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Constructing A Sociology For An Icon of Aesthetic Modernity - Olympia Revisited (Robert W. Witkin)
Constructing A Sociology For An Icon of Aesthetic Modernity - Olympia Revisited (Robert W. Witkin)
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ROBERT W. WITKIN
Sociologists of art have usually been reluctant to confront the challenge to socio
thought offered by art history. This reluctance has stemmed, in part, from a d
distance sociological inquiry from direct contact with art objects themselves. Unde
ably, the sociologist is nervous about straying onto territory occupied by art sp
with few methodological resources or justifications. Theodor Adorno could roam f
the territory of music specialists, but his cultural capital as a musician and compo
so considerable that few would seriously challenge his credentials for analyzing
work even when they did not agree with the analysis. Lacking such claims to sp
expertise, many sociologists opt for a sociology of art that does not require them
too far into the territory of the artwork. The sociology of art exemplified by H
Becker's (1982) Art Worlds has encouraged sociologists to pursue fruitful inquiri
the production and reception of art works in a way that circumvents critical ques
interpretation, style, and meaning in works of art, questions that arise more in the
of the grand version of continental European art history (see Witkin 1995, chap. 1
are positive reasons for this: art worlds really are legitimate territories for soci
inquiry. They provide a basis for making a genuine and distinctly sociological cont
*Address all correspondence to the author at Department of Sociology, University of Exeter, Amory
Rennes Drive, Exeter EX4 4RJ, England; email rwwitkin@exeter.ac.uk. An earlier version of this
given at the 1995 ASA meetings in Washington, DC. I am grateful to Judy Balfe for her constructive an
comments, both at the conference and in subsequent correspondence.
to the study of the arts and they have proved fertile ground for a va
studies that map an interface between the institutional and organization
tic production and the ideational, for example Diana Crane (1987), Paul
and Vera Zolberg (1996) If I join those seeking to theorize artworks fr
point of view, I do so in the belief that such a project is consistent with
to the aims of sociologists theorizing art worlds.
The correspondence between what occurs in paintings, or in artwor
what is happening in society has been central to what might be termed
art work (Witkin 1995). Arnold Hauser ( 1991 ) attempted (as did Wilhelm
before him) to reduce art to an opposition between formalized, geometri
naturalistic (in my terms "perceptual-realist") art. Hauser identified the
eties governed in accordance with aristocratic, hieratic, or authoritarian
latter with urban societies that have developed middle classes, commer
ture, and a heightened individualism. His thesis is epic in scale but too c
tionism to appeal to many art historians (Gombrich 1978). Hauser's app
with the more subtle methods of Michael Baxandall (1988) in tracing t
between social practices in fifteenth-century Italy-preaching, gauging,
contracts-and developments in painting. Equally restrained in its theo
Alpers (1983) work on the "art of describing" in Dutch painting, an ar
linked to definite developments in intellectual practices, scientific disco
and which she contrasts with the "narrative tradition" of Renaissance It
taken up by Martin Jay (1988), in his thoughtful paper "Scopic Regimes
that discusses the semiotic implications of both the visual models suggested by Alpers
together with a third model, that of the (baroque) imagery that he labels (following Chris-
tine Buci-Glucksmann) (1986) "la folie de voir" and which he sees as a "scopic regime"
particularly (but not exclusively) in evidence in modernity.
Inevitably, a (semiotic) sociology of the artwork must be judged by its success in con-
necting what goes on in artworks to social formation generally. In his essay, "Image, Dis-
course, Power," Norman Bryson (1983) asks how it is possible to connect two sets of facts
those, for example, indicating innovations in the iconography of poverty in English and French
painting of the late eighteenth century-a move from the depiction of outdoor labor to th
interiority of the laborer's dwelling and the leisure spaces of hearth and tavern-and thos
facts that indicate contemporaneous structural changes in the economy of labor and in th
family. Bryson insists that the coincidence between representational practices and social struc
ture cannot be simply a case of the one causing the other; the representation of poverty h
to be seen as an evolving structure modifying according to laws operative within its own au
tonomous provenance. "The problem is one of understanding the articulation of a technic
process against the history of social formation, of charting one material evolution in the spher
of practice against its reflection and refraction in a further domain of practice" (1983:134
For Bryson, the acts of transgression against visual convention may not be caused by changes
at the level of social formation but they are ultimately accountable to such changes. He ar
gues that a painting such as Manet's Olympia belongs among those images that have bee
constructed "in severance from the social body" (1983:148). The fate of all such images i
bound up with their connection or lack of connection to social formation. Unless they artic
ulate their local acts of transgression with the major movements and activities within the so-
cial formation they are ineffective ("insignificant"):
I am particularly indebted to the following sources: Hamilton 1969, Sandblad 1954, Reff
Hanson 1979, and Bataille 1955.
suous coherence and continuity at the level of action, is central to a discourse of values.
