International Journal of Intelligence and

CounterIntelligence

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Designing Intelligence

Darren Tromblay & Richard Podulka

To cite this article: Darren Tromblay & Richard Podulka (2020): Designing Intelligence,
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.1781465

Published online: 17 Aug 2020.

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International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 0: 1–22, 2020
# 2020 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0885-0607 print/1521-0561 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2020.1781465

DARREN TROMBLAY AND RICHARD PODULKA

Designing Intelligence

The aesthetics of an intelligence service are essential to supporting the work

that its people do. Intelligence collectors (i.e., “spies”) are the most
recognizable denizens of this world, but it is also a realm to which analysis
gives continuity and depth. Creating an environment optimal for analysis is
consistent with Intelligence Community Directive 203, “Analytic Standards,”
which the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
promulgated in early 2015. Analysis and collection are complementary

Darren E. Tromblay has served as an Intelligence Analyst with the U.S.

government for 15 years. He is the author of several books, including
Political Influence Operations and Spying: Assessing US Domestic
Intelligence Since 9/11. Mr. Tromblay holds an M.A. from the Elliott
School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and an
M.S. from the National Defense Intelligence College, and a B.A. from the
University of California. The views expressed in this article are entirely his
own and do not reflect the views of any U.S. government agency. The author
can be contacted at tromblay@gwmail.gwu.edu
Richard Podulka is a professional architect experienced in all aspects of the
practice, from client development to post-construction evaluation. He was
resident Architect at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts,
and served as a design manager for facility renovations at the Washington
Navy Yard. Mr. Podulka received his degree in architecture from the Case
Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. tromblay@gwmail.gwu.edu
Editor’s Note: This is the second article on intelligence and architecture by
these authors. The first article appeared in 2019: “Bricks and Mortar:
Architecture and U.S. Domestic Security,” International Journal of
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 770–780.

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2 DARREN TROMBLAY AND RICHARD PODULKA

functions, which means that aesthetics must facilitate the integration of these
two fields at the agency level. Furthermore, the U.S. Intelligence Community
(IC)—sixteen agencies plus the ODNI—must grapple with integration:
specifically finding a common point of reference, in order to encourage the
creation of an all-too absent—as the 9/11 Commission Report highlighted—
ethos of seamless collaboration.1 Finally, the IC must consider the esthetic it
presents to its clients—both the decisionmakers it serves and the broader
American public—in order to instill confidence among those to whom the IC
is accountable. By examining multiple agencies with intentional and
unintentional place-making, this article provides insights that will assist in
understanding a neglected factor in understanding how agencies evolved and
assessing their future development.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE AESTHETICS

Intelligence service personnel do not exist in a vacuum. They are part of a
physical agency and interact with their surroundings, which may be
conducive, neutral, or at cross-purposes with the work for which personnel
are responsible. Environment is a critical component to effective operations. It
affects basic functionality and also the mindset of its personnel. Those
surroundings are the manifestation of an agency’s esthetic—the “place-
making” for which successive leaders, through their individual choices, are
responsible. Although an agency reflects an aggregation of sometimes-
divergent decisions and a succession of dissimilar leaders (e.g., Allen Dulles
as opposed to Stansfield Turner) an esthetic—however unintended—emerges
from the ingredients.
The fundamental value of any physical space is whether it supports and
enhances the human activities within that space. The functions of various
spaces are carefully considered when designing new or renovating old. In
general, these areas are considered as public, private, service, and storage.
Factors that contribute to an overarching esthetic can be placed into two
broad categories. First, there are ambient factors—those elements that do not
call attention to themselves but contribute to the environment (e.g., color,
shape of space). Second, there are artifacts—those items consciously featured
to call a visitor’s or occupant’s attention to a specific idea.

WHERE TO THINK INTELLIGENTLY ABOUT INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence agencies have grappled to varying extents with how to create an
environment that will be conducive to analytic thinking. The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) acknowledged this when planning the artwork for
its New Headquarters Building. Its Fine Arts Commission (FAC) developed
a statement of principles for this endeavor that stated,

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People are the principal resource of the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA). It is their intellectual and physical energies that ultimately
provide the national policymakers with superior information and
analyses—the basis to formulate policies necessary to maintain this
country’s position in the world. An aesthetically pleasing work
environment at its Headquarters (HQ) is an important stimulus to the
efforts of those officers assigned here.2

This statement indicates that at least one U.S. intelligence service believed
aesthetics were meant to be something more than simply pretty pictures.
Focusing on aesthetics is complementary to other efforts directed at
ensuring rigor in analytic work. Intelligence Community Directive [ICD] 203,
“Analytic Standards,” which the ODNI published in 2015, is meant to
“articulate the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence,
integrity and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices.”3
Addressing questions of IC aesthetics dovetails with ICD 203. Aesthetics
provide the context for all of the mental processes that ICD 203 discusses—
they are an unacknowledged variable that can impact mindsets of those
responsible for analytic thinking. Four ambient factors—space, temperature,
color, and noise—have distinct implications for cognitive outcomes.
Some architects have worked to provide a format of identifiable
parameters for designing aspects of the environment. Christopher
Alexander’s Pattern 190, Ceiling Height Variety,4 states “A building in which
the ceiling heights are all the same is virtually incapable of making people
comfortable.” After a lengthy analysis and discussion, a solution is laid out.
“Vary ceiling heights continuously throughout the building, especially
between rooms which open into each other, so that the relative intimacy of
different spaces can be felt. In particular, make ceilings high in rooms which
are public or meant for large gatherings lower in rooms for smaller
gatherings and very low in rooms or alcoves for one or two people.” The
format defines criteria and rationale use to create a specific physical
arrangement.
Joan Meyers-Levy and Juliet Zhu studied how different ceiling heights
affect cognitive skills. The Myers-Levy and Zhu study5 concludes ceiling
height is one of the top three architectural details that influence consumers’
psychological well-being. Prompted by significant anecdotal information,
they set out to determine how various ceiling heights affect mental processes.
A relatively high ceiling activated freedom-related concepts, and this resulted
in enhanced recall clustering, which is an established indicator of relational
processing. Participants who completed the study in a high- versus low-
ceiling room appeared to rely predominantly on relational elaboration and
therefore identified more dimensions shared by a number of rather dissimilar
items and exhibited a greater degree of abstraction in the dimensions they

