| MONTGOMERY COLLEGE TAKOMA PARK CAMPUS LIBRARY ‘TAKOMA Pal THE UNFINISHED NATION A Concise History of the American People Volume Il: From 1865 Fifth Edition ALAN BRINKLEY Columbia University Iie i eae Gf Boston Burr Ridge, IL Dubuque, 1A Madison, WI New York San Francisco St, Louis Bangkok Bogoké Caracas Kuala Lumpur LUsbon London Madrid Mexico City Milan Montreal New Dethi Santiago Seoul Singapore Sydney Taipei Toronto“wonepunog Amauod orp Jo sseisnn Jo pavog atp Jo ueumeyp pur Smusp, senmeumpy [euOReN eff Jo sseasnn Jo preoq ap jo raquo © ‘ssouDES prey raypeay, 3eaH5 amp poe Lg6r us prEAsEEy Ye poem BumpeRy, osuona7] "y YdOsOf xp Wom 2fy AION TUMIY 30 JOHOR HROMSUIIEE] 4p Sem ay aTOYs GUSIOSIUA PLONO PUP, KOOHPS SIENPEID HOA AON, jo Azproara, AD amp ‘uonsouye ‘preasoey 28 ayBe 504 94 poe ‘Pree pur uoneourig 28 pawonpo sea fy usvu puy usean7 ae Lng, pur psy magynigey poog 22y suc fo pug 94 nang p Ley meray pueme Joog, [EUOREN, ¢g6T auP Uo YOR wnsaulcyaaU 292 po ‘wena, Jogang Sur long ssznag fo sanag yo sorpne 3p St 3EY -SIDATUN, BIQUIIOD 38 asouosg pur Aroasy Jo iossaOIg SUHON UTY 9p St STTINTAA NVIV royyny ay ynoqy a possi uopensoyer 9 Jo Ltsioan em snus 2005 uv nzmesgoyy 20 exxpne 2p Aq NWACIOpUD UP SkE}PU 04 $909 2 enpor 2 doped yo oan ogy ve sesnooe em mt SiR pot osEPPE SUNT Hy, 9449002 BOGEN TOLD HeHRHOD jo LEM AN nny HY al Sony rag ana eappenng ptoy Sony 9o0e @ gee mag "PH gfe OB BL “a re ass pu ud nad snags 961 ane] ones Heed UY HP) 240 sas 9 ypu i REA a a os ‘aseepnd 4 mee 2101 Hono) emery seg sug only prar-nif seep uuostodg 20725 s-tougee-10-0 ‘aH 0 £860900R00 058 os anmeat 29 203 dre auoucdnes iad pee lansep Zupaay “SEY au “Sucroy Sue 35) peouy 20 opmusien 20 Barossa po 30 You i ut 0 ftp et ‘104d NVOREENY TELL JO ANOUSIE ASTINOD V ‘NOLLYN GHHSINEINA BELL uoneonpa 20u6in EH a 6002 $2 Ar 99LSLS‘during which the rated and Ho the American: aboot Bi tatecasot ‘sbcubed the national: % é ‘t iu a Bees. ‘No issue in: twentieth-century. American. history has aroused more. del i ie ‘han the origins of the’ Cold War. Some have claimed that Soviet daplicity ‘created the intetnational tensions, others thar American” lease equally to blame : and expansionism creat prayocations and global ambitions were aa long shadow | decade. Th relation Kau, a reired ours sid head ofthe ike may Ataeas-coneaed abou Th book, pbohed a 1838 ae sel pm cats of pep196 (CHAPTER TWENTYNINE, Sources of Soviet-American Tension ‘At the heart of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 19403 was a fundamental difference in the ways the great powers envisioned the postwar world. One vision, first openly outlined in the Adantic Charter in 1941, was of 2 world in which nations abandoned their traditional beliefs in military alliances and spheres of influence and governed their relations with one another through democratic processes, with an international organization serving as the arbiter of disputes and the protector of every nation’s right of self-determination. ‘That vision omit Poem SPPEaled to many Americans, including Franklin ‘The other vision was that of the Soviet Union and to some extent of Great Britain, Both Stalin and Churchill had signed the Atlantic Charter. But Britain had always been uneasy about the implications of self decermination for its own enormous empire. And the Soviet Union was determined to create 2 secure sphere for itself in Central and Eastern Evrope as protection against possible future aggression from the West. Both Churchill and Stalin, therefore, tended to envision a postwar scruc- ture vaguely similar to the traditional European balance of power, in which the great powers would control areas of strategic interest to them. Gradually, the differences between these two positions would turn the peacemaking process into a form of warfare. Wartime Diplomacy Serious strains had already begun to develop in the alliance with the Soviet Union in January 1943, when Roosevelt and Churchill met in Casablanca, Morocco, to discuss Allied strategy. The two leaders could not accept Stalin’s most important demand—the immediate opening of a second front in western Europe. But they tried to reassure Stalin by announcing that they would accept nothing less than the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers, thus indicating that they would not nego- tiate a separate peace with Hitler and leave the Soviets to fight on alone, In November 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill traveled to ‘Teheran, Tran, for their first meeting with Stalin. By now, however, Roosevelt's most effective bargaining tool—Stalin’s necd for American assistance against Germany—had been largely removed. The German advance against Russia had been halted; Soviet forces were now launching their own west- ‘ward offensive. Nevertheless, the Teheran Confer- eaten ence seemed in most respects a success. Stalin agreed to an American request that the Soviet Union enter the war in the Pacific soon after the end of hostilitics in Enrope. Roosevelt, in turn, promised that an Anglo-American second froat would be established within six months. YALTA, 16 Franklin R enoughen later, nt oF the pros On already v Churchil ward, al Aiffeced s Poland th the claim London s governme three lead ‘More thar Stalin for Stalin’s re: the Sovier had lost ig ‘The nv internatior hammered ‘The new 1 every mem ‘manent re) Britain, Fre4d the Soviet ays the great ly outlined in as abandoned. nfluence and tic processes, dispuves and That vision ing Franklin ome extent of -ntic Charter ions of self- t Union was and Eastern am the West ‘ostwar struc of power, in rest to them. wuld turn the ace with the chill met in eaders could © opening of are Stalin by nconditional Md not nego- to fight on to Teheran, rsevele’s most cance against ance against sir own west- zran Confer- cccess. Stalin ae war in the zelt, in turn, » established pigh were shocked at he physical appearance of re et ental mectng at Yaa, Roosevelt hed athe was i fc gravely il Two months cally opis por. ‘YALA, 1945 Churchill (ef and Sean Franka Roosevelt (rte) when he ars rough