Garwood Civil Suit

Case 3:21-cv-00083-SPM Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 1 of 19 Page ID #1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOHN DOE 10 )
)
Plaintiff, ) Cause Number:
v. )
)
)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TRIAD ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL )
DISTRICT NO. 2, )
Serve: 203 E. THROP ST. )
TROY, IL 62294 )
)
ERIN GARWOOD )
Serve: 7420 CONNER LN )
EDWARDSVILLE, IL 62025-4668 )
)
and )
)
RODNEY WINSLOW )
Serve: 203 E. THROP ST. )
TROY, IL 62294 )
)
)
Defendants. )
COMPLAINT
NOW COMES Plaintiff John Doe 10, by his attorneys, and for his Complaint against
Defendants Erin Garwood, Rodney Winslow, and The Board of Education of Triad Community
Unit School District No. 2 (hereinafter, “the District”) states as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1. This is an action for damages brought pursuant to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,
42 U.S.C. § 1988, and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. Plaintiff brings
this action to address Defendants’ violations of Plaintiff’s civil rights, to hold Defendants
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responsible for the injuries he suffered due to sexual harassment and abuse perpetrated upon him
by a teacher and peers within his school, and to protect others from the pain of childhood sexual
abuse and harassment.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
2. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. §1681)
which is an act of Congress providing for protection of civil rights in as much as this case presents
a federal question. In addition, Plaintiff invokes this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) to hear and decide Plaintiff’s claims under Illinois state law.
3. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the events giving rise to these
claims occurred in Madison County, Illinois which is located within the Southern District of
Illinois.
PARTIES
4. Plaintiff John Doe 10 is an adult Illinois citizen, now age 19. Plaintiff was a minor
at all times relevant to the incidents described in this Complaint. Plaintiff resides in Madison
County, Illinois.
5. Defendant Erin Garwood is an adult Illinois citizen and resides in Madison County,
Illinois.
6. Defendant Rodney Winslow is an adult Illinois citizen and resides in Madison
County, Illinois.
7. Defendant Board of Education of Triad Community Unit School District No. 2 is
immediately responsible for the control and administration of the Triad Community School
District where the incidents in this case took place. Triad Community Unit School District No. 2
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is located in Madison County, Illinois. Defendant, the Board of Education, is responsible for
ensuring that the practices and policies of Triad Community Schools are in compliance with State
and Federal laws. The President of the Defendant Board of Education of the District is Jeff Hewitt.
Defendant Board’s principal office is located at 203 E. Throp St., Troy, IL 72294. The Triad
Community Unit School District No. 2 is a Federally Funded education program as it receives
federal financial assistance in the form of free and reduced school lunches and in other programs
for its students and further receives federal grants as required for litigation under Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C §1681 et seq.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
COMMON TO ALL COUNTS
8. Plaintiff attended multiple publicly operated and federally funded schools within
the District, including for Middle and High School.
9. Teacher Erin Garwood, worked at Triad Middle School, and was Plaintiff’s eighth-
grade science teacher.
10. Ms. Garwood began sexually harassing and abusing Plaintiff during the fall of his
eighth-grade school year and continued to sexually harass him through his junior year of high
school. The harassment consisted of sending him sexually harassing messages, e-mails, text
messages, and photographs. It further consisted in in-person stalking, leering, and lewd comments.
11. During the fall 2016, Plaintiff’s eighth-grade year, Garwood added Plaintiff as a
friend on a social media platform called Snapchat. Snapchat is a multimedia messaging application
that allows users send written messages and photographs that disappear after they are opened and
viewed. Garwood, a teacher, used Snapchat to send Plaintiff, her middle school student,
inappropriate messages. Garwood also sent Plaintiff sexually harassing text messages and e-mails.
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These messages discussed sex and other inappropriate topics for a teacher to discuss with her
student.
12. Toward the end of eighth grade, Garwood began sending Plaintiff extremely
sexually explicit messages. This continued through Plaintiff’s junior year of high school.
13. In her messages, Garwood told Plaintiff she found him “attractive,” and she
repeatedly asked Plaintiff to have sex with her. She told him about her sexual fantasies and
explained that these fantasies included him. She told Plaintiff she wanted to have sex with him in
her classroom closet. She sent Plaintiff a photograph of herself naked in a bathtub.
14. These harassing messages and comments continued until Plaintiff’s junior year of
high school.
15. In addition to teaching at the middle school, Garwood was also the Triad High
School dance coach. This meant that she spent time at the High School. Once Plaintiff entered
High School, he still encountered Garwood in hallways due to her position there. When Garwood
saw Plaintiff, she asked him to hug her. This made Plaintiff feel uncomfortable, especially due to
her sexually explicit messages. Garwood often waited for Plaintiff after wrestling practice to ask
him for hugs, when he and his teammates were shirtless.
16. Garwood continued to message Plaintiff throughout this time. She asked him to
have sex with her and sent him naked or otherwise revealing photographs of herself.
17. Garwood also contacted Plaintiff outside of school. In the summer of 2017,
Garwood went to Plaintiff’s house. She knocked on the door and asked for Plaintiff to come outside
to speak with her. She also attended Plaintiff’s baseball games and leered at him from the
bleachers. This was done all under the context of her explicit messages telling Plaintiff she wanted
to have sex with him.
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18. Garwood repeatedly told Plaintiff not to report her behavior because it would “ruin
her life.” She manipulated him to guilt him into staying quiet. Her behavior was emotionally and
sexually abusive.
19. Other students noticed Garwood was harassing Plaintiff. By the end of Plaintiff’s
junior year of high school, in 2018-2019, Plaintiff’s classmates openly discussed it. However, these
were children who failed to understand abuse dynamics, and this was a toxic culture that failed to
explain to children that males can be victims of sexual abuse by their teachers. The talk was in the
form of further sexual harassment toward Plaintiff.
20. Students gossiped about the “relationship” Plaintiff had with a teacher and made
jokes about the situation. They teased Plaintiff about having sex with a teacher. Plaintiff knew
Garwood had other male victims because he had overheard similar comments and jokes about
other male students of Garwood’s in the past. The school personnel never intervened or told these
students that what they were discussing and joking about was abuse and that their statements
constituted sexual harassment.
21. The comments, jokes, and harassment from Plaintiff’s peers became so open and
