Journal of Social Issues. Vol. 46, No. I , 1990, p p .

65-81

Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization:

Models of Conflict and Ethnocentrism
Daniel Bar-Tal
Tel Aviv University

Delegitimization is the process of categorizing groups into extremely negative

social categories and excluding themfrom acceptability. This paper analyzes the
causes and consequences of delegitimization, and suggests two models that
describe the role of conflict in delegitimization and of ethnocentrism in dele-
gitimization. During conflict. when the ingroup perceives the negating goal(s) of
an outgroup as far-reaching and evil, feelings of threat become intensijled and
delegitimizationmay be used to explain the conflict. Then, toprevent danger, the
ingroup may harm the threatening group and justify the ham by delegitimiza-
tion, which in turn increases perceived threat and intensifies harmjkl behavior
toward the other group. Even mild conflicts can escalate, become violent, and
lead to delegitimization as an explanation, and later, as justification. Ethno-
centrism is related to this process because groups that are perceived as very
different and devalued arouse feelings of fear and contempt. Their delegitimiza-
tion leads to harm,and later, to intensij?ed delegitimization to just$) the harm.

The concept, delegitimization, describes a specific case of group categori-

zation-categorization of a group or groups into extremely negative social cate-
gories that are excludedfrom the realm of acceptable norms andlor values (Bar-
Tal, 1988, 1989a). Delegitimization is a fundamental process that permits moral
exclusion. The most common means of delegitimization, which are not mutually
exclusive, are as follows:
1 . Dehumanization: labeling a group as inhuman by characterizing mem-
bers as different from the human race-using either categories of sub-
human creatures, such as “inferior races” and animals, or categories of

Thanks to Susan Opotow for her help on an earlier draft of this paper.
Correspondence regarding this article should be addressed to Daniel Bar-Tal, School of Educa-
tion, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.

65
0 1990 The Society for chc Psychological SNdy of SOeY lssucr
0022-4537/90/03ooM)65~.00/l
66 Bar-Tal

negatively valued superhuman creatures, such as demons, monsters, and

satans.
2. Trait characterization: describing a group as possessing extremely nega-
tive traits that are unacceptable in a given society, such as aggressors,
idiots, or parasites.
3. Ourcasting: categorizing members of a group as transgressors of such
pivotal social norms that they should be excluded from society and/or
institutionalized-e.g., murderers, thieves, psychopaths, or maniacs.
4. Use of political labels: describing a group as a political entity that
threatens the basic values of the given society, is a danger to its system,
and is therefore totally unacceptable-e.g., Nazis, fascists, commu-
nists, or imperialists.
5. Group comparison: labeling with the name of a group that is negatively
perceived, such as “Vandals” or “Huns.” Each society has a cultural
repertoire of groups that serve as symbols of malice, evil, or
wickedness.
Although delegitimization is a category of stereotyping and prejudice, the
latter terms refer to a wider range of cognitive and affective reactions. Dele-
gitimization has distinct features: (a) it utilizes extremely negative, salient, and
atypical bases for categorization; (b) it denies the humanity of the delegitimized
group; (c) it is accompanied by intense, negative emotions of rejection, such as
hatred, anger, contempt, fear, or disgust; (d) it implies that the delegitimized
group has the potential to endanger one’s own group; and (e) it implies that the
delegitimized group does not deserve human treatment and therefore harming it
is justified.
The present paper explores the phenomenon of delegitimization by analyz-
ing its causes and consequences. Two models are described-the conflict model
and the ethnocentric model-each of which has certain specific conditions that
elicit and maintain delegitimization.

Conflict Model

Every intergroup conflict begins with the perception that one group’s goals
are incompatible with the goals of another group (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Mar,
1989; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). The perception that a conflict exists means that a
group finds itself blocked because the attainment of its goal or goals is precluded
by another group. This situation is a common one-an inseparable part of
intergroup relations. Because groups have many goals and are in relations with
many groups, it is unavoidable that some goals may be contradicted by goals of
other groups, so conflicts are an inherent part of normal group life.
Conflicts can be of different types and intensity, and not all conflicts in-
C a m and Consequences of Delegitimization 61

Perception of
Far Reaching Perceived
Incompatibility -* High Threat cxp’vwum Delegitimization ~vcn‘ion
of Coals

Fig. 1. Conflict model: far-reaching incompatibility of goals.

volve delegitimization. Therefore, it is important to ask: What conditions of

conflict provoke extreme negative labeling? Two conditions in a conflict most
frequently incite delegitimization: perception of the outgroup’s goals as contra-
dictory, far-reaching, and sinister; and the occurrence of extreme violence. Al-
though these conditions can appear together, I will describe them separately.

