COQUILLA VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar.
He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the
Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the
U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate,
although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on
July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved
on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000
and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two (2) years.”
His opponent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he
had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six
months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Coquilla can be considered to have resided in Oras, Eastern Samar for more than
one (1) year.

RULING:
No. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
“dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).”

Coquillo lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, he was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration
laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. Until his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in
this country.

[NOTE: This doctrine was NOT applied to Grace Poe’s case.]

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2%
of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of
Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed
38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory
that at least 20% of the members of the House of Representatives come from the party-list
representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty
percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of
Representatives. The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe
the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional
prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat.
Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents
deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives =  #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party =  # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list
system

additional seats for concerned party =  # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x
 additional seats for concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of
representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the
deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the
intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government authority emanates
from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation
of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even
pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes
cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total
votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of
additional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to
as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order
to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that
to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

ANG BAGONG BAYANI VS COMELEC

FACTS:
Akbayan and Ang Bagong Bayani filed their MOTIONS before Comelec to have some party-list
groups DELETED FROM THE OFFICIAL LIST OF PARTIES. (for the 2001 elections) They
contend that there are SOME POLITICAL PARTIES (PMP, LAKAS-NUCD, NPC, LDP,
AKSYON DEMOCRATICO, PDP-LABAN, NATIONALISTA) included in the party-list
system. They argue that the party-list system is for the marginalized and underrepresented.

ISSUE:
Whether COMELEC was correct in including some of these political parties in the Party-List
Election.

RULING:

SC: THEY ARE QUALIFIED. These political parties cannot be disqualified from the party-list
election merely on the ground that they are political parties. The Constitution provides that the
members of the House may be elected through a party list system of REGISTERED
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SECTORAL PARTIES OR ORGANIZATIONS.
Under the Party List Law RA 7941, a PARTY is defined as either a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties. A political party is also defined as a group of citizens advocating
an ideology or platform, principles, and policies for the general conduct of government, and
which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and
supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. Thus, political
parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections.

While RA 7941 mentions the labor, peasants, fisher folk, urban poor, ICCs, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, OFWs and professionals as marginalized and
underrepresented, the ENUMERATION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE.
Looking into the Policy behind RA 7941, it is not enough for a candidate to claim representation
among these enumerated groups because representation is easy to claim and feign. The party list
group (even political parties) must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Again, the POLICY OF THE LAW: To enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors who lack well defined political constituencies but who could contribute
to legislation.
SC: CASE REMANDED TO COMELEC TO DETERMINE QUALIFICATIONS OF
THESE POLITICAL PARTIES.
GUIDELINES:
1. Party must truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
2. Major political parties allowed but they must still represent the marginalized
3. Religious sector may not be represented but a religious leader may be a nominee
4. Must not be disqualified under Sec 6 RA 7941
5. Must be independent from the government (not adjunct, not funded, not assisted)
6. Nominees must themselves be qualified (age, residence, citizenship)
7. Nominees must belong to the marginalized/underrep
8. Nominee must be able to contribute to appropriate legislation
 PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS

FACTS:  The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented. 

ISSUE:  Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply
to validly incarcerated persons in general.

RULING:

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives
arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week
will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system

TRILLANES IV VS JUDGE PIMENTEL

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.

On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City
and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials. After a series
of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed
as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a
seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests. Trillanes
requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC
however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set
aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work
and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of detention
prisoners who are held without bail

HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that
election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as the
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The Rules also
state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and
coup d’état cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class
of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present
case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance
was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage
of the criminal action.”

 
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. The
Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation,
or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of
arrest and detention.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to speak
of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does
not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate
a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters
elected him to the Senate, “they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of
action with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and
echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that
the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to
govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged
with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one
or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at
the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely abused,
petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to register as a
voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May
14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of taking
a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him and insists on
unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

a. Abbas vs Senate Electoral Tribunal 166 SCRA 651

Facts:
In the 1987 congressional elections, petitioners filed with respondent SET an election contest
against 22 senators-elect of the LABAN coalition. All members of the legislative component of
the SET at the time happened to be included in the senators assailed. Later, petitioners filed with
SET a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of all senators-members thereof for the reason
they are all interested parties (being respondents therein). SET denied the motion hence this
petition. Contending that SET committed a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require
the mass disqualification sought, and propose to amend the Tribunal’s rules as to permit the
contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
Issue:
Should the Senators-members be disqualified?
Held:
No. The SET must continue taking cognizance of the case with its current Senators-members.
Here is a situation which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any
of his other colleagues without inviting the same objections to the substitute’s competence.
However, the amendment proposed would, in the context of the situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only 3 Members, all Justices of this Court, who would remain whose
disqualification is not sought. It is unmistakable that the “legislative component” [of the SET]
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contest
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. Thus, the proposed mass
disqualification/inhibition, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Electoral Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform. This, to the Court’s
mind, is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. The charge that SET gravely abused its discretion in its
denial of the petition for [mass] disqualification/inhibition must therefore fail.