Values such as "freedom," "truth," or "honor" ultimately refer to qualities of social being.
Although it may well be the case in a so-called "traditional" or "simple" society that a
fully integral relationship may exist between motive and value structures-a weapon or a
pot may belong in different discourses, may be, for example, both an object of practical
utility and at the same time an aesthetically or religiously significant object-in so-called
individuated bourgeois societies, motive and value structures are more or less discrete and
the relations between them problematical. This disjunction manifests itself in all the major
social divisions in such societies, most noticeably, for example, in those of class and
gender. In Weber's distinction between class and status, class is described in terms of a
shared relationship to the market and as involving potential association for instrumental
purposes; status, on the other hand, refers to solidary structures, to genuine "communities"
whose members identify with one another on the basis of a shared mode of being or way
of life.
In pre-modern and early capitalist societies, a close identity was maintained between
class and status (instrumental and solidary) relations. Traditionally, however, that identity
was acknowledged to exist primarily for those at the top of the hierarchy, that is, for higher
social classes who could imagine that their instrumental relations were permeated with
value (the so-called higher motives), that they were "significant." Such significance was
deemed to be a "worthy" subject matter for art. The instrumental relations of the lower
social orders were not seen as permeated by value in this sense, were not therefore signif-
icant or worthy as subject matter for works of art. Hierarchy has often been associated
with a claim by higher social groups to manifest or embody value, and for such groups to
attribute to lower social groups a tendency to be governed by "calculation" and "motive."
The characteristic preference for the everyday and prosaic life in modernist works of art is
an inversion that tacitly acknowledges this claim.
In modern societies, the world of work and organizations has predominantly been seen
as instrumental and motive-driven while the domestic sphere, centered on interpersonal
and family relations, has been viewed as solidary and value-governed. The dichotomy
was, traditionally, a gendered one, with the man, as homo economicus, at the center of an
instrumental order-a motive-structure-and the woman at the center of the socio-
emotional order-a value-structure. At an ideological level, the disjoined parts are put
together as two halves of a reality that somehow adds up. In political life, for example, the
pursuit of selfish or egoistic interests as homo economicus can be thought of as tran-
scended through the dialectical mediation of those interests by the altruism of the family
and of family life. This is essentially the linkage that Hegel uses as a basis of his political
philosophy in the The Philosophy of Right (Avineri 1972) where he establishes an oppo-
sition between the egoistic interests of civil society and the altruism of the family, an
opposition that he sees as synthesized and transcended in the modern state. In his Trans-
formation of the Public Sphere, Habermas (1992) offers his own version of this linkage
between the domestic sphere-the free community of love in which the woman is a
centerpiece-and the political economy dominated by men:
there. The goddess that makes him whole-like the supine figure of the
promises the impossible, the reconciliation of value and motive, of the
the solidary, of communitas and egoism. Such a reconciliation is a f
society in which the discourse of motives has become predominant and
really sought is the instrumentalization of values, something that is tant
guishing the discourse of values altogether. The crisis that occurred in pa
the time Manet painted Olympia-a crisis insightfully discussed by T. J
The Painting of Modern Life-can be seen as reflecting the inauthentic re
cultural configuration to the bourgeois society developing in the middle
century. Manet's Olympia proffers a radical deconstruction of that cultu
as an acknowledgement of its illusory character and as a disclosure of its
instrumentalization of value. In and through the act of disclosure, how
distances itself in the best tradition of "romantic irony"; such disclosure
and of itself, a moment of spiritual resistance.