Threat and Delegitimization: Explanation and Derivation

An ingroup experiences threat when it perceives that it cannot easily achieve

its goals because of outgroup opposition (see Fig. 1). Since groups frequently
experience conflict in the course of their intergroup relations, the crucial ques-
tions in explaining the appearance of delegitimization in the early phase of
conflict are as follows: (a) How are the goals of the opponent perceived? (b)
What is the nature of one’s own goals that are perceived as blocked?
The first proposition is that when a group perceives that the negating
goal(s) of an outgroup is (are)far-reaching, especially unjustified, and threaten-
ing to the basic goals of the ingroup, then the ingroup uses delegitimization to
explain the conflict. In principle, these aspects are closely linked; when the goals
of the outgroup are perceived as outrageous, farfetched, irrational, and malev-
olent, they are also seen as negating fundamental ingroup goals and therefore as
threatening.
Usually this is a zero-sum type of conflict. The perception that the outgroup
will achieve its goals poses a danger to the very existence of the ingroup. The
danger can be economic (e.g., the group can be left without raw materials for
industry), political (e.g., the political system is challenged), or military (e.g., the
country, or part of it, is in danger of being conquered).
These beliefs about dangers anticipate impending, serious harm. Group
members, thus threatened, believe the danger will occur, the cohesion of their
group will be damaged, and its existence will be jeopardized. Whether the beliefs
are based on “reality” or “imagination” does not matter; it is the perception of
threat that leads to action and reaction (Bar-Tal et al., 1989; mitt, 1965). When
threat is perceived, it is real for the perceivers (Cohen, 1979; Knorr, 1976).
Threat perception in general, and especially in situations of severe threat, is
accompanied by stress, uncertainty, vulnerability, and fear (Lieberman, 1964;
68 Bw-Tel

Milburn, 1977; Singer, 1958; Tedeschi, 1970). These feelings arouse the need to
understand and structure the situation quickly, thus allowing explanation and
prediction (Y.Bar-Tal, 1989). Delegitimization fulfills this function. On one
hand, it explains why the other group threatens, and on the other hand, it predicts
what the other group will do in the future (see Fig. 1). Delegitimization thus
enables parsimonious understanding-fast, unequivocal, and simple-and it is
particularly likely to occur when high threat decreases ambiguity, narrows the
range of considered alternatives, and leads to antagonism (Holsti, 1971; Horns-
tein, 1965; Smock, 1955; Tedeschi, 1970).
Figure 1 illustrates this situation where the ingroup uses delegitimization to
explain the outgroup’s enraging aspirations and demands. As examples, dele-
gitimizing labels provide an explanation to Poles about why German Nazis
decided to occupy their country, or to Americans about why the Soviet Union
strives to dominate the world. Who else would do such things other than a group
that is imperialistic, satanic, or fascistic? These and other delegitimizing labels
indicate that a group has extremely negative characteristics, and by implication,
extremely negative behaviors that they can execute.
Once employed, delegitimization leads to inferences of threat from the
delegitimizingcategory (see Fig. 1). Thus, the labels “aggressive,” “ruthless,”
“devious,” or “oppressive” indicate that the outgroup is capable of destruction,
violence, or brutality, and this further disrupts the ingroup’s sense of security. In
this way, the explanation, together with its derivation, form a vicious cycle in
which the perception of severe threat and delegitimization feed each other.
’ h e conflict between Americans and Soviets, which reached a peak during
the cold war and only recently leveled out, provides an example of delegitimiza-
tion based on absolute negating goals. From the American perspective, the
Soviet goals expressed in communism contradict the American system. Most
Americans believed, and many still do, that the Soviet communists are expan-
sionists, seek dominance in the world, threaten American religious and moral
values, endanger the American social and economic order, and oppose the under-
lying American political ideology (e.g., Bider, 1985; English & Halperin, 1987;
Free & Cantril, 1967; Frei, 1986; Stouffer, 1966; Welch, 1970). Over the years,
Soviet acts in Poland, Finland, the Baltic States, Iran, Berlin, East Germany,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and even within the Soviet Union itself
have provided evidence that their goals are contradictory to those of the U.S.
Moreover, until recently, the Soviets themselves continuously communicated
that the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in an ideological,
political, economic, scientific, and cultural competition. This was often present-
ed as a zero-sum conflict, indicating that only one system would survive the
competition.
Given this framework, it is not surprising that Americans, as a defense
against perceived attempts to dominate them, characterized the U.S.A.-
Causes and Consequences of DelegitimizPtion 69

