Case Digest #1 - Fabian vs. Desierto | G.R. No.

129742 | September 16, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian and Private respondent Nestor V. Agustin were involved in
an amorous relationship. When misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents developed between
parties, the petitioner tried to terminate their relationship but the respondent refused and resisted
her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation, and threats.

Petitioner eventually filed a complaint against him seeking for his dismissal for violation
of Sec. 19, R.A. No. 6770 and Sec. 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807 under the category of
oppression, misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct. Respondent Ombudsman found
private respondent guilty of misconduct but later inhibited himself and transferred the case to
respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent from the administrative
charges.

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that — In all administrative disciplinary cases,
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court. (Sec. 27 of RA 6770).

Ruling:

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.

In line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43.

Case Digest #2 - City of Davao vs. RTC Branch 12, Davao City | G.R. No. 127383 | August 18,
2005

Facts:
 The GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction scheduling the
public bidding of GSIS properties for non-payment of realty taxes for the years 1992 to 1994
totaling (₱295,721.61). On 28 July 1994, the GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of
Levy on three parcels of land owned by the GSIS. Another Notice of Public Auction was
received by the GSIS setting the date of auction sale for 20 September 1994.

On 13 September 1994, the GSIS filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus
And/Or Declaratory Relief seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order, which, the
RTC issued for a period of twenty (20) days. At the pre-trial, it was agreed that the sole issue for
resolution was purely a question of law, that is, whether Sections 234 and 534 of the Local
Government Code have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of
realty tax.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS.  It concluded that notwithstanding the
enactment of the Local Government Code, the GSIS retained its exemption from all taxes,
including real estate taxes. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not a law may validly impose conditions for its future repeal.

Ruling:

No, this legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.

A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects and every legislative
body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. One legislature cannot
enact irrepealable legislation or limit or restrict its own power or the power of its successors as to
the repeal of statutes. The act of one legislature is not binding upon and does not tie the hands of
future legislatures.

Case Digest #3 - Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado | G.R. No. 105371 | November 11,
1993

Facts:

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. Which measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required
readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not
distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on
the independence of the Judiciary.

Issue:

Whether or not Sec 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is constitutional.

Ruling:

(1) Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution provides that "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The title of the
bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure.

(2) The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26
was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As
this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution.

Case Digest #4 - Acosta vs. Ochoa | G.R. No. 211559 | Oct. 15, 2019

Facts:

This Court resolves the consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 10591, or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act, and their corresponding provisions in the 2013 Implementing Rules and
Regulations for allegedly violating petitioners' right to bear arms, right to property, and right to
privacy.
 On March 25, 2014, licensed firearm owners Eric F. Acosta (Acosta) and Nathaniel G.
Dela Paz (Dela Paz) filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition, assailing the
constitutionality of the following provisions of law and acts:    

(a) Sections 4(g), 10, 26, and 39 (a), all of Republic Act No. 10591;
(b) Sections 4.4.(a), 4.10(b), 7.3, 7.9, 7.11.2(b), 7.12(b), 10.3, 26.3, 26.4, and 39(1)(a)
of the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations; and
(c) The requirement of signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection
in the pro forma application form for firearm registration, for violating Article III,
Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Issues:

Whether or not the Chief of the Philippine National Police added penal provisions in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations, thereby invalidly exercising a power exclusively vested in
Congress.

Ruling:

As an exception to the non-delegation of legislative power, Congress has historically

delegated to the chief of the police force the power to approve or disapprove applications for
license to possess or deal with firearms. Under Republic Act No. 6975, or the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, the authority to issue licenses for the possession of
firearms and explosives is now exclusively granted to the Philippine National Police.

Pertinently, the power to make laws-the legislative power-is vested in Congress. The rule
which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It
admits of exceptions. Ond of its exception permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing
power and such licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and
regulations.

Case Digest #5 - Sema vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 177597 | July 16, 2008

Facts:

The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for
the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight
municipalities. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed
of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao but it did not include Cotabato
City as part of the province.
 On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 renaming the legislative
district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City)." In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14
May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City," prayed for
the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the
votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. 

Issue:

(1) Whether or not Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional;
(2) If in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province.

Ruling:

(1) The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and
provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. Under Section 19, Article
VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.

(2) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in
the House of Representatives. Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

Case Digest #6 – Aquino III vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 189793 | April 7, 2010
Case Digest #7 – Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 176970 | December 8, 2008
Case Digest #8 – Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 136781 | October 6, 2000
Case Digest #9 – Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 147589 | June 26, 2001

Facts:

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for
registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the
Comelec, "verifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and
organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party was heard.” With
the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements,
review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a
decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and
individual resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the
disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the
Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001.

