List of Specific Motion Forms Included in Other Chapters

Form No. Nature of Form

                                         
Appellate Rule 3: Commencement of Appeal
                                         
Form No. AR3:10 Motion to Amend Notice of Appeal
Form No. AR3:11 Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction
Form No. AR3:12 Response to Appellant’s Motion to File Amended Notice of Appeal
Form No. AR3:20 Motion to Consolidate Appeals
                                         
Appellate Rule 4: Time Limits on Notice of Appeal
                                         
Form No. AR4:20 Motion to Extend Time for Appeal
Form No. AR4:21 Motion to Extend Time for Appeal on Grounds of Excusable Neglect—Counsel
Involved in Complex Litigation
Form No. AR4:22 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Extension of Time
                                         
Appellate Rule 7: Cost Bonds
                                         
Form No. AR7:10 Motion Making Objections to Cost Bond
Form No. AR7:11 Reply to Motion for Additional Security for Costs
Form No. AR7:12 Supporting Affidavit for Reply to Motion Seeking Additional Security
                                         
Appellate Rule 8: Stay on Appeal; Bonds
                                         
Form No. AR8:1 Motion for Approval of Bond in District Court
Form No. AR8:10 Motion for Stay of Judgment in Court of Appeals
Form No. AR8:30 Motion to Enforce Liability of Surety on Bond
                                         
Appellate Rule 9: Release of Prisoner Pending Appeal
                                         
Form No. AR9:10 Motion for Review of Post-Conviction Detention Order
Form No. AR9:11 Motion for Review of Post-Conviction Release Order
Form No. AR9:20 Application for Release Pending Appeal of Detention Order
                                         
Appellate Rule 10: Record on Appeal
                                         
Form No. AR10:9 Motion to Require Appellant to Include Additional Parts of Transcript
Form No. AR10:22 Motion to Settle Statement of Evidence
Form No. AR10:40 Motion to Settle Record—Inaccuracies in Transcript
Form No. AR10:43 Motion in District Court to Supplement or Correct Record on Appeal
Form No. AR10:45 Motion in Court of Appeals to Supplement or Correct Record on Appeal
                                         
Appellate Rule 11: Forward Record to Court of Appeals
                                         
Form No AR11:2 Motion for Retention of Record in District Court for Use in Preparing Briefs
Form No. AR11:20 Request to Transmit Record Needed for Appellate Motion
                                         
Appellate Rule 15: Review or Enforcement of Administrative Orders and Decisions
                                         
Form No. AR15:20 Motion to Dismiss Petition for Review
Form No. AR15:21 Motion to Transfer Petition for Review
Form No. AR15:70 Motion to Intervene—General Form
Form No. AR15:71 Motion to Intervene—Review of FCC Order
Form No. AR15:72 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Intervene—Review of FCC Order
Form No. AR15:73 Motion to Intervene—Review of NLRB Order
Form No. AR15:74 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Intervene—Review of NLRB Order
Form No. AR15:75 Motion to Intervene—Review of Federal Reserve Order
                                         
Appellate Rule 16: Record on Review of Administrative Orders
                                         
Form No. AR16:1 Motion to Correct Omissions in Record
                                         
Appellate Rule 17: Filing of Record on Review of Administrative Order
                                         
Form No. AR17:30 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Brief Because Certified List Delayed
Form No. AR17:31 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Enlargement of Time
                                         
Appellate Rule 18: Stay of Administrative Orders Pending Review
                                         
Form No. AR18:1 Motion for Stay of Judgment in Court of Appeals
                                         
Appellate Rule 20: Application of Federal Rules to Review Proceedings
                                         
Form No. AR20:1 Motion for Extension of Time [to Correct Record]
Form No. AR20:10 Affidavit in Support of Motion to File Oversized Joint Brief
Form No. AR20:11 Motion to File Amicus Curiae Brief
Form No. AR20:12 Affidavit in Support of Motion to File Amicus Curiae Brief
Form No. AR20:22 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Supplement Joint Appendix
Form No. AR20:51 Affidavit in Support of Motion to File Late Bill of Costs
                                         
