ART.

262 MUTILATION
AGUIRRE v. DOJ Sec

[ G. R. No. 170723, March 03, 2008 ]

GLORIA PILAR S. AGUIRRE, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
MICHELINA S. AGUIRRE-OLONDRIZ, PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, DR. JUVIDO AGATEP and DR. MARISSA B.
PASCUAL, Respondents.

A fitting riposte to the issue at hand lies in United States v. Esparcia, in which this Court had the occasion to
shed light on the implication of the term mutilation. Therein we said that:

The sole point which it is desirable to discuss is whether or not the crime committed is that defined and
penalized by article 414 of the Penal Code. The English translation of this article reads: "Any person
who shall intentionally castrate another shall suffer a penalty ranging from reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua." The Spanish text, which should govern, uses the word "castrare," inadequately
translated into English as "castrate." The word "capar," which is synonymous of "castrar," is defined in
the Royal Academic Dictionary as the destruction of the organs of generation or conception. Clearly it is
the intention of the law to punish any person who shall intentionally deprived another of any organ
necessary for reproduction. An applicable construction is that of Viada in the following language:

"At the head of these crimes, according to their order of gravity, is the mutilation known by the name of
'castration' which consists of the amputation of whatever organ is necessary for generation. The law
could not fail to punish with the utmost severity such a crime, which, although not destroying life,
deprives a person of the means to transmit it. But bear in mind that according to this article in order for
'castration' to exist, it is indispensable that the 'castration' be made purposely. The law does not look
only to the result but also to the intention of the act. Consequently, if by reason of an injury or attack, a
person is deprived of the organs of generation, the act, although voluntary, not being intentional to that
end, it would not come under the provisions of this article, but under No. 2 of article 431." (Viada,
Codigo Penal, vol. 3, p. 70. See to same effect, 4 Groizard, Codigo Penal, p. 525.)

Thus, the question is, does vasectomy deprive a man, totally or partially, of some essential organ of
reproduction? We answer in the negative.

ART. 263 SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES

MARIANO v. PEOPLE

[ G.R. No. 178145, July 07, 2014 ]REYNALDO S. MARIANO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The courts of law are hereby reminded once again to exercise care in the determination of the proper penalty
imposable upon the offenders whom they find and declare to be guilty of the offenses charged or proved. Their
correct determination is the essence of due process of law.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the petitioner with frustrated murder for hitting and
bumping Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the latter’s jeep in the information filed in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 81, in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), viz:
 That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of the motor vehicle he was then driving, with
evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, hit, bump and run over with the said
motor vehicle one Ferdinand de Leon, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which
ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Ferdinand de Leon, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon.

Contrary to law.[1]

The CA summarized the antecedent events as follows:

At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type
jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-year
old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from
the baptismal party and was driving his owner type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was
driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers.
They had just attended a worship service in Barangay Engkanto.

The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it. Ferdinand got mad,
overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the pick-up behind the jeep.
Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo
had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet
while Ferdinand hurled invectives at him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance
of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo “magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo
at pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand.” Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and they
went their separate ways.

Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house in
San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother and
alighted therefrom. However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and
lost consciousness. Urbanita shouted, “Mommy, Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie.” She identified the fast
moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.

On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand stopped
on the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6) meters away from their
pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he allowed to pass.
Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly
alighted from his jeep, lost his balance and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not
stop his pick-up and he proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his
companions. After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo
proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the incident.

Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed for two and a half
days and incurred medical expenses amounting to P17,800.00 On September 15, 1999, Ferdinand was
transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center in Quezon City, where he stayed until September 25, 1999 and
incurred medical expenses amounting to P66,243.25. He likewise spent P909.50 for medicines,
P2,900.00 for scanning, P8,000.00 for doctor’s fee and P12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers
and masseur from September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand suffered multiple facial injuries, a
fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head
trauma, as evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St. Luke’s Medical
Center. Urbanita, received the amount of P50,000.00 from Reynaldo Mariano by way of financial
assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated September 15, 1999.[2]
Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however, the RTC convicted the petitioner of frustrated
homicide,[3] to wit:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds the accused Reynaldo Mariano GUILTY for
the lesser offense of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 50
thereof and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of
Prision Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and is
hereby directed to pay the complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the amount of P196,043.25 less P50,000.00
(already given) as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On appeal, the CA promulgated its assailed decision on June 29, 2006,[5] modifying the felony committed by
the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries, ruling
thusly:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED and accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano is found
guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries and is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven
(7) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in
the amount of P58,402.75 as actual damages and P10,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[6]

In this appeal, the petitioner argues that his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, and
claims that Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere accident. He insists that he lacked criminal intent;
that he was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA should have appreciated voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance in his favor.

Ruling

We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.

The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:

Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep of Ferdinand, as
he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that
Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters away from his jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up
at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he
has known Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980 because they have a store where he used to buy
things. As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should have foreseen the possibility that Ferdinand would
alight from his jeep and go inside the house of his mother where the store is also located.

xxxx

As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate of speed and
within the control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s injuries. The very fact of
speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a
reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep
the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v. Garcia:

“A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. He is responsible for
such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through
 culpable abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would
ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.”

Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of Ferdinand, he could have
easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle,
when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at
least, minimizing his injuries.[7]

The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of both lower courts on the
circumstances that had led to the injuries of Ferdinand fully converged except for the RTC’s conclusion that
malicious intent had attended the commission of the offense. Such findings cannot be disturbed by the Court in
this appellate review, for it is a well-settled rule that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the CA, are binding and conclusive upon the Court.[8]

“Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing of
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.”[9] To constitute the
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the
motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.[10] The Prosecution must
further show the direct causal connection between the negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
In Manzanares v. People,[11] the petitioner was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and serious physical injuries because of the finding that he had driven the Isuzu truck very fast before
it smashed into a jeepney. In Pangonorom v. People,[12] a public utility driver driving his vehicle very fast was
held criminally negligent because he had not slowed down to avoid hitting a swerving car. In the absence of
any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to the CA’s observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-
up truck at a fast speed in order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake
unavoidably hit Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.

Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules
prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. “The rationale of the law,” according to People v. Medroso,
Jr.:[13]

x x x can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the carelessness, imprudence
or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent,
and resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts
must have ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We may call the mathematical
formula provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of this particular provision, the trial
court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating
circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset them.

Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting
in serious physical injuries. The error should be avoided because no person should be condemned to suffer a
penalty that the law does not prescribe or provide for the offense charged or proved. Verily, anyone judicially
declared guilty of any crime must be duly punished in accordance with the law defining the crime and
prescribing the punishment. Injustice would always result to the offender should the penalty exceed that
allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is the essence of due process of law.

The penalty for the offender guilty of reckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the resulting injuries had
his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code stipulates that had the act been
intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it would have constituted a light felony, arresto
menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code, a grave
felony is that to which the law attaches the capital punishment or a penalty that in any of its periods
is afflictive in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law
punishes with a penalty that is correctional in its maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of
the Revised Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a penalty of
either arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both is provided.

In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates the principal afflictive penalties to be reclusion

perpetua, reclusion temporal, and prision mayor; the principal correctional penalties to be prision
correccional, arresto mayor, suspension and destierro; and the light penalties to be arresto menor and fine not
exceeding P200.00. Under this provision, death stands alone as the capital punishment.

The Revised Penal Code classifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the gravity of

the physical injuries, to wit:

Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault another, shall be guilty
of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the injured person shall
become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in consequence of
the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of speech or the power to hear or to
smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member,
or shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor habitually engaged;

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in consequence of
the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have become deformed, or shall have lost any other part
of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the
work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;

4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if
the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more
than thirty days.

If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article 246, or with
attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case covered by subdivision number 1 of
this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by
subdivision number 2 by prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the
case covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods; and the
case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall
inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.

In its decision,[14] the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a fracture of the inferior
part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe head trauma; that he had become
stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and person. It was also on record that he had testified at the trial
that he was unable to attend to his general merchandise store for three months due to temporary amnesia; and
that he had required the attendance of caregivers and a masseur until October 31, 1999.

With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries did not fall
under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the petitioner’s act as a grave felony
had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the penalty at arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period. Instead, the petitioner’s act that caused
the serious physical injuries, had it been intentional, would be a less grave felony under Article 25 of
the Revised Penal Code, because Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for
having incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged in for more
than 90 days.

Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of
the Revised Penal Code are not applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum
term of imprisonment would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable,
[15]
 the Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor was the correct penalty for the
petitioner.

The Court agrees with the CA’s modification of the award of actual and moral damages amounting to
P58,402.75 and P10,000.00, respectively.

Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty. This is because the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork
in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual loss suffered, which should be based on the amounts actually expended by the
victim,[16] or other competent proof. Here, the receipts presented by the Prosecution proved the expenses
actually incurred amounting to P108,402.75, but such aggregate was reduced by the victim’s earlier receipt of
P50,000.00 from the petitioner in the form of financial assistance. Hence, the victim should recover only the
unpaid portion of P58,402.75.

Moral damages are given to ease the victim’s grief and suffering. Moral damages should reasonably
approximate the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.[17] Accordingly, the CA properly
reduced to P10,000.00 the moral damages awarded to Ferdinand.

In addition, we impose an interest of 6% per annum on the actual and moral damages reckoned from the
finality of this decision until the full payment of the obligation. This is because the damages thus fixed thereby
become a forbearance. The rate of 6% per annum is pursuant to Circular No. 799, series of 2013, issued by
the Office of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, and the pronouncement
in Nacar v. Gallery Frames.[18]

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 29, 2006, subject to the modifications
that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner shall be a straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor;
and (b) the awards for actual and moral damages shall earn 6% interest rate per annum commencing from the
finality of this decision until fully paid.

ART. 264 LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES

LACSON v. PEOPLE

[ G.R. No. 243805, September 16, 2020 ]

EDUARDO LACSON Y MANALO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

DELOS SANTOS, J.:

The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 12 September 2018 and the
Resolution[3] dated 18 December 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 40456, finding
petitioner Eduardo Lacson y Manalo (Eduardo) guilty of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
 The Facts

The case stemmed from six (6) separate Amended Informations for Attempted Homicide filed on 11 May 2011
by the Office of the City Prosecutor, City of San Fernando, Pampanga with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 1, against Eduardo, together with his co-accused
Hernani M. Lacson (Hernani), Elizer M. Lacson (Elizer), Deborah Samson-Lacson (Deborah), Adonis M.
Lacson (Adonis), and Erwin M. Lacson (Erwin; collectively, Lacsons).

The Amended Informations,[4] with the exception of the names of the victims, are similarly worded, which state:

Criminal Case No. 11-0287

That on or about the 5th day of May, 2011, in the City of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, and use personal violence upon one Gary Santos y Mallari, by then and
there hitting the latter on different parts of his body, using steel pipe, inflicting physical injuries upon
said Gary Santos y Mallari, in an attempt to end the latter's life, thereby commencing the commission of
the offen[s]e of homicide directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the crime of homicide by reason (sic) causes or acts other than the accused's own
spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely intervention of some well meaning citizens.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 11-0288

That on or about the 5th day of May, 2011, in the City of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, and use personal violence upon one Rudy Santos y Lumba, by then
and there hitting the latter on different parts of his body, using steel pipe, inflicting physical injuries upon
said Rudy Santos y Lumba, in an attempt to end the latter's life, thereby commencing the commission
of the offen[s]e of homicide directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of homicide by reason (sic) causes or acts other than the accused's own
spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely intervention of some well meaning citizens.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 11-0289

That on or about the 5th day of May, 2011, in the City of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, and use personal violence upon one Richard Santos y Mallari, by then
and there hitting the latter on different parts of his body, using steel pipe, inflicting physical injuries upon
said Richard Santos y Mallari, in an attempt to end the latter's life, thereby commencing the
commission of the offen[s]e of homicide directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of homicide by reason (sic) causes or acts other than the
accused's own spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely intervention of some well meaning
citizens.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 11-0290

 That on or about the 5th day of May, 2011, in the City of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, and use personal violence upon one Romeo Santos y Lumba, by then
and there hitting the latter on different parts of his body, using steel pipe, inflicting physical injuries upon
said Romeo Santos y Lumba, in an attempt to end the latter's life, thereby commencing the commission
of the offen[s]e of homicide directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of homicide by reason (sic) causes or acts other than the accused's own
spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely intervention of some well meaning citizens.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 11-0291

That on or about the 5th day of May, 2011, in the City of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, and use personal violence upon one Albert Santos y Mallari, by then
and there hitting the latter on different parts of his body, using steel pipe, inflicting physical injuries upon
said Albert Santos y Mallari, in an attempt to end the latter's life, thereby commencing the commission
of the offen[s]e of homicide directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of homicide by reason (sic) causes or acts other than the accused's own
spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely intervention of some well meaning citizens.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 11-0292