b. StandardChartered Bank vs Senate  Committee on Banks G.R. No. 167173, Dec. 27,
2007

Facts:
Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling
unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799)
and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent
the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator
Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent, which through its Chairperson Senator
Angara, set an initial hearing and invited petitioners herein to attend the hearing.
Petitioners via letter stressed that there were pending cases in court allegedly involving
the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the
jurisdiction of respondent committee to proceed with the inquiry.
Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited resource persons not being all
present, Senator Enrile moved for the issuance of subpoena and an HDO or to include
such absentees to the Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch List. During the hearing, it was
apparent that petitioners lack proper authorizations to make disclosures and lack the
copies of the accusing documents being mentioned by Senator Enrile. Thus, when
hearing adjourned, petitioners were later served with subpoenas by respondent.
 Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined from proceeding, citing
Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, claiming that since the issue is already
preempted by the courts, the legislative investigation is an encroachment upon the
judicial powers vested solely in the courts.
Issue: Whether the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent committee
encroaches upon the judicial power of the courts
Ruling: NO. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said
resolution, exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a
privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal
practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x.”
This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his
privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in
aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the
future.”
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a
quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation.
Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint.
Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative
inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee.
The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons were officials of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
These officials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to
their separate findings on the illegal sale of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-
Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for
remedies, in terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent
activity. Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit.

c. Neri vs Senate Committee G.R. No. 180843, March 25,2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of
U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the
People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project.
He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused
to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order
for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE: Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?
HELD: The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry
relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of
military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.”
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational
proximity” with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be

overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and
policy decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But the petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he
expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
 d. Phil International Trading Corp vs  Angeles G.R. No. 108461, Oct. 21,1996

Facts:
The Philippine Trading International Corporation (PITC) issued Administrative Order No.
SOCPEC 89-08-01 which commands that applications to the PITC for importation from the
People’s Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed Export
Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up
with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC
being applied for at one is to one ratio.
The private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, applied for
authority to import with the petitioner. However, they failed to comply with the mandates of AO
SOCPEC 89-09-01 so that further import applications were withheld by PITC. Because of this,
Remington filed for a petition for prohibition and madamus with prayer for the issuance of a
TRO against PITC and was joined by Firestone later.
Hon. Zosimo Angeles, the judge handling the case at the trial court, granted the petitioners’
request and declared as null and void and unconstitutional the administrative order issued by the
PITC. Among his reasons for the judgment was the fact that the AO was not published. Later on,
President Fidel Ramos directed the Department of Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease
implementing the said AO.
The respondents contend that the case has been moot and moved for its early resolution. PITC,
however, disagreed that the case is moot because the respondents still have an outstanding
liability.
Issues:
1. Does the administrative order have a binding effect even if it had not been published?
2. Can the respondents be made liable for an unpublished administrative order?
Ruling:
1. No. As provided by Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws is an indispensable
step in making the law effective. The administrative order in question should have been
implemented because its purpose is to “enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a
valid delegation.” Therefore, even before the president has directed that the AO cease to be
implemented, it had never been legally effective.
2. No. The unpublished administrative order had no effect in pursuance to Article 2 of the Civil
Code so any liability incurred because of it is invalid.
 e. Tobias vs Abalos 239 SCRA 106

FACTS:
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. RA 7675 was enacted
which in effect converted the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized City and
divided the legislative district of Mandaluyong and San Juan into 2 separate districts. Petitioners
as taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong assail the constitutionality of the RA contending it is
contrary to Secs 5(1), 5(4), 26(1) and 26(2) of Art VI of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
(1) Is RA 7675 contrary to Art VI, Sec 5(1) of the Constitution?
(2) Is it contrary to Sec 5(4) of the same?
(3) Is it contrary to Sec 26(1)?
(4) Is it contrary to Sec 26(2)?
RULING:
(1) No. To the argument that the RA resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Reps beyond that provided in Art VI, Sec 5(1) is thus contrary to the same, the court found no
merit. The Constitution clearly provides that the present composition of the House of Reps may
be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through legislative enactment.
(2) No. To the argument that the RA in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Art VI, Sec 5(4), it was held bordering on the absurd. It was the
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
(3) No. To the argument that the division of Mandaluyong and San Juan into 2 separate districts
was not sufficiently embraced in the title contrary to Art VI, Sec 26(1), the Court held in the
negative. The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion xxx. Thus, the title necessarily includes the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. A liberal construction of the one
title-one subject rule has been invariably adopted so as not to cripple legislation. It should be
given practical rather than technical construction; it sufficiently complies with the rule if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.

(4) No. To the argument that there is no mention in the RA of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250k inhabitants
provided in Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution to justify their separation, the Court held that the
reason does not suffice. The Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements of the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, It is not
required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by
Congress in the enactment of said laws.