Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Caption: 
Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin 
(253 SCRA 699) 
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts: 
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband
Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his
house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled
check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents
between her Wife and his alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the evidence of
her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and
for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3
of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and
Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a
immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and
to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital
separation and disqualification from medical practice. 

Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who thinks
herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom
the constitutional provision is to be enforced. 
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful
order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as
prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies
between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures
absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
 STAR PAPER CORPORATION, JOSEPHINE ONGSITCO & SEBASTIAN
CHUA, petitioners, vs. RONALDO D. SIMBOL, WILFREDA N. COMIA &
LORNA E. ESTRELLA, respondents
G.R. No. 164774                |              April 12, 2006

TOPIC: Stipulation against marriage

FACTS:

Respondents Ronaldo D. Simbol, Wilfreda N. Comia and Lorna E. Estrella

were all regular employees at Star Paper Corporation. During their
employment in the company, Simbol and Comia, met their co-employees,
Alma Dayrit and Howard Comia, and eventually married them.

Prior to their respective marriages, Jospehine Ongsitco, the Manager of the

Personnel and Administration Department, advised them that should they
decide to get married, one of the should resign pursuant to a company policy
promulgated in 1995, which states that:

1.       New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a

relative, up to the 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the
company.

2.       In case of two of our employees (both singles, one male and another
female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.

Simbol was compelled to resign on June 20, 1998. Comia resigned on June
30, 2000.

As for Estrella, she got impregnated by one of her co-employees Luisito

Zuniga, who was a married man. Upon her return to the company after
recuperating from an accident, she was denied entry and was handed a
memorandum stating that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct.
She refused to sign the memorandum as she was on leave for 21 days and
has not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write
an explanation but she was nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to
her urgent need for money, she submitted a letter of resignation in
exchange for her 13th month pay.

ISSUE:

Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the
same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution
and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of a management prerogative

RULING:
The case at bar involves Article of the Labor Code 136 of the Labor Code
which provides:

Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of

employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married
a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage.

There are 2 types of employment policies involving spouses: policies banning

only spouses from working in the same company (no-spouse employment
policies), and those banning all immediate family members, including
spouses, from working in the same company (anti-nepotism employment
policies).

In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States,

complainants utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the
disparate treatment and the disparate impact. Under the disparate
treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that an employment policy is
discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies requiring an
employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the
complainants must prove that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate
effect on a particular class.

The state courts’ rulings on the issue depend on their interpretation of the
scope of marital status discrimination within the meaning of their respective
civil rights acts. Though they agree that the term “marital status”
encompasses discrimination based on a person’s status as either married,
single, divorced, or widowed, they are divided on whether the term has a
broader meaning.

The courts narrowly interpreting marital status to refer only to a person’s

status as married, single, divorced, or widowed reason that if the legislature
intended a broader definition it would have either chosen different language
or specified its intent. They hold that the relevant inquiry is if one is married
rather than to whom one is married. They construe marital status
discrimination to include only whether a person is single, married, divorced,
or widowed and not the “identity, occupation, and place of employment of
one’s spouse.” These courts have upheld the questioned policies and ruled
that they did not violate the marital status discrimination provision of their
respective state statutes.

The courts that have broadly construed the term “marital status” rule that it
encompassed the identity, occupation and employment of one’s spouse.
They strike down the no-spouse employment policies based on the broad
legislative intent of the state statute. They reason that the no-spouse
employment policy violate the marital status provision because it arbitrarily
discriminates against all spouses of present employees without regard to the
actual effect on the individual’s qualifications or work performance. These
courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure of the
employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the
general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely
affect the business. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide
occupational qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one
spouse due to the current employment of the other spouse in the same
office. Thus, they rule that unless the employer can prove that the
reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital
status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would
better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate
against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse. This is
known as the bona fide occupational qualification exception.

To justify a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove

two factors: (1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to
the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual
basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.

The Court did not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar.
Petitioners’ sole contention that “the company did not just want to have 2 or
more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or
consanguinity” is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth
to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid
reasonable business necessity required by the law.

In the case at bar, respondents were hired after they were found fit for the
job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. The policy
is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be
less efficient. If the questioned rule is upheld without valid justification, the
employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a
perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of
tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee
marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-
employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the
Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate
impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it
is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The
failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working
together in one company.
 DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A.
TECSON, petitioners, vs. GLAXO WELCOME PHILIPPINES, INC.,
respondent
G.R. No. 162994                |              September 17, 2004

TOPIC: Stipulation against marriage

FACTS:

Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson signed a contract of employment as Medical

Representative  with Glaxo Wellcome Philippines which stipulates, among
others, that he agrees to study and abide by existing company rules; to
disclose to management any existing or future relationship by consanguinity
or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies
and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict
of interest, to resign from the company.