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identified and sorted these items into fewer and thus more inclusive
subgroups per dimension. In contrast, a lower ceiling primed confinement-
related concepts. This enhanced the average number of items recalled per
cued category, a memory measure that is a known indicator of item-specific
processing. High ceilings support relational processing; low ceilings support
item-specific processing.
Room temperature has its own influence. If the task requires precision,
cool temperatures are important. Warmer temperatures support complex
tasks. “A higher temperature usually activates affective processing because
heat depletes resources, or the amount of cognitive energy one has, so you
only process a subset of information and you go with your gut feeling.”6
Color also affects cognitive task performance. “Red enhances performance
on a detail-oriented task whereas blue enhances performance on a creative
task.”7 It is acknowledged that these colors can have previous associations
[red ¼ femininity, blue ¼ sadness], which may influence an outcome, but the
association here is with cognitive tasks. Although color does “not affect the
amount of processing … it affected the quality of responses, i.e., red led to
superior performances on detailed-oriented tasks and blue, on
creative tasks.”8
It is interesting that color was an early driver of the CIA’s FAC. The
Agency, in May 1962, finished its move to a new Headquarters Building in
Langley, Virginia.9 Occupants found the interior to be less than satisfactory.
Walls, partitions, and doors were all painted gray and most of the flooring
was gray as well. An internal Agency assessment of environmental conditions
assessed this as having a “depressing effect upon the employees.”10 In 1963,
the CIA’s executive director, Lyman Kirkpatrick, announced the
establishment of the FAC, which, among other early orders of business,
would review and make recommendations for an integrated plan for
changing the HQ color scheme.11
Finally, noise levels have impacts that go beyond introducing distraction.
Zhu has pointed out that 70 to 80 decibels of background noise facilitates
creative thinking.12 “Creativity is all about generating distant associations to
the current stimulus and, therefore, generating novel insights.” “Disfluency”
created by noise allows you to temporarily move away from the present task
and you start to “mind wander.” The term “disfluency” here is interesting as
it leads to a more serene mental process. Defined by Merriam-Webster as a
pathology of an involuntary disruption in the flow of speech. … Zhu
moderates the term with the characterization of “mind wander.” The
suggestion is that certain unconscious linking yields what some consider the
“ah-ha” moment. These revelations often happen to designers as well as in
the judgments derived by analysts.

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Backgrounds for Breakthroughs

Beyond simply creating similarities in spaces that can further enhance
consistency of analysis, aesthetics can spark innovative thinking. The 9/11
Commission took the U.S. national security enterprise to task for a “failure
of imagination.”13 Although ICD 203 has attempted to remedy this—as well
as the unfounded assumptions that led the United States into Iraq—by
mandating the consideration of alternative analyses.14
Multiple accounts of innovative thinkers highlight the power of place in
facilitating the emergence of the breakthrough, nonconformist ideas that the
9/11 Commission found lacking in the IC. Mozart, in an often-quoted
letter, wrote:

When I feel well and in a good humor, or when I am taking a drive or

walking after a good meal, or in the night when I cannot sleep,
thoughts crowd into my mind as easily as you could wish. Whence and
how do they come? I do not know and I have nothing to do with it.
Those which please me, I keep in my head and hum them.15

According to cognitive psychologist Robert Sternberg, “[W]e don’t have to

devote much conscious effort to the act of walking, our attention is free to
wander—to overlay the world before us with a parade of images from the
mind’s theatre. This is precisely the kind of mental state that studies have
linked to innovative ideas and strokes of insight.”16
Fredrich August von Kekule reported his discovery of the ring structure of
benzene while dozing in front of a fireplace after spending days thinking
about the problem. In discussions of this incident, two points are
emphasized.17 First, Kekule was dreaming, which points again to the
difference between creative thinking and ordinary conscious thinking.
Second, Kekule used a visual analogy in order to solve his problem. He
represented the strings of atoms as snakes, and then one of them bit its tail.
Thus, the use of remote analogy (snakes are far removed from atoms) points
to still another difference between creative thinking18 Finally, Albert Einstein
used a space—albeit figurative rather than literal—to contemplate physics. In
a thought experiment, when he was sixteen years old, Einstein imagined
riding on one light wave and looking at another light wave moving parallel to
him.19 This ultimately led to the theory of relativity.
When developing its FAC, the CIA did not go far enough in tying
intelligence to the aesthetics in which personnel conducted their work and,
instead, allowed people to design spaces, rather than creating spaces that
facilitated thinking. According to Lyman Kirkpatrick, the CIA’s executive
director (the position with which the FAC consulted), nominees should have
“willingness and desire to contribute time and attention to the work of the
Commission”; “interest and capability in artistic expression”; and “a fine

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judgement in discerning art form.”20 The FAC also missed an opportunity to

steer the development of an intelligence esthetic. Instead, it viewed its role as
permitting a consensus to emerge The FAC believed that the gradual
decentralization of good taste was essential as institutions grew.21
Additionally, the FAC recognized that it was “difficult if not impossible to
achieve the improvement of environment by management edict” and
therefore “sought to exercise its influence through the education and
involvement of individual members of the Agency.”22 Finally, the FAC
indicated that it saw one of its purposes as being the “stimulation of
employee interest in improving the appearance of office space through the
use of paintings, prints, sculpture, and other appropriate objects.”23
However, simply encouraging individuals to follow decorative trends does
not enhance the workspace’s contribution to intellectual activity if the trends
are not linked to a productive esthetic.

