Avicenna, Asad Q. Ahmed - Avicenna's Deliverance - Logic-Oxford University Press (2011)

Avicenna’s
Deliverance: Logic
Studies in Islamic Philosophy
General Editor
S. NOMANUL HAQ, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)
Editorial Advisory Committee
MICHAEL COOK, Princeton University
EVERETT ROWSON, New York University

ROBERT WISNOVSKY, McGill University
O7r 4
Studies in Islamic Philosophy

General Editor: S. Nomanul Haq
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Avicenna’s
Deliverance: Logic
Translation and Notes by

Asad Q. Ahmed
Introduction by
Tony Street
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Contents
General Editor’s Foreword XV

Introduction by Tony Street xix
Translator’s Preface XXxi
Translation of al-Najat: al-Mantiq The Deliverance: Logic

2. On Conceptualization (tasawwur) and Assenting
(tasdiq) and the Method of Each
. On the Benefit of Logic
. On Simple Utterances (alfaz mufrada)
. On Complex Utterances
. On the Universal (kulli) Simple Utterance
On the Particular Simple Utterance
. On the Essential (dhati)
. On the Accidental
WD
SF
N
SAND. On What is Said in Response to ‘What is it?’
. On What is Said in Response to ‘Which Thing is it?’ W
&
TN
OWAD
. On the FiveUtterances (alfaz khamsa)

. On Genus
. On Species
. On Specific Difference
. On Property
. On Accident ee
oe
el
SS
Hoo
Sw
6
FE
Re
SP
Pe
PPP
#6
OS
fk . On Individual Essences
Naan (a‘yan), Objects of the
Estimative Faculty (awham), Utterances,
and Writing 13
18. On Noun (ism) 13
29; On Verb (kalima) 14
20. On Particle (adat) 14
vill CONTENTS
21, On Statement (qawl)

22. On Proposition (qadiyya)
23. On the Attributive [Proposition] (hamliyya)
24. On the Conditional [Proposition] (shartiyya)
25. On the Conjunctive Conditional [Proposition]
(shartiyya muttasila)
26. On the Disjunctive Conditional [Proposition]
(al-shartiyya al-munfasila)
ai, On Affirmation (ijab)
28. On Negation (salb)
29. On the Predicate (mahmil)
30. On the Subject (mawdi‘‘)
a On the Singular [Proposition] (makhsiisa)
52. On the Indefinite [Proposition] (muhmala)
53. On the Definite/Quantified [Proposition] (mahsira)
34. On the Affirmative Universal [Proposition] ©
65. On the Negative Universal [Proposition]
36. On the Affirmative Particular [Proposition]
S7. On the Negative Particular [Proposition]
38. On the Quantifier (str)
59. On Two Opposite Propositions
(qadiyyatayn mutaqabilatayn) 18
40. On Contradiction (tanaqud) bbe
41. On the Matters (mawadd) of Propositions 20
42. On Bipartite (thuna’i) and Tripartite
(thulathi) [Propositions] 21
43. On the Ambiguous (ma‘diliyya) and Simple
(basita) Proposition 7a
44, On the Privative (‘adamiyya) 23
45. On Modes (jihat) 24
46. On the Fourfold (ruba‘iyya) 24
47. On the Possible and its Investigation 25
48. On the necessary and Impossible and, in sum,
the Necessary 28
CONTENTS ix
49. On the Equivalence (mutalazimat) of Modalized

[Propositions] aE
50. On Premise (muqaddima) and Term (hadd) 32
51. On the Dictum de Omni [et Nullo]
(maqiul ‘ala al-kull) 32
52. On Absolute [Propositions] 32
cee On Necessity [Propositions] 35
54, On Possibility [Propositions] 36
5D. On the Conversion (‘aks) of Absolutes a7
56. On the Conversion of Necessity [Propositions] 39
57; On the Conversion of Contingency [Propositions]
58. On Syllogism (qiyas) 42
59. On Perfect (kamil) and Imperfect (ghayr kamil)
Syllogisms 43
60. On Connective (iqtirani) and Repetitive
(istithna’l) Syllogisms 43
61. On the Parts of Connective Syllogisms and Their
Figures (ashkal) 43
62. On the Moods (durib) of First Figure [Syllogisms
Composed of] Absolutes 45
63. On Second Figure [Syllogisms Composed of]
Absolutes 46
64. On the Third [Figure Composed] of Absolutes 48
65. On the Composition from Necessity [Premises] 50
66. On the Mixture of an Absolute and a Necessity
[Premise] in the First Figure 52
67. On the Mixture [of an Absolute and a Necessity
Premise] in the Second Figure 53
68. On the Mixture [of an Absolute and Necessity
Premise] in the Third Figure 54
69. On the Composition from Two Contingency
[Premises] in the First Figure 55
70. On the Mixture of Contingency and Absolute
[Premises] in the First Figure 55
CONTENTS
pial On Mixing Contingency and Necessity [Premises]

in the First Figure 57
TL. On Two Contingency [Premises] in the
Second Figure 59
aa On the Mixture of Contingency and Absolute
[Premises] in the Second Figure i)
74. On the Mixture of Contingency and Necessity
[Premises] in the Second Figure 60
a. On the Mixture of Two Contingency [Premises]
in the Third Figure 60
76. On the Mixture of Contingency and Absolute
[Premises] in the Third Figure 61
Tie On the Mixture of Contingency and Necessity
[Premises] in the Third Figure 62
78. On Conditional (shartiyya) Propositions 62
29. On the Single and Multiple Conditional Premise 64
80. On Transformed (muharrafa) Conditionals 65
81. On Connective Syllogisms [Composed]
of Conjunctives 65
82. On Connective Syllogisms [Composed]
of Disjunctives 65
83. On Repetitive (istithna’i) Syllogisms 71
84. On Compound Syllogisms (qiyasat murakkaba) V2
85. On Acquiring Premises 74
86. On the Analysis (tahlil) of Syllogisms 95
87. On Establishing Conclusions that Follow from
the First Problem 76
88. On True Conclusions [Derived] from False Premises 76
89. On Circular Proof (bayan al-dawr) wT
90. On the Conversion of Syllogisms 78
v1, On the Syllogism [That Concludes by Way of]
Absurdity (qiyas al-khalf) a9
92. On Syllogisms [Composed] of Opposite Premises 80
CONTENTS xi
93. On Pre-positing (musadara) the First Problem 81

94, On Explaining How a Thing is Known and
Unknown at the Same Time 81
95. On Induction (istiqra’) 83
96. On Analogy (tamthil) 84
97. On the Enthymeme (al-damir) | 84
98. On Opinion (ra’y) 85
99. On Signification (dalil) 85
100. On Sign (‘alama) 85
101. On the Physiognomical Syllogism (giyas firasi) 86
102. On Conceptualization and Assent 87
103. On Sensibles (mahsisat) 88
104. On the Objects of Experience (al-mujarrabat) 88
105. On What is Universally Circulated (mutawatirat) 89
106. On Accepted Opinions (maqbiulat) 89
107. On Estimations (wahmiyyat) 89
108. On Widespread [Propositions] (dha’i‘at) 92
109. On Presumed (mazninat) [Propositions] 93
110. On Image-eliciting [Propositions] (mukhayyilat) 94
. On Primary [Statements] (al-awwaliyyat) 95
112. On Demonstration 95
a3. On Absolute Demonstration (burhan mutlaq) 96
114. On the Demonstration If [Something is the Case]
(burhan al-anna) 97
115. On the Question Whether (matlab hal) OF
116. On the Question What (matlab ma) 97
117. On the Question ‘Why’ (matlab lima) 98
118. On the Question ‘Which’ (matlab ayy) 98
119. A Section 98
120. On the Premises of Demonstration 99
121. On Essential Predication oF
122. On Primary Premises (mugaddima awwaliyya) 100
123, On the Dictum de Omni (maqil ‘ala al-kull) 101
xii CONTENTS
124. On Suitable [Premises] (mundsib) 102

125. On Subject Matters (mawdi‘at) 102
126. On Demonstrative Problems [Related to
the Subject Matters] 103
iZ7. On the Predicates of Demonstration 103
128. On Principles (usil) that are Known Prior to
Demonstrations 105
£29. On Propositions of Certitude 106
130. On the Subject Matters of the Sciences 106
131. On the Cooperation of the Sciences 109
132. On the Transfer of Demonstration (naql al-burhan) 110
£33. On the Sciences Sharing their Problematics 110
134. On the [Fact] That There is No Demonstration
of Corruptibles (fasidat) 110
135. On the Three Things 111
136. On the Difference between the Demonstrations
of If and Why 112
137. On the Nature of the Inclusion of Possibilities
in Demonstration 113
138. On Things That Occur by Chance sb ease its
£39. On Definition 114
140. On Acquiring Definitions 116
141. On [How] Division Aids in Giving Definitions 119
142. On the Ten Categories 120
143. On the Mutual Participation of Definition and
Demonstration 124
144. On the Various Meanings of Definition 126
145. On the Four [Causes] and Their Occurrence as
Middle Terms in Demonstrations 127
146. On Guarding Against Belief in Absurd
Circularit[ies That Arise] Out of Natural
Sequential Arrangement|[s] 130
147. On the Mode of the Inclusion of Specific Causes
in Demonstration[s] 131
CONTENTS xiii
148. On Knowledge, Intellection (‘aql), Opinion,

Sharpness of Intellect (dhaka’), Intuition (hads),
and the Mode of Grasping the Problem from
These [Means] 133
149. On an Explanation of the Ways in Which Error
Occurs in Explanatory Statements 136
150. On the Statements of the Sophists (siifista’iyya) 140
Notes 149
Glossary and Index of First Occurrence of Terms 167
General Index 177
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General Editor’s Foreword
Our Studies in Islamic Philosophy series would hardly be true to

its name without Avicenna figuring in it. Born in the Amu
Darya basin in Central Asia, this medieval personage is a
monumental figure in Arabic philosophy—indeed, he is the
Grand Sage (al-Shaikh al-Ra’is) of the tradition. On the other
hand, in the Arabo-Latin intellectual history too he has played
an enduring and significant role, and one that is intriguingly
ironic: for in the European philosophy of the Middle Ages,
Avicenna embodies at once a powerful current that was fully
naturalized in scholastic thought and a fateful watershed
marking a historic ramification.
Tony Street in his learned introduction to this book tells us
that Avicenna had drifted away from Aristotle in his fully
developed logical system, and so did the subsequent career of
logic in the Islamic world, given Avicenna’s overwhelming and
unparalleled impact here. This was not the case in the Latin
West, which continued to move around the Greek giant, and
so began to take its own course now with a distinct drift. This
means clearly that the vicissitudes of philosophy in Islam
cannot be explained except in a framework in which Avicenna
looms large. Nor can we tell the story of some of the defining
turns in the intellectual developments in European thought
without harking back to the Shaikh. An Islamic philosophy
series, then, was practically duty-bound to pay a focused
attention to him.
We also learn from Street that the medieval Latin scholars
had ‘shied away’ from Avicenna’s formal logical discourses,
and so Latin renderings of these discourses have not really
Xvi GENERAL EDITOR’S FOREWORD
come down to us. And this in turn means that Asad Ahmed’s
translation of the entire Logic (Mantiq) section of Avicenna’s
relatively concise Kitab al-Najat (The Deliverance) marks an
important event in the history of modern scholarship. What
had been placed on one side by the translators of the Medieval
Latin West has after centuries been picked up from the back
burner and now rendered into English. What is more, there is
a happy potential hidden in this book of Asad Ahmed: it will
facilitate, and in all likelihood inspire, investigations into the
post-Avicennan developments in logic in the Islamic milieu.
This is one vista in the modern studies in the history of this
rational discipline that has remained largely closed, with far-
reaching consequences beyond the world of philosophy, not
least the ideological consequence that continues to manifest
itself in the talk of the descent of intellectual darkness in the
Islamic world after and due to Ghazali.
Some experts have already spoken highly of this translation;
certainly, its author deserves commendation for undertaking
a task for which he had no help from any Latin model.
Constructed without this help and carrying the pioneer’s
burden, the Arabic-English glossary at the end of the book
should be received as a valuable bonus both by scholars and
beginners. Also, readers are likely to find the highly packed
Arabic narrative running rather smoothly in Asad Ahmed’s
English, and the text’s technical language often translated not
by another technical language but in terms of primitive
elements that serve to resolve Avicenna’s terminology into its
first principles. All of this is much enhanced in its worth by
Tony Street’s brief but highly informed historical disquisition
with which the book opens.
To Tony Street, then, I am most grateful. My colleagues
who sit on the editorial committee of the Studies in Islamic
Philosophy series have consistently been a source of great
GENERAL EDITOR’S FOREWORD Xvii
support to me and, as always, I must place on record my

gratitude to them. Ghousia Gofran~Ali, Managing Editor of
Oxford University Press, has continued to facilitate the
production process of the series, and again she has carried
out this task most efficiently, patiently, and delightfully. I
thank her profusely. Ameena Saiyid, OBE, Managing Director
of the Press, is ultimately to be given credit for this whole
endeavour, and it behooves me to recognize the services she
is rendering to the world of scholarship.
Our series has already seen works on Farabi, Ghazali, and
Ibn Taymiyya. And now with this volume on Avicenna we can
claim that it has completed its rite de passage.
School of Social Sciences, S. Nomanul Haq

Humanities, and Law General Editor
Lahore University of
Management Sciences (LUMS)
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Introduction
The Deliverance
From the earliest days of the translation movement which
first brought Avicenna’s philosophy to prominence in the
Latin west, scholars have shied away from translating his
logical treatises. The movement that secured his reputation
as a metaphysician and physician left most of his works on
formal logic to one side, with two consequences for the
modern study of Arabic philosophy. The first is that Avicenna’s
logic has been unfairly neglected by historians-of logic, given
the scale of its impact on post-Avicennan logicians. The
second is that modern translators have no Latin exemplar to
guide them in their work in the way that translators of his
metaphysics and physics do.’
Ignoring the works on logic was due in part to the fact that
it can be difficult to make Avicenna the logician speak to
Aristotle’s Organon in the same way that Avicenna the
metaphysician can be made to speak to Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
This in turn derives from various factors. Especially in his last
works, virtually no reference is made to Aristotle’s logical
doctrines. Major new assumptions about the truth-conditions
of the propositions to be used in the syllogistic are made,
often without fanfare, especially in the early works. These
new assumptions are set out with technical terms and phrases
Avicenna institutes for the new distinctions he wants to insist
on. Finally, any attempt to make Avicenna’s works elucidate
each other has to confront the fact that after the late 1020s,
his whole exposition of logic undergoes a seismic shift. To
xX INTRODUCTION
what extent can we use works from one period to shine a light
on those from another?
In what follows, I offer a few reflections on these points. I
begin by considering the lessening concern in Avicenna’s
logical work for Aristotle’s Organon, and where in that
trajectory the logic of The Deliverance falls. I go on to point out
a few of Avicenna’s logical innovations which, if unnoticed by
the reader, make his work seem strange or even technically
incompetent. I end by sketching what Avicenna’s impact
means for the study of the subsequent tradition of Arabic
logic. Unavoidably, what I have to say in the second section
of this introduction is somewhat technical, but I am confident
that turning to Asad Ahmed’s fine translation of Avicenna’s
Deliverance will clarify my obscurities.
Avicenna and the Aristotelian Organon

Amos Bertolacci has spoken of Avicenna’s work on Metaphysics
as marking the transition from exegetical ‘reform’ of
Aristotle’s text to ‘abandonment’, a point at which
interpretation of Aristotle’s work gave way to original
treatment of a newly conceived and independent discipline.
Similarly, Avicenna’s work on logic begins as a kind of
exegesis, and later shifts from interpretive reform of
Aristotelian doctrine to abandoning any reference to his
logical works. What I have to say here about his changing
approach is based on the chronology and periodization of
Avicenna’s major philosophical works developed by Gutas.? It
should be said at the outset that—given the current state of
research—there is no basis to distinguish between what
Avicenna is doing in logic in his early, transitional and middle
periods (up to the end of the 1020s). After that, however,
there is a major change, at least in exposition.
INTRODUCTION xxi
Avicenna’s logical work, from the earliest that has come

down to us right up to the last ten years of his life, always
maintains some kind of contact with the Aristotelian Organon.
Finding the reforms Avicenna is proposing in work from this
period is not always easy, especially when compared with
work from his final period, but it is possible—and this is a
significant compensation—to line up much of what he has to
say against corresponding passages in Aristotle. The difficulty
in identifying his reforms derives from the fact that they are
offered in a manner deferential to Aristotle. Sometimes
Avicenna censures as superficial those who adopt what
appears on a literal reading to be the doctrine of the Prior
Analytics; this is almost certainly a reference to the Syriac
Christian philosophers of Baghdad. These and other readers
fail to realise that Aristotle is merely testing his readers. As
he says in a work written to cover the same ground as
Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, The Syllogism of The Cure:
You should realise that most of what Aristotle’s writings have to

say about the modal mixes are tests, and not genuine opinions—
this will become obvious to you in a number of places.’
Somewhere around 1027, Avicenna starts to show less patience

with Aristotle himself, frequently pointing out the failure to
implement one set of principles consistently throughout the
Organon.> This is on the eve of what Gutas has called the
period of Eastern philosophy, a period in which Avicenna
presented the philosophy of the East (Khurasan) by pitting it
against that of the ‘Westerners’ (the superficial Syriac
Christian philosophers now under another name). The broader
purpose of The Easterners was to make it clear where Avicenna
had departed from Aristotle, to rip aside ‘the veils of feigned
neglect’ of mistakes in Aristotle’s system, to set out without
‘indirection’ true philosophical doctrine, relying on ‘our
Xxil INTRODUCTION
friends’ to know that the revisions of the period of Eastern

philosophy were in exposition only, not in substantive
doctrine.® The Easterners marks the point at which Avicenna
had decided to work out new ways of laying out his logic, ways
that are easier to understand and less derivative on those of
Aristotle.
In his last logical treatise, Pointers and Reminders, from his
Late Period philosophy, with the exception of a few asides,
Avicenna simply sets out his own logical system without
reviewing the contemporary or classical alternatives it is
meant to replace. The exposition has changed; among many
other areas, the modal logic no longer tracks with the
exposition in the Prior Analytics, but introduces a new order
of treatment that became standard for Arabic logicians after
Avicenna.’ It should be stressed, however, that Avicenna’s
journey from exegetical reform to abandonment of the
Aristotelian Organon did not involve changing a single major
logical doctrine. We can know this from the work of the
logicians of the twelfth century, who assessed substantive
changes through his works with care. All in all, they are
minor.®
The Deliverance, the logic section of which is offered here in
translation, is one of Avicenna’s major early works on logic.
It is early even though The Deliverance was composed in 1027,
because The Deliverance is a compilation of a number of
Avicenna’s early works. We are told by Avicenna’s amanuensis
Juzjani that the logic of The Deliverance was copied straight
from Avicenna’s Shorter Summary of Logic,’ written in Jurjan,
which is to say around 1013. But in 1027, on the eve of putting
forth The Easterners, Avicenna wanted to recycle a text he had
written many years earlier to show his readers that his
doctrine had not shifted, even though his exposition of that
doctrine was to change dramatically. The logic of The
INTRODUCTION Xxili
Deliverance is, in short, one text in a chrestomathy of early

works designed to make available to readers of The Easterners
material which could prove Avicenna’s claim never to have
changed his substantive doctrine.
Finding Avicenna’s Logical Innovations

As an early period work, the logic of The Deliverance is an
excellent place to begin to appreciate what is original about
Avicenna’s logic. The logic is presented in an order still close
enough to the Aristotelian to allow easy comparison,
particularly in the modal logic, and it is a summary which,
while avoiding abstruse disquisitions, is solid enough to serve
as preparation for Avicenna’s deeper treatments. It can,
however, make demands on its reader, because ‘the veils of
feigned neglect’ can be fairly opaque. The presentation of the
absolute proposition will serve to exemplify this.
First, however, it is important to note the two subjects
Avicenna dwells on longest. He shows intense interest in
modal logic, that is, logic involving premises modified by
‘possibly’ or ‘necessarily’. A glance at the text from section 40
to section 77 reveals that over a quarter of the whole treatise
is largely or wholly concerned with modal premises, their
truth-conditions and the inferences one may draw from them.
After his development of the modal syllogistic, Avicenna
settles into an equally long exposition of the theory of
Demonstration, running from section 102 to section 149.
Avicenna shifted position on how best to set out his theories
of demonstration through his various writings on logic. In
Pointers and Reminders, Avicenna effectively bookends his
treatment of formal aspects of the syllogistic with two
sections that go to his theory of demonstration. In The
Deliverance, by contrast, he firstly sets out formal issues, and
only after that turns to treat demonstration, concluding with
XXiV INTRODUCTION
a short treatment of Sophistical Fallacies (because fallacious

argument is that with which a demonstration is most easily
and disastrously confused).
I have mentioned that it can be difficult in The Deliverance
to be sure of the changes Avicenna is advocating. The
treatment of the absolute proposition (al-qadiyya al-mutlaqa)
is an excellent example of how a highly influential Avicennan
logical innovation is introduced. I would ask the reader to flip
forward to the translation from time to time to follow the
comments I offer here.
For most logicians in the Aristotelian tradition, the basic
proposition with which one starts a development of the
syllogistic is unmodalized (that is, with neither of the
operators ‘necessarily’ or ‘possibly’). This proposition is often
referred to by logicians in the tradition as ‘assertoric’, and is
mainly referred to in pre-Avicennan Arabic logic as the
mutlaqa. Among other truth-conditions for the assertoric, it is
assumed that no J is B is true if someJ is B is false, and vice
versa. They are, in the terms of the trade, contradictories.
Using this assumption it is possible to prove that no J is B
converts to no B is J (for a version of the common proof for
this conversion, see section 55 ii below). Once proved, the
conversion is used, among other things, for the proofs of
second-figure moods of the syllogism (for these proofs, see
section 63 ii-vi). Only after all three figures of the assertoric
syllogistic have been investigated does the Aristotelian
logician typically proceed to examine syllogisms with modal
premises.
Avicenna rejects all this. In The Easterners, he explicitly
condemns the way the Westerners conceive the absolute
proposition:
How wretched is what the Westerners have done when they

consider modality in the contradiction of the necessary and
INTRODUCTION XXV
possible propositions, and don’t for the absolute; yet being

absolute is also one of the modalities.”
In Pointers, he presents his own doctrine with only passing and

dismissive reference to alternatives. By contrast, although he
sets out his own doctrine in The Deliverance, he sets it out
briefly, and nearly always sets it out after a longer statement
of generally accepted Peripatetic doctrine.
So it is that we find the following exposition of the absolute
proposition. Section 40 on contradiction presages nothing
unusual. Section 52 introduces the absolute proposition and
implies in subsection ii that ‘it is not unlikely’ that the
traditional square of opposition cannot stand, but devotes
most of its space to the doctrine of various great forebears.
Only in section 55, on conversion, does it appear that Avicenna
is differing from the standard development. But even then,
although section 63, on second-figure syllogisms, states in
subsection i that the moods do not conclude, it devotes ii to
vi to proofs that they do.
It is fairly easy to come away from these sections unaware
that Avicenna jis making no use of the standard square of
opposition assumed through the Prior Analytics, that he has
eliminated the account of conversion for propositions of the
form no J is B, and that he has shown that all second-figure
moods are to be rejected. Of course, the simple fact is that
Avicenna’s absolute proposition is not Aristotle’s assertoric.
Avicenna’s has to be read as modified by a hidden ‘at least
once’. But it is easy to miss what is going on. Historically,
many of Avicenna’s contemporaries did miss what was going
on. It is probably the questions these early accounts of the
syllogistic excited that led to the changed exposition we find
in Avicenna’s later works.
Of many other, less obviously consequential, changes
Avicenna introduced to the syllogistic, two should be
XXvi INTRODUCTION
mentioned. Avicenna’s syllogistic is further set off from

Western traditions by introducing what later came to be
called a proposition in the descriptive reading (al-qadiyya
al-wasfiyya), that is, a proposition under a condition that it be
read while the description of the subject term holds, as in
everyJis B whileJ(see the third part of section 48, and the last
part of section 66). As with the new truth-conditions for the
absolute, the innovation is introduced with almost no fanfare.
Once again, its consequences for Avicenna’s formal logic are
considerable. Even more significantly, Avicenna’s formal
account of the syllogistic is subordinated to the aim of
providing a framework for demonstrative proofs. Those
demonstrative proofs will use, we find out in section 123 iii,
propositions in the descriptive reading. The paucity of formal
examination of propositions in the descriptive reading in
Avicenna is astonishing. It is clearly an exorbitant demand he
makes of his readers. Many hitherto unknown technical terms
and phrases that are used throughout post-Avicennan logic
are developed in Avicenna’s discussion introducing these
propositions.
Secondly, Avicenna introduced an entirely new way of
dividing the syllogistic, into igtirani and istithnd’i (see section
60 of the translation). Everyone save obdurate Aristotelians
like Averroes followed Avicenna in this innovation. One
consequence it had was for what might be called metalogical
analysis, and the proof by reduction to an impossibility was
analysed by making use of this division (see section 91). This
analysis generated discussion in the later tradition, though
none of this material has yet been properly assessed.
Post-Avicennan Arabic Logic

The most important thing to bear in mind while coming to
grips with post-Avicennan logic is the insignificance of
INTRODUCTION XXVii
Aristotle. Nearly every major logician after Avicenna was an

Avicennan logician. This has consequences for the technical
preparation any modern reader needs to have to be able to
come to grips with post-Avicennan logic, a point I will return
to ina moment. Of greater cultural significance is the fact that
Avicenna has come to occupy the place which Aristotle used
to occupy in Arabic logic, and which Aristotle continued to
occupy in Western logic for many centuries after Avicenna’s
death. After Pointers—certainly the most influential book in
the history of Arabic philosophy—Aristotle ceased to matter
as a cultural coordinate for Muslim scholars; his name was at
most a shibboleth, discarded on entry to the vibrant disputes
of Arabic philosophy. In this respect, intellectual life in the
pre-modern realms of Islam was radically distinct from that
of the Latin west.
Technically, the modern reader of Arabic logic needs to
bear in mind at the very least the innovations that have been
mentioned in this introduction, and which are laid out in the
translation that follows: the idiosyncratic set of truth-
conditions that Avicenna stipulated for the absolute
proposition, and all the consequences this has for the way it
contributes to inferences; the descriptive proposition and its
truth-conditions; the division of the syllogistic into igtirani
and istithna’i. Almost all Arabic logicians who come after
Avicenna share these commitments, and they are handy
criteria to determine whether an Arabic logician should be
considered Avicennan. Those who adopted these doctrines
from Avicenna developed them considerably in the centuries
after his death. By contrast, post-Avicennan logicians did not
share Avicenna’s interest in the theory of demonstration, and
what they have to say on it develops his insights only
slightly.
XXVili INTRODUCTION
But something far more important is at stake, beyond these

unstated technical assumptions. Aristotle is left almost
entirely unmentioned by the great logicians of the thirteenth
century ce, and their exposition of logic tends to follow the
one used in Pointers and Reminders, which is much more remote
from Aristotle than the exposition in The Deliverance. To make
these logicians speak to Aristotle, and through him-to later
Greek logic, Latin logic, and the analyses of the modern
period, they must be made first to speak to Avicenna. In short,
if we want to be able to include Arabic logic in the exciting
work on pre-modern logics going on today, the only way to
do so is to go back to the point before Avicenna sundered the
Arabic tradition so decisively from Aristotle. Only by referring
to works like The Deliverance will we be able to proceed in
integrating the study of Arabic logic into the modern project
of writing the history of logic.
A translation of the logic of The Deliverance is therefore an
enormously welcome addition to our stock of texts on Arabic
philosophy. Unlike the logic in Philosophy for ‘Ala’addawla, it is
technically advanced enough to show us some of Avicenna’s
major and influential contributions to the discipline. Unlike
the logic in The Cure, it is short enough not to overwhelm the
reader who is not intending to take up Arabic logic as a
primary scholarly focus. Unlike the logic in Pointers and
Reminders, it is fairly easy to line up comparatively with
Aristotle’s texts, particularly those in the Prior Analytics on
modal logic. In retrospect, it is perhaps regrettable that
scholars did not start with the logic section of The Deliverance."
But we have a fine translation of it now.
Tony Street
Cambridge University
INTRODUCTION xxix
NOTES
. See e.g. the scant reference to Avicenna in W. Kneale & M. Kneale, The
Development of Logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1962, pp. 230, 266 (having
to do only with his teaching on secondary intelligibles and universals
as they influenced Western logic). Note that C. Burnett in ‘The
translation of Arabic works on logic into Latin in the Middle Ages and
the Renaissance’ in D. Gabbay & J. Woods eds. Handbook of the History of
Logic, volume 1: Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic, Elsevier, Amsterdam 2004,
pp. 597-606, at p. 598, seems to claim that all of Avicenna’s logic in The
Cure was translated, and not just part of the Madkhal, though he cites
no evidence for this claim. It is however true that, as stated by Burnett,
Ghazali’s translation of Avicenna’s Philosophy for ‘Ala’addawla was
translated into Latin, though it is too elementary to touch on the
significant issues treated in The Deliverance.
. A. Bertolacci, The Reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitab
al-Shifa’, Brill, Leiden 2006, p. viii.
. D. Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading
Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, Brill, Leiden 1988; a summary of Gutas’s
conclusions is given at p. 145.
. From Avicenna, Kitab al-Shifa’: al-Qiyds, eds. S. Zayed & I. Madkour,
al-Hay’a al-‘amma li-shu’tn al-matabi‘ al-amiriyya, Cairo 1964, p. 204.
. We find this attitude to Aristotle in al-Masa’il al-ghariba al-‘ishriniyya, in
Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language, eds. M. Mohaghegh & T.
Izutsu, Tehran University Press, Tehran 1974, pp. 81-103, especially pp.
95ff. Iwould argue that this text was composed immediately before The
Easterners, because it lays out answers to problems that arise from pre-
Easterners expositions; I acknowledge that my dating is only
speculative.
. Arapid summary of the argument developed in Gutas, Avicenna op. cit.
pp. 115-130. As luck would have it, what remains of The Easterners goes
on far enough to show us what Avicenna was doing with the absolute
proposition, one of his most characteristic changes to Aristotelian
logic. |
. Essentially, a change from following Aristotle’s order of treatment,
especially in the modal logic, to an order treating all first-figure
syllogisms, be they with absolute, necessity or possibility premises,
then second figure, then third figure.
. See the notes by the great early twelfth-century logician, ‘Umar ibn
Sahlan al-Sawi, al-Basd’ir al-Nasiriyya fi |-Mantiq, ed. M. ‘Abduh, Cairo
XXX INTRODUCTION
1898; e.g. pp. 68.14f, 76.3f, 91.10f, where he compares doctrine in The
Cure with that in Pointers. This is a common twelfth-century concern.
Identified in Y. Mahdavi, Fihrist-i Nuskhah-ha-i Musannafat-i Ibn Sina,
Intisharat-i Danishgah-i Tihran, Tehran 1954 as The Middle Summary of
Logic (pp. 217-219, work 108). This identification is however wrong: The
Middle Summary is nearly twice the length of the logic section in The
Deliverance, and devotes much more space to Aristotle’s early
commentators. I am grateful to David Reisman for sending me a copy
of Nuruosmaniye 4894 which contains a copy of the Middle Summary.
10. Avicenna, Mantiq al-Mashrigiyyin, ed. S. Najjar, Dar al-Hadatha, Beirut
1982, p. 133.
A. We have translations of all or much of each of these works, waiting for
revision in light of the present translation and recent research. Logic
from Philosophy for ‘Ala’addawla: F. Zabeeh, Avicenna’s Treatise on Logic.
Part One of Danesh-Nameh Alai, Nijhoff, The Hague 1971; the treatment
of non-categorical syllogistic from The Syllogism of The Cure: N. Shehaby,
The Propositional Logic of Avicenna. A Translation from al-Shifa’: al-Qiyas
with Introduction, Commentary and Glossary, Reidel, Dordrecht-Boston
1973; Logic from Pointers and Reminders: S. Inati, Remarks and Admonitions.
Part One: Logic, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto
1984.
Translator’s Preface
Some years ago, I had produced a translation of the logic part

of the Deliverance on the basis of the print by Majid Fakhry. I
found many parts of my work to be utterly dissatisfying,
mainly because of the absence of a proper critical apparatus
to guide me. So I started again, this time with Danishpazih’s
1985 work and completed the task in summer 2007. This
edition, though it presented a number of variant readings in
the apparatus, did not shed any light on its method. However,
many years ago, a cursory and partial comparison with the
earliest known manuscript of the work found at Oxford—Hunt
534 (dated 466 an/1073 ce)—had given me the impression that
the editor was following it faithfully. In my own translation I
had followed the main text presented by Danishpazth,
adopting and noting variants from the apparatus when
required by sense. My understanding was that I had translated
the earliest witness, supplementing it with an eclectic, but
carefully documented translation method.
After the arrival of the final proofs, I requested some advice
from a senior scholar, who judiciously suggested that I consult
Hunt 534 with a bit more attention. We were both hopeful
that earlier impressions would be confirmed, that the
manuscript would then go to press, and, in addition to being
an accessible translation, this book would also serve as a
useful aid to the future editor of the Deliverance. Unfortunately,
a close comparison of the text edited by Danishpazth with the
Hunt manuscript revealed far too many editorial irregularities,
so much so that my translation, as it existed then, looked
more like an interpretation of an interpretation (I had thought
Xxxii TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
that I was simply an eclectic translator, but I was now two

degrees removed from Avicenna). I started again, this time
basing myself on Hunt 534. This is a translation of this earliest
extant witness of Avicenna’s work.
Having gone carefully through Danishpazth and Hunt, I
wish to provide a few examples of what troubled me about the
printed text. Though we are not told in the introduction, from
the fact that Danishpazth gives folio numbers of Hunt in the
margins of his printed text, we can safely infer that he has
adopted this as his base. Given this, one would expect him to
document carefully and consistently, with accompanying
explanations, all divergences from the text in the Hunt
manuscript. This is not the case. He interpolates text even
when there is no corresponding variant in any of the other
manuscripts he used, sometimes compromising the sense of
the argument (e.g. p. 7, 1.8; p. 7, 1.13; p. 9, 1.7; p. 10, 1.2, 11.10,
etc.); he does so, recording some variants, but not mentioning
that in fact the same readings are also found in Hunt, thus
giving the impression that Hunt reads differently (p. 8, 1.10;
p. 21, 1.14; p. 41, 1.7, etc.); he omits text that is in fact found
in Hunt, without giving reference to any such omissions in the
other manuscripts, leading the reader to believe that such
omissions are found in Hunt (p. 17, 1.5; p. 26, 1.14; p. 27, 1.1;
p. 28, 1.11; p.. 40, 1.125 p. 46,-15: 0, 46, 1,155 p. 90,.1.9. etc); he
adds marginal text from Hunt, without noting this in most
cases (p. 10, 1.17; p. 11, 1.13; p. 12, 1.2, etc); he changes the
diacritical marks in Hunt, apparently to correct the grammar,
but in fact introduces errors (p. 12, 1.13; p. 43, 1.7, etc.); he
records and sometimes adjusts orthographic peculiarities in
some cases, but neglects to do so on other occasions (p. 34,
1.5, 6, etc.); he emends the Hunt text with variants from other
manuscripts, but makes unfortunate choices (p. 14, 1.14); and
he records the Hunt text incorrectly (p. 36, 1.7; p. 36, 1.10;
p-39, Lay p.. 42, 12, ete)
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE XXXili
It is clear that Danishpazth’s work alone cannot be used

for a translation; it will lead one too far away from what
Avicenna wrote. On the other hand, there is also no doubt that
it is by far the best printed text we have and, despite its
shortcomings, it resolves many of the rather difficult points
of the text as found in the Hunt manuscript, especially those
associated with the choice of diacritical points. My task would
have been immensely more difficult had I not first relied on
Danishpazth and I am indeed indebted to it.
In producing this final version, I have not deviated from
Hunt unless utterly forced by consideration of sense. In such
cases, I have recorded my choices by one of the following
symbols.
[x] = my interpolation, in most cases to render a smoother

translation
[x]® = an interpolation by Danishpazih, with no recorded
variant, adopted for sense
[x]?“= a marginal note in Hunt from an apparently different
hand, adopted for sense
[x]?° = a variant reported by Danishpazih, adopted for
sense
<x> = areading of Hunt, which I would prefer to remove for
sense
To get an uncompromisingly faithful translation of Hunt, the

reader need only make adjustments to these recorded
changes.
Listed in Bibliothecae Bodleianeae Codicum Manuscriptorum
Orientalium Catalogus (A.J. Uri, 1787), i, 117, as Hunt 534, The
Deliverance is part of a silken codex containing a total of six
distinct works in various hands. Other than the work treated
in this volume, the codex contains (1) Avicenna’s Mubahathat
(85 folios) and (2) Hayy ibn Yaqzan, along with a commentary
XXXiV TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
(22 folios); (3) Fakhr al-Din al-Razi’s Kitab al-nafs wa-’r-rih (38
folios); (4) Ibn Sab‘in’s Kitab al-ajwiba...ft ahwal al-nafs (Sicilian
Questions, 50 folios); and Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Ash‘ath’s
Kitab al-hayawan (155 folios).
The Deliverance itself, dated 466 an/1073 ce, contains, in the
following order, the parts on logic (folios 112r-159r), physics
(folios 159r-209r), and metaphysics (folios 209r-256v). The
colophon indicates that it was completed by a certain Nasr b.
Mansir and that ‘the original was presented and was
corrected, to the best of his capability, in Dht al-Hijja, 466
[aH],’ the same month in which the scribe finished his work.
In the colophon, there is some additional information,
apparently a fuller identification of the scribe, but I am not
able to decipher it.
The Deliverance is a highly legible manuscript, with eighteen
to twenty lines per page and ten to fourteen words per line
in the logic section; other parts of the manuscript, especially
the metaphysics, is more tightly packed. For the logic, it
appears to me that the matn has the contribution of four
hands, all in the same script. This claim needs to be verified
by a palaeographer, who should also be able to say something
about the provenance of the script and so also the manuscript.
The four different hands appear at 112r-161v, 162r-189v,
190r-199v, 200r-256v. Within each segment, the vast majority
of marginalia is in the same hand as the matn, though at least
two other distinct ones are also identifiable. When in the same
hand as the matn, most of the marginalia fills a clear lacuna,
introduced due to scribal negligence—skipped words or lines,
incorrect words that share a similar rasm, etc. In the rare
cases of alternative hands, the marginalia supply very brief
clarifications of points. It also appears that the various
marginal notes have distinct manners of emending or
supplementing the text. For example, one hand, which
appears to be the same as that of the matn, uses a curved line
TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE XXXV
to indicate where the marginal note should be inserted in the

main text; this same hand uses no such symbols in cases of
clarification and sometimes uses the expression afhamu to
indicate that the note is meant as a clarification; yet another
hand uses a caret-like symbol for interpolations.
In addition to scientifically verifying some of the passing
observations above, the editor of The Deliverance would also
be expected to pay attention to some of the orthographic and
grammatical peculiarities of the text. Thus, the text displays
certain distinct features of Middle Arabic regarding gender
agreement; and in a number of cases, for example, it also
replaces alifs with alif maqsaras and short vowels with long
ones, and so on.
Some final remarks on what I have and have not done are
in order. In this translation, I have consistently dropped the
heading ‘Section’ (fasl) on all occasions (it is rather rare
anyway). I have also included all marginal emendations in
Hunt that are clearly in the same hand, without noting that
they are marginal. I have adopted this method because it is
very clear to me, both from the nature of the changes and
their location in the text, that the same scribe collated Hunt
with the master copy at least once and made corrections. As
noted above, however, I have carefully documented marginal
emendations in the fresh hands wherever I have adopted
them (this is rare). I have also not recorded possible diacritical
variants when two or more words share the same skeleton
(rasm). In fact, when Hunt supplies a word without diacritics,
or wrongly pointed, but which is read by Danishpazih in a
way which I approve, I have simply adopted the latter without
reporting it. In such cases, it seemed obvious to me that the
scribe was working with a master copy that had either no
diacritics or ambiguous ones and that he was likely responsible
for introducing the error. Similarly, I have not recorded clear
scribal errors related to textual duplication, spacing, and
XXXvi TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE
orthography. Thus I have made adjustments in instances such

as ‘la yumkinu an <yumkina> yubayyaba,’ ‘al-usid vs. al-aswad,’
and ‘ila ifham (with an alif) vs. ila ifham (with an alif maqsira)
without noting. Hunt is also typical of presenting a text with
grammatical irregularities representative of Middle Arabic,
such as gender agreement, participle forms, and accusative/
nominative cases (e.g. hadha al-tabagat vs. hadhihi al-tabaqat,
zaydun mashi vs. zaydun mashin, inna kitabun vs. inna kitaban).
In cases where the philosophical sense is not at stake, I have
simply assumed the correct grammatical form and have not
recorded it. The task of producing the proper Arabic text is
reserved for the future editor and falls outside my concerns
as a translator. However, I do hope that this translation will
be useful not only for those interested in Avicenna’s logic, but
also for anyone intending to publish a proper scholarly
edition of the Deliverance.
I wish to thank Professor Dimitri Gutas for his guidance and
sound advice and Professors Michael A. Cook, Jon McGinnis,
and Hossein Modarressi for various corrections and explana-
tions. Foremost, to Dr Tony Street I would like to express my
profound gratitude for agreeing to write the introduction, for
sending me his comments on this translation, and for
encouraging and inspiring me. The many errors are all
mine.
Asad Q. Ahmed
Washing University in St. Louis
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
Translation of
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The Deliverance: Logic
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1. On Conceptualization (tasawwur) and
Assenting (tasdiq) and the Method of Each
i. All primary cognition (ma‘rifa) and scientific knowledge’
(‘ilm) is either conceptualization or assenting. Conceptualization
is knowledge that comes first'' and is acquired by means of
definition (hadd) and whatever is like it. [An example is] our
conceptualization of the quiddity (mahiyya) of man. Assenting
comes about only by means of syllogism (giyds) and whatever
is like it. [An example is] our assenting [to the fact] that the
universe (al-kull) has a single source (mabda’). Definition and
syllogism are two tools by means of which one acquires
objects of knowledge (ma‘limat) that are [at first] unknown
and then become known by means of deliberation (rawiya).
Each of these two [is divided into] the [1] real (hagqiqi), [2] the
unreal—but beneficial to some extent in its own way—and [3]
the false that resembles the real. In most cases, human nature
(fitra insaniyya) [by itself] is insufficient for distinguishing
among these [three] types. If this were not so, there would
occur neither any disagreement among the wise nor any
contradiction in the judgment of any single one [of them].
ii. Both the syllogism and the definition are constructed and
composed of intelligible (ma‘gila) concepts (ma‘ani) in keeping
with a determined [mode of] composition. Each one has a
matter (madda) from which it is composed and a form (sira)
whereby its composition [is completed]®. And just as it is not
proper to build a house or a chair from any arbitrary matter
whatever nor to complete their [construction] from their
respective matters in any arbitrary form—rather everything
has its specific matter and a specific and exact form—likewise
every object of knowledge, known by means of deliberation,
has its specific matter and form whereby one comes to its
verification. And just as corruption in the building of a house
4 AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC
may occur on account of the matter even if the form is correct

