, to figh
as the motive power of its actions.
There is nothing intrinsically evil about the p
is not an acontextual fact either that obtaining m
War is a difficult enterprise for money-making
nature. But force is not acontextually evil, eithe
immoral, but initiation of force is. And if Rand i
profit is not evil at its root, but virtuous in nat
both the values necessary for human survival
virtues, such as productiveness.
Pattison's second concern was that the intentions of the State and

the intentions of PMCs might be at odds. PMCs may have alterna-

tive, corrupt intentions that contradict the principle of jus ad bellum.
Pattison calls for stricter regulation, but it is hardly necessary. Some
laws - to refrain from initiating force and to respect individual rights
- apply to PMCs as well. Pattison's concern that many PMCs have
not been held accountable for their crimes should not be taken lightly;
if a State fails to prosecute or investigate the activities of those PMCs
involved in performing its legitimate functions, the State's (or the
current government's) legitimacy itself becomes questionable. Indeed,
as Pattison concludes, the intentions of PMCs must be congruent
with the State's intentions. And Rand would maintain that a just
cause to inflict harm is necessary in the justification of the profit-
motive itself. The concerns Pattison raises about the privatization of
military force are not, however, the only issues Objectivism might
have with PMCs. Earlier, I discussed Rand's main argument against
such privatization, that it would lead to anarchism, a view Rand
rejected. Anarchism, however, is not the only objection that might be
raised. If the State decides to privatize its military forces by contract-
ing PMCs, is there a danger that this leads to crony capitalism, in
which contracts are won by PMCs closest to the government? How
can we ensure that the competition leads to government contracts
being granted through objective and impartial standards? I will now
proceed to discuss these issues.

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274 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24)

3.4 Anarchy, PMCs and the Aristocracy of Pull

In an earlier section, I presented Ranďs main arguments against
anarchism. Privatized military forces would lead to gang-rule, where
each gang has its own military forces and weapons fighting against
other gangs for power. However, Rand's argument is not really an
argument against competing PMCs. It is an argument against
competing governments, a form of competition that Rand considered
unacceptable (1964, 112). The privatization of military force is not
the same as privatising governments , because that would require the
judicial functions and rest of the government to be privatized as well.
When governments, courts and the military are all privatized, we have
a full-blown system of anarchy. I am not, however, suggesting such
a thing. It should be clear that privatizing military force alone is not
a sufficient condition for anarchy. Some might, however, argue that
once the military is privatized, courts and the rest will soon follow, for
what is a government that does not govern its military?
The employment of PMCs would not render a government
toothless, unless it contracted only one company to handle all of its
military operations. As long as there are multiple companies, none of
which is powerful enough to overthrow the other companies loyal to
the government, there is no threat of a coup or anarchy - and
consequently no threat that the government will lose control of the
privatized military. One might still argue that one or all of these
companies could turn against the government. I have no qualms with
admitting that it is possible. But I would like to ask, what exactly
stops military personnel employed by the State, such as generals, from
turning on their government? Absolutely nothing, except the
generals' belief that their job is to serve their country and that it would
be wrong to attempt a coup. But there are no better safeguards in
State-owned and -run militaries than in privately-owned ones. History
is filled with generals, and entire militaries, who have turned on their
governments. One must look no further back than the recent revolu-
tion in Egypt, in which the military turned on Mubarak's regime,
allowing the demonstrators to overthrow the government. If I am
required to provide some foolproof safeguards for keeping PMCs
loyal to the government, then so is any proponent of a State-run
military. History shows that there are no such foolproof safeguards.
Another issue that might be raised is the threat of crony capital-

