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Analysis of root causes for maritime accidents originated from human factor

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 IAME 2020 CONFERENCE | HONG KONG

Paper ID 440
(The number assigned by the Paper Submission System)

Analysis of root causes for maritime accidents originated

from human factor

Yip, Tsz Leung (The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong)
Sahin, Bekir (Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway |
Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Abstract
In this study, characteristics of maritime accidents caused from human factor and the lessons
learnt are investigated. 19175 human factor related maritime accidents among 31412 unique
reports in which the data for occurrences from 1993 and reported to Marine Accident
Investigation Branch (MAIB) by the end of April 2012 are analysed in detail. The
characteristics of maritime accidents are identified as (1) initial accident type, (2) damage and
injuries, (3) location, (4) vessel type, (5) vessel status, (6) involving component, equipment or
system, and (7) underlying reasons. Maximum occurring maritime accident is Accident to
Person (46.14%). Policy implications of the research findings are discussed to strengthen
maritime safety.

Keywords: Maritime accidents, human factor, shipping industry, MAIB

1. Introduction
It In the literature, there are many publications related to human factor (most of it deal with
IMO regulations and general procedures) but our paper approaches the human factor in
maritime accidents in a more systematic manner. We attempt the root causes, categories, and
subcategories based on empirical data of almost 20-year past incident data.

First, the number of accidents is large enough to identify statistically significant variables.
Second, more robust probabilistic methods will be conducted such as fault tree analysis, root
cause analysis, etc. Mostly, researchers cannot find data to process it. This will be a good
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guide for them. For example, in Table 2, the reasons underlying the accidents are revealed in
list. The tables are presented by analysing all the accidents derived from MAIB.

In this paper, we are not dealing with a specific case. We take a general picture of human
factor in maritime accidents. This paper investigates port traffic risk issues by discussing
historic accidents in United Kingdom ports, which, for many years, was ranked as the world’s
busiest waters. According to UK Department for Transport Shipping Fleet Statistics, United
Kingdom has the 19th largest trading fleet in the world at the end of 2016, that is 0.8% of the
total deadweight tonnage. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
provides the statistics of carrying capacity by type of ship is described as oil tankers (38,715
thousands DWT), bulk carriers (13,023 thousands DWT), general cargo (1,022 thousands
DWT), container ships (8,942 thousands DWT), other types of ships (5,091 thousands DWT).
This is just fraction of the daily marine activity within United Kingdom waters comprising
barge, ferry, fast launch, recreational and fishing boat activity. In other words, as of 2012
there exist 19,278 ships in total, 1,163 of the ships are oil tankers, 2,016 are bulk carriers,
1,228 are general cargo, 10,073 are container ships, and 4,708 are other types of ships
(UNCTAD). The number of UK major and minor ports, all freight traffic is 485,729 thousand
tonnes (UK Department for Transport Shipping Fleet Statistics). Many fairways in United
Kingdom have more than thousands of vessel movements every day and the continuing
growth of the port ensures that constant vigilance is required to ensure safe operations.
However, in the presence of such high level of vessel movements, the number of accidents
reported is not proportionally large and there were 31,412 accidents reported to the local
authority during the period of analysis.

Shipping is international. Consequently, most marine policies are set at the international level.
There has been a strong focus on the relationship between marine accidents and vessel
particulars, flag states and crews. However, despite seaports being a key part of the facilities
for water transportation, there has, to date, been no comprehensive study or marine accidents
with human factor. One reason for this is because a maritime policy is often designed
specifically to fit the local situations. Globalisation of trade has led to a rapid increase in
vessel movements in many seaports owing to the and as this trade continues to grow many of
the maritime risk issues observed in the United Kingdom waters today will face most busy
marine traffic in the near future. United Kingdom, unlike most Asian authorities, has
maintained good data on accident records, making it a good country to study in carrying out
the analysis described here.

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The paper first provides a review of the current literature on root causes of maritime
accidents originated from human factor. This is significant in terms of several perspectives.
The authorities might bring a solution and take precautions for each root causes listed in this
study. Secondly, the probabilistic data might be used in several risk assessment or failure
analysis applications. An analysis of the data from the United Kingdom is then analysed and
finally policy implications on human factors arising from this analysis are discussed. In
particular, a review of the relevant accident statistics is carried out for the purposes of
assessing marine traffic risks and their cumulative effects.