U.S.S.R. conflict as a struggle between good and evil, morality and immorality.
These beliefs nourished the feelings of threat that permeated all sectors of Ameri-
can society (Smith, 1983). On the basis of these perceptions, delegitimization
evolved. On one hand, it explained the existing threat; on the other hand, it
intensified the perception of threat. President Reagan expressed delegitimizing
beliefs in a widely quoted speech on March 8, 1983, saying:
They are the focus of evil in the modern world. [rt is a mistake] to ignore the facts of
history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant
misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and
wrong, good and evil.

Although delegitimizing labels were placed on Soviet communists, refer-

ence was also made to Russians, or Soviets, in general. Consequently the label,
“communist,” has itself become a delegitimizing term in the United States,
implying that a person or group is attempting to overturn the accepted norms and
values of American society. In addition, Russians were delegitimized with de-
scriptions such as “brutal,” “primitive,” “aggressive,” “sadistic,” “cold-
blooded,” “ruthless,” “cruel,” and “devious.” The Soviet Union was de-
scribed as striving for dominance in all parts of the world, and being committed
to destroying capitalism and democratic political institutions; it was dele-
gitimized with labels such as “oppressive,” “troublemaker,” “without respect
for human life or human rights,” “totalitarian,” “militaristic,” “deceptive,”
“adventuristic,” and “offensive” (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1961; Cohen, 1986;
Dallin, 1973; Stein, 1985; Ugolnik, 1983; White, 1984).
Although serious conflicts involving far-reaching incompatibility usually
end with direct violent confrontation or war, this is not a necessary outcome. In
spite of the entrenched conflict between Americans and Soviets, the two super-
powers have not yet engaged in direct warfare. Recent developments that have
eased the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. conflict will continue to modify mutual perceptions.
Nevertheless, in spite of the easing of tensions in this case, violent confrontation
is a more frequent outcome of serious conflicts that lead to delegitimization
through the perception of high threat (see Fig. 1).

Delegitimization and Harm: Prevention and JustiFcation

In most instances of serious conflicts, delegitimizationleads to violence and

harm. Once the ingroup delegitimizes the outgroup with labels that imply threat
and evil- “imperialists,” “fascists,” “terrorists”-acts for preventing danger
usually follow. By their nature, these acts cause harm to the outgroup. Because
the outgroup is delegitimized, preventive measures can be severe, for dele-
gitimized groups are perceived as not deserving human treatment. The denial of
their humanity often leads to acts of extreme violence by the delegitimizing
70 Bar-Tal

group. Deportations, destruction, and mass killings of civil populations are not
unusual in these cases. An example of this phenomenon was provided in an
insightful statement by an American soldier in the Vietnam War:
When you go into basic training you are taught that the Vietnamese are not people. You
are taught they are gooks, and all you hear is “gook, gook, gook, gook . . ..” The Asian
serviceman in Vietnam is the brunt of the same racism because the GIs over there do not
distinguish one Asian from another . ... You are trained ”gook, gook, gook” and once
the military has got the idea implanted in your mind that these people are not humans, they
are subhuman, it makes it a little bit easier to kill ’em. (Boyle, 1972, p. 141)

Exceptionally violent and harmful actions by the ingroup augment the pro-
cess of delegitimization because they seem to justify further actions that exceed
normative behavior (see Fig. 1). The more violent the behavior, the more dele-
gitimization occurs because more justification is needed to explain the harm
done. In addition, violent acts of the delegitimized group during confrontation
reinforce delegitimizationbecause they explain the deviant and extreme behavior
of the delegitimizing group. Thus, the second proposition states that a violent
conflict leads to delegitimization to justify and explain it.
A current example of delegitimizationbased on far-reaching incompatibility
of goals exists in the Middle East. Israeli Jews and Palestinians persistently
delegitimize each other to explain the threat that each group poses to the other
and to justify the harm that they inflict on each other (Bar-Tal, 1988, in press a).
Both groups have struggled for the same land over the present century, and
today, despite attempts to bridge the irreconcilable goals, the protracted conflict
continues.
The majority of Israeli Jews believe the ultimate objective of Palestinians is
the annihilation of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state (Bar-Tal,
1989b). This belief is reinforced by the central tenet of the Palestinian National
Covenant, which declares “a total repudiation of the existence of Israel and
institutionalizes this stand and the theoretical and practical implications that
derive from it in an ideological system” (Harkabi, 1979, p. 11). Even recent
conciliatory statements by Yasir Arafat are perceived by many Israelis, including
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, as tactical moves to achieve the ultimate goal of
establishing a Palestinian state on the ruins of the State of Israel. Violent acts by
Palestinians in the present century provide evidence of Palestinian objectives to
Israeli Jews. Violent objection to the establishment of the Jewish State, the
pogroms against Jews in the 1920s and 1930s, Palestinians’ active participation
in the Independence War,the continuous terrorist activities against the Jewish
population within Israel and outside it that have caused hundreds of casualties,
and recently, the uprising against Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip-
in Israeli eyes, all of these are expressions of Palestinian intransigence and
irreconcilability (Bar-Tal, in press a; Herzog, 1978; Katz, 1973; Lorch, 1976,
Schiff & Rothstein, 1972; Shamir, 1982; Yaari, 1970).
Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization 71