Appellate Rule 22: Habeas Corpus and Section 2255 Proceedings
                                         
Form No. AR22:10 Official Form—Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence by a Person in
Federal Custody (Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255)
Form No. AR22:40 Motion for Permission to File a Second Petition for Habeas Corpus—General Form
Form No. AR22:41 Motion for Permission to File a Second Section 2255 Motion—General Form
Form No. AR22:42 Example of Court-Supplied Form for Motion for Permission to File Second Habeas
Corpus Petition or Section 2255 Motion—1st Circuit
Form No. AR22:43 Example of Court-Supplied Form for Motion for Permission to File Second Habeas
Corpus Petition or Section 2255 Motion—4th Circuit
Form No. AR22:44 Example of Court-Supplied Form for Motion for Permission to File Second Habeas
Corpus Petition or Section 2255 Motion—9th Circuit
                                         
Appellate Rule 24: Proceedings in Forma Pauperis
                                         
Form No. AR24:1 Official Form 4—Affidavit Accompanying Motion for Permission to Appeal in Forma
Pauperis
Form No. AR24:2 District Court Motion for Permission to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
Form No. AR24:3 Renewed Motion in Court of Appeals to Appeal in Forma Pauperis
Form No. AR24:4 Court of Appeals Motion for Permission to Proceed with Review of Administrative Order
in Forma Pauperis
                                         
Appellate Rule 26: Time Limits
                                         
Form No. AR26:1 Motion for Extension of Time—Skeletal Form
                                         
Appellate Rule 29: Amicus Curiae Briefs
                                         
Form No. AR29:1 Motion to File Amicus Brief
Form No. AR29:2 Motion for Leave to File Amicus Brief and Statement of Interest
Form No. AR29:3 Affidavit in Support of Motion to File Amicus Brief
                                         
Appellate Rule 30: Appendix to Briefs
                                         
Form No. AR30:20 Motion for Filing of Supplemental Appendix
Form No. AR 30:22 Motion for Appeal on Original Record, Without Appendix
                                         
Appellate Rule 31: Filing and Service of Briefs
                                         
Form No. AR31:1 Motion for Extension of Time to File Brief
Form No. AR31:2 Motion to File Late Brief
Form No. AR31:10 Motion to Limit Number of Copies of Brief That Must Be Filed
Form No. AR31:11 Motion to File Only Ten Copies of Brief
                                         
Appellate Rule 32: Form of Briefs and Other Papers
                                         
Form No. AR32:10 Motion for Leave to File Oversized Brief
Form No. AR32:11 Affidavit in Support of Motion to File Oversized Brief
                                         
Appellate Rule 34: Oral Argument
                                         
Form No. AR34:2 Motion to Waive Oral Argument
Form No. AR34:3 Motion to Postpone Oral Argument
Form No. AR34:4 Motion for Additional Time on Oral Argument
                                         
Appellate Rule 37: Interest on Judgment
                                         
Form No. AR37:1 Motion to Recall Mandate
                                         
Appellate Rule 38: Frivolous Appeals
                                         
Form No. AR38:1 Motion for Double Costs and Attorney’s Fees—Frivolous Appeal
                                         
Appellate Rule 40: Motion for Rehearing
                                         
Form No. AR40:10 Motion for Enlargement of Time to File Petition for Panel Rehearing
Form No. AR40:11 Opposition to Motion for Enlargement of Time
                                         
Appellate Rule 41: Mandate
                                         
Form No. AR41:1 Motion for Expedited Issuance of Mandate
Form No. AR41:10 Motion for Stay of Mandate
Form No. AR41:11 Opposition to Motion for Stay of Mandate
                                         
Appellate Rule 42: Voluntary Dismissal
                                         
Form No. AR42:20 Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Appeal
                                         
Appellate Rule 43: Substitution of Parties
                                         
Form No. AR43:1 Motion for Substitution—Deceased Party
                                         
Appellate Rule 46: Attorneys
                                         
Form No. AR46:3 Request for Permission to Argue Appeal Pro Hac Vice
After determining that the elements of the offense potentially state a particularly serious crime, "all reliable
information may be considered in making a particularly serious crime determination, including the
conviction records{2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 8} and sentencing information, as well as other information
outside the confines of a record of conviction." In re N-- A-- M--, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 342

***No one as a saying in the geographical territory of his birth. There isn't a better way to express citizenry
than the contribution in the economic growth of a country one is endebted to. Is being born in a foreign
country a lese magesty or the pecuniary inability to afford justice? Victim of a labyrinthine process
supposedly crafted to "protect the lowly", but in reality, malicously engineered for those that can afford
Justice