encrgy wo perform capably at conference, raat rea er he gave Congress what tamed outto be sn unre aie troops for postwar peace he died, tome) On other matters, however, the origins of furure disagreements nt ‘of Poland. Roosevelt and already visible, Most important was the question f the Soviet border west ‘Clurchill were willing to agree to a movement of Caer owing Stalin to annex some histoseally Polish terion Boe they “Fale sharply on the nature of the postwar goverament in ts Porsoe of in independent. Roosevelt and Churchill sepported fe that had been functioning, in Pes Gan since 1940; Stalin wished to install another, pro-comman:s! exiled rant that had spent the war in Lublin, inthe Soviet Union. “The Berra left the “Teheran Conference with the sue unresolved Yalta More chan a year later, jn February 1945, Roosevelt joined Churchill and Malm for a peace conference in the Soviet city of Yalta, tn seusin for Saline genewed promise to encer the Pacific was, Roosevelt agreed that sane ec Union should receive some ofthe Pacific weritory hat Russia had Jost in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. OY The negotiators also agreed 104 lan for a NeW cent Ele international organization, one that bad been anernacd out the previous summer at conference in WasbiNglo™ DC. Nhe new United Nations would contain a General ‘Assembly, in which every member woukd be represented, ancl a Security Council, with per- cre representatives of the five major powers (ihe United States, th of which would have Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China), e#<78 CHAPTER TWENTYNINE veto paver. ‘The Security Council would also have temporary delegates {om several other nations. These agreements became the basis of the United Nations charter, drafted at a conference of fifty nations beginning ‘April 25, 1945, in San Francisco. In sharp contrast to the American rejec- tion of the League of Nations a generation before, the United States Sen- ate ratified the charter in July by a vote of 80 to 2. (It was, many inter- nationalists believed, @ “second chance” to create a stable world order.) ‘On other issues, however, the Yalta Conference produced no real accord, Basic disagreement remained about the postwar Polish govern ment. Stalin, whose armies now occupied Poland, had already installed a 3 ued RovEAMeNt composed of the pro-comumanist uggematrwerPilsd “I ubjin® Poles. Roosevelt and Churchill insisted that the pro-Westem “London” Poles must be allowed a place in the War- saw regitne. Roosevelt envisioned a government based on free, democratic élections which both he and Stalin recognized the pro-Western forces ‘vould win, Stalin agreed only to a vague compromise by which an unspec- ified number of pro-Western Poles would be granted a place in the gov- ernment. He reluctantly consented to hold “free and unfettered elections” in Poland on an unspecified Future date. They did not take place for more than forty years "Nor was there agreement about Germany. Roosevelt seemed to want a reconstructed and reunited Germany. Stalin wanted to impose heavy reparations on Germany and to ensure e permanent dismemberment of the nation, The final agreement was, like the Polish accord, vague and unstable. The decision on reparations would be referred to a farure com- mission, The United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union would each control its own “zone of occupation” in Germany—-the zones to be determined by the position of troops at the end of the war. Berlin, the German capital, was already well inside the Soviet zone, but because of its syinbolic importance it would itself be divided into four occupied Sectors. At an unspecified date, Germany would be reunited. As for the rest of Europe, the conference produced 2 murky accord on the estab- lishment of goveraments “broadly representative of all democratic ele- ments” and “responsible to the will of the people.” “The Yalta accords, in other words, were less a Prien ofthe Yale Seards serstoment of postwar issues than a sct of loose principles that sidestepped the most difficult questions. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin returned home from the conference each apparently convinced that he had signed an important agreement. But the Soviet {interpretation of the accords differed so sharply from the Anglo-American interpretation that the illusion endured only briefly. In the weeks follow- ing the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt watched with growing alarm as the Soviet Union moved systematically to establish pro-communist govern ‘ments in one Central or Eastern European: nation after another and as Stalin refused to make the changes in Poland that the president believed he had promised. Still believing the differences coukl be settled, Roosevelt left Washin Springs, Ge stroke and The new pn national isse ibility. Tron: who conside Saalin himse ‘Truman had with the Sov Molotor ane fact, Truman much of the divided amor ina war ind ond conflict able to get “ ‘was ultimatel He conce sions to the y ment, hopin influence the Truman met Churchill (wt replaced as pi tantly accept. had long dem any reparation ecu ‘The western United States pro-Soviet, ec American hope required a sto:emporary delegates ae the basis of the y nations beginning the American rejec: United States Sen- Te was, many inter able world order) produced no real war Polish govern- lalready installed a ve. pro-commanist Churchill insisted a place in the War- on ee, democratic aro- Western fores Y which an unspece a place in the gov- afettered elections” take place for more alt seemed to want to impose hea dismernbermene of accord, vague and dd to a future com- the Soviet Union emany—the zones of the war. Berlin, zone, but because into four occupied sunited. As for the cord on the estab- UW democratic ele- words, werg less a van a set of loose stions. Roosevelt, ce each apparently xt. But the Soviet ¢ Anglo-American the weeks follow- wing alarm as the ommunist govern- er another and as president believed settled, Roosevelt The Cold War refe Washington