Simultaneously, Palestinians believe Israeli Jews disregard the existence of

the Palestinian people, neglect their national aspirations, and forcefully take their
land (e.g., Jiryis, 1976; Zogby, 1981). Presently, they are especially threatened
by what they perceive as the Israeli desire to expand by annexing the West Bank
and Gaza Strip, and possible consequent expulsion of the Palestinian population.
This perceived threat is based on the past acts of the Jews who immigrated to
Israel (previously Palestine), and later expropriated Arab-owned land, expelled
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, confiscated Arab property, and discrimi-
nated against Israeli citizens of Palestinian origin (Bishuti, 1969; Hadawi, 1969;
Kayyali, 1974). The perceived threat is supported by violent acts that I‘sraeli
Jews have committed against Palestinians throughout the decades. Recently, in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, hundreds have been killed, thousands have been
wounded, and there have been mass arrests, deportation, limitation of civil
rights, imposition of curfews, and humiliation (e.g., Al-Abid, 1973; Bar-Tal, in
press a; Zogby, 1981; Zureik,1979).
The protracted conflict intensified the perception of threat and caused mutu-
al attempts to exclude the other group from the community of nations through
delegitimization. The continuing mutual harm and violence has only strength-
ened the delegitimization process. The Palestinians label Israeli Jews as “coloni-
alists, ’’ “racists,” “aggressors, ” “Nazis, ” “imperialists,” “fascists,” and
“oppressors” (e.g., Hussein, 1970; Kishtainy, 1970; Said, 1980; Sayegh,
1965). They call them “Zionists,” and they consider Zionism a “colonialist
movement in its inception, aggressive and expansionist in its goals, racist and
segregationist in its configurations, and fascist in its means and aims” (Article
19 in the National Covenant of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PL0)-
Harkabi , 1979).
The Israeli Jews, from the beginning of their encounters with Palestinians,
viewed them as primitive, bandits, cruel mobs, and failed to recognize their
national identity. Later, with the eruption of violence, they delegitimized Palesti-
nians with labels such as “robbers,” “criminals,” “gangs,” “anti-Semites,”
“terrorists,” and “neo-Nazis.” In the last decades, special efforts have been
made to delegitimize members and sympathizers of the PLO, which represents
the national aspirations of the Palestinians (e.g., Kelman & Weiner, undated;
Landau, 1971; PLO, 1982). On September 1, 1977, the Knesset of Israel
adopted a resolution by a vote of 92-4 saying that
The organization called the PLO aspires, as stated in its Covenant, to destroy and extermi-
nate the State of Israel. The murder of women and children, and terror, are part of this
organization’s ideology, which it is implementing in practice.

Another example of violent intergroup conflict that involved delegitimiza-

tion was the Vietnam War. In this case, the government of South Vietnam,
supported by the United States, perceived the goals of the Viet Cong, backed by
12 Bw-Tal

North Vietnam, as completely contradictory. It was a struggle between two

opposing ideologies, in which only one could win.
White (1970) described the perceptions of supporters of the Viet Cong and
of the Americans during the violent conflict. Both sides committed violent and
brutal acts. On the one side, President Johnson called the violent confrontation
“a war of unparalleled brutality. Simple farmers are the targets of assassination
and kidnapping. Women and children are strangled in the night because their
men are loyal to their government.” On the other side, the Viet Cong claimed
that U.S. imperialists and their lackeys “killed about 170,000 people, wounded
and crippled through torture about 800,000 people, detained more than 400,000
people in more than 20,000 prisons, raped more than 40,000 women.” The cruel
and vicious acts performed were fueled by delegitimization reinforced by nega-
tive categorizations. In one study, White (1970) found that 100% of the 337
communist characterizations of Americans appearing in Vietnamese communist
statements were stated in terms of evil. They were labeled “imperialists,”
“aggressors, ’* “international gendarme,’’ “cruel enemy ,’’ “neocolonialists, ”