That on or about the 5th day of May, 2011, in the City of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack, and use personal violence upon one Rommel Santos y Mallari, by then
and there hitting the latter on different parts of his body, using steel pipe, inflicting physical injuries upon
said Rommel Santos y Mallari, in an attempt to end the latter's life, thereby commencing the
commission of the offen[s]e of homicide directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime of homicide by reason (sic) causes or acts other than the
accused's own spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely intervention of some well meaning
citizens.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, the Lacsons all pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.[5]

The prosecution presented six witnesses: (1) Rommel M. Santos (Rommel); (2) Gary M. Santos (Gary); (3)
Richard M. Santos (Richard); (4) Rowena L. Santos-Cunanan (Rowena): (5) Romeo L. Santos (Romeo); and
(6) Dr. Duane P. Cordero (Dr. Cordero).[6]

The prosecution summarized their version of the facts as follows:

On 5 May 2011, at around 9:00 P.M., Gary, Arnold Santos (Arnold), Eliza Santos (Eliza), and Joyce
Ann Santos (Joyce Ann) arrived in their house at Sitio Boulevard, Barangay San Agustin, City of San
Fernando, Pampanga. The group told Romeo, Rommel, Richard, and Albert Santos (Albert;
collectively, Santoses) that they were being chased and stoned by the Lacsons.[7]
 Arnold then left but while he was running towards the Lacsons' house, the group followed and tried to
pacify him, but they failed. Upon reaching the Lacsons' house, Arnold had a heated discussion with
Hernani and Elizer. Moments later, Rudy Santos (Rudy), who resides at the back of the Lacsons'
house, arrived.[8]

Deborah, Hernani's wife, brought out a steel pipe out of their house and told Hernani "Oyni ing tubo
pamalwan mu la!" (Here is a steel pipe, hit them). Eduardo responded by hitting Arnold's head with a
steel pipe. The Santoses wanted to help Arnold who fell on the ground but the Lacsons likewise
attacked them using steel pipes. As a result, Rommel, Gary, Richard, and Romeo sustained injuries on
their heads and different parts of their bodies.[9]

When the barangay patrol arrived, Richard, Rommel, Romeo, and Gary, together with Albert and Rudy, were
brought to Jose B. Lingad Memorial General Hospital, where they were treated by Dr. Cordero, the resident
physician on duty at the Department of Surgery.[10]

Later on, Arnold died. A separate criminal case for Attempted Homicide was filed against Eduardo.[11]

Dr. Cordero cited mauling as the cause of the injuries and issued the Santoses' respective Medical Certificates
summarized as follows:[12]

Name Injuries Suffered Periods of Healing

Richard Cerebral concussion with lacerated wound;
eyebrow, right, lacerated wound; occipital area
secondary to mauling
Rommel Lacerated wound on parietal area; periorbital
edema secondary to mauling; hemorrhage, left
frontal, ethmoid and maxillary sinuses
Romeo Lacerated wound on temporal, auricular, and
parietal areas, secondary to mauling; complete,
displaced fracture, middle third of the left ulna,
radiopaque foreign bodies, middle third of the right
forearm
Gary Contusion hematoma on the parietal area, left;
complete, non-displace fracture involving the distal
third of the right radius; the right wrist joint space is
narrowed; the left hand and left foot are
unremarkable
Barring complication, the injuries will
require a period more than 30 days of
healing
Barring complication, the injuries will
require a period of 2 weeks of healing
Barring complication, the injuries will
require a period of 6-8 weeks of healing
Barring complication, the injuries will
require a period of more than 30 days of
healing

Prosecution evidence also showed that Rudy and Albert sustained injuries requiring a period of two (2) weeks
of healing, However, while Rudy and Albert submitted their respective judicial affidavits, they were not
presented to testify and affirm the same. Thus, the Lacsons were not given the opportunity to confront them.[13]

On the other hand, Adonis and Erwin were not arrested. Thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons.[14]

After the presentation of the prosecution's testimonial evidence and the subsequent formal offer of its
documentary evidence, the defense failed to present any witness. The MTCC declared the Lacsons' right to
present evidence as waived. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.[15]

In a Joint Decision[16] dated 18 February 2016, the MTCC found the Lacsons guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
not of the crime of Attempted Homicide as charged, but of Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 of
the RPC. The MTCC declared that intent to kill, an essential element of Attempted Homicide, was not clearly
and convincingly proved by the prosecution. Absent such intent to kill, the offender would be liable
for physical injuries only. The MTCC stated that the evidence showed that the alleged mauling started when
Arnold, followed by Gary and the rest of the Santoses, went to accost Hernani and Elizer in front of the
Lacsons' house. With the number of the Santoses and the Lacsons and their sudden engagement in the brawl,
the MTCC held that the infliction of the injuries was indiscriminately done and not deliberately aimed at specific
portions of the victims' bodies. Thus, the MTCC declared that the prosecution was able to prove conspiracy but
failed to prove the element of intent to kill which downgraded the crime committed.[17] The dispositive portion
states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11-0287

Accused Hernani Lacson y Manansala, Eduardo Lacson y Manalo, Elizer Lacson y Manansala and Deborah
Samson-Lacson are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11-0288

Accused Hernani Lacson y Manansala, Eduardo Lacson y Manalo, Elizer Lacson y Manansala and Deborah
Samson-Lacson are ACQUITTED of the charge of Attempted Homicide due to insufficiency of evidence.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11-0289

Accused Hernani Lacson y Manansala, Eduardo Lacson y Manalo, Elizer Lacson y Manansala and Deborah
Samson-Lacson are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11-0290

Accused Hernani Lacson y Manansala, Eduardo Lacson y Manalo, Elizer Lacson y Manansala and Deborah
Samson-Lacson are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11-0291

Accused Hernani Lacson y Manansala, Eduardo Lacson y Manalo, Elizer Lacson y Manansala and Deborah
Samson-Lacson are ACQUITTED of the charge of Attempted Homicide due to insufficiency of evidence.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11-0292

Accused Hernani Lacson y Manansala, Eduardo Lacson y Manalo, Elizer Lacson y Manansala and Deborah
Samson-Lacson are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries defined and penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period.

In addition, the accused are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay the private complainants actual
damages in the amount of Pesos Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Three (PhP13,363.00) Philippine
Currency for hospital expenses and Pesos Fifty Thousand (PhP50,000.00) Philippine Currency for legal
expenses incurred.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Eduardo filed an Appeal,[19] in Criminal Cases Nos. 11-0287, 11-0289, 11-0290, and 11-0292, with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 22292 to 22295.