INA ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS

To answer that question, we first must decide what analytical framework to apply. The Supreme Court has
provided three potential frameworks for us to consider: the "categorical approach," the "modified
categorical approach" and the "circumstance-specific approach." United States v. Price, 777 F.3d 700,
704 (4th Cir. 2015).

categorical approach

Under the categorical approach, we look to the statutory definition of the state crime to determine whether
the criminalized conduct falls within the definition of "sex offense" under SORNA. See United States v.
Battle, 927 F.3d 160, 164 (4th Cir. 2019). In doing so, we are "bound by the interpretation of such offense
articulated by that state's courts." United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 684 (4th Cir. 2017). This
analysis "focus[es] on the minimum conduct required to sustain a conviction for the state crime," United
States v. Doctor, 842 F.3d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks{2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 8}
omitted), but such conduct "must give rise to a 'realistic probability, not a theoretical probability' that a
state would apply the law and uphold a conviction based on such conduct." Battle, 927 F.3d at 165
(quoting Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 185 L. Ed. 2d 727 (2013)). We must
find that the elements of the statute of conviction are "the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic
offense in order to find a categorical match." Price, 777 F.3d at 704.

With our analytical framework determined, we now analyze whether a South Carolina voyeurism
conviction is a "sex offense" under SORNA. In doing so, we ask whether the minimum conduct required
to violate the voyeurism statute is the same as, or narrower than, the minimum conduct required by
SORNA's definition of "sex offense." If it is, the district court did not err in denying the motion. If it is not,
Helton's motion to dismiss should have been granted.

(rejecting evidentiary limitations on sources to which the court can look under the circumstance-
specific approach). Therefore, we conclude that the Board properly held that Reid is removable.
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 41, (2009).

Petitioner Zavala did not contest the IJ's finding with respect to his domestic relationship with
his victim. The BIA, adopting the circumstance-specific approach, concluded that the IJ proper-
ly found that Hernandez-Zavala's conviction constituted a "crime of domestic violence," render-
ing him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. Hernandez-Zavala v. Lynch, 806 F.3d
259, 263 (2015).
statute
the fact that there already exist

Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407 (1991)

(`` 'In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language,
but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy' '')

In City of Arlington v. FCC, the United States Supreme court stated that if the intent of Con-
gress is clear in enacting a statute or law, it must be given the courts and agencies. See City of
Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.1863, 1868 (2013).

8- The express enactment of a neighboring statute (M.G.L.c.258E) governing incidents among

acquaintances, strangers and friends is self-evident of M.G.L.c.209A's legislative purpose, and
compatible with the District court of this Circuit's decision in Doe v. Wlliston (and other cases cited
there-in), stating that "...construing [a statute] to conflict with [another statute] is a disfavored me-
thod of construction; conflicts of this kind are to be avoided if possible... .The Legislature is pre-
sumed to be aware of existing statutes when it amends a statute or enacts a new one. See Doe v.
Williston, 766 F.Supp. 2d 310, 313; Charland v. Muzi Motors Inc., 417 Mass.580, 582-583, 631 N.
E.2d 555 (1994).

...a court may "disregard a stipulation if to accept it would be manifestly unjust or if the evidence
contrary to the stipulation is substantial." PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120,
123 (2d Cir. 1984).

(...courts always avoid interpreting a statute in a manner that renders any section of a statute superfluous,
insignificant, or void. United States v. Ramírez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (1st Cir. 1996)
(quotingUnited States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 301 n. 14, 92 S. Ct. 471, 476 n. 14, 30 L. Ed. 2d
457 (1971).

The charging documents, police reports and every other reliable materials related to this incident clearly
established that the incident in question--predicate of the removal proceedings--was not domestic in
nature, thus the issuance of a domestic restraining order (209A) was inapropriate because there already
exist a statute (258E) governing incidents between strangers, acquaintances or friends. For instance,
when the reporting police asked the alleged victim about her relationships with the Petitioner in case, she
replied: were "just friends" and "roommates" for 1 day "approximately 3 weeks ago". In Smith v.
Mastalerz, the Supreme Judicial court of Massachusetts dismissed a civil harassment (258E) order
obtained by the plaintiff against her former roommate because there was "insufficient evidence to support
the issuance of the harassment prevention orders. Smith v. Mastalerz, 467 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2014); See
also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258E (258E).

