Fraser - Critical Thoery Habermas e Feminismo1985

What's Critical about Critical Theory?
The Case of Habermas and Gender

Author(s): Nancy Fraser
Source: New German Critique, No. 35, Special Issue on Jurgen Habermas (Spring - Summer,
1985), pp. 97-131
Published by: New German Critique
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AboutCritical
What'sCritical Theory?
TheCaseofHabermasand Gender*
by Nancy Fraser
To mymind,no one has yetimprovedon Marx's 1843 definition of

CriticalTheoryas "the self-clarificationofthestrugglesand wishesof
theage."' Whatis so appealingabout thisdefinitionis itsstraightfor-
wardlypolitical character.It makes no claim to any special epis-
temologicalstatusbut,rather,supposesthatwithrespecttojustification
thereis no philosophicallyinteresting differencebetweena critical
of
theory society and an one.
uncritical But thereis, accordingto this
an
definition, importantpolitical difference.A criticalsocial theory
framesitsresearchprogramand itsconceptualframework withan eye
to theaims and activitiesofthoseoppositionalsocialmovementswith
whichithas a partisanthoughnotuncriticalidentification. The ques-
tionsitasksand themodels itdesignsare informedby thatidentifica-
tionand interest. Thus, forexample,ifstruggles contesting thesubor-
dinationofwomenfiguredamong themostsignificant ofa givenage,
then a criticalsocial theoryforthattime would aim, among other
things,to shedlighton thecharacterand bases ofsuchsubordination.
It would employcategoriesand explanatorymodels whichrevealed
ratherthanoccluded relationsofmale dominanceand femalesubor-
dination.Anditwoulddemystify as ideologicalrivalapproacheswhich
obfuscatedor rationalizedthoserelations.In thissituation,then,one
ofthestandardsforassessinga criticaltheory,once ithad been subjec-
ted to all the usual testsof empiricaladequacy, would be: How well
does ittheorizethesituationand prospectsofthefeminist movement?
To whatextentdoes it servethe self-clarification of the strugglesand
wishesof contemporary women?
In whatfollows,I am goingto presupposetheconceptionofcritical
*I am gratefultoJohnBrenkman,Thomas McCarthy,Carole Patemanand Martin

Schwab forhelpfulcommentsand criticism;to Dee Marquez forcrackerjackword
processing;and to the StanfordHumanitiesCenterforfinancialsupport.
1. Karl Marx, Letterto A. Ruge, September1843. In KarlMarx:EarlyWritings,
trans.Rodney Livingstoneand GregorBenton(New York:VintageBooks, 1975), p.
209.
97

98 Habermasand Gender
theorywhichI havejustoutlined.In addition,I am goingtotakeas the

actual situationofour age thescenarioI just sketchedas hypothetical.
On the basis of thesepresuppositions,I wantto examine thecritical
social theoryofJiirgenHabermas as elaboratedin the Theory ofCom-
municative Actionand relatedrecentwritings.2 I wantto read thiswork
fromthe standpointof the followingquestions: In whatproportions
and in what respectsdoes Habermas' criticaltheoryclarifyand/or
mystify the bases of male dominance and female subordinationin
modern societies?In whatproportionsand in whatrespectsdoes it
challenge and/orreplicateprevalentideological rationalizationsof
suchdominanceand subordination?To whatextentdoes itorcan itbe
made to servethe self-clarificationof the strugglesand wishesof the
contemporary women'smovement?In short,withrespectto gender,
whatis criticaland whatis not in Habermas' social theory?
This would be a fairlystraightforward enterprisewereitnotforone
thing.Apartfromabriefdiscussionoffeminismas a"new socialmove-
ment" (a discussionI shall consideranon), Habermas saysvirtually
nothingabout genderin theTheory ofCommunicativeAction.Now,on my
viewofcriticaltheory,thisis a seriousdeficiency.Butitneed notstand
in thewayofthesortofinquiryI am proposing.Itonlynecessitatesthat
2. JiirgenHabermas,TheTheory ofCommunicative I, trans.Thomas McCarthy