early inthe spring for a vacation at his retseayin Warm Springs, Georgia. There, on April 12, 1945, he suffered a sudden, massive stroke and died, "THE COLLAPSE OF THE PEACE “The new president, Harry 8, Truman, had almost no familiarity with ntes= sa aey res Nor did he share Roosevelt apparent faith in Soviet flex: Thi. Truman sided instead with the rany people inside the governatens ao ieedered the Soviet Union fandamentally wnrustworthy and viewed ‘Stalin himself with suspicion and even loathing. The Failure of Potsdam ‘Truman had been in office only a few days before he decided to “ger tough” with the Soviet Union. On April 23, he met with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and sharply chastised ‘him for violations of the Yalta accords, In fact, Truman had litle leverage. Russian forces already ‘occupied Poland and much of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. Germany wis already “divided among the conquering nations. ‘The United States was still engaged sea war in the Pacific and was neither able nor willing to enter into 4 so ‘ond conflict in Europe. Truman insisted that the United States should be ttle t0 get “85 percent” of what it wanted, but he - ‘was ultimately forced to settle for much less. ito Sri every He conceded first on Poland. ‘When Stalin made a few minor conces- sions to the pro-Western exiles, ‘Truman recognized the ‘Warsaw govern- ment, hoping that noncommunist forces might gradually expand their Snfucnce there. Undil che 1980s, they did not. ‘To ‘settle other questions, “Truman met in July at Potsdam, in ‘Russian-occupied Germany, with Churchill (who, after elections in ‘Britain in the midst of the talks, was replaced as prime minister by Clement “Attlee) and Stalin. Truman rehuc- tantly accepted the adjustments of the Polish-German border that Stalin sarong demanded he vefused, however, wo permit she Rossian 1 Cat any reparations from the American, French, ‘and British zones of Germany. ‘This stance effectively confirmed that Germany ‘would remain divided. “The western zones ultimately united into one nation, friendly to the ‘United States, and the Russian zone ‘survived as another nation, with a pro-Soviet, communist government ‘The China Problem and Japan American hopes for an open, peaceful world “policed” by the great powers aad a strong, independent China. But those hopes faced a major, perhaps(CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE, insurmountable obstacle: the Chinese government ee of Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was generally friendly to the United States, but his government was corrupt and incompetent with feeble popular support. Ever since 1927, the nationalist government he headed had been engaged in a biteer rivalry with the communist armies of Mao Zedong. By 1945, Mao was in control of one-fourth of the population. Some Americans urged the government to try to find a “third force” to support as an alternative to either Chiang or Mao. Teuman, however, decided reluctantly that he had no choice but to continue supporting Chi- ang. For the next several years the United States continued to pump money and weapons to Chiang, even as it was becoming clear chat the cause was lost. But Truman was not prepared to intervene militarily to save the nationalist regime. Instead, the American government began to consider an alternative to China as the strong, pro-Western force in Asia: a revived Japan. Aban- doning the strict occupation policies of the first years after the war (when General Douglas MacArthur had governed the nation), the United States lifted restrictions on industrial development and encouraged rapid eco- nomic growth in Japan. The vision of an open, aera united world was giving way in Asia, as it was in Europe, to an aceeptance of a divided world with a strong, pro-American sphere of influence. ‘The Containment Doctrine By the end of 1945, a new American foreign policy was slowly emerging. Ie became known as containment. Rather than attempting to create a uni- fied, “open” world, the United States and its allies would work to “con- tain” che threat of farther Soviet expansion. ‘The new doctrine emerged in part as a response to events in Europe in 1946, In Turkey, Stalin was trying to win control over the vital sea lanes to the Mediterranean. In Greece, communist forces were threatening the pro-Western government; the British had announced they could no longer provide assistance. Faced with these challenges, Truman decided to entn- Giate a firm new policy. In doing so, he drew from the ideas of the influ- ential American diplomat George F. Kennan, who had warned not long after the war that the only viable American response to Soviet power was a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expan- sive tendencies.” On March 12, 1947, Truman appeared before Congress and used Kennan’ warnings as the basis of what became known as the ae ‘Truman Doctrine. “I believe,” he argued, “that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” In the same speech he requested $400 million for aid to Greece and Turkey, which Congress quickly approved. The Au “Turkey and More impo would survir Although th within the the left belie fact, the caus not, as defer A less vi from many 1 ‘was too wea should be “re ing communi increasing en organizations Neither « 19405 and 19 ‘competing ch An integral p economie rec humanitarian’ remain an ecc rebuild; and a But above all could be don Western Eurc rapidly growic Jn June 19 {© provide ecx Soviet Union) Russia and its sixteen Wester, tion there was in Crechoslova communist gor Economie Coo the Marshall B next three year S12 billion of economie revivite Chinese government 3, was generally friendly ‘rrapt and incompetent nationalist government y with the communist ontrol of one-fourth of 1 to find a “third force” viao. Truman, however, ontinue supporting Chi- ‘es continued to. pump ecoming clear that the » intervene militarily to consider an alternative a revived Japan. Aban- cars after the war (when tion), the United States encouraged rapid eco- Che vision