4BR***Had the Legislators of Massachusetts wished to include strangers, acquaintances or friends

without any familiar relationships whatsoever (such as simple roommates) as "household members" in a
roomming-house arrangement based on a financial convenience among other factors, they could have
easily done so by simply employing more inclusive terms such as any persons or all persons "who are
residing or have resided together in the same household", as peviously done in other statute in the " as
"household members", they could have easily done so by simply saying that "Family or household
members” should mean "all person(s) who" are or have been residing together in the same household,
as it has previously done in other statutes. For instance: Art.II § 1 c.5: No Person except a natural born
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible
to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States;

4BR***The charging document and sentencing-related materials had clearly established that the incident
that engendered the improperly issued restraining order was civil in nature, not domestic. There is no way
we can classify strangers, acquaintances or friends in a rooming-house arrangement (roommates) as
"household members" while there already exist another statute (MGLc.258E) governing incidents
between roommates in Mastelerz

For instance in Nijhawan, the phrase "involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims
exceeds $ 10,000.", qualifies his crime as a agravated felony (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) for removal
purposes. See Nijhawan v. A. G of United States, 523 F.3d 387 at 393 (3rd Cir. 2008).

The Goverment misread Abshatko and Medina-Jimenez. The scopes of the decisions in both
cases is limited to the "conducts" and "portions" that constituting the violation of domestic abuse
the prevention orders. Not the family or family-like relationships or elements necessary to qualify a
prevention order as domestic nature. In massachusetts, not every prevention orders are domestic
in nature.

in practical terms, “both the specific circumstances surrounding an alien’s violation and what a court has
‘determined’ regarding that violation may be established through any reliable evidence. Matter of
Obshatko, 27 I&N Dec. at 176 (2017) citing Matter of H. Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749, 753 (BIA 2016).

Rudolf Strydom

Rudolf Strydom, a South African with LPR status in the United States, was served in April 2010 with an
order granting his wife protection from abuse pending a hearing. Little more than a week later, he was
convicted of violating the no-contact provision of the order (Kansas Statutes Annotated § 21-3843) and
harassing by telephone (KSA § 21-4113(a)(2)). DHS charged him with being removable under INA §
237(a)(2)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), which covers protection orders against ``credible threats of
violence, repeated harassment, or bodily injury to the person or persons for whom the protection order
was issued.'' He argued that his attempt to make a phone call to his wife's home was not a deportable
offense. The IJ disagreed. Strydom appealed.

The BIA (Grant, Malphrus, Mullane; opinion by Mullane) observed that the conviction did not specify
which subsection of § 21-3843 applied, and that some would and some would not fall under § 237(a)(2)
(E)(ii). Accordingly, the BIA used the modified categorical approach and held that § 21-3843(a)(1) was the
relevant provision. The BIA then rejected Strydom's claim that mere violation of a ``no-contact'' provision
would not be a deportable offense. It explained that the temporary relief order would not have been
issued without ``an abusive incident'' or ``an immediate danger of physical abuse.'' Furthermore, it
considered that the no-contact order is an ``important form of protection'' with the ``primary purpose'' of
protecting an offender's domestic-abuse victims. Citing two Ninth Circuit decisions as support, the BIA
agreed with the IJ.

Cespedes v. Lynch, 805 F.3d 1274, 1277 (2015), As Strydom pointed out, the circuit "court emphasized
that there was no requirement in [§1227(a)(2)(E)(ii)] that the respondent actually had engaged in violent,
threatening, or harassing behavior, noting that it only requires a violation of the portion of a protection
order that involves protection against credible threats of such conduct." Strydom, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 510-
11

Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2009) (an injunction against telephoning a
domestic partner in the context of a domestic violence protective order “ ‘involves protection against’
violence, threats, or harassment, even if it is possible that the [offender’s] violative conduct did not
independently constitute violence, threats, or harassment”);

Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, U.S. App. LEXIS 29210 1, 20-21 (9th Cir. 2019), The BIA's interpretation in
Obshatko and Medina-Jimenez is reasonable and consistent with the statute. The BIA reasonably read §
1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) as focusing on the alien's "conduct" and the "portion" of the protection order that was
violated.

The modified categorical approach entails scrutiny of the nature of the conviction itself and those
elements that the jury necessarily found through an examination of judicial record evidence

Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995), 582 ("We consider the elements or nature of a crime as
defined by the relevant statute, not the actual conduct that led to the conviction."); Goldeshtein, 8 F.3d at
647.