Action,
(Boston: Beacon Press,1984). Hereafter,TCAI.
Theorie
deskommunikativen Handelns,II (Frankfurt
am Main: SuhrkampVerlag,1981).
Hereafter,TCAII.
I have consultedthefollowingEnglishtranslationsof portionsof TCAII:
"New Social Movements,"excerptfromch. VIII, section3, TCAII. Telos,49
(1981),
33-37. Hereafter,NSM.
"Marx and theThesis ofInnerColonization,"excerptfromch. VIII, section2, TCA
II, pp. 522-547.TranslatedbyChristaHildebrandand BarbaraCorrell.Unpublished
typescript. Hereafter,MIC.
"Tendencies ofJuridification," excerptfromch. VIII, section2, TCAII, pp. 522ff.
Unpublishedtypescript. Hereafter,TJ.
Othertextsby Habermas:
Legitimation Crisis,trans.Thomas McCarthy(Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). Here-
after,LC.
"Introduction,"Observations on"TheSpiritualSituation
ofthe
Age":Contemporary German
ed. Jirgen Habermas; trans.AndrewBuchwalter(Cambridge,MA: MIT
Perspectives,
Press,1984). Hereafter,OSSA.
"A Replyto my Critics,"Habermas:Critical Debates,eds. David Held and John B.
Thompson (Cambridge,MA: MIT Press,1982). Hereafter, RC.
I have also consultedtwohelpfuloverviewsof thismaterialin English:
Thomas McCarthy,"Translator'sIntroduction,"TCA I, pp. v-xxxvii.Hereafter,
TI.
John B. Thompson, "Rationalityand Social Rationalisation:An Assessmentof
Habermas' Theoryof CommunicativeAction,"Sociology, 17:2 (1983), 278-294. Here-
after,RSR.

NancyFraser 99
one read theworkin questionfromthestandpointofan absence; that

one extrapolatefromthingsHabermas does sayto thingshe does not;
that one reconstructhow various mattersof concern to feminists
would appear fromhis perspectivehad theybeen thematized.
Thus, in sectionI, I examine some elementsof Habermas' social-
theoreticalframework in orderto see how ittendsto castchildrearing
and themale-headed,modern,restricted nuclearfamily.In sectionII,
I look at his account of the relationsbetweenthe public and private
spheresoflifein classicalcapitalistsocietiesand tryto reconstruct
the
unthematizedgendersubtext.And finally,in sectionIII, I consider
Habermas' account of the dynamics,crisistendenciesand conflict
potentialsspecificto contemporary, Western,welfarestatecapitalism
so as to see in whatlightit castscontemporary feministstruggles.s
I. The Social-TheoreticalFramework:A FeministInterrogation
Let me begin by consideringtwodistinctionswhichare centralto

Habermas' social-theoretical categorialframework. The first
oftheseis
thedistinction betweenthesymbolicand thematerialreproductionof
societies. On the one hand, claims Habermas, societies must re-
produce themselvesmaterially;theymust successfullyregulatethe
metabolicexchangeofgroupsofbiologicalindividualswitha nonhu-
man, physicalenvironmentand withother social systems.On the
otherhand, societiesmustreproducethemselvessymbolically;they
must maintainand transmitto new membersthe linguistically ela-
boratednormsand patternsofinterpretation whichare constitutive of
social identities.Habermas claims thatmaterialreproductioncom-
prises what he calls "social labor." Symbolicreproduction,on the
otherhand,comprisesthesocializationoftheyoung,thecementingof
group solidarity,and the transmissionand extension of cultural
traditions.4
This distinctionbetweensymbolicand materialreproductionis in
thefirstinstancea functionalone. It distinguishestwodifferent func-
tionswhichmustbe more or less successfully fulfilledin orderthata
societysurvive.At thesame time,however,thedistinctionis used by
Habermas to classifyactual social practicesand activities.These are
distinguishedaccordingto whichone of the two functionstheyare
3. I shallnottakeup suchwidelydebatedissuesas Habermas' theoriesofuniversal

pragmaticsand socialevolution.Forhelpfuldiscussionsoftheseissues,see theessays
in Habermas:Critical
Debates,op.cit.
4. Habermas, TCA II, pp. 214, 217, 348-49; LC, pp. 8-9; RC, pp. 268, 278-9.
McCarthy,TI, pp. xxv-xxvii.Thompson,RSR, p. 285.