prevalent that eventually, in or about May 2019, a teacher who heard the discussions about sex
with a teacher reported it to the School Resource Police Officer, Officer Kip Heinle.
22. Officer Heinle pulled Plaintiff out of baseball practice to question him about what
the students had been saying. During the questioning, Officer Heinle told Plaintiff one of the
teachers heard he had a sexual relationship with Garwood. No one explained to Plaintiff he was a
minor who was unable to consent, or that sexual harassment and abuse by teachers was illegal.
Plaintiff became overwhelmed with fear thinking that he was in trouble with the school.
Accordingly, Plaintiff, a terrified high schooler, lied and said nothing happened between him an
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Garwood. Plaintiff did not mention the texting, Snapchats, or messages to Officer Heinle. The
School Resource Police Officer saw Plaintiff’s demeanor and did not believe him.
23. Officer Heinle called Plaintiff’s mother while Plaintiff was still in the room for
questioning. He told Plaintiff’s mother that Plaintiff “acted nervous” during questioning. He also
told Plaintiff’s mother he did not believe Plaintiff when he said that nothing happened with
Garwood. Officer Heinle later placed hotline call to the Illinois Department of Children’s Services
to report the abuse by Garwood.
24. Throughout the rest of May 2019, Plaintiff’s classmates continued to bully and
harass him about the victimization by Garwood. The sexual harassment consisted of jokes about
the abuse and accusations that Plaintiff had a sexual relationship with. his teacher. One of
Plaintiff’s classmates manipulated a photograph of Garwood and her husband to show Plaintiff’s
face on the husband’s body. The photograph circulated among the students.
25. On May 21, 2019, the Illinois Department of Family Services took Plaintiff to a
Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”) in Wood River, IL for a forensic interview regarding the
abuse. During the interview, a forensic interviewer who is trained to talk to children who have
been abused without being suggestive spoke to Plaintiff. An investigator with DCFS; the State’s
Attorney, Allison Foley; and Detective Kris Thorpe watched from behind a one-way mirror.
During the interview, Plaintiff revealed Garwood sent him inappropriate Snapchat messages and
photographs. Plaintiff gave his phone and social media account information and passwords to
investigators during the interview. From there, the police began a criminal investigation.
26. Upon information and belief, Defendant School District had actual knowledge that
Garwood was an abuser before and throughout the time that Garwood abused Plaintiff. After the
school had actual notice that Garwood had sexually harassed and abused Plaintiff and that students
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at the school were actively harassing Plaintiff about it, Administrators failed to act to eliminate the
hostile environment.
27. In addition, Defendant District failed to have required policies and procedures
and/or failed to follow those policies and procedures for Plaintiff to access his education following
the harassment. Defendant District failed to prevent the hostile environment that was created,
failed to address the hostile environment after having actual notice of it, and failed to provide
accommodations to Plaintiff to allow him to access and continue his education. As a result,
Plaintiff was forced to drop out of school due to fear for his safety in the hostile environment and
inability to move forward in his education at Triad.
28. At the end of May 2019, Plaintiff’s mother called Principal Winslow, the Triad
High School principal, to notify him Plaintiff would not return to Triad High School in the fall for
his Senior year. Plaintiff’s mother cited the hostile environment and sexual harassment as the
reason Plaintiff could not return. Winslow did discuss safety measures, accommodations or any
corrective measures that might address the environment and allow Plaintiff to continue his
education. Moreover, despite the criminal investigation and Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant
District did not investigate Garwood as required under Title IX.
29. In late June 2019, after school was out, and after Plaintiff informed Triad that he
would not return to the District, Principal Winslow called Plaintiff’s mother and asked her if she
and Plaintiff would come to the school for more questioning for the school’s “internal
investigation” into the allegations against Garwood. This “investigation” was required under Title
IX. However, it was required to have happened much earlier: as soon as the District became aware
of the harassment. Even with the late attempt to comply with Title IX, and the fact that Plaintiff
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and his mother agreed to participate, Principal Winslow never followed up. The District never
informed Plaintiff if any investigation was completed.
30. Garwood harassed other minor male students at Defendant District. Plaintiff heard
students talking about having sex with her. Moreover, the criminal investigation revealed other
victims. One stated that Garwood took him and several other students out to dinner in Missouri
and that she invited students to her house, illegally plying them with alcohol. That victim’s mother
also revealed knowledge of yet a third student who Garwood sexually abused.
31. The District allowed Garwood to resign from the District in the summer after
another student was discovered in her personal vehicle. Allowing abusive teachers to resign instead
of firing reveals a troubling policy and practice because it means the District has failed to reveal
these abuses on the record. Instead, the District allows abusive teachers to resign without any
notice of the abuse on their record. This allows child sex abusers to move freely to the next
unknowing school to abuse again. This policy and practice itself reveals a lack of concern about
teacher on student abuse.
32. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct and deliberate indifference
to Plaintiff’s rights under Title IX, Plaintiff lost access to his education and school programs as he
was unable to continue his schooling at the Defendant School District. He further suffered
educational, emotional and economic damages, injuries, pain and suffering, inconvenience,
emotional distress, and impairment of the quality of life.
33. Plaintiff had no choice but to quit the baseball team due to increasing depression
and anxiety, despite a promising athletic career as a prospective college athlete. Plaintiff’s
relationships with his peers were irreparably damaged by the continuous peer sexual harassment
which caused him distress and made it impossible to focus on his sports or education. As a result,
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Plaintiff had to drop out of high school and enroll at an entirely new high school during his senior
year. Plaintiff began attending Lebanon High School in 2019. Plaintiff has since graduated but not
at the same level of academic or physical accomplishment as before the abuse.
34. On December 5, 2019, Garwood was criminally charged with felony indecent
solicitation of a child and grooming based the abuse of Plaintiff described here. DCFS also
determined that Garwood committed “sexual exploitation.”
35. At all times relevant herein, Defendant District and District employees acted under
color of law in their actions and failures to act.
36. Defendant District engaged in gender discrimination and harassment and/or failed