of an open, ay in Asia, as it was in ‘a strong, pro-American ‘ine cy was slowly emerging. empting to create a uni es would work to “con- nse to events in Europe sLover the vital sea lanes zes were threatening the zed they could no longer Yuman decided to enun~ na the ideas of the inlu- vo had warned not Jong nse to Soviet power was smnent of Russian expan >peared before Congress xe became known 2s the ve,” he argued, “that it United States to support sion by armed minorities “quested $400 million for ly approved. qi ste American eominitment ultimately helped ease Sovie: Pres Oo _Turkey and helped the Greek government defeat (he ‘communist insurgents. Weare important, it established a basis for American foreign policy that Motld survive for more than thirty years Opposition to Containment hough the containment policy attracted broad, nonpartisan support shoe United States, it was n0t without ccs, Hay ‘Americans on a afe believed that containment wes wnjustiahly ‘elligerent and was, in free the eause of an unnecessary breakdown of ‘American-Soviet relations, It of that breakdown. wee ge defenders of containment believed, a re5) Beenie but more widely held objection to copii caine from many more conservative Americans who ‘believed that containment feo rea a response to communism. Americi’s goal, they believed, TSA be “rolling back” the borders of communism no ‘imply contain- tng eormmonism within them. Many of these cts also opposed America’s ire easing engagement with the United Nations ‘and other international organizations. eAisher of these views had much influence on Americ! policy in the 1540s and 1950s, but both survived to become the basis ‘of important and Competing challenges to containment in the 19608 and beyond. ‘The Marshall Plan ‘An integral part of the containment policy was 2 proposal to aid in the ‘geonomic reconstruction of Western Europe. “There were many motives: rumanitarian concern for the European ‘people; a fear that Europe would pe an economic drain on the United States if it could not quickly rebuild; and a desire for a strong European. market for American goods: Bur above all, American policymakers ‘believed that unless something vonld be done to strengthen the shaky ‘pro-American governments in GRecnern Europe, those governments might fall under the control of rapidly growing domestic communist parties. Tn June 1947, Secretary of State George ‘G. Marshall announced 2 plan to provide economic assistance 10 ‘al European nations (including the Soviet Union) that would join in drafting a progr for recovery. Although Russia and its Fastern satellites quickly ‘andi predictably rejected the plan, Sateen Western European nations eagerly ‘participated. Whatever ‘opposi- er ahere was in the United States largely ‘vanished after a sudden coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, which established @ Soviet-dominated Communist government. In April, Congress approved the creation of the leonomie Cooperation Administration, the ageney that would administer the Marshall Plan, as it became known. Over the hhext three years, the Marshall Plan channeled over Rebs ory §12 billion of American aid into Europes helping to spark a substantial 32 onal By the end of 1950, Buropesn industria production had(CHAPTER TWENTYNINE risen 64 percent, communist strength in the member nations bad dectined, and opportunities for American trade had revived. Mobilization at Home Jn 1948, a the president’ request, Congress approved a new military draft ind revived the Selective Service System. In the meantime, the United States, having failed to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on inter- ational control of nuclear weapons, redoubled its own efforts in atomic watcarch, elevating nnclear weaponry to a central place in its military arse nal. The Atomic Energy Commission, ‘established in 1946, became the sspervisory body charged with overseeing all nuclear research, civilian and military alike. And in 1950, the Truman administration approved the development of the new hydrogen bomb, a ituclear weapon far more pow erful than those used in 1945. “The National Security Act of 1947 reshaped epee est aye nations major military and diplomatic instita- tions. A new Department of Defense would over- see all branches of the armed services, combining functions previously performed separately by the War and Navy departments. A National Security Council (NSC), operating out of the White House, would gov. ern foreign and military policy. A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Srould replace the wartime Office of Strategic Services and would be responsible for collecting information through both open and covert methods; 2s the Cold War continued, the CIA would also engage secretly jn political and military operations on behalf of American interests ‘The Negional Security Act, in other words, gave the president expanded pow- ‘ers with which to pursue the nation's international goals. ‘The Road to NATO “The United States also moved to strengthen the military capabil ‘Western Europe. Convinced that a reconstructed Germany was essential to the hopes of the West, Truman reached an agreement with England ‘and France to merge the three western zones of occupation into @ new West German republic (which would include the three non-Soviet sec- tors of Berlin, even though that city lay ‘within the Soviet zone). Stalin responded quickly. On June 24, 1948, he imposed 2 tight blockade trend the western sectors of Berlin. If Germany was to be officially ‘divided, he was implying, then the country’s Western government would shave to abandon its outpost in the heart ‘of the Soviet-controlled eastern zone. Truman refused to do so. Unwilling to risk Bern ie war through a military challenge to the blockade, he ordered 4 massive airlife to supply the city with food, fuel, and other needed goods. The airlift continued for more than ten months, trans- porting nearly 2.5 million tons of material, keeping a city of 2 ‘million pivot Borope allied w Shaded (aro peopk blocka the Fe East— Tl in effe em Ex