or on account of the form even if the matter is sound (or on
both their accounts together), likewise corruption in
deliberation may occur on account of the matter even if the
form is correct and on account of the form even if the matter
is sound (or on both their accounts together).
2. On the Benefit of Logic

i. Logic is a theoretical discipline (sina‘a nazariyya) that
explains to you from which forms and matters come about the
correct definition that is truly called a definition, and the
correct syllogism that is called a demonstration (burhan). And
it explains to you from which forms and matters comes about
the convincing (igna‘i) definition called a description (rasm);
and from which forms and matters comes about the strong
type of convincing syllogism that generates [a kind of] assent
that resembles certainty and is called the dialectical (jadali)
[syllogism]; and about the weak type that generates
overwhelming belief [and is called] the rhetorical (khatabi)
[syllogism]. [Logic also] explains to you from which form and
matter come about the false definition and the false syllogism
that is called the misleading (mughdliti) and the sophistical
(safista’i) [syllogism]. It is that which presents itself as a
demonstrative or dialectical [syllogism], while not being so.
[And logic also explains to you] from which form and matter
comes about the syllogism that generates no assent
whatsoever; it effects imagination (takhyil) in the mind that
causes the soul to desire a thing or to reject it; or it causes it
to be disgusted, happy or sad. This is the poetic syllogism
(giyas shi‘ri).
ii. This is the benefit of the discipline of logic. Its relation to

deliberation is [comparable to] the relation of grammar to
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC 5)
speech and of prosody to poetry. However, a sound nature and

innate faculty of discernment can perhaps dispense with the
study of grammar and prosody. [But] there is nothing in
human nature that, in using deliberation, can dispense with
preparing this instrument beforehand.
3. On Simple Utterances (alfaz mufrada)

i. Since theoretical speech occurs by means of compound
utterances (alfaz mu’allafa) and intelligible thoughts by means
of compound intelligible statements (aqwal) and [since] the
simple precedes the compound, we must speak first about the
simple utterance.
ii. We say that the simple utterance is that which signifies a

meaning, while no part of it signifies in itself any part of that
meaning. [An example is] our statement, ‘insan’, [man], by
which a meaning is certainly signified. Now by its two parts—
let them be ‘in’ and ‘san’—either no meaning is signified or
they signify two meanings which are not two parts of the
meaning of ‘al-insan’. [So even] if it so happened that ‘in’
signified, say, the soul and ‘san’ the body, in the composite of
our statement ‘insdan’, what is signified by each of them is still
not intended. So it is as if the two do not signify anything at
all when they are taken as the two parts of ‘insan’.
4. On Complex Utterances
i. As for the complex (murakkab) or compound (muallaf)
utterance, well it signifies a meaning. It has parts from which
its sound is composed; and [from the] meanings [of these
parts] the meaning of the whole is composed. [An example is]
our statement, ‘Man walks’ or ‘[The man] throws the stone’.
5. On the Universal (kulli) Simple Utterance

i. [The universal simple utterance] signifies the many by way
of one coinciding meaning. [These may be] either many with
respect to existence (such as man) or many with respect to
what the imagination (tawahhum) allows (such as the sun). In
sum, the universal is an utterance whose very sense does not
preclude that its meaning be shared by many. If anything
precludes [it—i.e. the utterance from being shared by many—
] from this, it is something other than the very sense of [the
utterance].
6. On the Particular Simple Utterance

i. [The particular simple utterance]® is that whose unique
meaning cannot possibly be anything more than a unique
thing—either with respect to existence or in accordance with
the imagination. Rather, its very sense precludes this. [An
example is] our saying ‘Zayd’; for the meaning of ‘Zayd’—if
taken as a unique meaning—is the unique essence (dhat) of
Zayd. It is neither possible in existence nor in the imagination
for it to be for anything other than the unique essence of Zayd
since the denotation precludes this. So if you say, ‘This sun’
or ‘This man’, it is not allowed for anything other than [this
very man and this very sun] to participate in it.
7. On the Essential (dhati)

i. Let us leave aside the particular and occupy ourselves with
the universal. Every universal [utterance] is either essential
or accidental (‘aradi). The essential [utterance] sets down the
quiddity of that of which it is said. It is not enough in the
explanation of the essential to say, ‘It is that which does not
separate [from its substance]’. For many things which are not
essential are still inseparable [from their substances]. Nor is
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC i
it sufficient to say that its meaning is, ‘That which neither

separates [from its substance] in existence nor in the
imagination, such that, if it were removed in the imagination,
the described [subject] would thereby cease to exist.’
[However,] many things that are not essential have this
attribute (sifa), such as the sum of the angles of a triangle
being equal to two right angles. For this is an attribute of
every triangle, neither separable in existence nor removable
in the imagination, so much so that it [is valid] to say that if
we were to remove it in the imagination, it would be necessary
for us to declare the triangle to be non-existent. But it is still
not an essential [attribute of the triangle]. Nor is [the
essential] something whose existence for its subject is obvious
in addition to its being’ its concomitant. For many
concomitants of a thing that follow after its quiddity has been
established are [also] its obvious concomitants.
ii. Rather, the essential is such that, if the meaning [of the
subject] is understood and occurs to the mind and if the
meaning of what is essential to it is understood and occurs to
the mind at the same time, it would be impossible for the
essence of the subject to be understood unless first the
meaning [of that which is essential to it] is already understood
to belong to it.
iii. An example is ‘man’ and ‘animal’. For if you understand

what an animal is and understand what a man is, you will not
understand what the latter is without first understanding
what the former is.
iv. As for the non-essential, well you may understand the

essence of the described subject independently of it. If you
understand [the subject], sometimes the existence of [the
non-essential concomitant] is necessarily understood to apply
to it. [An example is] the [the non-essential concomitance of]

location for a point. Or [the application of the non-essential
concomitant] may be understood on the basis of examination
and investigation, such as the angles of a triangle being equal
to two right angles. Or it may be possible [to remove the
concomitant] in the imagination even if it may not be removed
in existence, such as blackness for a black man. Or [the’
concomitant] [may be removed both]™ in existence and in the
imagination, such as youth in the case of something that
passes away slowly and sitting in the case of something that
passes away quickly.
8. On the Accidental
i. As for the accidental, well it is everything we enumerated
that is not essential. One may make an error about it and
believe incorrectly” that it is that accident which is the
counterpart of substance. (We will mention these two [i.e.
substance and accident] later.) This is not so. For the
accidental may be a substance, such as the white [object],
whereas an accident, such as whiteness, is not a substance.
9. On What is Said in Response to

‘What is it?’
i. Then, from the [category of] the essential is that which is
said in response to ‘What is it?’ and that which is not so said.
The [nature of the] essential said in response to ‘What is it?’
is not clear. Most of the commentaries are pretty neglectful
of investigating [this matter]. The opinion of superficial
logicians’ [concerning what is said in response to ‘What is it?’
pretty much reduces to [the idea] that it]® is the essential. But
the essential is more general than that.
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC S)
ii. Our examination revealed [as follows:] that a unique thing

may have many attributes (awsaf), all of them essential, but it
is what it is, not because of any one of them but on account
of their totality. For man is not man due to his being an
animal, but due to the fact that, in addition to his animality,
he is rational or mortal or something else. So if a simple
utterance were posited that included (I do not say, ‘that
implied’) all the essential meanings constitutive of a thing,
that [simple utterance]“ would be said in response to ‘What
is it?’ [An example is] our saying ‘man’ for Zayd and ‘Amr, for
it includes every simple and essential meaning belonging to
[man,] such as substantiality, corporeity, faculties of
nourishment, growth, and reproduction, of sense, movement,
speech, and others. Nothing essential belonging to Zayd [and
‘Amr] is left out of it. Likewise, ‘animal’ is [said] not just of
man, but also of man, horse, bull, and others in a shared
manner. For [animal] includes all the essential attributes
which belong to these [creatures] in a shared manner. Only
that which is specific to each one of them is left out. So what
is said in response to ‘What is it?’ is [as we have explained].
As for what is included in response to ‘What is it?’, well it is
every essential.
10. On What is Said in Response to ‘Which

Thing is it?’
i. As for what is said in response to ‘Which thing is it?’ well it
is that which indicates a meaning whereby things that share
in a single meaning are distinguished from each other. Among
[the responses can be] an accidental, such as white which
distinguishes snow from coal, the two being inanimate bodies.
And among them [can be] an essential such as rational, which
distinguishes a man from a horse, the two being animals. A
group [of logicians] had conventionally named the essential
as ‘that which is said in response to ‘which is it?” so that,

according to their technical terminology, ‘that which is said
in response to ‘which is it?” distinguishes a thing essentially
after its shared quiddity [has been set down]. [An example is]
rational for man after animal [has been set down for it], but
not whiteness for snow.
11. On the Five Utterances (alfaz khamsa)”#

i. The five universal utterances are: genus (jins), specific
difference (fasl), species (naw‘), property (khdssa), and
accident (‘arad).
12. On Genus
i. Genus is what is said of many things that differ with respect
to [their] species in response to [the question] ‘What is it?’
Our statement ‘that differ with respect to [their] species’
means ‘[that differ with] respect to their essential forms and
realities’, although [the concept of] species, which is [here]
brought into relation with the [concept of] genus, has not yet
been defined. Our statement ‘in response to [the question]
‘what is it?” means ‘a statement about a shared, [but] not a
distinguishing condition’, such as ‘animal’ [which is said] of
man and horse [but] not as ‘sentient’ [which may be said] of
them. For ‘sentient’ does not indicate the [complete’]®? shared
essence of man and horse, even if it does indicate some
essential meaning, i.e. [their] possessing sense. [But] it leaves
out ‘[capable of] moving voluntarily, sleeping, taking
nourishment, and so on’, except by way of implication, not by
inclusion [in the meaning of ‘sentient’]. There is a difference
between implication and inclusion, for a roof implies a wall
1. Reading kamal with D and Q.

AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC 11
but does not include it; and a house implies a wall and
includes it.
ii. It is necessary that when you determine the genus [of

something] you do so by means of that with which no specific
difference of the genus is associated; nor should you, when
you determine the genus, make it revolve around the species.
Do not occupy yourself with what (Porphyry) says.
13. On Species
i. As for species, well it is the essential universal which is said
of many things in response to [the question] ‘what is it?’ It is
also said in response to [the question] ‘what is it in a shared
[sense]?’% [[An example is] ‘animal’; for it is a species of body
and is said of man and horse in response to [the question]
‘what is it in a shared [sense]?’]’ Body is said of [animal] and
of others also in a shared [sense] in response to [the question]
‘what is it?’
ii. A thing may be a genus for species and a species of a genus,

such as animal is of a body with a soul. For [the former] is the
species [of the latter];* [but] of man and horse it is the genus.
However, the upward hierarchical arrangement* [of genera]
comes to end with a genus above which there is no [additional]
genus. It is called the genus of genera (jins al-ajnas). [Likewise,]
the downward hierarchical arrangement” [of species ends
with] a species below which and beyond which is no species.
It is called the species of species (naw‘ al-anwa‘). It is
described** as ‘that which is said of a number of different
things in response to [the question] ‘what is it?” as ‘man’ [is
said of] Zayd and ‘Amr and ‘horse’ of this and that horse.
14. On Specific Difference

i. As for specific difference, well it is an essential universal
[utterance] that is said of a species [that falls] under a genus;
[and it is said] in response [to the question], ‘which thing from
[this genus] is it?’ [An example is] ‘rational’ for man; for it is
thus that one responds when asked, ‘which animal is it?’ The
difference between ‘the rational’ and ‘man’ is that-man is an
animal that has rationality, while the rational is something
that, though it has rationality, has not been specifically
identified.*' Rationality is an abstracted (mujarrad) specific
difference while rational is a compound specific difference; it
is the latter that is the logical specific difference.
15. On Property
i. Property, is the universal that indicates a single species in
response to [the question] ‘which thing is it, not with respect
to its essence but with respect to its accident?’ [It indicates]
either a species that is [itself] a genus, such as [the property
that] the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. For
it is a property of a triangle.*” Or [it indicates] a species that
is not a genus, [an example being] man’s capacity for laughter;
[for] it is a concomitant property [of man and is applicable to
all] equally. [Another example is] ‘writing’ which is neither a
concomitant property nor one equal [to all men] but specific”
[to some].
16. On Accident
i. As for common accident, well it is every simple accidental
(i.e., non-essential) universal in whose meaning many species
participate. [An example is] whiteness as it applies to snow
and swan. Do not concern yourself with whether it is a
necessary concomitant of or separable from each member of

the species*’ or some of them. [Nor should you trouble
yourself with] whether it is in‘itself a substance, such as the
white [object], or an accidental such as whiteness, provided
[it has been determined that] it is not constitutive of the
essence. For the occurrence of the accident for the latter and
for that which falls in the category of substance*’ happens in
two different senses in existence.
17. On Individual Essences (a‘yan), Objects of

the Estimative Faculty (awham),
Utterances, and Writing
i. A thing is either an existent individual essence or a form
existent in the estimative faculty or the intellect (‘aq]),
extracted from [the individual essence]. These [essences and
forms] do not differ with respect to regions and peoples. Or
[a thing] is an utterance that indicates a form expressed in
the estimative faculty or the intellect; or it is a writing that
indicates an utterance. These last two differ with respect to
peoples. For writing indicates an utterance; an utterance
indicates an estimated or intellected form; and this form
indicates existent individual essences.
18. On Noun (ism)

i. A noun is a simple utterance that indicates a meaning
without indicating the time (past, present, and future*”')
during which this meaning existed. [An example is] our
statement ‘Zayd’. Among nouns are those which are positive
(muhassal) such as ‘Zayd’ and those which are not; [in the
latter case,] an utterance of negation is attached to something
which is a [positive] noun [generating a meaning] opposite
that of the [positive] meaning. So it is made a noun for that

meaning. [An example] is our statement, [‘non-man’”?]??.
19. On Verb (kalima)

i. A verb is a simple utterance that indicates a meaning and
the time during which this meaning was existent for some
undetermined subject. [An example is] our statement, ‘he
walked.’ For this indicates the walking of an undetermined
walker during a time which has passed.
20. On Particle (adat)

i. As for a particle, well it is a simple utterance that indicates
a meaning that is correctly posited or predicated only after it
is attached to a noun or a verb. [Examples are] ‘in’ and
‘upon’,
21. On Statement (qawl)

i. A statement is every compound utterance. We explained it
earlier.
22. On Proposition (qadiyya)

i. A proposition and a report (khabar) is every statement in
which there is a relationship between two things such that
the judgment ‘true’ or ‘false’ follows from it.
23. On the Attributive [Proposition] (hamliyya)

i. The.attributive proposition generates the [above-mentioned]
relationship between two things. This relationship exists with
2. Reading with D: al-la-insan for al-insan.

respect to these two only insofar as it is possible to indicate

each of them by means of a simple utterance. [An example is]
our statement, ‘Man is an animal’; [another is] our statement,
‘The animal [capable of] laughter moves from one place to
another by putting down a foot and raising the other’; for it
is as if you said, ‘The man walks’. [Yet another example] is
your statement, ‘Such and such a person’s knowledge is great’;
for your saying ‘his knowledge is great’ is equivalent to your
saying, ‘a philosopher’.
24. On the Conditional [Proposition]

(shartiyya)
i. The conditional proposition [also] generates this relationship
between two things. [But] this relationship exists with regard
to each of them insofar as [it may be] divided (mufassala).**
[An example is] our statement, ‘If the sun rises, the morning
would exist.’ For if you were to undo** this relationship, it
would break down to your statement, ‘The sun rises’ and your
statement, ‘The morning exists.’ Each one of these is a
proposition. Likewise [is the case] if you were to say, ‘Either
this number is even or this number is odd’.
25. On the Conjunctive Conditional

[Proposition] (shartiyya muttasila)
i. As for the conjunctive conditional proposition, well it either
affirms or negates that a proposition follows another, as we
just presented in the example of the conditional
[proposition].
26. On the Disjunctive Conditional

[Proposition] (al-shartiyya al-munfasila)
i. The disjunctive [proposition] either affirms or negates the
exception of a proposition with regard to another, as we just
set out in the example of the conditional [proposition].
27. On Affirmation (ijab)

i. Affirmation, in an absolute sense, is the generation and
production of this relationship with regard to existence.™ In
the attributive [proposition], it is the judgment that the
predicate exists for the subject.
28. On Negation (salb)

i. Negation, in an absolute sense, is the removal of the
relationship between two things with regard to existence. In
the attributive [proposition], it is the judgment that the
predicate is non-existent for the subject.
29. On the Predicate (mahmil)

i. The predicate is that which is judged (mahkam bihi) to exist
or not to exist for another thing.
30. On the Subject (mawdi‘)

i. The subject is that about which it is judged whether some
other thing exists or does not exist for it. An example of a
subject is ‘Zayd’ in our statement, ‘Zayd is a writer.’ And an
example of a predicate is ‘writer’ in our statement, ‘Zayd is a
writer’.
31. On the Singular [Proposition] (makhsisa)

i. The singular is an attributive proposition whose subject is
a particular thing, as our statement, ‘Zayd is a writer.’ It may
be affirmative or negative.
32. On the Indefinite [Proposition] (muhmala)

i. The indefinite is an attributive proposition whose subject is
universal, it being unclear whether the judgment applies to
all or some of it. [An example is] our statement, ‘(The) Man is
white’. [The proposition] may be affirmative or negative.
Since it is unclear whether the judgment regards all or some
of [the subject], it must [at least concern] some of it; [the
possibility] that it concerns all of it is maintained in a weaker
fashion. For this reason the status of the indefinite
[proposition] is the same as that of a particular [proposition]
that we will mention.
33. On the Definite/Quantified [Proposition]

(mahsura)
i. A definite [proposition] is that whose subject is universal
and it is clear whether the judgment applies to all or to some
of it. It may be either affirmative or negative. :
34. On the Affirmative Universal [Proposition]

i. The universal affirmative among the definite [propositions]
is that in which the judgment is an affirmation applied to each
[member] of the subject [class], such as our statement, ‘Every
man is an animal.’
35. On the Negative Universal [Proposition]

i. The universal negative [among the definite propositions] is
that in which the judgment is a negation applied to the entire
subject [class], such as our statement, ‘Not a one among men
is a stone.’
36. On the Affirmative Particular [Proposition]

i. The affirmative particular [among the definite propositions]
is that in which the judgment is an affirmation, but applied
to some of the subject [class], such as our statement, ‘Some
men are writers.’
37. On the Negative Particular [Proposition]

i. The negative particular [among the definite propositions] is
that in which the judgment is negated, but only of some of
the subject, such as our statement, ‘Some men are not writers’
or ‘Not every man is a writer—but it is possible for some [to
be so].’
38. On the Quantifier (sur)

i. The quantifier is an utterance that indicates the measure of
the quantification, such as ‘every’, ‘none’, ‘some’, and ‘not
all’.
39. On Two Opposite Propositions (qadiyyatayn

mutaqabilatayn)
i. Two opposite propositions differ [from each other] with
respect to negation and affirmation. Their subject and
predicate are the same as regards their meaning, relation
(idafa), potentiality (quwwa), actuality (bi-'-fi'l), particularity,
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC i)
universality, location (makan), time (zaman), and condition

(shart). Thus, if [a proposition posited] a father for Zayd, [he
would not be considered here insofar as he was also] ‘Amr’s
father; or if [he was a] father in potentiality, then [he would
not be considered] in actuality; or if blackness [were posited]
of some, [then [one would not consider] blackness [simpliciter]
or the blackness of some others; or if a past time [is posited],
then the’]’° present or the future or any other time [is not
considered], [but that time exactly*]®° or [if] for example, ‘that
it moves on the earth’ [were posited], then [we would not
concern ourselves with] ‘that it moves in the sky’.
40. On Contradiction (tanaqud)

i. Two propositions opposite in a contradictory fashion oppose
each other as regards affirmation and negation such that it is
necessary due to this opposition itself that one of [the
propositions] is true and the other false. Such happens only
when, in these propositions, the conditions of contradiction
as regards singular and quantified propositions obtain fully.
In addition, one of the [propositions] is universal and the
other particular. If they are both universal, they are called
contraries (mutaddddatayn), both of which [may be] false as
regards either possible predication.~' [An example is] our
statement, ‘Every man is a writer’ and ‘There is not a single
one among men that is a writer’. If the [two propositions] are
particulars and are called sub-contraries, they [may both be]
true with respect to the same predicate. [An example is] our
statement, ‘Some men are writers’ and ‘Some men are not
writers’.
3. It is unclear where Danishpazih has found much of what is in the

brackets, though some of it occurs in the apparatus.
4. Reading with RM: bal fi dhalika ’z-zamani.
ii. There is no condition other than opposition for the singular

propositions to be contradictory. [As for] future possible
(mumkin) predication, well the truth and falsity [of the
proposition] is not determined for either side of the
opposition, even though it must be one or the other. [An
example is] your statement, ‘Zayd will walk’ and ‘Zayd will not
walk.’ If it were the case that one of these two were true at
this time and the other false due to the statements themselves,
one of the two things will come to be and the other fail to be
by necessity. Thus, the matter will be necessary (wajib), not
possible, and choice (ikhtiyar) and the preparedness (isti‘dad)
[of potentialities for actualization] will no longer exist."
[Thus] the nature of the possible will be entirely nullified.
41. On the Matters (mawadd) of Propositions

i. The necessitating matter is a condition of the predicate in
relation to the subject whereby it is necessary and inevitable
for it to obtain always and at all times, i.e. that at all times
the affirmation is true. [An example is] the condition of
‘animal’ for ‘man’; the negation is not considered. The
prohibiting [or impossible] (mumtani‘) matter is a condition of
the predicate in relation to the subject whereby the truth
always obtains with the negation. [An example is] the
condition of ‘stone’ for ‘man’; the affirmation is not
considered. The possible matter is a condition of the predicate
in relation to the subject whereby the truth does not persist
for it either in [its] affirmation or in [its] negation. [An
example is] the condition of ‘writer’ for ‘man’. It is said that
the possible is that for which no judgment exists at some time,
i.e. the present, and that it thereafter comes to have this
judgment [apply to] it in the future.” It is on this basis that
it is distinguished from that to which a judgment applies in
the present [and] by necessity.
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC PAN
42. On Bipartite (thuna’i) and Tripartite

(thulathi) [Propositions]
i. In the mind, there are three essential parts to every
attributive proposition: the meaning of the subject [term], of
the predicate [term], and of the relation between the two. As
regards the utterance, sometimes it remains limited to [1]
that which indicates the meaning of the subject term and [2]
that which indicates the meaning of the predicate term. The
utterance indicating the meaning of the relation [between the
two] is suppressed. [This kind of utterance] is called a
bipartite, such as our statement ‘Zayd [is] a writer’.
ii. The tripartite is that in which the utterance indicating the

relation [between the subject and predicate] is made explicit.
[An example is] our statement, ‘Zayd is a writer.’ This
utterance is called the copula (rabita). A verb is copulative by
itself since it indicates a subject in every case, so that the
relation is [already] included in it.
43. On the Ambiguous (ma‘duliyya) and Simple

(basita) Proposition
i. The simple proposition is that whose subject and predicate
are positive nouns. The ambiguous proposition is that <most
of> whose subject or predicate is not positive. [An example of
the latter] is your statement, ‘The non-man is white’ [or] ‘The
man is non-white.’ The ambiguous absolute proposition,
insofar as one [attributes ambiguity to it,°]®? is one whose
predicate is as described here. [An example is a] statement
like, ‘Zayd is non-seeing.’ This statement is an affirmative
ambiguous [proposition].
5. Reading with Q: al-mutlaqa fi wasfiha bi-’l-‘udil for al-mutalqa al-‘udil.
%
Jags AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC
ii. The difference between an affirmative ambiguous

[proposition], such as our statement, ‘Zayd is non-seeing’ and
a simple negative [proposition], like, ‘Zayd is not seeing’ [is
twofold]. [1] It has to do with the form [of the proposition,]
since the word of negation in the ambiguous [proposition] is
a part of the predicate. Thus, it is as if you took ‘non-’ and
‘seeing’ as single things, and obtained [the predicate] from
them by means of a composition. If you then affirmed this
totality as a single thing, it would be an ambiguous affirmative
[proposition]. If you negated it, you would say, ‘Zayd is not
non-seeing’ and this would be an ambiguous negative
[proposition]. As for the simple [proposition], the word of
negation is not part of the predicate, but something external
to it; it is inserted into it and removes [the predicate from the
subject]. [2] [The difference between the two types of
propositions also has to do with the issue of] concomitance
(talazum) and reference (daldla).*’ For the simple negative
[proposition] is more general than [the ambiguous proposition],
since the negation is correct[ly applied to] a non-existent
subject, but the affirmation, in the case of the ambiguous or
positive [types of propositions], is correct[ly applied] only to
an existent. For it is correct for you to say, ‘The griffon is not
seeing’, but not correct to say, ‘The griffon is non-seeing’.
iii. ‘As for what is said of the difference between these two
in addition to this, do not pay attention to it. For the
affirmation of ‘non-seeing’ is correct for every existent that
is deprived of vision, whether it is in its nature or not in its
nature to have it (better, whether it is in the nature of its
species or genus [to have it or not]) or not at all in its nature
to have it.
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC a
iv. In the bipartite proposition, ambiguity and negation are

distinguished only in one of two ways. The first of these is by
way of the intention of the speaker. For example, if one said,
‘Zayd [is] not/non- seeing’, it means that Zayd is not seeing,
which is a negation, or that Zayd is non-seeing, which is an
affirmative ambiguous [proposition]. The second is by way of
the knowledge of the linguistic habits of the one who negates
[that are shared with the addressee]. Thus, if he said, ‘Zayd is
non- (ghayr) seeing’, it is known that it is an affirmation
because non- (ghayr) is used to [express] ambiguity and not
negation.
v. As for the tripartite [proposition], well the ambiguous

affirmation is distinguished from the positive negation in
every way because the copula, when it is added to the word
of negation, joins the latter with the predicate as one thing.
Thus it affirms, as in your statement, ‘Zayd is non-seeing’.»
And if the word of negation is added to the copula, it negates,
as your statement, ‘Zayd is not seeing’. [This is so] because
the copula makes ‘seeing’ alone the predicate and leaves the
word of negation outside of it.
44. On the Privative (‘adamiyya)

i. A privative proposition is one whose predicate is the baser
of two opposites. So goes the commonly accepted (mashhur)
[account]. [An example is] your statement, ‘Zayd is unjust’ or
‘The air is murky’. In reality, it is that [proposition] whose
predicate indicates the privation of a thing that normally
belongs to that thing, to its species, or its genus.
45. On Modes (jihat)

i. There are three modes: [1] the necessary (wajib), which
indicates the perpetuity of existence; [2] the impossible
(mumtani‘), which indicates the perpetuity of non-existence;
and [3] the possible (mumkin), which indicates the [non-
perpetuity*]®° of existence and non-existence. The difference
between mode and matter is that the mode is an explicit
expression that indicates one of these [three] meanings. The
matter is the condition of the proposition in itself that is left
implicit. Sometimes these two differ, as in your statement, ‘It
is possible for Zayd to be an animal.’ For, [in this case,] the
matter is necessary and the mode is possible. There are other
differences between these two, but we will not elaborate
them.
46. On the Fourfold (ruba‘iyya)

i. A fourfold proposition is one in which the copula and mode
are mentioned in addition to the predicate and the subject.
[The modified’]®° affirmative fourfold [proposition] is only
negated by the application of the word of negation to the
mode, not of the mode to the negation. [Take, for example,]
the propositions, ‘It is possible for Zayd to walk’ and ‘It is
possible for Zayd not to walk’. [Here the word of negation is
not applied to the mode,] and so they may both be true.
[Likewise,] the propositions, ‘It is necessary for Zayd to walk’
and ‘It is necessary for Zayd not to walk’ may both be false.
[And the same is the case for] ‘It is impossible for Zayd to
walk’ and ‘It is impossible for Zayd not to walk’. Rather, the
opposite of ‘It is possible’ is ‘It is not possible’, of ‘It is
6. Reading la dawam with D, HJ, T, Q for al-adwam.

7. Reading with Q: muwajjaha for al-jiha.
necessary’ ‘It is not necessary’, and of ‘It is impossible’ ‘It is

not impossible’.
47. On the Possible and its Investigation

i. There is some ambiguity about the possible. However, many
of the ambiguities and errors that befall people with respect
to the contradiction and equivalence of modified [propositions]
would disappear if we mention [the possibility-modified
propositions] and offer a corrective analysis. So we say that
the common people (al-‘amma) understand of the possible
something other than what the specialists (al-khassa)
understand of it, in accordance to their agreement about it.
As for the common people, by their statement ‘possible’ they
mean ‘that which is not impossible’, without laying it down
whether [it is ‘necessary’]’ or ‘not-necessary’. Thus the
meaning of their statement, ‘It is not possible’ is ‘It is not not
impossible’, so that its meaning comes to be ‘It is impossible’.
Thus, the common-possible is that which is not impossible
and the non-possible is that which is impossible. [The result
is that] everything is either possible or impossible for them
and there is no third type. Thus, according to this usage, the
possible can be said of the necessary as its genus—though it
is not its synonym—because, as far as its meaning is concerned,
the necessary is not the impossible. :
ii. As for the specialists, they found a meaning [for the

possible] that [corresponds to the idea:] ‘neither necessary
nor impossible’. Among the common people, there is no noun
[corresponding to] this concept, since for them the noun
‘possible’ [was designated] for some other concept. However,
in accordance with both the common and specialist usage, it
is correct to say for this thing that ‘It is possible for it to be’
and ‘It is possible for it not to be’ in the sense that ‘It is not
impossible for it to be’ and ‘It is not impossible for it not to

be’. [Given this,] they transferred the noun ‘possible’ and took
it to indicate [‘not impossible’].*”" They [also] posited the
noun ‘possible’ to indicate something that is neither
impossible nor necessary. [This ‘possible’] is the non-
Necessary (dariri) in the states [of being and not being]. This
sense is more special than the one which the common [people]
use. Thus, let the necessary fall outside of the [genus of the]
possible, so that our statement, ‘It is not possible’ does not
come to mean ‘impossible’, but ‘not non-Necessary’. [This in
turn means that] it is necessary or impossible. And neither of
these [modes] are this ‘possible’ [as posited by the common
people].
iii. [A problem is] that, in saying, ‘It is not possible’ in the

specialist sense (mumkin khassi), those of weak opinions are
made to imagine the meaning of the common-possible. [Now]
according to them, the meaning of ‘It is not possible’ was ‘It
is impossible’ and [at the same time] the necessary was
excluded from the possible [according to the specialist
account]. So they get confused. For, when they say, ‘The
necessary is [a species of] the special-possible and the special-
possible is that which may not be’, the necessary becomes (for
them) that which may not be. And when they say, [in keeping
with the specialist account,] ‘The necessary is not-possible’
and imagine that the non-possible is the impossible, the
necessary becomes impossible.
iv. If they keep an eye on the terms (hudid) of the examination

and take the possible of the two types in a uniform [and non-
equivocal] manner, this confusion would not arise. For if they
take the possible in the sense that it is something that is not-
Necessary either in its existence or non-existence*™* and
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC cai
[then] look into whether the necessary is possible, they would

find it to fall outside the possible and to be that which is not-
possible. Then, it would not follow that that which is not-
possible is impossible because the possible is not ‘that which
is not-impossible’ so that its negation would be ‘impossible’.
Rather, [it is] ‘that which is not-Necessary with regard to its
existence and non-existence’. Thus, that which is <not>
possible is that which is not-Necessary with regard to its
existence and non-existence. And so ‘not-possible’ would
[apply] truthfully to the necessary since it does not entail
Necessity either in its existence or its non-existence. [And this
is so] because [the necessary] has Necessity with regard to
existence.
v. Likewise, if they define ‘non-possible’ as ‘impossible’, then

why do they not define ‘possible’ as ‘non-impossible’, so that
it can be said correctly of the ‘necessary’ and [so that] the
statement, ‘It is possible for it not to be’ would not follow?
[This is so] because when ‘possible’ is meant as ‘non-impossible’
it need not be the case that what has a possible existence
must also have a possible non-existence;**' nor [should it be]
that whatever is ‘non-necessary”**” or whatever is ‘non-
impossible’ be that which is ‘non-impossible not to be’.
vi. From this it can be gathered that the necessary falls within
the [scope of] the common-possible, but not within that of
the special-possible. [And it is also understood] that the
special-non-possible does not mean impossible, but rather
Necessary either with respect to existence or non-existence.
[It can be concluded] that the judgment with respect to the
possible has a non-Necessary status and when this judgment
is assumed to exist, either as an affirmation or a negation, no
absurdity thereby occurs.
vii. It is not among the conditions of the possible that it

should be non-existent or existent in the present. For then
one would say that the description of the possible is ‘that
which does not exist in the present but if it is assumed to exist
in the future, no absurdity follows thereby.’ [The first part of
this description must be rejected] because, if the cause that
precludes the existence [of a thing] were the fact of its
becoming necessary with respect to its existence [in the
present], one must consider this cause also from the aspect of
its non-existence [in the present].*’ Thus, if it were assumed
to be non-existent in the present, it would thus be necessary
with respect to its non-existence in the present and" [it
would therefore be] impossible. Thus, if the present
impossibility does not affect the possible adversely, then the
present necessity does not do so either. If it were the case that
that which has a possible existence were necessarily non-
existent [in the present],“*”"' then that which has a possible
non-existence would be necessarily not non-existent [in the
same fashion]. But the possible existent is precisely the
possible non-existent. Thus, according to their principle, it
would be necessary for the possible existent to exist.~i#
48. On the Necessary and Impossible and, in

Sum, the Necessary
i. There exists a diametrical difference between the necessary
and the impossible, despite the fact that they share in the
concept of Necessity. For the former is Necessary with respect
to existence and the latter is Necessary with respect to non-
existence. When we speak about the Necessary it is permissible
for us to shift the account, exactly as it is, to either one of
them [i.e. the necessary and the impossible].°°*
ii. We say that the Necessity predication occurs in six manners

and that each of these has [some] share in perpetuity (dawam).
[1.] The first of these is that the predication is eternal,™ as [in]
your statement, ‘God is living.’
iii. [2.] The second [type of Necessity is that in which the

predication exists] for as long as the substance of the subject
exists, i.e. does not pass away. [An example] is our statement,
‘Every man is by necessity an animal,’ i.e., each one among
humans is always an animal as long as his substance exists.
[This is] not perpetually [the case], without any condition, so
that he should be an animal eternally, before his coming to
be and after his passing away. The first and this second [types
of Necessities] are the two used and intended when it is said,
‘a Necessary affirmation or negation’ and, in a certain fashion,
a single meaning is common to both. [And this meaning is]
‘Necessity, as long as the substance of the subject exists,
either perpetually, if the substance exists perpetually, or for
some time, if the substance may pass away’.
iv. [3.] As for the third [type], it [has the following condition:]
‘as long as the substance of the subject is described by a
description that is posited along with [this substance]’ and not
‘for as long as the substance of the subject exists’. [An
example] is your statement, ‘By Necessity, every white [thing]
has a color that dilates sight’. In other words, [this predication
holds] neither eternally nor for as long as the substance of
that white thing exists. If this substance persists and does not
pass away, but the whiteness passes away from it, it may not
be described as having a color that dilates sight. Rather, this
Necessity persists not for as long as the substance exists, but
[for as long as it is] described by whiteness.
v. [4.] As for the fourth [type], it [has the following condition:]

‘as long as the predication exists.’ It has no Necessity without
this condition. [An example is] our statement, ‘By Necessity,
Zayd is walking, for as long as he is walking.’ For it is not
possible for him not to be walking while he walks.
vi. [5.] As for the fifth [type], well the Necessity obtains for a
certain specific inevitable [span of] time. [An example is] our
statement, ‘By Necessity, the moon eclipses.’ However, [this
is not a Necessity that persists] perpetually, but for some
exact and specified [span of] time.
vii. [6.] The sixth type is [that in which the predication is] by
Necessity for some unspecified [span of] time. [An example
is] your statement, ‘By Necessity, every man breathes,’ i.e. for
some period, neither perpetually nor for a specific and exact
[span of] time. Z
viii. If no condition is posited in these [last] four types, the

predication is called absolute (mutlaq). If the mode of Necessity
is posited as a condition in them, it is more suitable for the
mode to be a part of the predicate, and not something
extraneous to it. This is so because, in the case [of stipulating
Necessity in these four types of propositions,] the predicate
is not by itself a predicate, but [comes] with extra elements
(zawa’id). Since the mode is like a part of them, these extra
elements and the predicate are not understood to be one
thing as long as the mode is not among them.™"
ix. In the case of the Necessity premise, well the predicate is

intended to be posited independently and by itself and the
mode has no effect on it. [Its effect] is rather on the copula.
Thus, the predicate is in itself like a single concept and the
mode is extraneous to it.*"#
49. On the Equivalence (mutalazimat)*"# of

Modalized [Propositions]
i. Equivalent [propositions], which replace each other, are of
the following grades. One is thus: ‘it is necessary that it exist;
it is impossible that it not exist; it is not possible*"’ that it not
exist.’ Their contradictories are also equipollent (muta‘akisa),
as in our statement, ‘It is not necessary that it exist; it is not
impossible that it not exist; it is possible (but not contingent)
that it not exist.’
ii. Another grade is as follows: ‘It is necessary that it not exist;

it is impossible that exist; it is not possible (not contingent)
that it exist.’ [The case with] their contradictories is similar:
‘It is not necessary that it not exist; it is not impossible that
it exist; it is possible that it exist.’
iii. There is a grade [comprising the] real contingent, but here

only two things are equipollent*”: ‘it is contingent that it
exist’ and ‘it is contingent that it not exist’. However, their
contradictories are not*™ equipollent. Nothing from among
the rest of the modes follows from them as a mutually
converting [equipollent]. As for ‘It is possible that it exist’,
well ‘It is possible that it not exist’ is not its equipollent, as
we Clarified earlier. :
iv. As for propositions that do not entail mutually,*”" well [an

example is], ‘It is necessary that it exist.’ [The following
statements are its non-mutual] entailments: ‘It is not
impossible that it exist’ and that which falls in its grade, such
as ‘It is not necessary that it not exist’, ‘It is possible that it
exist’, ‘It is not contingent that it exist’ (because it is
necessary," not contingent), ‘It is not contingent that it not
exist’. Likewise, the following are [non-mutual] entailments
3Z. AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC
of ‘It is impossible that it exist’: the negation of ‘It is necessary

that it exist’ and that which falls in its grade, and the negation
of the two real contingents, [I mean]’, the ambiguous and the
positive.*"*
v. ‘It is possible that it exist’ and ‘It is possible that it not exist’
and those [things] that fall in their grade are the [non-mutual]
entailments of ‘It is contingent that it exist’. [It is hoped] that
one can [deduce] what remains from the foregoing.
50. On Premise (muqaddima) and Term (hadd)

i. A premise is a statement that either affirms something of
something or denies it of something. It is made a part of
syllogism. A term is something to which a premise, insofar as
it is a premise, reduces, when the link [between the subject
and predicate] dissolves. Thus, it is without doubt that only a
subject and predicate remain.
51. On the Dictum de Omni [et Nullo] (maqul

‘ala al-kull)
i. A premise containing a dictum de omni [states that] there is
nothing of which the subject is said of which the predicate is
not also said. The negation is [to be understood] accordingly.
Every premise is absolute (mutlaga), or [Necessary (daririyya)]*,
or possible (mumkina).
52. On Absolute [Propositions]

i. There are two opinions regarding absolute [propositions]:
[1] the opinion of Theophrastus, then of Themistius and
others. [It states that absolute propositions] are those in
which the mode of the Necessity or possibility of the judgment
is not mentioned; rather, it occurs in an absolute fashion [and

free of any explicitly mentioned mode]. Thus, the judgment
may exist by Necessity or without it, ie. not perpetually.
ii. It is not unlikely that this is the opinion of the Philosopher

[ie. Aristotle] regarding the absolute. For the Philosopher
allows that two universals—one an affirmative, the other a
negative—can be absolute and true. [An example is] your
statement, ‘Every horse is sleeping’ and ‘No horse is sleeping’.
He also transfers a universal affirmative absolute judgment to
a universal negative absolute judgment. Those who are of this
opinion think that this is allowed, but not necessary, because
the Philosopher sometimes also adduces! examples (regarding
the absolutes), in which this is not allowed. [Such propositions]
are perpetually Necessary.
iii. [2] As for the proponents of the second opinion—and

among them are Alexander and many of the later scholars
who verified [knowledge]!' (among whom he is the most
probative)—well they think that this [aforementioned]
transfer must apply to absolute [propositions]. [They also
believe] that, when [affirmative or negative] predication
(hukm) occurs in absolute propositions, Necessity applies only
according to one of the four types of aforementioned ways
after the first two [types]. Thus, for them, the [affirmative or
negative] predication exists in absolute propositions, not
perpetually, i.e. for as long as the substance of that about
which the judgment is made exists, but for some time. And
this time [obtains] either for as long as the subject is described
by that which describes it, as [in] your statement, ‘Every white
[thing] dilates sight’; or [it obtains] for as long as the predicate
is judged [to apply to the subject]; or for a specified Necessary
time, like the eclipse of the moon and the [gestation] of each
human in the womb; or for a Necessary, but unspecified time,

like breathing for animals. [In the last case,] it is not necessary
for this to be one [and the same] time, which all [subjects]
share. Rather a certain time is specific to each one [of them].
It is [also] not unlikely that this is the opinion of the
Philosopher. However, we will not occupy ourselves with
preferring one opinion over the other. Rather, we will
consider the judgments regarding the absolute in both ways
together. And this will become apparent to you when we
elaborate on the absolute quantified [propositions]. Thus,
[when we] say, ‘Absolutely, Every B is A’, its meaning is that
every single thing that is described in the intellect [or®]®° in
existence as B—whether it is so described perpetually or for
some time after coming to be B—that thing is described as A.
We do not know when [this is the case:] does [it occur] when
it comes to be described as B? Or at some other time? Or
perpetually? Or not perpetually? So it is according to the
opinion of Theophrastus.
iv. As for the second opinion, it is not opposed to the first as

regards the subject. For there is no doubt that the meaning.
of our statement ‘Every mover’ is ‘Everything that is described
as a mover or is posited for it [as a substrate], whether
perpetually [or]®° for some time’. The meaning of mover in
both [interpretive] cases is the same, though it differs as
regards the period of its persistence. But a period is something
accidental to a meaning, not constitutive of it. Instead, they
disagree on the matter of the predicate. Those holding the
first opinion consider the predication' in a more general
fashion than what is possible for one to understand of it, [i.e.]
without any condition of persistence or non-persistence
whatsoever. [On the other hand, the proponents of the second
8. Reading with the other manuscripts: aw- for wa-.