Ruling of the RTC

In a Joint Decision[20] dated 30 January 2017, the RTC affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTCC. The
dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision of the MTCC, Br. I of City of San Fernando,
Pampanga dated February 18, 2016, in Criminal Case Nos. 11-0287, 11-0289, 11-0290, and 11-0292, finding
accused appellant Eduardo Lacson y Manalo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
of less serious physical injuries is AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED.[21]

Eduardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] but was denied by the RTC in a Joint Order[23] dated 14
September 2017 for lack of merit.

Eduardo filed a Petition for Review[24] with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision[25] dated 12 September 2018, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed in toto the findings of
the RTC. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed January 30, 2017 Joint Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, Pampanga, Branch 44, in Criminal Case Nos. M-22292-95, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[26]

Eduardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration[27] which was denied in a Resolution[28] dated 18 December 2018.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

Whether or not the CA erred in finding Eduardo guilty of the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries despite
that (1) his participation in inflicting any injury to any of private complainants was never established, and (2)
conspiracy was not proven.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Eduardo contends that the brawl should be considered as a tumultuous affray under Article 252 of the RPC
and that Article 265 of the RPC is inapplicable. Eduardo avers that even if tumultuous affray is found to have
occurred, he could not be held liable since in Article 252, the person who used violence must be identified, but
no such evidence was adduced against him. Also, Eduardo argues that conspiracy in this case was not
proven.

Article 252[29] of the RPC states:

 ART. 252. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. - When in a tumultuous affray as referred to
in the preceding article, only serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the participants thereof and the
person responsible thereof cannot be identified, all those who appear to have used violence upon the
person of the offended party shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that provided for
the physical injuries so inflicted.

When the physical injuries inflicted are of a less serious nature and the person responsible therefor

cannot be identified, all those who appear to have used any violence upon the person of the offended
party shall be punished by arresto mayor from five to fifteen days.

In Wacoy v. People,[30] We held that a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between
several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some
person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.[31]

In the present case, the dispute was between two distinct groups of individuals – the Santoses and the
Lacsons. The records provide that the Santoses, namely Gary, Amold, Eliza, and Joyce Ann were chased and
stoned by some members of the Lacson family. Upon reaching their house, they told the rest of the Santos
family, namely Romeo, Rommel, Richard, and Albert what happened. Arnold then ran ahead to the Lacsons'
house and had a heated discussion with Hernani and Elizer. Eduardo, armed with a steel pipe given by
Deborah, hit Amold on the head and proceeded to hit the other members of the Santos family. The Lacsons,
who by then had more steel pipes at their disposal, attacked the Santoses, who were not able to fight back and
defend themselves. Clearly, this was a definite attack on the Santoses by the Lacsons, an identified
group, and not a case of tumultuous affray where the assault occurred in a confused and disorganized
manner, resulting in death or injuries of the ones involved, and the person responsible could not be
determined. Here, Eduardo was sufficiently identified as the person who first hit Arnold on the head using a
steel pipe then continued on to inflict injuries to the other members of the Santos family, with the help of the
Lacsons.

Thus, We agree with the appellate and trial courts that Eduardo is guilty of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries under Article 265 of the RPC, which states:

ART. 265. Less serious physical injuries. - Any person who shall inflict upon

another physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the
offended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same period,
shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.

The law is clear that to be held liable for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries, the offender must have
inflicted physical injuries to the offended party, and that the inflicted injuries incapacitated the offended party for
labor or would require him medical assistance for ten (10) days or more.

In this case, the prosecution established that the injuries suffered by the victims required varying periods of
healing from two (2) weeks to eight (8) weeks. Dr. Cordero, the attending physician, testified and gave a
detailed description of the injuries that they suffered and the accompanying amount of time they needed to rest
and heal from such injuries.

In the similar case of Mupas v. People,[32] where the Information charged petitioners with Frustrated Homicide,
we ruled upon a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of Less Serious Physical Injuries. We held that when
intent to kill is lacking but wounds were inflicted on the victim, the crime is not frustrated homicide
but less serious physical injuries, considering that (1) the latter offense is necessarily included in the former,
and since the essential ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense
of homicide; and (2) the attending physician's opinion that the wounds sustained by the victim would take two
(2) weeks to heal. The penalty imposed was imprisonment of four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto
mayor in its maximum period. In some other cases[33] where we upheld Article 265 of the RPC, we imposed the
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day to four (4) months of arresto mayor in the medium
period.
Here, since the Santoses suffered physical injuries incapacitating them for a longer time of two (2) weeks to
eight (8) weeks, the duration of the penalty of arresto mayor is for the maximum period of six (6) months.

With regard to the allegation that conspiracy was not proven, We agree with the appellate and trial courts that
conspiracy was adequately shown. Article 8 of the RPC states:

ART. 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. - x x x

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.

Direct proof is not required to prove conspiracy. In a number of cases,[34] the Court ruled that conspiracy
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. It may be established through the collective acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of a felony, all the accused aimed at the same object, one
performing one part and the other performing another for the attainment of the same objective; and that their
acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of
personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.[35]

Here, the Lacsons were convincingly presented to have acted in unison in attacking the Santoses with steel
pipes. The conduct of the Lacsons, before, during, and after the commission of the crime, showed that they
possessed a joint and conceited purpose to assault the Santoses after chasing, hurling a beer bottle at them,
and witnessing the heated discussion between some of their family members and Arnold, which escalated to a
full-on attack. The Santoses had no means of defense, lacking the strength in numbers of the Lacsons who
possessed steel pipes as weapons which caused injuries to their heads and different parts of their bodies.
Thus, the act of one becomes the act of all and the Lacsons must be held accountable for their actions.

In sum, We affirm the conviction of Eduardo for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries in Criminal Case
Nos. 22292 to 22295 and he is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months
of arresto mayor for each count, and ordered to pay the victims, jointly and severally with other co-accused, the
amounts of P13,363.00 as actual damages for hospital expenses, and P50,000.00 as legal expenses. Also, to
conform with prevailing jurisprudence,[36] We award moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 for each count.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 12 September 2018 and the Resolution dated 18
December 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40456 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Eduardo Lacson
y Manalo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime
of Less Serious Physical Injuries, defined and penalized under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, and he
is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor for each count,
and ordered to pay the victims jointly and severally with his co-accused: (1) actual damages of P13,363.00 for
hospital expenses; (2) legal expenses of P50,000.00; and (3) moral damages of P5,000.00 for each count, with
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) interest per annum, from the date of finality of this Decision until full
payment for each count.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., (Chairperson), Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.