The instrumentalization of value is ideologically reinforced and form
logical analysis itself. Although the recognition of the alienation and sub
sensuous domain was central to the sociologist's understanding of mode
understanding that bore the imprint of that same rational and instrume
Sociological understanding was, so to speak, a consequence of that d
instrumental reason recognizing itself and recognizing the sensuous dom
other. In that same moment of recognition, however, sociology, as instru
appropriated the sensuous domain, instrumentalizing it by assigning to a
rational tasks within the division of labor and making "affective instrum
ing socio-emotional needs) complementary and subordinate to its "effecti
ity" (solving tasks in the object world). The sensuous life was thus reduce
means-end rationality that characterizes the instrumental life, with the con
the satisfaction of personal needs constituting the ends. By contrast, t
cance of cultural modernism was its resistance to the instrumentalization of the sensuous
life and of solidary relations and its resolute pursuit of a discourse of values.
PRESENTATIONAL CODES
OLYMPIA'S MODERNISM
Manet
L'Olympia
Mus6e d'Orsay
? Photo R.M.N.
There is, however, a different type of explanation-one that Clark's work (in
does not entertain: flatness in painting can be seen as answering to a "semiotic
2 "Whether the simplified tonal structure of Olympia ... imitates similar effects in contempora
taken in strong sunlight or brilliant artificial light is less certain" (Reff 1976:79).
We might note here that the sociology of Goffman also aims at analysis that liberates
the "natural" condition of social subjects, that probes their social construction, their self-
composing. At the heart of all this constructive work we catch a glimpse of his earnest
performers, working so hard to make it all happen. What we glimpse is that evanescent
being, that fugitive being, already in the process of passing beyond one of its appearances,
to which Baudelaire (1964) alludes in The Painter of Modern Life.
In the Renaissance perceptual-realist traditions, art aimed at an identity of inner (sub-
jective) being and outer (objective) form. The ideal, expressed by Leon Battista Alberti
(1966), was that the gestures and movements of depicted bodies would express or convey
emotions; the dialectic of "inner" and "outer" thus became central to painting. Moreover,
subjectivity, extending beyond the immediate situation, comprehended the historical or
biographical development of the individual as well as the historical evolution of the social
totality that emerged from the interactions among individuals. Thus, the ideal of subject-
object identity is but an expression of a social process, of social relations in which there is
an identity between part and whole, between the individual subject and society. The social
totality is, therefore, presupposed in the actions of individuals, and their interactions with
others construct that totality as the project of an historical narrative or drama. Such a
process corresponds to the ideal of a bourgeois class in its "heroic" entrepreneurial phase
(see Witkin 1995, chap. 5; Hauser 1991).
A part-whole/inner-outer identity can best be constructed in and through a simulation
of the volumetric world of natural perception, not because we experience a need to be
amazed by likeness to that world but because the bodies and objects of natural perception
are possessed of mass and interiority and it is this which fits them semiotically for the
symbolic construction of the dialectics of inner/outer and, therefore, for the construction
of part-whole identity (see Witkin 1995, chap. 3). In a Vermeer painting of a woman
pouring milk or weighing gold or reading a letter, the attention and flow of thought that
animates the figure presupposes a unitary and integral subjectivity that is one with the
objects it animates. The more that such an identity between subject and object obtains,
albeit ideal-typically, the more does it demand the construction of depth and interiority in
depicted forms.
What then is different about the world of the modernist painters? The ans
the growing disparity between whole and part, between society and the
constitute it. Without this identity, the sensuous being of the subject, m
junct networks of the modern metropolis, is fragmented among a varie
contexts that are no longer continuous, that no longer add up. Each of t
furnishes the subject with a self, a "being"; the subject now becomes a "h
for a multiplicity of Goffmanian facet-beings. In the contemplative attitud
subject does not doubt itself, is not fragmented, does not deconstruct it
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OLYMPIA REVISITED 113
JAPANESE TECHNIQUE
5 Manet has actually altered the direction of gaze in both the depictions in order to turn them toward Zola.
6 Sandblad 1954:82; see also his discussion of another of Manet's paintings, La Chanteuse des Rues.
7 This is not the only source of parodic reference. Another obvious one is Goya's Maja.
pursue that source here. However, to do so would not affect my argument; it would only am
Baudelaire had commented on the charming indecency of thinness: "Thinness is more bare, more indecent
than fatness" (Baudelaire, Charles, 1952, Vol. 2:58).