to address a gender discriminatory hostile environment within their District. Defendant District’s
illegal acts and failures to act described herein were undertaken deliberately, with willful and
wanton intent and with malice, and deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s rights.
VIOLATIONS OF LAW
COUNT I
VIOLATION OF TITLE IX (20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.)
Against Defendant District
(Deliberate Indifference to Actual Notice of Prior sexual harassment by Garwood Leading
to Sexual Harassment of Plaintiff)
37. All paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference.
38. Upon information and belief, Defendant School District had actual knowledge that
Defendant Garwood sexually harassed students before she encountered and harassed Plaintiff. It
was well known and regularly discussed among students, teachers and Administrators that
Defendant Garwood was a sexual harasser and/or had committed specific acts of sexual harassment
and abuse against students before and during the time Garwood was harassing and abusing
Plaintiff.
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39. Defendant School District was deliberately indifferent to the known acts of sexual
harassment committed by Defendant Garwood before and during the time that she harassed and
abused Plaintiff.
40. Defendant School District failed to act to prevent Defendant teacher Garwood from
abusing and harassing other students, including Plaintiff after having this actual knowledge.
41. As a result of Defendants’ actions and/or failures to act, Plaintiff has suffered loss
of access to his education, emotional distress and psychological damage, and his character and
standing in his community have suffered from the harassment fostered as a direct and proximate
result of Defendant District’s deliberate indifference to the rights of students under Title IX.
COUNT II
Against Defendant District
(Official Policy Created by Pattern and Practice of Deliberate Indifference to Sexual
Harassment within the District That Created a Heightened Risk)
43. Defendant School District violated Title IX by intentionally pursuing an official
policy of discriminating on the basis of sex in the following ways:
a. Failing to have Title IX policies and procedures in place;
b. Failing to follow Title IX policies and procedures that were in place;
c. Failing to have a Title IX Coordinator to train and inform students, teachers and
staff about their rights and responsibilities under Title IX;
d. Failing to address sexual harassment within the district;
e. Allowing harassers and abusers to be emboldened by the lack of effective policies
and procedures in place to address sexual harassment within the District;
f. Encouraging a culture where male students who have been sexually abused and
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harassed are afraid to report for fear of further harassment and retaliation;
g. Encouraging a culture where male teenagers who have been sexually abused and
harassed by adults do not understand that they have endured abuse;
h. Encouraging and fostering a culture where students feel free to harass each other
about teachers on student abuse because the harassed and abused student was male
instead of female;
i. Creating a heightened risk of harassment and abuse of males within the District by
not taking prior harassment and abuse of males seriously; and
j. Creating a heightened risk of harassment and abuse of males within the District by
fostering toxic gender stereotypes that males are not supposed to be bothered by (or
are even supposed to enjoy) such harassment and abuse.
44. In addition, the perpetrator here, Defendant Erin Garwood, had gotten away with
her sexually harassing and abusive behavior with students for so long under the policies and
procedures of deliberate indifference within the District. Having been a District employee for a
sufficient time, Garwood was aware the District failed to punish teachers and other employees for
gender harassment and abuse that she was specifically emboldened to harass and abuse with
abandon. This created a heightened risk for students, like Plaintiff, who encountered her at school.
Defendants had actual knowledge of this heightened risk.
43. Defendant Garwood and other teachers, staff and administrators’ behavior with
regard to these Title IX issues was subject to the School District’s control.
44. Plaintiff was sexually harassed as a result of Defendant’s Official Policy created by
this Pattern and Practice of Deliberate Indifference to Sexual Harassment within the District that
created a heightened risk of harassment and abuse within the District.
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45. As a result of Defendants’ actions and/or failures to act, Plaintiff has suffered loss
of access to his education, emotional distress and psychological damage, and his character and
standing in his community have suffered from the harassment fostered as a direct and proximate
result of Defendant District’s deliberate indifference to the rights of students under Title IX.
COUNT III
Against Defendant School District
(Deliberate Indifference to Sexual Harassment by Peers)
46. Plaintiff endured sexual harassment by peers including but not limited to the
dissemination of harassing photographs coupled with harassing comments and taunts related to
having been abused and sexually harassed by a teacher, Erin Garwood at school.
47. The School District had actual notice of this peer harassment.
48. Upon information and belief, teachers and administrators and others with authority
witnessed and/or were aware of this harassment within the school by means of being in the school
daily. This is evidenced by School Administrators’ statements to Plaintiff’s mother that they
thought they had dealt with the problem of the harassing photograph of Plaintiff and Garwood
sufficiently.
49. The sexual harassment that Plaintiff suffered at the hands of peers was based on
gender discrimination and gender stereotypes and was so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it deprived Plaintiff of access to educational opportunities or benefits provided by
the Defendant School District. However, Defendant School District did not respond to the actual
notice of the sexual harassment.
50. As a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the sexual harassment that
Plaintiff suffered at the hands of his peers, the harassment continued to escalate to the point that
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Plaintiff had to drop out of the school baseball program and then eventually had to leave the school
altogether.
51. The Defendant School District’s failure to promptly and appropriately respond to
the sexual harassment resulted in Plaintiff, based on his sex being excluded from participation in,
being denied the benefits of, and being subjected to discrimination in the School’s education and
extracurricular programs in violation of Title IX.
52. Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress and psychological damage, and his
character and standing in his community have suffered from the harassment fostered as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant School District’s deliberate indifference to his rights under Title
IX.
COUNT IV
(Deliberate Indifference to a Hostile Environment)
54. The sex-based harassment articulated perpetrated by Defendant Garwood and by
Defendant’s peers described above was so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it led
to a hostile environment for Plaintiff at school. The hostile environment then deprived Plaintiff of
access to educational opportunities or benefits provided by the Defendant District.