Gonzalez-Alvarado v. INS, 39 F.3d 245, 246 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that in deciding whether an alien's
conviction defines a crime of [ ], ``we consider the elements or nature of a crime as defined by the
relevant statute'').

Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440 (6th Cir. 2016) ("[B]ecause deportation strips a non-citizen of his rights,
statutes that impose this penalty are subject to vagueness challenges under the Fifth Amendment.").

Vurdugo-moraless v. Sessions, 719 Fed. Appx. 507, 514, 515 (2018)...domestic relationships as defined
by "the domestic or family violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or
unit of local government."

Vurdugo-moraless v. Sessions, 719 Fed. Appx. 507, 514 (2018) A law is impermissibly vague if "it fails to
give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [if it is] so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement." Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358,
103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983)).

People v. Holifield, 205 Cal. App. 3d 993, 252 Cal.Rptr. 729, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("We do think that
section 273.5 requires something more than a platonic, rooming-house arrangement.")).

Vurdugo-moraless v. Sessions, 719 Fed. Appx. 507, 512 (2018) "crime of domestic violence" means any
crime of violence against a person committed by a current or former spouse of the person, by an
individual with whom the person shares a child in common, by an individual who is cohabiting with or has
cohabited with the person as a spouse, by an individual similarly situated to a spouse of the person under
the domestic or family violence laws of the jurisdiction where the offense occurs, or by any other
individual against a person who is protected from that individual's acts under the domestic or family
violence laws of the United States or any State, Indian tribal government, or unit of local government.8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

The methodology this circuit and others follow in order to determine whether a conviction constitutes a
predicate offense for deportation purposes is well-established. When possible, we apply the
"categorical" approach, "looking only to the statutory definition[] of the prior offense." Taylor, 495
U.S. at 600. However, when it is not clear from the statutory definition of the prior offense whether that
offense constitutes a removable offense under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), we apply a "modified" categorical
approach under which we may look beyond the language of the statute to a narrow, specified set of
documents that are part of the record of conviction, including "the indictment, the judgment of conviction,
jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, or the transcript from the plea proceedings." See United States v.
Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). We do not, however, look beyond the
record of conviction itself to the particular facts underlying the conviction. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
Accordingly, when the documents that we may consult under the "modified" approach are insufficient to
establish that{2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18} the offense the petitioner committed qualifies as a basis for
removal under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i), we are compelled to hold that the government has not met its
burden of proving that the conduct of which the defendant was convicted constitutes a predicate offense,
and the conviction may not be used as a basis {371 F.3d 621} for removal. See United States v. Franklin,
235 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000).
The charging documents, police reports and every other reliable materials associted to the incident that
engender the improperly issued the domestic abuse prevention order (c. 209A) clearly show the Petitioner
and the alleged victim that the root cause of the cancerous protective order is not domestic in nature but
civil between acquaintances governed by an already existing statute, to wit, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 258E.
in question--predicate of the removal proceedings--was not domestic in nature, thus the issuance of a
domestic restraining order (209A) was inapropriate because there already exist a statute (258E)
governing incidents between strangers, acquaintances or friends. For instance, when the reporting police
asked the alleged victim about her relationships with the Petitioner in case, she replied: were "just friends"
and "roommates" for 1 day "approximately 3 weeks ago". In Smith v. Mastalerz, the Supreme Judicial
court of Massachusetts dismissed a civil harassment (258E) order obtained by the plaintiff against her
former roommate because there was "insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the harassment
prevention orders. Smith v. Mastalerz, 467 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2014); See also Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
258E (258E).

Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 29210 5, 20-21The BIA's interpretation in Obshatko and
Medina-Jimenez is reasonable and consistent with the statute. The BIA reasonably read § 1227(a)(2)(E)
(ii) as focusing on the alien's "conduct" and the "portion" of the protection order that was violated. While a
conviction may underlie the charge, whether the alien has been "convicted" is not the critical question of §
1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Instead, the statutory provision focuses on what the state court found about the alien's
conduct. The BIA's two-step inquiry for determining whether an alien is ineligible for cancellation of
removal based on a violation of a protection order is consistent with the statutory language and is a
reasonable interpretation: whether the alien has been "convicted" as defined by{2019 U.S. App. LEXIS
21} § 1101(a)(48)(A); and whether a state court found that the alien's "offense" involves conduct
described under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii). Accordingly, the BIA's interpretation is a rational, permissible
construction of the statute.