Fostering Integration across an Agency

The individual thinking that the aesthetics of light, color, space, and noise
facilitate is of limited use in a collaborative enterprise such as a complex
intelligence service. Agencies such as the CIA and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) employ both analysts and intelligence collectors (e.g., case
officers and special agents, respectively). In addition to the different functions
of personnel, the expansive nature of agencies’ mission sets makes cohering
around a common identity and working effectively in a complementary
fashion difficult. For instance, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
aggregated 22 different agencies, more than 15 years later, striving to achieve
a unity of effort; even the FBI, although much smaller, addresses issues
ranging from catching bank robbers to thwarting foreign governments’
intelligence activities.
Interestingly, although the CIA had established a FAC in 1963 that was
integral to acquiring an impressive collection of works, the FAC—for the
first several decades of its existence—seemed to steer clear of historical
works. For instance, in 1974, the FAC determined that the development of
CIA “in-house” displays were almost entirely outside of its purview.24
However, in 1989, the FAC noted a proposal for the establishment of an art
collection that “capture[d] at least the flavor of the CIA’s activities and
accomplishments.” The FAC indicated that the reaction, at FAC meetings
and elsewhere, to the proposal had been very positive.25 According to the
FAC, an operational art collection would help to remedy the lack of
anything within the Agency’s environment or culture that gave the staff—
most of whom had only contributed to specific aspects of the CIA—exposure
to the “rich background” of the Agency writ large.26 Establishment of this
collection, in the FAC’s assessment, would contributed to staff esprit by

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encouraging “increased identification with the special nature of intelligence as

a career” and “identification with the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole
through knowledge of the accomplishments of its separate elements.”27
Creation of an operational art collection would, to a certain extent, remedy
the un-curated interpretation of aesthetics that the FAC’s other efforts had
the potential to unleash. Instead, interested CIA officers would have
opportunities to create specific works with guidance from the CIA’s
Historical Intelligence Collection staff and the FAC or to oversee additional
acquisitions. Officers whose proposals were accepted would remain members
of their parent organization/career service and would be detailed to the
project that they had proposed.28 This had an added value of bringing
employees who had created successful projects back to their units as
ambassadors of aesthetics who would hopefully spur additional interest. The
collection would be protected from schlock contributions through the
selection of employees based on factors including artistic ability, knowledge
of relevant Agency activity, and ability to conduct research.29 A potential
impediment—aside from the necessity of ensuring that the projects did not
disclose sensitive information—was that officers needed to secure the
approval of their parent organization and career service.30 This had the
potential to hold talent hostage to management that did not recognize the
long-term value of such projects.
The operational art collection appears to have been a predecessor to what
is now called the Intelligence Art Collection. According to the Toni Hiley, the
director of the CIA’s museum, the intelligence art collection exists “to take
the workfore, the viewer, where the CIA Museum cannot go. So we don’t
always have artifacts to act as the portal to get us to that particular part of
our history. So commissioning these historical paintings are one way that we
can ensure that this historical legacy remains accessible to the workforce.”31
Consistent with the original operational art collection proposal, a CIA
employee, Deborah Dismuke, painted two of the intelligence art collection’s
pieces: “Message from Moscow,” depicting a chapter of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, and “Argo: Rescue of the Canadian Six,” commemorating the
exfiltration of U.S. hostages from Iran.32
One of the more somber elements that creates a sense of unity is the
commemoration of heroism by an agency’s employees. The CIA’s Memorial
Wall is a powerful reminder of individuals lost in the line of duty. Similarly,
the FBI’s Wall of Honor at both HQ and field offices memorializes “Service
Martyrs”—FBI agents killed as the direct result of an adversarial action—as
well as FBI agents and staff who gave their lives in the performance of a law
enforcement duty.33
In addition to the formal artworks meant to memorialize significant
moments in the Agency’s history, the CIA facilitated artistic expression by its

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own personnel. For instance, it held an annual exhibition of paintings by

Agency employees.34 Furthermore, Agency employees contributed objects
d’art to the CIA’s space. According to one CIA report, the building hosted
“major exhibits of artifacts gathered from all parts of the world by the
Agency’s employees.”35 Showcasing various contributions—such as an
employee’s antique pewter collection36—provided by personnel helps to
create an amalgam of elements that coalesces into a shared esthetic across the
workforce. Even when employees were not “uniformly enthusiastic” about an
exhibit, the FAC found that personnel “strongly support[ed]” the concept of
exhibitions.37

Seating Arrangements
The use of space—how people are located and how this leads them to
interact—is another aspect of aesthetics with which the IC has grappled. CIA
records illustrate that the FAC consistently afforded consideration to this
issue. FACs interior design subcommittee, circa 1981, was responsible for
recommending CIA interior design standards, assisting in monitoring
adherence to these standards, and recommending FAC action on proposed
interior changes, whether by OL, the General Services Administration
(GSA), or Agency employees.38 (This was distinct from the art subcommittee,
which was specifically responsible for recommending the selection of works
of art and their placement in public spaces in CIA buildings.39) Furthermore,
according to a 1978 list of possible initiatives, the FAC identified office
landscaping—specifically the guidelines for CIA use of modular furniture and
the open office concept—as a topic of interest and proposed visiting other
organizations for a discussion of those organizations’ experience with the
issue.40 The FBI has been far less introspective about its interior design—
with multiple government reports and journalistic accounts discussing the
disorganization and dysfunctionality of the Bureau’s brutalist HQ building.41
Current trends in office design are becoming diverse. Inc. magazine
published five new trends.42 They include: (1) combining old and new,
keeping the formal elements of the original building design and overlaying
with modern elements and company personality; (2) flexible seating, negating
assigned seating, and allowing for a variety of different arrangements; (3)
even smarter conference rooms that incorporate high tech electronics
instantly available; (4) color blocking, combining colors from opposite ends
of the color wheel to define spaces and orientation; and (5) non-office design,
matching characteristics from gyms, coffee houses, and bookstores in a loose
arrangement of seating, workspaces, and other unrelated elements.
Government agencies, when confronted with larger staffs, realignment, or
new tasks have, in renovation or new construction, included some of these