and so on. At the same time, out of 130 characterizationscontained in statements

by President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, 127
(over 97%) were negative. They used such terms as “terrorism,” “aggression,”
“sabotage,” or “assassination” to describe the acts of Vietnamese communists.
Not all conflicts begin with far-reaching incompatibility between the goals
of the parties involved. Conflicts may also begin with less incompatibility that
does not involve a high level of threat. Although such a situation can continue as
a stalemate for a long time, this type of conflict can also escalate into violent
confrontation.
Deterioration of conflict can lead to mutual harm and violence. As Fig. 2
shows, delegitimization emerges from violence because an ingroup needs to
justify and explain harm perpetrated by its members, as well as explain similar
acts performed by the members of the outgroup.
An example of conflict that evolved into bloody and violent confrontation
was the Iran-Iraq war, which ended in 1989 with heavy losses on both sides. The
principal dispute between Iran and Iraq centered around the demarcation of a
border on the Shatt al-Arab waterway and its administration, originating from a
1937 treaty. The conflict emerged at the end of 1959, when Iran began to
demand a resolution to the disagreement. Through the following years, the
conflict between these two countries was managed through diplomatic channels,
with only a few minor confrontations (Chubin & Zabih, 1974; Pipes, 1983). But
in September 1980, a war erupted that very quickly became one of the bloodiest
confrontations since World War II and claimed hundreds of thousands of casu-
alties, including civilians.
During eight years of the war, the Iranians and Iraqis delegitimized each
other to explain the brutality of the other side and to justify the harm they
Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization 73

Perception of
Incompatibility -
of Goals
+ Perceived
Threat
dc=* Harm -* Delegitimization

Fig. 2. Conflict model: deterioration.

themselves committed. The Daily Report of the Foreign Broadcast Information,

which reported radio speeches and interviews of the political and military leaders
of Iran and Iraq, provided illustrations of mutual delegitimization. In 1984,
Iranians labeled Iraqis “Saddamist mercenaries,” “criminals,” “aggressive
Ba’thist forces, ” ‘‘Zionist protectors, ” “terrorists, ‘‘archsatans,’’ ‘‘imperi-
”

alists,” “criminals,” “reactionaries,” and described their acts as “inhuman”

and “diabolical.” Similarly, the Iraqis labeled Iranians “criminals,” “ag-
gressors,” “deceitful diabolic entity,” neofascists,” “agents of Zionism,” “il-
literates,” and “expansionists.” In a publicized statement to Iraq’s President,
Saddam Hussein, a military commander graphically reported:
We gladly inform you of the annihilation of thousands of harmful magi insects . . . .
We . . . will turn what is left of these harmful insects into food for the birds of the
wilderness and the fishes of the marshes. (Bengio, 1986. p. 475)

Ethnocentric Model

Delegitimization does not occur only in conflict. A group may also attribute
delegitimizing labels to another group as a result of ethnocentrism. Ethno-
centrism, a term originally introduced by Sumner (1906), denotes a tendency to
accept the ingroup and reject outgroups. Delegitimization can serve this tenden-
cy. Using delegitimization, ingroup members see themselves as virtuous and
superior, and the outgroup as contemptible and inferior (LeVine & Campbell,
1972).
The model in Fig. 3 illustrates how the ethnocentric tendency to devalue the
other group and perceive them as different can foster delegitimization. Neverthe-
less, a necessary mediating condition for delegitimization is feelings of fear
and/or contempt toward the outgroup. Subsequently, delegitimization can en-
gender harm when the ingroup attempts to prevent the danger implied by the
delegitimizing label, or to treat the outgroup inhumanely, “as deserved.”

Group Perceived Feelings of

as Different .-+ Fear andlor -*
a~lribu~on
Delegitimization
and Devalued Contempt

jusoficalm

Fig. 3. Ethnocentric model.