Baltazar-Padilla, J., on leave.

ART. 266 SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT

CALAOAGAN v. PEOPLE

FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 222974, March 20, 2019 ]

JEFFREY CALAOAGAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:

This appeal by certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the February 9, 2016 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35518. The CA affirmed the November 5, 2012 Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan, Branch 53 (RTC), finding Jeffrey Calaoagan (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 10(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 ("Special Protection of Children
Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act") in Criminal Case No. 4877-R; and modifying the RTC
decision in Criminal Case No. 4878-R finding appellant guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Antecedents

Two separate Informations for violation of R.A. No. 7610 were filed against petitioner before the RTC for the
alleged physical maltreatment of minors AAA and BBB.[4] The accusatory portions of the informations state:

Criminal Case No. 4877-R:

That on or about the 31st day of October, 2004 at around 12:00 midnight,
in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and for no apparent
reason[,] physical[ly] maltreat[ed] the complainant AAA, a minor of about 15 years of age[,] by hitting
him with a stone on his left shoulder, thus place (sic) him in an embarrasing (sic) and shameful situation
in the eyes of the public.

Contrary to Article VI, Section 10(a), Republic Act 7610.[5]

Criminal Case No. 4878-R:

That on or about the 31st day of October, 2004, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight,
in xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and for no apparent reason[,]
physically maltreat the complainant BBB, a minor of about 17 years of age[,] by punching his face and
head, thus place (sic) him in an embarrasing (sic) and shameful situation in the eyes of the public.

Contrary to Article VI, Section 10(a), Republic Act 7610.[6]

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.[7] Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the private offended parties AAA and BBB, and Dr. Raul Castaños[8] (Dr.
Castaños), medico-legal officer. Their testimonies established the following:

AAA was born on December 18, 1988, while BBB was born on September 21, 1987.[9] They alleged that at
around 12:00 midnight on October 31, 2004, they were on their way home
to xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, when they encountered petitioner accompanied by two persons.
Petitioner, seemingly annoyed by AAA and BBB, brought AAA near the church and hit AAA's right shoulder
with a stone. BBB followed petitioner and AAA, which prompted petitioner to punch BBB on the right cheek.[10]

Dr. Castaños conducted a medical examination on AAA and BBB. The examination showed that AAA suffered
from "confluent abrasion" on the left shoulder and "soft tissue contusion" in the deltoid area; while BBB bore a
"soft tissue contusion" on the left periorbital area and on the right occipital parietal area of the head.[11]

Version of the Defense

Petitioner had a different version of the events at midnight of October 31, 2004. He averred that he and his two
companions passed by a group of persons which included AAA and BBB. The group shouted "Hoy!" at them,
which impelled him to shout back "Hoy!" at the group. Thereafter, AAA and BBB's group started hurling stones
at him and his companions, which made them run to petitioner's house. AAA and BBB's group then pelted
stones at petitioner's house, prompting petitioner to call the police. After the police had responded and left,
AAA and BBB returned to petitioner's house. Petitioner claimed that he saw BBB carrying a knife and
attempting to attack his sister, Jennifer Malong (Jennifer). Consequently, petitioner picked up a bamboo stick
and swung it towards AAA and BBB.[12] However, he claimed that he did not know whom he hit while swinging
the bamboo stick.[13] Thereafter, when he saw other persons entering his gates, petitioner ran inside his house.
After the incident, Jennifer went to the police station to report the incident.[14]

The RTC Ruling

In its November 5, 2012 Decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of Other Acts of Child Abuse, as defined and penalized under Sec. 10, par. (a) of R.A. No. 7610. Accordingly, it
sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, in each of the two (2) cases.[15]

The RTC held that petitioner physically maltreated AAA and BBB. Thus, it ruled that petitioner committed two
(2) counts of violation of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case Nos. 4877-R and 4878-R. The RTC
gave credence to AAA and BBB's straightforward testimonies despite the variance between their testimony
and the medical findings.[16]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its February 9, 2016 Decision, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction in Criminal Case No. 4877-R for
physically maltreating AAA. It ruled that petitioner had struck AAA, then a minor. It accorded respect to the
findings of the RTC in giving merit to the testimonies of AAA and BBB as corroborated by their medical
examinations. The CA opined that despite the variance between the testimonies of AAA and BBB and the
results of the medical examination, there was no cogent reason to discount AAA and BBB's testimonies.
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 4877-R, it awarded moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, with an
interest rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until its full payment.[17]

However, in Criminal Case No. 4878-R, the CA held that petitioner was not liable for violating Sec. 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610 for assaulting BBB. Instead, it ruled that petitioner was only guilty
of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the RPC because BBB was allegedly already eighteen (18)
years old at the time of the incident. Consequently, in this case, the CA sentenced petitioner to suffer the
penalty of arresto menor and ordered him to pay P20,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as
temperate damages, with an interest rate of 6% per annum from the finality of the decision until its full
payment.[18]

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF R.A. No. 7610 IN CRIM. CASE NO.
4877-R BY GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT AAA THAT HE WAS
MAULED BY THE ACCUSED WHO HIT HIM SEVERAL TIMES ON THE LEFT SIDE OF HIS FACE AND
WHO ALSO HIT HIM WITH A STONE ON HIS RIGHT SHOULDER, CONTRARY TO THE MEDICO-LEGAL
FINDINGS.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
IN CRIM. CASE NO. 4878-R OF THE CRIME OF PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED
UNDER ARTICLE 266(1) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BY GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT BBB THAT HE WAS PUNCHED BY THE ACCUSED ONCE ON HIS RIGHT
CHEEK, CONTRARY TO THE MEDICO-LEGAL CERTIFICATE FINDINGS.[19]

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision because AAA's testimony was not consistent
with the results of the medical examination showing that the injury sustained was "confluent abrasion, shoulder
left, soft tissue contusion deltoid area." Likewise, he claims that the CA erred in convicting him
of slight physical injuries under the RPC because BBB's testimony was contrary to the medical examination
findings that the injury sustained was "soft tissue contusion, shoulder left, soft tissue contusion, occipital
parietal area head, right."[20]

In its Comment,[21] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the People of the Philippines,
countered that the issues in the petition constitute questions of fact. As such, the petition must be
dismissed for being contrary to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The OSG also argues that the petition seeks
a review of the factual viability of the findings of the courts a quo in arriving at their verdicts, without presenting
a question of law. Further, it claims that petitioner is guilty of child abuse under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 for
hitting AAA, and is likewise guilty of slight physical injuries for striking BBB.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is partly meritorious.