9 This line is from a long poem by his friend, Zacharie Astruc; Manet inscribed the first stanza on the frame o
the picture.
The "game" of prostitution was well understood in Manet's day. The class background
those drawn into the "profession" was more or less obvious as were the conditions, esta
lishments, and venues in which prostitutes plied their trade. For a sophisticated Parisia
the 1860s, the prostitute and the courtesan had their allotted place in the endless circu
tion of sights, meanings, and money values that made up the modern metropolis. Wh
would it mean "to make all this visible"-how would one do so? The problem is that of t
fundamental categories into which social life is poured, categories such as social class,
marriage, gender, the family, and so forth. At the level of functional and means-end r
tions, such categories are "hard-edged" in the sense of having more or less clear boun
aries in respect to their functional relations and differentiation from other categories.
making all this visible were truly the goal of painting, then there would be a basis f
agreeing with many Marxist aestheticians who have advanced the claims of realist sty
of art over modernisms (Lukacs 1963).
The growing autonomy of subjectivity, of art, and of culture creation, its disembedding
(as culture creation) from the sphere of instrumental relations, widens the compass of cu
tural resources available to the subject through which the fundamental tensions of the sen
suous life seek resolution. Of course, class, gender, domination, power, and exploitation ar
involved in the process of culture creation and in the invasive appropriations through whic
the socially dominant seek to resolve the tensions and reinforce the spiritual claims of a re
deeming sphere of purely personal relations in their own lives. An art that discloses all thi
that makes this process of culture construction-of categorial invasiveness and appropriation
visible, together with the contradictory forms of social-being involved in it, would have t
be a polysemic, syntactically unstable art of paradox and irony-a modernism.
I would argue that Manet's Olympia offended the bourgeois critics of his day because o
its modernist vision. It is equally possible, however, to see the offense to bourgeois sen
sibilities as having been caused despite and not because of the painting's modernism. Th
is a view that would seem ideally suited to a Marxist reading of the painting. The reasonin
is as follows: For many Marxist aestheticians (Lukacs 1963), a Marxist account of social
relations and social life, of the drama of class conflict and exploitation, is one for which
"realist" sensibility appears to be both integral and necessary. The grand historical narra-
tive in classical Marxism is one in which concrete and absolutely particular individuals
contributing, through their interactional relations with others, to the historical develop-
ment of a society are, at the same time, absolutely typical of that society-in-the-making
The organic interconnectedness of individuals in the making of a society, their historicity
appears to demand for its depiction a realist art, since the latter is suited to depicting bot
the interaction of individuals and the organic drama of part-whole identity (Witkin 1995
From this point of view, modernism, which undermines historical construction and sub
verts and fragments objects and individuals, is seen as being unsuited to the task of truth
fully depicting reality. It is accused of succumbing to the pathology of capitalism, of
indulging alienation. It has been especially true of what one might term "official Marxism
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118 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
apparent than real, an artifact of Clark's own project that leads him into a reading that aims
at snatching a realist project from the jaws of Manet's modernism. Modernism appears to
many Marxist critics to have withdrawn from all the hard classifications that constitute the
social realities of which these theorists are certain. At the heart of modern society we
confront the hard truths of social classes and relations of exploitation, the great engines of
capitalism, and so forth. The challenge that confronts the artist is, in this view, to realize a
truthful depiction of these "hard-edged" truths. Modernism, it is argued, has led art into
subjectivism and formalism, into the vagueries of a shifting and unstable set of paradoxes:
"It [modernist art] prefers the unfinished, the syntactically unstable, the semantically mal-
formed. It produces and savours discrepancy in what it shows and how it shows it, since
the highest wisdom is knowing that things and pictures do not add up" (Clark 1995:12).
Clark applauds the depiction of class in the painting; but if the paint
depicting class it is probably not class in the hard-edged sense in whic
that is, class as a determined location within the social body; it is much
painting depicts the constitutive dynamics of class, that is, class as c
itive "rational" and "historical" construction of the world is the grou
version of Marxist criticism and the critical consciousness of bourgeoi
time, to whom Olympia appeared genuinely incomprehensible. In the p
class relations, the prostitute exemplifies exploitative relations at the
and gender. However, the negative dialectics of modernist art, in its
constitutive dynamics of experience, discovers the juxtaposition of m
social categories, with all the accompanying sense of invasion and pos
the dream rather than waking reality is the model.