14 Bar-Tal

Ethnocentrism and Delegitimization:Attribution

Delegitimization is used in extreme cases of ethnocentrism because it max-

imizes intergroup differences and totally excludes the delegitimized group from
commonly accepted groups, implying a total superiority of the ingroup. It not
only differentiates between the groups by placing a definite boundary between
them, but also denies the humanity of the outgroup.
Not every case of ethnocentrism ends with delegitimization. A mere percep-
tion of difference and devaluation does not lead necessarily to exclusion, for
arousal of fear and/or contempt for the outgroup is also necessary (see Fig. 3). The
third proposition states that delegitimization is used when a group perceives
another group as different and devalued, and feels fear of it and/or contempt
for it.
The more the two groups differ, the easier it is to delegitimize. As Brewer
(1979) indicated, perception of salient differences between the ingroup and out-
group facilitates the development of negative attitudes and reactions toward the
outgroup. Salient differences clearly demarcate the intergroup boundary and
allow easy identification of outgroup members. They signify that the delegitimiz-
ing label cannot be generalized to the ingroup.
The most salient differences are based on physical appearance because they
enable a'clear distinction and an easy identification. Thus, characteristics such as
skin color, physiognomic features, hair color, body structure, or even dress
permit unmistakable differentiation between groups. Throughout human history,
these differences were most often the bases for differentiation and delegitimiza-
tion. Other cues, including invisible ones, are obviously possible; people also
differentiate and delegitimize on the basis of such hidden criteria as religion or
ideology. In these cases, however, external identification may be impossible,
and the delegitimizing group needs other cues for simple identification.
In addition to intergroup differences, devaluation is necessary for dele-
gitimization to occur. Devaluation results from the basic ethnocentric tendency
(Brewer & Campbell, 1976) for ingroup members to feel positive about their
own group and attribute favorable characteristics to it, while feeling antipathy
toward outgroups and attributing unfavorable characteristics to them (see Ador-
no, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950).
The final necessary condition, which not only evokes delegitimization but
directly causes it, is arousal of fear and/or contempt. Fear is elicited when the
different and devalued group presents a threat or a mysterious aspect. In this
case, the ingroup uses delegitimization as an attribution to explain their fear (see
Fig. 3). Feelings of contempt can accompany feelings of fear or appear sepa-
rately. They emerge when the outgroup is perceived as absolutely inferior, based
on perceived cultural, economic, military, scientific, and/or political achieve-
ments. The ingroup usually evaluates these achievements on the basis of super-
Causes and Consequences of Delegitimizntion ’Is
ficial and visible cues, such as clothing, working tools, weapons, housing, or
religious practices.
There are two main reasons for ethnocentric delegitimization: first, the
desire to completely differentiate the outgroup from the ingroup in order to
exclude it from humanity; second, the desire to exploit the outgroup. Although in
many cases these two reasons complement each other, they do not necessarily
appear together.
An example of ethnocentric delegitimization occurred in the first encounters
between Europeans and American Indians, in which perceptions of difference
and inferiority combined with feelings of contempt underlay delegitimization of
the American Indians. Original writings by Europeans provide illustrations of
this phenomenon. American Indians were described as follows:
Without religion or government, [having] nothing more than diverse superstitions and a
type of democracy similar to that of ants.
Indians are so free and live so like animals.
Viewed in the most favorable manner, these poor creatures are miserably brutish and
degraded.
The indigenous population of America present man under many aspects, and society in
various stages, from regular but limited civilization of Mexico and Peru, to savage life in
this most brutal state of abasement.
Indians as a race are, of course, far inferior to white men in intellectual capacity. (Forbes.
1964, pp. 16-17)

In these first impressions of American Indians, delegitimization initially served

the motive of differentiation and exclusion. With time, another function
emerged: exploitation.
In the case of American Indians, the Europeans’ economic needs for land
and other resources led to further delegitimization and abuse. An outgroup per-
ceived as greatly different and inferior is a suitable target for exploitation, which
almost always involves inhumane treatment.
A prime example of delegitimization used to rationalize exploitation is the
enslavement of Black people by White people. Delegitimization was, perhaps,
the most important justification for slavery. Otherwise, how could the moral,
deeply religious, and gallant Southerners have treated these people so inhu-
manly? Black people differed from Whites in physical appearance, folkways and
mores, religion, language, and culture, and these characteristics were also great-
ly devalued, so that Black people were a perfect target for exploitation.
As the preamble to South Carolina’s code of 1712 declared, Blacks had
.
“barbarous, wild savage natures, . . wholly unqualified to be governed by the
laws, customs, and practices of this province.” In a similar vein, Stampp (1956)
pointed to three beliefs that undergirded slavery: (a) the “all wise Creator” had
designed Black people for labor in the South; (b) being inferior in intellect and
having a particular temperament, Blacks were the natural slaves of White people;
76 Bar-Tal

and (c) Black people were barbarians who needed rigid discipline and severe
control. Black people’s enslavement, thus, was seen as natural and essential for
their own good and for the preservation of White civilization (see also Bancroft,
1931; Genovese, 1969; Sellers, 1950). These perceptions legitimized the slavery
of Black people in the Southern states. Being “inferior” and “subhuman,” they
were considered as property that could be used to satisfy the economic needs of
the South (Genovese, 1966).