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ideas. Certainly photographs of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency

point in that direction.
These sometimes dramatic changes in office landscape come from an
expanded understanding of how the environment impacts people and
activities in the workplace. The physical arrangement of space,
interconnections of related spaces, color, light, texture, and noise all have an
influence on people. Performance is influenced more and more by the nature
of the activities of staff. By examining the nature of these activities,
supportive changes in the physical makeup of the spaces can be applied.
Space creates opportunities for integration of personnel with unique
competencies. The CIA has attempted to affect integration through the
creation of mission centers, which combine analysts and operators to focus
on specific security concerns ranging from counterterrorism and weapons and
counterproliferation to country and regional hot spots such as Iran and the
Western Hemisphere,43 On the other side of the Potomac, the FBI—despite
its organizational mayhem—has insisted that “[i]ntegrating intelligence and
operations is part of the broader intelligence transformation [of
the Bureau].”44
The technology sector—which seeks to develop implementable
knowledge—is a natural parallel to the challenge of integrating intelligence.
In the latter field, analysts must make judgments that are useful to—and
change based on feedback from—operational components (e.g., collectors).
The technology sector has sought to create this integrated workforce through
the use of open-plan spaces that bring synergistic elements together.
However, the collaborative free-for-all that might lead to the creation of
implementable knowledge would likely be inhibited by entrenched cultures
within the IC. The IC is arguably dominated by the Department of Defense
(DoD), which Robert Gates once referred to as the “800 pound gorilla in the
intelligence arena.”45 DoD elements include the National Security Agency
(NSA), which is the U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) service. This defense
dominance brings with it an emphasis on rank and chain of command, which
can lead—even when unintended—to self-censorship. Outside of the military
agencies, fetishization of rank— regardless of intellectual aptitude—pervades
institutional cultures. Individuals who have achieved high military
officerships have become heads of the CIA and its predecessor, the Central
Intelligence Group. These include the very first director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), Sidney Souers. Most recently, David Petraeus served as
director of the CIA, from 2011 to 2012. The FBI veers toward an emphasis
on rank—regardless of merit—thanks to its regimented law enforcement,
gun-toting culture.

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Engagement with External Customers

Agencies must engage three sets of external entities in order to succeed. First,
they need to find mutual understanding with counterparts in order to
effectively collaborate. They must also engage the constituencies from whom
they need cooperation. (The FBI and the DHS, for instance, must find a way
to elicit assistance from Americans on whom they rely for information.)
Finally, related to the need to engage constituencies for cooperation is the
need to appear credible with overseers—specifically Congress but also the
public, which makes demands, through the ballot box, on their
elected officials.

Art
One way in which the CIA has forged associations with external entities is
through its art program. As an Agency analysis noted, “The Agency plays
host throughout the year to many prominent visitors from both the
American corporate and academic worlds, and it will be important for art to
contribute to the favorable and lasting impressions on them that we
require.”46 These individuals, according to the CIA, were “sophisticated, as
well as artistically and culturally aware.”47 Faced with this constituency, the
Agency needed to connect with visitors’ values by demonstrating that “[t]he
staff and visitors at CIA are educated, cosmopolitan, and sensitive to
many cultures.”48
Esthetically, the Agency attempted to project sophisticated American
culture through the art it displayed. Starting in the 1960s, the CIA developed
an arrangement with art collector Vincent Melzac, who was an early
supporter of the artists who collectively made up the Washington Color
School.49 This group of artists’ work, which emerged from the abstract
expressionism in the late 1950s, included works that resembled “something
that looks more like an impersonal force of nature.”50 Their work was in the
same genre as that which Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock, among others,
produced.51 Melzac permitted the Agency to periodically change its artwork
through periodic exchanges of the items, which his collection provided on
long-term loan.52 The CIA also examined the artistic potential of what might
be called folk art. For instance, in the early 1970s, the Agency afforded
consideration to the use of pottery produced by native craftsmen in
Appalachia.53 A 1987 memo discussing plans for the New Headquarters
Building further clarified the CIA’s desired esthetic, stating that “new art
must be equally worldly, yet have identifiable American roots, either in
concept, materials, representation, etc.”54
These efforts were not always welcomed by the Agency’s “educated” and
“cosmopolitan” employees. In 1982, an unimpressed CIA employee

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complained to the FAC about the art selections, lamenting that the FAC did
not “give the traditionalists a chance.”55 This prompted a letter from the
FAC’s chairman, which expressed “regret that our efforts to bring a variety
of form and color to the public corridors of our building are so objectionable
to you” and assured the miffed correspondent that “there are some who find
the paintings do have merit.”56
In the process of establishing its displays, the CIA connected with several
prominent cultural entities. The National Collection of Fine Arts (now the
Smithsonian’s American Art Museum) loaned a number of prints—which the
CIA, in return, had framed.57 Additionally, the Collection provided the
Agency with several large paintings that the CIA hung in public spaces.58
The Corcoran also provided the CIA with both artworks and art advice.
Several Currier and Ives prints adorned the DCI’s suite, courtesy of a
Corcoran loan.59 Furthermore, the FAC called on the Corcoran for
assistance after realizing that the CIA lacked sufficient knowledge about
contemporary art and its installation to work with Melzac’s loans.60 James
Harithas, who served as the Corcoran’s director, selected six paintings from
the Melzac collection on behalf of the CIA and visited CIA HQ to assess
installation possibilities.61 Finally, the FAC hosted traveling exhibits
sponsored by the American Federation of Art.62 Such interactions are useful
for demystifying the world of intelligence for the layman by identifying areas
of common interest.

Art-in-Architecture
The U.S. government’s General Services Administration (GSA) has done
similar decorating on an institutional level through its Art-in-Architecture
Program.63 This program—which was created in 1962 by the President’s Ad
Hoc Committee on Federal Office Space—oversees the commissioning of
artwork for new federal buildings, in order to “enhance the civic meaning of
federal architecture and showcase the vibrancy of American visual arts.”64
Although the CIA has had a long track record with the display of art objects,
it was not until 1981 that the Agency’s FAC engaged the GSA about the
possibility that the CIA could “tap” the Art-in-Architecture Program for a
modern sculpture for an open area opposite the main entrance.65 GSA
advised that senior Agency management would have to make a request of
GSA before it could put CIA on its list of possible clients for art and also
indicated that the Agency attempt to obtain from the building architect some
indication of the extent to which the architect, at the time the building was
designed or in subsequent years, may have felt a need for sculptural
enhancement of the building. A strong statement by the architect would do
much to support the Agency’s request.66