2. Literature Review
Maritime safety has been a core subject in maritime studies because it is coupled with
transport safety, shipping efficiency, distribution reliability and loss prevention. Maritime
accidents have often been attributed to human errors, and discussion of human error and
maritime accidents can be found in Millar (1980).

Whilst effort has been devoted to analyses of historic maritime accidents under particular risk
hazards, for example, port safety (Yip et al., 2015), bunker spills (Talley et al., 2012), arctic
marine accidents (Kum and Sahin, 2015), relatively little research has been carried out for
maritime accidents with human factor. At the same time, there has been significantly more
emphasis in safety climate at the organisational level. Havold (2000) demonstrated the use of
safety culture, to improve safety in maritime environment. Lu and Tsai (2008) analysed the
safety climate in the container shipping. Analysis of maritime accidents often ignore the link
to human errors.

Celik and Cebi (2009) proposed an analytical framework for identifying human errors in
shipping accidents. The benefits of having an analytical framework is to provide a consistent
manipulation of data and information of shipping accidents. They found that the primary root
causes of shipping accidents are skill-based human errors and the shortfalls of execution of
organisational processes. Yip et al. (2015) provided empirical evidence that the maritime
safety can be improved via the training of vessel crew members. Unver at al. (2019) and
Akpinar (2019) analysed the failures in maritime sector by providing detailed root causes.

By illustrating the use of FSA in analysing human errors in vessel collision and grounding,
Martins and Maturana (2010) discussed the stepwise approach of FSA for safety
improvement of marine operations. As a quantitative risk assessment, the FSA requires that
levels of risk are quantified in a matrix of likelihood and consequence. Consequently, one of

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the critical steps in the safety improvement is the requirement to remove or reduce
opportunities for human errors.

Human and organizational factor analysis for marine casualties has been studied by Chen et
al. (2013). They illustrated an accident in a multiple-levels why-because graph and identified
how the human factors are involved in an accident amongst factors. A drawback of this
method is that the analyser should have substantial knowledge on the maritime accidents and
operational environments.

Chauvin et al. (2013) evaluated the relationship between human factors and maritime safety
in the Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). They examined the
human factors in 5 causal categories and further divided human failures into perception and
decision. They suggested to use psychological experiments to train people for a higher level
of safety in the maritime field. Although the cause-and-effect relationship between human
factors and maritime accidents is yet to be defined, she provided that the human factors is a
critical factor of maritime accidents.

By reviewing the accident patterns of United Kingdom, which has been ranked the busiest
waters in the world for years, this paper aims to formulate a future maritime policy for
maritime management.

3. Background and Data

3.1 Characteristics of United Kingdom Waters
The waters of United Kingdom were the world’s busiest. UK major ports handled 473.5
million tons of freight in 2016. By 2016, United Kingdom have 53 major ports and 109 minor
ports (Department for Transport Statistics, 2016).

While a number of these characteristics are commonly found in international waters, United
Kingdom statistics show a high quality of reporting and availability of data.

3.2 Reported Accident Data

The United Kingdom MAIB has historically conducted investigations to establish the causes
and circumstances under which marine accidents have occurred and has identified
improvement measures which can be implemented to avoid recurrence. They have set up the
database of marine accidents.

When reviewing any data, it is necessary to identify the nature of the data and manner of
collection. Data collated for marine traffic risks in United Kingdom between 1993 and 2012
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(20 years) illustrates the key characteristics of maritime accidents and more details of human
factors in maritime accidents. Marine accidents were classified as “Accident to Person”
(46.14%), “Grounding” (9.40%), “Collision” (8.17%), “Hazardous Incident” (7.43%),
“Machinery Failure” (7.25%), “Contact” (6.83%), “Person Overboard” (4.83%), “Fire /
Explosion” (3.09%), “Flooding / Foundering” (2.73%), “Capsize / Listing” (2.03%), among
others.

3.3 General Trends

Table 1 illustrates the number of reported accidents in United Kingdom between 1993 and
2012. The marine accidents are grouped into two types: Human factor and non-Human factor.
This grouping is proposed because it is assumed that accidents caused from human factor are
associated more with the behaviors of human beings, for example, competency, training, or
fatigue. In contrast, non-human factor is related to physical and machinery issues.
Approximately 46% of accidents in each year of the period 1993-2012 were “Accident to
Person”. Therefore, according to the occurrences of maritime accidents, the seven major
initial accident type are “Accident to Person”, “Grounding”, “Collision”, “Hazardous
incident”, “Machinery failure”, “Contact” and “Person overboard”.