Delegitimization and Harm: Intention and Justification

Once invoked, delegitimization can-but does not necessarily have to-

open the way to harm. Delegitimizing labels may indicate either that the dele-
gitimized group is inhuman and therefore harming it is allowed, or that it is
threatening and therefore, to prevent the danger, harm should be carried out. In
addition, delegitimization may lead to intergroup conflicts. The goals of the
ingroup and the outgroup may clash because of the superior and imperialistic
feelings of the ingroup. Then, when harms are committed, delegitimization
serves to justify inhumane treatment of the outgroup (see Fig. 3).
The delegitimization of the American Indians facilitated cruel behavior
toward them and had far-reaching negative effects on the fate of these people.
Once they were labeled “savages,” “inferior,” or “animals,” it was but a short
distance to harm. Because “inferior” and “savage” men do not deserve human
treatment, Europeans did not hesitate to destroy, to enslave, to drive them away,
or to kill them. Illustrating this logic, one of the first English settlers of Virginia
proposed the following:
It is more easy to civilize them by conquest than by faire meanes; for the one may be made
at once, but their civilizing will require a long time and much history. The manner how to
suppress them is so often related and approved, I omit it here: and you have twenty
examples of the Spaniards how they got the West Xndies, and forced the treacherous and
rebellious infidels to do all manner of drudgery work and slavery for them. (Vogel, 1972,
p. 40)
The strengthening of delegitimization after harming others is illustrated in
the development of defenses by White people to justify their enslavement of
Black people (e.g., McKitrick, 1963). Doctors, scientists, and phrenologists in
the South searched for physiological differences to substantiate the assumed
temperamental and intellectual differences:
Dr.Samuel W. Cartwright of Louisiana argued that the visible difference in skin pigmen-
.
tation is also extended to “the membranes, the muscles, the tendons, and . . [to] all the
fluids and secretions. Even the Negro’s brain and nerves, the chyle and all the humors, are
tinctured with a shade of the pervading darkness” and Dr. Josiah C. Nott of Mobile
proposed that Negro and Whites do not belong to the same species. (Stampp, 1956, p. 8)

One of the striking cases of ethnocentric delegitimization that led to tragic

consequencesis the treatment of Jews in Germany between 1933-1945 (Bar-Tal,
Causes and Consequences of Delegitimiition 77

in press b). This case combines all the elements of the proposed model (see Fig.
3). Jews, perceived as different and devalued, incited fear and contempt; as time
progressed they were excluded, exploited, and murdered.
During the Nazi era, Germans grew to accept the belief that Jews were
responsible for the alienation of humanity from the natural order and were the
main obstacle to human redemption. Therefore, many of them agreed that it was
necessary to exclude Jews from the economic, political, societal, and cultural
aspects of life, and to deny their humanity. Official anti-Semitism in Nazi Ger-
many is one of the few cases in modem times in which delegitimization was
legally enforced. Individuals who violated the delegitimizing laws were arrested
and even executed (Dawidowicz, 1975; Wistrich, 1985). The background for
delegitimization of Jews can be Iocated in German ethnocentrism embedded in
their racist ideology, which asserted Aryan superiority over other races, es-
pecially Jews (Mosse, 1964; Pulzer, 1964). The major proponent of racial ide-
ology, Hans F. K. Gunther, suggested that Jews were an inferior race, a mixture
of Oriental or interasiatic races; Aryans, in contrast, were at the peak of racial
superiority. In line with this view, Jews were portrayed as ugly, dirty, perverted,
corrupt, and most important, inferior and inhuman (Mosse, 1964; Wistrich,
1985; Zeman, 1964). For example, in the best-known Nazi anti-Semitic propa-
ganda film, “Wer ewige Jude” (The Eternal Jew), Jews were pictured as phys-
ically repellent, greasy, fat, hook-nosed, black-haired, and wearing traditional
Jewish clothes. More important, this film portrayed Jews as greedy, sneaky, and
exploiting other Germans. The narrator stated,
Jews have no indigenous civilization; they are unclean; they are not poor, they simply
prefer to live in a state of squalor; their community life is on the streets; they hardly ever
make anything for themselves; they do not want to work. Their only desire is to trade;
their pride lies in haggling over a price. They have no ideals; their divine law teaches them
to be selfish to cheat any non-Jew. (Richards, 1973, p. 345)