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The Agency again approached the Art-in-Architecture Program in

connection with the creation of CIA’s New Headquarters building. In 1987,
the CIA developed a panel to work with GSA with respect to obtaining,
reviewing, and approving artistic proposals, to acquiring art for this
expansion.67 According to the minutes of a CIA FAC meeting, GSA would
request the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to appoint art
professionals, primarily from the region of the project, to meet with the
design architect for the purpose of nominating three to five artists for each
proposed art work. In furtherance of this, GSA created a panel of experts
from the NEA to review samples of work—ultimately 300 entries—from
artists throughout the United States.68 Simultaneously, the CIA formed a
group to work with the GSA/NEA contingent and developed a statement of
principles that it provided to the NEA as guidance.69 The panel was designed
to represent a cross-section of the people who would most likely work in the
building.70 In December 1987, the NEA panel convened at CIA to narrow
the context to five artists.71

A Tale of Three Museums

How agencies present and leverage their respective histories provides some
overarching hints about their aesthetics. There are parallels between how an
organization uses its conceptual space—its history—and its physical space in
furtherance of its missions. While the CIA (the primary U.S. foreign
intelligence service) and the NSA (the country’s primary SIGINT service)
take slightly different, but equally serious, approaches to the resource of
accumulated knowledge, the FBI—an agency older than both the CIA and
the NSA—has literally outsourced its legacy.
The CIA has treated history as integral to its mission. Future DCI William
Colby, while serving as executive director–comptroller, noted that exhibiting
items significant to the CIA’s development would have “a salutary effect on
employee morale, on training or on special problems the Director
identifies.”72
The CIA Museum is divided into multiple galleries that highlight the
functions of the Agency (Directorate of Analysis and Directorate of Science
& Technology), historical development (Office of Strategic Service), and key
moments in history (Afghanistan and the Cold War).73 According to the
Agency, its museum “is now the preeminent national archive for the
collection, preservation, documentation and exhibition of intelligence
artifacts, culture and history.”74 Such a sweeping ambition—now that the
director of the CIA is no longer the DCI— might be a bit grandiose, but it
demonstrates how the CIA perceives itself—an agency that builds on history
to shape the trajectory of future efforts.

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Similarly, the NSA makes its history a resource via the Center for
Cryptologic History (CCH). The CCH provides a historical and objective
account of cryptologic history for the IC and the DoD. Most importantly,
the CCH perceives itself as “enhancing the knowledge and decision-making
abilities of the intelligence community.”75
Compare the gravitas of the NSA and the CIA with these agencies’ even
older counterpart—the FBI—and the difference between the primary foreign
and the primary domestic intelligence services could not be more apparent. In
contrast to the CIA Museum and CCH, the Bureau has “The FBI
Experience”—which, by its description, includes “interactive multimedia
exhibits”—and caters to a titillation-seeking public, rather than scholars.76
Even more telling is how these two agencies chose to engage their
respective histories and the knowledge that can be mined from those
histories. In 1972, William E. Colby (a DCI whose willingness to grapple
with the Agency’s history was encapsulated in his delivery of the “family
jewels” collection of documents to Congress) suggested that the CIA create a
museum and put the Agency’s components and its FAC in charge of
identifying items of historical significance. The CIA, when it expanded the
architectural footprint of its Headquarters in the 1980s, designed space for a
museum and established the office of the curator.77 The FBI was far less
thoughtful in its approach. It contracted out “The FBI Experience” to
Smithsonian Exhibits, which organized the content, conducted research, and
wrote the exhibition’s script.78

AN ENIGMATIC ELEMENT
Ambient aesthetics of color and space create an environment conducive to
analysis, while history provides an opportunity to cohere a corporate culture
and communicate it to external entities. However, there is a third element
that needs to be part of designing any intelligence agency—an enigmatic
element. This challenges the viewer to keep their mind in a state of constantly
examining problems from different angles. It also picks up the CIA’s theme
of showing the mental prowess of its workforce to external customers. (Can
you imagine if an intellectual arms race broke out between agencies—with
each one seeking more sophisticated problems to throw open for
consumption?) Finally, when it can be discussed publicly, this element of
challenging the public’s imagination, rather than shutting the public out and
allowing fears of the “deep state” to run rampant, will simultaneously meet
the public’s imagination half way.
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., in the Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,79
prescribes several remedies to overcome mental biases. The aesthetics of an
intelligence agency—specifically a focus on thought provoking
surroundings—can help to overcome the impediments that Heuer has

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Figure 1. Author’s sketch.

identified. One concept that Heuer discusses is point-of-view—and although

he, of course, means conceptually, a visualization provides reinforcement.
Figure 1 demonstrates this idea. Is the red or green face forward? The form
of the cube changes based on which is selected while the elements remain
unchanged. The results change; the data do not.
A review of the literature and declassified record shows that aesthetics that
stimulate problem-solving prowess are underrepresented across the IC. The
one notable exception is the CIA’s Kryptos sculpture. Kryptos was a creation
of GSA’s Art-in-Architecture program. In November 1988, the Agency and
an NEA panel selected James Sanborn’s Kryptos, a two-part sculpture
located at the main entrance to the New Headquarters building and in
the courtyard between the New Headquarters Building and the Old
Headquarters Building cafeteria.80 Sanborn installed the sculpture in 1990.81
From this vantage point, the left half of the copper screen is the encoded text
and the right half of the copper screen is a series of alphabets, one above the
other and is a “chart” called the Vigeneries Tableaux, developed by sixteenth-
century French cryptographer Blaise de Vigenere. In Kryptos, this chart has
been intentionally flipped so it can only be read from the back of the
sculpture. The artist used this “chart” system, in combination with matrix
coding systems, to encipher the first three encoded texts on the left side of the
screen. The artist designed the fourth section (now referred to as K4) to be
very difficult to crack and as of April 2019 it had not been broken.82
Kryptos is a good example of how the aesthetics of enigma engage internal
and external audiences. In 1998, CIA analyst David Stein deciphered three of
the four Kryptos sections, after working for a total of more than 400 hours
with paper and pencil during lunch breaks.83 The NSA—a hothouse of