55. The Defendant School District created, subjected and/or failed to address the
hostile educational environment that Plaintiff endured at school in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“Title IX”).
56. Plaintiff was subjected to repeated, regular sexual harassment by a teacher and by
other students.
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57. The harassment was based on sex, was sexual in nature, and was related to issues
surrounding sexual abuse.
58. Defendants created a hostile educational environment due its deliberate
indifference to known harassment by a teacher and by other students, its lack of policies and
procedures to address repeated harassment, its failure to follow policies and procedures related to
repeated harassment, and its failure to properly investigate and/or address the sexual harassment.
59. Defendant School District failed to respond to the sexual harassment in a manner
that was clearly unreasonable. As a result, Plaintiff was excluded from participation in, denied the
benefits of, and was subjected to discrimination in the District’s education and sports programs in
violation of Title IX.
60. Defendant School District’s failure to take immediate and effective remedial steps
to resolve the complaints of sexual harassment forced Plaintiff to endure a hostile environment at
school.
61. Defendant School District persisted in its actions and inactions even after it had
actual knowledge of the sexual harassment to Plaintiff.
62. Plaintiff suffered emotional distress and psychological damage, economic
damages, institutional betrayal as a proximate cause of Defendants actions. Plaintiffs are entitled
to attorney’s fees for this claim.
COUNT V
(Failure to Accommodate)
64. Defendant School District failed to accommodate Plaintiff following actual notice
of known sexual harassment.
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65. Defendant School District failed to provide safety measures for Plaintiff to help
him stay safe from the abusive teacher or the harassing students despite actual knowledge of the
harassment.
66. Defendant School District failed to provide any accommodations to aid Plaintiff in
accessing his education and/or School District sports participation following reports of sexual
harassment.
67. Because of Defendant’s actions and/or inactions, Plaintiff’s lost sports and
education opportunities culminating in his need to leave the School District completely.
68. Plaintiff was afraid for his safety at school such that it affected his access to
education and extracurricular activities.
69. As a direct result of Defendant’s actions and failures to act, Plaintiff has suffered
emotional distress and psychological damage, institutional betrayal, economic damages, as a direct
and proximate result of Defendant District’s deliberate indifference to her rights under Title IX. In
addition, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees for this claim.
COUNT VI
1983 VIOLATION (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Against Individual Defendant Erin Garwood
71. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff has the right at a public school district
to personal security and bodily integrity and Equal Protection of Laws.
72. Defendant teacher Erin Garwood, as a teacher at Triad High School, was a State
actor acting under color of state law. She is sued in this Count in her individual capacity.
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73. Defendant Garwood knowingly subjected Plaintiff to violations of his right to
personal security and bodily integrity and Equal Protection of Laws by sexually harassing and
abusing Plaintiff.
74. Plaintiff suffered emotional distress and psychological damage, educational harm,
institutional betrayal, and economic damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant
District’s deliberate indifference to his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff is also
entitled to legal fees for this claim.
COUNT VII
1983 VIOLATION (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Against Individual Defendant Winslow
76. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff has the right at a public school district
to personal security and bodily integrity and Equal Protection of Laws.
77. Defendant Principal Rodney Winslow, as the Principal of Triad High School, was
a State actor acting under color of state law. He is sued in this Count in his individual capacity.
78. Defendant Winslow knowingly subjected Plaintiff to violations of his right to
personal security and bodily integrity and Equal Protection of Laws. Defendant Winslow had
knowledge that Plaintiff was being sexually abused and harassed by his teacher and by other
minors and failing to act for the student’s safety. Defendant’s actions and failures to act were taken
due to gender discrimination, and gender stereotypes.
79. Plaintiff suffered emotional distress and psychological damage, educational harm,
institutional betrayal, and economic damages as a direct and proximate result of Defendant
District’s deliberate indifference to his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff is also
entitled to legal fees for this claim.
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COUNT VIII
Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.)
Against Defendants Garwood and District
81. It is the public policy of Illinois to prevent sexual harassment in elementary,
secondary, and higher education.
82. Defendant District is an Institution of Elementary, Secondary, or Higher Education
as defined by 775 ILCS 5/5A-102(A).
83. Defendant Garwood is an Elementary, Secondary, or Higher Education
Representative as defined by 775 ILCS 5/5A-102(D).
84. Plaintiff is a student as defined by 775 ILCS 5/5A-102(C).
85. In relevant part, 775 ILCS 5/5/A-102(E) defines sexual harassment as “any
unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors made by an elementary, secondary, or
higher education representative to a student, or any conduct of a sexual nature exhibited by an
elementary, secondary, or higher education representative toward a student, when such conduct
has the purpose of substantially interfering with the student's educational performance or creating
an intimidating, hostile or offensive educational environment.
86. Defendant Garwood committed a civil rights violation, in violation of 775 ILCS
5/5A-102(A) when she committed and engaged in sexual harassment of Plaintiff.
87. Defendant District committed a civil rights violation, in violation of 775 ILCS
5/5A-102(B), when it failed to take appropriate disciplinary action against a representative of an
institution of elementary, secondary, or higher education when it knew that the representative was
engaging in sexual harassment at school.
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88. As a proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff has suffered emotional
distress such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, inconvenience, humiliation, embarrassment,
loss of enjoyment of life, and stress.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests judgment in his favor and against
Defendants, as follows:
A. Award Plaintiff such damages as would fully compensate him for his injuries
caused by the Defendants’ actions;
B. Punitive damages;
C. Statutory interest;
D. Costs and expenses;
E. Reasonable attorney fees;
F. Grant any additional relief as the court deems just and proper.
JURY DEMAND
Pursuant to Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff respectfully demands
a trial by jury on all issues triable by a jury.
Respectfully submitted by:
/s/ Sarah Jane Hunt