Generally, a question of fact

cannot be entertained by the
Court; exceptions

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.[22] Well-settled is the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts. Its function in petitions for review on
certiorari is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.[23]

Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule: (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings
of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of
the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.[24]

In this case, two exceptions exist, particularly, that the judgment of the CA was based on misapprehension of
facts and that the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts. Thus, as the exception applies, the Court
may then entertain a question of fact, such as the existence of the elements of the crimes charged.

Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 requires an

intent to debase, degrade, or demean
the intrinsic worth of a child victim.

In Criminal Case No. 4877-R, petitioner was charged with violating Sec. 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610,
which states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, child abuse is defined by Sec. 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. —

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.[25] (emphasis supplied)
Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes an act when it constitutes as child abuse. In relation thereto, Sec. 3(b) of
the same law highlights that in child abuse, the act by deeds or words must debase, degrade, or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Debasement is defined as the act of reducing the value,
quality, or purity of something; degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character
or quality; while demean means to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character.[26]

When this element of intent to debase, degrade or demean is present, the accused must be convicted
of violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, which carries a heavier penalty compared to that
of slight physical injuries under the RPC.[27]

In Bongalon v. People,[28] the petitioner therein was charged under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 because he
struck and slapped the face of a minor, which were done at the spur of the moment and in anger. The Court
ruled that only when the accused intends to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child as a
human being should it be punished with child abuse under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. Otherwise, the act
must be punished for physical injuries under the RPC. It was emphasized therein that the records must
establish a specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being as it is the essential element in the crime of child abuse. As the prosecution failed to establish the said
intent, the petitioner therein was only convicted of slight physical injuries.

Comparably, in Jabalde v. People,[29] the petitioner slapped and struck a minor as an offshoot of the former's
emotional rage. In the absence of any intention to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child
victim, the Court declared that the act of the petitioner was merely slight physical injuries punishable under the
RPC, since there was no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of any required
medical attendance. Underscored is that the essential element of intent must be established with the
prescribed degree of proof required for a successful prosecution under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

More recently, in Escolano v. People,[30] the Court held that the petitioner's act of shouting invectives against
private complainants does not constitute child abuse since petitioner had no intent to debase the intrinsic
dignity of the child. The Court opined that petitioner's acts therein were done in the heat of anger because
sachets of ketchup were thrown at her by the minors involved. As such, the Court held that the petitioner was
only guilty of other light threats under the RPC.

On the other hand, in Lucido v. People,[31] the petitioner maltreated an eight-year old child through numerous
and repeated acts of strangulation, pinching, and beating causing the said child to limp. The Court then held
that these acts of abuse were intrinsically cruel and excessive because these impair the child's dignity and
worth as a human being and infringe upon the child's right to grow up in a safe, wholesome, and harmonious
environment.
Prosecution failed to prove intent
to debase, degrade or demean.

In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution did not present any iota of evidence to show petitioner's intent
to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child victim. The records do not show that petitioner's
act of hitting the victims had been intended to place the latter in an embarrassing, shameful, and demeaning
situation. There was no indication that petitioner had any specific intent to humiliate and degrade AAA and
BBB.

On the contrary, the Court finds that petitioner inflicted the injuries in the heat of argument. AAA and BBB claim
that it was petitioner's group that first annoyed the former's group; while petitioner claims that it was AAA and
BBB's group that initiated the shouting match. Nevertheless, it is clear that the altercation between AAA, BBB,
and petitioner only occurred when their groups met on the street without any prior confrontation.

As observed in the cases of Bongalon, Jabalde, and Escolano, when the infliction

of physical injuries against a minor is done at the spur of the moment, it is imperative for the
prosecution to prove a specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child;
otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

Verily, as the prosecution in this case failed to specify any intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic
worth of AAA and BBB, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

Petitioner committed the crime

of slight physical injuries.

Even though there was no intent to debase, degrade or demean, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC and
the CA that petitioner struck AAA with a stone on his shoulder and hit BBB, causing physical injuries. While
there may be some minor inconsistencies in the exact location of the injuries based on the testimonies of AAA
and BBB and the medical findings of Dr. Castaños, it was established that petitioner assaulted AAA and BBB.
Petitioner even admitted that he swung a bamboo stick towards AAA and BBB in the altercation.

In Criminal Case No. 4877-R, petitioner is found guilty of slight physical injuries under the RPC for assaulting
AAA. The prosecution was not able to present any evidence of actual incapacity of AAA for labor or of a
required medical attendance as a result; nor was there proof as to the period of AAA's incapacity for labor or of
a required medical attendance. Nevertheless, under Art. 266 of the RPC, an offender may still
commit slight physical injury even if the inflicted injuries did not require medical assistance or there was no
proof of the victim's incapacity.

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 4878-R, the CA found that BBB was no longer a minor on the date of
the incident on October 31, 2004, because he was already eighteen (18) years old. However, the CA's finding
is incorrect. BBB's Certificate of Live Birth[32] shows that he was born on September 21, 1987. Thus, he was a
minor being only seventeen (17) years, one (1) month, and ten (10) days old at the time of the incident.

Nonetheless, even if BBB was still a minor, the Court affirms that petitioner is guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 4878-R because the prosecution failed to prove the specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of the child. Petitioner's act of hitting BBB resulted in
the latter's injuries requiring medical attendance for one (1) to nine (9) days, which is within the definition
of slight physical injuries.

The crime of slight physical injuries is punishable under Article 266 of the RPC as amended by R.A. No.
10951,[33] to wit:
Section 61. Article 266 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.— The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one (1) day to nine (9) days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) and censure when the
offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended party from engaging in his habitual
work nor require medical assistance.

3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) when the
offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.

Accordingly, in Criminal Case Nos. 4877-R and 4878-R, petitioner committed two (2) counts
of slight physical injuries. Thus, he is sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of arresto menor of twenty (20)
days for each count.