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codebreakers—also took a crack at Kryptos. While on a 1991 visit to CIA, a

group of NSA cryptanalysis “interns” scribbled all the letters from the
sculpture onto sheets of paper and brought them back to NSA as a challenge
for their colleagues.84 Little progress was made until the following year, when
William O. Studeman, the then–CIA deputy director who had previously
served as the NSA director, challenged his former agency to solve Kryptos.85
By 1993, a group of three NSA analysts solved three out of the four Kryptos
sections (with some initial help from computer diagnostic tools).86
In addition to capturing the attention of individuals across the U.S. IC,
Krytos has become a public sport in wonkier circles. A computer scientist in
California announced, in 1999, that he had cracked three of the sculpture’s
four sections using his computer.87 The public fascination with Kryptos is
further indicated by at least one attempt to cheat by using the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) process. On 25 September 2005, the CIA received a
FOIA request for the CIA’s copy of the “full plaintext” for Kryptos.88 The
CIA’s response indicated that it had “received many similar requests in
the past.”89

WORKING WITHIN CONSTRAINTS

There is an inherent tension between the logistics of governmental edifices
and the generation of knowledge about architecture and the use of space to
enhance productivity and creativity. These tensions include the glacially
changing nature of government buildings. Those that rose in one era are not
easily reshaped as new theories of aesthetics—one only needs to look down
Pennsylvania Avenue to see how literally set in stone (and concrete) are the
halls of power.
Theory progresses faster than building cycles. Studies by environmental
researchers, architects, and designers provide a growing library of
information about the environment and its effects on people. Since the 1960s,
when interest in the social–psychological aspects of the built environment
emerged, research into the influences of physical design on the behavior of
human beings has accelerated. Edward T. Hall, in Hidden Dimension,90
demonstrates how humankind’s use of space can affect personal and business
relations, cross-cultural interactions, architecture, city planning, and urban
renewal. Focusing specifically on the science of proxemics, Hall’s work sets
the tone for much work that followed. Studies of noise, light, volume, color
and texture, and technology along with proxemics are critical factors that
now influence the design and marketing of the simplest of products.
Part of the slowness of change is the limited ability to learn from trial and
error. Christopher Alexander, Sara Ishikawa, and Murry Silverstein’s work,
Pattern Language,91 creates a body of research whose application yields
richly textured design solutions. Alexander et al. establish a formula for

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design patterns: (1) a problem is described that occurs over and over in the
environment; (2) a core solution is described so that any single design
solution never has to be repeated; (3) the context in which the problem
occurs and is interconnected to a larger landscape; (4) a complete, empirical
background of the evidence for the pattern’s validity, and the range of
different ways the pattern can be manifested in a building and so on; and (5)
a solution describing the field of physical and social relationships necessary to
solve the problem in the stated context.
The perpetual process of self-correcting patterns to align with an agency’s
mission requires the capacity for recognizing context. As pointed out in the
paper “Bricks and Mortar: Architecture and US Domestic Security,”92 the
design of the FBI headquarters building remained the same, but—because of
the way interpretations shifted around it—went from suggesting scientific
precision to projecting a sense of totalitarianism. In a class, Carl Droppers, a
professor of architecture at Western Reserve University, suggested that
young architects recognize when and where a design solution occurs; that
time and place when the data come together and the abstraction of
similarities results in an appropriate judgment. Heuer pointed out a similar
phenomenon when he stated, “The significance of information is always a
joint function of the nature of the information and the context in which it is
interpreted.”93
The IC, for several reasons, cannot reinvent its infrastructure in order to
keep pace with new theories in design. Once a government edifice has been
constructed it is unlikely to be discarded. The origins of the CIA illustrate
this—as the Agency was initially scattered throughout a multitude of leftover
locations prior to the construction of its Langley headquarters. More
recently, the creation of the DHS did not initially net the new department a
new, custom-built HQ, but instead plunked the head of this Frankenstein on
an old Navy facility in northwest Washington, DC.
Furthermore, the government’s infrastructure is ruled by a mind-boggling
set of regulations. The security requirements of IC agencies impose even
greater restrictions. For instance, when it was originally designed, all of the
entrances to CIA HQ had safety grilles. The main entrance was the exception
to this feature. However, the upsurge of “radical activities” in the late 1960s
led to a reconsideration of this concept.94 Similar security concerns have also
dictated interior decoration. CIA security objected to the use of
organizational component signs on office doors.95 This was presumably a
reflection of the “need to know” principle. (Interestingly, FAC concurred
with security’s take on this problem. During a January 1985 meeting the
Commission discussed the display of office seals and logos and reaffirmed its
own long-standing position that these should not be displayed.96) Even the
CIA’s operational art collection had to work within security parameters—as

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“[t]hroughout the course of a project, there would be close coordination with

relevant Agency organizations to ensure adequate protection to sensitive
information. Specifically, the directorates could review all material for
security and cover consideration at the start of research, before the creation
of graphs, and prior to the display of any works.”97
However, there are opportunities to work within the confines of
bureaucratic reality toward a better alignment of aesthetics and agency
missions. As an internal CIA assessment of environmental design explained,
“Basic commitments with regard to space in the original design of any of our
buildings may leave little flexibility. The treatment of the space has much.”98
An incident involving the delicate balance between secrecy and transparency
highlights how necessity can be addressed in a way consistent with an agency’s
aesthetics. According to an internal CIA document, the FAC noticed that the
Agency’s perimeter fence was rusting. The FAC proposed that the fence be
repainted in a color that would make it less visually obtrusive because “it
seems important in the CIA to live with security not to flaunt it.”99

AESTHETICS AS A TOOL FOR ASSESSMENT

Examination of an agency’s aesthetics provides several opportunities to ask
qualitative questions about its development and functionality on several
fronts. First, when an agency such as the FBI is unable to have sufficient self-
awareness to effectively memorialize its history, overseers should ask whether
said agency is capable of learning from its past and, if not, why. Additionally,
if agencies find themselves in positions of being unable to adopt private-
sector design concepts such as tech-sector-style workspaces that foster
collaboration overseers should ask why this is not occurring. Such lines of
questioning might highlight unhealthy human capital dynamics (e.g., the
fixation on rank versus merit). Furthermore, when an agency is unable to
develop an esthetic—it is hard, for instance, to discern one at the DHS—
overseers might want to take this as the starting point for a discussion about
whether the agency has taken on too many disparate mission sets. Similarly,
if an agency’s esthetic is lopsided toward one element—for example, the
FBI’s cultivation of its enforcement, rather than intelligence, image—
overseers should raise questions about whether the esthetic indicates a
lopsided culture, a short-shrifting of a mission set, or the need to reconsider
the distribution of functions across the government.