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution
No. 3426 dated December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective
Manifestations, stating their intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and
political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filed Motions for
Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list
elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
(2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.

Ruling:

(1) Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the
party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may
be registered under the party-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be

valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list

system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

(2) Political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-
list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:

"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
 (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number
of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after
the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." (Emphasis supplied.)

Case Digest #10 – Atong Paglaum vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 203766 | April 2, 2013

Facts:

In an attempt to overturn several Comelec resolutions disqualifying them from the May
2013 party-list contest, 52 party-list groupings and organizations filed separate petitions with the
Supreme Court. The Comelec ruled, among other things, that these party-list groups and
organizations failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, that their nominees
did not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and that some of the
organizations or groups were not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent in
Congress in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November, and December of 2012.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners

from participating in the May 2013 party-list election.

Ruling:

No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since
the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning
the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to
the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to
register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or
organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.   The
present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly
qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters
prescribed by this Court.

Case Digest #11 – Trillanes vs. Castillo-Marigomen | G.R. No. 223451 | March 14, 2018

Facts:

Petitioner, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed Proposed Senate Resolution No.
826 directing the Senate's Committee on Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations to
investigate, in aid of legislation, the alleged overpricing of the new 11-storey Makati City Hall II
Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall Building, and
related anomalies purportedly committed by former and local government officials.

Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly during gaps
and breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings, he expressed his opinion that
based on his office's review of the documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or
"nominee" or is acting as a "dummy" of the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.

On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages against
petitioner, for the latter's alleged defamatory statements before the media. He averred that
petitioner's accusations were defamatory, as they dishonored and discredited him, and malicious
as they were intended to elicit bias and prejudice his reputation. He further averred that such
statements were not absolutely privileged since they were not uttered in the discharge of
petitioner's functions as a Senator, or qualifiedly privileged under Article 354 of the Revised
Penal Code, nor constitutive of fair commentaries on matters of public interest.

Issue:

Whether or not the statements made by the petitioner are covered by the privilege of speech and
debate under Art. VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling:
 No. Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private
respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the so-called Hacienda
Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee
hearings in the Senate. It is evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of speech
or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The statements were clearly not
part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its committees. They were also not spoken in
the course of any debate in said fora.

Case Digest #12 – Jimenez vs. Cabangbang | G.R. No. L-15905 | August 3, 1996

Facts:

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of

its Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an
open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that
the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president.

The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that
Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end.
The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then
filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that
Cabangbang’s statement is libelous.

Issue:

Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of
Congress. 

Ruling:

According to Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of
the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place.”

The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to
utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as
well as bills introduced in Congress.
 The Supreme Court does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the
point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed
Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and
the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described
as “planners” include these two (2) high ranking officers. Wherefore the Petition is dismissed.

Case Digest # 13 – Adaza vs. Pacana, Jr. | G.R. No. L- 68159 | January 18, 2011

Facts:

Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the
January 30, 1980 elections. While the responded was the elected vice-governor for said province
Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27 and
April 27, 1984, respondent Pacana and petitioner Adaza filed their certificate of candidacy for
the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections respectively. In the ensuing elections, petitioner
won by placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.

Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa and respondent took his oath
of office as governor of Misamis Oriental and started to perform the duties of governor on July
25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this
petition to exclude respondent therefrom.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.
(2) Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost,
can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if
the said office is vacated.

Ruling:

(1) No. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from
holding any other office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and
unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. The language used in the
above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned
therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member.

(2) Yes. Section 13[2] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 specifically provides that "governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a
certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably,
respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed
 his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan

Case Digest #14 – Liban vs. Gordon | G.R. No. 175352 | January 18, 2011

Facts:

This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration filed by respondent
Richard J. Gordon (respondent) of the Decision promulgated by this Court on July 15, 2009 (the
Decision). In the Decision, the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate
when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the
PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution."

The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as it creates the
PNRC as a private corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under
the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be
a private corporation."

Issue:

Whether or not it is correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of
the constitutionality of the PNRC charter?

Ruling:

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it
was not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a
GOCC nor a private corporation. This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality
unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international
law.  This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the
issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. Thus, R.A.
No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive
portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence.
Case Digest #15 – Puyat vs. De Guzman | G.R. No. L-51122 | March 25, 1982

Facts:

On May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with
respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to
which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before any
administrative body".

Issue:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC
Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Ruling:

Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be

said to be appearing as counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection
of the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel. A
ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. In brief,
we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the
ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.