Table 1 – Accumulated probability of an accident with human factor

Initial Number of
accident type accidents %
Accident to Person 8848 46.14%
Capsize/Listing 390 2.03%
Cargo Handling Failure 110 0.57%
Collision 1566 8.17%
Contact 1310 6.83%
Escape of Harmful Substance 110 0.57%
Fire/Explosion 593 3.09%
Flooding/Foundering 524 2.73%
Grounding 1802 9.40%
Hazardous Incident 1425 7.43%
Heavy Weather Damage 86 0.45%
Hull Failure 39 0.20%
Machinery Failure 1390 7.25%
Missing Vessel 6 0.03%
Person Overboard 926 4.83%
Pollution 50 0.26%
Total 19175
Source: MAIB

It is instructive to review the reported accident level with respect to the number of “Accident
to Person” over a long-time span. From Figure 1, the frequency of total number of accidents
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is on a consistent declining trend reflecting general improvements in shipping management

and operation. It is apparent that the safety regime in United Kingdom waters has improved
over the last 20 years with an accident rate approximately 0.81%. The principal driver behind
the improvements in accident occurrence is the action of policy makers (such as the MAIB
and the International Maritime Organisation) in improving the safety of the traffic system.
Improved vessel traffic systems, navigation aids, ship specifications and training
requirements have also all reduced accident rates. The improvements made in the port traffic
risks are a credit to the vigilance of local and international authorities. Adversely, human
factor related maritime accidents is still on a consistent inclining trend which means that one
or more human factor related incidents involve maritime accident. For instance, 1922 human
factor related incidents involve in 1450 maritime accidents in the year 2008.

Figure 1 – The frequency of human factor related maritime accidents versus total
maritime accidents

Source: MAIB

The data for root causes of the maritime accidents involving human factor is explained in the
Appendix section which presents the reported root cause of maritime accidents for the period
1993 to 2012. It can be seen that “involving negligence/careless” (2,431 / 19,175 = 12.68%)
are the most common causes, which mirrors the potential problems of harsh task load, lack of
sleep and rest, lack of awareness increasing education or training. It is believed that the
consequences of human factor accidents that do occur will be more serious than previously,
following the general increase in vessel size and the presence of more people on board.

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Unfortunately, the accident database does not have information on financial losses and thus
the financial impact could not be studied.

3.4 Accident Causalities

The number of maritime accidents against the location is shown in Table 2. The vessel type is
reported in Table 3. The vessel status of maritime accidents is given in Table 4. Table 5
summarizes the maritime accidents versus component, equipment, and system. Groups and
sub-groups of human factors are stated in Table 6.

The number of maritime accidents against the location is shown in Table 2. Table 2 suggests
that over one-third of all accidents occurs in “Coastal waters” (6,577 / 19,175 = 34.30%),
while almost one-third of all accidents occur within “Port / harbor area” (6,501 / 19,175 =
33.90%). The distribution of “High Seas” and “River / canal” are (3,546 / 19,175 = 18.49%)
and (1,340 / 19,175 = 6.99%), respectively. This result is attributed to the fact that port /
harbor areas and coastal waters are associated with busier marine traffic and more ship
handling activities. The navigation speeds and courses are less determined in port / harbor
areas and coastal waters. The probability of maritime accidents reduces when a ship has
entered a sheltered river / canal, where more regulated traffic greatly reduces the likelihood
of maritime accidents.

Table 2 – Location of maritime accidents

Location of Accidents Number of Accidents Percentage (%)

Coastal waters 6,277 34.30%
High seas 3,546 18.49%
Non-tidal waters 129 0.67%
Port / harbor area 6,501 33.90%
River / canal 1,340 6.99%
Unknown / Other 1,082 5.64%
Total 19,175 100%
Source: MAIB

Here, the vessels involved in maritime accidents are categorized, and the number of
occurrences for each vessel type is presented in Table 3. Table 3 presents the reported vessel
types from maritime accidents between 1993 and 2012. Table 3 further summarizes the type
of vessels involved in maritime accidents. It was found that the vessel types involved in
maritime accidents were largely “Passenger”, “Dry cargo” and “Fish catching / processing”.
The observed higher “Passenger” from maritime accidents is probably caused by relatively
frequent that provide higher likelihood during maritime accidents. The higher speed of

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Table 3 – Maritime accidents according to vessel type