Thomas E. Kennedy, III,
Sarah Jane Hunt
MaryAnne Quill
KENNEDY HUNT, P.C.
4500 W Pine Blvd
St. Louis, MO 63108
Tel: (314) 872-9041
Fax: (314) 872-9043
tkennedy@kennedyhuntlaw.com
sarahjane@kennedyhuntlaw.com
mquill@kennedyhuntlaw.com
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/s/ Nicole E. Gorovsky

Nicole Gorovsky
GOROVSKY LAW, LLC
4500 W Pine Blvd
St. Louis, MO 63108
Tel: (314) 272-3255
Fax: (314) 787-6101
Nicole@Gorovskylaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
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Case 3:21-cv-00083-SPM Document 1-1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #20

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JOHN DOE 10 )
) Cause Number:
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
BOARD OF EDUCAION OF TRIAD )
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL )
DISTRICT NO. 2, ERIN GARWOOD, )
and RODNEY WINSLOW )
)
Defendants. )
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

PURSUING THIS ACTION UNDER PSEUDONYM
Comes now, John Doe 10, by and through his attorneys, Kennedy Hunt PC and Gorovsky
Law, and request permission from the Court to file this matter using pseudonym. Plaintiff submits
this motion and memorandum to address the circumstances that necessitate allowing him to litigate
this matter under a pseudonym.
Plaintiff is filing his complaint in this case under the pseudonym John Doe 10. John Doe
10 is a young adult who was repeatedly sexually harassed by his teacher, Defendant Erin Garwood,
and peers at Triad Community Unit School District No. 2, while he was a minor. Plaintiff seeks to
remain anonymous to the public because Plaintiff is a young adult and because of the nature and
circumstances regarding his abuse as a minor. If Plaintiff is required to use his name in the
prosecution of this lawsuit, he and his family will be subject to embarrassment, oppression, and
re-victimization.
Accordingly, he requests that this Court find good cause to allow him to proceed
anonymously and to issue a protective order in this matter to bar Defendants from revealing his
name and/or personal information to the public.
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I. Legal Grounds for Allowing Plaintiff to Proceed Anonymously
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) states that “the court may, for good cause, issue an
order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense.” Accordingly, there is statutory authority given to allow judges the discretion to protect
a party’s identity.
There is also judicially espoused authority granting judges this discretion if there is good
cause. In Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir 2004), the Seventh Circuit explained
that although judicial proceedings generally are supposed to be open, the presumption of openness
can be rebutted for good cause shown. Further, the United States Supreme Court has implicitly
recognized the use of pseudonyms. See e.g. Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Doe v Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
Plaintiff can show good cause exists in this case to keep his identity confidential. “For good
cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm
will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips v. GMC, 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir 2002).
In Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, ll2 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997),
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the use of fictitious names is disfavored, and the
judge has an independent duty to determine whether exceptional circumstances justify a departure
from the normal method of proceeding in federal courts. Id. However, the Court also concluded
that exceptional circumstances that warrant allowing the use of fictitious names include protecting
the privacy of children, rape victims, and other particularly vulnerable parties or witnesses. Id.
Likewise, although the plaintiff in Doe v. City of Chicago, was not able to show good cause
and rebut the presumption in her case of sexual harassment, the Seventh Circuit noted that had the
suit been about a minor, rape or torture, the Court would have seen it differently. 360 F.2d at 669.
2
In John Doe v. Freeburg Community Consolidated School District No. 70, No. 10-CV-
00458-JPG, the Court considered a case of abuse and harassment and issued the protective order.
The present case has facts to rebut the presumption of identity disclosure because it
involves repeated sexual harassment to a minor. Here, Plaintiff was sexually harassed by his
teacher and by his peers at school while he was a minor and attending high school. The facts in the
complaint show that he suffered sexual harassment, bullying and emotional abuse from peers at
his school relating to much more serious criminal sexual enticement and harassment by his teacher
that began when he was a middle-schooler. Plaintiff is still a young adult, now in college. He is
just beginning to escape the community that made life so difficult for him. Revealing his identity
now, as he seeks justice for the offenses committed against him, threatens to expose his
victimization to his new college community and re-open these wounds. These experiences are still
sensitive to him and he looks to move forward with his life free from the oppression and
humiliation.
In Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that the District Court abused its discretion when refusing to allow a minor to
proceed anonymously in a civil case involving child pornography. Although this is not a child
pornography case where the jury may see images of the plaintiff’s abuse, this is a case that compels
plaintiff to disclose information that is “of the utmost intimacy.” Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186
(5th Cir 1981).
Perhaps the most obvious reason for allowing the use of a pseudonym is to protect a
plaintiff who has already been crushed by those he trusted from suffering further harm. As noted
by a Massachusetts court presented with a similar issue:
[f]or many victims of sexual abuse, … public revelation of the abuse, if not sought
by them, victimizes them yet again. It stigmatizes them as victims of such abuse,
3
generates conversations that may re-open emotional wounds that had only begun to
heal, and causes others, even those who mean well, to treat them differently. If the
identit[ies] of these victims are not protected by the courts, then their access to the
courts will be severely diminished, because they will not be able to turn to the courts
for relief from or compensation of their emotional injuries without aggravating
those same injuries.
Globe Newspaper Co., Inc. v. Clerk of Suffolk County Superior Court, 2002 WL 202464, *6, 14
Mass.L.Rptr. 315 (Mass.Super., 2002).
II. Circumstances of This Case Warrant Protection of Plaintiff’s Identity
The instant case involves allegations of sexual harassment and emotional abuse of a minor.
Clearly, sexual harassment and abuse involving minors is a highly sensitive and personal matter.
Plaintiff’s descriptions of how the perpetrator, who was his teacher, harassed him are explicit and
humiliating. Requiring Plaintiff to use his true identity would immediately expose him to the public
further as a victim of sexual harassment and abuse. Plaintiff’s desire to remain anonymous is
understandable and his interest in protecting his identity outweighs any interest in favor of open
judicial proceedings. This is particularly true when, as here, Defendants will know the identity of
Plaintiff and can continue with the litigation without prejudice.
Plaintiff fears embarrassment in his community. Lawsuits involving sexual abuse evoke
strong emotions and anger. Moreover, it is not run of the mill embarrassment that is at issue here,
as Plaintiff in this case is particularly vulnerable. Plaintiff endured sexual harassment and abuse
for a significant period of time in school while he was a minor. When his peers found about his
victimization, they ridiculed him. Accordingly, Plaintiff is all too familiar with what happens
when his identity is revealed along with this sensitive information. As a result of the ridicule at his
school, Plaintiff was forced to leave his sports team and change schools. His fear of being
ostracized and ridiculed again is justified. Moreover, the stigma of being a male victim of sexual
harassment and enticement exacerbates the humiliation for this particular victimization. It should
4
not be that way, but in our society, a sexual harassment and child enticement victim is somehow
seen in the community as less deserving of kindness and empathy when the victim is male. In that
way, gender discrimination is abundant and adds to the stigma.
Defendants will be told of his identity, and that scares Plaintiff enough. But, if it is revealed
to the public, he will have to fear all of Defendants’ employees, their friends, their family members,
his former and current school mates, school personnel, and others in the community over whom
they may have influence. “The danger of retaliation is often a compelling ground for allowing a
party to litigate anonymously.” Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir 2004).
III. Strong Public Policy Reasons Require Plaintiff be Allowed to Proceed Anonymously
While protecting victims from further suffering is alone a sound policy reason weighing
enough to support allowing Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym, the benefits of such a decision
also promote the good of the general public. The reality is that the threat alone of potential re-
victimization in a public lawsuit regarding sexual abuse is enough to keep most victims out of the
courts. See Globe Newspaper Co., Inc. v. Clerk of Middlesex County Superior Court, 2002 WL
562658, *2, 14 Mass.L.Rptr. 412 (Mass.Super., 2002) (“Releasing [the victims’] names and
identifying information . . . carries the unacceptable risk that they will be re-victimized by the
possible stigma associated with the allegations that they were sexually abused.”); Jennifer J. Freyd
et al., The Science of Child Sexual Abuse, SCIENCE, April 22, 2005, at 308 (“[C]lose to 90% of
sexual abuse cases are never reported to the authorities”). Allowing such pressure to prevent those
few plaintiffs who would otherwise muster the courage to come forward against institutions would
prevent not only the individual from achieving some modicum of justice, but also prevents the
public from attaining the benefit that prosecuting such cases bring. In short, the reform that large
“meditating institutions” such as churches, universities, and schools undertake as a result of suits
5
like Plaintiff’s makes the public safer and the institutions themselves more trustworthy. Moreover,
Plaintiff’s case serves as a warning to the community at large to be awake to similar risks.
The federal courts have recognized the public benefit that results from allowing individuals
to pursue these types of cases under a pseudonym. One example of the court’s recognition of such
public benefit involved suits by individuals suffering from mental illness. There, the court held
that:
[T]here is substantial public interest in ensuring that cases like Plaintiff’s are
adjudicated and the rights of mental illness sufferers are represented fairly and
without the risk of stigmatization. However, this goal cannot be achieved if
litigants . . . are chilled from ever reaching the courthouse steps for fear of
repercussions that would ensue if their condition was made public. Although
any litigant runs the risk of public embarrassment by bringing their case and
revealing sensitive facts in a public courtroom, the situation here is vastly different
because Plaintiff’s bipolar condition is directly tied to the subject matter of the
litigation–his mental illness and the disability benefits he allegedly is entitled to as
a mental illness sufferer. . . . Plaintiff is faced with circumstances that society may
not yet understand or accept and his condition is directly tied to the issues before
the Court.
Doe v. Hartford Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 550 -551 (D. N.J. ,2006).
IV. Conclusion
For good cause shown, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter a protective order
in this case prohibiting the parties from revealing Plaintiff’s identity or identifying information to
any person who is not part of the Court or a party to this lawsuit, except for as is necessary to
consult with experts or potential witnesses.1
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Sarah Jane Hunt