In the dream, objects, relations, and events that could not belong to
time or space in real life are often confounded. " Objects can be strange
and something else altogether. The distinction of here and now, ther
forth, vanishes and what makes no objective sense is somehow fraugh
import. Freud (1973) labelled this division between two types of consciousness-
sensuous id consciousness and realistic ego consciousness-as primary process and sec-
ondary process, respectively. There are precursors of such a principle. Hegel (1977) begins
his Phenomenology by positing for consciousness an original state of sensuous certainty
that is marked by a complete undifferentiation. More recently, and acknowledging Freud,
Ulric Neisser (1967, chap. 11), in his book Cognitive Psychology, had recourse in his
account of the cognitive processing of information to this same distinction between an
undifferentiating awareness that knows no distinction between this and that or now and
then and a differentiating awareness. Among writers on the arts, Anton Ehrenzweig (1967)
made this distinction central in his analysis of the creative process. He claims that the
duality reaches into the very process of reception, arguing that superior listening, in the
case of complex polyphonic music, for example, is listening with an undifferentiating
mind, as opposed to listening with a mind that taps out the dominant rhythm or melody
line.
Dedifferentiation as a process is ironogenic. Its quintessential form is that of the para-
dox. Rend Magritte was a master of this aspect of the modernist subversive project (Gablik
1970). Through ludic reversals and transformations, the undifferentiating subject discloses
itself as a distancing, a deconstructing of the forms of experience. Deconstruction presup-
There is a tension here for which the game of prostitution is one kind of resolution.
classless courtesan simulates the sacralized power of the bourgeois feminine only to fa
itate its desacralization, its displacement from a discourse of values and of love to a
course of motives and desire, that is, to bring its erotic potential into the world of exch
values and market transactions. The game of prostitution draws its reality from the v
marriage relation of which it is held to be the antithesis. The game has its origin in
tension generated there. The respectable and the disreputable possess one another, th
marriage bed of the goddess and the couch of the whore are one.
Finally, the courtesan's simulation of the sacralized erotic of the bourgeois feminine
demands the concealment of class. Manet's deliberate confounding of the signs of the
lower-class whore and the classless courtesan in the body of Olympia discovers this con-
cealment. The suffering and injuries of class-the signs of sickness, tiredness, and
depravity-are there in the proffered body of Olympia. The bourgeois feminine conjures
the disreputable out of the respectable, bodily sickness out of bodily health, the lower-
class whore out of the upper-class woman, the desacralizing game of prostitution out of
sacralizing bourgeois marriage bond.
Olympia distances herself in the very process by which she arranges her nudity. A
Clark himself notes, the observer has some difficulty in establishing a point of view fr
which to relate to the painting. Olympia is in command, here. There is an element of ro
play demanded of the observer. As she arranges herself for the encounter, we are pos
tioned in the place that the prospective client would occupy. Her stare is cool and frank
makes no pretense to identify with the game to be played out with the "india rubber" bo
the pliable and "informe" body, ready to assume whatever shape or condition that is requi
of it. The body is offered, its spiritual centre is withdrawn-inviolate-from the use that
to be made of the body. That withdrawal is an act of self-possession; not so the body of
client who is engaged in a more or less futile attempt to resolve the contradictions of a
politics of intimacy, of a sacralizing and desacralizing of woman that has its origin in th
bourgeois marriage bed. This last reversal, which brings the working-class whore into t
commanding position, which assimilates the construction of the bourgeois feminine to t
self-possession of Olympia in the game of prostitution, raises the ironogenic structure
the work to a new level. The powerless, in self-possession, possesses, constructs, and act
The powerful is possessed, constructed, and acted upon.
There is something about these last reversals that suggests a Christian theme. Ther
were only two paintings exhibited by Manet at that exhibition. The other painting, actua
exhibited together with Olympia, was Christ Insulted by the Soldiers. Was there a conne
tion between the two? Is the whore, receiving the tribute of flowers wrapped in (new
paper, some kind of echo of the insulted Christ who identified with whores and sinners?
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OLYMPIA REVISITED 123
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