held to serveexclusivelyor primarily. Thus, accordingto Habermas,

in capitalistsocieties,the activitiesand practiceswhichmake up the
sphereofpaid workcountas materialreproductionactivities since,on
hisview,they are "social labor" and servethefunctionofmaterialre-
production.On theotherhand,thechildrearing and practices
activities
which in our societyare performedwithoutpay by women in the
domesticsphere - let us call them "women's unpaid childrearing
work"- count as symbolicreproductionactivitiessince,in Haber-
mas' view, they serve socialization and the functionof symbolic
reproduction.5
It is worthnoting,I think,thatHabermas' distinction betweensym-
bolic and materialreproductionis susceptibleof twodifferent inter-
pretations. The of
first these takes thetwo functions as two objectively
distinct"naturalkinds"to whichboth actual social practicesand the
actual organizationofactivitiesin anygivensocietymaycorrespond
more or less faithfully. Thus, childrearingpracticeswould in them-
selvesbe symbolicreproductionpractices,whilethepracticeswhich
producefoodand objectswould in themselvesbe materialreproduc-
tionpractices.And moderncapitalistsocial organization,unlike,say,
thatof archaicsocieties,would be a faithful mirrorof thedistinction
betweenthetwonaturalkinds,since it institutionally separatesthese
practices.This naturalkinds interpretation is at odds withanother
possible interpretation whichI shall call the"pragmatic-contextual"
interpretation. It would nottakechildrearing practicestobe in them-
selvessymbolicreproductionpracticesbut would allow forthe pos-
sibilitythat,undercertaincircumstances and givencertainpurposes,it
could be usefulto considerthemfromthestandpointofsymbolicre-
production.Forexample,ifone wishedtocontestthedominantview,
ina sexistpoliticalculture,accordingtowhichthistraditionally female
is
occupation merely instinctual,natural and ahistorical.
Now I wantto arguethatthenaturalkindsinterpretation is concep-
tuallyinadequateand potentially ideological.I claimthatitis notthe
case thatchildrearing practicesservesymbolicas opposed to material
reproduction.Granted,theycompriselanguage-teaching and initia-
tionintosocial mores,but also feeding,bathingand protectionfrom
physicalharm. Granted,theyregulatechildren'sinteractionswith
otherpeople, but also theirinteractions withphysicalnature(in the
form,for example, of milk,germs,dirt,excrement,weatherand
animals).In short,notjust theconstruction ofchildren'ssocial iden-
titiesbut also theirbiologicalsurvivalis at stake.And so, therefore, is
5. Habermas, TCAII, p. 208; RC, pp. 223-5. McCarthy,TI, pp. xxiv-xxv.

NancyFraser 101
thebiologicalsurvivalofthesocietiestheybelongto. Thus, childrear-

ingis notperse symbolicreproductionactivity;itis equallyand at the
same timematerialreproductionactivity.It is whatwe mightcall a
"dual-aspect"activity.
But the same is true of the activitiesinstitutionalizedin modern
capitalistpaid work.Granted,theproductionoffoodand objectscon-
tributestothebiologicalsurvivalofmembersofsociety.Butitalso and
at the same timereproducessocial identities.Not just nourishment
are produced,butculturally
and sheltersimpliciter elaboratedformsof
nourishmentand shelterwhich have symbolically-mediated social
meanings. Moreover, such production occurs via culturallyelabo-
ratedsocial relationsand symbolically-mediated, norm-governed so-
cial practices.The contentsofthesepracticesas wellas theresultsserve
to form,maintainand modifythe social identitiesof persons direc-
tlyinvolvedand indirectly affected.One need onlythinkofan activity
like computerprogrammingfora wage in the U.S. pharmaceutical
industryto appreciatethe thoroughlysymboliccharacterof "social
labor." Such labor, like unpaid childrearingwork, is a "dual-
aspect" activity.7
6. I am indebtedto MartinSchwab fortheexpression'dual-aspectactivity.'

7. For a more positiveassessment,froma feministperspective,of Habermas'
categorialdistinctionbetween"social labor" and "socialization"and oftheclassifica-
tion of childrearingpracticesas the latter,see Linda Nicholson,Feminism and Social
Theory(New York: Columbia University Press,forthcoming). Nicholson argues that
Habermas' distinctionhelps overcome the androcentrismof orthodox Marxism.
OrthodoxMarxismallowedforonlyone kindofhistorically significant name-
activity,
ly,"production"or "social labor." Moreover,itunderstoodthatcategoryandrocen-
tricallyand therebyexcluded women's unpaid childrearing fromhistory.By
activity
contrast,Habermas allows fortwo kinds of historicallysignificant activity,"social
labor" and the"symbolic"activities whichinclude,amongotherthings,childrearing.
Thus, he manages to includewomen'sunpaid activity in history.Accordingto Nich-
olson,thishelpsremedytheproblem.I disagree.Atbest,thisleads towhathascome to
be knownas "dual systemstheory,"an approachwhichpositstwodistinct"systems"
of human activityand, correspondingly, twodistinct"systems"of oppression:cap-
italismand male dominance.Butthisis misleading.These are not,infact,twodistinct
systemsbut,rather,two thoroughlyinterfuseddimensionsof a singlesocial forma-
tion.In ordertounderstandthatsocialformation, a criticaltheoryrequiresa singleset
of categoriesand conceptswhichintegrateinternally both genderand politicalecon-
omy (perhaps also race). For a classic statementof dual systemstheory,see Heidi
Hartmann,"The UnhappyMarriageofMarxismand Feminism:Towarda More Pro-
gressiveUnion," Women and Revolution,
LydiaSargent,ed. (Boston:South End Press,
1981). For a critiqueof dual systemstheory,see Iris Young,"Beyond the Unhappy
Marriage:A Critique of Dual SystemsTheory," Womenand Revolution, op.cit.;and
"Socialist Feminismand the Limitsof Dual SystemsTheory,"Socialist Review,50-51
(1980), 169-180.
In sectionsII and III of thepresentpaper,I am developingargumentsand linesof