Thomas E. Kennedy, III,
Sarah Jane Hunt
MaryAnne Quill
1
If the Court desires, Plaintiff will submit a Proposed Order.
6
KENNEDY HUNT, P.C.

4500 W Pine Blvd
St. Louis, MO 63108
Tel: (314) 872-9041
Fax: (314) 872-9043
tkennedy@kennedyhuntlaw.com
sarahjane@kennedyhuntlaw.com
mquill@kennedyhuntlaw.com
7
JS 44 (Rev. 07/16) CIVIL COVER SHEET
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the
purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)
I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TRIAD

JOHN DOE 10 COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT no. 2, ERIN
GARWOOD, and RODNEY WINSLOW
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff MADISON County of Residence of First Listed Defendant MADISON
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES) (IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)
NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF
THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.
(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number) Attorneys (If Known)
Kennedy Hunt, P.C. and Gorovsky Law, LLC

4500 W. Pine Blvd., St. Louis, MO 63108; 314-872-9041
II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an “X” in One Box Only) III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an “X” in One Box for Plaintiff
(For Diversity Cases Only) and One Box for Defendant)
’ 1 U.S. Government ’
X 3 Federal Question PTF DEF PTF DEF
Plaintiff (U.S. Government Not a Party) Citizen of This State ’ 1 ’ 1 Incorporated or Principal Place ’ 4 ’ 4
of Business In This State
’ 2 U.S. Government ’ 4 Diversity Citizen of Another State ’ 2 ’ 2 Incorporated and Principal Place ’ 5 ’ 5
Defendant (Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III) of Business In Another State
Citizen or Subject of a ’ 3 ’ 3 Foreign Nation ’ 6 ’ 6