(..."at the hearing, the government called as a witness the crime victim to testify as to the nature
of her prior relationship with Tokatly.") Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 616 (2004).

To support its fallacious decision,

the Government (once again) cited In re Abshatko and In re Medina-Jimenez.

The decisions of the cases that the Board relied on to refuse and which decisions'
scope is limited to the conducts that constitute the violation of the prevention orders

The IJ took it up on himself to challenge the Petitioner's legal argument instead letting the agency's
lawyer doing it.
*** The BIA repeated the IJ's decision verbatim without any supporting legal authority.

8- The express enactment of a neighboring statute (M.G.L.c.258E) governing incidents among

acquaintances, strangers and friends is self-evident of M.G.L.c.209A's legislative purpose, and
compatible with the District court of this Circuit's decision in Doe v. Wlliston (and other cases cited
there-in), stating that "...construing [a statute] to conflict with [another statute] is a disfavored me-
thod of construction; conflicts of this kind are to be avoided if possible... .The Legislature is pre-
sumed to be aware of existing statutes when it amends a statute or enacts a new one. See Doe v.
Williston, 766 F.Supp. 2d 310, 313; Charland v. Muzi Motors Inc., 417 Mass.580, 582-583, 631 N.

Statutory interpretation begins with an analysis of the statute's language. Mallard v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, [490] U.S. [296]. 490 U.S. 296, 109 S. Ct. 1814, 104 L. Ed. 2d
318 (1989); Timber Company v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685, 105 S. Ct. 2297, 2301, 85 L. Ed. 2d 692
(1985). If the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent, there is no need to inquire beyond the plain
language of the statute. United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., [489] U.S. [235], 489 U.S. 235, 109
S. Ct. 1026, 103 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1989). If the language is clear, "the sole function of the court is toenforce
it according to its terms." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S. Ct. 192, 194, 61 L. Ed. 442
(1917). This rule is conclusive "except in rare cases where the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters." Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, {135 B.R.
65} Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S. Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982). In such a rare situation
where the statute appears to contravene intent or conflict with other statutes, courts must adopt "a
restrictive rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words." Id.

Turner v. Lewis, 434 Mass. 331, 334-336 ;749 N.E.2d 122, 125-126 (2001) Violence brought on by, or
exacerbated by, familial relationships was the "mischief or imperfection to be remedied" by c. 209A.
Adoption of Derrick, supra at 444, quoting Telesetsky v. Wight, supra at 872. Moreover, c. 209A has
always reflected "[a] significant decision by the legislature . . . to broaden the definition of persons eligible
to seek protection from abuse and domestic violence beyond the 'family' and to also include other
persons having some 'family-like' connection." C.P. Kindregan, Jr., & M.L. Inker, Family Law and Practice,
supra at § 57.5.
Our conclusion is supported by sound public policy. We take judicial notice of the social reality that the
concept of "family" is varied and evolving and that, as a result, different types of {434 Mass. 335} "family"
members will be forced into potentially unwanted contact with one another. The recent increases in both
single parent and grandparent headed households are two examples of this trend.
With respect to the increase in single parent headed households, "children under age [eighteen] are
considerably more likely to be living with only one parent today than two decades ago." Marital Status and
Living Arrangements: March 1994, Bureau of the Census, United States Department of Commerce (Feb.
1996). See Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March 1998 (Update) Bureau of the Census (Dec.
1998) (between 1970 and 1998, proportion of children under age of eighteen years living with single
parent grew from twelve per cent to 27.7 per cent). "High levels of divorce and postponement of first
marriage are among the changes that have reshaped the living arrangements of children and adults since
the 1970's." Id. In the majority of these cases, women are the head of the household. Id. (eighty-four per
cent of children who lived with single parent in 1998 lived with mother). The often contentious nature of
custody arrangements necessitates the protection of these single parents through legislation like G.L. c.
209A.

Turner v. Lewis, 434 Mass. 331, 334 ;749 N.E.2d 122, 124 (2001) The "main object to be accomplished"
by c. 209A, Champagne v. Champagne, supra at 326, was the prevention of violence in the family setting.
Violence brought on by, or exacerbated by, familial relationships was the "mischief or imperfection to be
remedied" by c. 209A. Adoption of Derrick, supra at 444, quoting Telesetsky v. Wight, supra at 872.
Moreover, c. 209A has always reflected "[a] significant decision by the legislature . . . to broaden the
definition of persons eligible to seek protection from abuse and domestic violence beyond the 'family' and
to also include other persons having some 'family-like' connection." C.P. Kindregan, Jr., & M.L. Inker,
Family Law and Practice, supra at § 57.5.

Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines the word household as follows:

Noun: Persons who dwell together as a family. Arthur v Morgan, 112 US 495, 499, 28 L Ed 825,
5 S Ct 241. A family residing together in one dwelling, using common living quarters and facilities
under such domestic arrangements and circumstances as create a single family unit or establish-
ment. Anno: 88 ALR2d 923. A family relation of a character both permanent and domestic,not that
of persons abiding together as strangers or mere boarders. Robbins v Bangor Railway & Electric
Co. 100 Me 496, 62 A 136. Quite the same as "family" for the purpose of the exclusion, in a policy
of automobile theft insurance, of "theft" by a member of insured's "household."Anno:48 ALR2d 93.
Adjective: Pertaining to or belonging to the house or family. AUTHORITY: Rydstrom v Queen Ins.
Co. 137 Md 349, 112 A 586, 14 ALR 212, 214. ( Quoting Ballentine's Law Dictionary 3rd Edition).

To succeed on a claim of judicial bias, a petitioner must "overcome a presumption of honesty and
integrity in those serving as adjudicators." Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43
L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975). A judge's remarks or opinions will not demonstrate bias unless they "reveal
such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible." Liteky v. U-
nited States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994).
In the absence of any evidence of some extrajudicial source of bias or partiality, neither adverse
rulings nor impatient remarks are generally sufficient to overcome the presumption of judicial inte-
grity, even if those remarks are "critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties,
or their cases." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. at 555

***Had the Legislators of Massachusetts wished to include strangers, acquaintances or friends without
any familiar relationships whatsoever (such as simple roommates) as "household members" in a
roomming-house arrangement based on a financial convenience among other factors, they could have
easily done so by simply employing more inclusive terms such as any persons or all persons "who are
residing or have resided together in the same household", as peviously done in other statute in the " as
"household members", they could have easily done so by simply saying that "Family or household
members” should mean "all person(s) who" are or have been residing together in the same household,
as it has previously done in other statutes. For instance: Art.II § 1 c.5: No Person except a natural born
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible
to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States;

14
Chapter 234A Office of Jury Commissioner for the Commonwealth

§ 3. Selection of Jurors; Discrimination; Exemptions.

Juror service in the participating counties shall be a duty which every person who qualifies under this
chapter shall perform when selected. All persons selected for juror service on grand and trial juries shall
be selected at random from the population of the judicial district in which they reside. All persons shall
have equal opportunity to be considered for juror service. All persons shall serve as jurors when selected
and summoned for that purpose except as hereinafter provided. No person shall be exempted or
excluded from serving as a grand or trial juror because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
economic status, or occupation. Physically handicapped persons shall serve except where the court finds
such service is not feasible. The court shall strictly enforce the provisions of this section.
HISTORY:
1982, 298, § 1.

***In re Fostolo (2015), n.9-11 :9 Chapter 209A, the Abuse Prevention Statute is one of a number of
statutes concerning domestic relations. Virtually all aspects of domestic relations in Massachusetts are
governed by chapters 207 through 210 of the General Laws of Massachusetts. These chapters deal with
marriage, divorce, real and personal property relations between husband and wife, abuse prevention,
child custody jurisdiction, children born out of wedlock, and adoption of children.

MOTION TO RELATE CASE TO

Petitioner (or "Mr.Tabia") pro se, respectfully moves this Honorable Court persuant to its

broad discretionary authority, and the appropriate Federal Court Rule(s) or Precedure(s),to conso-

lidate this instant petition with the former (No.19-11823-ADB),previously decided by the Honorable

Judge Burrough. Said consolidation is in the best interest of this Court, because it prevents an un-

duly and burdensome duplication of labor, as well as expenses.

and

most likely to expenses very acquainted to the precedural history according to the appropriate
Federal Court Rule(s) or precedure(s) permitting the consolidation the two cases for being fully

acquainted to The actions concern substantially the same parties, property, transaction or event; and
(2) It appears likely that there will be an unduly burdensome duplication of labor and expense or
conflicting results if the cases are conducted before different Judges.