Escape of Harmful Substance

Heavy Weather Damage

Flooding / Foundering
Cargo handling Failure
Accident to Person

Hazardous Incident

Machinery Failure

Person Overboard
Capsize/Listing

Missing Vessel
Fire / Explosion

Hull Failure
Grounding
Collision

Pollution
Contact
Vessel Type Total
Dry cargo 957 4 60 527 414 36 116 15 547 379 35 12 227 116 6 3451
Barge 26 1 9 10 2 7 6 3 2 4 1 71
Bulk carrier 47 85 12 3 29 30 17 2 30 17 272
Container 369 1 36 130 65 11 33 4 90 110 23 1 72 57 2 1004
General cargo 221 2 14 242 216 3 39 9 344 171 5 8 62 29 3 1368
Reefer 26 19 3 6 8 8 70
Ro-ro/lo-lo, freight only (<12 drivers) 204 1 9 28 66 8 8 2 48 42 1 24 10 1 452
Specialized carrier 52 8 28 11 5 22 19 2 21 1 169
(blank) 12 6 14 6 6 1 45
Fish catching/processing 777 117 1 342 48 108 312 498 205 11 446 292 16 3173
Dredger 98 23 6 16 13 27 19 26 21 249
Liner 22 3 13 6 3 5 52
Netter 22 22 21 12 25 12 6 7 12 139
Other 4 3 13 6 2 23 3 4 8 66
Potter 82 24 20 5 8 41 111 19 3 101 93 507
Trawler 351 35 126 23 40 152 181 49 4 67 120 14 1162
(blank) 198 10 1 156 17 13 79 138 109 234 41 2 998
Other (non-commercial) 229 67 2 29 16 3 7 19 23 3 9 407
Naval Craft 32 1 16 1 3 17 2 72
RNLI Lifeboat 146 7 2 11 3 2 2 1 1 3 178
(blank) 51 59 2 12 1 7 14 5 2 4 157
Other commercial 2179 102 14 229 327 18 123 93 365 257 19 23 311 207 11 4278
Aggregates Dredger 170 4 9 25 1 8 2 17 6 21 4 267
Associated with offshore industry 432 1 2 33 103 5 41 5 26 24 7 47 16 4 746
Icebreaker 4 4
Mega yacht 11 2 2 7 22
Naval support & RFA 280 12 11 6 7 10 41 33 4 6 410
Other 112 3 4 7 5 6 6 15 2 8 7 175
Port service 383 26 86 96 3 21 15 49 62 4 1 32 50 828
Small commercial motor vessel 160 58 23 19 11 42 79 56 18 70 38 574
Small commercial sailing vessel 230 9 47 42 10 4 136 25 5 32 50 590
Survey/research 122 1 9 5 7 18 17 43 6 228
Workboat 61 1 1 12 7 7 18 9 2 8 19 1 146
(blank) 214 12 8 2 3 5 9 2 1 2 17 13 288
Passenger 4157 1 30 106 303 28 191 31 218 313 15 245 6 123 5 5772
Cruise ship 1867 28 15 27 5 11 48 8 31 23 2063
HSC, passenger ferry 25 5 29 8 5 10 5 2 89
HSC, vehicle/passenger ferry 28 1 17 5 38 5 5 2 1 1 103
Other ferry 28 11 10 2 9 7 14 1 3 5 90
Another passenger vessel 134 42 46 7 8 45 21 56 38 1 398
Ro-ro, vehicle/passenger ferry 2006 13 36 140 13 128 6 142 212 4 141 6 51 3 2901
(blank) 69 7 12 14 3 8 3 8 4 128
Passenger cargo 81 23 5 2 2 33 2 28 2 178
General cargo/ passenger 9 9
Ro-ro, freight/vehicle ferry (>12 drivers) 68 21 5 2 2 27 2 23 2 152
(blank) 4 2 6 5 17
Pleasure craft (non-commercial) 107 99 226 30 23 60 55 76 1 4 28 158 867
Angling vessel 12 3 1 12 1 1 7 37
Jet ski 1 3 4
Open boat 33 52 83 22 3 4 14 2 7 73 293
Other 11 6 9 4 10 6 1 3 2 11 63
Yacht 45 4 107 1 4 25 36 55 1 2 6 55 341
(blank) 17 25 21 2 9 14 14 3 12 12 129
Tanker/combination carrier 361 3 107 149 23 27 6 98 139 3 102 19 12 1049
Chemical tanker 66 16 77 7 21 18 10 1 3 219
Liquid gas carrier 46 20 20 13 3 3 20 1 2 128
Oil tanker 155 3 36 30 1 15 26 46 40 8 5 365
Oil/bulk/ore carrier 27 3 2 1 1 7 41
Oil/Chemical tanker 13 6 1 1 26 20 39 3 109
Other tanker 10 9 1 1 3 24
Tanker barge 1 3 6 3 13
(blank) 43 17 15 8 19 27 3 9 5 4 150
Grand Total 8848 390 110 1566 1310 110 593 524 1802 1425 86 39 1390 6 926 50 19175