The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee

is expected to inform management of any existing or future relationship by
consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug
companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employee’s employment with the
company, the management and the employee will explore the possibility of a
“transfer to another department in a non-counterchecking position” or
preparation for employment outside the company after 6 months.

Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, a Branch

Coordinator in Albay for Glaxo’s competitor, Astra Pharmaceuticals. Despite
receiving several reminders from his District Manager regarding the possible
conflict of interest which may arise from his relationship with Betty, Tecson
married Bettsy on September 1998.

ISSUE:

Whether Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying employees from

competitor companies is valid

RULING:

Glaxo’s policy prohibiting an employee from having a relationship with an

employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra are rival
companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.

The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of

competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is reasonable under the
circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the
interests of the company. In laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo
only aims to protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.

As held in a Georgia, USA case, it is a legitimate business practice to guard

business confidentiality and protect a competitive position by even-handedly
disqualifying from jobs male and female applicants or employees who are
married to a competitor.  The Court pointed out that the policy was applied
to men and women equally, and noted that the employer’s business was
highly competitive and that gaining inside information would constitute a
competitive advantage.

From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its
employee handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its employees and those of
competitor companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with
and marry persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks
to avoid is a conflict of interest between the employee and the company that
may arise out of such relationships.

The policy being questioned is not a policy against marriage. An employee of

the company remains free to marry anyone of his or her choosing. The
policy is not aimed at restricting a personal prerogative that belongs only to
the individual. However, an employee’s personal decision does not detract
the employer from exercising management prerogatives to ensure maximum
profit and business success.
 GOMEZ vs. LIPANA
The defendant-appellant, Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the
first with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with Isidra Gomez y
Aquino in 1935. At the time of the second marriage the first was still
subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from the second wife.
On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second marriage acquired by
purchase a piece of land in Cubao, Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00.
The Torrens title for the property (Transfer Certificate No. 25289 of the
Register of Deeds for Quezon City) was issued on February 1, 1944, in the
name of “Joaquin Lipana married to Isidra Gomez.” On July 20, 1958 Isidra
Gomez died intestate and childless, and survived only by her sisters as the
nearest relatives. On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix of
her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for the forfeiture of the
husband’s share in the Cubao property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is
placed on Article 1417 of the old Civil Code, the Spanish text of which
provides:
La sociedad de gananciales concluye al disolverse el matrimonio o al ser
declarado nulo.
El conjuge que por su mala fe hubiere sido causa de la nulidad, no tendra
parte en los bienes gananciales.
The society of joint property concludes after the marriage dissolves or on
having been declared void. The conjuge that for his bad faith will have been
a cause of the nullity, will not have part in the community properties.
The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void ab initio and that
the husband was the one who gave cause for its nullity, applied the
aforequoted provision and declared his interest in the disputed property
forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second wife.
In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes two errors to the trial
court: (1) in allowing a collateral attack on the validity of the second
marriage and in holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in
holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.
ISSUE: WON a collateral attack on the validity on the second marriage in
holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio.
WON that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is applicable in this case.

HELD:
Yes. The party who challenges the validity of the second marriage can be
challenged collaterally. There is no suggestion here that the defendant’s
1930 marriage to Maria Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when
he married Isidra Gomez in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under
the conditions envisioned in sub-section (b). the burden is on the party
invoking the exception to prove that he comes under it; and the defendant
has not discharged that burden at all, no evidence whatsoever having been
adduced by him at the trial. Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less
than seven years after the first, and he has not shown that his first wife was
then generally considered dead or was believed by him to be so.
On the second issue, the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been
no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very action, filed after
dissolution by death had taken place and when Article 1417 of the Spanish
Civil Code was no longer in force.
Even though the said provision was no longer in force it is still presumed,
with respect to the spouse who acted in bad faith, that neither the marriage
nor the conjugal partnership ever existed, and hence such spouse has no
right to share in the conjugal properties; but this legal effect of such
presumption derives from the premise that Article 1417 is still in force, and
in any event is of doubtful application if it would be in derogation of and to
the prejudice of the right of the other spouse of the first marriage in the
conjugal partnership formed thereby, which includes properties acquired by
the husband during its existence.
The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the
right of the second wife to her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.
The decision appealed from is reversed and the complaint is dismissed,
without pronouncement as to costs.