The award of damages

Under par. (1), Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting
in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock
suffered by the victim and his family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An award requires no
proof of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
moral damages is appropriate for less serious, as well as slight physical injuries.[34] In this case, the CA
awarded P20,000.00 as moral damages. However, petitioner only committed slight physical injuries against
AAA and BBB. Thus, the award of moral damages to AAA and BBB must be reduced to P5,000.00.[35]

On the other hand, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than actual or
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered,
but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[36] As such, its award is premised
on the fact that actual damages could have been recovered were it not for the fact that the precise amount of
damages could not be accurately ascertained. In other words, if a party-claimant had not suffered any
damages, no damages, either actual nor temperate, are recoverable.[37]

In this case, the CA simply awarded temperate damages to BBB because he suffered pecuniary loss for the
treatment of his injuries, although the actual amount could not be determined. However, there was no
discussion on the facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged pecuniary loss. BBB neither asserted that
he suffered any pecuniary loss nor any kind of loss of earning capacity as to justify the temperate damages
awarded by the CA. As such, the Court deletes the award of P20,000.00 as temperate damages for lack of
factual basis.[38]

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The February 9, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 35518 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner Jeffrey Calaoagan
is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of Slight Physical Injuries under paragraph
1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code. He is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of 20 days of arresto
menor for each count and to pay AAA and BBB the amount of P5,000.00 each as moral damages for each
count, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment until full
payment.

SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo,** (Acting Chairperson), Carandang, and Lazaro-Javier,*** JJ., concur.

Bersamin, C.J., on official business.

SABAY v. PEOPLE

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 192150               October 1, 2014

FEDERICO SABAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 23, 2009 and the
resolution3 dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.

The CA affirmed the April 28, 2008 decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 126,
finding petitioner Federico Sabay guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries.
The RTC decision in tum affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court's (MTC) judgment.

The Antecedent Facts

At around three o’clock to four o’clock in the afternoon of June 12, 2001, while the petitioner and his daughter
Erlinda Sabay (Erlinda) were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of Godofredo Lopez (Godofredo),
the latter confronted the petitioner about his (the petitioner’s) alleged intrusion into Godofredo’s property. A
verbal altercation ensued between them.

In the course of the verbal exchange, Erlinda hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object. The petitioner
joined in by throwing a stone at Godofredo’s face, breaking the latter’s eyeglasses. Godofredo claimed that as
a result, he felt dizzy.5 The petitioner and Erlinda then shouted at Godofredo and threatened to kill him.

Immediately thereafter, Jervie Lopez (Jervie) came and pacified the three. But in the course his efforts, he was
hit in the hand with a bolo.6 The neighbors intervened not long after and pacified the parties.

The Medico Legal Certificates7 dated June 12, 2001 showed that Godofredo suffered a contusion on the left
parietal area of his head and an abrasion in his left cheek, while Jerviesustained a wound in his right palm.

On June 13, 2001, Godofredo and Jervie filed a complaint against the petitioner before the barangay.8 The
parties agreed to settle the complaint based on the recommendation of the building inspector and reflected
their agreement in their Kasunduang Pag-aayos9 (Kasunduan) dated June 20, 2001. The Kasunduan,
however, was not implemented because the building inspector failed to make the promised recommendation to
resolve the boundary dispute between the parties.10 Thus, the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a
Certificate to File an Action.

The petitioner was accordingly charged before the MTC with the crime of Physical Injuries under two (2)
Informations11 that read:

Criminal Case No. 209934

That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously hit with a bolo one JERVIE LOPEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which
required and will require medical attendance for not more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will
incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work for the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 209935

That on or about the 12th day of June 2001, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously hit with a bolo one GODOFREDO LOPEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries
which required and will require medical attendance for not more than seven (7) days or incapacitated or will
incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work for the same period of time.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The petitioner, together with his daughter Erlinda, was also charged with Light Threats12 for allegedly uttering
threatening words against the private complainant, Godofredo.

When arraigned, both accused pleadednot guilty to all the charges. Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following eyewitnesses: Rodolfo Lata, Sr. y Dolping (Rodolfo) and
Dina Perez y Alapaap (Dina) (who both testified on the details of the crime); Godofredo; Jervie; and Dr.
Melissa Palugod (Godofredo’s attending physician). The defense, on the other hand, presented the petitioner,
Wilfredo Verdad and Caridad Sabay.

The petitioner denied the charge and claimed that he had simply acted in self-defense. He narrated that on the
date of the incident while he was putting a monument on his lot, Godofredo suddenly hit him with an iron bar in
his right hand, causing him injuries. Jesus Lopez (Jessie), Godofredo’s son, went out of their house and with
a .38 caliber gun, fired the gun at him. To defend himself, he got a stone and threw it at Godofredo.

The MTC’s and the RTC’s Rulings

In its decision, MTC believed the prosecution's version of the incident and found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight physical injuries. The MTC, however, dismissed the light threats
charged, as this offense is deemed absorbed in the crime of slight physical injuries. Further, it absolved Erlinda
for the crime of light threats as there was no allegation that she uttered threatening words against Godofredo.

The MTC rejected the petitioner’s claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting
evidence. The MTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that there had been unlawful aggression by
Godofredo; he did not even present the medical certificate of his injury as evidence. The dispositive partof its
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Federico Sabay y Bactol is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for two (2) counts of Slight Physical Injuries and is meted a penalty of imprisonment of Eleven
(11) Days for each count as there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance.

SO ORDERED.

In due course, the petitioner appealed his judgment to the RTC, which fully affirmed the MTC’s decision.

The petitioner sought recourse with the CA, arguing in this appeal that: (1) the MTC has no jurisdiction over the
case in view of the prosecution’s failure to offer the Certification to File an Action in evidence; and (2) the trial
court erred in not sustaining his claim of self-defense.

The CA’s Ruling

The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s decision. The CA held that even if there
had been no formal offer of exhibit pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence, the Certification
to File an Action could still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, it has been incorporated into the records of the case. Noting that the
Certification to File an Action was identified by the complainants and is attached to the records of the case, the
CA ruled that an exception to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence could be recognized.
The CA also dismissed the petitioner’s plea of self-defense. The CA ruled that self-defense is essentially a
factual matter that isbest addressed by the trial court; in the absence of any showing that both the MTC and
the RTC overlooked weighty and substantial facts or circumstances that could alter their conclusion, the
appellate court saw no reason to disturb their factual ruling.

On March 22, 2010, the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.

The Issues

On the basis of the same arguments raised before the CA, the petitioner questions: (1) the jurisdiction of the
MTC over the criminal cases in view of the alleged inadmissibility ofthe Certification to File Action; and (2) the
lower court’s finding of guilt, its appreciation of the evidence and its rejection of the claim of self-defense.