Source: MAIB
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passenger ships and the poor manoeuvrability of fishing ships may increase the risk of
maritime accidents.

The vessel status of maritime accidents is given in Table 4. Table 4 illustrates the distribution
of vessel status. It can be noted that almost (5,442 / 19,175 = 28.38%) of all accidents
recorded were “On Passage”, with “Alongside or moored” accounting for approximately
(2,567 / 19,175 = 13.39%). “Entering or leaving port” (2,369 / 19,175 = 12.35%) are the third
commonest status. The top commonest status form over half of the maritime accidents
(54.12%).

Table 4 – Maritime accidents according to vessel status

Escape of Harmful Substance

Heavy Weather Damage

Flooding / Foundering
Cargo handling Failure
Accident to Person

Hazardous Incident

Machinery Failure

Person Overboard
Capsize/Listing

Missing Vessel
Fire / Explosion

Hull Failure
Grounding
Collision

Pollution
Contact

When happened? Total

Alongside or moored 1752 2 13 12 55 31 132 74 17 165 1 5 113 157 38 2567
Anchoring operations 42 1 2 11 5 2 8 1 72
At anchor 142 3 8 15 4 3 14 5 55 20 3 21 38 331
Drifting 7 2 8 5 2 2 11 10 7 3 57
Dry or wet dock 52 4 1 6 1 5 1 1 71
During Drill/Exercise 99 3 2 15 6 21 16 41 33 236
During emergency 17 1 1 4 3 5 31
Entering or leaving port 290 14 17 273 707 1 45 20 556 168 4 214 59 1 2369
Guardship duties 9 3 9 1 22
Gutting/handling/stowing fish 38 5 2 5 8 58
Hove-to/dodging 9 4 2 1 20 1 2 5 44
Involved in towing operations 109 19 52 49 8 10 28 1 26 8 310
Loading/discharging cargo 88 13 10 11 1 1 17 2 15 3 161
Mooring operations 257 1 42 147 1 10 41 16 60 575
Negotiating canal lock 4 5 10 8 8 35
Not under command 4 1 1 2 1 9
On passage 1899 132 41 746 172 16 209 150 753 633 55 12 487 6 128 3 5442
Other offshore operations 267 13 32 54 6 4 14 23 5 12 32 462
Pleasure trip 153 72 79 19 5 40 38 47 2 62 93 610
Preparing/stowing fishing gear 56 1 5 2 5 6 51 126
Replenishment at sea operations 3 14 4 1 4 26
Shooting/hauling fishing gear 409 24 27 14 38 25 28 140 141 846
Towing fishing gear 23 21 31 6 7 35 5 36 19 1 1 185
Unknown 314 11 3 34 32 2 7 14 28 67 1 1 52 16 582
(blank) 2805 64 13 189 28 46 134 107 224 92 12 144 90 3948
Grand Total 8848 390 110 1566 1310 110 593 524 1802 1425 86 39 1390 6 926 50 19175

Source: MAIB

Table 5 shows the number of maritime accidents related to component, equipment, or

systems. Maritime accidents might cause from every component, equipment, or system.
Interestingly, our results show that (9,569 / 19,175= 49.9%) of maritime accidents reported
involve general shipboard activities. This result is reasonable because almost shipboard
activities rely on crew and labour. The percentage of bridge procedure is associated with

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(4,483 / 19,175= 23.38%) of maritime accidents reported, when the bridge procedure is
carried out due to during collision, contact, or grounding accidents. Obviously, such bridge
procedure under emergency will increase the likelihood of human errors.