lishingttions had declined, new military drafe atime, the United Union on inter- ‘efforts in atomic 1 its military arse- 1946, became the 2arch, civilian and on approved the on far more pow. 2 1947 reshaped plomatic instita- mse would over- stions previously ats. A’ National mse, would gov- Agency (CIA) sand would be pen and covert engage secretly a interests, The expanded pow- " capabilities of Ly was essential with England ion into a new on-Soviet sec- zone), Stalin ight blockade © be offically mment would zrolled eastern willing to risk the blockade, sel, and other ronths, trans- of 2 million Bee ‘The Cold Wer l Banc} DIVIDED EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR. This mop shows the sharp division that emerged in Europe afer Werld War Il between the area under the contol ofthe Soviet Union, and the area Aled with the United States. In the eat, Sovee concolor infience extended into all he nations ‘Shaded gold-inluding the caster half of Germany Inthe west an south, che greenshaded tutions were alld with the United Seates as members ofthe North Adantie Treaty Organization (NATO) The counties shaded brown were aligned with aither of the two superpowers. The femal map ia the upper right shows tbe division of Bevin among the varios ocaupying power at {heen of de war Eventusly, the American, Bris and French sectors were combined “ete West Berlin, city governed by West Germany but entirely surrounded by commanist Est Germany. » Hod be Wn eune Eset Germany fom abebing West Beri? people alive. In the spring of 1949, Stalin lifted the now ineffective hlockade. And in October, the division of Germany into two nations the Federal Republic in the west and the Democratic Republic in the East—became official “The crisis in Berlin accelerated the consolidation of what was already in effect an alliance among the United States and the counties of West- ‘ern Europe. On April 4, 1949, twelve nations signed an agreement estab- lishing the North Adlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and declaring (tee contin om pege 765)DEBATING THE PAST The Cold War Salt w For more than dete after the begining ofthe Cold Was, ew hisorian sw positon aay ans ty challenge the ofa Amerian interpretation of is orgs. The Finger ‘breakdown of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union was, stood. Sj ‘most agreed, a direct result of Soviet expansionism and of Stalin’s violation of the ee ond “arte agreements forged at Yalta and Potsdam. ‘The Soviet imposition of com- Junie regemes in Eastern Burope was part of larger idcological design to spread Communism throughout the world, American policy was the logical and neces- Scry responce: # frm commitment ro oppose Soviet expansionism and to keep | ‘American forces in a continual sae of readiness. | Dinillasionment with the oficial justificstions for the Cold War began 0 | find expression even in the late 1950s, when anticommunist sentiment in | Amesien remained strong and pervasive. William Appleman Williams’ Tée a ‘Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959) insisted that the Cold War was simply pan | States in (ie exis f a consistent American effort in the tweatieth cen- i the most recent version of i i fauy t0 preserve an “open door” for American trade in world markets, The malitary | Confrontation with the Soviet Union, he argued, was less 2 response to Soviet threat of Siggressive designs than an expression of the American belie in the necessity the Sovie ernmente of capitalist expansion. ‘As the Viewam War grew larger and more unpopular in the 1960s, the scholarly critique of the Cold War quickly gained intensity. Walter Leber ‘America, Rusia, end the Cold Wer, fst published in 1967, maincained that Amer~ : ica’s supposedly idealistic internationalism at the close of the war was in teality Jn Septen figure. fn eflort so ensure a postwar order shaped in the American image—with every weapon, ration open to American influence (aad to American trade). ‘That was why the American United States was so apt to misinterpret Soviet policy, much of which reflected ‘ment in ¢ a perfectly reasonable commitment to ensure the security of the Soviet Union 1949, Ch itself, as pare of a larger aggressive design, to th “The revisionist interpretations of the Cold War ultimately produced = hide reaction of their own: what has come to be known as “postrevisionise” schol- Aaa Brship. ‘The most important works in this school have attempted to suike a fe balance between orthodoxy and revisionism and to identify areas of blame and as parterns of misconceptions on both sides of thé conflict. An important easly In thi: | if Etstement of this approact was John Lewis Gaddis, Tbe United Staer and the review of | Cold War, 1941-1947 (1972), which argued that *neither side can, bear sole National : | responsibility for the onset of the Cold War” Both sides had limited options, and comm | fiven their Own political constraints and their own preconceptions. Other tion. The | : postrevisionist works-—by Thomas G, Paterson, Melvyn Lefer, William Tiub- George Ki | fon, and others—-have claboraced on ways in which-the United States and che distinetion Soviet Union acted in response to genuine, if not necessarily accurate, beliefs of fess imp about the intentions of the other, “The United States and the Soviet Union jae cha svete doomed to be antagonists,” Ernest May wrote in 1984. *There probably that the U ‘vas never any real possibility chat the post-1945 relationship could be anyching initiative ir | but hostility verging on conic.” 