The Court’s Ruling

We find no reversible error committed by the CA and affirm the petitioner’s conviction for two counts of slight
physical injuries.

On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the lower courts erred in disregarding the existence of the
Kasunduan executed by the parties before the Lupon. This existing settlement between the parties rendered
the Certification to File an Action without factual and legal basis, and is hence null and void. The petitioner also
contendsthat the CA erred in not holding that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the criminal cases in view of the
noncompliance (i.e., issuance of the Certification toFile an Action despite the existence of an agreement) with
conciliation procedures under Presidential Decree No. 1508.

We see no merit in these contentions.

The Office of the Barangay Captain Cannot be Precluded From Issuing a Certification to File an Action Where
NoActual Settlement Was Reached; the Certification to File an Action

Issued by The Office of The Barangay is Valid.

The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Luponfor conciliation prior to the institution of the
criminal cases before the MTC. The parties in fact admitted that a meeting before the Lupontranspired
between them, resulting in a Kasunduan.

Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduanthat embodied their agreement was never
implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the building inspector failed to make his promised
recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay Captain was thus compelled to issue a Certification to
File an Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any settlement.

The CA correctly observed and considered the situation: the settlement of the case was conditioned on the
recommendation of the building inspector; with no recommendation, no resolution of the conflict likewise took
place.

Furthermore, the BarangayCaptain, as a public official, is presumed to act regularly in the performance of
official duty.13 In the absence of contrary evidence, this presumption prevails; his issuance of the disputed
Certification to File an Action was regular and pursuant to law.14 Thus, the Barangay Captain properly issued
the Certification to File an Action.

Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain’s issuance of the Certification toFile
and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the criminal
cases before the MTC. As we held in Diu v. Court of Appeals:15
Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and
non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the
subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. Similarly, in Garces v. Court of Appeals,16 we
stated that:

In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is
not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

Thus, the MTC has jurisdiction to try and hear the petitioner’s case; the claimed irregularity in conciliation
procedure, particularly in the issuance of the Certification to File an Action, did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction. If at all, the irregularity merely affected the parties’ cause of action. 17

The petitioner next contends thateven if there was a valid Certification to File an Action, the lower courts still
erred in admitting the Certificate into evidence as the prosecution did not formally offer it as required by the
Rules on Evidence. He emphasizes that in Fideldia v. Sps. Mulato,18 the Court held that a formal offer is
necessary because judges are required to base their findings solely upon evidence offered by the parties. In
the absence of a formal offer, the Certification is not admissible pursuant to Section 412 of Republic Act No.
7160, and cannot be considered by the court.

We do not find this argument sufficiently persuasive.

The Certification to File an Action is Admissible.

Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any evidence that has
not been formally offered.19 Formal offer means that the offering party shall inform the court of the purpose of
introducing its exhibits into evidence, to assist the court in ruling on their admissibility in case the adverse party
objects.20 Without a formal offer of evidence, courts cannot take notice of this evidence even if this has been
previously marked and identified.

This rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in the appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer
rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted.

The cases of People v. Napat-a,21 People v. Mate,22 and The Heirs of Romana Saves, et al. v. The Heirs of
Escolastico Saves, et al.,23 to cite a few, enumerated the requirements so that evidence, not previously offered,
can be admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

In the present case, we find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present. As the
lower courts correctly observed, Godofredo identified the Certification to File an Action during his cross-
examination, to wit:24

Q: And I’m referring to you this Certification from the Office of the Brgy. docketed as 181-01, is this the one you
are referring to?

A: This is with respect to the hitting of my head.

Atty. Bihag: At this juncture, your Honor, we would like to request that this particular certification referring to the
case 181-01 entitled Mr. Godofredo Lopez, Mr. Jervie Lopez versus Mr. Federico Sabay and Mrs. Erlinda
Castro, be marked as Exh. "1" for the defense. [TSN, Godofredo Lopez, page 119; emphasis ours.]

Although the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit "1" and attached to
the records of the case.25 Significantly, the petitioner never objected to Godofredo’s testimony, particularly with
the identification and marking of the Certification. In these lights, the Court sees no reason why the
Certification should not be admitted.
 The Claim of Self-Defense

On the claim of self-defense, we recognize that the factual findings and conclusions of the RTC, especially
when affirmed by the CA as in this case, are entitled to great weight and respect and are deemed final and
conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.26

In the absence of any indication that the trial and the appellate courts overlooked facts or circumstances that
would result in a different ruling in this case, we will not disturb their factual findings.27

We thus uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of the crime of slight physical
injuries fully established during the trial. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected the petitioner’s claim of self-
defense because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing proof.

Self-defense as a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
implies the admission by the accused that he committed the acts that would have been criminal in character
had it not been for the presence of circumstances whose legal consequences negate the commission of a
crime.28 The plea of self-defense in order to exculpate the accused must be duly proven. The most basic rule is
that no self-defense can be recognized until unlawful aggression is established.29

Since the accused alleges self-defense, he carries the burden of evidence to prove that he satisfied the
elements required by law;30 he who alleges must prove. By admitting the commission of the act charged
and pleading avoidance based on the law, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence to prove that the
facts that the legal avoidance requires are present; the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence is immaterial
after he admitted the commission of the act charged.31

In this case, the petitioner admitted the acts attributed to him, and only pleads that he acted in self-defense.
His case essentially rests on the existence of unlawful aggression – that Godofredo hit him with an iron bar on
his right hand.

As the RTC and the CA pointed out, the petitioner failed to substantiate his claimed self-defense because he
did not even present any medical certificate as supporting evidence, notwithstanding his claim that he
consulted a doctor. Nor did he ever present the doctor he allegedly consulted. His contention, too, that he was
attacked by Godofredo and was shot with a .38 caliber gun by Jessie was refuted by the prosecution
eyewitnesses – Rodolfo and Dina – who both testified that it was the petitioner who had attacked Godofredo.

The prosecution eyewitnesses' testimonies were supported by the medico legal certificates showing that
Godofredo sustained a contusion on the left parietal area of his head and an abrasion on his left cheek. These
medico legal findings are consistent with Godofredo' s claim that the petitioner hit him and inflicted physical
injuries.

In sum, we are fully satisfied that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of slight
physical injuries, as the lower courts found. His claim of self-defense fails for lack of supporting evidence; he
failed to present any evidence of unlawful aggression and cannot thus be said to have hit Godofredo as a
measure to defend himself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the decision dated October 23, 2009
and the resolution dated March 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31532.

SO ORDERED.