opinion] specify the condition of non-persistence. Thus, for

them the meaning of our statement, ‘Every B is A’ comes to
be, ‘Everything that is described as B—whether by Necessity
or without Necessity—is described as A, not by Necessity, but
for some time, as mentioned [above]’.! Likewise, our
statement, ‘Absolutely, nothing that is B is A’ means ‘Nothing
is described as B—in whatever manner it may be described [,
by Necessity or not]—except that A is negated of it.’ Either we
do not know how and when [this negation occurs] or it occurs
for some [limited] time. You will [be able] to discover [the
status of] the [affirmative and negative] particulars from the
universals.
53. On Necessity [Propositions]

i. Our statement, ‘Every B is A by Necessity’ means ‘Everything
that is described in the intellect as B—whether [it is so
described] perpetually or non-perpetually—is perpetually
described as A, as long as its individual substance exists’. [An
examples is] your statement, ‘By Necessity, every mover is a
body’. Our statement, ‘By Necessity, nothing that is B is A’
means ‘Nothing that is described as B—whether it is so
described by Necessity or due to a non-Necessary existence
[as B]—cannot but have A negated of it perpetually, at all
times in which its substance exists’.
ii. You will discover the two particulars from the [examples]
of the two universals except as far as one thing is concerned.
And it is that the persistence of negation and affirmation does
not confer Necessity to the particularized [subject]; rather
[this Necessity is conferred to it by] a persistence that is not
proper to its nature. For it is possible for writing to be negated
or affirmed of some men, for as long as their substance exists,
but only by chance, not as something proper [to their
nature]."" This is not so for the universals because [there,] as

long as [their nature] does not require the persistence of
negation or affirmation, the truth of the [Necessity]
proposition is not ascertained. In fact, [in such a case, the
proposition] is not true at all. For truth is [determined] by
correspondence and, [in the case of universal Necessity
propositions,] this correspondence is realized only for
something whose persistence is necessary. We do not judge
propositions whose predicate is possible and whose time
reference is the future to be true or false for as long as they
neither correspond to existence nor fail to do so.
54. On Possibility [Propositions]

i. As for a possibility [proposition], well it is that whose
negative or affirmative predication is not-Necessary. If it is
assumed to be existent, no absurdity occurs because of this
[assumption]. Thus, our statement, ‘Possibly, every B is A’
means ‘Everything that is described as B—however [it is so
described|—the affirmation of A is non-Necessary for it.’ If
this affirmation is assumed to obtain [in fact], no absurdity
occurs because of it. Learn about the universal negative and
the two particulars along these lines.
ii. There is a difference between our statements, ‘Necessarily,

it is not...’ and ‘It is not Necessary’. For the first is a Necessary
negative and the second is the negation of Necessity. However,
it may be believed [incorrectly] that our statement, ‘It is not
Necessary’ necessarily implies that ‘It is possible that not...’.
[This happens when people] do not distinguish [between
possibility and contingency’]®° in this matter.” [The truth is
that] ‘It is possible that not...’ is implied by it only in the
9. Reading bayn al-‘ammi wa-'l-khassi with Q.

conventional sense [that it has] among the common people,

not its technical [sense] among the specialists.
iii. Likewise, there is a difference between our statements,

‘Possibly, it is not...’ and ‘It is not possible’. For the first is a
negative possible and the second is the negation of possibility.
However, one may believe [incorrectly] that ‘Necessarily not’
is implied by the negation of possibility (as in our statement,
‘It is not possible’). [‘Necessarily not’] is implied by it only
when the sense of possibility is meant, not contingency.
iv. As for contingency, well Necessity must be implied in its

negation, but neither [on the side of] existence, as opposed
to non-existence, nor non-existence, as opposed to existence.
This is not specifically [a Necessity of existence or non-
existence]. A [certain] group of logicians are ignorant of
these matters, which fact casts them in great error. They
persist in [this error] in judgments regarding modalized
[propositions].
55. On the Conversion (‘aks) of Absolutes

i. Conversion means turning the subject into a predicate and
the predicate into a subject, while retaining affirmation,
negation, truth, and falsity as they are.
ii. It is widely [believed] that the universal negative absolute

converts [to a proposition] like itself. For if we said, ‘No B is
A’, then ‘No A is B’ is true. If not, then let ‘No A is B’ be false
and let its contradiction, ‘Some A is B’, be true. Now, let us
assume this ‘some’ to be a specific thing and let [this thing]
be J. Thus, this thing that isJwill be both A and B and this B
[i.e. which is J] will be A. But no B was A. [Thus,] this [leads
to] an absurdity (khulf).
iii. In this case, the truth is that this conversion is true not
with respect to everything that is considered an absolute, but
only with respect to those absolutes in which the condition
of the sound attachment of Necessity [to the proposition] is
not a time [span] that differs with reference to [various]
individuals, but is something non-temporal. An example of a
condition according to which the attachment of the mode of
Necessity is sound [in this case] is ‘As long as the subject is
described by that which is posited along with it [as its subject
term]’. [An example is] our statement, ‘Every mover changes.’
For if you attach the mode of Necessity to it, you must say
either by your tongue or in your soul, ‘As long as it is
described as a mover.’ It may not be true [and sufficient] to
say, ‘As long its substance exists.’ This conversion follows in
such absolutes. In these [cases,] when ‘No thing’ is true,
‘Some’ is false, and when ‘Some’ is true, ‘No thing’ is false.
[And this is so] not with the stipulation of a specific time as a
condition, but absolutely. Examples of these are used in the
sciences, even though they are more specific than the
necessary due to the same word. If it is not [as we have
described], then the universal negative absolute need not
convert, as [in the] examples of those [propositions] in which
the negation obtains for a certain period, (as cited by the First
Teacher). [Examples are] our statements, ‘No animal is moving
voluntarily’, i.e., at the time of rest, and ‘No animal is
sleeping’. For he takes these and similar [propositions] as
absolute negations. And these do not convert at all.
iv. There is no doubt that the universal affirmative does not

convert with a universal affirmative. For our statement,
‘Every mover is a man’ need not be true when the statement,
‘Every man is moving’ is true. However, it converts to a
particular affirmative.
v. As for the widely-accepted explanation that sticks to the

condition mentioned for [the absolutes], well it is [as follows:]
If every B is A, then some A is B. If not, then no A is B. So no
B is A. But [we had posited] that every A is B. This is an
absurdity.
vi. As for the real account that works for every matter [of a
proposition], it is by means of ekthésis (iftirad). It [states:] if
every B is A, then let us suppose a certain thing that is exactly
both B and A. Let this thing be J. So J is both B and A. Thus,
there is a certain A that is both B andJ.
vii. Then, it is widely held that this converse is an absolute

and that it must be absolute in the most general sense, i.e.
[one that] is not precluded from being Necessary. [An example
is] our statement, ‘In existence, every animal moves
voluntarily’ and ‘Every or some voluntary mover is an animal
by Necessity’. As for the second opinion, [it states that] the
converse of an absolute need not be an absolute, for [reasons]
we already clarified.
viii. The particular affirmative converts with itself. Its widely-

held and real explanations are analogous to those of the
universal affirmative. An example of this is, ‘Some men are
writers’ and ‘Some writers are men’. The particular negative
absolute does not convert. For when our statement, ‘Not every
man is a writer’ is correct and true, it need not [also] be true
that ‘Some writers are not men’.
56. On the Conversion of Necessity

[Propositions]
i. The universal negative Necessity [proposition] converts
with itself to a universal negative. For when no B is A by
Necessity, then No A is B by Necessity. Otherwise, it is possible

for some A to be B. Let this be J, so that at the time that it
comes to be A, it [also] comes to be B. Thus, it is B and A. This
B, [i.e. J,] is A; [but] this is an absurdity. The universal
affirmative Necessity [proposition] converts to an affirmative
particular, in accordance with the preceding account
regarding the absolute [proposition]. However, it is. widely
held that that its converse must be a Necessity, because, if it
were an absolute, its converse—which was included in the
first paradigm'“—would be an absolute. Thus, some B would
be A absolutely, though all [of it] was [so] by Necessity."
ii. In reality, it is not necessary for the converse of an absolute

to be an absolute, without any Necessity in it. Therefore, [the
preceding] explanation does not work. Rather, the correct
[account] is that the converse of the Necessity [proposition]
is sometimes absolute, as in your statement, ‘By Necessity,
every writer is a man’ [which] you [convert to] ‘Some men are
writers’. This [obtains] not with the Necessity which you
intend, but if [it does so] occur and inevitably, [it is] with
another Necessity. [And this Necessity] is correctly [said] of
everything possible. [An example is] ‘Some men are writers,
as long as they are writers’. However, we did not intend
something like this by Necessity. [Next,] the account of the
particular affirmative Necessity [proposition] is like that of
the universal.
iii. As for the particular negative Necessity [proposition], it

does not convert. For you say, ‘By Necessity, not every animal
is a man’ but do not say, ‘By Necessity, not every man is an
animal’.
57. On the Conversion of Contingency”

[Propositions]
i. As for the universal negative contingency [proposition], in
reality, it does not convert with itself. For you say, ‘It is
contingent that not one among men is a writer’ but you do
not say, ‘It is contingent that not one among writers is a man’.
However, it is widely and incorrectly held that it converts to
a particular [proposition]. The reason for this is that our
statement, ‘It is contingent that no B is A’ is true along with
our statement, ‘It is contingent that every B is A’. The latter
converts to ‘It is contingent that some A is B’, as we will
mention later.“ Then, they believe [incorrectly] that ‘It is
contingent that some A is not B’ follows from this converse.
But we will explain that [in] this converse, [the mode] is
possibility, not contingency, and, [given this,] the transference
to the negation does not follow. As for the truth, well the
conversion of this premise is not allowed. For when you say,
‘It is contingent that not one among men is a writer’, you do
not [thereby] say, ‘It is contingent that not all writers are
men’ [or] ‘It is contingent that some writers are not men’. Do
not turn to what they burden themselves with.
ii. As for the universal affirmative contingency [proposition],

well it is widely held that it converts to a particular affirmative
contingency [proposition]. For if contingently every B is A,
then contingently some A is B. Otherwise, by Necessity no A
is B; so by Necessity, no B is A. This is an absurdity. As for the
truth, well it does not enjoin that when ‘contingently [some
A is B'°}?”’ is false, ‘by Necessity [no A is B"]®” must [follow].
Rather, sometimes ‘by Necessity all-or some’™ [follows from
that negation], as we said [before]. The universal negative
10. Reading ba‘du alifin ba’un with Q and Ha.

11. Reading la shay’a min alifin ba’un with Q.
[Necessity proposition] must be true only when our statement,

‘Possibly some A is B’ is false.“ The truth is that the converse
of the affirmative contingent is a possibility [proposition],
which may be a Necessity or a contingency [proposition].
iii. As for the particular affirmative contingency [proposition],

the condition of its conversion, both in widely-held opinion
and in reality, is like that of the universal affirmative
contingency [propositions]. The account of one is exactly the
same as that of the other.
iv. As for the particular negative contingency [proposition],

it is believed [incorrectly] that it converts with itself, for
reasons mentioned with reference to the universal negative.
However, the truth precludes its conversion. [The explanation
is] similar to that regarding the universal.
58. On Syllogism (qiyas)

i. A syllogism is a statement composed of [other] statements.
When they are posited, a statement other than them follows
from them. [The new statement is generated] through these
[statements] themselves, not by accident, but by necessity.
The meaning of ‘follows’ is that assent [to the truth of the new
statement] is granted and that [this new statement] must be
inferred” due to the assent granted to the premises and their
form (shakl)."“ If [the truth of this derived statement] is
apparent in itself and a syllogism [composed] out of premises
of a similar apparent status is applied [to the task of
generating it], this would not be a true syllogism.
59. On Perfect (kamil) and Imperfect

(ghayr kamil) Syllogisms
i. In a perfect syllogism, the deduction of whatever follows
from it®”' is evident [simply] from [the syllogism’s] being
posited. Thus, one does not need to clarify that it follows from
it. In an imperfect [syllogism, the deduction of what] follows
is not evident straightaway. Rather, if we intend to explain
this [deduction], we must do so by means of something else,
which cannot be external to the totality of what was stated.
[This other thing may be] a contradiction or converse of what
was stated, or a specification (ta‘yin) and ekthésis of some
[part] of it, as we shall explain.
60. On Connective (iqtirani) and Repetitive

(istithna’1) Syllogisms
i. [When] neither the conclusion™* of a syllogism nor its
contradictory is actually stated in it’ in any way, but
[exist] potentially, it is called a connective syllogism. [An
example is] your statement, ‘Every body is composite; every
composite is created; so every body is created.’ [When] its
conclusion or its contradiction is stated in it, it is called a
repetitive syllogism. [An example is] your statement, ‘If the
soul produces an act by itself, it subsists by itself; but it
produces an act by itself; so the soul subsists by itself.’
61. On the Parts of Connective Syllogisms and

Their Figures (ashkal)
i. Every connective syllogism comprises at least two premises
that share a term and that differ with respect to two
[additional] terms. So the terms are three [it total]. It is in the
nature of the shared [term] to withdraw from the middle
[position] and establish [a connection] between the other two

terms. [The two terms joined together] constitute the
deduction. [An example is] our statement, ‘Every body is a
composite; every composite is created; so every body is
created.’ The three terms are body, composite, and created.
‘Composite’ is repeated and is the middle [term], while ‘body’
and ‘created’ do not repeat. The deduction is that which is
combined of these two. F
ii. The one that repeats is called the middle term (awsat) and
the other two are called the extremes." The extreme that one
wishes to make the predicate of the conclusion is called the
major (al-akbar) extreme; and that which one wishes to make
the subject of the deduction is called the minor (al-asghar)
extreme. The premise containing the major extreme is called
the Major (al-kubra) and that in which the minor extreme
occurs is called the Minor (al-sughra). The composition of a
Minor and Major is called a connection (garina) and the form
of the connection is called a figure. The connection from
which and through which follows another statement is called
a syllogism.’ As long as the deduction is not deduced, but is
something towards which the syllogism is directed, it is called
a problem (matliib). When it is deduced, it is called a conclusion
(natija).
iii. If the middle term is a predicate in a premise and a subject

in the other, such a connection is called a first figure. If it is
a predicate in both of them, it is called a second figure. And
if it is a subject in both, it is called a third figure. All the
figures share in common the fact that no syllogism comes
about from two particular [premises]. All of them, except
those composed of possibility [premises], [also] share in
common the fact that no syllogism comes about from two
negative [premises]; nor [does it come about] from a negative

Minor, whose Major is a particular [premise]. The conclusion
follows the lesser of the two premises in terms of its quantity,
i.e. [in being] universal and particular, and quality, i.e.
affirmation and negation. Then, certain conditions are specific
to each figure.
iv. This is the end of the first part, which is followed, in the
second part, by a discussion of the types of first figure
[syllogisms composed] of absolute [premises]. Praise be to
God, the Lord of the worlds, and blessings upon the Prophet
Muhammad and his entire family.
62. On the Moods (durub) of First Figure

[Syllogisms Composed of] Absolutes
i. In the first figure, only that [type] in which the Major is a
universal and the Minor is an affirmative yields a conclusion.
Thus it [can have] four [types] of connections [between the
two premises]. The first mood comprises two universal
affirmatives and they yield a universal affirmative. An
example is ‘EveryJ is B’ and ‘Every B is A’. This is a perfect
syllogism and it yields ‘EveryJ is B’. [With terms, it is] as [in]
your statement, ‘Every body is a composite’, ‘Every composite
is created’, so ‘Every body is created’.
ii. The second mood comprises a universal affirmative Minor

and a universal negative Major and it yields a universal
negative. An example is ‘EveryJ is B’ and ‘No B is A’. This is
[also] a perfect syllogism and it [yields] ‘NoJ is B’. It is like
your statement, ‘Every body is a composite’, ‘No composite is
eternal’ ,!“" and it yields ‘No body is eternal’.
iii. The third mood comprises two affirmatives—the Minor

being a particular—and it yields a particular. [An example is]
your statement, ‘Some J is B’, ‘Every B is A’. This is a perfect
syllogism and it [yields] ‘SomeJ is A’. [With terms,] an example
is the statement, ‘Some divisions™*” are distances’, ‘Every
distance is a quantity’, so ‘Some divisions are quantities’.
iv. The fourth mood comprises a particular affirmative Minor

and a universal negative Major and yields a negative
particular. [An example is] your statement, ‘SomeJ is B’, ‘No
B is A’ and this yields ‘Not everyJ is A’. [With terms,] an
example is ‘Some divisions are quantities’, ‘No quantity is a
quality’, so ‘Not every division is a quality’.
v. The rest of the connections, which you should learn about

after these four, do not yield anything exact. Rather, when
joining the extremes as an affirmative [proposition] is valid
with respect to some matter, some other matter exists with
respect to which their joining is valid as a negative
[proposition]. [And this is the case while] the connection
[itself] remains exactly the same. Then, you already know that
the first figure yields all the four [types] of quantified
conclusions and that, as long as there is no particular
[premise] in it, it does not yield a particular [conclusion].
63. On Second Figure [Syllogisms Composed of]

Absolutes
i. As for the second figure, well it is widely held that it yields
a conclusion when its Major is a universal and when one of
the premises is the opposite of the other in terms of [their]
qualities.” [This is taken to be the case] even if [the
syllogism] comprises absolutes. As for the correct
[interpretation], well it requires that the second figure
comprising absolutes does not conclude when the universal

negative does not occur in accordance with the aforementioned
condition. According to the correct teaching, [this condition
allows] the universality [of the proposition to] convert with
itself. This is analogous to the case of two possibility
[premises] in [the second figure], as it will become clear. It is
already known that this [figure] is imperfect when it yields a
conclusion.
ii. The first mood comprises two universals, with the Major
being negative. [An example is] your statement, ‘EveryJ is B’
and ‘No A is B’. We say that this yields, ‘NoJ is A’. [This is so]
because we took the universal absolute negative as something
that converts. So it becomes, ‘No B is A’; ‘EveryJ is B’ was
already given. So [we get] ‘NoJ is A’, in the manner of the first
figure. It [may also be explained’’]®> by means of an ad
impossibile [proof], which is [as follows:] if our statement ‘No
J is A’ is not true then ‘SomeJ is A’ [is true]. [This is so]
according to our determination that the particular affirmative
is false [when] the universal negative [is the case], due to the
aforementioned condition. So if ‘SomeJ is A’ and ‘No A is B’,
then ‘Not everyJ is B’. But [it was stated that] everyJ is B.
This is an absurdity.
iii. The second mood comprises two universals, of which the

Minor is negative. [An example] is your statement, ‘NoJ is B’
and ‘Every A is B’, so ‘NoJ is A’. Let us convert the Minor and
say, ‘Every A is B’, ‘No B is J’ and it yields, ‘No A is J’. ‘No A is
J’ becomes ‘NoJ is A’. The ad impossibile proof: if ‘SomeJ is A’
and ‘Every A is B’, then ‘SomeJ is B’. This is an absurdity.
12. Reading yatabayyanu for tabayyana with HJ.

iv. The third mood comprises a particular affirmative Minor

and a universal negative Major and yields a particular
negative. An example is, ‘SomeJ is B’, ‘No A is B’, so ‘Not every
J is A’. Its proof [consists of] the conversion of the Major. [It
can also be proved] by ad impossibile: if ‘EveryJ is A’ and ‘No
A is B’, then ‘No J is B’. But it was [given] that ‘Some J is B’.
This is an absurdity.
v. The fourth mood comprises a particular negative Minor and

a universal affirmative Major and yields a particular negative.
[An example is] your statement, ‘Not everyJ is B’ and ‘Every .
A is B’, so ‘Not everyJ is A’. This is not proved by conversion
because the Minor is a particular negative and does not
convert and the Major converts to a particular. Thus, if it is
connected to the Minor, [we would end up with] two
particulars which do not conclude. Rather, here we must take
up the [method] of ekthésis in place of conversion. We posit
that some which is J and not B as D. Thus, ‘No D is B’, ‘Every
A is B’, so ‘No D is A’. Then we say, ‘SomeJ is D’, ‘No D is A’,
so ‘Not everyJ is A’. It can also be explained by ad impossibile:
if ‘EveryJ is A’ and ‘Every A is B’, then ‘EveryJ is B’. But [it
was given that] ‘Not everyJ is B’.
vi. These are the moods that conclude. The rest of them are
non-conclusive due to the reason that was mentioned
regarding analogous [types] of the first figure.
64. On the Third [Figure Composed] of

Absolutes
i. As for the third figure [composed] of absolutes, well its
condition for yielding a conclusion is that the Minor is an
affirmative. Then, [as] in every figure, there must also be a
universal. Thus, its connections are six.
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE; LOGIC 49
ii. The first [mood] comprises two universal affirmatives and

it yields a particular affirmative. [An example is] your
statement, ‘Every B is J’, ‘Every B is A’, so ‘SomeJ is A’. It is
proved by the conversion of the Minor and [then] the
connection reduces to the third [mood] of the first [figure].
By means of ad impossibile it is [as follows:] if ‘No J is A’ and
‘Every B is J’, then ‘No B is A’. This is an absurdity.
iii. The second [mood] comprises two universals, where the

Major is a negative. It yields a particular negative [conclusion]
and is proved by means of the conversion of the Minor and
by ad impossibile.
iv. The third [mood] comprises a particular affirmative Minor

and a universal affirmative Major. It yields a particular, like
the first type does, and its proof is of the same manner.
v. The fourth [mood] comprises an affirmative universal

Minor and a particular affirmative Major and it yields a
particular affirmative. An example is ‘Every B is J’, ‘Some B is
A’, and it yields, ‘SomeJ is A’. It is proved by the conversion
of the Major and its placement as a Minor. The Major connects
with it and it yields, ‘Some A is J’, which converts to ‘SomeJ
is A’. Thus, by this second conversion, it is correct [to say] that
the conclusion is an absolute according to the first opinion.
As for the second opinion, well the [proof does not obtain] by
means of this conversion. For it is not necessary for the
converse of an absolute to be an absolute according to the
second opinion, but absolute according to the first. Rather,
[the proof consists of] ekthésis, as we will explain in other
places. It is already clear that this hae concludes also by the
method of ad impossibile.
vi. The fifth [mood] comprises a universal affirmative Minor

and a particular negative Major and yields a particular
negative. [An example is, ‘Every B is J’, ‘Not every B is A’, and
it concludes, ‘Not everyJ is A’.]’™ It is not possible to give a
proof by means of conversion, [for reasons] similar to those
[given] for the fourth [mood] of the second [figure]. But [it is
possible to do so] by ekthésis. So let that some which is B and
not A be D. So, ‘Every B is J’, ‘Some B is D’, [so that] ‘SomeJ is
D’. [Then] ‘No D is A’, so that ‘Not every J is A’. [This is so
because we converted ‘Some B is D’ to ‘Some D is B’. To this
was connected ‘Every B is J’ and this yielded ‘Some D is J’. This
converts to ‘Some J is D’.]'’ It may also be proved by ad
impossibile: if [the conclusion] is not [as given] and it is rather
that ‘EveryJ is A’ and ‘Every B is J’, then ‘Every B is A’. But it
was [given] that ‘Not every B is A’. This is an absurdity.
vii. The sixth [mood] comprises a particular affirmative Minor

and a universal negative Major. It is proved by the conversion
of the Minor and by ad impossibile that the conclusion is a
particular negative.
viii. These are the moods that conclude and the rest are non-
concluding. It is already clear to you that this figure does not
yield a universal conclusion [and only] a particular even if no
premise [in it’]®° is particular.
65. On the Composition from Necessity

[Premises]
i. As for the first figure [composed] of two Necessity
[premises], well it does not differ from the [first figure
containing] two absolutes either in concluding or in
13. Reading with Q: fihi ‘l-muqaddima for al-mugaddima.

perfection, except as regards the mode of Necessity in the

premises and the conclusion. As for the two other figures, well
they also do not differ from their corresponding absolutes in
concluding or the verification of their yielding a conclusion
in the manner of the first [figure], except'as regards two
things: the first of them is the mode and the second is that
the fourth [mood] of the second [figure] and the fifth of the
third were proved for the absolutes only by means of ekthésis
and ad impossibile. [These methods] may be excused here. For
if we remove the Necessity negative [proposition], we must
posit an affirmative that stands in its place as a possibility,
not a contingency [proposition]. If we connect this with the
other premise in order to prove ad impossibile, the connection
[will be between] a possibility and a Necessity [proposition].
However, we do not know yet what this connection yields. Nor
is it of any use if we posit the possible as something existent.
For we do not yet know about the mixture of an [existential
(wujidi)]® and a Necessity [premise]. So how can we know
what is produced from this?!
ii. As for using ekthésis, one of the two syllogisms of the

ekthésis may comprise two Necessity [premises]. As for the
second syllogism, it will consist of an existential and a
Necessity [premise]. But we do not know [the nature of this
composition] yet. You know that every ekthésis must be
completed by means of two syllogisms: a syllogism in exactly
the same figure and one in the first figure."
iii. However, if we set aside this path [of inquiry] and return
to the things themselves, we will realize that, even though we
have not yet pointed out [the nature of] the mixture of an
existential Minor and a Necessity Major in the first figure,
[such a mixture] is not an imperfect syllogism, such as to
require a proof that it concludes. Thus, we shall find a way to

use the two methods of ad impossibile and ekthésis for the
proof. So let us consider them.
66. On the Mixture of an Absolute and a

Necessity [Premise] in the First Figure
i. The correct [position] on the mixture of the absolute and
the Necessity [premises in] the first figure is that of the First
Philosopher, [i.e.] that the factor to consider is the Major; if
it is absolute, the conclusion will be an absolute like it. If it is
a Necessity, the conclusion will be like it. As for the former
case, there is no doubt about it. As for the latter case, [this is
a valid position to hold] because the meaning of our
statements, ‘By Necessity every B is A’ or ‘By Necessity, no B
is A’ is ‘Every single thing described as B and is posited [as a
subject] for B and is B for some time or perpetually, not by
Necessity, that thing is perpetually and for all time described
as A; or, [in the case of a negation,] it is never described as A.’
Thus, any J, described by B, no matter the manner [of its
description,] is included [as taking on] this predication
(hukm).
ii. At this point, there is something that ought to be known:
when the Major is an absolute [in the sense] ‘as long as the
substance of the subject is described by that which describes
it’ the conclusion is a Necessity. For J is always B and it was
already posited that B, as long as it is B, is A; so Jis always
A.™* Here the conclusion may be a Necessity, though the
Major is an absolute.
67. On the Mixture [of an Absolute and a

Necessity Premise] in the Second Figure
i. As for the second figure, well the superficial* and widely-
held view is that the factor to consider is the negative
[premise] which becomes the Major of the first [figure] by
conversion or ekthésis. [It is also believed] that the conclusion
follows [its mode,']®° on the basis [of the opinion] that the
absolute negative [premise] converts with itself in every
way.’ We have already spoken about this matter. [However,]
the truth requires something by which we should not be
embarrassed—that the conclusion is always a negative
Necessity. For if the absolute is such that it is true as a
Necessity, [the validity of this position] is evident. If [the
absolute premise] is such that it is <true or> false as a
Necessity, then [either of the extremes] is [still] negated of the
other by Necessity. The natures of J and A are non-essentially
[related to each other] and the one is negated of the other
by Necessity. [The reason is that] they oppose each other in
that one of them is posited for B perpetually and by Necessity
or not posited for it at all, at any time, and the other is posited
for [B] non-perpetually or not so posited non-perpetually.™"
We must limit ourselves to this measure of proof, assuming
the understanding of the student. If he is not satisfied by this
much, let him turn to the more comprehensive book in which
we elaborated on this and other chapters to a great extent.
ii. [Within the scope of] this same explanation, we must say
that this mixture in this figure concludes, even if it is
[composed] of two negatives or two affirmatives. The
conclusion is a negative Necessity. This is so because the
negation and affirmation of an absolute in its purely true
[sense] is the same thing. Then, when the relation of the
14. Reading with Q: al-natijatu tabi‘atun li-jihatiha for al-natijatu fi hukmiha.
predicate to the two Extremes differs with respect to

perpetuity or non-perpetuity, even if this relation coincides
in affirmation and negation, a necessary opposition between
the [Extremes] would exist.
68. On the Mixture [of an Absolute and

Necessity Premise] in the Third Figure
i. As for the third figure, well it is widely held that when the
premises are both universal affirmatives, then, [if] either is a
Necessity [premise], [the conclusion is a Necessity.]* [For] you
can convert the absolute and make it the Minor of the first
[figure], such that it yields a Necessity [conclusion]. If you
need a second conversion, the conversion of a Necessity
[premise] is widely held to be a Necessity. However, the true
[account] precludes this conversion and we have already
finished [explaining this].
ii. The truth is that the conclusion follows the Major. Of two
universals, if the Major is negative, it is the factor to
consider. If it is [composed] of a particular and a universal
[premise], then it is commonly held that the universal is the
determining factor because it becomes the Major of the first
[figure]. However, if the negative [premise] is a particular,
then it is commonly believed that the conclusion of this and
the second figure is not a Necessity in any case.“ The truth
requires the Major to be the determining factor, even if it is
a particular. The proof is by means of ekthésis. Let us prove
this, taking the Major to be a particular negative Necessity.
We say that the conclusion is a Necessity [proposition] and
suppose that part of <A which is> B which is not A to be D. So
‘No D is A by Necessity’; but ‘Every B is J’; and ‘Some B is D’.
So “SomeJ is D by Necessity’ and ‘No D is A’. So ‘By Necessity,
someJ is not A’. It is proved in the same manner if you made

the Major a particular affirmative Necessity.’
69. On the Composition from Two

Contingency“ [Premises] in the First
Figure
i. As for the syllogism comprising two contingency [premises]
in the first figure, well it is like the syllogism [formed] of two
absolutes in [this figure] in every way, except when the Minor
is a negative contingency [premise]. For, though a syllogism
does come about from it, it is imperfect. It is proved by
recasting it as an affirmative, since the negative contingency
has the same force as an affirmative [contingency]. It yields
an affirmative [conclusion], which is then transferred to a
negative. In deriving the conclusion, the condition to consider
here has to do with quantity, i.e. the universality of the Major,
not the quality. Thus, there is no objection to [the possibility
of] deriving a conclusion out of two negative [premises].
70. On the Mixture of Contingency and

Absolute [Premises] in the First Figure
i. As for the mixture of contingency and absolute [premises]
in the first figure, well there is no doubt that when the Major
is a contingency, the conclusion will be like it. [This is so]
becauseJ is posited for [B and B is posited for A and A is
contingently predicated of it. So A will also be contingently
predicated of J.1°]® If it is a pure absolute, with no Necessity
in it at all, then there is no dispute that, if it is an affirmative,
the conclusion will be a contingency [proposition]. [This is so]
15. Reading with Q: wa-ba mawdia‘atun li-alifin wa-alifun mahmilatun ‘alayha

bi-'l-imkani fa-takanu ’l-alifu mahmilatan ‘ala 'l-jimi kadhalika bi-’'l-imkan.
because if we posit that the contingency conclusion is false,

the true [conclusion] will either have the Necessity of
affirmation or the Necessity of negation. So, let us first posit
the Necessity of negation and make the Minor contingency an
absolute existential. Even if both of these are false, this would
be a non-absurd falsity. So we say, ‘By Necessity, someJ is not
A’ and ‘EveryJ is B’; so, ‘By Necessity, some B is not A’. But, it
was [given] that ‘Contingently, every B is A’ and this is an
absurd falsity. The syllogism concludes, with one of its two
premises false, but not absurd. But no absurdity [should]
follow from it. For it is possible for a non-absurd falsity to
exist at some time and, at that time, that which follows from
it also exists with it in a non-absurd manner. For if it existed
without that which follows from it, it would not be something
that follows from it. And if it existed in the present, it would
not be an absurd falsity. No absurdity follows from a false
non-absurdity. The alternative is that it follows [as an
absurdity] on account of the Necessity. So this [negative
Necessity] must be false.
ii. [Now] let us make the Necessity affirmative. We have

already explained that the conclusion [of this mixed figure]
is also a Necessity. So [now the conclusion] would be that ‘By
Necessity, some B is A.’ But it was [given] that B may or may
not be A, absolutely [and] without any necessity in it.* [And]
this is absurd; so the conclusion is a contingency [proposition].
[However,] if the Major is an absolute according the first
opinion, then it may yield an absolute, according to that
opinion. We will explain that a Major absolute with a Minor
contingency sometimes concludes a Necessity and sometimes
a non-Necessity.** The [conclusion] that follows will be an
absolute that encompasses these two.
iii. As for when the Major is an absolute negative, the

commonly-held view is that the conclusion is sometimes a
possibility and sometimes a contingency [proposition]. It may
also yield a Necessity. [An example is] your statement, ‘It is
possible for every man to think’ and ‘Nothing that thinks is a
raven’, so ‘By Necessity, no man is a raven’.
iv. As far as an investigation [of this matter is concerned], this

is also the case when the absolute is [construed] according to
the first opinion. As for when it is a pure absolute, it will only
yield a contingency [proposition]. And its proof is exactly of
the same type as the one [given] when the absolute was an
affirmative. [This is so] because if our statement, ‘There is no
Necessity forJ to be or not to be A’ is not true, then let it be
the Necessity of being or non-being. [At this point,] we will
do what we did [with the previous proof]. As for the example
that is commonly cited, it is not suitable for the absolute
according to the second opinion, because its Major [i.e. of the
commonly-cited example,] is a Necessity.
71. On Mixing Contingency and Necessity

[Premises] in the First Figure
i. As for mixing contingency and Necessity [premises] in the
first figure, well when the Major is a contingency, then there
is no doubt that the conclusion is a contingency [proposition].
[This is so] becauseJ is posited as the subject of B [and B is
[contingently] posited as the subject of A, so A is contingently
predicated ofJ**]®? If [the Major] is a Necessity [premise], then
it is commonly believed that, if it is an affirmative, the
conclusion is a contingency [proposition]. Otherwise, it would
16. Reading with Q 1 and 2: ba mawda‘atun li-alifin fa-yakinu alifun

mahmulatan ‘ala ’l-jimi bi-’l-imkan.
not be contingent for everyJ to be A. So, ‘By Necessity, some

J is not A’. [It was given that] ‘By Necessity, every B is A’; so
‘By Necessity, someJ is not B’. [However, it was posited] that
it was contingent for all of [J] to be [B]. This is an absurdity.
ii. As for the [true] investigation [of this matter, it suggests

that] this is not a [real] absurdity. For the contradiction of
that [contingency] conclusion is not ‘By Necessity, not-’.*“
The truth requires the [contradiction of the] conclusion to be
a Necessity [simpliciter]. Thus, [to disprove their claim,] if we
posit ‘Contingently, everyJ is A’ and ‘Contingently, everyJ is
B’, it concludes, as we will explain, that ‘Contingently, some
B is A’. Thus it is possible for [B] not to be A, but it was by
Necessity A. This is an absurdity. [So the conclusion is not a
contingency proposition].*“#
iii. Let us explain this in another.way that is easier to

understand. We say that if every B is A perpetually by
Necessity, then that thing of which B is said is perpetually A.
So if B is said of J, it will always be A, not [just] for as long as
it is described as B. For the Necessity that we intend in these
figures is other than of this [type]; and we have already
explained this. Rather, [the qualifying condition is] ‘as long
as the substance of J, described as B, exists’. So if a certainJ
comes to be B, it was already A, even before its coming to be
B. And so [it will continue to be] after its coming to be [B] and
after [the latter’s] passing away from it.*“”
iv. An example to settle this [point] is our statement, ‘It is

contingent for every man to move’, ‘By Necessity, every
mover is a body’, so ‘By Necessity, every man is a body’.
[Finally,] if the Major is a negative Necessity [proposition], it
is commonly believed that it yields a possibility [proposition],
so that it is sometimes correct as a contingency and sometimes
an absolute [proposition]. The truth is that the conclusion is

always a Necessity, as we explained.
72. On Two Contingency [Premises] in the

Second Figure
i. There is no syllogism [composed] of two contingency
[premises] in the second figure. For there may be two natures,
one of which is predicated of the other, such as animal of
man. Then something may be negated contingently of one of
them and affirmed of the other. Likewise, there may be two
different natures, such as man and horse. Then, let the middle
term be ‘movement’ in bringing these two terms together [in
a conclusion].** It is not possible to prove [this syllogism] by
conversion, because this contingency does not convert.*™
ii. [Likewise,] it is not possible to prove this by ad impossibile

because the syllogisms to which the ad impossibile will be
applied are mixed with Necessity [premises] and these
syllogisms] are not yet known. And those that are known do
not yield anything that contradicts the premises. You will
come to know them by experience.

Absolute [Premises] in the Second Figure
in the second figure, well it is commonly believed that when
the negative is an absolute universal, its conversion is
possible. It is [also] said that if it is a particular, it is possible
[to use] ekthésis. So a syllogism from their mixture is possible.
This yields a possibility conclusion, according to what was
said regarding the first figure. Otherwise, it does not
conclude.
ii. The truth is that there is no syllogism out of a contingency

and an absolute proposition in the second figure, unless the
absolute is taken as a Necessity. [But] then, in reality, it would
be some other mixture. This is obvious to you from what we
said about the mixture of two contingencies and two absolutes
in this figure. An example of this is: ‘Contingently, every man
moves’, ‘Absolutely, no single animal is moving’, as the First
Teacher uses [this last statement].**“' [This does not
conclude.17]®°

Necessity [Premises] in the Second Figure
i. As for the mixture [of contingency] and Necessity [premises]
in the second figure, well it is commonly believed that there
is no difference between this and the [same] mixture in the
first [figure], except in having a dual conclusion, as the
distinction was made with respect to the first figure. As for
the truth, well it is that the conclusion is always a Necessity
negative [proposition], whether it is [composed of] two
negatives, or two affirmatives, or however it may be. [Such
will be the case] provided the Major is a universal. The proof
of this is like that of the mixture of absolute and Necessity
[premises] in this figure.*#
75. On the Mixture of Two Contingency

[Premises] in the Third Figure
i. As for two contingency [premises] in the third figure, well
a syllogism may be [formed] of them if one of the two
[premises] is a universal.** It always yields a contingency
[proposition].
17. Reading with Q: fa-innahu Ia yuntiju.

ii. The proof of this is either by reversion to the first [figure]

by means of a single conversion; and so it is by conversion.
Or it is by means of reversion to the first [figure] by means of
a conversion, but [here] the derivation of the conclusion
requires a second conversion.“ Or [its proof is obtained] by
reversion to the first [figure, and involves] ekthésis.“
[However,] the conversion of the first conclusion, though it is
a [kind of] possibility [proposition], is [actually] a possibility,
[not a contingency]. And from this it does not follow that it
is not a Necessity.“

Absolute [Premises] in the Third Figure
in the third figure, well it is commonly believed that, if they
are both affirmatives, then undoubtedly the conclusion is a
contingency [proposition]. [This is so] because you can make
the absolute [premise] the Minor, so that it yields a
contingency, even if [this comes about] by a second
conversion.
ii. As for when one of the two [premises] is negative and the
absolute is affirmative, well their status is the same as that of
two affirmatives. [This is so] because the negative contingency
is potentially affirmative, so that it does not change anything
in the derivation of the contingency [proposition]. If the
negative [premise] is an absolute, it [may] only be a Major in
the first [figure]. So it yields a possibility, which is sometimes
a contingency and sometimes a Necessity [premise].“"
iii. As for the truth, well it is that all the conclusions are
contingency [propositions]. If the absolute is of a pure
[type],*” [the conclusion is] a contingency. If the absolute is
not pure, [the conclusion is] a possibility. This is proved

either by a single conversion or by ekthésis, where that is
appropriate.