Foreign Country
IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
CONTRACT TORTS FORFEITURE/PENALTY BANKRUPTCY OTHER STATUTES
’ 110 Insurance PERSONAL INJURY PERSONAL INJURY ’ 625 Drug Related Seizure ’ 422 Appeal 28 USC 158 ’ 375 False Claims Act
’ 120 Marine ’ 310 Airplane ’ 365 Personal Injury - of Property 21 USC 881 ’ 423 Withdrawal ’ 376 Qui Tam (31 USC
’ 130 Miller Act ’ 315 Airplane Product Product Liability ’ 690 Other 28 USC 157 3729(a))
’ 140 Negotiable Instrument Liability ’ 367 Health Care/ ’ 400 State Reapportionment
’ 150 Recovery of Overpayment ’ 320 Assault, Libel & Pharmaceutical PROPERTY RIGHTS ’ 410 Antitrust
& Enforcement of Judgment Slander Personal Injury ’ 820 Copyrights ’ 430 Banks and Banking
’ 151 Medicare Act ’ 330 Federal Employers’ Product Liability ’ 830 Patent ’ 450 Commerce
’ 152 Recovery of Defaulted Liability ’ 368 Asbestos Personal ’ 840 Trademark ’ 460 Deportation
Student Loans ’ 340 Marine Injury Product ’ 470 Racketeer Influenced and
(Excludes Veterans) ’ 345 Marine Product Liability LABOR SOCIAL SECURITY Corrupt Organizations
’ 153 Recovery of Overpayment Liability PERSONAL PROPERTY ’ 710 Fair Labor Standards ’ 861 HIA (1395ff) ’ 480 Consumer Credit
of Veteran’s Benefits ’ 350 Motor Vehicle ’ 370 Other Fraud Act ’ 862 Black Lung (923) ’ 490 Cable/Sat TV
’ 160 Stockholders’ Suits ’ 355 Motor Vehicle ’ 371 Truth in Lending ’ 720 Labor/Management ’ 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g)) ’ 850 Securities/Commodities/
’ 190 Other Contract Product Liability ’ 380 Other Personal Relations ’ 864 SSID Title XVI Exchange
’ 195 Contract Product Liability ’ 360 Other Personal Property Damage ’ 740 Railway Labor Act ’ 865 RSI (405(g)) ’ 890 Other Statutory Actions
’ 196 Franchise Injury ’ 385 Property Damage ’ 751 Family and Medical ’ 891 Agricultural Acts
’ 362 Personal Injury - Product Liability Leave Act ’ 893 Environmental Matters
Medical Malpractice ’ 790 Other Labor Litigation ’ 895 Freedom of Information
REAL PROPERTY CIVIL RIGHTS PRISONER PETITIONS ’ 791 Employee Retirement FEDERAL TAX SUITS Act
’ 210 Land Condemnation X
’ 440 Other Civil Rights Habeas Corpus: Income Security Act ’ 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff ’ 896 Arbitration
’ 220 Foreclosure ’ 441 Voting ’ 463 Alien Detainee or Defendant) ’ 899 Administrative Procedure
’ 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment ’ 442 Employment ’ 510 Motions to Vacate ’ 871 IRS—Third Party Act/Review or Appeal of
’ 240 Torts to Land ’ 443 Housing/ Sentence 26 USC 7609 Agency Decision
’ 245 Tort Product Liability Accommodations ’ 530 General ’ 950 Constitutionality of
’ 290 All Other Real Property ’ 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - ’ 535 Death Penalty IMMIGRATION State Statutes
Employment Other: ’ 462 Naturalization Application
’ 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - ’ 540 Mandamus & Other ’ 465 Other Immigration
Other ’ 550 Civil Rights Actions
’ 448 Education ’ 555 Prison Condition
’ 560 Civil Detainee -
Conditions of
Confinement
V. ORIGIN (Place an “X” in One Box Only)
X 1 Original
’ ’ 2 Removed from ’ 3 Remanded from ’ 4 Reinstated or ’ 5 Transferred from ’ 6 Multidistrict ’ 8 Multidistrict
Proceeding State Court Appellate Court Reopened Another District Litigation - Litigation -
(specify) Transfer Direct File
Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1983
VI. CAUSE OF ACTION Brief description of cause:
Sexual harassment and abuse under Title IX, the Illinois Human Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
VII. REQUESTED IN ’ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION DEMAND $ CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:
COMPLAINT: UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P. JURY DEMAND: X Yes
’ ’ No
VIII. RELATED CASE(S)
(See instructions):
IF ANY JUDGE DOCKET NUMBER
DATE SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD
1/20/2021
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
RECEIPT # AMOUNT APPLYING IFP JUDGE MAG. JUDGE

JS 44 Reverse (Rev. 07/16)
INSTRUCTIONS FOR ATTORNEYS COMPLETING CIVIL COVER SHEET FORM JS 44

Authority For Civil Cover Sheet
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replaces nor supplements the filings and service of pleading or other papers as
required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is
required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. Consequently, a civil cover sheet is submitted to the Clerk of
Court for each civil complaint filed. The attorney filing a case should complete the form as follows:
I.(a) Plaintiffs-Defendants. Enter names (last, first, middle initial) of plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff or defendant is a government agency, use
only the full name or standard abbreviations. If the plaintiff or defendant is an official within a government agency, identify first the agency and
then the official, giving both name and title.
(b) County of Residence. For each civil case filed, except U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county where the first listed plaintiff resides at the
time of filing. In U.S. plaintiff cases, enter the name of the county in which the first listed defendant resides at the time of filing. (NOTE: In land
condemnation cases, the county of residence of the "defendant" is the location of the tract of land involved.)
(c) Attorneys. Enter the firm name, address, telephone number, and attorney of record. If there are several attorneys, list them on an attachment, noting
in this section "(see attachment)".
II. Jurisdiction. The basis of jurisdiction is set forth under Rule 8(a), F.R.Cv.P., which requires that jurisdictions be shown in pleadings. Place an "X"
in one of the boxes. If there is more than one basis of jurisdiction, precedence is given in the order shown below.
United States plaintiff. (1) Jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. 1345 and 1348. Suits by agencies and officers of the United States are included here.
United States defendant. (2) When the plaintiff is suing the United States, its officers or agencies, place an "X" in this box.
Federal question. (3) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1331, where jurisdiction arises under the Constitution of the United States, an amendment
to the Constitution, an act of Congress or a treaty of the United States. In cases where the U.S. is a party, the U.S. plaintiff or defendant code takes
precedence, and box 1 or 2 should be marked.
Diversity of citizenship. (4) This refers to suits under 28 U.S.C. 1332, where parties are citizens of different states. When Box 4 is checked, the
citizenship of the different parties must be checked. (See Section III below; NOTE: federal question actions take precedence over diversity
cases.)
III. Residence (citizenship) of Principal Parties. This section of the JS 44 is to be completed if diversity of citizenship was indicated above. Mark this
section for each principal party.
IV. Nature of Suit. Place an "X" in the appropriate box. If the nature of suit cannot be determined, be sure the cause of action, in Section VI below, is
sufficient to enable the deputy clerk or the statistical clerk(s) in the Administrative Office to determine the nature of suit. If the cause fits more than
one nature of suit, select the most definitive.
V. Origin. Place an "X" in one of the seven boxes.