During the Nazi regime the delegitimizing beliefs about Jews were exten-
sive, including all the previously mentioned aspects. A partial list includes
descriptions of Jews as “satanic,” “devils,” “the incarnation of destructive
drive,” “destroyers of civilization,” “parasites,” “demons,” “bacteria, ver-
min, and pests,” “degeneration of mankind,” “international maggots and bed-
bugs,” “spiders that slowly suck the people’s blood at their pores,” and “in-
spirers and originators of dreadful catastrophes” (Gordon, 1984; Jackel, 198 1;
Noakes & Pridham, 1984). In addition, Jews were specifically accused of start-
ing World War I, causing Germany’s war defeat, precipitating the Great Depres-
sion, polluting the Aryan race, exploiting German people, performing criminal
acts, and seeking world domination.
Jews were labeled politically, and viewed as promoters of such diverse evils
as bolshevism, capitalism, democracy, and internationalism-all aimed at sub-
verting Aryan racial superiority. These and other delegitimizing beliefs became
part of the almost daily diet of the German people during the Third Reich. Nazi
78 Bw-Tnl

propaganda was entirely preoccupied with spreading delegitimizing beliefs,

Press, pictures, films, lectures, literature, radio programs, art, and political
speeches continuously and repeatedly expressed these beliefs (see, for example,
Mosse, 1966). In the totalitarian Nazi regime, all means were used to achieve the
end of delegitimizing Jews (Bramsted, 1965; Gordon, 1984; Zeman, 1964).
There is little doubt that the distance between delegitimization of this inten-
sity and behavioral harm is very small. It is not surprising that between 1933 and
1945, Jews in Europe were subjected to exclusion, deportation, expropriation,
expulsion, pogroms, mass killings, and ultimately genocide on an unprecedented
scale, performed in a systematic, organized, and brutal way. During six years,
1939-1945, about 6 million Jews perished as a consequence of starvation, dead-
ly epidemics, mass executions, and systematic gassing (Bauer, 1982; Cohn,
1967; Dawidowicz, 1975; Mosse, 1978; Wistrich, 1985). Finally, there is little
doubt that as these terrible actions were carried out, Germans justified them with
delegitimizing beliefs, which first encouraged the atrocities and later supported
and reinforced them.

Conclusion

Delegitimization, the exclusion of an outgroup and denial of its humanity, is

a phenomenon with cognitive, affective, and behavioral aspects. On the cog-
nitive level, delegitimization involves categorization that enables understanding
of the social world. It organizes “reality” by providing an explanation for the
perceived characteristics and behaviors of the outgroup and a prediction of poten-
tial future events. On the emotional level, delegitimization is a reaction to feel-
ings of fear, threat, or contempt stimulated by another group. Its occurrence not
only strengthens these feelings, but also may provoke new negative emotions.
On the behavioral level, delegitimizationleads to an array of behaviors including
malevolent treatment and preventive steps to avert potential danger to the in-
group. Delegitimization is also a consequence of brutal and cruel behavior be-
cause it sehes as a justification mechanism.
Delegitimization, as an extreme case of stereotyping and prejudice, is a
widespread phenomenon in intergroup relations. Two related models of the
process have focused on situations that elicit delegitimization:conflict and ethno-
centrism. Delegitimization occurs in conflicts that involve a perception of far-
reaching, outrageous, and incompatible goals between groups and/or a high level
of brutal violence. Delegitimization occurs in ethnocentrism when an outgroup is
perceived as very different and is devalued. Since delegitimization can lead to
the most severe consequences, including genocide, it is vital to understand it
better and to attempt to reduce it.
Closes and Consequencesof Delegitimization

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DANIEL BAR-TAL received his Ph.D. in social psychology from the University
of Pittsburgh, and is currently on the faculty in education at Tel Aviv University.
During the first part of his career he concentrated on studying prosocial behavior
and achievement attributions. In the last decade his interest has focused on
knowledge acquisition and change in general, and specifically on political beliefs
shared by group members, including conflict, patriotism, siege mentality, se-
curity, and delegitimization. He recently authored Group Beliefs and coedited
The Social Psychology of Knowledge, The Social Psychology of Intergroup
Conflict and Stereotyping and Prejudice.