Necessity [Premises] in the Third Figure
i. As for the mixture of contingency and Necessity [premises]
in the third figure, well it is commonly believed that it is in
accordance with what was said of the [same] mixture [in the]
first [figure],°” except in having a dual conclusion.
ii. As for the true opinion, well it requires the conclusion to

follow the Major. This is proved by conversion, in [cases]
where one conversion [is involved] and by ekthésis, in [cases]
having two conversions.
78. On Conditional (shartiyya) Propositions

i. We have already spoken about syllogisms [having]
attributive propositions [that are] absolute, various, and have
coinciding and different modes. It now remains for us to
mention syllogisms that yield conditional conclusions by
means of establishing a connection [between the premises].
The conditionals may be obtained in the manner of the
attributives.
ii. Let us begin by mentioning [some] elements that will help

[us] in investigating conditional premises. We say that
affirmation and negation are found not just [in cases of]
predication, but also in conjunctions (ittisal) and disjunctions
(infisal). Thus just as in an attributive [proposition] an
affirmation is the signifier (al-dalala) for the existence of the
predicate, so in a conjunctive [proposition] an affirmation is
the signifier for the existence of the conjunction. [An example

is] our statement, ‘If it is so, then it is so.’ Affirmation in a
disjunctive [proposition] signifies the existence of the
disjunction. [An example is] our statement, ‘Either it is so or
it is so.’ And just as the signifier for the removal of the
existence of the predication is a negation of the predication,
so the signifier for the removal of the conjunction or
disjunction is a negation in the disjunction and conjunction.
[Examples are] our statement, ‘It is not the case that if it is
so, then it is so’ and ‘It is not the case that either it is so or it
is so.’ Every negation is the cancellation of the affirmation
and its removal.
iii. In a conjunction and disjunction, the affirmation and

negation may be universally and particularly quantified and
they may be indefinite. For when you say, ‘If it is so, then it is
so’ and [‘Either it is so or it is so’*]®° and when you say ‘It is
not the case that if it is so then it is so’ and ‘It is not the case
that either it is so or it is so’ you speak in an indefinite
[fashion]. And when you say, ‘Every time it is so, then it is so’
or ‘It is perpetually the case that either it is so or it is so’, you
quantify [the proposition] universally and affirmatively. And
when you say, ‘It is not at all the case that if it is so, then it is
so’ or ‘It is not at all the case that either it is so or it is so’, you
quantify [the proposition] universally and negatively. And
when you say, ‘It may be that if it is so, then it is so’ or ‘It may
be that either it is so or it is so’, you quantify [the proposition]
particularly and affirmatively. And when you say, ‘It may not
be the case that if it is so, then it is so’ or ‘It is not always the
case that [if] it is so, then it is so’ or ‘It may not be the case that
either it is so or it is so’ or ‘It is not always the case that either
it is so or it is so’, you quantify negatively and particularly.
18. Reading the repetition of imma an yakina kadha with Q.

iv. The first part of every conditional [proposition] to which

the conditional word” attaches and whose response is
anticipated is called the antecedent (muqaddim). The second
[part] is called the consequent (tdli). In itself, each one of
these [parts] is a proposition and each of them may be
attributive or a conjunctive or disjunctive conditional,
quantified, undetermined, negative and affirmative.
v. The negation, affirmation, quantification, and indefiniteness

of a conditional is not contingent upon [either] the antecedent
[or] the consequent [taken separately], but on the condition.
For if you say, ‘If A is not B, then B is not J’, the premise is an
affirmative, even though the antecedent and consequent are
both negative. It is an affirmative only because you affirmed
the [condition of] conjunction. Probe the rest on the basis [of
what has been provided].
79. On the Single and Multiple Conditional

Premise
i. The antecedent of a conjunctive conditional may [consist
of] many propositions, but, despite this, the premise may be
[only one]. [An example is] your statement, ‘If it is so and so
then it is so.’
ii. If the consequent [consists of] many propositions, the

conjunctive premise will not be one. [An example is] our
statement, ‘If it is so, then it is so and so and so.’ For these
three [consequents] are [separate] premises, as every single
[proposition] mentioned in the consequent is a consequent in
itself. [An example is] ‘Zayd is an animal and white and a
laugher.’ For these are three premises or three attributive
propositions.
80. On Transformed (muharrafa) Conditionals

i. [Among propositions] conjunctive and disjunctive
conditionals may be used whose surface [form] has been
transformed. [An example is] your statement, ‘J is not D and
A is B.’ Its meaning is ‘If A is B, then J is not D.’ [Another
example is] your statement, ‘J is not D or A is B.’ It is like your
statement, ‘EitherJ is not D or A is B.’ This much should
suffice mentioning for an understanding of conditional
premises. Let us [now] begin mentioning their connections.
81. On Connective Syllogisms [Composed] of

Conjunctives
‘i. As for the connection existing in [syllogisms composed of]
conjunctives, well it is such that [1] either the antecedent of
one [premise] is made the consequent of the other; or [2] they
both share the consequent; or [3] both share the antecedent.
This occurs in analogy to the figures of attributive [syllogisms]
and the [types under consideration] have the same conditions
as theirs. The conclusion is a conditional, which is obtained
by means of joining together the antecedent and the
consequent, both of which are like two extremes. [They are]
either universal or particular, negative or affirmative,
according to what was said [before].
82. On Connective Syllogisms [Composed] of

Disjunctives
i. As for the connections existing in [syllogisms composed of]
disjunctives, well it is not possible for them to [yield
conclusions] with respect to all the parts“ [of the premise],
but only with some of them, i.e. part of the consequent or of
the antecedent.“ Thus, it will [conclude] according to the
following analogy: Either this number is even (zawj) or it is

odd (fard). We take ‘even’ as a middle term and posit it as a
part of the disjunction of the second disjunctive [premise]. So
we say, ‘Every even [number] is either made up of two even
[numbers] or two odd [numbers]* or two even and two odd
[numbers]’.“' Then we drop the middle [term] in the
conclusion and take [the conclusion] to be: ‘Every [number]
is either odd or two even [numbers] or two odd [numbers] or
two even and two odd [numbers].’ This is an example.
ii. As for the conditions that [yield] the conclusion, well [they
are as follow: 1] it is necessary for the Minor, which is like the
first disjunctive, to be affirmative; whether it is a particular
or a universal [is not a condition to consider]. [2] It is also
necessary for the part that is shared to be affirmed. [3] And
the disjunction in the Major should be a universal. It is up to
you to enumerate its [various] connections. One may mention
them with reference to other figures as well, except that it is
better to mention them in more elaborate works. For [these
figures] are farther from [our] innate natures.*"
iii. In sum, let it be known that, of the conditional connective

[syllogisms], we will only mention those whose conclusions
appear easy to derive*" and those that are suitable for use by
our innate natures. As for that which is subtler than this, well
it is mentioned in the Book of the Cure and in the Book of
Appendices. ’
iv. As for the connection between a conditional conjunctive

and an attributive [proposition], well it is contingent upon the
attributive [proposition’s] sharing in the consequent of the
conjunctive and taking up the place of the Major. Thus, the
shared [term] drops out and the conclusion consists of the
antecedent, a part of the consequent, and of the attributive

[proposition]. As far as their terms are concerned, well the
latter two are like the extremes. An example is, ‘If A is B, then
everyJ is D; every D is H.’ It concludes, ‘If A is B, then everyJ
isthe
v. If the middle [term] is the subject of the attributive

[proposition] and the predicate of the consequent, as in our
example, we call this the first figure. The condition of yielding
a conclusion is that, if the conjunctive [premise] is affirmative,
it is necessary for the state obtaining between the consequent
and the attributive [propositions] to be like the state between
two [premises] of attributive syllogisms in the first figure. If
the consequent and [attributive]’ [propositions] were [set in
a connection] by themselves, the conclusion would be the
same as that of an [attributive]® syllogism. The antecedent
would remain an antecedent, as it was.
vi. As for when the conjunctive is negative, well its composition

is among the things we will not mention in this book. It is up
to you to enumerate its connections.
vii. As for what we refer to as the second figure in this

category, well it comes about when the relation between the
consequent and the Major attributive [proposition] is like the
relation of two premises of attributive [syllogisms] in the
second figure. An example is, ‘If A is B, then everyJ is D.’ Then
we Say, ‘No H is D.’"
viii. If the conjunctive is affirmative, the condition is as it was

said to be with regard to attributive [syllogisms] and the
conclusion is as we mentioned [before].
ix. If the conjunctive is negative, then it has a different status,

which is mentioned in another book. As for its connections,
enumerate them by yourself.
x. As for what we refer to as the third figure in this category,

well it concludes when the relation between the two
[premises] is in accordance with what it is for the third figure
[composed] of attributive [premises]. So if the conjunctive is
affirmative, the condition is as it was in the attributive
[syllogism]. If the conjunctive [premise] is negative, its status
is mentioned in the [more] extensive books. As for the
connections, enumerate them by yourself.
xi. In this kind of connection, if the attributive [premise] is

made [to take] the place of the Minor, three figures come
about, according to the [following] descriptions:
xii. The first figure comes about when the conjunctive is

affirmative and the condition in it is the same as that in the
attributive [syllogisms]. If it is negative, its status is mentioned
in other books. Its example is, ‘EveryJ is B’ and ‘If D is H, then
every B is A’; so ‘If D is H, then everyJ is A.’
xiii. [In] the second figure, if the conjunctive is affirmative,

then the condition is as it was in attributive [syllogisms]. If it
is negative, its status [is discussed] in other books.
xiv. As for the third figure, well it does not depart in its
condition from what was said regarding the third [figure] of
attribute [propositions]. [This is the case] provided the
conjunctive is affirmative.
xv. From the side of the antecedent, these same connections

are less useful in the sciences. It is better for us to mention
their state in the extensive books.
xvi. A connection may come about between a disjunctive and

a single attributive [premise]. The natural [type] here is that
in which the attributive is the Minor and affirmative. Its
predicate is a subject of the entire disjunction. The conditional
is a universal and analogous to the first figure. [An example
is] ‘Every large quantity is countable’*’ and ‘Everything
countable is either even or odd’; so ‘Every large quantity is
either even or odd.’ It has four [types] of compositions.
xvii. [A connection] may [also] occur between a Minor

disjunctive [premise] and Major attributive [premises]. The
attributives are numerically the same as the parts of the
disjunction. Every attributive [premise] shares something
with every part [of the disjunction] and all the parts of the
disjunction participate in a [single] term. Thus [the syllogism]
comes about either“ in accordance with the composition of
the first figure. So let it be called a complete induction (istigra’
tamm), as when you say, ‘Every mover is either an animal or
a plant or a mineral’ and ‘Every animal is a body and every
plant is a body and every mineral is a body.’ So, ‘Every mover
is a body.’ It is necessary for the parts of the disjunctive to be
affirmative and for the attributives to be universals.
xviii. [Or a connection] may come about according to the

second figure. The conditions between its parts and the parts
of the attributives is the same as those that exist between two
attributives in the second figure. No [connection] comes about
according to the third figure.
xix. [A connection] may also come about between a conjunctive

and a disjunctive [premise]. As regards [conclusions] with
respect to a complete part,“ well [for this to occur] it is
required for the conjunctive to be a Minor and for the
disjunctive to be a Major. The disjunctive must be an
affirmative and one of the two must be a universal. As long as
they are not both universals, the conclusion is not so either.
One is allowed to say that it yields a conjunctive or a
disjunctive conclusion. An example is, ‘If the sun rises,
morning exists’, ‘Either the morning exists or the night
exists.’ This yields two types of conclusions. [The first is] a
conjunctive, as follows, ‘If the sun rises, night does not exist’;
[the second is] a disjunctive, as follows, ‘Either the sun rises
or the night exists.’ You will [come] to know its various moods
[by yourself].
xx. As regards [conclusions] with respect to an incomplete

part, well among the natural types, it is necessary for the
predicate of the consequent to be a subject among the parts
of the disjunction and for the consequent to be a universal
affirmative. It yields a conclusion that is a disjunctive,
consisting of the remainder of the consequent; and the
conclusion is a conjunctive, with a disjunctive consequent.*“#
An example is, ‘If this thing is much, then this thing is
[something] numerical’; ‘Everything numerical is either even
or odd’. It concludes, ‘If this thing is much, then this thing is
either even or odd.’ You will [come] to know its [various]
moods [by yourself].
xxi. [If] a connection is possible between an attributive and a

conditional, then whatever is analogous to it is [also] possible
between a conjunctive and that [same] conditional. If the
conditional part is a conjunctive like the [second] conjunctive
premise, it shares either an antecedent or a consequent with

it.-* You must be satisfied with what we have mentioned here.
If you seek further elaboration, you will find it in the more
exhaustive books.
83. On Repetitive (istithna’l) Syllogisms

i. A repetitive syllogism is composed of two premises, of which
one is a conditional and the other either posits or removes
one of its parts. [This other premise is] allowed to be.
attributive and conditional. It is called the repeated
(mustathnat) and the conclusion is dependent upon it. The
conditional that is posited indicates the entailment or its
absence. In a syllogism [in which] the conditional is a
conjunctive, [that which is repeated]®° is [1] either the
antecedent, so that it is the antecedent exactly, which yields
the consequent exactly. An example is our statement, ‘If Zayd
walks, he moves his feet’; ‘He walks’; so ‘He moves his feet’.
ii. [2. Or] if it is the consequent [that is repeated], then [this

second premise] must be its contradictory, so as to yield the
contradictory of the antecedent. [An example is] your
statement, ‘He does not move his feet’, which yields, ‘So he
does not walk’. The choice of the contradictory of the
antecedent and the consequent exactly does not yield
anything. This will become clear to you if you consider it.
iii. If the conditional is a disjunctive, if it consists of only two

affirmative parts, then no matter which is repeated exactly,
it yields the contradictory of the remaining [part]. And [if the]
contradictory of whichever is repeated, it yields the remaining
[part] exactly. An example is, ‘This number is either even or
odd; it is even; so it is not odd.’ [Or one can say,] ‘It is odd; so
it is not even.’ [Or one can say,] ‘It is not even; so it is odd.’
[Or,] ‘It is not odd; so it is even.’
iv. If one or both of the two parts is negative, it concludes only

by means of the repetition of the contradictory [of one side].
[An example is] your statement, ‘Either this individual entity
is not an animal or it is not a plant; it is an animal; so it is not
a plant’; [or] ‘it is a plant, so it is not an animal.’ Likewise,
[one can say,] ‘Either ‘Abdallah is in the ocean or he did not
drown.’ This one also concludes by way of the repetition of
the contradictory [of one side of the disjunction]. With respect
to [these types] you will learn that the repetition of exactly
[what is given] does not supply [a conclusion].
v. If the disjunctive has a finite number of parts, [when] the

contradictory of whichever [of these] is repeated, it yields all
the remaining [parts as they are]. And [when] whichever one
is repeated exactly [as it is], it yields the contradictory of the
remaining [parts]. [The conclusion will be] one exact [part as
it is] only [through] the repetition of the contradictory of all
the other parts.
vi. As for when the parts are infinite, well its use does not
benefit any, as when you make the predicates of the parts
infinite colors or something resembling this.
84. On Compound Syllogisms (qiyasat

murakkaba)
i. As for compound syllogisms, well they may be either
repetitive or connective. They are not so called because the
problem and conclusion of each [constitutive] syllogism is the
same thing; that is rather called the multiplication of the
syllogism.“ Compound syllogisms are only such that if the
collection of syllogisms [that they comprise] is dissolved to

separate [syllogisms], each one would conclude something
different. The conclusions of some of them are the premises
of others, though [they appear] in an abridged [form] and may
not be obvious. The syllogism close to the first problem
consists of two premises and the [other] syllogisms are
inserted [in the chain] to make the two premises explicit.°~
Sometimes induction or analogy or similar things are mixed
with them. We will mention induction and analogy [later].
ii. The compound syllogism may be explicit (mawsilan), i.e. it

may be one in which the conclusions are not concealed.
Rather, they are actually mentioned once as a conclusion and
once as a premise. [An example is] your statement, ‘EveryJ is
B; and every B is H; so everyJ is H; and every H is D; so every
J is D’ and so on in this way.
iii. As for the implicit (mufassal) [compound syllogism], well it

is that in which the conclusions have been removed and are
not mentioned. [An example is] your statement, ‘EveryJ is B;
and every B is H; and every H is D; so everyJ is D.’
iv. The [more] recent [logicians] have added the compound

syllogism to [the category of] repetitive conditionals and they
take it to be a single [syllogism]. [An example is] your
statement, ‘If the sun rises, the morning exists; and if the
morning exists, the night blind can see; the sun rises; so the
night blind can see.’ In this case there is a conclusion that has °
been concealed, a repetitive in potentia, i.e. ‘The morning
exists.’ From this conclusion follows that one.
85. On Acquiring Premises

i. As for acquiring premises, well this comes about when you
posit the two terms of the [conclusion sought from the
syllogism’?]®” and take what is particular™" to each of them,
along with the genera, super-genera, differences,™” specific
differences*” and necessary and non-necessary accidents that
are attached to these [two terms]. You continue doing this and
seek as much of it as possible. You also determine what each
of these two [terms] is predicated of and what is not predicated
of them. And you posit each sentence* with [mental]
sharpness.
ii. For the universal affirmative, you will investigate whether

there is anything in the totality of what is predicated of the
subject that [also falls among] the totality of what is posited
as a subject for the predicate.
iii. For the universal negative, you will investigate whether,

among the concomitants™” of one of the two extremes, you
find something that is not a concomitant of the other
[extreme].
iv. For the particular affirmative, you will investigate whether,

among those things of which one of the extremes is a
concomitant,“ there is anything of which the other is [also]
a concomitant. Or whether, among its concomitants—but not
with respect to all of it—there is something that is a
concomitant of the other.
v. And for the particular negative, you will investigate

whether, among those things of which one of the extremes is
19. Reading with Q: mina ‘I-qiyds for al-qiyas.

a concomitant, there is something of which the other

[extreme] is not a concomitant. Or whether, among the
concomitants of some of one of the two terms, there is
something that is not the concomitant of the other.
86. On the Analysis (tahlil) of Syllogisms

i. The analysis of a syllogism consists of your singling out the
problem and investigating whether you [can] find something
in the statement that yields [this problem] that [also] has a
share in the latter. If you find it, investigate whether it is its
predicate or its subject. Thus you have found the Minor or
Major, and the middle [term]. Then determine by which figure
the problem is proved. Attach the second extreme [term] of
the problem to the middle [term] in accordance with the
paradigm of that figure and that mood. If this is possible to
do, you have found the two premises in actuality [and the
figure is complete.”°]®° Take into consideration [any syllogistic]
composition; [if such exists,] proceed from the conclusion to
a conclusion before it, until you arrive at the primary
syllogisms.
ii. Sometimes the word in the conclusion is other than the one
in the premise; so concern yourself with the meaning and aim
at it. [Likewise,] there may be a noun in the one and another
noun or a statement in the other. You must take all this into
consideration, along with the difference between ambiguity
and negation. Do not take an affirmative ambiguous
[proposition] to be a negative.
20. Reading with Q: fa-in amkanaka dhalika fa-qad wajadta....wa-tamma laka

’sh-shakl.
87. [On Establishing Conclusions that Follow

from the First Problem?‘]®°
i. Every conclusion entails its converse,“ its contradictory
converse (‘aks al-nagid), its particular, and the converse of its
particular, if it has one. Every syllogism entails that whatever
is judged of the major [term] apply [also] to all the subjects
of the minor [term], as if it were imagined to be the same as
them. This is [the case] if [the syllogism] is in the first
figure.
88. [On True Conclusions [Derived] from False

Premises”?]®°
i. False premises may yield a true conclusion. It is correct that
when the syllogism has a proper composition and true
premises, the conclusion must be true. However, it is not the
case that when the contradictory of the antecedent is repeated
it yields the contradictory of the consequent. For it is said that
[since this syllogism] either has false premises or a corrupt
composition, it cannot yield a true conclusion. [But false
premises can produce true conclusions.] An example of this
is when you say, ‘Every man is a stone;.every stone is an
animal’; and this yields, ‘Every man is an animal,’ which is
true.
ii. However, the falsity is either in a particular or in a

universal premise. When it is in a universal premise, the
falsity occurs either with reference to the whole (so that the
contrary of the premise is true) or the part (so that the
21. Reading with Ha and Q1 and Q2: fi istiqrari ‘n-nata’iji ’t-tabi‘ati (li-1-
matlabi ’l-awwal).
22. Reading with Ha and Q1 and Q2: fi’n-nata’iji ’s-sadiqati min mugaddimatin
kadhibatin.
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC ed,
contradictory, not the contrary, of the premise is true). An

example of the first [case] is: ‘Every man is a stone;’ and of
the second is: ‘Every man is a writer.’
iii. In the first figure, if the false [element] is a single premise

that is the Major and if it is false with reference to the whole,
it is not possible for it to yield a true [conclusion]. This is
because if the conclusion is true and then the contrary [of the
false Major] is posited as a Major, the syllogism will yield the
opposite of that [previous] conclusion as a true conclusion.
This is an absurdity.*™ If [the Major] is false with reference
to a part, [the syllogism] is not precluded from yielding a true
[conclusion]. When the Minor or both [premises] are false, or
when [the syllogism is] in a different figure, truth may be
concluded from falsity, however they may be. You must derive
this on your own.
89. On Circular Proof (bayan al-dawr)

i. As for circular proof, well it [consists of] your taking the
conclusion and the converse of one of the two premises, so as
to derive the second premise. This is possible only when the
terms in the premises convert mutually, without there being
a change in the quantity. In the affirmative, it is like our
statement, ‘Every man is a thinker and every thinker is a
laugher; so every man is a laugher.’ And ‘Every thinker is a
man and every man is a laugher; so every thinker is a laugher.’
[The rest is] analogous.“
ii. As for when the premise is negative, well according to

circular proof, the converse is such that whatever is negated
is negated specifically of the subject and not of anything else.
[This is] just as what happens in the case of affirmation,
[when] that which is affirmed is affirmed specifically of the
subject and not of anything else. [An example is] your

statement, ‘No substance is an accident,’ which you convert,
saying, ‘Whatever is not an accident is a substance.’ When
such a conversion is possible in a negation, circularity is
possible. [An example is] your statement, ‘Every man is a
substance; no substance is an accident; so no man is an
accident; and whatever is not an accident is a substance; so
every man is a substance.’ Then, it is up to you to learn how
circularity [may] exist with regard to each problem and in
each figure.
90. On the Conversion of Syllogisms

i. As for the conversion of syllogisms, well [it consists of] your
taking the opposite of the conclusion, either [its] contrary or
contradiction, and adding it to one of the two premises, so as
to yield the opposite of the other premise. [This is used”*]®° as
a strategy in dialectics (jadal) to preclude a syllogism by
changing the name*™# of one of the terms of the conclusion,
lest one notice [the trick].
ii. For example, if the syllogism is: Every J is B; every B is A;

so every J is A. You would say, ‘NoJ is A; everyJ is B; so not
every B is A.’ Thus you falsify the Major. Or you say, ‘NoJ is
A; every B is A; so no J is B,’ thus falsifying the Minor. You
must test this out in every figure and mood and with a
consideration of the contrary and the contradiction [of the
conclusion].
23. Reading with Q: wa-yusta‘malu ihtiydlan for ihtiyalan.

91. On the Syllogism [That Concludes by Way

of] Absurdity (qiyas al-khalf)
i. A syllogism by absurdity is one in which the problem is
proved by way of the falsification of its contradiction. In
reality, it is composed of a connective and a repetitive
syllogism. An example is: If ‘Every A is B’ is not true, then its
contradiction, i.e. ‘Not every A is B’, is true. But ‘EveryJ is B’
[is given]. This connection consists of a conditional and an
attributive [proposition].“” The totality of what has preceded
yields: If it is not the case that every A is B, then not every A
is J. Then you make the conclusion a premise and choose the
contradictory of its consequent, saying, ‘If it is not the case
that ‘Every A is B’, then ‘Not every A is J’; but ‘Every A is J’
[was given] and this is the contradictory of the consequent.
This yields the contradictory of the antecedent, i.e. ‘Every A
is B’.
ii. This is the form of the syllogism by absurdity and [the

manner] of its completion by way of conditionals, though
most people are confused about its analysis.
iii. The syllogism by absurdity is similar to the conversion of

the syllogism. [This is] due to the fact that [in the latter] the
contradiction of a certain problem is taken up and a premise
is [then] attached to it. This yields the falsification of the
[premise] that was [already] granted. Thus if a person took up
the contradiction of the conclusion of a syllogism by absurdity
along with the granted premise, he would derive a sound
conclusion. [An example is] one’s saying, ‘Every A is J and
everyJ is B,’ so as to conclude, ‘Every A is B’. When any
syllogism by absurdity is converted, it becomes sound. There
24. Reading with Q: mugaddimatan wa-tastathni naqida taliha fa-taqalu in lam
yakun kullu alifin ba’an fa-laysa kullu alifin jiman.
is [of course] this difference between the syllogism by

absurdity [and the conversion of a syllogism: the conversion
of a syllogism [comes about] after a syllogism has been
produced, whereas the syllogism by absurdity is]*™ a
beginning, though in force it is a converse of the sound
syllogism. Now investigate what the contradiction of each
problem is, how a premise may be attached to it, so that it
may yield an absurdity, and in which figures this is possible.
92. [On Syllogisms [Composed] of Opposite

Premises|®
i. A syllogism comprising opposite premises is one composed
of two premises that share terms, but are different with
respect to quantity. [Such syllogisms] are widespread only due
to the fact that, in some of the terms, the nouns are
substituted, so that [the opposition of the premises] is not
detected. [Thus,] for example, it is not said, ‘Man is a laugher;
and man is not a laugher.’ Rather, after saying, ‘Man is a
laugher’, they say, ‘Humans are not laughers’. The result of
this syllogism is that a thing is not itself. For example, ‘Man
is not human.’
ii. The sophists (mughalitin) use it only as a way of overcoming

[their opponents]. And it is sometimes [also] used in the
service of dialectics when an opponent disagrees [with
another] regarding his point of departure.” Thus, he gets
him to concede a premise; and then he gets him to concede
some others, which yield the contradictory of the one
loriginally] conceded. Then the conclusion and its
contradictory, [the premise] that was first conceded, are
taken up and a syllogism out of opposite [premises] is
constructed. This will conclude that a thing is not [itself].
93. On Pre-positing (musadara) the First

Problem
i. Pre-positing a first problem consists of making this problem
itself a premise in a syllogism from which it is to be yielded
as a conclusion. [An example is] someone’s saying, ‘Every man
is human; and every human is a laugher; so every man is a
laugher.’ Here the Major and the conclusion are the same.
However, the noun has been changed through trickery, so
that one may be made to imagine [some] difference [between
the two identical terms].
ii. No matter which premise you make into the conclusion by ©

changing some noun, the two extremes of the other premise
[will have] one meaning, having synonymous nouns. As we
have already said, [an example is,] ‘Man is human,’ which is
like your saying, ‘Man is man.’
iii. This is how it is when one pre-posits the first problem in

a single syllogism. As for [when it is a question of] more
[syllogisms,] well this happens with respect to sequential
composite syllogisms only when the problem is proved by
means of a premise that is yielded by a syllogism, one of
whose premises is the problem itself. And whenever [such
pre-posited problems occur] farther [in a sequential chain,]
they are easier to accept [as premises]. Then contemplate how
this is possible in every figure.
94. [On Explaining How a Thing is Known and

Unknown at the Same Time]?
i. A given man may know a thing by a knowledge that is not
specific (yakhussuhu) to it, but is general and otherwise. And
[this same man] may not know it with reference to what is
specific to it [or in any other way], so as not to know it at all.

Or he may believe in its specific [properties] due to opinion
and false supposition, without realizing it. [An example] is a
man who knows that every two is a number and even, without
knowing whether the two in the hand of Zayd is an even
[number] or not. Or he may believe it to be an odd [number]
because he does not know it to be two. Or, when he does know
it to be two, it does not occur to his mind that every two is
even. There is no contradiction in such ignorance because
[such a man] only knows that every thing that is two is even,
but does not know every two [in actuality and that it is
even.”*]®°2 When he [comes to] know that this thing is two,
then he knows that it is even due to his primary knowledge
of the universal [two]. For this is knowledge of universals and
the ignorance of particulars does not contradict it.
ii. It is possible for one to know a thing potentially“ and to

be ignorant of it in actuality, as [when] one knows not only
the Major universal premise, but also the Minor, [but] fails to
know the conclusion. This is so because the knowledge of the
two [premises] is something other than the knowledge of the
conclusion; rather, it is a cause for one’s knowledge of the
conclusion. [Furthermore,] however it may be, it is not a cause
unless [the two premises] are connected in the mind. As for
when the two of them are known separately, well without
being connected [and] without occurring to the mind together
and as [premises] directed towards the conclusion, they are
not a cause in actuality. [In such a case,] their effect, i.e. the
knowledge of the conclusion in actuality, does not follow. [An
example is] a man who knows very well that every female
mule is barren; and he also knows that this animal is a female
25. Omitting anna, though no manuscript reading supports this and reading
with Q: ithnayni bi-'-fili wa-annahu zawjun.
mule. And upon seeing it with a swollen belly, he believes that

it is pregnant. However, if the two [bits of] knowledge had
been connected [in his mind,] he would not have believed
this.
iii. It is possible for thought (fikr) and imagination**“ to

contradict each other, for imagination follows the senses
(hiss). Imagination either precludes the existence of everything
that is at variance with the sensibles**” or makes its
existence analogous to that of the sensibles. Thus, as much as
we may intellect that the universe is finite, [extending]
neither towards [infinite] plenitude (mala’) nor a vacuum
(khala’), we never imagine™ in ourselves anything except an
infinite plenitude or vacuum following a plenitude.*" We also
intellect that the universe has a source! that cannot be
pointed out and that it neither has a place nor is found in a
direction. But the imagination necessitates its existence only
in one of these states and is almost incapable of extracting
itself from them.
95. On Induction (istiqra’)

i. Induction is [the act of passing] a judgment about a universal
due to the existence of that judgment for the particulars [that
fall under] that universal. [This occurs] either [with regard
to] all of them (which is a complete induction (istigra’ tamm))
or most of them (which is the common induction (istigra’
mashhir)). It is like predicating the major [term] of the middle
due to the existence of the major for the minor. An example
is that every animal that has a long life has a small heart
because every animal that has a long life is like a man and a
horse and a [bull?°]®°. And men and horses and bulls have
26. Reading with HJ and Q: thawr.

small hearts. It is their habit not to mention [an induction]

with this [sequential] order [of particulars]. Rather, they
limit themselves to what is like a Minor or a Major.
96. On Analogy (tamthil)

i. As for analogy, well it is a judgment about a specific thing
due to the existence of that judgment for some other specific
thing (or some other specific things) on the grounds that that
judgment is [applied] universally due to a concept whereby a
resemblance is established [between the two].“'” That
concerning which the judgment is passed [i.e. the primum
comparandum] (mahkim ‘alayhi) is the problem; that from
which the judgment is transferred is the model [i.e. the
secundum comparatus] (al-mithal); the concept whereby the
resemblance is established [i.e. the tertium comparationis]
(ma‘nad mushabih fthi) is that which joins [the two compared
things]. An example of a judgment is: the world is created.*
[This is so] because it is a composite body, so that it resembles
a building. And a building is created. Thus the world is
created. Here [the four elements of analogy are:] the world,
[the primum], building, [the secundum], corporeity, [the
tertium], and created, [the judgment].
97. On the Enthymeme (al-damir)

i. The enthymeme is a syllogism whose Major is concealed
either [1] due to the fact that it is evident and can be dispensed
with, as it habitually occurs in mathematics (ta‘alim). [An
example is] your statement, ‘Two lines AB and AJ extend from
the center to the circumference and [this] results in their
being equal.’ [Here] the Major has been concealed.“ [2] Or
[the Major is left concealed] so that its falsity, [which is
apparent] when it is made explicit as a universal, may be
hidden. [An example is] the statement of the orator, ‘This man
is addressing the enemy; so he is a traitor,’ which is accepted
due to the ellipsis. If he said, ‘And anyone who addresses the
enemy is a traitor,’ one would have realized how his statement
would be contradicted and it would, [therefore,] not be
accepted.
98. On Opinion (ra’y)

i. An opinion is a generally accepted™ universal premise to
the effect that such a thing is or is not, exists or does not
exist, and is right or wrong to do. It is always taken in an
indefinite fashion in oratory. In most cases, when a syllogism
is constructed out of it, the premise is made explicit as a
Major and the Minor is concealed. [An example is] your
statement, ‘The envious are hostile’ and ‘Friends advise
[well].’*vii
99. On Signification (dalil)

i. Signification, in this instance, is an enthymeme, whose
middle term, when it exists for the minor [term,] the existence
of something else for the minor [term] is always entailed,
however it may do so. If its two premises were made explicit,
it would occur in accordance with the first figure. An example
is your statement, ‘This woman is lactating; so she has given
birth.’*"* Sometimes this syllogism itself is called a signification
and sometimes the middle term is called by [this name].
100. On Sign (‘alama)

i. As for sign, it is an enthymeme whose middle term is [1]
either more general than both the extremes, so that, if its two
premises were made explicit, the conclusion would come
about from two affirmatives in the second figure. [An example

is] your statement, ‘This woman is pale’; so ‘She is pregnant.’
[2] Or [the middle term] is more particular than both the
extremes, so that, if its two premises were made explicit, it
would [yield conclusions] in the third figure. [An example is]
your statement, ‘The brave are oppressors, because al-Hajjaj
was brave [and an oppressor.’]®
101. On the Physiognomical Syllogism

(qiyas firasi)
i. As for the physiognomical syllogism, it resembles
signification from one aspect and analogy from another. The
middle term in it is a [bodily] form (hay’a) that exists for the
person being investigated and for some other non-rational
animal. It is in the nature of this [bodily] form to be entailed
by a complex mixture, which also entails a disposition (khulq).
When it is granted that bodily forms follow from complex
mixtures and matters and that certain dispositions also follow
from them, then the complex mixtures and matters are
[understood to be] a cause for the bodily [forms] and the
dispositions [together]. These latter two follow from them in
the body. This is [discussed in the sections] on the soul.
ii. Its terms are four, like the terms of analogy. [Thus, an
example with four terms follows: 1] Zayd and [2] lion and [3]
the greatness of the upper limbs that both of them have. That
[they have this greatness of the upper limbs] is a given fact;
the existence of [4] courage in the lion is also granted. [But]
that Zayd [is courageous is granted] by argument (hujja), after
a variety of animals have been observed that share their
dispositions with the lion and [after it has been observed] that
what shares courage with it shares its [bodily] form as well.
[This same thing] differs from it considerably in its other

dispositions, such as the nobility attributed to it, with respect
to which, [for example,] the panther differs from it. [However,]
it shares the greatness of its chest“ and its courage with it.
Whatever does not share courage with it does not share this
with it either, even if it shares some other disposition with it
(such as nobility). Thus, it is said, ‘Such and such has a
[broad’’]’? chest; everything with a broad chest is courageous
because the lion has a broad chest and is courageous.’
102. On Conceptualization and Assent

i. All scientific knowledge is either the conceptualization of
some concept or assent [to some judgment]. Sometimes
conceptualization exists without assent, as [in the case of] one
who conceptualizes someone’s statement that the vacuum
exists, without assenting to it. [Another example] is someone’s
conceptualization of the concept of man, without giving
assent to or denying this [concept] or any other simple
[concept].
ii. Every [instance of] assenting and conceptualization is

acquired either by means of some investigation or it exists in
a primary [way]. Assent is acquired by means of syllogisms
and [other] things resembling them that we have [already]
mentioned. Conceptualization is acquired by means of
definition and [other] things resembling it that we will
mention [below].
iii. A syllogism has parts that one assents to and others that
are conceptualized; a definition has parts that are [only]
conceptualized. [But] this does not proceed ad infinitum, in
27. Reading ‘arid for ‘azim with the other manuscripts.

such a way that knowledge is obtained from these parts [only]

due to [their] acquisition from other parts, this being their
nature ad-infinitum. Rather, things reach a limit with assents
and conceptualizations that have no intermediaries. So let us
enumerate assents without intermediaries.
103. On Sensibles (mahsisat)

i. Sensibles are things by means of which [the faculty of]
sensation generates assent. [An example is] your statement,
‘Snow is white’ or your statement, ‘The sun is luminous.’
104. On the Objects of Experience

(al-mujarrabat)
i. Objects of experience are things by means of which the
[faculty of] sense, in collaboration with syllogism[s], generates
assent. This is so because, when the existence of something
for some [other] thing repeats itself before our [faculty] of
sensation, e.g., the loosening of the bowels for scammony, and
the observed movements of heavenly [bodies], this repeats
itself in our memory.‘ And when it repeats itself in our
memory, an experience comes about for us due to a syllogism
that is connected with the memory. [An example is,] ‘If this
thing, such as the loosening of the bowels due to scammony,
were something arbitrary and accidental and not due to some
requirement of nature, then it would not occur consistently
in most cases.’ [The result is that,] if this does not happen [in
a certain case], the soul considers the incident to be rare and
seeks a cause due to which it did not happen. When this
sensation and this memory combine with this syllogism, the
soul concedes—due to this assent—that it is the nature of
scammony that, if it is drunk, it causes loosening of the
bowels in the drinker.“
105. [On What is Universally Circulated

(mutawatirat)??]®°
i. One assents to the truth of something universally circulated
due to [this very] universal circulation; regarding these types
[of reports] agreement to their <truth or> falsity, for whatever
reason,’ is incorrect. [An example is] the necessity of our
assenting to the existence of existing cities and countries,
though we have not seen them.“
106. [On Accepted Opinions (maqbulat)”?]*”

i. Accepted opinions are those to which one assents due to
their being uttered by someone whose truthfulness (with
respect to what he says) has been ascertained. [This certainty
is] either due to a celestial matter specific to [this person] or
due to a strong opinion or thought by which he is distinguished.
[An example is] our belief in things that we accept from the
imams [who give us] Laws (peace be upon them).
107. On Estimations (wahmiyyat)

i. Estimations are opinions belief in which is necessitated by
the estimative faculty (quwwat al-wahm), which is dependent
on the [faculty of] sense [and] is directed towards passing
judgment on sensibles. [This is so] because nothing other than
[sensibles] is represented‘ in the estimative faculty. An
example of this is a belief from which the totality of the
masses cannot turn away, namely, that the universe either
ends in a vacuum or is an infinite plenitude. [Another example
is] the assent of all the primary“ estimations that everything
that exists must be localized (mutahayyiz) in [some] place
28. Reading with Q, HJ: fi I-mutawatirat.

29. Reading with HJ: fi l-maqbulat.
(jiha). These two are examples of false estimations. Among

[estimations] there may be those that are true and that the
intellect [also] concedes. [An example is] that it is not possible
for one to estimate two bodies in a single location or a body
in two locations at the same time. For it neither exists in this
way nor is so intellected.
ii. These estimations are very strong in the mind (dhihn) and
the false ones among them are falsified only by the intellect.
Yet, despite their falsification, they do not cease to exist in
one’s estimation. For this reason, at first, they are not
distinguished from the primary [objects] of intelligence and
similar things, because, if we revert to the testimony of our
primary intelligence (fitra),‘"" it would testify [the same
thing] about [these estimations] by means of [the] objects of
intelligence (‘agliyyat).
iii. The meaning of primary intelligence is [as follows:] if one

imagines himself as if he came to this world at once, mature
and wise,* but had not heard any opinion, and did not
believe in any creed, nor was ever associated with any
community, nor knew any political system,** [but] he has
witnessed the sensibles and has extracted sensible forms
(khayaliyyat) from them; then something from among [these
sensible forms] occurred to his mind and he doubted it; if
[such] doubt is possible for him, the primary intelligence does
not certify [this thing]. Otherwise, the primary intelligence
necessitates [it].
iv. Not everything necessitated by the primary intelligence is

true; in fact a lot of it is false. Only the primary intelligence
of the faculty called intellect is truthful. As for the primary
intelligence of the estimative [faculty taken] as a totality, well
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC OL
sometimes it is false. This falsity occurs only with reference

to those things that are not sensibles in themselves, but are
either the sources of the sensibles—such as prime matter
(hayuli) and form [and, more precisely, the] intellect and the
Creator—or are more general than the sensibles, such as
oneness, multiplicity, finitude, cause, effect and such things.
When the intellect begins with premises with which the
estimation assists it, neither contradicting it nor disputing
with it with respect to any of them, [and] then ends up with
conclusions that are opposed to that which is required by the
primary intelligence of the estimation, the estimation is
understood as refusing to concede the necessary truth. Thus,
it is known that this primary intelligence is false and that the
reason for this is that this is the nature™ of a faculty that
imagines things only in a ‘sensible’ fashion. This is like the
estimation’s coming to the assistance of the intellect with
respect to all the premises that conclude that among existents
there is something that neither has a position (wad‘) nor is in
a place; and then it refuses to assent to the existence of this
thing.
v. The primary intelligence of the estimation with respect to

sensibles and their properties—insofar as these are sensible—
[allows one] to grant assent; [and] the intellect follows it [in
its judgment of these things]. Rather, it is an instrument of
the intellect with respect to sensibles. As for its primary
intelligence with respect to non-sensible things, it is a
[false>°]®° primary intelligence due to its turning towards
sensible existence.
30. Reading fitra kadhiba for fitra mahsisa with Q.

108. On Widespread [Propositions] (dha’i‘at)

i. As for widespread [propositions], well they are premises or
well-known and lauded opinions to which assent must be
granted. [This is] either due to everyone’s testimony, such as
[the statement] that justice is beautiful, or due to the
testimony of the majority or of the scholars or of most of
them or of the best among them regarding that about which
the masses do not disagree.
ii. Widespread [propositions] qua themselves are not such as

to generate assent in the primary intelligence. For that which
is [counted] among widespread [propositions] is neither a
primary intellected nor a [primary] estimated [object]. [Such
propositions] are not [related] to the primary intelligence, but
are established in the souls because of continuous habituation
from one’s childhood [and because they exist] through
arbitrary“ conventions. Sometimes one [accepts them] for
the love of reconciliation and [some] [compromise*']®” to
which one is compelled. [Or this may be due to] some aspect
of human ethics, such as shame and sociability, or ancient
traditions that have survived and have not been superseded,
or extensive induction. [Finally, it may be because of] a
statement that, in itself, has a subtle condition[, but] appears
to be either purely true or purely false. [However,] this
condition is not perceived and the [statement] is taken in an
absolute [fashion].
iii. If you wish to know the difference between a widespread

[proposition] and [one related to] the primary intelligence,
propose your statement(s], ‘Justice is beautiful’ and ‘Falsity is
ugly’ to the primary intelligence, whose state we came to
31. Reading al-islah for al-istilah with Q 1 and 2.

know in the previous section, and apply some doubt towards

them. You will find that doubt arises about these two, but not
about [the statement] that the whole is greater than [its] part,
which is a primary truth; [nor will any doubt occur] about [the
claim] that the universe ends at some external [boundary]
that is a vacuum or a plenitude, which is a false estimative
[proposition]. Primary (al-awwaliyyat) and estimative
[statements] are also widespread. [However, | sometimes
certain reasons present themselves that falsify the estimative
[statements] and cause them to be excluded from those that
are widespread.
iv. As for widespread [propositions] that are lauded at the

outset, well they are opinions that are accepted when
presented to common intelligent minds that are not in
agreement or that are in agreement. When they are
investigated, they turn out not to be praiseworthy. [An
example is] someone’s statement, ‘You must aid your brother,
whether he be the oppressor or the oppressed.’ [However,]
the same thing is not widespread at the outset in relation to
every listener; rather, its [effect] is [relative] to each person.
109. On Presumed (mazninat) [Propositions]

i. Presumed [propositions] are opinions to which assent is not
granted in a firm manner; rather, the possibility of their
contradictory occurs [to a person], but the ‘mind is more
inclined towards [what is presumed]. If the possibility of their
contradictory does not occur <and> [or] it so happens that
their contradictory presented itself to the mind and it neither
accepted it nor allowed for its possibility, then it is not
something presumed in a pure [sense]. Rather, it is something
believed (mu‘tagad) and, if it is called something presumed,
that is so only homonymously. It is as if this [appellation]
applies only to something that is believed, [but] is false or

non-necessary or non-perpetual.**"
ii. [Among propositions] that are believed and are false or do

not require acceptance and their contradictory does not occur
to the mind; or, when [the contradictory] is pressed upon [the
mind], then it is not necessary for [the contradictory] to be
praised and accepted and [for the believed proposition to]
become repugnant and doubted, in accordance with [the
grade of] its popularity [—such propositions] are initially
widespread [statements]. And in this manner they are
distinguished from that which is presumed.
110. [On Image-eliciting [Propositions]

(mukhayyilat)*?]>°
i. Those [propositions] that [elicit images*]®° are premises
that are stated not so that one would assent to them, but so
as to [make [one] imagine] that a thing is something else.
[This happens] by way of mimesis (muhakat) and, in most cases,
[some manner of] repulsion of the soul from something or its
attraction towards it is the result. In sum, [the soul] feels
dejected or exhilarated. [An example is] our drawing a
similarity“” between honey and bile, so that one’s nature is
repulsed by it. [Another] is our drawing a similarity between
carelessness and courage or between cowardice and caution,
so that one’s nature is drawn to it.
32. Reading mukhayyilat for matakhayyilat with Q.