4 ae Since the fall ofthe Soviet Union in 1991, scholars have had access to newly mmnist exp | released Russian archives that have enciched—although not: fundamentally sic strategi | altered—the way historians view the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis, in We Now feo the | power, witl | \ i |«historians saw is origins. The 4iet Union was, violation of the csition of com- lesign to spread seal and neces- mand: to kesp ‘Wer began to Williams's The Yar was simply twentieth cen- markets, ‘The sonse to Soviee a the necessiry the 1960s, the alter Laleber’ yed that Amer- 1 was in reality senith every x was why the which reflected + Soviet Union ly produced s sionist” schol- ced to strike a 3 of blame and nportant ea States and he can bear sole ited options, pcions. Other William ‘Taub- States and the ccurate, beliefs Soviet Union ‘here probabl (abe anything cxess to newly fondamentally lis, in We Now 95) portays a = Cold War somewhat more dangerous than his own earlor studies, and those of anyother scholars, had portrayed, and argues tht the song anticommunist {positions of Margaret Thatcher, ‘Ronald Reagan, and Pope John Paul UI had ffrger impact of the weakening of the Soviet Union than previously under, BIBS lnilarly assisted by newly released archives, Arne Westad, in The Gla Toa Ten root the origins of the dangerous instability in the so-called Third ‘Glavld in the frequent interventions of both the Soviet Union and the, United States in the Cold War era. (ext eed fom page 762) chat an armed attack against one member would be considered an attack against all. The NATO countries would, moreover, maintain a standing military force in Europe to defend against what many believed was the threat of a Soviet invasion. The formation of NATO eventually spurred the Soviet Union to create an alliance ofits own with the communist gov- Emments in Eastern Europe, as formalized in 1955 by the Warsaw Pact. Reevaluating Cold War Policy In September 1949, the Soviet Union successfully exploded its first atomic ‘weapon, years catlier than predicted, shocking and frightening many ‘Americans. So did the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist govern~ nent in China, which occurred with startling speed in the last months of 1949. Chiang fled with his political allies and the remnants of bis army to the offshore island of Formosa (Taiwan), and the entire Chinese main- land came under the control of a communist government that many ‘Americans believed to be an extension ‘of the Soviet Union. The United Staves refused to recognize the new communist regime. Tn this atmosphere of escalating crisis, Truman called for 2 thorough review of American foreign policy. The result, @ iB National Security Council repore issued in 1950 ontatnent Egon and commonly known as NSC-68, outlined a shift in the American posi on. The frst statements of the containment doctrine—the writings of George Kennan, the Truman Doctrine speech—had made at lease some distinctions between areas of vital interest to. the United States and areas Of less importance to the nation’ foreign policy and had called on Amer. ica to share the burden of containment ‘with its allies. But NSC-68 argued that the United States could no longer rely on other nations to take the initiative in resisting communism. It must move on its own to stop com= tnunist expansion virtually anywhere it occurred, regardless of the fe strategic or economic value of the lands in question. Among ‘other things, the report called for a major expansion of American military power, with a defense budget almost four times the previously projected figure. 65[HARRY AND BESS-TRUMAN AT HOME. Senator Harty Truman and his wife Bess pose fr, Photographers ia he ithen of their Washington apartment, opgeting the “comuton man” cree rumen tesined throughout bis public bf. The pice was aken shorty before the Tote Democratic Nasional Convention, which would nominate Troan for vce president. Less ‘the Trumans would be living inthe White House. (eters) shana your lates, AMERICA AFTER THE WAR “The evises overseas were not the only frustrations the American people encountered after the war. The nation also faced serious, if short-lived, ‘economic difficulties in adapting to peace. And it suffered from an excep- tionally heated political climate that produced a new wave of insecurity and repression, ‘The Problems of Reconversion Despite widespread predictions that the end of the war would return ‘America to depression conditions, economic growth continued after 1945: Pent-up consumer demand from workers who had accumulated substan- tial savings during the war helped spur the boom. So did a $6 billion tax cut. The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, geen better known as the GI Bill of Rights, provided housing, education, and job training subsidies to veterans and increased spending even forther. ‘The wanted cexpresse benefits the war discrimis ernment limit ber ‘This of serion percent. unrest. B electrical United forty day 0 resum: mines. Br most of it a toul sh walked ot ‘Truman Recor minorities returning Tispanis, Some war ofa desire cent of wo to contin growing es Gehich left all combiz women. A: fore, wome (above all, Days after twenty-one “Fair Deal, ing of the I ‘0 ensure fc investment, and slum ch. and goverm161 “Tie Gold War “The GI Bill expressed the progressive hopes of many Americans who wanted to see the government do more to assist its citizens. Bue it also SEprescd some ofthe enduring inequalities in American lif, Few Co Bill copes were available to women, even though many women had assisted Bene effort in important ways. And while the GI Bill itself did not TReciminate against African Americans, its provisions giving local gov- carents juriadiction allowed southern states, in particular, to deny or jimit benefits to black veterans. "This flood of consumer demand contributed to more than two years of serious inflation, duri tes of 14 to 15 Dunrest. By the end of electrical, and steel United fine Workers out on sek, shutting forty days. ‘Truman finaly forced coal production “ss to resume by ordering government seizure of the se el ance iu the process, he pressared mine owners to grant the union mines. Figs demands, Almost simultaneously, the nation’ railroads suffered rose adown the first in the nation’ history—as two major unions aan anon strike, By chreatening to use the army to run the trains, Tainan pressured the stzkers back to work after only afew days. Raccpwerion was particularly difficult for the millions of women and imingeitien mbo had entered the work force during the