CONCLUSION
Aesthetics play an important, although often under-theorized, role in the IC.
The variables of space, color, temperature, and noise all contribute to efforts
at an individual level. Standardizing these elements would be consistent with
ICD 203 by removing a variable that might skew analysis. Aesthetics are also

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an important factor at the corporate level. They help organizations to cohere

around a shared worldview and facilitate integration among components.
Finally, aesthetics play an important role in how agencies effectively engage
their partners in national security, engage with overseers, and enlist the
confidence of the public.
To ensure that IC agencies are learning from their own experiences and
applying new developments in the realm of workspace design, the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence should create two new offices. The first
of these—a chief aesthetics officer—would assess whether the environments
that agencies created aligned with those agencies’ own missions and with the
facilitation of a common IC-wide culture. The second office should
consolidate the individual historical staffs and entities across the IC—for
example, the Center for Cryptologic History at the NSA, the Center for the
Study of Intelligence at the CIA, the FBI Experience resources—into an
ODNI entity that could ensure that agencies not only devoted resources to
preserving and mining their legacies, but also ensure that the knowledge from
these legacies was accepted throughout the IC—rather than the current
environment, which verges on a cultural arms race as each agency promotes
its own history and emphasizes its way of doing business.
Aesthetics are simply one aspect of integrating the IC. The questions that
discussions of IC aesthetics raise also suggest the need for inquiries in other
fields. For instance, intelligence linguistics is currently a stew of agency-
specific terms (e.g., an FBI special agent is not the same thing as a CIA
agent). Improvements and impediments in all of these fields that govern how
individuals and organizations engage with each other will determine the
effectiveness of collaboration and, ultimately, whether the United States can
remain ahead of threats to its security and maintain an informational
advantage in decisionmaking.

REFERENCES
1
9/11 Commission Report, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_
Ch11.pdf
2
Central Intelligence Agency, “Art for the New Building,” 29 October 1987,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89G00643R00080
0150003-0.pdf
3
Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive 203, 2
January 2015, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Anal
ytic%20Standards.pdf
4
Christopher Alexander, Sara Ishikawa, and Murry Silverstein, A Pattern
Language (New York, Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 876.
5
Joan Meyers-Levy and Rui (Juliet) Zhu, “The Influence of Ceiling Height: The
Effect of Priming on the Type of Processing That People Use,” Journal of
Consumer Research, Vol. 34 (August 2007), https://www.researchgate.net/

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE

DESIGNING INTELLIGENCE 19

publication/23547371_The_Influence_of_Ceiling_Height_The_Effect_of_Priming_
on_the_Type_of_Processing_That_People_Use
6
Major Tian, “How The Environment Impacts Creative Thinking,” CKGSB
KNOWLEDGE, 13 January 2014, https://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2014/01/13/
management/how-the-environment-impacts-creative-thinking/
7
Revi Mehta and Rui (Juliet) Zhu, “Blue or Red? Exploring the Effect of
Color on Cognitive Task Performances,” Science (March 2009).
8
Ibid.
9
Central Intelligence Agency, “Planning and Construction of the Agency
Headquarters Building: January 1946–July 1963,” June 1973, https://www.cia.
gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00708R000300050001-1.pdf
10
The White House, “Memorandum to the Heads of Departments and
Agencies,” 26 May 1971, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP87-01130R000100130033-0.pdf
11
Lyman Kirkpatrick, “Decorating the Building,” https://www.cia.gov/library/
readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84-00780R000100150024-1.pdf
12
Tian, “How the Environment Impacts Creative Thinking.”
13
9/11 Commission Report.
14
Director of National Intelligence, Intelligence Community Directive 203.
15
Maria Popova, “Mozart on Creativity and the Ideation Process,”
BrainPickings.org, 24 February 24.
16
Ferris Jabr, “Why Walking Helps Us Think,” Annals of Technology, New
Yorker Magazine, 3 September 2014.
17
Koestler, 1964.
18
Robert J. Sternberg, ed., The Nature of Creativity: Contemporary Psychological
Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 149–150.
19
John D. Norton, “Chasing the Light: Einsteinʼ s Most Famous Thought
Experiment,” Thought Experiments in Philosophy, Science and the Arts (New
York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 123–140.
20
Central Intelligence Agency, “Establishment of a Fine Arts Commission,”
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000100
160050-1.pdf
21
Central Intelligence Agency, “An Environmental Design for CIA,” https://
www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87-01130R000100140005-0.pdf
22
The White House, “Memorandum to the Heads of Departments
and Agencies.”
23
Central Intelligence Agency, “Scope of the Fine Arts Commission,” 26 January
1966, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87-01130R0001
00140035-7.pdf
24
Central Intelligence Agency, “Expanding CIA Displays,” 28 January 1974,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP81-00261R00070003
0081-7.pdf
25
Central Intelligence Agency, “Proposal for a CIA Operations-Oriented Art
Collection,” 7 February 1969, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/
CIA-RDP92G00017R000800010013-5.pdf
26
Ibid.