33. Reading mukhayyilat for mutakhayyilat Q.
111. [On Primary [Statements]

(al-awwaliyyat)**]°°
i. Primary [statements] are propositions or premises that are
generated in man on account of his intellective faculty (quwwa
‘agliyya), with no cause that necessitates assent to them except
their own essences and that thing which makes them
proposition[s], i.e. the cogitative faculty (quwwa mufakkira).
[The latter] joins simple [elements]*’ by way of affirmation
and negation.
ii. When the simple concepts come about in man either with
the help of the senses or the formative imaginative faculty
(khayal)**“ or [in] some other way“ and then the cogitative
faculty“! compounds them, the mind must assent to them —
from the very beginning, without [recourse to] another cause
and without feeling that this is something only recently
acquired. Rather, man believes that he always knew it. The
natural intelligence of the estimative [faculty] does not
propose it,‘“* as we explained. An example of this is, ‘The
whole is greater than the part.’ This [proposition] is not
acquired from a sense or induction or anything else. True, the
sense[s] may supply [one] with [an example of] an image of
‘the whole’ and ‘the greater’ and ‘the part’. As for assent to
this proposition, well it is due to [primary] nature. As we
explained, whatever is true among the estimations is included
in this totality.
112. On Demonstration
i. A demonstration is a syllogism composed of [premises of]
certitude that yield conclusion[s] of certitude. [Premises of]
certitude are [1] primary [propositions] and whatever is
34, Reading with HJ and Q: fi l-awwaliyyat.
collected within [their category] or [2] [propositions based in]

experience (tajribiyyat) or [3] [based on] sensibles. We have
already explained them. As for [propositions that are]
widespread, commonly accepted, and presumed [true], well
they fall outside this rubric.
113. On Absolute Demonstration

(burhan mutlaq)
i. An absolute demonstration is a demonstration of why
(burhan al-lima). This is something that not only gives you the
cause of the coming together in the mind of the two extremes
of the conclusion, along with [your] assent—and its benefit is
that you understand why it is necessary to assent to it—but it
also gives you the cause of the coming together of the two
extremes of the conclusion in existence. Thus, you know why
a thing is such and such in itself, so that the middle term is
[not only] a cause of your granting the conclusion, [but also]
a cause for the [very] existence of the conclusion. [This is so]
because it is a cause for the major term, either absolutely, as
[when] you say, ‘Something having intense heat transformed
this piece of wood; everything that is transformed by
something having intense heat burns; so this piece of wood
burns.’ Or [the middle term is the cause of the major term]
not in an absolute manner, but [insofar] as it is a cause of its
existence for the minor [term. An example is when] the
middle term is a certain species, having a genus or a specific
difference, or a property. So [the major] is first predicated of
the [middle] and it is [then] predicated of that which is
posited as [the] subject [of the middle] on account of [the
latter]. [An example is] our statement, ‘Every isosceles is a
triangle; every triangle has angles that equal two right angles;
[so every isosceles has angles that equal two right angles].
114. On the Demonstration If [Something is the

Case] (burhan al-anna)
i. As for the demonstration of if [something is the case], it
gives you only the cause of the coming together in the mind
of the two extremes of the conclusion, along with [your]
assent to it. [Thus,] you understand why the assent to [a
certain] statement is necessary. [However,] it does not give
you the reason for why a thing is so in itself. [This is so]
because, from a [certain] aspect, the middle term in it is not
in itself a cause for the major [term]; [nor**]®° is it a cause for
the existence of the major in the minor, though it is sometimes
its effect. [An example is] our statement, ‘This piece of wood
is burning; so something hot has transformed it.’ [The action
of] burning is an effect of the existence of the major term
in the minor. Whatever is thus is called a sign.?
115. [On the Question Whether (matlab hal)]®°

i. Among questions is that [whereby]® affirmation or
negation—in sum, assent—is granted. It is either the question
‘whether’ in an absolute sense, such as our statement, ‘Does
God exist?’ and ‘Does the void exist?’ [By this question,
]®° one
finds out only the state of a thing as existing or failing to exist
in an absolute sense. As for the question ‘whether’ in a
qualified sense,“ well it is like our statement, ‘Is God the
creator of man?’ and ‘Is the body created?’ [By this] one finds
out whether a thing exists or fails to exist in a certain state.
116. [On the Question What (matlab ma)**]®°

i. The question ‘what’ [leads one] to conceptualize [a thing].
[This occurs] either in accordance with the noun, as [when]
35. Reading wa-la ‘illa with Q for wa-lakinnahu ‘illa.
36. Reading from Q: fasl fi matlab ma.
one says, ‘What is the vacuum?’ the meaning of which is ‘What

is intended by the [term] vacuum?’ This precedes every
question. Or {this occurs] in accordance with the essence, as
your statement, ‘What is man insofar as he exists?’ [By means
of this]®° [question] one finds out the reality of [man’s]
essence. The [question] ‘whether’ in an absolute sense
precedes this [question].
117. On the Question ‘Why’ (matlab lima)

i. [By the question] ‘why’ one finds out the cause for the
answer to ‘whether’. It is either only the cause for the assent
or the cause for the existence [of a thing] itself.
118. On the Question ‘Which’ (matlab ayy)

i. As for the question ‘which’, well, in potentiality, it is
included in the composite qualified [question] ‘whether’. It
only seeks to know the distinguishing [characteristics of a
thing]*" either with reference to essential qualities or
properties.
119. [A Section]®
i. The things that constitute demonstrations are three: [1] the
subject matter under investigation (mawdi‘at), [2] problems
[related to the subject matter] (masa’il), and [3] premises that
are the principles [and starting points].“” One demonstrates
about subject matters, demonstrates [the solution to]
problems [related to the subject matter], and demonstrates
by means of premises. Let us therefore speak first about
premises.
120. On the Premises of Demonstration

i. The premises of demonstration are essential, certain, and
true. They reduce to primary premises that are universally
predicated (maqila) of the whole. They may be necessary,
except as regards things that change, which [exist] in a
certain mode in most cases. Thus, they [also fall in the
category of things that are true] for the most part (akthariyya).
[1f7]®° they are causes for the existence of the conclusion,
they are appropriate.
121. On Essential Predication

i. Predication is called essential in two ways: [1] either [when]
the predicate is taken in the definition of the subject, as
animal is [taken] in the definition of man; [2] or [when] the
subject or its genus is taken in the definition of the predicate,
as nose is taken in the definition of snub-nosed or as surface
is taken in the definition of the triangle. [[Similaris the case
of | the subject of the accident-substrate (mawdi‘ ma‘radihi),?°
like ‘that which dilates sight’, in whose definition body is
taken. [For] body is the subject of the white thing [,which is
the] accident-substrate for that accidental (‘arid).**]®° This
[predicate] is essential only because it is specific to something
that falls in the subject matter of the discipline in the totality
of which this thing falls. So it follows the thing or the subject
matter of its discipline insofar as it is [what it is]. It is not
[something] added to it form the outside.
37. Reading with Q: wa-in takinu for wa-takinu.

38. Reading with Q: aw-mawdia‘u ma‘ridihi ka-mufariqi ‘l-basari ‘lladhi
yu’khadhu fi haddihi ‘l-jismu wa-'l-jismu mawda‘u ‘l-abyadi ‘lladhi huwa
ma‘radun li-dhalika ‘l-‘arid.
122. [On Primary Premises

(muqaddima awwaliyya)]*
i. A premise is called primary for two reasons: [1] The first of
them is that assent to it comes about in the intellect in an a
priori fashion“ such as [when one grants] that the whole is
greater than the part.
ii. [2] The second [reason is] that[, in primary premises,] the
affirmation or negation does not apply universally to what is
more general than the subject. As for the affirmation, well it
is like your statement, ‘The angles of every triangle equal two
right angles.’ For this is not predicated of what is more
general than the triangle (like figure) in a universal fashion.
As for what is more specific than a triangle, such as an
isosceles triangle,“ well it may cease to be, though what is
more general than it, i.e. a triangle, remain. [But] the angles’
being like two right angles is not [thereby] falsified.
[Furthermore,] when the triangle ceases to exist, this concept
no longer remains [true of any subject] [due to*?]®° what is
more general than it (such as figure). Then, as long as triangle
is predicated of a thing, this concept exists, no matter whether
that which is more specific than it remains or fails to do so.
And when triangle is removed as a predicate of a thing, this
concept is likewise removed from it, though what is more
general than the triangle may [still] remain for it. [This is so]
since that which is more general than a triangle was not
predicated in its totality. [So] it is more suitable for [the
predicate] to be something more general, like the genus, or
something equal, but not something more specific.
39. Reading with all manuscripts, except B, Ha: lima for ma.
123. [On the Dictum de Omni

(maqil ‘ala al-kull)]’
i. The dictum de omni here is other than what it was in the Prior
Analytics.” For here the meaning of the dictum de omni is
that [a predicate] is applied to every [single] one [of its
subjects] at all times, as long as [this subject] is described [by
a description that] is posited with it. [This is so] because the
universals of demonstration are necessary and do not change.
Here a universal has more conditions: for it must be applied
to every [single] one, at all times, and, in addition to this, it
must be a primary statement.
ii. The subject’s being individual (shakhsiyya) in existence does

not preclude the universality of the predication, [since] it is
possible in the very act of its conceptualization to have the
subject apply to many, even though an impediment outside
its meaning [prevent’’]"? this [in actuality]. [An example is]
‘sun’ (but not ‘Zayd’).
iii. Here the necessary is [also] other than what it was in the
Prior Analytics. For here, by the necessary one means ‘that
which is always the predicate for that which is posited as a
subject’, even if [the qualification is] not ‘as long as it exists’,
but ‘as long as it [i.e. the subject] is described by that which
is posited for it’. [An example is] our statement, ‘By necessity,
every white [thing] has a colour that dilates sight.’ [This is
necessary] not for as long as its substance exists, but for as
long as it is white.
40. Reading ‘aga ‘a’iqun with HJ and Q for kana ‘a’iqun.

124. [On Suitable [Premises] (munasib)]*

i. [The principle] of suitab[ility precludes] the premises in [a
demonstration] from being derived from a foreign science.
One who uses the premises of geometry (handasa) in the [field
of] medicine [exemplifies someone who overlooks this
principle]. Rather, [premises should be] from that same
science or from a science that is commensurate with it or
from one that shares its subject matter in some way, as we
shall explain. [This is so] because demonstrative premises are
cause[s] of their conclusion[s] and a cause is suitable for its
effect in a certain way. For this reason, when a physician says
that the round wound heals slowly for the person under
treatment because the circle is the most expansive of figures,
he has not demonstrated [in the field of] medicine. [In other
words, he has not argued medically.]
125. [On Subject Matters (mawdiu‘at)]*

i. As for subject matters, well in the sciences, they are those
posited things whose essential accidents are sought [by the
investigator]. [Their examples are] measurable [dimensions]
(miqdar) for geometry, number for arithmetic (hisab), body,
insofar as it moves and is at rest, for physics (al-‘ilm al-tabi‘i),
and the Existent and the One for theology (al-‘ilm al-ilahi).
Each one of these [subject matters] has essential accidents
that are particular to it, such as range, boundary, and form
for measurable [dimensions], even and odd for number,
change, growth, wilting, etc. for the natural body, and
potentiality, actuality, perfection, deficiency, generation, and
eternity and similar things for the Existent. The subject
matter [of a science] may be one, such as the natural body, or
it-may be many things, homogeneous or commensurate, such
as line and surface for geometry.
126. [On Demonstrative]® [Problems Related to

the Subject Matters*!]®°
i. As for demonstrative problems, well they are propositions
that are specific to each science and one seeks the
demonstration of those among them that are uncertain.
choxiThe subject matters [of demonstrative problems] are [of
the following types]: [1] they are the subject matter of the
science itself, like our statement, ‘Every measurable
[dimension] is either a number that has a common factor with
another, [like four to six,] or not.’ [2] Or they are subject
matters, along with an essential accident, like our statement,
‘Every measurable [dimension] that is placed in the middle of
the relation is a side bound by two extremes’. [3] Or they are
a species of the subject matter, like [the statement that] every
line may be divided into two halves. [4] Or they are a species
of the subject matter, along with an accident, like our
statement, ‘Every line that is set upon another has such and
such two angles. [5] Or they are [species of the subject matter,
along with] an essential accident, like our statement, ‘The
angles of every triangle are such and such.’
127. [On the Predicates of Demonstration‘?

]®”
i. As for the predicate, well it may not belong to the subject
essentially, in the sense of being included in the definition of
the subject, because the existence of this [predicate] [for*?]®°
the subject is obvious in itself." [This is so] except in two
cases.
41. Reading with Ha: fi ’I-masa’il.

42. Reading with Ha: fi mahmalati ‘l-burhan
43. Reading with Q: li-’l-mawdi‘ for al-mawdi’.
ii. The first of them is that the subject is already imagined and
is only known by way of things external to it or only by name.
Its essence has not yet been investigated. [An example] is our
seeking to find out whether the soul is a substance or not,
because until then we had only known the soul by its name
and some act, without knowing its essence. So in reality, the
subject, [as it is known to us until this point,] is an essential
accidental for the soul, [namely,] being the agent of actls],
such as [being] a mover and perceiver. [It is the same as]
white is for snow.**“' [In all this,] what one seeks to find out
is the accident-substrate’s genus, which is not constitutive of
the quiddity of the accidental in the manner in which essential
predicates are.
iii. The second case is when, by demonstration, one does not

intend to generate assent, along with [an understanding of]
the cause [of the conclusion]. [In other words, one does not
seek the demonstration of the] if and why taken together.
Rather, [one seeks to acquire] the cause alone. [An example
of this is] if we had known that man is a substance [and that]
substance does not belong to him in a primary fashion, then
lif] we wished to learn of the cause [for man’s being a
substance] and said, ‘Because [man] is a body.’
iv. Rather, in problems that are demonstrative, the essential

in the second sense is the problem. As far as the premises are
concerned, well the two premises may not correspond in their
essential predication according to the first sense [of essential],
so as to become essential[ly predicated] in this manner.
Otherwise, the major [term] will be essential for the minor in
this sense [also]. And we have already explained that this is
not what is sought except in the two aforementioned cases. It
is permitted for the two premises to be essential in the second
x
sense. It is [also] permitted for the minor [premise] to be

essential in the first sense and for the major [premise] to be
so in the second and vice versa.
128. [On Principles (usil) that are Known Prior

to Demonstrations|®
i. Principles that are known prior to demonstrations are
three: definitions, postulates (awda‘), and propositions of
certitude. Definitions supply the conceptualization of those
subject matters and accidentals of the disciplines that are not
clearly conceptualized. [Examples are:] that the point is an
extreme that has no part; that the line is a length that has no
width <like this> and that the triangle is a figure enclosed in
such and such a way. [Definitions] do not supply assent in any
way; nor is there any affirmation or negation in them.
ii. As for postulates, they are premises that are not obvious in |
themselves, but the student is tempted to concede them and
their explanation. [This happens] either in some other
discipline or, after some time, in the same discipline.
[Examples are] found among the primary [premises] of
geometry: that we can travel between two points by means of
a straight line; that we can make a circle around every point
and with every measure of distance; and that if a straight line
is posited over two [intersecting] lines, then the two angles
that are on the same side are less than two right angles. For
the two [original] lines intersect on that [same] side.
Whichever of the postulates a student concedes, without there
being any resistance to it in his soul, is called a postulated
principle (asl mawdi‘’‘) in an absolute fashion. And that which
[requires some degree of] concession and against which the
soul of the student has some resistance is called a pre-
position.°™
A06 AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC
129. On Propositions of Certitude

i. As for propositions of certitude, well they are [of the
following type:] that measurable [dimensions] that are equal
to a single measurable [dimension] are equal. Among them
are those that are specific to a science, such as our statement,
‘Every measurable [dimension] is either the same as or
different from [another].’ Among [such propositions] are
[also] those that are general, such as ‘Either affirmation or
negation is truly applied to everything.’ In the sciences, the
general propositions are made specific, so that in geometry
one does not say, ‘Everything is either equal or unequal [to
another];’ rather, [one says,] ‘Every measurable [dimension is
either equal or unequal to another].’ Sometimes [such
propositions] are specific with reference to both sides,“ as
in their statement, ‘Every measurable [dimension] is either
rational or irrational’
130. On the Subject Matters of the Sciences

i. Sciences are either distinct [from each other] or correspond
[to each other].
ii. The subject matters of those that are distinct do not overlap
either with respect to their essences or their genus. [An
example of two such distinct sciences is] arithmetic and
physics.
iii. Of those [sciences] that correspond [to each other, some

are] equal to each other in rank, [some] are contained in
others, and some of them are inferior to others.
iv. As for those that are equal in rank, well [an example pair
is] arithmetic and geometry. For their subject matters are the
same in kind because measurable [dimension] and number are

two species of quantity. [Another example is] physics and the
science of the stars (‘ilm al-nujim), i.e. astronomy (‘ilm al-
hay’a). For their subject matters are one and the same, i.e. the
celestial bodies of the world, though their approaches [to this
same subject matter] are different. For the former considers
[them] insofar as they move and are at rest, come to be mixed
and separated, etc. Most of [this science] centers on the
quality [of the subject matter]. [On the other hand,] the latter
investigates [this same subject matter] insofar as it and its
accidents are quantified. For this reason, [these two sciences]
often share their problems, though one of them supplies the
demonstration of why and the other the demonstration of if;
[again,] one of them supplies a demonstration of the efficient
cause (“lla fi‘liyya) and the other of the formal cause (‘lla
suriyya).
v. As for those [sciences] that are not of the same rank, with
some of them being contained in others, [well an example pair
is] conics (makhratat), insofar as it falls within geometry,
because conics investigates a species of the subject matter of
geometry.
vi. As for those [sciences] that are not of the same rank, with
some being inferior to others, it is necessary for [one of two
cases to obtain]. [1] Either the subject matter of the higher
[science] is not in reality a genus of the subject matter of the
lower [science], being rather like a genus due to its
generality,” but not [existing] in the manner of the
generality of the genus. If it were in the manner of the
generality of genus, the lower [science] would not be
precluded from being one of its species, as conics is for
geometry. [But the case here] is like the particular sciences
that fall under first philosophy, whose subject matter is the

Absolute Existent (al-mawjid al-mutlaq) insofar as it is an
Absolute Existent.
vii. [2] Or the [subject matter**]®° of the higher [science] is a

genus for the subject matter of the lower [science], but the
lower, insofar as it is a species of the higher, is not taken as
its [species*]®? absolutely. Rather a certain accident is
attached to it, along with which it is taken as a subject matter.
And its essential accidents are investigated insofar as it is [in
this state]. This is like the investigation of the moving globes
that falls under the field of geometry. [Another example is]
investigations in the science of optics (manazir), because the
subject matter of optics is lines, presented to [this science] if
they connected to an eye socket, having penetrated through
a transparent medium, so as to reach sides of a body.it
viii. Sometimes the subject matter is from one science and

the accident from another. However, its investigation takes
place insofar as it has this accident that is foreign to it, [but
also insofar as this accident is] essential for another subject
matter. [An example is] [the science of] music (misiqi),
whose subject matter is melody, which is among the
accidentals of [the science of] physics. Music investigates
melody only insofar as it has a foreign accidental, which is
essential to another subject matter, i.e. its arithmetical
affinity. For this reason, [music] falls under arithmetic and
not under physics,
44, Reading mawdi‘ with D, where it is added in another hand.

45. Reading naw‘an with D, where it is added in a newer hand.
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC —AL09
131. [On the Cooperation of the Sciences**]”

i. Cooperation among sciences entails taking a problem from
one science as a premise in another. The science in which [the
proposition] is the problem aids the science in which [it
occurs as] a premise. This happens in three ways. 7
ii. The first of them is [when] one of the two sciences is

inferior to the other, so that the lower science acquires its
principles from the higher [one]. [An example is the reception
of premises by] the science of music from arithmetic, by
medicine from physics and by all the sciences from First
Philosophy.
iii. Or the two sciences share the subject matter, as physics

and astronomy [share] the body of the universe. For one of
them, such as physics, investigates the substance of the
subject matter and the other, such as astronomy, investigates
its accidents. The investigator of the substance of the subject
matter supplies principles to his counterpart, such as the
physicist, who supplies to the astronomer [the principle] that
celestial motion must be circular.
iv. Or the two sciences share the genus [of the subject matter].
[However,] one of them investigates a simpler species, such as
arithmetic, and the other a more composite species, such as
geometry. The investigator of that which is simpler supplies
his counterpart principles, just as arithmetic does for geometry.
[Examples are found] in Euclid’s Tenth [Book of the Elements].
46. Reading with T: ft ta‘awuni -‘ulam.

132. [On the Transfer of Demonstration

(naql al-burhan)]*
i. [The expression] ‘transfer of demonstration’ may be applied
to the act of taking up a principle [for one science that was the
conclusion in another], as we mentioned [above]. And it may
be applied [to a process] like the demonstration [of problems
related to] optical conics in [the field of ]Optics by means of a
geometrical demonstration. If the conic is freed of its relation
to sight, this same demonstration would apply to it. This is
because the middle term will be from another science, while
the minor term will be from that [related] science.
133. [On the Sciences Sharing their

Problematics|]®
i. The sciences may sometimes share their problematics, as
we have already said; at other times, [this participation in the
same problematics] occurs between a higher and a lower
science. Each one of these gives a demonstration of why. [A
case in point is] that some causes are in the higher science,
such as the causes of mutual separation that belong to natural
bodies; others are in the lower science, such as the causes of
the mutual union [of natural bodies,] like prime matter and
form. If the demonstration is given on the basis of the causes
of mutual union, it belongs to the lower science; and if it is
given on the basis of the causes of mutual separation, it
belongs to the higher science.
134. [On the [Fact] That There is No

Demonstration of Corruptibles (fasidat)]®
i. Demonstration supplies perpetual certainty, [but] nothing
holds perpetually of things that are corruptible. [This is so]
because, in syllogisms [composed] of such corruptibles, the

minor premises are not eternally true. Therefore, they are not
demonstrative. Thus, it is clear that there is neither any
demonstration of them nor any definition [for them]. For we
will explain that demonstration and definition share their
parts, so that that which has no demonstration also has no
definition. And how can it have a definition, given that it is
distinguished [from other things] only by non-constitutive
accidentals? As for those that are constitutive, they participate
in [definition and demonstration].
135. [On the Three Things?’

]®°
i. The things out of which demonstrations are constructed
[are three:] The first of them are subject matters, whose
definitions and quiddities must be supplied if their definitions
are hidden (as in the case of point and unity). Their existence
is conceded insofar as one concedes the premise, which is a
primary principle, or a [principle of**]*° the subject matter or
a pre-position. As for the problems that are essential
accidentals, well their definitions [must be] supplied if they
are hidden. [Examples of these are] irrational and rational
[numbers] and that which resembles these.” As for the
existence [of essential accidentals] for the subject matter,
well that [is a question] left for its [suitable] place in a
demonstrative proof.*° As for principles, well they must be
conceded and posited as postulates with reference to [the
question] ‘whether’.
47, Reading with Q and RM: fi l-ashya’i th-thalatha.

48. Reading with Q: aw-asl mawdi‘ for mawdi’.
136. [On the Difference between the

Demonstrations of If and Why’’}"”
i. Ina single science, the difference between the demonstration
of if and why may occur in two ways. One of these is that one
of the two syllogisms supplies a distant cause, with the
investigation into the [question] why still remaining. Thus,
the [process of] supplying the [answer to the question] why
has not yet been completed. This may occur with reference to
the affirmative problem, such as [in the case of] one who
posits the cause for a feverish person that his pores are
blocked, not that his mixture has been putrefied. In the
negative, [we can give the example] of one who responds to
the question, ‘[Why*’]®” does a wall not breathe?’ by positing
as the cause that it is not an animal, not that it has no lung.
The latter is the correct response; for the existence of the
lung and breathing are mutual causes of each other and the
negation [of lungs] negates breathing.
ii. The second way [in which the two demonstrations differ]
is when one of the two syllogisms has a cause, but the other
one does not. This is like the syllogism of one who says, ‘The
fixed™“ stars are very far because they twinkle; and everything
luminous that twinkles is very far.’ Then we say, ‘The planets
are close; and everything that is very close does not twinkle;
so the planets do not twinkle.’
49. Reading with HJ, Q: fi ikhtilafi burhani ’l-anna wa- ’I-lima.

50. Reading lima with the other manuscripts.
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC PS
137. [On the Nature of the Inclusion of

Possibilities in Demonstration™]"”
i. As for possibilities that obtain for the most part (mumkinat
akthariyya), well undoubtedly they have causes that obtain for
the most part. When the latter are made to be middle terms,
they generate knowledge and acquired, convincing opinion.*“
As for knowledge, well this obtains in view of the fact that the
conclusion occurs for the most part; and this is [called]
certainty.““’ As for opinion, well it obtains [due to our
realization] that the [conclusion] exists due to the fact that if
it is correct that something has a cause that obtains for the
most part, [this cause] generates its existence. This is like the
growth of hair on the chin at the time of reaching maturity
due to the firmness of the epidermis and the root. Things that
obtain for the most part have some necessity from a certain
aspect. For this [reason,] their existence is distinguished from
that of their contradictories. This has been explicated in
detailed books.
138. [On Things That Occur by Chance

(ittifaqiyyat)]*°
i. As for things that occur by chance, well it may be possible
to demonstrate that they are [in fact] things that occur in
this fashion and that they are included in the larger
[concept] of possibility. [However,] there is absolutely no
demonstration of them as regards the [question] of their
being or not being. Otherwise, [either] the side [of their
being or of their non-being] would gain preference and [that
which occurs by chance] will become something that occurs
for the most part.
51. Reading with Ha: fi kayfiyyati dukhiali ‘l-mumkinati fi ’l-burhan.

139. On Definition
i. It is not possible to acquire a definition by means of
demonstration. For then this would require a middle term
that is equal to the two extremes. [This is so] because the
definition and the thing defined*” are equal and the middle
[term] must either be another definition [of the thing defined]
or [its] description and property. As for [its being} another
definition, well the question of acquiring [a definition by
means of a demonstration still] endures. For if it is acquired
by a third definition, the matter proceeds ad infinitum. And if
it is acquired by means of the first definition, then this is
circular. If it is acquired by some means other than
demonstration, why is it that the [initial] definition was not
acquired in this [same way], given that it is not permissible
for two perfect definitions to belong to one thing, as we will
explain later? If the means [whereby one acquires the
definition] is something other than a definition, how does that
which is not a definition come to be known to exist for that
which is defined better than something essential and
constitutive of it—i.e. the definition—until this latter is [itself]
acquired? Likewise, is the definition in the major premise
predicated of the middle [term] only as a predicate simpliciter
or as its definition? For if it is predicated of the middle [term]
as a predicate simpliciter, then this only yields the conclusion
that it is predicated of the minor [term], without our finding
out that it is its definition. Thus, there is no need for this
syllogism. For we have already explained that the predication
of a definition and its parts of something defined has no need
of a demonstration. If it is predicated as the definition of the
middle [term], it[s predication of the minor term as its
definition may still be] false. For the definition of the species
is not the definition of its property in an exact manner: the
definition of man|, for example,] is not exactly the definition
of risible. However, someone [may] say, ‘It is predicated of the

middle [term] insofar as it is a definition of its subject, i.e. that
it is the definition of that which is the subject of the middle
[term].’ But this [predication as definition of the minor is also]
false: for mourner, timid, and the rest of the properties and
specific differences that are equal [to them*?]®° carry the
predicate ‘property’, but the definition of the species is not
their definition.“ If someone says, ‘It is predicated of the
middle [term] as the definition of that which is the subject of
the middle term, [the subject] having been posited in the real
[sense,] i.e. in the manner in which a species is posited for its
properties’, he has already taken up the problem in his very
explanation. For if this is known, there is no need for
demonstration.
ii. Definition is not acquired by [the process] of division

(gisma). For division posits parts,*“! no particular one among
which is predicated [of the subject], unless it is set down as a
postulate, without division having any part [to play in the
process]. As for the repetition*™ of the contradictory of a
part, so that [only] the part that is included in the definition
remains, this [involves] the clarification of a thing by that
which is like it or is more obscure than it. For if you were to
say, ‘But man is not non-rational; so he is rational’, you would
not be taking up in your repetition something better known
than the conclusion.
iii. Likewise, definition is not acquired by means of the

definition of the opposite. For not everything defined has an
opposite; nor is it the case that the definition of one of the
two opposites is more suitable [to be used] in this [way] than
the definition of the other opposite.
52. Reading with Q: al-musawiya laha for al-musawiya.

iv. Likewise, [since] induction cannot provide universal

knowledge, how can it provide the definition? For if you were
to carry out an induction, thinking that definition is definition
of each individual, so that you make it a definition of the
species, you will have made an error. And if you were to say
that definition is something predicated of every individual,
without adding [any other claim], this will not necessitate its
being a definition of the species. Furthermore, if you were to
say that definition is a definition of the species of each one
of these individuals, you will have pre-posited the first
problem.* Therefore, there remains no space for induction
[in the process of acquiring definitions].
140. On Acquiring Definitions

i. Rather, definition is sought in stages.“ This consists of our
relying on indivisible individual particulars’ and then
investigating to which of the ten categories, which we will
mention, do they belong. Then we take up all the predicates
that are constitutive of them [and] which fall in that category
or in the thing that is [like**]®° a category for them. We gather
a number of them after we learn which of them is primary for
which one. Thus, sensation“ is primary for animal; [and]
rationality [is secondary]. Likewise [is the case of] body, for
it is primary for animal; rational [is secondary]. We [ought]
to be careful that in the collection [of predicates] there is
nothing that recurs without our being aware [of it]. [An
example of error generated due to this oversight is when] we
say, ‘a body that has a sentient soul’ and then say in addition,
‘animal’.. For animal [becomes] redundant, at times with
reference to the treatment of its parts and its definition and,
at others, with reference to its treatment as a whole and its
53. Reading ka-’l-jins with the other manuscripts for fi ’l-jins.

AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC LL.
appellation.“ When we collect these predicates and find

something among them that is equal to the thing defined in
two ways, that is the definition.
ii. As for one of the two ways, well the equivalence is with
respect to the predication. [By this] I mean that everything of
which this predication holds is that [of which the defined
thing is true] and that [of which the defined thing is true] has
, this predication.
iii. [As for] the second [of the two ways,] the equivalence is
with respect to the intention.’ In other words, [the predicate
should] indicate the perfection of the reality of the essence
[of the thing defined], with nothing of [this essence] being
excluded from [this predicate]. For many things that
distinguish an essence fall short of some genera or of some
properties, so as to be equivalent with respect to the
extension,“’ but not so with respect to the intention. [An
example is] your statement, in defining man, that he is a
mortal, rational body. For this is not a true definition; rather,
it is deficient because the proximate genus is not posited in
it. [Likewise is the case] in your statement, in defining animal,
that it is a body having a sentient soul, without saying that [it
also] moves by will. For [the predicate] is equivalent with
respect to the extension, but deficient as far as the intention
is concerned.
iv. [When considering] the definition, do not turn to [the idea

that it must be] concise. Rather, a definition is not perfect as
a definition [simply because] it distinguishes [a thing]
concisely, without positing a proximate genus either by name
or by definition (if it has no name). So [a perfect definition]
consists of a shared quiddity; after this, it is provided with all
the essential specific differences, though they may be a

thousand and though [only] one may suffice in distinguishing
[the defined]. For if you leave aside some of the specific
differences, you will leave aside some of the essence. The
definition is also a denotation“™” and an explanation for the
essence. Thus, it is necessary for the definition to generate an
intelligible form in the soul, one that is equivalent to the
existing form in its perfection. [In this way,] the thing defined
will come to be distinguished.
v. The philosophers do not seek in definitions [their capacity]

to distinguish [one thing from another], though some [such
function] may be attached to them. Rather, they seek to
investigate the essence and quiddity of a thing. For this
reason, there is in reality no definition for that which has no
existence. [What seems like a definition of such things] is only
a statement that explicates their name.
vi. For this reason, the Philosopher”! <does not> defines

definition as a statement that indicates the quiddity [of a
thing] and does not say [that it is] a concise statement that
distinguishes [one thing from another]. [The latter manner of
speaking about definitions] is according to the habit of the
later [philosophers].“““ For this reason, the definition of one
who takes up only the material element (‘unsur) in his
definition is criticized. [An example is that of] the physicists
in their definition of anger [as the boiling of the blood of the
heart. Or [one only supplies] the form [in giving the
definition]. [An example is that of] the dialecticians in their
definition of anger]*“ as a desire for revenge. [These two
manners are criticized] not because they do not distinguish
[one thing from another] but because they do not fully supply
the perfection of the quiddity. Rather, it has been ordered
that, in a definition, [a thing] must be defined on the basis of

both these things together, even though [neither] fails to
mention an essential cause.
vii. It is in this manner that definitions of species must be

sought. As for genera, well [determining their definition
means] taking the specific differences that are specific to the
species and excising them. Then, if what remains is a simple
noun, its specific difference is given‘ with a view to the
predicates[, as explained above]. And if it is compound, then
it is what was sought.
141. [On [How] Division Aids in

Giving Definitions™]®°
i. Division also aids definition. If it is with respect to
essentials,“* generally it is a division with reference to [an
entity’s] being what it is. For the division of animal into
‘having two feet’ and ‘having many feet’ is not something that
applies to it insofar as it is an animal. Rather, it applies to it
insofar as it walks. It is predisposed to this division because
of its being a walker, not because of its being an animal. For
animality is not sufficient for this predisposition in a primary
fashion, [i.e.] not for as long as the nature of walking does not
obtain for it. Thus, if animal[s] had not been [capable of]
walking, they would not be predisposed to this division at all.
If you [follow] this [method], you will have preserved the
[proper] order [in the process of obtaining definitions].
ii. [Furthermore,] you must be wary of a third condition, i.e.

that you should not stop [the process] in the middle. Rather,
[you must] carry out division until you arrive at those
54. Reading with Q1 and Q2: fi i‘anati ‘l-qismati fi ’t-tahdid.

essentials, which, if divided further, lead to accidentals or

individuals. For, when the division in the category of
substances ends with man, it stops and does not divide
[further] [into essentials]® after it. After this, either it divides
into individuals or into accidental differences, like [capable
of] writing and illiterate, justly successful and usurper, etc.
142. [On the Ten Categories]®

i. As for these ten categories, well among them is substance.
It is everything whose essence does not exist in a subject, i.e.
in any proximate receptacle (mahall). It subsists“ by itself in
actuality and without [such a receptacle], not due to its
causing it to subsist.
ii. Among [the categories] is [also] quantity. It is that which

essentially accepts equality, non-equality and division. It is
either continuous,“ since there exists for its parts a shared
limit in potentiality where [they] come together and by which
they are limited [and are thus distinguished as discrete parts].
[An example of this type of quantity] is the point of a line. Or
[quantity] is discontinuous,“ with this [aforementioned
state] failing to exist for its parts either in potentiality or in
actuality. [An example of this is] number.
iii. That which is continuous may or may not have a position

(wad‘). There exists for the parts of that which has a position
a continuity and stability.“~” [And there also] exists the
possibility that one can point out where each one of them is
in relation to the other. Thus, among [these types of
quantities] there are those that accept division in a single
dimension (jiha), ie. a line; and there is that which accepts
[it] in two dimensions which may be cut perpendicularly,°*”
i.e. a surface (sath); and there is that which accepts it in three
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC SIAN
dimensions, some of which are perpendicular to others, i.e. a

body.
iv. Location also has a position because it is the hidden

[surface**]®° of that which contains [a localized body].
v. As for time, well it is a measure of movement, except that

it has no position. [This is so] because its parts do not exist
together, though they do have continuity, since the past and
present have a [shared] limit, i.e. the now (dan).
vi. As for number, well in reality it is a discontinuous

quantity.
vii. Among the ten categories is [also] relation. It is

something“ that exists with respect**”' to another thing and
that does not have any other existence. [An example] is
fatherhood in relation to sonhood; [the former] is not like
father, since [father] has an existence that is specific to it,
such as humanness.
viii. As for quality (kayf), well it is every settled disposition

(hay’a) in a body the consideration of the existence of which
[disposition] does not necessitate that the body have a relation
to something extrinsic; [nor does it necessitate] a relation
among the parts [of the body]. [In fact] taking [it into
consideration does not thereby cause [a body] to have
part[s]*°]’°. [Examples of quality are] whiteness and blackness.
[Quality] is [1] either specific to quantity, insofar as it is a
quantity, such as the quadrupleness of surfaces, the
straightness of lines, and oddness of numbers. [2] Or it is not
55. Reading with the other manuscripts: al-sath.

56. Reading with Q: li-jumlatihi i‘tibarun for wa-la bi-'l-jumlati i‘tibaran.
specific to it. That which is not specific to it is [2A] either

sensible, [something] by which the senses are affected; it
is due to the influence of the mixtures that [such qualities]
exist. Among them, [2Ai] those which are firmly established,
such as the yellowness of gold and the sweetness of honey,
are called the passive qualities (kayfiyyat infi‘dliyyat). [2Aii]
And those that pass away quickly, though they are qualities
in reality, are not called qualities, but affects (infi‘alat). [They
are so called] because they are substituted [by other qualities]
quickly. [Examples of affects are] blushing due to
embarrassment and yellowness due to fear. [2B. Or] among
them are those that are not sensible. And these are [2Bi]
either predispositions,““* which are only imagined in the soul
in relation to perfections* [for which they are predispositions].
[2Bia] If it is a predisposition for [some kind of] resistance and
rejection of influences (infi‘al), it is called a natural faculty
(quwwa tabi‘iyya). [Examples are] salubriousness and firmness.
[2Bib] If it is a predisposition towards quick submission and
reception of influence, it is called a natural non-faculty.°™
[Examples are] sickliness and softness. [2Bii] Or they are in
themselves perfections [and] are not imagined as predis-
positions for other perfections. In addition to this, they are
non-sensible in themselves. [2Biia] Among these, those that
are firmly established are called habitus (malaka), such as
knowledge and health. [2Biib] And that which passes away
quickly is call a state (hal), such as the anger of the mild-
tempered and the sickness of the healthy. There is a difference
between health and a disposition towards health because one
who has such a disposition may not be healthy and one who
is sickly may be healthy.
ix. Among the totality of the ten [categories] is [also] place

(ayn). It is the being of a substance in the location in which it
is, like Zayd’s being in the market.
x. ‘When’ (mata)[, another category,] is the being of a

substance in the time in which it is, such as this thing’s being
yesterday.
xi. [Another one is] position. It is a body’s being such that

some of its parts have a relation with some others, a relation
of inclination and parallelism with reference to directions and
the parts of location, if it is in a location. [Examples are]
standing and sitting. These two senses are different from the
[concept of] position mentioned in the section on quantity.
xii. [Another category is] possession (mulk), [a concept] I do

not understand." It seems that it is the being of a substance
in another substance, which includes it[, and that the former
substance] moves with the movement [of the latter]. [Examples
are] being clothed and being armed.°*™"
xiii. Action (fi) [is another category]. It is the relation of a

substance to something that exists due to it, but which does
not have a firmly [existing] essence. Rather, it continues to
wax and wane. [Examples are] the acts of heating and
cooling.
xiv. [Finally, another category is] passion (infi‘al). It is the

relation of a substance to a state which [exists] in it [as a
state]. [Examples are the state of] being cut and being
heated.
143. [On the Mutual Participation of Definition

and Demonstration’*’]*”
i. Just as we do not seek the cause [for a thing by asking the
question] ‘why’ except after the question ‘whether’ [has been
answered], so we do not seek the reality [of a thing by asking
the question] ‘what’ except after [that same former question
has been answered]. Each one of these two questions [i.e. why
and what] has an answer, but the real response to [the
question] ‘why’ is the one that offers the essential cause [of a
thing]. In addition, the essential cause is constitutive of a
thing and is therefore included in [its] definition and in the
response to [the question] ‘What is it?’ Thus, the contents of
the two answers correspond.
ii. An example of this is: Why does the moon eclipse? [To this]
we say, ‘Because the earth has come to be between it and the
sun, so that its light disappears.’ [This is like] our saying,
‘What is the eclipse of the moon?’ [to which] we say, ‘It is the
disappearance of the light of the moon due to the earth
coming between [it and the sun].’ However, when one is
investigating [the matter], this perfect definition of the
eclipse [does not occur as] a single term in a demonstration.
In other words, it is not one part of a premise in the
demonstration, but two parts. So of these two, in the
demonstration, that which is predicated of the subject first,
i.e. the middle term, is predicated second in the definition.
And that which is predicated second in the demonstration [,
i.e. the major term,] is predicated first in the definition. For
in a demonstration you say, ‘The earth has come to be
between the moon and the sun; the light of everything that is
illuminated by the sun disappears [when] the earth comes to
57. Reading with D, Ha, T: fi musharakati ‘l-haddi wa- ’l-burhan.

be between them; so it yields the conclusion that the light of

the moon disappears.’ Then we say, ‘That whose light
disappears is eclipsed; so the moon is eclipsed.’ So first the
fact of being placed in the middle is predicated and then the
disappearance [of the light]. [But] in a perfect definition, the
disappearance [of the light] is mentioned first and then the
fact of being placed in the middle. For you say that the eclipse
of the moon is the disappearance of its light due to the earth’s
coming between [it and the sun].
iii. If you made each one, [i.e.] the earth’s being placed in the
middle and the disappearance of the light, as definition[s
contributing to] the definition [of an eclipse] and it turned
out that [this larger definition] is capable of distinguishing
[an eclipse from other phenomena,] then [you have supplied]
some definition. If it is not a perfect [definition,] that [part]
which is the middle term in the syllogism is called ‘a definition
that is the principle of a demonstration.’ Other [examples are
found] in our statements, such as, ‘Thunder is the sound of
the surfacing of fire in the clouds’ or ‘Anger is the desire for
revenge’. And of these two, that which is the major term is
called ‘a definition which is the conclusion of a demonstration’.
[Examples are] our statements, ‘An eclipse is the disappearance
of the light of the moon’ and ‘Anger is the boiling of the
heart’s blood’. [These two separate definitions] correspond
only when one part of the perfect definition is a cause for the
other part. [However,] if it is limited to the cause, such as the
earth’s being in the middle, the definition is called ‘the
principle of a demonstration’. And if it is limited to the effect,
such as the disappearance [of the light], the definition is
called ‘the conclusion of a demonstration’. The perfect
definition [includes] both of them, along with the genus.
144. [On the Various Meanings of Definition®*]"”

i. Definition refers to five things equivocally (bi-’t-tashkik):
ii, Among them is [1] the definition that explains the meaning
of a noun. [In this case,] the existence of a thing is not taken
into account. If the existence of the thing is not obvious, the
definition is taken primarily as an explanation of the noun.
[An example is] the definition of an equilateral triangle‘ at
the beginning of Euclid’s book. If a thing in fact exists, then
it is known that the definition is not merely with reference to
a noun.
iii. [A definition] is so called [also] insofar as it refers to the

essence [of a thing]. [This can be in three ways: a definition
that is] [2] the conclusion of a demonstration, and [3] the
principle of a demonstration, and [4] a perfect definition
comprising these two.
iv. [Finally,] it can be [5] a definition of things that either have

no causes or whose causes are not external‘ to their
substance. [Examples are] the definitions of point, unity, limit
(hadd), and that which resembles these. For their definitions
are not given just with reference to a noun or a principle or
conclusion of a demonstration or something compounded of
these last two.
58. Reading with Q: fi aqsami ma‘na ’1-hadd.

AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE: LOGIC eee:
145. [On the Four [Causes] and Their Occurrence

as Middle Terms in Demonstrations®’]®”
i. Cause refers to [1] the agent and the principle of movement,
such as the carpenter for the chair and the father for the child.
It also refers to [2] matter and that which a thing needs in order
to be until it receives it essence, such as wood and menstrual
blood. It also refers to [3] the form of every [generated®]*°
thing. For the thing will not exist for as long as the form
remains unattached to the matter. It may also refer to [4] the
end and the thing towards which [another thing tends] and for
the sake of which it [exists]. [An example is] shelter [for the
sake of which] the house [exists]. And each one of these is
either a proximate [cause], such as putrefaction is for fever, or
a distant [one], such as the obstruction [of the pores is for the
same effect]. [Also, these causes are] either potential or actual;
specific, such as the act of building is for a house; or general,
as its builder. [They may also] either be essential, such as
scammony, [from the point of view that it] heats by its very
nature, or accidental, such as scammony, [from the point of
view that it] cools, as it [meanwhile] removes the heated
[material from the body. Likewise is the case when] the
drinking of cold water generates heat because it collects
together that which is heated.
ii. In demonstrations, it is necessary to supply only the cause

that is essential, specific, proximate and actual so that the
question ‘why’ may be answered in an absolute fashion.
Otherwise, its being [a] distant [cause] is obvious.
59. Reading with D margin: fi 7-‘ilali ‘l-arba‘* wa-tawassutiha ft 'I-barahin.

60. Reading with D, T: li-sirati kulli shay’in mukawwanin for li-’s-sirati min
kulli shay’in an yakina.
iii. The four causes may occur as middle terms in demons-

trations to yield propositions whose predicates are essential
accidents.
iv. It is not necessary that, when the efficient and receptive

(qabiliyya) causes are posited, the effect and its affirmation
should also be posited. [This is not the case] for as long as that
which indicates their becoming actual causes does not [also]
attach to [them]. [An example is] the attachment of the
influence of the effect of the natural heat in bodies on opium
to the potential for cooling that exists in it. [It is only once
this attachment is at hand that] it necessitates cooling due to
its potential. We find similar [things] as regards many
mater|ial causes]. However, the attachment of the matters of
many of the natural things to their agents [does] necessitate
the existence of the effect. In fact, this is [the case] with all
of them. [Indeed] the matters of most that must exist for the
[agent™]®° [to act on] do not exist naturally unless the agent
[itself] exists. [An example is] the sperm of man. [In this case,]
it is as if there were no difference between the two types [of
causes].
v. This necessity [of the occurrence of the effect] does not

preclude its being for the sake of some end, as we will explain
in the [discussion of the] sciences. And so using the end in
their demonstrations is not precluded. In the demonstrations
of those non-natural generated things that are not like
[natural things], nothing precludes one from using the end;
in fact, it must be [used]. Since the effect is necessitated only
by the coming together of the agent and the patient, for as
long as they do not come together, one of them [alone] is not
sufficient as a middle term. [An example is,] ‘Why are the
61. Reading with Ha: yajibu an yijada li-'-k@’ini illa wa-yajadu 1-ka’in.
teeth that grind wide?’ We say, ‘Because the matter was fully
prepared for [receiving] that agent whose potentiality had
been perfected when the two had came together.’ We also say,
‘Molars are meant for grinding and everything which is
intended for grinding is wide.’
vi. As for the material form (stra maddiyya), well no condition

needs [to be fulfilled] when including it as a middle term.
The end [for the sake of which something occurs] usually
supplies [the answer to the question] ‘why’ only and not [also
to the question] ‘if’.
vii. [Indeed] more than one cause may come together in a

thing, even all four. And some things may have some causes
and not some others. For this reason no material cause (‘lla
mdddiyya) is included in the definitions or demonstrations of
sciences that concern quantity.
viii. We have already spoken about causes and their inclusion

in demonstrations. As for their inclusion in definitions, well
we have clarified that essential causes are constitutive and if
a thing has a cause that is equal to it or more general and is
[also] essential, its inclusion [in the definition] is obvious.
ix. As for causes that are more particular than a thing—such

as the causes of fever like putrefaction, the violent movement
of the spirit, or flaring up due to reasons other than
putrefaction, and of sound, [such as] the surfacing of fire [in
the clouds], the breaking of a bottle, the knocking of a stick,
and similar things—well there is nothing among these [causes]
that is included in the definition, though it may be included
in the demonstration. As for [what is in fact included in the
definition], well something that would join [the various
causes,] if such a thing exists, is sought. [An example would

be some kind of] knocking on a par with all [the causes of
sounds]. This would be the cause that is included in the
definitions. As far as the particular causes are concerned, well
they are for the definitions of the species of a thing, such as
the surfacing of fire as a definition of thunder, not of sound
in an absolute way.
x. A thing may be defined with reference to all its four causes

if it has them and if they are essential. [An example is of] one
who defines the adz as an iron tool [used] in a discipline,
having such and such a shape, so that one may carve wood
with it. So the instrument is a genus, the discipline indicates
the originating agent, the shape [indicates] the form, carving
[indicates] the end, and iron [indicates] the matter. These
matters [require] a long discussion, which is not suitable in
abridged works.
146. [On Guarding Against Belief in Absurd

Circularit[ies That Arise] Out of Natural
Sequential Arrangement[s]?]°"
i. Among created things, there are some that are causes of
others in a circular [fashion]. So those syllogisms that are
[constructed] from them are [also] circular. [An example is
what follows from the question:] why are there clouds? It is
said, ‘Because there was vapour.’ So it is said, ‘Why was there
vapour?’ It is said, ‘Because the earth was moist and it was
heated.’ So it is said, ‘Why was the earth moist?’ It is said,
‘Because there was rain.’ So it is said, ‘Why was there rain?’
It is said, ‘Because there were clouds.’ This [line of argument]
a I OE a eR NER eae ae
62. Reading with Q: fi dafi tawahhumi ’d-dawri I-muhali min tarattubin fi’'t-tabi
‘iyyati yuhimu dhdlika.
yields the conclusion that there were clouds [because there

were clouds.®]®? Among its middle [terms is the statement]
that there were clouds, though there were other middle
[terms as well].
ii. In a circular demonstration there is no difference between,

[on the one hand,] there being a redundant term, without
there existing anything linking its two repetitive occurrences,
[and on the other,] there being a redundant term, with middle
[terms] linking its two occurrences. However, the example
that we mentioned above is not circular in reality because the
clouds that exist as the major term and those that exist as the
middle term are essentially and numerically [not]*” one and
the same; rather, they are [one and the same only] as regards
their species. And this is not something that makes a syllogism
circular because the circular is that [in which] a thing is taken
up in its very explanation. [A demonstration is not circular
when] that which is the equivalent [of a thing] with respect
to its species, i.e. something other than it as regards its
[individual] essence, is taken up in its explanation.
147. [On the Mode of the Inclusion of Specific

Causes in Demonstration[s]*]®°
i. [Instances of] causes that are more particular [than the
effect®]®° and are middle terms in demonstration [are
exemplified in the following:] the existence of clouds due to
the condensation of the air because of the cold and due to the
coagulation of vapor; [the existence of] earthquakes due to
the occurrence of winds or the crushing of the heights [down
into] a deep ditch or the bursting forth of a flood under the
63. Reading with Q: li-annahu kana sahab.
64. Reading with Q: akhass mina ’l-ma‘lal for akhass.
65. Reading with Q: fi kayfiyyati dukhali 1-‘ilali ’l-khassati fi l-burhan.
earth; of thunder due to the wind and the surfacing of igneous

fumes; and of fever due to putrefaction and due to the heat
of the spirit without putrefaction. It may be possible to gather
for these particular causes a general concept that is predicated
of them. For this reason, it would be closer to the effect and
would [then be] a cause that is equal to it. However, it may be
that [such a concept cannot] be brought together, not because,
in this case, the matter would proceed ad infinitum, but
[because] it would <not> come to stop at a general [concept]
that has no intermediary connection with these particular
[causes]. It is known then that it is not possible to find a cause
that is equivalent to the major term.
ii. The particular causes cannot be made middle terms for as

long as there exists nothing between them and the major term
that is more general than them and equivalent to it. [However,
they can be made middle terms] for those subjects of theirs
that are also more particular than the major [term]. But then
they would not be causes for the existence of the major [term]
absolutely, but for its existence for the more particular minor
[term]. For fever in an absolute sense is not the effect of
putrefaction; rather the fever of this [and this] man or tertian
fever is [in fact its effect]. Likewise, species is not the cause
of the existence of the genus in an absolute sense; rather, it
is [the cause] of what is below the species, i.e. an individual
or a species below it.
iii. As long as a general concept exists, if the major is

predicated of the middle terms that are more particular, it [is
so predicated] not primarily, but via the intermediary of this
general [concept]. [An example is:] the leaves of this tree,
which is a fig, fall out; and [so also for] another, which is a
Palma Christi; [and similarly for] another, which is a
grapevine. The cause for the falling out of their leaves is the
freezing of their moisture or its ebb. But [the leaves] do
[not®]®° primarily [fall out] because of these particular
intermediaries, i.e. fig, Palma Christi, and grapevine; rather,
[they do so] due to their having [wide’’]®° leaves. The fig,
Palma Christi, and grapevine are wide-leaved without any
intermediary [cause]. As for the freezing or ebb in their
moisture, this does not [happen] because they are fig, Palma
Christi, or grapevine, without any intermediary [cause], but
because they are wide-leaved. And their leaves fall out neither
because they are these [particular types of plants] nor because
of the wideness of their leaves, but because of the ebb or
freezing of their moisture.
iv. So it is clear where the middle term, which is the cause, is

interchangeable“ with the major [term, which is] the
effect, and where this cannot happen.
148. [On Knowledge, Intellection (‘aql), Opinion,

Sharpness of Intellect (dhaka’), Intuition
(hads), and the Mode of Grasping the
Problem from These [Means]*]®°
i. Opinion, in the true [sense], is the personal judgment
regarding a thing that it is so and so, while [leaving intact]
the possibility that it may not be so. Knowledge is the
conviction’ that a thing is so and so and that it is not
possible for it not to be so. [Such knowledge exists] [because
of an intermediary that requires [the conviction] that the
66. Reading with Q: laysa.

67. Reading with D, T, and Ha: li-‘arid.
68. Reading with T, and Ha: fi ‘I-‘ilmi wa-'l-‘agli wa-’z-zanni wa-’dh-dhaka’i
wa-'l-hadsi wa-kaffiyyati idraki ’l-matlabi min jihatin hadhihi.
thing is in fact <not> so.]*™ [The appellation ‘knowledge’] may

apply to the conceptualization of the quiddity [of a thing] by
means of giving a definition. Intellection is the conviction that
a thing is so and so because it is not possible for it not to be
so. [This epistemic state exists] by nature and without any
intermediary. [An example is] conviction in [the truth of] the
first principles of demonstrations. [The appellation] may
apply to the conceptualization of the quiddity [of a thing]
through itself, without the [intermediary] process of giving a
definition, such as the conceptualization of the first principles
of definition.
ii. The mind is a capacity of the soul that prepares [it] for
acquiring knowledge.
iii. Sharpness of intellect is a capacity of preparedness that

belongs to intuition. And intuition is a movement towards
correctly hitting upon the middle term when the problem has
been posited. Or [it is a movement towards] correctly hitting
upon the major term when the middle [term] has been
correctly targeted. In sum, [it is] the quick transfer from that
which is known to that which is unknown, as [in the case of]
one who observes the various gradations of the illumination
of the moon during the states it is near and far from the sun
and intuits that it is illuminated by the sun.
iv. Sensation only apprehends individual particulars. Memory

and imagination preserve whatever sensation supplies them
with in accordance with its individuality. As for imagination,
well it preserves the form; and as for memory, well it
preserves the non-formal meaning**™ that is extracted from
it. When sensation repeats itself, memory is generated; and
when the latter repeats itself, experience comes about.
Regarding objects of sensation and experience, we have

already said about them what is sufficient in a discourse such
as this.
v. Intellective thinking (fikr ‘agli) acquires universals insofar

as they are abstracted. Sensation, imagination, and memory
acquire particulars. Thus, neither sensation nor imagination
acquires man as said of the many. For no matter what image
(stra) you present to the imagination (takhayyul) or to human
sensation, it will not be possible for you to include all the
particular individual forms in it. [The reason is that] whatever
is imprinted in the senses and the imagination occurs along
with accidents of quantity, quality, place, and position, none
of which are necessary with respect to humanity; nor are they
equal to it. The universals, assents, and conceptualizations
that exist with respect to [humanity] are not apprehended by
the senses or by the imagination. Nor are its causes
[apprehended] except by intuition or experience. These latter
two aid the intellect. As for conceptualization, sensation
presents mixed objects to the imagination and the imagination
[does the same] for the intellect. Then the intellect
distinguishes among them and abstracts them and takes each
one of the non-sensory forms singly. [It then] arranges in
order the most particular and the most general, the essential
and the accidental. Thus, the primary meanings are imprinted
in the intellect for [the process of] conceptualization. Then
definitions are compounded out of them. As for assent, well
sensation and imagination may aid [it] by means of experience
and intuition; [or they may aid it] through induction.
vi. The difference between induction and experience is known.

[When assent] [seeks the aid of [sensation and imagination]
by way of induction,®]®° [it does so] through proof (ihtijaj) or

alerting." [An example is] the case of one for whom the
particular [examples] of things are presented for the process
of induction. The judgments passed about these things are
obviously true, except that there was some negligence [of
their truth] in the [person’s] soul.°~*' [Induction] may also
aid [assent] by way of exhibiting [its objects,] i.e. it may aid it
by first supplying concepts.“” Then the concepts are joined
to an affirmation or a negation. Thus it becomes apparent to
the intellect that one must assent to such and such a thing in
itself; and the syllogism whereby such and such a thing
acquires assent also becomes apparent. :
149. [On an Explanation of the Ways in Which

Error Occurs in Explanatory
Statements” ]®"
i. As regards definitions, well there are points with respect to
which one must be careful, lest some error**” occur due to
their negligence. Among them [are errors] that occur with
reference to the genus and those that are with reference to
the specific difference. [There are also] those that combine
these two; and such a combination [of errors] applies also to
the deficient definition and description.
ii. Among errors related to the genus, [one type occurs] when
the specific difference [is posited]® in its place. [An example
is] one’s statement that passion is the act of exceeding the
bounds of love, whereas it is only excessive love.
69. Reading with Q: wa-isti‘anatuhu bi-tariqi ’l-istiqra’ for al-istiqra’.

70. Reading with Q: fi bayani wujihi I-ghalati fi ’l-aqwali ’Il-shariha.
iii. Among [such errors, one type occurs] when one posits
matter in place of the genus, as when they say that the chair
is wood on which one sits or that the sword is iron with which
one cuts. In these two, the matter has been taken up in place
of the genus.
iv. Among [such errors, another type occurs] when the matter
is taken up in place of the genus, as in their statement that
ashes are burnt wood.
v. [Likewise is the case] when they take up the part in place

of the genus [in the definition of7']®° the whole. [An example]
is their statement that ten is five plus five. Another example
of this is mentioned in the First Teaching (al-ta‘lim al-awwal),
i.e. their statement that animal is a body endowed with a
soul.“***! [One will have to supply] a penetrating discussion
in investigating this [matter].
vi. [Similarly, the error occurs when] the habitus is posited in

place of a capacity and vice versa. This [often] happens with
respect to genera that are put forth in the parts of definitions,
as in their statement that the chaste is one who is capable of
avoiding appetitive delights; well the licentious is also capable
[of this,] though he does not act [in this fashion]. [Here] a
capacity has been posited in place of a habitus due to the
resemblance [of the two], since a habitus is a [firmly]®
[established] capacity. [Another example is] their saying that
one capable of oppression is such that it is in his manner of
being“ and in his nature to strive towards wresting away
what is not his from someone else’s hand. [Here] the habitus
is posited in place of the capacity because one capable of
71. Reading with Q: fi haddi ’Il-kull for li-’l-kull.

oppression may [in fact] be just and may not oppress, though
his nature is not such.
vii. [Likewise, the error may occur] when you take up a noun
metaphorically or ambiguously, as when one says that
understanding is [being] in harmony and that the soul is a
number.
viii. [Similarly, the error occurs] when the concomitants [of a

thing] are posited in place of the genera, such as ‘one’ and
‘existent’. [And so is also the case] when you posit the species
in place of the genus, as when you say that evil is the
oppression of the people, though oppression is a species of
evil.
ix. As for [the errors that occur] with respect to the specific
difference, well this [entails] your taking the concomitants in
place of those things that are essential and the genus in place
of the specific difference. [They can also occur when] you
consider affects to be specific differences, since when the
former become intense, a thing is <not> destroyed, and when
the latter become intense a thing becomes firm and strong.
[Errors also occur when] you take accidents as the specific
differences of substances; the specific differences of quality
as having nothing to do with quality; and the specific
differences of things related as having nothing to do with that
related thing, [i.e.] not as something that has a relation.
x. As for the shared rules [of error that one must guard
against, well one example] is your gaining knowledge of a
thing by means of something more obscure [than it]. It is like
one’s definition of fire as a body that resembles the soul, while
the soul is [itself] more obscure than fire. [Another example]
is one’s definition of a thing by means of something that is

equally known or whose knowledge is acquired after the
knowledge [of the thing in question]. An example of the
former is their statement that number is the multiplicity of
units (ahad). But number and multiplicity are the same thing.
In this case the thing itself is taken up in its definition.
xi. In this category also falls [the error] of taking the contrary
in the definition of its contrary. [An example is] their
statement that even is a number that is more than the odd by
one. And then they say that odd is a number that falls short
of even by one.
xii. Likewise, [the error occurs when] that which is related is

taken in the definition of that to which it is related. [This is]
what Porphyry does since he thinks that one must take the
genus in the definition of the species and vice versa. He did
not know what error there was in this [position] and what
negligence there was in this opinion of his. [He also did not
know] what alternative there was to being forced into this
[claim]; nor [did he know that,] in understanding the reality
of the definition that he used in a necessary fashion, the
objection of uncertainty that he mentioned was [in fact]
unlikely.
xiii. As for things that are opposites in being negations and

non-existents, well that which is affirmed and that which is a
habitus are taken in their definition, but not vice versa."
xiv. As for the [error] in taking up something that occurs later

in the definition of something [that occurs earlier], well it is
like their saying that the sun is a planet that rises in the
morning. Well it is not possible to define morning except with
reference to the sun because it is the time of the rising of the

sun. Likewise is the well-known definition of quantity—that
it is susceptible to being equal and unequal [to another]—and
of quality—that it is susceptible to being mutually similar [to
another quality] or not similar. This and what resembles this
are among the things that impede one from [correctly
acquiring]® definitions.
150. [On the Statements of the Sophists

(sufista’iyya)’?]*
i. We say that the acts of the sophists either have to do with
syllogisms, where the aim is to derive a conclusion, or they
have to do with things that fall outside the syllogism.
[Examples of the latter are] shaming the opponent, dismissing
him, mocking him, cutting off his speech, [attacking] him
beyond the proper bounds of speech, employing something
that has no [part] in the problem, and similar things, [all of]
which amount to ten. [However,] we need not mention them.
As for [those acts of the sophists] that have to do with
syllogisms whereby the aim is to derive a conclusion, well we
will mention those that produce errors“ in syllogisms.
ii. These things that produce error occur either with respect
to the utterance or the meaning; [and they may also occur]
either in the form of the syllogism or its matter. [In addition,]
they are either errors or sophisms (mughalata).
iii. We know that when the syllogistic statements are arranged

according to one of the figures and when there exist primary
distinct parts, i.e. the terms, and secondary distinct parts, i.e.
72. Reading with RM: fasl fi aqwali ’s-sufista’iyya (sifista’iyya occurs as

sufistaniyya).
the premises, and [when] the mood of the figure is one that
concludes, and the premises are true and other than the
conclusion [itself], and [when they are] better known than
[the conclusion,] then whatever follows from it follows
truly.
iv. Thus that statement from which truth does not follow, i.e.
the sophistical syllogism, is [1] either not arranged according
to one of the forms; or it is not in accordance with one of the
concluding moods; [2] or there are no distinct primary and
secondary parts; [3] or the premises are not true; [4] or they
are nothing other than the problem; [5] or they are not better
known than it.
v. [1] As for the first [scenario,] well it occurs because [1.a]

[the syllogism] is not composed of propositions (qawl jazim);
[1.b] or [because] it [is composed] of only one proposition;
[1.c] or [because] it [is composed of] more than one
proposition, except that these lack the [kind of] compositional
overlap! [required by the syllogism].
vi. [The third case occurs] in two ways: [1.c.i] either the
overlap fails to exist both in reality and overtly or [1.c.ii] it
[fails] to exist in reality, while existing overtly. If the overlap
exists overtly [but not in reality], then there exists an
utterance that is understood with reference to more than one
meaning. And this [multiplicity of meaning] occurs either
insofar as [the utterance] is [1.c.ii.A] simple or [1.c.ii.B]
complex.
vii. When this occurs with reference to a simple [utterance,]

[1.c.ii.A.1] it may be homonymous (lafz mushtarak), i.e. one
that is applied to a number of meanings, none of which is
more deserving of it than another. [An example is the word]

‘ayn, which is applied to a spring of water and to the
instrument of sight and to the dinar. [1.c.ii.A.2] Utterances
that may be called systematically ambiguous (lafz mushakkak)
[also] fall in this [larger category]. They comprehend both a
thing and its opposite, such as jalil [i.e. both advanced in age
and young] and nahil [i.e. someone who has quenched his
thirst and also someone who is harried by it].
viii. [1.c.ii.A.3] Or it may be an [utterance]® by analogy

(mutashabih), which is something that is applied to many
things that have similar forms, but are different in reality.
[However,] one hardly pays attention to their differences, as
[in the case of] [rational]®“, applied to man, the heavens, and
angels. [Another example is] ‘living’, which is applied to god,
man, plants, and everything that grows and has movement in
its substance, [i.e. not due to something external].
ix. [1.c.ii.A.4] Or [it may be] a transferred utterance (lafz

manqul), which is applied to various things with various
senses. But its application to one of them is more ancient.
However, in reality, that which is more recent is referred to
[by this same utterance]. [Examples are] the utterances
munafiq [hypocrite/Hypocrite], fasiq [deviant/sinner], kafir
[one who covers or hides/unbeliever] and the utterances
sawm [abstention/ritual fast] and salat [blessing/ritual
prayer].
x. [1.c.ii.A.5] Or [it may be] a metaphor (lafz musta‘ar), which

is [an utterance] taken up for a thing from some other thing,
without any transfer [of meaning] in language. So it is made
a name for [that thing] in reality, though the [original]
meaning is still intended by [the utterance]. [An example] is

one’s saying that the earth is the mother of men.
xi. [1.c.ii-A.6] Or [it may be] a figurative utterance (lafz majaz)

that is overtly applied to a thing, while that thing to which it
is applied in reality is something other than it. [An example
is] one’s saying, ‘Ask the village,’ i.e. its people.
xii. [1.c.ii.A.1] Sometimes the homonymous utterance occurs

not because the conditions [of homonymy] are shared in its
substance, but [because they are shared] with respect to its
external form and its states.““" [Examples are] the homonymous
utterances [linking the] agent and patient, masculine and
feminine, and similar things. For this reason, some people
with weak opinions think that it is suitable to say that the
prime matter produces an act (taf‘alu fi‘lan ma) because it
receives (qdabilatun) influences, [given that] reception is an
act (fi‘l).
xiii. As for [the errors] that occur with respect to the

complexity [of the utterance], well [1.c.ii.B.1] they may be due
to the fact that connective particles refer [to]’” different
things. [An example] is one’s saying that whatever the wise
man knows, well [it is/he is] just as it/he is known. Here ‘well
it/he’ [, both of which latter set of words can translate huwa,]
is the [grammatical] apposite of ‘whatever’ and ‘wise man’ and
the meaning changes according to it[s reference]. [1.c.ii.B.2]
[Or the error] may occur due to one’s changing the necessary
order [of the complex utterance]. [1.c.ii.B.3] Or it may happen
due to [confusion over] the end and beginning [of an
utterance]. [1.c.ii.B.4] The [error] may also occur due to the
ambiguity of the connective particles themselves and their
indication of a number of meanings with reference to the
connective. Thus, a thing may be true as a whole and thought

to be true insofar as it is divided. [An example is] one’s saying
that five is an even and an odd [number] since it is three and
two. [This [may] lead one to believe that’*]®° five is even and
that it is also odd. The reason for this is the ambiguity of the
indication of ‘and’. For it can indicate the collection of the
parts [of a thing] and also the collection of [its] attributes.
[Likewise,] a thing may be true insofar as it is divided, but not
so as a whole. [An example is] one’s saying that Zayd is a
physician (though he is ignorant of medicine) and Zayd is
skillful (and he is in fact so in sewing). Thus, when it is said
that [Zayd]* is a skillful physician, one believes the error due
to the ambiguity of the state[s,] in accordance with this word
[‘and’, because] skill has a share in medicine and [because
skill] by itself is a description of Zayd.
xiv. [2] As for the second reason, i.e. the lack of distinction in
the parts of a syllogistic statement, well it does not present
itself [in those syllogisms] in which the primary parts [i.e.
terms] are simple, but those in which they are complex
utterances. Then [of this phenomenon] there are two types:
[2.a] either the parts of the predicate and the subject are
distinguished from each insofar as [they are] posited [as such
parts]; but they are not distinguished from each other as far
as the syntax [is concerned]. [2.b] Or [these parts] are not
distinguished from each other insofar as [they are so] posited,
such that there is something that is [part] of the subject, [but]
is taken to be [part] of the predicate [and vice versa]®™. An
example of that which is distinguished insofar as it is posited
[as a subject or a predicate], without any distinction as far as
the syntax [is concerned], is one’s saying, ‘The philosopher is
like whatever he knows/Whatever the philosopher knows is
73. Reading with HJ: fa-yantagilu ’‘l-wahm and with Q: ila anna.
AVICENNA’S DELIVERANCE; LOGIC 145
[in fact] as he knows it;°*" the philosopher knows stones; well,

he is like a stone.’ An example of something that is not
distinguished insofar as it is posited [as a subject or a
predicate] is one’s saying, ‘Man insofar as it is man is either
white or is not white.’ The statement ‘insofar as it is man’ is
ambiguous: is it part of the predicate or of the subject? It is
not unlikely that these sophisms, whose remedy is difficult,
occur due to this and similar things. This sophism may occur
in all modes of ambiguous arrangements.
xv. [3] As for [errors due to] falsities in premises, well it is

undoubtedly the case that when [one’s] nature grants [the
claim] of a false [statement], it does so only due to some
reason and because [the falsity] has a relation to the truth in
[certain] cases. (Anyone who comes to the point of granting
the truth of anything whatsoever without any reason has been
excised of human nature.) And this reason lies [3.a] either in
the utterance or [3.b] in the meaning.
xvi. [3.a] The [reason] that has to do with the utterance is

apparent from what we will mention. [A case, for example,
would involve] an utterance that has two meanings, both of
which are considered equal to each other in every judgment
[that is passed]. [Another example is that of] two utterances
that have the [same] meaning, but which are different from
each other with respect to a meaning that is allowed for [one
of these two] utterances, [but not for the other]. When things
are so, one is made to believe that the judgment involving the
two utterances is one [and the same]. However, sometimes
one of the two utterances has an additional meaning due to
which the judgment [changes]*“. An example of this is wine
and choice wine. For these two nouns share a single meaning,
but choice wine has an additional meaning.
xvii. [3.b] As for [the reason for conceding a lie] that has to
do with the meaning, well the false [statement] must [3.b.i]
either be a lie in toto, i.e. neither in any state nor at any time
is any predication involving it, applied to any of its subjects,
true. [3.b.ii] Or [the statement] is a lie with respect to a part,
i.e. the predication involving it is true for some of its subject
or at some time or in some state. If it is a lie in toto, it must
share something with the true [statement] as far as their
meaning is concerned. This meaning may be a genus, a
specific difference, or an overlap with respect to an accident
or with respect to the equivalence of relation. You know that
[the truth and the falsehood] may generally intersect with
reference to that which is equivalent to the genus and the
specific difference. For that which is shared [by them] may be
an accidental that is universall|ly applied] to both the subjects;
[or] it may be universal for one of them and [applied to] some
of the other; [or] it may be [applied to] some of both of them.
That which is not true with respect to the whole is [true] for
some of the subject only; or [it is true] for each one of the
subject, but only at some time and not at some others; or [it
is true] at all times, but conditionally, not absolutely; [or [it
is true] absolutely]™, except in a [certain] condition. This
condition is either compounded with the statement or not. If
it is not so compounded, it is either singled out or not. And if
it is also an accidental for part of the subject, it is either
natural or coincidental. All this takes place to generate belief
in the converse [of the truth]. For if it so happened that one
saw a yellow liquid that was bitter, i.e. [like] bile, and then
happened to see some other yellow liquid, he would think that
it was bitter, though it might [in fact] be sweet, like honey.
The reason for this is that when [this person] found bile, he
thought that all yellow liquids are bile, since bile is a yellow
liquid.
xviii. [4] As for [the reason for conceding a lie] that has to do
with the fact that the premises are nothing other than the
conclusion, well it concerns a proof that pre-posits the first
problem in a straightforward [syllogism] and pre-posits the
contradiction of the conclusion in the [syllogisms that
conclude by way of an] absurdity. But this has already been
pointed out in what has preceded.
xix. [5] As for [the reason for conceding a lie] that has to do
with the fact that the premises are not better known than the
conclusion, well the [sophist employs] things [5.a] that are as
known or as unknown as the conclusion; [5.b] [or he employs]
things that are known after [the conclusion]. [The method in
use] is that of the circular syllogism. This has already been
pointed out in what has preceded.
xx. From all this, it is gathered that all the reasons for
sophisms in syllogisms [reduce] either to those that have to
do with the utterance or those that have to do with the
meaning. Those that have to do with the utterance [comprise]
homonymy as regards the substance of the simple utterance;
or as regards its external form and figure; or homonymy that
occurs with respect to a complex, not a simple utterance.
[Such sophism may also occur] due to an [utterance] that is
true as a compound, but has been split [into parts], so that
[these parts are] considered true; or [it occurs] due to [an
utterance] that is true insofar as it is split, but has been
compounded, so that it is considered true [as a whole]. As for
[sophisms] that have to do with the meaning, well they are
either due to that which is accidental or because one does not
properly consider the conditions of [truth”]®> when
predicating; or [due to] the [absence of]*“ a connection
74, Reading with Q: shuriti ’s-sidg for shuriti ’n-naqid.

[between the major and minor terms]; or because one is made

to believe the converse of the concomitants; or because of the
pre-position of the [first]* problem; or due to one’s taking up
something that is not a cause as a cause; or because of the
joining together of the [various] problems [related to the
subject matter] into one problem, so that they are not specific
to a single and exact problem.
xxi. We have been brief with you about the science of logic to
this extent. We have informed you of the method that will
incline [you] towards what is correct, i.e. the demonstrative
syllogism, the true definition, and the method of guarding
against error. [The last] comprises the points (about which we
have informed you) at which one may be led to error as
regards syllogisms and definitions. We will not elaborate [on
logic further] by mentioning things beyond these two
concerns, though there is definitely benefit [in this]. [For one
can speak, for example,] about points related to dialectics, its
instruments and usage, about rhetorical syllogisms, their
matters and objectives. If you are interested in finding out
about these [things], then seek them in our book called The
Cure. The logic [section] of the Book of Deliverance is
concluded.
Notes
. Conceptualization and assenting can both occur in a primary and

secondary fashion. Thus, the awareness of the concept of unity
is primary and of the quiddity of man secondary, though both
are conceptualizations. The latter type requires the process of
deriving definitions. The awareness that the whole is greater
than its part is primary and that God exists is secondary, though
both involve the subject’s assent to a judgment. The latter type
of knowledge requires a syllogism. Here ma’rifa refers to a
primary sort of awareness (a direct gnosis of facts) and ‘ilm to a
derivative scientific knowledge (epistémé).
. al-‘ilm al-awwal. Conceptualization certainly precedes assent
epistemologically, but it can also be the product of a primary
awareness that precedes the scientific definition. Here Avicenna
seems to be referring to the former sense of al-‘ilm al-awwal.
ili. ma‘a.
iv. yuzannu.
. az-zahiriyyin mina ’l-mantigqiyyin.
vi. The text reads, fa-dhdalika ’sh-shay’, i.e. referring to the signified,
not the signifier. So, sticking with the text, the point is to be
understood to mean that if we ask, ‘What is it?’ of a man and if
there were a word, ‘man’ comprising all the essential character-
istics of man, then that thing, man, and not that signifier, ‘man’,
will be said in response. But objects do not signify themselves.
Vii. al-alfaz al-khamsa: the five predicables, hai pente phonai.
viii. In other words, it responds to the question about the shared
essential nature of a thing. ;
. The heavenly bodies also have souls.
. al-irtiga’.
x: al-inhitat.
xii. yursamu.
xiii. lam yu‘lam ayyu shay’in huwa.
xiv. The point is that when one is asked, ‘Which non-essential feature
distinguishes this genus, namely, this figure, from others?’ one
responds by pointing out the accident of the sum of its angles
150 NOTES
equaling 180 degrees. This accident specifies the triangle not just
as a specific type of figure, but, insofar as all triangles have this
same property, it also singles it out as a genus.
XV. li-kulli wahidin mina ’n-naw‘.
Xvi. gasim al-jawhar. It seems that the point is that an entity may be
recognized in itself as a substance, regardless of whether its
existence is necessary or accidental. In both cases, accidents may
come to inhere in it, but will do so in different ways. The three
concepts under consideration are: accident (that which inheres),
accidental (that whose occurrence is non-essential), and
substance (that in which the accident inheres).
. mina 1-azminati ’th-thalatha.
Xviii. In other words, the relationship is established between two
propositions, which can be separated with its dissolution.
xix. fassalta
. an-nisba al-wujidiyya. In other words, it states that A exists for
B.
XXxi. jami‘un li-I-basar.
xxii. i.e. affirmation and negation.
xxiii. irtafa‘a.
XXiv. In other words, it is said that possibility statements relate only
to the future and that the judgment regarding their truth or
falsity applies only then.
XXV. The point, as Avicenna immediately explains, is that one cannot
predicate affirmatively of a non-existent subject. When
ambiguous statements try to convey the same information
affirmatively as their negative counterparts, one may end up
dealing with a significans as a subject term that has no significatus.
More specifically, this poses a problem in an affirmation when
the predicate term is ambiguous and the subject term is non-
existent.
XXVi. zaydun huwa 1d basirun.
XXVii. zaydun laysa huwa basiran.
XXViii. i.e. ‘not-impossible’ can be taken to mean ‘possible’. Thus, ‘It is
not impossible for it to be’ means ‘It is possible for it to be’.
Xxix. Here is the problem Avicenna is describing (P1 = common-
possible; P2 = special-possible/contingent; N = Necessarily (p or
not-p); I = impossible; n = necessary): not-P1p = Ip; not-P1p > not-
np; np > P2p (though in fact n is subsumed under P1); but P2p >
not-Ip & not-np (or not-Np); so np > not-P1p (though it is in fact
not-P2p). This has led to the contradiction P1p > not-Pip. Or np
NOTES 151
= not-P2p; not-P2p = Ip (though it is in fact not-P1p = Ip); so np =