war. With veterans miening hiome, employers tended to push women, Altican Americans, THispenis, and exhers out ofthe plants to make room for white mals, Caan workers, particularly women, left che work force voluntariiy, out See cine to return to their former domestic lives. But as many as 80 per, sear women workers, and vireally ail black and Hispanic males, wanted cot othe working, The postwar inflation, the pressure to meet the growing expectations ofa high-consumpson soci the rising divorce mre Ech lefe many women responsible for their own economic well-being) — GTretibined to create a high demand for paid employment among acon xs they found themselves excluded (rom industrial jobs, there- cee ets nen workers moved increasingly into other areas of the economy {above all, the service sector). The Fair Deal Rejected Days after the Japanese surrender, Traman submitted to Congress 2 Cecnry-one-point domestic program outlining what he later named the THune Deal.” It called for expansion of Social Security benefits, the rais- ing of the legal minimum wage from 40 to 65 cents st hour, a program ane oe ve faleemployment through aggressive use of federal spending and Savestment, a permanent Fair Employment Practices Act, public housing sat clam clearance, long-range environmental and public works plannig, nd government promotion of scientific research. Weeks later he ‘addedce (CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE, other proposals: federal aid to education, government health insranct find prepaid medical care, funding for the St. Lawrence Seaways and nationalization of atomic energy. Frat most of Truman's programs fell victim to the same public and congressional conservatism that had crippled the last years of the New eee tadeed, that conservatism seemed to be intensifying, as the Recmber 1946 congressional clections suggested. Using the simple but veusting slogan “Flad Enough?” the Republican Pasty won control of both houses of Congress, which quickly moved to reduce government spending and chip away at New Deal reforms. Its most notable action speneig le of the Wagner Act of 1935, in the form of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, better known 2s the “Tat-Hartley aaa svade illegd the closed shop (a workplace in which no one can be Net J alehout first being a member of # union). And although it concin- ted to permit the creation of union shops (in which workers rust jel we esvon after being hired), it permitted states to pass, “right-to-work” laws prohibiting even that. The Taft-Hartley Act also empowered the president to call for a ten- week “cooling-of? period before 2 strike by issuing an injunction against Say worke stoppage that endangered national safety or beach, Outraged aa son nd phion leaders denounced the measure as 2 “slave labor bill.” ‘Baar ‘The Taft-Hartley Act dis damage weaker unions in relatively lightly organized industries such as SRowisals and textiles, and it made much more difficult the organizing Sferackers who had never been union-members at all, especially in the South and the West. a a ‘The Election of 1948 ‘Truman and his advisers believed that ‘the American public was not ready to abandon the achievements ‘of the New Deal, despite the 1946 election results, As they planned their strategy for the 1948 campaign, therefore, they hoped to appeal to enduring Democratic loyalties. ‘Throughout 1948, “Truman proposed one reform measure after another (including, on February 2, the frst major civil right bill of the century) Te no one's surprise, Congress ignored ot defeated them all, but the president was building campaign issues for the fall These remained, however, the problems of Truman’ personal ‘unpopularity—the sssumpsion ‘among much of the electorate that i ess ‘stature and that his administration was w¢ BuleBawwcPy od inept—and the deep divisions within the Democratic Party. At the Democratic Convention that summer, two fac ‘Bons abandoned the party altogether. Angered by Truman's proposed civil Sts bill and by the approval atthe convention ofa ciil rights plank seesanform (engincered by Hiobert Humphrey, the reform mayor oft health insurance. ence Seaway, and » same public and years of the New ensifying, as the ing the simple but -duce government ost notable action | rm of the Labor 7 the Taft-Hartley ich no one canbe though it contin. vorkers must join 3 “right-to-work” ‘Taft-Hartley Acc © call for a ten- junction against health. Outraged “slave labor bill m the same day. ment. But it did adustries such as te the organizing especially in the lic was not ready he 1946 election paign, therefore, broughout 1948, (including, on ty). To no one’s e president was man’s personal ‘ctorate that he sation was weak ons within the immer, two fac- ’S proposed civil rights plank in form mayor of See 4 “The Cold War (58% of electorate voting) ee) HERB 6s oan Cemsers) 303 «105695 8.5) 21,969,170 (45) ern rs TEER sor tiem iomer teks) 8 eo | HER ny aac rope 2 as6108 eH oan (Commi, a ELECTION OF 1946 Despite the widespread expecation thatthe Republican candidate, Thomas ‘Dewey, woud easly defeat Truman in 1948, the president in face won «substantial re-election ‘icy that yese‘This nap shows the broad geographic reach of Trumaa’ vetry: Dewey swept Tost of che Novas, but Thuan dominated almost everywhere els. Suwon Thurmond, the ‘Ste’ Rights candidat, cared fur etatesin the South. ¢ What bad prompted Touraend to ere the Dement Parey and an for president obs on? go co werwnhe.com/aatinish Tntcractive version of Minneapolis), Southern conservatives walked out and formed the States’ Rights (or “Disiecrat") Party, with Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina as its nominee. At the same time, some members of the party's ef wing—contempruous of what they considered ‘Truman's ineffectual jeadership and his excessively confrontational stance toward the Soviet Unior—joined the new Progressive Party, whose candidate was Henry A. Wallace. "Many Democratic liberals who were unhappy with ‘Truman were unwill- ing to leave the party. The Americans for Demo- cae