Original Proceedings. (1) Cases which originate in the United States district courts.
Removed from State Court. (2) Proceedings initiated in state courts may be removed to the district courts under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1441.
When the petition for removal is granted, check this box.
Remanded from Appellate Court. (3) Check this box for cases remanded to the district court for further action. Use the date of remand as the filing
date.
Reinstated or Reopened. (4) Check this box for cases reinstated or reopened in the district court. Use the reopening date as the filing date.
Transferred from Another District. (5) For cases transferred under Title 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a). Do not use this for within district transfers or
multidistrict litigation transfers.
Multidistrict Litigation – Transfer. (6) Check this box when a multidistrict case is transferred into the district under authority of Title 28 U.S.C.
Section 1407.
Multidistrict Litigation – Direct File. (8) Check this box when a multidistrict case is filed in the same district as the Master MDL docket.
PLEASE NOTE THAT THERE IS NOT AN ORIGIN CODE 7. Origin Code 7 was used for historical records and is no longer relevant due to
changes in statue.
VI. Cause of Action. Report the civil statute directly related to the cause of action and give a brief description of the cause. Do not cite jurisdictional
statutes unless diversity. Example: U.S. Civil Statute: 47 USC 553 Brief Description: Unauthorized reception of cable service
VII. Requested in Complaint. Class Action. Place an "X" in this box if you are filing a class action under Rule 23, F.R.Cv.P.
Demand. In this space enter the actual dollar amount being demanded or indicate other demand, such as a preliminary injunction.
Jury Demand. Check the appropriate box to indicate whether or not a jury is being demanded.
VIII. Related Cases. This section of the JS 44 is used to reference related pending cases, if any. If there are related pending cases, insert the docket
numbers and the corresponding judge names for such cases.
Date and Attorney Signature. Date and sign the civil cover sheet.
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action

for the
__________ District of __________
)
)
JOHN DOE 10
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TRIAD )
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2, )
)
ERIN GARWOOD, and RODNEY WINSLOW )
Defendant(s) )
SUMMONS IN A CIVIL ACTION
To: (Defendant’s name and address)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TRIAD COMMUNITY UNIT

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2
203 E. THROP ST.
TROY, IL 62294
A lawsuit has been filed against you.
Within 21 days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it) — or 60 days if you
are the United States or a United States agency, or an officer or employee of the United States described in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12 (a)(2) or (3) — you must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached complaint or a motion under Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer or motion must be served on the plaintiff or plaintiff’s attorney,
whose name and address are:
Sarah Jane Hunt
Kennedy Hunt, P.C.
4500 W. Pine Blvd
St. Louis, MO 63108
If you fail to respond, judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint.
You also must file your answer or motion with the court.
CLERK OF COURT
1/20/2021
Date:
Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk
AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE
(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))
This summons for (name of individual and title, if any)

was received by me on (date) .
’ I personally served the summons on the individual at (place)

on (date) ; or
’ I left the summons at the individual’s residence or usual place of abode with (name)
, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there,
on (date) , and mailed a copy to the individual’s last known address; or
’ I served the summons on (name of individual) , who is

designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of (name of organization)
on (date) ; or
’ I returned the summons unexecuted because ; or
’ Other (specify):
.
My fees are $ for travel and $ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .
I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.
Date:
Server’s signature
Printed name and title
Server’s address
Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:


for the
__________ District of __________
)
)
JOHN DOE 10
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
Defendant(s) )
RODNEY WINSLOW
203 E. THROP ST.
TROY, IL 62294
Sarah Jane Hunt
Kennedy Hunt, P.C.
4500 W. Pine Blvd
St. Louis, MO 63108
CLERK OF COURT
1/20/2021
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address


for the
__________ District of __________
)
)
JOHN DOE 10
)
)
Plaintiff(s) )
)
v. Civil Action No.
)
)
Defendant(s) )
ERIN GARWOOD
7420 CONNER LN
EDWARDSVILLE, IL 62025-4668
Sarah Jane Hunt
Kennedy Hunt, P.C.
4500 W. Pine Blvd
St. Louis, MO 63108
CLERK OF COURT
1/20/2021
Date:
Civil Action No.
PROOF OF SERVICE


on (date) ; or

on (date) ; or
.
Date:
Server’s address

Garwood Civil Suit

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Case 3:21-cv-00083-SPM Document 1 Filed 01/21/21 Page 1 of 19 Page ID #1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Unit School District No. 2 (hereinafter, “the District”) states as follows:

abuse and harassment.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. Defendant Rodney Winslow is an adult Illinois citizen and resides in Madison

7. Defendant Board of Education of Triad Community Unit School District No. 2 is

Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C §1681 et seq.

the District, including for Middle and High School.

grade science teacher.

him for hugs, when he and his teammates were shirtless.

to have sex with him.

form of further sexual harassment toward Plaintiff.

constituted sexual harassment.

to report the abuse by Garwood.

inability to move forward in his education at Triad.

District did not investigate Garwood as required under Title IX.

informed Plaintiff if any investigation was completed.

teacher on student abuse.

emotional distress, and impairment of the quality of life.

at the same level of academic or physical accomplishment as before the abuse.

determined that Garwood committed “sexual exploitation.”

color of law in their actions and failures to act.

37. All paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference.

42. All paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference.

43. Defendant School District violated Title IX by intentionally pursuing an official

policy of discriminating on the basis of sex in the following ways:

a. Failing to have Title IX policies and procedures in place;

b. Failing to follow Title IX policies and procedures that were in place;

staff about their rights and responsibilities under Title IX;

d. Failing to address sexual harassment within the district;

e. Allowing harassers and abusers to be emboldened by the lack of effective policies

and procedures in place to address sexual harassment within the District;

harassed by adults do not understand that they have endured abuse;

not taking prior harassment and abuse of males seriously; and

are even supposed to enjoy) such harassment and abuse.

Defendants had actual knowledge of this heightened risk.

created a heightened risk of harassment and abuse within the District.

45. All paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference.

offensive that it deprived Plaintiff of access to educational opportunities or benefits provided by

notice of the sexual harassment.

50. As a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the sexual harassment that

extracurricular programs in violation of Title IX.

53. All paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference.

54. The sex-based harassment articulated perpetrated by Defendant Garwood and by

access to educational opportunities or benefits provided by the Defendant District.

Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“Title IX”).

surrounding sexual abuse.

58. Defendants created a hostile educational environment due its deliberate

violation of Title IX.

actual knowledge of the sexual harassment to Plaintiff.

62. Plaintiff suffered emotional distress and psychological damage, economic

to attorney’s fees for this claim.

63. All paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference.

of known sexual harassment.

education and extracurricular activities.

addition, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees for this claim.

70. All paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference.

to personal security and bodily integrity and Equal Protection of Laws.

73. Defendant Garwood knowingly subjected Plaintiff to violations of his right to

entitled to legal fees for this claim.

75. All paragraphs above are incorporated herein by reference.

to personal security and bodily integrity and Equal Protection of Laws.

District of

District of