Ip; Ip = nnot-p. This has led to the contradiction: np = nnot-p.
‘adamihi.
XXXi. In other words, if one understands ‘possible’ to mean ‘contingent’
or ‘neither necessary nor impossible’, then ‘not possible’ would
mean ‘either necessary or impossible’. This, in turn, would mean
that what is not possible may in fact be necessary.
XXXxil. Avicenna means to say that if these logicians take possibility in
the common sense, they must be consistent. For to say that ‘not
possible’ implies ‘impossible’ means also to commit oneself to
the position that ‘possible’ implies ‘not-impossible’. This would
allow necessity to be subsumed under possibility and would rule
out a contingency reading.
Xxxili. Again, such a reading rules out contingency as a negation of
Necessity, which we are employing (with the capital ‘N’) to refer
to the necessity of affirmation and negation.
XXXivV. The expression here is dariri, which we usually translate as
‘Necessary’, but here it must be understood as wajib, i.e.
‘necessary’.
XXXV. In other words, if a possible thing cannot exist now because its
present existence would imply a necessity of said existence, then
it cannot fail to exist now either, because its present non-
existence would also imply a necessity of said non-existence.
XXXVi. wajib al-‘adam seems redundant.
XXXVIi. mawjid al-la-kawn. The expression refers to the negative
existential status of a being.
XXXViii. If the possibility of existence is equivalent to the possibility of
non-existence, then they would imply identical results and
conditions. fa-mumkinu ‘I-kawni yajibu an 1a yakina...mawjida ‘1-la-
kawn.
XXXix. In other words, whatever we say of the Necessary will apply
equally to the necessary and the Impossible.
xl. da’iman lam yazal wa-la yazalu.
xli. In the four conditioned propositions, the predicate is to be read
as, e.g., ‘necessarily-splits the air-for as long as it is white’. The
mode and condition are part of the predicate.
xlii. Avicenna’s point is that a real Necessity premise (perhaps not
necessarily a Necessity proposition) is one in which the mode
applies to the copula, not to the predicate. This certainly does
not explain Avicenna’s modal system, for it must also allow for
qualified necessities of the type discussed above. In paragraphs
152 NOTES
viii and ix Avicenna is making the following points: (1) if the

proposition is not conditioned by either of the last four types of
necessities, we call it absolute (mutlagq). (2) If it is so conditioned,
the predicate has a mode and the qualification as a part of it.
Thus, in ‘Man is necessarily walking for as long as he is walking’,
the predicate is ‘necessarily walking for as long as he is walking’.
Thus the predicate has a mode, itself qualified, as extra elements.
(3) In the Necessity premise, the mode is external to the
predicate, applying rather to the copula. Zawa’id, as a technical
term of logic, refers to the non-essential parts of a proposition,
i.e. the quantifiers and modes. Thus they are elements of a
proposition. However, here they are included among things that
are predicated. This is very likely a non-technical sense of the
word, so that the translation ‘extra elements’, as opposed to
‘non-essential parts’ is more suitable.
xliii. Avicenna’s terminology is somewhat loose here, though one can
we
fish for some order: generally, the third and sixth forms of ‘-K-S
should be translated as equipollence, though, in paragraph iv,
the seventh form seems to mean the same. Likewise, the sixth
form of L-Z-M also generally means equipollence (though I
translate it here as equivalent to set it apart from ta‘akus). But
other forms of L-Z-M may also refer loosely to equipollence.
xliv. mumkin bi-’l-ma‘na ’l-‘amm. Henceforth, the mumkin ‘ammi is
designated as ‘possible’ and the mumkin khassi as ‘contingent’.
xlv. yan‘akisu.
xlvi. The negation here does not appear in D, Ha, T, RM, Q1, and Q2.
According to these readings, one must translate, ‘Their
contradictories are equipollent.’ This is problematic, for
equipollence is an important tool in syllogistics and any
ambiguity regarding them can lead to serious interpretive
discrepancies. It is entirely conceivable that Avicenna does allow
for the equipollence of the contradictories of contingent
propositions. For ‘It is not contingent that A is B’ is equivalent
to (1) ‘It is necessary that A is B’ or (2) ‘It is impossible that A is
B’ and ‘It is not contingent that A is not B’ is equivalent to (3) ‘It
is necessary that A is not B’ or (4) ‘It is impossible that A is not
B’. The pairs (1) and (4) are equipollent as are (2) and (3). But I
doubt Avicenna would endorse this.
xl vii. In other words, these propositions do convert, but not both ways,
i.e. not as equipollents.
xlviii. This should probably be Necessary, i.e. dariiri, not wajib.
NOTES 153
xlix. E.g. ‘It is not contingent that A is not-B’ and ‘It is not contingent
that A is B’.
gad yuridu.
li. ‘iddatun mina ’l-muhassilina mina ’l-muta’akhkhirin.
lii. al-hukm bi-’l-mahmial.
liii. i.e., not by Necessity of the first two types, but conditioned
Necessity.
liv. In other words, though one may say that some men are
necessarily writing because they are always writing, this
perpetual affirmation of writing does not produce necessity.
Rather, it is the accidental fact of their writing that obliges one
to say that they are necessarily writing. In other words, the
necessity is due to an accidental, but perpetual, fact, not due to
the nature of the subject. And this is how particular necessities
must always be understood.
lv. The sense is somewhat vague. ‘Necessarily not-p’ implies
‘Impossible p’. The specialist reading would allow the implication
of ‘not-Contingent p’, but the common reading would allow
‘Possible not-p’. Under a common reading then, if one confuses
‘Necessarily not-p’ with ‘not-Necessary p’, then the latter
certainly follows from ‘Possible not-p’. The mistake is twofold:
(1) reading ‘not-Necessary p’ for ‘Necessarily not-p’ and (2)
understanding mumkin as the common-possible. But this is a very
roundabout elaboration of what Avicenna seems to be saying.
The following simpler interpretation would force us to
acknowledge that, in this paragraph, Avicenna is using the
expression dariri in a loose sense, i.e. as wajib. We can then say
that ‘It is not necessary’ implies ‘It is possible that not-’, which
is compatible with ‘It is impossible that’, which, in turn, is
equivalent to, ‘It is necessary that not-’.
lvi. In other words, ‘It is not contingent’ yields the disjunction, ‘It is
necessary that or it is necessary that not-’. But, ‘It is not possible’
only yields, ‘It is impossible’, which, in turn, means, ‘It is
necessary that not’.
lvii. The proof above required an e-conversion, which works with a
limiting set of conditions.
lviii.wa-huwa dakhilun fi-’l-asli ’l-awwal.
lix. In other words, if the converse of a universal affirmative
Necessity proposition is a particular affirmative absolute, then
the converse of the latter, as already explained, must be a
particular affirmative. Thus, we would end up with a proposition
154 NOTES
like, ‘Some B is A’ when we originally had ‘By Necessity, all B

is A’.
Ix. Though the technical term used here is mumkinat, which does
not specify whether the focus is contingency or possibility, the
details that follow make it sufficiently clear that the former is
the topic of discussion. Avicenna is generally careless in using
the expression imkan in the following paragraphs, as he does not
specify whether one is dealing with the common or specialist
sense of the word. The context allows one to determine this.
lxi. This claim will be denied immediately here and in the next
paragraph. Here Avicenna is speaking in the voice of those who
hold incorrect opinions.
lxii. That is, if it is not contingent for some As to be Bs, then the
relation between at least some As and Bs is of a Necessity type.
This means that all or some As may have either an affirmative
or negative Necessity relation with Bs.
xiii. This is so because the negation of possibility entails impossibility.
Thus, if it not possible for some A to be B, then it is impossible
for any A to be B. This means that by necessity no A is B. So it
must be understood according to the interpretation of the
common-possible, for which the negation of possibility entails
impossibility.
Ixiv. idtiraran.
. laziman.
Ixvi. If one grants the validity of the premises and the figure of the
syllogism, one must also grant the validity of the conclusion.
Ixvii. luzim ma yalzamu ‘anhu.
Ixviii. ma yalzamuhu.
Ixix. bi-7-fi'l.
hex i.e. not stated among the premises of the syllogism.
Ixxi. at-tarafayni wa-’r-ra’sayn.
Ixxii. qiyas wa-sulijismas.
Ixxili. qadim.
Ixxiv. fasl, i.e. a section, cross-section, interval.
Ixxv. In other words, one premise is affirmative and the other
negative.
Ixxvi.
In other words, it converts from a universal negative to a
universal negative. The condition mentioned here, i.e. a
Necessity that is not temporally specific, is discussed in 55.
xxvii. An ad impossibile proof would require the contradiction of
‘Necessarily, someJ is not A’, which is ‘Possibly, everyJis A’. But
NOTES 155
the latter is possibility, not contingency, since the negation of

contingency can imply both a necessity and an impossibility. As
Avicenna has not yet explored the mixture of possibility and
Necessity premises, an ad impossibile proof cannot be used here.
Likewise, ekthésis cannot be used here because the conversion of
a Necessity particular affirmative proposition will then have to
be considered. And, as Avicenna explained above, these need not
always be Necessity propositions. Thus, one would again end up
with a mixed syllogism. If one were to pull out Ds such that
‘Every D is J’ and ‘Necessarily, no D is B’ one would still end up
considering the mixed syllogism, ‘SomeJ is D’ and ‘Necessarily,
No D is A’. See the next section.
xxviii. Here is Avicenna’s point: Premise 1: ‘Necessarily, not everyJ is
B’; ekthésis: ‘Every D is J’, ‘Necessarily, no D is B’. Premise 2:
‘Necessarily, every A is B’; ‘Necessarily, no B is D’ (conversion),
‘Necessarily, no A is D’; ‘Necessarily, no D is A’ (conversion),
‘Some J is D’ (conversion). We have ended up with a mixed
syllogism in Ferio.
lxxix. I do not follow this argument. It appears that ‘J is always A-for
_as long as it is B’ should be the proper conclusion. I am also
unclear about the conditions under which the perpetuity of the
application of B to J is being claimed.
xxx. az-zahir.
Ixxxi. ie. in quantity and quality.
Ixxxii. tabi‘atay jim wa-alif khilafa dhatiyyin.
Ixxxiii. The Necessity and essential relation between J and B, for
example, will exclude the relation ofJand A in the same manner.
But I do not see how this claim will be valid with the following
terms: ‘Absolutely, Every man is walking’, ‘Necessarily, nothing
sitting is walking’, so ‘Necessarily, nothing sitting is a man’,
which is false.
Ixxxiv. The proof: 1. ‘Necessarily, every B is J’. 2. ‘Every B is A’. 3. ‘Some
A is B’ (conversion of 2). 4. ‘Necessarily, some A is J’ (Darii). Now
the conversion of this Necessity particular affirmative is what
Avicenna questions. Earlier, in the section on the conversion of
Necessity propositions, he had said that, though one can get a
Necessity converse in such cases, it is a kind of Necessity that
applies to everything possible, e.g., ‘Necessarily, some men are
writers, as long as they are writers’.
Ixxxv. Example: 1. Necessarily, JeA. 2. BaA. 3. AiB (conversion of 2). 4.
Necessarily, JoB. But the conclusion would not have Necessity if
156 NOTES
the minor is a Necessity, as explained in the mixture of Absolutes

and Necessities above.
Ixxxvi. fihalin. All manuscripts except Q have the following at this point:
‘{But] it is said that this is a manuscript error’. Which manuscript
is being referred to is not clear.
Ixxxvii. Avicenna says some things in this proof that can only be granted
as a concession to his earlier claim at the close of the section on
the mixture between Absolutes and Necessities in the first figure,
namely, that an Absolute Major, when read as a descriptive
Necessity, will yield a Necessity. Even so, the conclusion will be
a Necessity only if we grant the perpetual application of the
middle term to the minor term. But for the proof in the current
section, one need not fall back on these claims as Avicenna
seems to. Proof: 1. Necessarily, AoB. 2. JaB ekthésis: 3. Necessarily,
AeD and 4. (Necessarily) DiB (this need not be a Necessity and,
moreover, does not serve any function in deriving a Necessity
with 2). 5. JaB 6. (Necessarily) JiD (same point as last). 7. DiJ 8.
Necessarily, AeD. 9. Necessarily, AoJ.
Ixxxviii. The expression used here is mumkin, so that it is unclear whether
Avicenna is discussing possibility or contingency. The contents
of the section make it clear that contingency is under
consideration.
Ixxxix. The first figure composed of assertoric premises must have an
affirmative Minor. Here one is allowed to have a negative
contingency Minor since this can convert to an affirmative
contingency Major. But, as Avicenna explains above, such a
premise must be a universal.
XC. Q 1 and 2 in Danishpazih’s apparatus omit fa-yakan...khulf and in
its place have: fa-naqilu ba‘du jimin alifun bi-’d-darirati wa-kullu

jimin ba’un bi-'l-wujadi ’n-nashi min al-fardi '1-jd’izi fa-yuntiju ba‘du
ba’in alifun bi-’d-dararati hadha khulfun. This typical elaboration
of Q translates as: we say, ‘By Necessity, someJ is A’ and ‘Every
J is B’ due to an existence that proceeds from a permitted sup-
position (fard). Thus, ‘By Necessity, some B is A.’ This is absurd.
XC Thus are the absolutes construed according to the first
opinion.
xcii. fa-inna nagida tilka ’n-natijati laysa bi-mumkinin ‘ammiyyin hatta
yalzamahu bi-’d-darirati la.
Xciil. Avicenna gives a reductio proof to establish that an absurdity
occurs if we take the conclusion as a contingency proposition.
So the conclusion must be some kind of Necessity.
NOTES 157,
XCiV. This makes B not a descriptive but a denotative tag.

XCV. In other words, two terms may be essentially related, but a term
may apply contingently to one and fail to apply contingently to
the other. This would mean that at least some of one of the two
original terms would fail to apply to the other due to the newly
introduced and contingently related middle term. Likewise,
there may be two natures, neither of which is essentially
predicated of the other. But a contingent term may be introduced
so as to establish a relation between the two. It is unclear to me
how this contingent term would affect the conclusion in the
second figure. For any inclusion of a contingent middle term like
movement would conclude in a negation of the relationship
between the two terms like man and horse. But this is perhaps
not Avicenna’s point, on which see the next note.
XCVi. A syllogism in the second figure with a middle term ‘movement’
and the extremes ‘man’ and ‘horse’ may not yield a false
conclusion. For saying that some men are not horses does not
preclude the truth of the claim that no man is a horse. However,
the statement, ‘Contingently, some men are not horses’ implies
the negation of any kind of Necessity relation (positive or
negative) between man and horse and this is certainly false. At
any rate, Avicenna is driving at a different point here: it is
simply impossible to prove the validity of second figure
syllogisms composed of two contingency premises because
universal contingency premises do not convert. He will go on to
tell us that the ad impossibile proof fails as well, because the
contradiction of the conclusion results in the mixture of
Necessity and contingency premises that are not yet known.
Those mixtures that are known are not useful because they do
not contradict the other premise.
XCVii. This last premise is not incompatible with ‘Every animal is
moving’. Above, Avicenna ascribes this view to Aristotle and uses
the example of sleep.
XCVIil. The claim is based on the possibility of the complementary
conversion of contingency propositions. This move will restore
the syllogism to one of the four moods of the second figure.
xcix. Ha, HJ, marginal note, RM, and Q add wa-in kanati ’s-sughra
sdlibatan. A contingency universal minor in the third figure will
yield a syllogism via a complementary conversion to a universal
affirmative.
158 NOTES
. This would be the case if one converted the Major instead of the
Minor. In such a scenario, when a conclusion comes about, one
would have to convert again to retain the form of the figure. The
problem with such a final conversion, however, is that it will
yield a possibility, not a contingency. Here is an example of a
single conversion proof: 1. Contingently, AaB (Major). 2.
Contingently, JaB (minor). 3. Conversion of (2) to Possibly, Bij. 4.
Contingently, AiJ (Conclusion).
ci As an example, the proof of contingency Bocardo would look like
this: 1. Contingently, AoB (Major). 2. Contingently, JaB (minor).
3. Contingently, AoJ (desired conclusion). ekthésis: 4. Contingently,
BaD. 5. Contingently, AeD. 6. Contingently, JaD (by 4 and 2). 7.
Conversion of (6) to Possibly, DiJ. 8. (3) (by 5 and 7).
cil Avicenna may be referring here to the proof involving double
conversions, which are required if one proceeds with an initial
conversion of the Major.
ciii. This would occur under the Theophrastian/Themistian
reading.
Civ. i.e. of the Alexandrian type.
s CV: Presumably, Avicenna is referring to what was said by those with
whom he disagrees, namely, that the conclusion is always
contingency proposition. Otherwise, it appears that Avicenna’s
position in both cases is the same, i.e. that the mode of the
conclusion follows that of the Major.
cvi. harf
cvii. fijuz’in tammin.
cviii. Thus, one would take the subject or the predicate of the
consequent or the antecedent as a middle term and conclude
something on its basis. In the example that follows, Avicenna
takes the predicate of the antecedent, even, as the middle term
and derives a conclusion, while maintaining the consequent ‘it
is odd’ as it was in the disjunctive conclusion.
CL zawj al-zawj.
ex; zawj al-fard.
cxi. zawj al-zawj wa-'l-fard.
cxii. tiba’.
cxili. la’ih ‘ani 'l-garib.
CXiv. Thus, ‘IfA is B, then no J is H’.
CXV. ma‘did.
CXVi. The other option, i.e. a syllogism in the second form, is
mentioned below in division xviii of this section.
NOTES 159
cxvii. In other words, in these cases, one does not take just the subject
or the predicate of the antecedent or the consequent as a middle
term. One takes the whole of either the subject or the predicate
as middle terms.
cxviii. Thus, in the example that follows, the shared predicate of the
consequent is ‘numerical’ and it occurs as the subject of the
disjunctive proposition. The remainder of the consequent is ‘this
thing’ and it occurs in the conclusion.
cxix. i.e. of two conditional premises, where one is ‘If p then q’, the
other must share either p or q with it as a middle term.
CXX. takthir al-qiyds. In other words, compound syllogisms do not
comprise a series of syllogisms, each of which yields the same
conclusion. When they are set up in this way, the phenomenon
is called takthir al-qiyas.
CXXi. Thus, ‘A is B, B is C; A is C, C is D...’
CXXii. al-muhdathin.
CXxiil. khass.
CXXiv. fasul.
CR: al-fusul al-khassiyya.
CXXVi. jumla. One would wish to read tada‘u jumlata hadhihi...i.e. And you
posit all of this...jumla, in the sense of totality, does occur in the
sentence to follow, but in this sentence, no variant allows this
reading and the proposed emendation is too far from the
established text.
CXXVii. lawahiq.
CXXViii. malhugqat.
Cxxix: A conversion by contradiction requires one to take the
contradictory of the predicate and place it as the subject of the
original subject, which remains as it was; the quality of the
proposition is also the opposite of the original proposition. So
‘Every man is an animal’ has a conversion by contradiction as
‘No non-animal is a man’.
CXXX. ‘All animals are bodies’; ‘No body is a substance’ (Major that is
false with reference to the whole); so ‘No animal is a substance’.
If ‘No animal is a substance’ is true, and then the true premise,
‘All bodies are substances’ is posited, then it will yield ‘All
animals are substances’, the contrary of ‘No animal is a
substance’. But the former conclusion must be true because both
the form and matter of the syllogism are true in this case. So its
contrary must be false.
160 NOTES
CXXXi. It is worth noting that the premises themselves are not

converted. It is only that their terms are taken up and put
together conversely in the same quantitative relation as in the
original premise. In such cases, then, one steps outside the
formal bounds of the argument and considers it with reference
to the matter of the premises. In other words, formally a
universal affirmative premise is not equipollent, but it may be
so with reference to certain kinds of matters.
CXXXii. ism.
CXXXili. In other words, one would use the contradictory or contrary of
the conclusion under the guise of different terms to arrive at the
contradictory or contrary of a premise that the opponent may
use in a syllogism that proves his point, namely the conclusion
whose contradictory was used to preclude the required premise
of the opponent’s syllogism.
CXXXiv. As elaborate by Q, the premises would be: If it is not the case
that every A is B, then not every A is B; EveryJ is B’.
CXXXV. ma’khadh.
CXXXVi. bi-l-quwwa.
CXXXVii. wahm.
CXXXViii. al-mahsis.
CXXXix. na‘qilu.
cxl. natasawwaru.
cxli. The point is that, since we have never seen a vacuum, we can
only imagine the infinite extension of plenitude or something
that we call a vacuum that starts where the plenitude ends. But
a vacuum cannot be bound by plenitude.
cxlii. mabda’.
cxliii. ‘ala hadha ’n-nazm.
cxliv. al-mutashabih fthi.
cxlv. muhdath.
cxlvi. i.e., ‘All lines that extend from the center of a given circle to its
circumference are equal.’
cxlvii. mahmida.
cxlviii. Q has the additional explanation that, in the first case, the Minor
would be, ‘These people are envious’ and, in the second, ‘These
people are friends’.
cxlix. Q, which has clearly emerged as engaging in expositions of
Avicenna’s sense, states the implicit premise, ‘Every woman that
lactates has given birth’.
NOTES 161
cl. The reference is again to the upper limbs, which include the
shoulder, chest, etc.
cli. Assent is not to be understood only in the sense of affirming the
truth of something. Rather, the point is that one holds some
truth-value to apply to the judgment. The conceptualization of
the statement of another person or of a concept either need not
or cannot have such attached truth-values.
clii. Memory is a translation for dhikr, which is the faculty that
preserves non-sensible ideas that are extracted from sensibles.
In other words, two things repeatedly occur together as observed
by our senses and the repeated observation, in turn, repeatedly
produces the non-sensible idea that these two things are related
in a consistent fashion. This is an experience.
cliii. The sensory perception of the drinking of scammony and the
concomitant loosening of the bowels generates the non-sensory
idea that the drinking of scammony has as a concomitant the
loosening of the bowels. When the sensory perception is
repeated, the memory is as well. Then one produces the
following repetitive syllogism: ‘If this thing, such as the
loosening of the bowels due to scammony, were something
arbitrary and accidental and not due to some requirement of
nature, then it would not occur consistently in most cases’; “But
it does occur in most cases’ (repeated memory, i.e. experience);
so ‘The loosening of the bowels due to scammony is not
something arbitrary, (i.e. it is the nature of scammony that, if it
is drunk, it causes loosening of the bowels in the drinker—the
conclusion to which one grants assent).
cliv. li-gharadin mina 'l-aghrad.
clv. The definition of mutawatir reports, as given here, is obviously
circular and seems to have no real epistemological base. Such
reports are true simply because they are such reports. It is
interesting that all manuscript readings, except Q, seem to say
that agreement either to the truth or the falsity of these types
of reports is incorrect. But this does not fit with the preceding
statement.
clvi. yutasawwaru.
clvii. fitriyya. >
clviii. fitra: a natural (and sound) disposition for understanding, i.e.
intelligence. This is not to be confused with the intellect and its
objects, the intelligibles. As it will become clear from what is to
162 NOTES
follow, various faculties, such as the estimative and the intellect,

have their own natural dispositions towards comprehension.
clix. an yatawahhama 'l-insanu nafsahu hasala fi ’d-dunya daf‘atan.
clx. siyasa.
clxi. jibilla.
clxii. ittifaqiyya.
clxiii. ghayr da’im.
clxiv. tashbih seems to be used here in a non-technical sense, not as
simile. >
clxv. al-basa’it.
clxvi. al-khayal, i.e. that faculty which holds forms.
clxvii. This is not to say that any of these means delivers concepts to
the intellect. As Avicenna states, they only help acquire
concepts.
clxviii. al-mufakkira al-jami‘a.
clxix. tastad‘iilayha.
clxx. tasawwur.
clxxi. ‘Burning’ is the middle term.
clxxii. In other words, the middle term, ‘burning’, is a sign that
something hot has come to inhere in the substrate.
clxxiii. mugayyad.
clxxiv. at-tamyiz.
clxxv. mabdadi’.
clxxvi. mawdu‘ ma‘radihi. In other words, ‘body’ is the subject or
substrate which, though a substance, is an accidental, i.e. ‘white’,
and is the substrate/subject for the predicate ‘that which
splits...’.
clxxvii. fi awwali ’I-‘aql.
clxxviii. mutasawi ’s-saqayn.
clxxix. kitab al-giyds.
clxxx. al-mashkak.
clxxxi. musharik and mubayin.
clxxxii. Thus, one requires no demonstration of them.
clxxxiii. Until this point in the investigation, one only knows the soul
phenomenologically, not essentially. This is the same as to know
snow as some white thing, but not essentially.
clxxxiv, In such cases, the predicate of demonstration may belong to the
‘ssubject matter essentially.
clxxxv. musdadara.
NOTES 163
clxxxvi. That is both the subject and predicate are specific to the
discipline. In the example to follow, the subject matter is a
measurable quantity and the predicates both pertain specifically
to notions of quantified measurements (as opposed to, e.g.,
‘equality’, which is not specific to this discipline). .
clxxxvii. ‘umamihi.
clxxxviii. In other words, the subject matters of the sciences that
investigate moving globes (astronomy) and lines connected to
the pupil (optics) are particular types that fall within the subject
matter of geometry (i.e. globes and lines).
clxxxix. It is my understanding that the problems of demonstration are
statements requiring proof. As such, one would like this sentence
to say either that the subject of the problem is an essential
accidental or that its predicate is so, not that the problem itself
is an essential accidental. The example provided suggests that it
is the predicate that is meant.
CXC. i.e. under the rubric of the qualified ‘hal’, where the existence of
something in a certain state is investigated.
cxci. ath-thabit.
cxcii. The first syllogism leads one to assent that the fixed stars are
far; it is a demonstration of ‘if’. The second syllogism not only
leads one to assent that the planets do not twinkle, but also tells
us why this is the case—because they are near.
cxciii. zannan muktasaban ghaliban.
CXciv. yaqin.
CXCV. mahdid.
CXCvi. The definition of properties includes ‘species’. This latter cannot
be applied in the definition of ‘mourner’, ‘timid’, etc. An example
of this point is: ‘mourner’ is a property; a property is a generic
or non-generic species. But ‘mourner’ is not a species.
cxcvii. aqsam.
cxcviii. istithna’.
CXcix. That is you will already have found the definition, which was the
first problem, i.e. the first sought conclusion.
cc. bi-'t-tarkib.
cci. ashkhas, i.e. this animal that is, say, Zayd and not animal
generally.
ccii. al-hiss.
164 NOTES
ccili. I think the point is that ‘animal’ can be redundant if we take

parts, such as ‘the sentient’, ‘the voluntarily moving’, etc. or if
we take a more comprehensive synonym for it.
cciv. ma‘nd, i.e. intension, as opposed to extension.
ccv. al-haml, i.e. extension, as opposed to intention.
ccvi. ‘unwan.
ccvil.faylasif, i.e. Aristotle.
ccviii.al-muhdathin.
ccix. fussila.
CCX: adh-dhatiyyat.
ccxi. gama.
ccxii. muttasil.
ccxiii. munfasil.
ccxiv. thabat.
CCXV. mutagati‘atayni ‘ala ’l-qawa’im.
CCXVi. ma‘na.
Ccxvil. bi-'l-giyas.
ccxviii. yanfa‘ilu.
ccxix. isti‘dadat, i.e. a preparedness to become actual.
COX kamalat, i.e. the actualized preparedness.
cx la quwwa tabi'‘iyya, i.e. it is the predisposition of a thing towards
becoming something else.
ccxxii. If ‘when’ is a category, then the total number comes to eleven,
not ten: substance, quantity, time, relation, quality, place,
(when), position, possession, action, affection.
CCXxiil. lastu ahsuluhu
CCXXiV. This category corresponds to Aristotle’s category of state.
CCXXV. al-muthallath al-mutasawi 1-adla‘.
CCXXVi. ghayr dakhil. As in the discussion of modalities above, the
expression dakhil seems to refer to the act of inclusion, not the
fact of being included.
CCXXVii. Ha and a fresher hand in the margin of D add: ‘Just as we say,
‘Why is this body/individual burning?’ So we say, ‘Because it has
a fiery form/Because it has received a fiery form.’
CCXXViii. yan‘akisu.
CCXXix. ra’y.
CCXXX. i‘tiqad.
CCXXXi. al-ma‘na.
CCXXxii. tanbih.
CCXXxXili. In other words, ‘A is B’ may be proved by the presentation of the
various instances of As being Bs. Thus, a person either constructs
NOTES 165
an inductive syllogism, a mode of argument, or is simply alerted

to the truth of ‘A is B’ and assents it.
CCXXXiV. al-mutasawwirat.
CCXXXV. sahw.
CCXXXVi. The additional comment in T is instructive: body here refers to
the matter, not the genus.
CCXXXVii. min sha’nihi.
CCXXXViii. In other words, the definition of the opposite of an affirmation
and of an existent will take the affirmed and the habitus into
account. But the definition of the affirmed and the habitus will
not take the negated or the non-existent into account.
CCXXXix. al-mughallitat.
ccxxl, That is there is no overlapping middle term.
ccxli. The external form of the active participle gabil leads one to
conclude that the prime matter is the producer of the act.
ccxlii. Kullu ma ‘alimahu ’1-faylastfu fa-hwa kama ‘alimahu.
ries citaehcoor oft 3a.22arene utd 5
adriana tiki, bos bane utter (ye detente,
te Se =
= cantroccningcckaucin oli bs:eobitivediah ald $a 4 |
prenas aye abies ea ~ — aise 18
Fialai rind th ae oe
Glossary and Index of First
Occurrence of Terms
Key: Section Number (1, 2, 3), Paragraph Number (i.ii.iii)
adat: particle, 20
‘adamiyya: privative proposition, 44
ahad: units, 149, x
al-akbar: the major term, 61, ii
‘aks: conversion, 55
‘aks al-naqid: contradictory conversion, 87
akthariyya: things that are true for the most part, 120, i
‘alama: sign, 100
alfaz khamsa: five predicables, 11
alfaz mu’allafa: compound utterances, complex utterances, 3, i
alfaz mufrada: simple utterances, 3
alfaz murakkaba: complex utterances, compound utterances, 4
‘amma: the common people (i.e. non-specialists), 47, i
an: now, 142, v
‘aq: intellect, intellection, 17, i
‘agliyyat: primary intelligence, 107, ii
‘arad: accident (as opposed to substance): 8, i
‘aradi: accidental, 7, i
‘arid: accidental, 12, i
al-asghar: the minor term, 61, ii
aslan mawdi‘an: postulated principle, 128, i
awda‘: postulates, 128, i
awham: objects of estimative faculty, 17
al-awsat: the middle term, 61, ii
awwaliyyat: primary statements, 108, iii
a‘yan: individual essences, 17
ayn: place, 142, ix
168 GLOSSARY AND INDEX
basita: simple proposition, 43

bayan al-dawr: circular proof, 89
burhan: demonstration, 2, i
burhan al-anna: demonstration if such and such is the case, 114
burhan al-lima: demonstration of why, 113, i
al-burhan al-mutlaq: absolute demonstration, 113
dakhilatayni tahta ’ t-tadad: sub-contraries, 40, i
dalala: signification, 43, ii
dalil: signification, 99
darb: mood (of a syllogism), 62
dariri: Necessary, i.e. either necessarily existent (wajib) or
necessarily non-existent (mumtani’‘), 47, ii
dartriyya: Necessity premise or proposition, 51, i
da@’iman lam yazal wa-la yazalu: eternal, 48, ii
dawam: perpetuity, 45, i
dha’i‘at: widespread propositions, 108
dhaka’: sharpness of intellect, 148
dhat: essence, 6, i
dhati: essential, 7
dhihn: mind, 107, ii
fard: odd, 82, i
fard: assumption (of the existence or non-existence of something,
specifically of a possibility actualizing), 70, ii
fasidat: corruptibles, 134
fasl: specific difference, 11, i
fikr: thought, 94, iii
fikr ‘agli: intellective thinking, 148, v
fil: action, 142, xiii
bi-'1-fil: actuality, actually (as opposed to potentially), 39, i
fitra: primary intelligence, natural disposition of faculties, 107, ii
fitra (insaniyya): (human) nature, 1, i
hadd: definition, 1, i
hadd: term, limit, 47, iv (though here only a loose usage in this
sense), 50
hads: intuition, 148
hal: a state that passes away quickly, 142, viii
hamil: substrate, 39, i
GLOSSARY AND INDEX 169
hamliyya: attributive proposition, 23

handasa: geometry, 124, i
hagiqi: real, 1, i
haqiqiyya: reality, existential [proposition], 76, ii
hay’a: (bodily) form, disposition, 101, i, 142, viii
hayali: prime matter, 107, iv
hisab: arithmetic, 125, i
hiss: senses, sensation, 94, iii, 140, i
hujja: argument, 101, ii
hukama’: philosophers, 140, v
hukm: judgment, 22, i
hukm: predication, 52, iii
idafa: relation, 39, i
iftirad: ekthésis, 47, vi, 55, vi
ihtijaj: proof, 148, vi
ikhtiyar: choice, 40, ii °
‘illa fi'liyya: efficient cause, 130, iv
‘lla maddiyya: material cause, 145, vii
‘illa qabiliyya: receptive cause, 145, iv
‘illa striyya: formal cause, 130, iv
‘ilm: knowledge (usually scientific), 1, i
‘ilm al-hay’a: astronomy, 130, iv
al-‘ilm al-ilahi: theology, 125, i
‘ilm al-nujum: astronomy, 130, iv
al-‘ilm al-tabi‘i: physics, 125, i
yab: affirmation, 25, i
iltizam: implication (of one concept by another, e.g.), 12, i
infi‘al: passion, 142, xiv
infi‘alat: affects, influences, 142, viii
infisal: disjunction, 78, ii
iqna‘i: convincing, 2, i
iqtirani: connective (syllogism), 60
ism: noun, 18
ism ma‘dal: ambiguous noun, such as not-Zayd, 18, i
isti‘dad: preparedness (for the actualization of some potentiality),
40, ii
istiqra’: induction, 82, xvii
istigra’ mashhuar, common induction, 95, i

istiqra’ tamm: complete induction, 95, i
istithna’i: repetitive (syllogism), 60
ittifagiyyat: things that occur by chance, 138
ittisal: conjunction, 78, ii
jadal: dialectics, 90, i
jadali: dialectical, 2, i
jawhar: substance, 8, i
jiha, mode, 45
jiha: place, dimension, 107, i
jins: genus, 11, i
jins: category (any one among the ten), 140, i
jins al-ajnas: genus of genera, supreme genus, 13, ii
juz’: particular (as opposed to universal), 6 (here it seems to be the
equivalent of an ‘ayn), 32, i,
kalima: verb, 19
kamm: quantity, 62, iii
kayf: quality, 142, viii
kayfiyyat infi‘aliyyat: 142, viii
khassa: property, 11, i
al-khassa, the elect, the specialists, 47, i
khala’: vacuum, 94, iii
khatabi: rhetorical, 2, i
khayal: formative imaginative faculty, 111, ii
khaydliyyat: extracted sensible forms, 107, iii
khulf: absurdity, ad impossibile proof (bi-I-khulf: 63, ii), 55, ii
khulg, 101, i
al-kubra: the major premise, Major, 61, ii
al-kull, universe, 1, i
kulli: universal, 5
lafz: utterance, 3
lafz majaz: figurative utterance, 150, xi
lafz manqil: transferred utterance, 150, ix
lafz mushakkak: systematically ambiguous [statement], 150, vii
lafz mushtarak: homonymous, 150, vii
lafz musta‘ar: metaphor, 150, x
lawazim: concomitants, 7, i
lazim: deduction (i.e. that which is deduced); conclusion (i.e. that

which follows from premises): 60, i
mabda’: source, beginning, 1, i
madda: matter, 1, ii
ma‘diliyya: equivalent, ambiguous proposition, 43, i
mahall: receptacle, 142, i
m@hiyya: quiddity, 1, i
mahkam ‘alayhi: that about which judgment is passed, 30, i
mahkum ‘alayhi: primum comparandum, 96, i
mahkum bihi: that which is judged to be the case, 29, i
mahmiul: predicate, 27, i
mahsura: definite or quantified proposition, 33
mahsusat: sensibles, 103
makan: location, 39, i
makhratat: conics, 130, v
makhsisa: singular proposition, 31
mala’: plenum, 94, iii
malaka: habitus, 142, viii %
ma‘lumat, objects of knowledge, scientific facts, knowables, 1, i
ma‘na: concept, meaning, intention, non-formal meaning, 1, ii
manazir: optics, 130, vii
mantiq: logic, 2
magqbulat: accepted opinions, 106
ma‘gil, intelligible, 1, ii
maqiul: predicated, 120, i
maqil ‘ald al-kull: dictum de omni (et nullo), 51
ma'rifa: cognition (in the sense of immediate awareness), 1, i
masa’il: problems related to the subject matter, 119, i
mashhir: what is commonly accepted, 44, i
mata: when, 142, x
matlab ayy: the question ‘which’, 118
matlab hal: the question whether something is the case, 115
matlab lima: the question ‘why’, 117
matlab ma: the question ‘what’, 116
matlab: the sought conclusion of a syllogism; the undeduced
conclusion of a syllogism, the problem, 61, ii
mawdi‘: subject, subject [term], 30
ifr? GLOSSARY AND INDEX
mawdii‘ ma‘radihi: accident-substrate, 121, i

mawdi‘at: subject matter of an investigation, 119, i
mawjtd al-kawn: a being with a present existence, 47, vii
mawjid al-la-kawn: a being with a present non-existence, 47, Vii
al-mawjid al-mutlaq: Absolute Existent, 130, vi
mazninat: propositions presumed to be true, 109
migdar: measurable (dimension), 125, i
mithal: tertium comparationis, 96, i
mufassal: divided, 24, i
mufrad: simple (as opposed to complex), 16, i
mughalata: sophism, 150, ii
mughaliti: misleading, sophistical, 2, i
mughdlitin: sophists, 92, ii
al-muhakat: mimesis, 110, i
muharrafa: transformed [proposition or premise], 80
muhassal: a positive concept, such as Zayd (as opposed to a negative
one like not-Zayd), 18, i
muhmala: indefinite proposition, 32
mujarrabat: objects of experience, 104
mujarrad: abstracted, 14, i .
mujiba juz’iyya: particular affirmative proposition, 36
mijiba kulliyya: universal affirmative proposition, 34
mukhayyilat: image eliciting propositions, 110
mulazama/mulazima: concomitance/concomitant, 7, i
mulk: possession, 142, xii \
mumkin: possible, 40, ii
mumkina: possibility premise or proposition, 51, i
mumkin ‘ammi: ‘common possible’ (or simply ‘possible’, as opposed
to contingent), 47, i
mumkin khassi, ‘special-/specialist-possible’ (or ‘contingent’, as
opposed to the common sense of possible that may include the
necessary), 47, iii
mumkinat akthariyya: possibilities that obtain for the most part, 137,
i
mumtani‘: impossible, prohibiting, 41, i
munasib: commensurate, 124
mugaddim: antecedent, 78, iv
muqaddima: premise, 50
mugaddima awwaliyya: primary premise, 122
murakkab: compound, 14, i
musdadara: pre-positing (a conclusion), 93
musiqi: science of music, 130, viii
mustathnat: the repeated [premise], 83, i
mutadadd: contrary, 40, i
mutalazimat: equipollent, 49
mutagabil: opposite (propositions), 39
mu ‘taqgad: A proposition believed (to be true), 109, i
mutashabih fthi: secundum comparatus, 97, i
mutawatirat: universally circulated (report), 105
mutlaqa: absolute proposition or premise, i.e. one in which no
condition is posited, 43, i
naq| al-burhan: transfer of demonstration, 132
natija: the deduced conclusion of a syllogism, 61, ii
naw‘: species, 11, i
naw‘ al-anwa‘: species of species, lowest species, 13, ii
nazari: theoretical, 2, i
qadim: eternal, 62, ii
gadiyya: proposition, 22
garina: the connection between the Major and Minor, 61, ii
qawl: statement, 3, i
gawl jazim: proposition, 150, v
gisma: the process of division for acquiring definitions, 139, ii
giyas: syllogism, 1,i
giyas al-damir: enthymeme, 97
giyas firdsi: physiognomical syllogism, 101
giyas kamil: perfect syllogism, 59
giyas ghayr kamil: imperfect syllogism, 59
giyds al-khalf: a syllogism that concludes by way of a reductio ad
absurdum, 91
giyas murakkab: compound syllogism, 84
giyas murakkab mawsil: explicit compound syllogism, 84, ii
giyas murakkab munfasal: implicit compound syllogism, 84, iii
quwwa, faculty: potentiality, 39, i
quwwa ‘agqliyya: intellective faculty, 111, i
quwwa mufakkira: cogitative faculty, 111, i

quwwa tabj‘iyya: natural faculty, 142, viii
quwwat al-wahm: estimative faculty, 107, i
rabita/rabt: copula, 42, ii
rasm: description, 2, i
rawiya: deliberation, reflection, 1, i
ra’s: taraf, extreme term, 61, ii
ra’y: opinion, 98
rubd‘iyya: fourfold proposition, 46
saliba juz’iyya: particular negative proposition
saliba kulliyya: universal negative proposition, 35
salb: negation, 25, i
sath: surface, 142, iii
shakhsiyya: individual in existence, 123, ii
shakl: figure (of syllogism), form, 59, i
shart: condition, 39, i
shartiyya: conditional proposition, 24 |
shartiyya munfasila: disjunctive conditional proposition, 26
shartiyya muttasila: conjunctive conditional proposition, 25
shi‘ri: poetic, 2, i
sifa: attribute, 7, i
sina‘a: discipline, 2, i
sufista’i: sophistical, 2, i
sufista’iyya: sophists, 150
al-sughra: the minor premise, Minor, 61, ii
stlijismis: syllogism, 61, ii
stra: form, image, 1, ii
stra mdaddiyya: material form, 145, vi
sur: quantifier, 38
ta‘akus: mutual conversion, equipollence, 49, i
ta‘alim: mathematics, 97, i
tadammun: inclusion (of one concept in another, e.g.), 12, i
tahaqqua: verification, 1, ii
tahayyuz: localization, 107, i
tahlil: analysis (of syllogisms), 86
tajribiyyat: propositions derived from experience, 112, i
takhayyul: imagination, 148, v
GLOSSARY AND INDEX VIS
takhyil: to effect imagination, 2, i

talazum: concomitant, implication, 43, ii
tali: consequent, 78, iv
tamthil: analogy, 96
tanaqud: contradiction, 40
tasawwur: conceptualization, 1
tasdiq: assenting, 1
bi-’t-tashkik: equivocally, 144, i
taraf: extreme term, 61, ii
tawahhum: imagination, supposition: 5, i
ta‘yin: specification (of a certain part of a term), 59, i
thuna’: bipartite proposition, 42
thulathi: tripartite proposition, 42
‘unsur: element, 140, vi
usul: principles, 128
wajib: necessary, 40, ii
wad’: position, 107, iv
wahm: estimative faculty, imagination, 17, i
wahmiyyat: estimations, 107 ;
wujud: existence, 5, i
wujidi: existential (proposition), 65, i
yaqiniyyat, propositions of certitude, 112, i
zaman: time, 39, i
Zawj: even, 82, i
- raerihe ;
whe
General Index
A 146-7, 150n.xvi, 153n.liv, 161n.

cliii, 162n.clxxvi
A priori fashion, 100 Accidental difference, 120
Absolute [premises] (mutlaq), 32, 45, Accident-substrate (mawda ‘
59, 61 ma‘ridihi), 99, 104, 162n.clxxii,

Absolute affirmative, 57, 61 162n.clxxvi
Absolute demonstration (burhan Accusative/nominative cases, xxxvi
mutlaq), 96 Acquiring premise, 74
Absolute Existent (al-mawjid al- Action (fil), 123, 143, 164n.ccxxii
mutlaq), 108 Actual cause, 127-8
Absolute existential, 56 Actuality (bi-’-fi), 18-9, 20, 43, 81-
Absolute Major, 156n.lxxxvii 2 101-2. 120,127,
Absolute negation [proposition], 38, Ad impossibile [proof], 47-9, 50-2, 59,
53, 57 154n.lxxvii, 155n.lxxvii, 157n.
Absolute proposition (al-gadiyya al- xcvi
mutlaqa), xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii, Ad infinitum, 87-8, 114, 132
16, 21, 30, 32-4, 37, 40, 50-7, 59, Affects (infi‘alat), 122, 164n.ccxxii
60-2, 92, 96-8, 127, 130, 146, Affirmation (ijab), 16-9, 20, 27, 29,
152n.xlii, 155n.lxxxiii, 156n. 33, 35-7, 45, 53-4, 55, 61-4, 67-8,
Ixxxv, 156n.lxxxvii, 156n.xci 77, 95, 97, 100, 105-6, 128, 136,
Absolute quantified [propositions], 150n.xxii, 150n.xxv, 151n.xxxiii,
34 165n.ccxxxviii
Absolute universal, 59 Affirmative [conclusion], 55
Absolutes, 38-9, 47-8, 50-1, 55, 60, Affirmative [contingency], 55
156n.lxxxv, 156n.[xxxvii Affirmative [proposition], 46, 60,
Abstracted (mujarrad), 12, 135 64-5, 70-1, 77, 86, 112, 150n.xxv,
Absurdity (khulf), 36-7, 39, 40-1, 154n.Jxii, 154n.Ixxv
47-9, 50, 56, 58, 77, 79, 80, 147, Affirmative ambiguous [proposition],
156n.xc, 156n.xciii 21-3, 32, 75
Accepted (mashhir) [account], 23 Affirmative contingency major,
Accepted opinions (magqbulat), 89 156n.1xxxix
Accident (‘arad), 10, 12-3, 42, 74, 78, Affirmative particular [proposition],
108-9, 146, 149n.xiv, 150n.xiv 18, 40
Accidental (‘aradi), 6, 8-9, 12-3, 34, Affirmative predication, 36
88, 99, 105, 108, 120, 127, 135,
178 GENERAL INDEX
Affirmative universal Minor, 49 Averroes, xxvi