ee ADAY’s coalition of exscoramunie — ™*O= liberals, tried to entice Dwight D. Eisenhower, tn the popular war hero, to contest the nomination. Only after Eisenhower refused did liberals concede the nomination to ‘Truman. ‘The Republicans, jn the meantime, once again nominated Governor Thomas F. Dewey of70 CHAPTERTWENTY-NINE, New York. Austere, dignified, and competent, he seemed to offer an unbeat- able alternative to the president. Only Truman, it sometimes appeared, believed he could win. As the campaign gathered momentum, he became more and more aggressive, turn- ing the fie away from himself and toward Dewey and the “do-nothing, ¢good-for-nothing” Republican Congress, which was, he told voters, respon- Sible for fueling inflation and abandoning workers and common people. ‘To déamatize his point, he called Congress into special session in July to give it.a chance, he said, to enact the liberal measures the Republicans had recently writen into their platform, Congress met for two weeks and, pre- Gicably, managed 1 pas almost nothing use ‘On clection night, to the surprise of almost Spina Stes Vite veryone, he won a narrow but decisive and dramatic victory: 49.5 percent of the popular vote to Dewey's 45.1 percent (with the ‘two splinter partes dividing the small remainder evenly between therm), and an electoral margin of 303 to 189. Democrats, in the meantime, had regained both, houses of Congress by substantial margins. The Fair Deal Revived Despite the Democratic victories, the Fighty-first Congress was litde ‘more hospitable to Truman's Fair Deal reform. ‘Truman did win some important victories, to be sure. Congress raised the legal minimum wage from 40 cents to 75 cents an hour. It approved an important expansion of the Social Security system, increasing benefits by 75 percent and extending them to 10 million additional people. And it passed the National Housing Act of 1949, which provided for the construction of £810,000 units of low-income housing accompanied by long-term rent subsidies. But on other issues—national health insurance and aid to education ‘among them—Traman made little progress. Nor was he able to persuade Congress to accept the civil rights legislation he proposed in 1949, legis- Tation that would make lynching a federal crime, provide federal protec tion of black voting rights, abolish the poll tax, and establish a new Fair Employment Practices Commission to curb discrimination in hiring. Southern Democrats filibustered to kill the bill. ‘Undeterred, Truman proceeded on his own to battle several forms of racial discrimination. He ordered an end to discrimination in the hiring of government employees. He began to dismantle segregation within the armed forces. And he allowed the Justice Department to be- come actively involved in court battles against discriminatory statutes, ‘The Supreme Court, in the meantime, signaled its own growing aware: eis ness of the issue by ruling, in Shelley v. Kraemet = madimert (1948), that courts could not be used to enforce” private “covenants” meant to bar blacks from res: tions ¢ tific kx lead it Hirost knowle cruelty TE atom,” comple mately atomic ‘Nuclea areas electric celebraOn June 24, 1950, the armies of communist North Korea swept acrois their southern border and invaded the pro-Western half of the Korean peninsula. Within days, they had occupied much of South Korea, includ- ing Seoul, its capital. Almost immediately, the United States committed itself to the conflict. ‘The Divided Peninsula When World War I ended, both the United States and the Soviet Union had troops in Korea fighting the Japanese; neither army was wil ing to leave, Instead, they divided the nation, supposedly temporarily, "THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-1953 ‘These ro mape astra the changing fortunes of UN forces (hich were mostly American) in Kore daring the 1950-1953 war. The map atthe left shows the ‘eaten ofthe North Korean vation ofthe South in 1950; commons forces for ate controled “lof Koes excep a amall ees around Puss in the southeast On September 15, 1950, UN troops 5 ‘under Dough MacArthur landed i force arTachon and soon dave te Nor Koreans back across” tbe border Macc then puned te North Koreans well ino their om territory. The map at right shows the very difleret circumstances once te Chinese entered the war in November 1950 Chinese fores drove the UN army bac below te 38h parallel and, briefly, dep inc South ‘Korea blow Seoul The UN trop fought back othe prewar brder between North and South ‘Korea lito 1951, but the war then bogged dwn nto stalemate that cntined fra year and shall © Whe impact did she Keene War hve on American pln th cl 195088‘tates committed and the Soviet © army was will- 7 Aly temporacily, oF WINTER EN KOREA, 1950 An American soldier trades tothe crest of an cyan esate Map dering ber Sighting in Non Korea between American divisions nd Chiese commons Fees elad entered he waras the United Nation forces approached the Korean-Chinese ‘pordet (Tbe Naina Abies ond Res Adan) slong the 38th parallel. The Russians finally departed in 1949, lesving ehiad a communist government in the north with a strong, Soviet- equipped army. The Americans left 2 few months later, handing. control to the pro-Western government of Syngman Rhee. Anticommunist fet only nominally demo 0) eee atlg, he used his relatively small military primarily to sappress internal opposition. “The relative weakness of the south offered a strong temptation to nationalists in the North Korean government who wanted to reunite the ‘country, particularly after the American government implied that it did hot consider South Korea within its own “defense perimeter.” The Soviets we Chinese did not order the invasion, but they did not try to stop it ‘and supported the offensive once it began. Fi seer mediately on June 27, 1950, the president ordered limited ‘American military assistance to South Korea, and on the same day he appealed to the United Nations to intervene. The Soviet Union wat boycotting the Security Council a che time (to protest the councils refusal