Table 5 – Maritime accidents related to component, equipment, or system

Accident to Collision Contact Grounding Hazardous Machinery Failure Person Total
Person Incident Overboard
Auxiliary machinery 43 3 32 13 17 78 8 302
Bridge procedure 41 1,174 991 1,292 802 75 22 4,483
Deck machinery 71 4 3 9 30 43 23 199
Electrical 21 1 4 12 9 83 179
Flooding 1 1 4 11 3 210
Foundering 5 4 63
General management / procedure 405 37 44 116 121 91 96 1,085
General shipboard activities 7,895 57 95 60 312 119 614 9,569
Main Machinery 25 16 51 30 31 738 1,029
Maneuverability 1 29 45 12 4 2 98
Navigation / communication equipment 3 46 16 50 17 3 140
Operational design 68 3 6 2 95
Pollution 1 4 71
Safety equipment and emergency response 102 5 5 3 37 84 64 421
Stability 11 2 4 16 222
Structural integrity 11 36 6 20 4 12 3 141
Blank 151 151 15 172 19 50 68 861
Grand Total 8,848 1,566 1,310 1,802 1,425 1,390 926 19,175

Source: MAIB

Table 6 shows groups and subgroups of human factor in under another representation to use
in probabilistic failure analysis if needed. The frequencies are computed thus, possibilities
can easily be found to find the occurrence probability of the desired failure investigation.

Table 6 – Human factor group and subgroups

Human Factor Number of accidents Percentage (%)

People 11,816 61.62%
System – Company and organization 1,341 6.99%
System – Crew factors 2,532 13.20%
System – Equipment 1,620 8.45%
System – External bodies liaison 387 2.02%
Working Environment 1,122 5.85%
Blank 357 1.86%
Grand Total 19,175 100%
Source: MAIB

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4. Discussion

4.1. Present Risk Management System

The MAIB is responsible for investigating all maritime accidents occurring in UK vicinity
and all UK vessels worldwide. Its principal function is to ensure safe operation of the ports
and all British waters as well as regulating functions.

Such findings echo the conclusion of De and Ghosh (2003) that marine traffic risk is coupled
with maritime safety, port and shipping efficiency and maritime accident analysis. Thus, for
United Kingdom authority, it is considered more appropriate to identify and target local risks,
than seek parity with international practice.

4.2. Policy Implications

The policy implications derived from this study are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Since the dominant marine accidents in United Kingdom were collisions and contacts, such
human factor-type accidents are strongly correlated to traffic activity and systemic settings.
The human factor- type accidents shared a higher percentage in United Kingdom than the
worldwide average. It is expected that when the traffic volume increases, the likelihood of
Human factor will increase. Consequently, more effort should be expended on improving the
traffic system than to on individual training and shipping management.

It is identified from Table 4, that collision frequency versus ship visits is on a consistent
downward trend, reflecting improvements in shipping management and traffic control. Safety
issues of maritime structures have also been considered Yip et al. (2002). The principal driver
behind the reduction in accident occurrence is the action of regulatory bodies with improved
tools (e.g. vessel traffic system, navigation aids) and shipping policy (e.g. ship specifications,
training requirements). The improvements made in this respect are a credit to all shipping
participants.

In contrast, human factor accidents are principally dependent on the safety culture of
mariners. Given that the largest proportion of these accidents are associated with passenger
vessels (5,772 / 19,175 = 30%), the ability of local authority to directly improve safety in
these areas is more critical. Recent initiatives (such as information posters on vessel over-
loading, and parallel enforcement actions) targeted against passenger vessels are clearly
addressing the key cause of some human factor accidents and will bear fruit in the long run.

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In reality, human factor could not only affect the likelihood of maritime accidents but also the
occurrence. Our results show that the inattention is the major type of human factor that has
increased the maritime risk, followed by inadequate procedures and risk perception.

5. Conclusions

The main objective of this study is to develop a data analysis model to investigate
relationships between maritime accidents and their contributing factors. The results of this
analysis should allow the identification of the main sources of maritime accidents with
human factor and at the same time provide useful information for laying down procedures for
safer operation and drawing up contingency plans. Human factor risk accounts for
approximately 46% of all accidents within United Kingdom waters. The maritime
environment of United Kingdom compares favourably with international average. Review of
time trends appears that a shift is underway from non-human factor to human factor being the
principal maritime accidents reported, although involving negligence/careless have the
greatest ability to result in maritime accidents. The findings provide a solid foundation for the
creation go a strategic marine traffic risk model and estimate future risk levels.

6. Appendix

Data of root causes for occurrences from 1993 and reported to MAIB by the end of April
2012 can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/yy2fs3dtvg.1

Data are provided for all vessel types, for accidents, injuries and near misses that those are
reported to MAIB.

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