Al-‘ilm al-awwal, 149n.ii Avicenna, xix, xx, xxi, xxii, xxiii,
Alexander, 33, 158n.ciii XxXiv, XXV, Xxvi, xxvii, xxviii,
Al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din, xxxiv Xxxii, xxxiii, xxxvi, 149n.ii, 150n.
Ambiguous negative [proposition], XXV, 150n.xxix, 151n.xxxii, 151-
Dida : 2n.xlii, 152n.xliii, 152n.xlvi, 153n.
Ambiguous, 32, 138, 143-5, 150n. lv, 154n.lx, 154n.Ixi, 155n. xxvii,
Xxv, 152n.xlvi 155n. xxviii, 155n.lxxxiv, 156n.
Analogous, 47-8, 69, 70, 77, 83 Ixxxvii, 156n.Ixxxviii> 156n.xciii,
Analogy (mutashabih), 142 157n.xcv, 157n.xcvi, 157n.xcvii,
Analogy (tamthil), 66, 73, 84, 86 158n.cii, 158n.cv, 160n.cxlviii,
Antecedent (mugaddim), 64-6, 67, 69, 162n.clxvii
71, 76, 79, 158n.cviii, 159n.cxvii
Arabic logic, xx, xxvii, xxviii B
Arabic logician, xxii, xxvii, 151n.
Xxxii Baghdad, xxi
Arabic philosophy, xix, xxvii, xxviii Believed (mu‘taqad), 93-4
Argument (hujja), 86, 160n.cxxxi, Bertolacci, Amos, xx
165n.ccxxxiii Bipartite [utterance], 21, 23
Aristotelian doctrine, xx, xxii, xxiii, Bocardo, 158n.ci
Xxiv Bodily form (hay’a), 86, 90
Aristotle, xix, xx, xxi, xxii, xxv, Book of Appendices, 66
XXVli, xxviii, 33, 157n.xcvii, 164n. Book of the Cure, 66, 148
CCXXiV
Arithmetic (hisab), 102, 106, 109 Cc
Arithmetical affinity, 108
Assent, 3, 42, 87-9, 91-8, 100, 104-5, Cause(s), 28, 82, 91, 95-9, 102, 104,
135-6, 149n.i, 149n.ii, 161n.cli, 107, 110, 112-3, 121, 124-9, 130-
161n.cliii, 163n.cxcii, 165n. 2, 135, 148, 161n.cliii; are of four
CCXXXiii ‘ types, 127 see also Actual cause;
Assertoric syllogistic, xxiv Potential cause; Specific cause;
Assertoric, xxiv, xxv, 156n.Ixxxix Proximate cause
Astronomy (‘im al-hay’a), 107, 109, Certainty, 113
163n.clxxxviii Certitude, proposition of, 95, 105-6
Attribute (sifa), 7 Chance (ittifagiyyat), 113
Attributes (awsdf), 9, 87 Choice (ikhtiyar), 20
Attributive [premises], 68-9 Circular demonstration, 131
Attributive [proposition] (hamliyya), Circular proof (bayan al-dawr), 77,
14, 16, 21, 64, 67-9, 70, 79, 144 130
Attributive [syllogism], 65, 67-8, 71 Circular syllogism, 147
Attributives, 62 Circularity, 78
GENERAL INDEX Lo
Cogitative faculty (quwwa mufakkira), 119, 129, 146-7, 151n.xxxviii,

95 153n.liii, 153n.lvii, 154n.Ixxvi,
Common induction (istigr@ mashhir), 155n.lxxix
83 Conditional conclusion, 62
Common people (al-‘amma), 25-6, Conditional connective [syllogisms],
oi 66, 79
Common sense, 151n.xxxii, 154n.1x Conditional premises, 62, 65, 71,
Common-possible, 25, 150n.xxix, 159n.cxix
153n.lv, 154n.lxiii Conditional proposition (shartiyya),
Complex (murakkab) utterances, 5, 15-6, 64, 69, 70, 71, 146, 151-
141, 143-4 2n.xli
Complex mixtures, 86 Conditions [of homonymy], 143
Composite qualified [question], 98 Conics (makhratat), 107
Composition, [mode of], 3, 67 Conjunctions (ittisal), 62-4
Compositional overlap, 141 Conjunctive [proposition], 62, 64-8,
Compound statements (aqwal), 5, 14, 70-1
126, 146-7 Conjunctive conditional proposition,
Compound syllogism (qiydsat 15, 64, 66
murakkaba), 72-3 Conjunctive premise, 64, 67
Compound utterances (alfaz Connection (garina), 44, 46, 48-9, 51,
mu’allafa), 5 62, 65-9, 70, 82-3, 132, 147
Concepts (ma‘ani), 3, 30, 84, 87, 95, Connective particles, 143-4
100, 113, 123, 132, 136, 150n.xvi, Connective syllogism, 43, 72, 79
161n.cli, 162n.clxvii Consequent (tdli), 64, 67, 70-1, 76,
Conceptualization, 3, 87-8, 97, 101, 79, 158n.cviii, 159n.cxvii, 159n.
105, 134-5, 149n.i, 149n.ii, 161n. CXViii
cli Contingency [premises], 55, 57, 59,
Conclusion (natija), 43-9, 50-4, 56-9, 157n.xcvi
59, 60-2, 65-7, 70-9, 80-2, 85, 91, Contingency [proposition], 51, 55-8,
95-7, 99, 102, 113-5, 125-6, 131, 60-1, 152n.xlvi, 156n.xciii, 157n.
140-1, 147, 154n.lxvi, 155n.1xxix, xcviii
155n.Ixxxv, 156n.lxxxvii, 156n. Contingency conclusion, 56
xciii, 157n.xcv, 157n.xcvi, 158n.c, Contingency Universal Minor, 157n.
158n.cv, 158n.cviii, 159n.cxviii, Xcix
159n.cxx, 159n.cxxx, 160n.cxxxiii, Contingency, 36-7, 42, 51, 56, 59,
161n.cliii, 163n.cxcix, 165n.ccxli 60-2, 151n.xxxii, 151n.xxxiii,
Concomitance (talazum), 7-8, 22, 154n.Ix, 155n.Ixxvii, 156n.
74-5, 138, 148, 161n.cliii Ixxxviii, 158n.c
Concomitant property, 12 Contingent, 31-2, 41, 57-8, 64, 66,
Condition (shart), 19, 20, 30, 34, 38- 150n.xxix, 151n.xxxi, 152n.xliv,
9, 42, 47-8, 55, 65-8, 79, 92, 101,
180 GENERAL INDEX
153n.xlix, 154n.)xii, 157n.xcv, 161n.clv, 163n.cxcvi, 163n.cxcix,

158n.ci 165n.ccxxxvili
Contingently, 41, 55-9, 60, 157n.xcv, Deliberation (rawiya), 3-5
157n.xcvi, 158n.c, 158n.ci Deliverance, The (466 au/1073 ce,
Contradiction (tandqud), 19, 25, 31, Avicenna), xx, xxii, xxiii, xxiv,
37, 43, 58, 59, 71-2, 76-9, 80, 82- XXV, Xxviii, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxiv,
35, :85;-91,) 93=45 113) 105 2147, XXXV, XXXVi, 148
150n.xxix, 151n.xxix, 152n.xlvi, Demonstration (burhan), xxiii, xxvii,
154n. xxvii, 157n.xcvi, 159n. 4, 95-7, 99, 100, 102, 104-5, 110-
cxxix, 160n.cxxxiii 1, 113-5, 124-9; 131; 134,-162n.
Contradictory converse (‘aks al- clxxxii, 162n.clxxxiv
naqid), 76 Demonstration, transfer of (naq] al-
Contraries (mutaddddatayn), 19, 77- burhan), 110
8, 139, 160n.cxxxiii Demonstrative problems, 103, 163n.
Converse, 76-7, 146, 148, 153n.lix, clxxxix
155n.Ixxxiv Demonstrative syllogism, 4, 148
Conversion/convert, 37-9, 41-3, Denotation, 118
47-9, 50, 53-4, 59, 62, 78-9, 80, Derivative scientific knowledge
155n.lxxvii, 155n.lxxxiv, 157n. (epistémé), 149n.i
xcvi, 157n.xcviii, 157n.xcix, 158n. Description (rasm), 4, 28, 52, 101,
c, 158n.ci, 158n.cii, 159n.cxxix, 114, 136
160n.cxxxi Descriptive Necessity, 156n.Ixxxvii
Convincing (igna‘i), 4 Descriptive reading, proposition in
Cooperation (of sciences), 109 the (al-qadiyya al-wasfiyya), xxvi
Copula (rabita), 21, 23-4, 30, 151n. Dhikr, 161n.clii
xli, 152n.xlii Dialectic (jadal), 78, 148 see also
Corporeity, 84 Dialectical (jadali)
Correct [position], 52 Dialectical (jadali) [syllogism], 4, 78,
Corruptibles (fasidat), 110-1 80
Dictum de omni [states that], 32, 101
D Differences, 37, 60, 74, 80-1, 92, 112,
131, 135, 142
Danishpazth, xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, Disjunctions (infisal), 62-3, 66, 70,
XXXV, 19n.3, 156n.xc 153n.|vi
Deduction, 43-4 Disjunctive [proposition], 16, 63-5,
Definite/Quantified [proposition] 69, 70-2, 159n.cxviii
(mahsira), 17, 19, 46, 63-4, 107 Disjunctive conclusion, 158n.cviii
Definition (hadd), 3, 87, 99, 103, 105, Disjunctive consequent, 70
111, 114-9, 124-6, 129, 130, 134, Disposition (khulq), 86-7, 161n.clviii,
136-9, 140, 148, 149n.i, 149n.ii, 162n.clviii
Divided (mufassala), 15, 120, 144
GENERAL INDEX 181
Division (gisma), 46, 115, 119, 120, Estimation (wahmiyyat), 89, 90-1,
158n.cxvi 95
Dual conclusion, 60, 62 Estimative [statements], 93, 95
Estimative faculty (quwwat al-wahm),
E 13, 89, 90, 95, 162n.clviii
Euclid, 109, 126
East (Khurasan), xxi Even (zawj), 15, 66, 70-2, 82, 102,
Eastern philosophy, xxi, xxii 139, 144
Easterners, The (Avicenna), xxi, xxii, Existence, 6-8, 13, 16, 27-8, 31-2,
xxiii, xxiv 34-7, 39, 51, 54, 62-3, 83, 85, 88-
Effect, 30, 82, 91, 97, 128, 132, 138 9, 91, 96=9, 101, 103, 111-3, 118,
Efficient cause (‘ill fi‘liyya), 107 121, 126, 128, 131-2, 141, 150n.
Ekthésis (iftirad), 39, 43, 48-9, 50-4, xvi, 151n.xxxv, 156n.xc, 163n.
59, 61-2, 155n.Ixxvii, 155n.lxxviii, cxc
156n.Ixxxvii, 158n.ci Existence, perpetuity of, 24
Elements (zawa’id), 30, 77, 95, 152n. Existent, 36, 102, 138, 165n.
xlii CCXXXViii
Ellipsis, 85 Existential (wujiidi), 51
Enthymeme (al-damir), 84-5 Existential Minor, 51
Epistemologically, 149n.ii, 161n.clv Experience (tajribiyyat) [proposition],
Equality, 120, 163n.clxxxvi 59, 96, 135-6, 161n.clii, 161n.cliii
Equilateral triangle, 126 Experience, objects of (al-mujarrabat),
Equipollent (muta‘akisa), 31, 152n. 88
xliii, 152n.xlvi, 152n.xlvii, 160n. Explicit (mawsilan), 73, 85-6
CXxxi Extensive induction, 92
Equivalent [proposition], 31, 117, Extremes term, 44, 46, 54, 65, 67, 74,
131-2, 146, 152n.xlvi, 153n.lv 81, 85, 96-7, 103, 114
Equivocally (bi-’t-tashkik), 126
Essence, 12-3, 95, 98, 104, 106, 117- F
S201 2354 26-7.
Essential (dhati) [utterances], 6-9, Fakhry, Majid, xxxi
99, 127, 135, 138, 155n.)xxxiii, False estimation, 90
157n.xcv False estimative [proposition], 93
Essential accidents, 102-4, 108, 111, False, 14, 19, 20, 36-7, 41, 47, 53, 56,
128, 163n.clxxxix 76-9, 82, 90-4, 114-5, 145-6,
Essential attributes, 9, 10, 98, 104 157n.xcvi, 159n.cxxx
Essential cause, 119, 124, 129 Falsification, 90
Essential predication, 104 Falsity, 76-7, 84, 89, 91-2, 145, 150n.
Essential universal [utterances], xxiv, 161n.clv
11-2 Fasig [deviant/sinner], 142
182 GENERAL INDEX
Figurative utterance (lafz majaz), H

143
Figure (form), 44-5, 75, 80, 140-1, Habitus (malaka), 122, 137, 139, 165n.
149n.xiv, 154n.Ixvi, 158n.c CCXXXViii
Finitude, 91 Homonymous (lafz mushtarak), 141,
First figure, 44-5, 47-9, 50-5, 57, 59, 143, 147
60-2, 67-9, 76-7, 85, 156n.lxxxvii, Human ethics, 92
156n.Ixxxix, 156n.xci Human nature (fitra insaniyya), 3, 5,
First mood, 45, 47, 49 22, 135, 145 :
First philosophy, 108-9
First Teaching (al-ta‘lim al-awwal),
Sz
Form (shakl), 42, 102, 118, 134, 141, If, demonstration of ((burhan al-
143, 159n.cxxx anna), 97, 99, 104, 107, 112, 129,
Form (sira), 3-4 163n.cxcii
Form existent, 13 Image (sira), 135
Formal cause (‘illa striyya), 107 Image-eliciting [propositions], 94
Formative imaginative faculty Imagination (takhayyul), 135
(khayal), 95, 162n.clxvi Inducing an image (takhyil), 4
Fourfold [proposition], 24 Imagination (tawahhum), 6-8, 83, 94,
Fourth mood, 46, 48-9, 50-1, 157n. 134-5, 160n.cxli
xcviii Imperfect syllogism, 51
Future possible (mumkin) prediction, Implicit (mufassal), 73
20 Impossible (mumtani‘), 24-8, 31-2,
150n.xxviii, 150n.xxix, 151n.xxxi,
G 151n.xxxii, 151n.xxxix, 152n.xlvi,
153n.lv, 154n.lxiii, 157n.xcvi see
Genera, genus of (jins al-ajnas), 11, also prohibition
22, T&- AAT; 119)137-8 In potentia, 73
Genus (jins), 10-2, 23, 25, 96, 99, 100, Indefinite [proposition] (muhmala),
107-9, 117, 132, 136-8, 146, 149n. 17, 63-4
xiv, 150n.xiv, 165n.ccxxxvi Individual (shakhsiyya), 38, 101, 115,
Geometry (handasa), 102, 105-9, 120, 132, 164n.ccxxvii
163n.clxxxviii Individual essence, 13, 131
Gnosis, 149n.i Individual substance, 35
Grammar, 4-5 Indivisible individual particulars,
Greek logic, xxviii 116
Griffon, 22 Induction (istiqra’ tamm), 69, 73,
Gutas, Dimitri, xx, xxi, xxxvi 83-4, 95, 116, 135-6
Inductive syllogism, 165n.ccxxxiii
Influences (infi‘al), 122
GENERAL INDEX 183
Intellect (‘agl), 13, 90-1, 100, 134-6, Logic (Avicenna’s), xix, xx, xxi, xxii,
161n.clviii, 162n.clxvii XXiii, XXivV, XXVi, XXXVi
Intellective faculty (quwwa ‘agliyya), Logic, 4-5, 148, 152n.xlii
95, 162n.clviii ’
Intellective thinking (fikr ‘agli), 135 M
Intelligence, objects of (‘aqliyyat),
90, 95, 161n.clviii Major (al-akbar) extreme, 44
Intelligible (ma‘gula), 3, 118, 161n. Major (al-kubra), 44-5, 47, 52-7, 60-
clviii 2, 66, 70, 75-8, 81, 83-5, 96-7,
Intermediary [cause], 132-4 104-5, 114, 124-5, 132-4, 148,
Investigation (mawdia’at), 8, 57-8, 62, 158n.c, 158n.ci, 158n.cii, 158n.cv,
75, 80, 98, 104, 107-9, 112, 116, 159n.cxxx
124, 136, 162n.clxxiii, 163n. Major attributive [premise], 69
clxxxviii, 163n.cxc Major attributive [proposition], 67
Igtirani, xxvi, xxvii Major premise, 114
Irrational, 106, 111 Major universal premise, 82
Isosceles triangle, 96, 100 Mansur, Nasr b., xxxiv
Matakhayyilat, 94n.32
J Material cause (‘illa maddiyya), 129
Material element (‘unsur), 118
Judged (mahkum bihi), 16 Material form (siira maddiyya), 129
Judgment, 3, 14, 16-8, 20, 27, 32-4, Mathematics (ta‘alim), 84
37, 83-4, 87, 89, 91, 133, 136, 145, Matters (mdadda), 3-4, 20, 24, 36-7,
149n.i, 150n.xxiv, 161n.cli 39, 46, 53, 57-8, 86, 89, 98, 127-9,
Juzjani, xxii 130, 132, 137, 140, 148, 159n.
CXXXx, 160n.cxxxi, 165n.ccxxxvi
K Measurable [dimensions] (migqdar),
102-3, 106-7
Knowledge, 15, 33, 82-3, 88, 113, Medicine, 102, 109
133-4, 138-9, 149n.i Metaphor (lafz musta‘ar), 142
Knowledge, objects of (ma‘lamat), 3 Metaphorically, 138
Metaphysics (Aristotle), xix
L Metaphysics (Avicenna), xx
Metaphysics, xix
Late Period philosophy (Avicenna), Middle Arabic, xxxv, xxxvi
xxii Middle term (awsat), 44, 59, 66-7, 75,
Latin logic, xxviii 83, 85-6, 96-7, 103, 110, 113-5,
Latin west, xix, xxvii 119, 124-5, 128-9, 131-4, 156n.
Limit (hadd), 126 Ixxxvii, 157n.xcv, 157n.xcvi,
Localized (mutahayyiz), 89 158n.cviii, 159n.cxvii, 159n.cxix,
Location (makan), 8, 19, 90, 121, 123
184 GENERAL INDEX
162n.clxxi, 162n.clxxii, 165n. Nature(s), 22, 43, 59, 66, 88, 91, 95,
ccxxl 113; 12739334 0137-8) 145; 153n.
Mimesis (muhakat), 94 liv, 157n.xcv, 161n.cliii
Mind (dhihn), 4, 7, 21, 90, 93-7, 134 Necessary (dariiriyya), 32-4, 36, 38-9,
Minor (al-sughra) extreme, 44-6, 40, 54, 66, 70, 74, 91, 94, 96-7, 99,
48-9, 50, 54-6, 61, 66, 69, 70, 75- 101, 107, 127-8, 135, 139, 143,
6, 78, 82-5, 96-7, 105, 110, 114, 150n.xvi, 151n.xxxi, 151n.xxxiv,
148, 156n.lxxxv, 156n.lxxxvii, 151n.xxxix, 152n.xlviii, 153n.lv,
156n.Ixxxix, 158n.c, 158n.ci, 153n.lvi, 155n.Ixxvii, 155n. xxviii,
160n.cxlviii 156n.lxxxvii
Minor disjunctive [premise], 69 Necessary (wajib), 20, 24-9, 31, 151n.
Minor extreme (al-asghar), 44 Xxxiv, 152n.xlviii, 153n.lv
Minor premise, 111 Necessity [conclusion], 54
Misleading (mughaliti), 4 Necessity [premise], 30, 50-2, 54, 57,
Mixed syllogism, 155n.Ixxvii, 155n. 59, 60, 151n.xli, 152n.xlii, 155n.
xxviii Ixxvii
Mixture [of contingency], 59, 60-2, Necessity [proposition], 20, 29, 30,
73, 86, 155n.Ixxvii 32-3, 35-9, 40-2, 51, 53, 55, 57-9,
Mixture, 52, 57, 59, 60, 122, 156n. 60-2, 89, 101, 113, 128, 151n.
Ixxxv, 156n.Ixxxvii, 157n.xcvi Xxxiii, 151n.xxxv, 153n.liii, 153n.
Modal logic, xxii, xxiii, xxiv, xxviii, liv, 154n.lix, 154n.)xii, 154n.1xiii,
37, 151n.xli 154n.lxxvi, 155n.Ixxvii, 155n.
Modal syllogistic, xxiii Ixxxiii, 155n.Ixxxiv, 155n.lxxxv,
Modalized [proposition], 37 156n.lxxxvii, 156n.xc, 156n.xciii,
Modes (jihat), 24, 30-2, 38, 51, 62, 99, 157n.xcvi
145, 152n.xlii, 158n.cv, 165n. Necessity [simpliciter], 58
CCXXxiii Necessity affirmative, 56, 151n.
Movement, 59, 129, 142, 157n.xcvi XXXili
Multiplicity, 91, 139, 141 Necessity Major, 51-2
Munafiq [hypocrite/hypocrite], 142 Necessity negative [proposition], 51,
Music (misiqi), 108-9 60
Mutawatir, 161n.clv, 161n.clv Necessity predication, 29
Mutually converting [equipollent], Necessity, concept of, 28
31 Necessity, mode of, 38
Negation (salb), 16-9, 20, 22-4, 27,
N 29, 32-3, 35-7, 41, 45, 52-5, 62-4,
78, 95, 97, 100, 105-6, 112, 136,
Natural [type], 69, 70, 128 139, 150n.xxii, 151n.xxxiii, 152n.
Natural faculty (quwwa tabi‘iyya), xlvi, 154n.)xiii, 155n.Ixxvii, 157n.
122 Xcv, 165n.ccxxxviii
Negative [premises], 45, 61, 77
GENERAL INDEX 185
Negative [proposition], 46, 59, 60, Optical conics, 110

64-5, 68, 71, 75, 77, 150n.xxv, Optics, science of (manazir), 108, 110,
154n.lxii, 154n.Ixxv 163n.clxxxviii
Negative contingency Minor, 156n. Order [sequential], 84
Ixxxix Organon (Aristotle), xix, xx, xxi,
Negative contingency, 55, 61 xxii
Negative existential, 151n.xxxvii Oxford-Hunt 534 (dated 466 an/1073
Negative Minor, 45, 47 ce), Xxxi, xxxii, xxxiii, xxxv,
Negative Necessity, 36, 53, 56, 58, XXXVi
151n.xxxiii
Negative particular [proposition], P
18
Negative possible, 37 Parallelism, 123
Negative predication, 36 Part (akthariyya), 64, 69, 70-2, 95, 99,
Non-absurd falsity, 56 105, 113-6, 120-1, 125, 136, 139,
Non-being, 57, 113 140-1, 144, 146-7, 152n-xlii
Non-constitutive accidentals, 111 Particle (adat), 14
Non-equality, 120 Particular [cause], 131-2
Non-essential, 6-8, 12, 53, 149n.xiv, Particular [conclusion], 46, 49, 50,
150n.xvi, 152n.xlii 54, 65-6, 74, 76, 115
Non-existence, 22, 24, 26-8, 37, 139, Particular [premise], 44-6, 50
150n.xxv, 151n.xxxv, 151n. Particular [proposition], 17, 19, 39,
xxxviii, 165n.ccxxxviii 41, 54, 59, 76, 102, 130, 135-6
Non-rational, 86, 115 Particular affirmative absolute
Non-sensibles, 91, 122, 161n.clii [proposition], 153n.lix
Non-sensory, 135, 161n.cliii Particular affirmative contingency
Noun (ism), 13-4, 21, 25-6, 75, 80-1, [proposition], 41-2
9751261355138 Particular affirmative Major, 49
Now (dn), 121 Particular affirmative Minor, 46,
Numerical, 70 48-9, 50
Particular affirmative Necessity
oO [proposition], 40, 55, 155n.lxxvii,
155n.1xxxili
Odd (fard), 15, 66, 70-2, 82, 102, 139, Particular affirmative, 47, 49, 74,
144, 158n.cviii 153n.lix
Oneness, 91, 138 Particular individual forms, 134-5
Opinion (ra’y), 26, 32-4, 39, 42, 49, Particular minor [term], 132
57, 62, 85, 89, 90, 92-3, 113, 133, Particular negative [conclusion],
139, 143 48-9, 50, 74
Opposite proposition (qadiyyatayn Particular negative absolute, 39
mutagabilatayn), 18-9, 115, 139
186 GENERAL INDEX
Particular negative contingency Possibility [proposition], 36-7, 41-2,

[proposition], 42, 55 A415 13.55, 57=9,) 61=2, 93,9113,
Particular negative Major, 50 120, 133, 150n.xxiv, 151n.xxxii,
Particular negative Minor, 48 151n.xxxviii, 154n.lx, 154n.lxiii,
Particular negative Necessity 155n.Ixxvii, 156n.Ixxxviii, 157n.
[proposition], 40, 54 xcvili, 158n.c
Particular simple utterance, 6 Possibility conclusion, 59
Particularity, 18 Possible (mumkin), 15, 20, 25-8, 31-2,
Particularized [subject], 35 34, 36-7, 58-9, 65, 70, 778; 80-1,
Passion (infi‘al), 123 90, 101, 113-4, 132-5, 150n.xxviii,
Passive qualities (kayfiyyat 151n.xxxi, 151n.xxxv, 152n.xliv,
infi‘aliyyat), 122 153n.lv, 154n.lxiii, 155n.Ixxxiv,
Perfect definition, 125-6 156n.lxxxviii, 158n.ci
Perfection, 102, 117-8 Possible existent, 28
Peripatetic doctrine, xxv Possible non-existent, 28
Permissible, 114 Possibly, 37, 42
Perpetually, 29, 30, 33-5, 52-3, 58, Post-Avicennan logic, xxvi, xxvii
63, 110, 153n.liv, 156n.lxxxvii Post-Avicennan logicians, xix, xxvii
Perpetuity (dawam), 29, 54, 155n. Potential cause, 127-8
xxix Potentiality (quwwa), 18-9, 20, 82,
Persistence, 34-6 y 98, 102, 120, 127-9
Physics (al-‘ilm al-tabi‘i), xix, 102, Pre-Avicennan Arabic logic, xxiv
106-9 Predicate (mahmil), 16, 18-9, 20-1,
Physiognomical syllogism (qiyds 23-4, 30, 32-3, 36-7, 44, 54-5, 57,
firdsi), 86 59, 62, 67, 69, 70, 72, 74-5, 83, 96,
Place (ayn), 123, 135-8, 142, 164n. 99, 100-1, 103-4, 114-7, 119,
Ccxxii 124-5, 128, 132, 144-5, 147, 150n.
Plenitude (mala’), 83, 89, 93, 160n. xxv, 151n.xli, 152n.xlii, 157n.xcv,
cxli 158n.cviii, 159n.cxvii, 159n.cxviii,
Poetic syllogism (qiyds shi‘ri), 4 159n.cxxix, 162n.clxxvi, 162n.
Pointers and Reminders (Avicenna), clxxxiv, 163n.clxxxvi, 163n.
xxii, xxiii, xxv, xxvii, xxviii clxxxix
Porphyry, 11, 139 Predicate simpliciter, 114
Position (wad‘), 91, 120-1, 123, 135, Predication (hukm), 29, 33-4, 52,
139, 164n.ccxxii 62-3, 99, 101, 114, 117, 146
Positive noun (muhassal), 13-4, 21 Predication Absolute (mutlaq), 30
Possession (mulk), 123 Predisposition, 122, 164n.ccxxi
Possibilities of the most part Premise(s) (muqaddima), 30, 32, 41-2,
(mumkindat akthariyya), 113 44-5, 50-1, 54-5, 59, 60-2, 64-5,
Possibility [premise], 44, 47 67-8, 70-1, 73, 75-9, 80-2, 85,
91-2, 94-5, 98-9, 100-1, 104-5,
GENERAL INDEX 187
109, 111, 124, 141, 145, 147, 154n. Prohibition [or impossible]
Ixvi, 154n.Ixx, 156n.Ixxxix, 157n. (mumtani’‘), 20
Xcvii, 159n.cxxx, 160n.cxxxi, Proof (ihtijdj), 49, 50, 52-4, 57, 60-1,
160n.cxxxiii, 160n.cxxxiv, 160n. 136, 147, 153n.lvi, 155n.lxxxiv,
cxlix ; 156n.lxxxvii, 158n.cii, 163n.
Preparedness (isti‘dad), 20 clxxxix
Pre-positing (musddara), 81, 116, Property (khdssa), 10, 12, 96, 98,
147 114-5, 117, 163n.cxcvi
Pre-position, 105, 111, 148 Proposition (qadiyya), 14, 38-9,
Present impossibility, 28 103,105, 109, 128, 150n.xviii,
Present necessity, 28 152n.xlii, 152n.xlvii, 159n.cxxix
Presumed [proposition], 93-4, 96 Proximate cause, 127
Primary (al-awwaliyyat) [statements], Proximate receptacle (mahall), 120
93, 95, 101, 116, 135, 140-1, 144, Pure [type], 61, 93
149n.i, 149n.ii
Primary [proposition], 95 Q
Primary cognition (ma‘rifa), 3, 149n.
i Quadrupleness, 121
Primary estimations, 89 Quality (kayf), 45-6, 55, 107, 121-2,
Primary intelligence (fitra), 90-2 135, 138, 164n.ccxxii
Primary premises, 99, 100, 105 Quantifier (sir), 18, 152n.xlii
Primary syllogism, 75 Quantity, 45-6, 55, 80, 107, 121, 123,
Primary truth, 93 129, 135, 140, 163n.clxxxvi, 164n.
Prime matter (hayali), 91, 110, 143, ccxxii
165n.ccxli Quiddity (mahiyya), 3, 6-7, 10, 104,
Primum comparandum (mahkim 111, 117-8, 134, 149n.i
‘alayhi), 84
Principles (usil), 28, 105, 109, 110-1, R
125-7, 134
Prior Analytics, doctrine of (Aristotle), Rational, 9, 10, 12, 106, 111, 115, 117,
xxi, xxii, xxv, xxviii, 101 142; is a Compound specific
Privative proposition, 23 difference, 12; it is also Logical
Probative, 33 specific difference, 12
Problem (matlab), 44, 79, 80-1, 84, Rationality, 12, 116; is an abstracted
98, 115-6, 140-1, 147, 150n.xxv, (mujarrad) specific difference, 12,
158n.c, 163n.cxcix 135:
Problematics, 110, 152n.xlvi Real (hagiqi), 3, 39, 79, 98, 115
Problems [related to the subject Reality, 42, 60, 79, 104, 121-2, 124,
matter] (masa’il), 98, 104, 109, 131, 139, 141-3
110, 134, 148, 163n.clxxxix Receives (qabilatun) influences, 143
Reductio proof, 156n.xciii
188 GENERAL INDEX
Reference (daldla), 22, 38, 42, 66, Sensible forms (khayaliyyat), 90

76-7, 106, 111-2, 116, 119, 123, Sensibles (mahsisat), 83, 88-9, 90-1,
126, 130, 136, 140-1, 143, 146, 96, 122, 161n.clii
159n.cxxx, 160n.cxxxi, 161n.cl Sentient, 10, 116-7, 164n.cciii
Relation (idafa), 14, 16, 18, 20-1, Separate [syllogisms], 73, 82, 150n.
67-8, 93, 103, 109, 121, 123, 138- xviii
9, 145-6, 150n.xviii, 150n.xxiv, Sequential composite syllogisms,
154n.lxii, 155n.lxxxiii, 157n.xcv, 81
160n.cxxxi, 164n.ccxxii Settled disposition (hay’a), 121
Repeated (mustathnat), 71-2, 76 Shared [term], 43, 66, 71, 75, 80, 117,
Repetition, 72, 115 120-1, 138, 146
Repetitive occurrences, 131 Shorter Summary of Logic (Avicenna),
Repetitive syllogism, 43, 71-3, 79, xxii
161n.cliii Sign (‘alama), 85, 97
Report (khabar), 14, 161n.clv Significans, 150n.xxv
Reversion, 61 Signification (dalil), 85-6
Rhetorical (khatabi) [syllogism], 4 Signified, 5, 149n.vi
Rhetorical syllogism, 148 Signifier (al-daldla), 62-3, 149n.vi
Risible, definition of, 114-5 Similarity, 94, 142
Simple negative [proposition], 22
S Simple proposition, 21-2
Simple utterances, 5-6, 9, 13-5, 141,
salat [blessing/ritual prayer], 142 147
Science(s), 38, 102-3, 106-9, 110, Single dimension (jiha), 120.
112, 128-9, 148, 163n.clxxxviii; Single source (mabda’), 3, 83
higher, 107-9, 110; lower, 107-9, Singular [proposition] (makhsisa),
110 17, 19, 20
Scientific knowledge (‘ilm), 3, 87, Sixth Mood, 50
149n.i Sophisms (mughdlata), 140, 145, 147
Second conversion, 61, 158n.cii Sophistical (sufista’i) [syllogism], 4,
Second disjunctive [premise], 66 141
Second figure, 44, 46-7, 50-1, 53-4, Sophistical Fallacies, xxiv
59, 60, 67-9, 86, 157n.xcv, 157n. Sophists (mughalitin), 80, 140, 147
xcvi, 157n.xcviii Souls, 4, 38, 43, 88, 92, 94, 104, 116-
Second mood, 45, 47, 49, 51 7, 134, 136, 138
Secondary parts, 141, 149n.i Specialist sense of possible (mumkin
Secundum comparatus (al-mithal), 84 khassi), 26, 152n.xliv, 153n.lv,
Sensation, 88, 116, 134-5, 161n.cliii 154n.1x
Senses (hiss), 83, 88-9, 95, 97, 104-5, Specialists (al-khdssa) usage, 25, 37
122-3, 133, 135, 161n.clii Special-possible, 26, 150n.xxix
Sensible existence, 91
GENERAL INDEX 189
Species (naw‘), 10-3, 22-3, 103, Super-genera, 74

107-8, 108n.45, 109, 114-6, 119, Supposition (far) ), 156n.xc
130-2, 138-9, 163n.cxcvi Surface (sath), 120
Species, species of (naw‘ al- anwa’), Syllogism (qiyds), xxiv, xxv, 3-4, 32,
11 42-6, 51, 55-6, 59, 60, 62, 65, 69,
Specific (yakhussuhu), 9, 38, 81-2, 84, 71-9, 80-1, 84-5, 87-8, 95, 111-2,
89, 96, 99, 100, 103, 106, 121-2, 114, 125, 130-1, 136, 140-1, 144,
127, 148, 154n.lxxvi, 163n. 147-8, 149n.i, 154n.Ixvi, 154n.Ixx,
clxxxvi 155n.Ixxvii, 157n.xcvi, 157n.
Specific cause, 127-8 Xcviii, 157n.xcix, 158n.cxvi, 159n.
Specific difference (fasl), 10-2, 74, CXxXX, 160n.cxxxiii, 163n.cxcii
96, 115, 118-9, 136, 138, 146 Syllogism, conversion of, 78
Specification (ta‘yin), 43 Syllogism, The (Aristotle), xxi
Stars, science of (‘ilm al-nujiim), 107 Syllogistic, xxiv, xxv, xxvi, xxvii,
State (hal), 122, 144, 146 140, 144, 152n.xlvi
Statement (gawl), 14-9, 20, 25, 27, Syntax, 144
29, 30-7, 41-7, 52, 57, 63-5, 71-3, Systematically ambiguous (lafz
75, 77-8, 84-6, 88, 92-3, 96-7, mushakkak), 142
100-1, 103, 106, 117-8, 125, 131,
137, 139, 140-1, 157n.xcvi, 161n. T
cli, 161n.clv, 163n.clxxxix
Sub-contraries, 19 Takthir al-qiyas (compound
Subject (mawdi‘‘), 16, 18, 20-1, 24, syllogism), 159n.cxx
29, 32-4, 37-8, 44, 52, 67, 69, 70, Tenth [Book of the Elements] (Euclid),
74-8, 96, 100-1, 103-4, 108n.44, 109
115, 120, 124, 132, 144-6, 149n.i, Terms (hudiid), 26, 43-4, 74-5, 78,
150n.xxv, 153n.liv, 158n.cviii, 80-1, 86, 140, 131, 140, 144, 157n.
159n.cxvii, 159n.cxviii, 159n. xcv, 160n.cxxxiii
cxxix, 162n.clxxvi, 163n.clxxxvi, Tertium comparationis (ma‘na
163n.clxxxix mushabih fihi), 84
Subject matter (mawdi‘at), 99, 101- Themistius, 32, 158n.ciii
3, 105-9, 111, 148, 162n.clxxxiv, Theology (al-‘ilm al-ilahi), 102
163n.clxxxvi, 163n.clxxxviii Theophrastus, 32, 34, 158n.ciii
Substance, 8, 13, 29, 33, 35, 52, 58, Theoretical discipline (sind‘a
78, 101, 104, 109, 120, 123, 126, nazariyya), 4
138, 142-3, 147, 150n.xvi, 159n. Third figure, 44, 48, 54, 60-1, 68-9,
cxxx, 162n.clxxvi, 164n.ccxxii 86, 157n.xcix
Suitability (mundsib)[premise], 102, Third mood, 46, 48-9
115 Thought (fikr), 83, 89
Superficial logicians, 8 Time (zaman), 14, 19, 30, 33-4, 36, 38,
Superficial, 53 123, 164n.ccxxii
190 GENERAL INDEX
Totality, 43, 74, 79, 89; 90, 95, 99, Universal negative [proposition], 18,
100, 123 33, 35-9, 42, 47, 74, 154n.Ixxvi
Transferred utterance (lafz manqil), Universal negative absolute
142 [proposition], 38
Transformed (muharraf) conditionals, Universal negative contingency
65, 96 [proposition], 41
Triangle, 7-8, 12, 96, 99, 100, 103, Universal negative Major, 45-9, 50,
105, 150n.xiv 54
Tripartite [proposition], 23 Universal negative Necessity
Tripartite [utterance], 21, 23 [proposition], 39, 41-2
True/Truth, 14, 19, 20, 36-8, 42, Universal premise, 76, 85, 156n.
53-5, 58-9, 60-2, 76-7, 79, 89, Ixxxix
90-27°95=6,) 111, 117; 1335-136, Universal simple [utterance], 6, 17
140-1, 144-8, 150n.xxiv, 157n. Universal utterances (alfaz khamsa),
xcvi, 159n.cxxx, 161n.cli, 161n. 10, 19, 149n.vii see also Genus
clv (jins); Specific difference (fasl);
Truth-conditions, xxiii, xxiv, xxvi, Species (naw’‘); Property (khdssa);
XXvii, 20, 147 Accident (“arad), 10
Universality, 19, 47, 55, 101
U Universally circulated (mutawatirat),
89
Uniform [non-equivocal] manner, Universals, 33, 35-6, 42, 45, 47, 49,
26 54, 60, 63, 65-6, 69, 70, 82-4, 101,
Unique essence (dhat), 6 135, 146; affirmative, 33, 46;
Unique, 9 negative, 33
Units (ahad), 139 Universe (al-kull), 3, 83, 89, 93, 109
Unity, concept of, 149n.i Utterance, 140-3, 145, 147
Universal absolute negative, 47, 59
Universal affirmative [proposition], Vv
33, 35, 38-9, 45, 49, 54, 70, 74,
157n.xcix, 160n.cxxxi Vacuum (khala’), 83, 87, 89, 93, 98,
Universal affirmative contingency 160n.cxli
[proposition], 41-2 Verb (kalima), 14, 21
Universal affirmative Major, 48-9,
50 Ww
Universal affirmative Minor, 45, 48
Universal affirmative Necessity What (matlab ma), 97, 124
[proposition], 40, 153n.lix When (mata), 123, 164n.ccxxii
Universal conclusion, 50 Whether (matlab hal), 97-8, 100, 111,
Universal knowledge, 116 124, 150n.xvi
iy Ft os
mh he “ve
eee Which (matlab ayy), 98
GENERAL INDEX 191
Why (matlab lima), 98, 124, 127, 129

Why, demonstration of (burhan al-
lima), 96, 104, 107, 110, 112
Widespread [proposition], 80, 92-4,
96
THEOLOGY LIGRARY
CLAREMONT, CA
”*

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Avicenna’s

S. NOMANUL HAQ, Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)

Editorial Advisory Committee

MICHAEL COOK, Princeton University

EVERETT ROWSON, New York University

Studies in Islamic Philosophy

Translation and Notes by

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.

Second Impression 2014

Typeset in Gentium Book Basic

ae riKgee caret ey. Yeguet cons

General Editor’s Foreword XV

Translation of al-Najat: al-Mantiq The Deliverance: Logic

. On the FiveUtterances (alfaz khamsa)

21, On Statement (qawl)

49. On the Equivalence (mutalazimat) of Modalized

pial On Mixing Contingency and Necessity [Premises]

93. On Pre-positing (musadara) the First Problem 81

124. On Suitable [Premises] (mundsib) 102

148. On Knowledge, Intellection (‘aql), Opinion,

Our Studies in Islamic Philosophy series would hardly be true to

support to me and, as always, I must place on record my

School of Social Sciences, S. Nomanul Haq

Avicenna and the Aristotelian Organon

Avicenna’s logical work, from the earliest that has come

You should realise that most of what Aristotle’s writings have to

Somewhere around 1027, Avicenna starts to show less patience

friends’ to know that the revisions of the period of Eastern

Deliverance is, in short, one text in a chrestomathy of early

Finding Avicenna’s Logical Innovations

a short treatment of Sophistical Fallacies (because fallacious

How wretched is what the Westerners have done when they

possible propositions, and don’t for the absolute; yet being

In Pointers, he presents his own doctrine with only passing and

mentioned. Avicenna’s syllogistic is further set off from

Post-Avicennan Arabic Logic

Aristotle. Nearly every major logician after Avicenna was an

But something far more important is at stake, beyond these

Some years ago, I had produced a translation of the logic part

that I was simply an eclectic translator, but I was now two

It is clear that Danishpazth’s work alone cannot be used

[x] = my interpolation, in most cases to render a smoother

To get an uncompromisingly faithful translation of Hunt, the

to indicate where the marginal note should be inserted in the

orthography. Thus I have made adjustments in instances such

may occur on account of the matter even if the form is correct

2. On the Benefit of Logic

ii. This is the benefit of the discipline of logic. Its relation to

speech and of prosody to poetry. However, a sound nature and

3. On Simple Utterances (alfaz mufrada)

ii. We say that the simple utterance is that which signifies a

5. On the Universal (kulli) Simple Utterance

6. On the Particular Simple Utterance

7. On the Essential (dhati)

it sufficient to say that its meaning is, ‘That which neither

iii. An example is ‘man’ and ‘animal’. For if you understand

iv. As for the non-essential, well you may understand the

to it. [An example is] the [the non-essential concomitance of]

9. On What is Said in Response to

ii. Our examination revealed [as follows:] that a unique thing

10. On What is Said in Response to ‘Which

as ‘that which is said in response to ‘which is it?” so that,

11. On the Five Utterances (alfaz khamsa)”#