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 Wetten - Private War 275

ism. If military operations are contracted to P

crony capitalism, or "the aristocracy of pull" (Ra
as Rand called it. "The aristocracy of pull" is a sy
with political pull [make] fortunes by means o
granted to them by the government" (Rand
contracts are given to those who have the best
tions to the government, the same way, in today
contracts of other kinds are handed to companies
to the government. Such a worry is, howeve
premature.
Government contracts can be distributed to PMCs by employing
a simple standard: the contract is won by the company that makes the
cheapest offer. Since the contents of the contract are the same to all,
the company that can produce the same results for the lowest cost to
the government will win the contract. Only if the PMC fails to meet
the terms of the contract, i.e., fails to provide the service it promised
(which is fraud), can the contract be terminated. And if a competing
company believes that the government gave the contract to someone
who did not make the cheapest offer, it can always sue the govern-
ment, just as in any other case of suspected fraud. Obviously, for this
to work, the companies' cost proposals must be public (even if the
specific operational details of the contract cannot be, for national
security reasons) so each company is able to dispute a government's
choice of a PMC. All in all, the standard of the lowest cost is
objectively verifiable and poses no threat of crony capitalism.
If empirical results show that the employment of PMCs leads to
anarchy or crony capitalism, in spite of theoretical predictions, we
have a case to argue that military forces should not be privatized. But
I cannot provide empirical assurances either way, for it is not possible
for me to make any such empirical tests. My argument, of course, is
not about whether a State should privatize military forces. My aim is
to show that there are no theoretical moral objections to doing this.
Only if empirical data shows otherwise, do Objectivists have a case to
reject the privatization of military force.

4. Conclusion
Privatization of military force will certainly become a more
prominent issue as the number of PMCs rises. The justification of

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276 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24)

PMCs is especially important to the United States, the only remaining

quasi-capitalist nation on the planet with a libertarian past. But will
libertarian arguments be used in the debate? It seems unlikely, since
very few people are willing to challenge the widely held premise that
money is evil. And it is profit that PMCs are motivated to accumulate
by taking part in a military enterprise. As we have seen, money is an
important factor in justifying the actions of PMCs as moral - along
with escaping the threat of anarchism and crony capitalism.
Objectivism provides the moral and political defense of a
libertarian state, which functions to protect individual rights. As long
as PMCs act in accordance with libertarian principles in a just war,
there is no reason not to employ PMCs, though the question of
whether we should do so remains a practical task of mapping effective-
ness against costs and benefits. These are more practical - rather than
ethical or political - undertakings.

Notes
1 . Pattison seems to assume that motives and intentions are distinct concepts,
though they need not be. To say that it is my intention to make money does not
differ much from saying that my motive is to make money. I suppose Pattison
considers intentions to be the agent's goals (such as peace) and motives (to do the
right thing) to be the agent's reasons for attempting to achieve the goal. In any
event, Pattison does not address this issue, so it is difficult to make definitive
statements about what he means when he uses the concept 'intention' or 'motive.'
2. Pattison later claims that the profit motive is questionable and morally wrong
in the context of war, but here he claims that the profit motive is also amoral. Since
these views contradict each other, it is possible that Pattison uses the concept
'amoral' in a negative way, so that to be amoral is to ignore morality (and thus be
evil). It is also possible that Pattison was unaware of the contradiction. Either way,
it is clear that his main argument is that the profit motive is inappropriate and
morally wrong in the context of war. The contradiction should, then, just be ignored
as a one-time mistake.
3. Pattison does not raise the issue of the State possessing the wrong intentions
or motives; in other words, whether it is inherently wrong for the State to wage war.
If PMCs are morally dubious, why not extend the same concern to States them-
selves? It is understandable, of course, because Pattison's articles concern only the
employment of PMCs, not the deep-rooted problematics of waging war to begin
with.

References
Binswanger, Harry. 1988. The Ayn Rand Lexicon. Online at: <http://aynrand
lexicon.com/lexicon/anarchism.html>.

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Block, Walter. 2005. The libertarian minimal state? A

Nozick, Levin, and Rand. In Philosophers of Capitalism :
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Den Uyl, Douglas J. and Douglas B. Rasmussen, eds. 1984. The Philosophic Thought
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Pattison, James. 2008. Just war theory and the privatization of military force. Ethics
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Philosophy 18, no. 4 (December): 425-47.

Sciabarra, Chris Matthew. 1995. Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical
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Rand, Ayn. [1957] 1996. Atlas Shrugged. 50th anniversary edition

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