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20 DARREN TROMBLAY AND RICHARD PODULKA

27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
“A Peak into the CIA Art Gallery Reveals [Redacted],” National Public
Radio, 20 May 2016.
32
Ian Shapira, “At the CIA, She’s an Operative with a Paintbrush,” Washington
Post, 6 May 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/at-the-cia-shes-an-
operative-with-a-paint-brush/2019/05/05/75285b18-65da-11e9-8985-
4cf30147bdca_story.html (accessed 5 January 2020).
33
“Wall of Honor,” https://www.fbi.gov/history/wall-of-honor
34
The White House, “Memorandum to the Heads of Departments
and Agencies.”
35
Central Intelligence Agency, The Fine Arts Commission,” n.d., https://www.cia.
gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87-01130R000100130020-4.pdf
36
The White House, “Memorandum to the Heads of Departments
and Agencies.”
37
Ibid.
38
Central Intelligence Agency, “Committees of the Fine Arts Commission,” 1981,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87-01130r0001001
30002-4. Although “OL” is not spelled out in the 1981 document it is likely a
reference to the “Office of Logistics” as indicated by contemporaneous CIA
documents. See for instance Central Intelligence Agency, “Procedures for
Requesting Guest Speakers from the Office of Logistics,” 1982, https://www.
cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88-00428R000200020051-4.pdf
39
Ibid.
40
Central Intelligence Agency, “Possible Fine Arts Commission Initiatives,” 1978,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87-01130R0001000700
09-4.pdf
41
Darren E. Tromblay and Richard Podulka, “Bricks and Mortar: Architecture
and U.S. Domestic Security,” International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2009), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/08850607.2019.1605808
42
Kevin J. Ryan, “5 Hottest Office Design Trends of 2019,” Inc., 10
September 2019.
43
Shane Harris, “CIA Creates New Mission Center to Turn up the Heat on
Iran,” Washington Post, 2 June 2017; Offices of CIA: Mission Centers; Greg
Miller, “The CIA Unveils a Radically New Org Chart,” Washington Post, 1
October 2015; Directorates Mission Centers—Central Intelligence Agency,
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/leadership/Org_Chart_Oct2015.pdf (accessed 5
January 2020).
44
Integration of Operations & Intelligence, https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-
and-structure/national-security-branch/integration-of-operations-intelligence
45
David F. Oakley, Subordinating Intelligence (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 2019), p. 149.
46
Central Intelligence Agency, “Art for the New Building,” 29 October 1987.

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47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Central Intelligence Agency, “Agency Medallion for Vincent Melzac,” 19
November 1982, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87-
01130R000100100005-4.pdf
50
National Gallery of Art, “The Washington D.C. Color School,” https://www.
nga.gov/audio-video/audio/eb-20th-century-art/eb-20th-century-art-dc-color-
school-11.html
51
Ibid.
52
Central Intelligence Agency, “Agency Medallion for Vincent Melzac”; The
White House, “Memorandum to the Heads of Departments and Agencies.”
53
The White House, “Memorandum to the Heads of Departments
and Agencies.”
54
Central Intelligence Agency, Art for the New Building, 29 October 1987.
55
Central Intelligence Agency, “Art in CIA,” 3 September 1982, https://www.cia.
gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87-01130R000100100037-9.pdf
56
Ibid.
57
The White House, “Memorandum to the Heads of Departments
and Agencies.”
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
General Services Administration, “Art in Architecture Program,” https://www.
gsa.gov/real-estate/design-construction/art-in-architecture-fine-arts/art-in-
architecture-program
64
Ibid.; Central Intelligence Agency, “Art-in-Architecture Program,” https://www.
cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP87-01130R000100090007-4.pdf
65
Ibid.
66
Ibid.
67
Central Intelligence Agency, “Art for the New Building,” 19 February 1988,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP90M01364R000700120021-5.pdf
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
70
Central Intelligence Agency, “Art for the New Building,” 1987, https://www.
cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP89G00643R000800150014-8.pdf
71
Central Intelligence Agency, “Art for the New Building,” 19 February 1988.
72
Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Museum,” https://www.cia.gov/
library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85-00988R000400030003-3.pdf
73
Central Intelligence Agency, “About CIA: CIA Museum,” November 1, 2018,
https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/cia-museum
74
Ibid.
75
National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, https://www.nsa.
gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/center-cryptologic-history/

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76
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The FBI Experience,” https://www.fbi.gov/
contact-us/fbi-headquarters/the-fbi-experience
77
Central Intelligence Agency, “About CIA: CIA Museum.”
78
Smithsonian Exhibits, “The FBI Experience,” http://exhibits.si.edu/portfolio/
thefbiexperience/
79
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC:
Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1977).
80
Central Intelligence Agency. “Kryptos,” https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/
headquarters-tour/kryptos/?tab=list-1
81
“Solving the Enigma of Kryptos,” Wired, 21 January 2005, https://www.wired.
com/2005/01/solving-the-enigma-of-kryptos/?currentPage=all
82
Central Intelligence Agency, “Kryptos.”
83
“CIA Releases Analyst’s Fascinating Tale of Cracking the Kryptos Sculpture,”
Wired, 5 June 2013, https://www.wired.com/2013/06/analyst-who-cracked-
kryptos/
84
“Documents Reveal How the NSA Cracked the Kryptos Sculpture Years
before the CIA,” Wired, 10 July 2013, https://www.wired.com/2013/07/nsa-
cracked-kryptos-before-cia/
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
Central Intelligence Agency, “Kryptos.”
88
Central Intelligence Agency, Reference F-2006-00005, 14 October 2005, https://
www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001255578.pdf
89
Ibid.
90
Edward T. Hall, Hidden Dimension (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966).
91
Alexander, Ishikawa, and Silverstein, A Pattern Language.
92
Tromblay and Podulka, “Bricks and Mortar.”
93
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Center for the
Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1977), p. 41.
94
Central Intelligence Agency, “The Support Services Historical Series:
Housekeeping Plus: CIA’s Logistics Services Division. 1961–1971,” July 1972,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00708R0004000
60001-9.pdf
95
Ibid.
96
Central Intelligence Agency, “From: Defense Management Branch, SOV, To:
Chairperson: Fine Arts Commission,” 13 February 1985; Central Intelligence
Agency, “Request for Removal of Post,” 4 February 1985; Central Intelligence
Agency, “Request for Removal of Sign,” https://www.cia.gov/library/
readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88G00186R000700830035-0.pdf
97
Central Intelligence Agency, “Proposal for a CIA Operations-Oriented
Art Collection.”
98
Central Intelligence Agency, “An Environmental Design for CIA.”
99
Ibid.

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