Thus, the distinctionbetweenwomen's unpaid childrearingwork

and otherformsof workfromthe standpointof reproductionfunc-
tionscannotbe a distinction ofnaturalkinds.Ifitis tobe drawnatall,it
mustbe drawnas a pragmatic-contextual distinctionforthe sake of
focalizingwhatis in each case actuallyonlyone aspectofa dual-aspect
phenomenon. And this,in turn,must find its warrantrelativeto
specificpurposes of analysisand description,purposes which are
themselvessusceptibleof analysisand evaluationand which need,
therefore,to be justifiedvia argumentation.
Butifthisis so, thenthenaturalkindsclassification ofchildrearing as
symbolicreproduction and of otherwork as material reproductionis
potentiallyideological.It could be used, forexample,tolegitimatethe
institutionalseparationof childrearingfrompaid work,a separation
whichmanyfeminists, includingmyself, considera mainstayofmod-
ernformsofwomen'ssubordination.Itcould be used,incombination
withotherassumptions,to legitimatetheconfinement ofwomen to a
"separate sphere." Whether Habermas so uses it will be considered
shortly.
The secondcomponentofHabermas' categorialframework whichI
wantto examine is his distinctionbetween"socially-integrated" and
"system-integrated action contexts."Socially-integrated action con-
textsare those in which agents coordinate theiractions with one
anotherby referenceto some formofexplicitor implicitintersubjec-
tiveconsensusabout norms,values and ends, consensuspredicated
on linguisticspeechand interpretation. System-integrated actioncon-
texts,on the otherhand, are those in whichthe actionsof different
agentsare coordinatedwithone anotherbythefunctionalinterlacing
of unintendedconsequences, while each individualaction is deter-
minedbyself-interested, utility-maximizing calculationstypically en-
tertainedin theidiomsor,as Habermas says,in the"media" ofmoney
and power.8Habermas considersthecapitalisteconomicsystemtobe
analysiswhichrelyon conceptsand categoriesthatinternally integrategenderand

politicaleconomy.(See note 33 below.) This mightbe considereda "single system"
approach,bycontrastwithdual systemstheory.However,I findthatlabel misleading
because I do notconsidermyapproachprimarily orexclusivelya "systems"approach
in thefirstplace. Rather,likeHabermas, I am tryingto linkstructural(in thesense of
objectivating)and interpretive approaches to the studyof societies. Unlike him,
however,I do not do thisby dividingsocietyinto two components,"system"and
"lifeworld."See thissectionbelow and especiallynote 15.
8. Habermas,TCAI, pp. 85, 87-88, 101,342, 357-360; TCAII, p. 179; LC, pp. 4-5;
RC, pp. 234, 237, 264-5. McCarthy,TI, pp. ix, xvix-xxx.
In presentingthe distinctionbetween and socially-integrated
system-integrated
actioncontexts,I am relyingon theterminology ofLCand am modifying theterminol-

NancyFraser 103
theparadigmcase ofa system-integrated actioncontext.Bycontrast,

he takesthemodern,restricted, nuclearfamilytobe a case ofa socially-
integratedaction context.'
Now thisdistinctionis a rathercomplex one. It containssix, an-
alyticallydistinct,conceptual elements:functionality, intentionality,
consensuality,
linguisticality, normativity and strategicality.
However,
I am going to set aside the elementsof functionality, intentionality
and linguisticality.Followingsome argumentsdeveloped byThomas
McCarthyin anothercontext,I assume that,in both capitalistwork-
place and modern, restrictednuclear family,the consequences of
actionsmaybe functionally interlacedin waysunintendedbyagents;
that,at thesame time, in both contextsagentscoordinatetheiractions
withone anotherconsciouslyand intentionally; and-that,in bothcon-
texts,agents coordinate theiractionswith one another in and through
language.' I assume,therefore, thatHabermas' distinction effectively
turns on the elements of consensuality, normativityand
strategicality.
ogyofTCA.Or, rather,I am selectingone oftheseveralvaryingusagesdeployedin the

latterwork.There, Habermas oftenspeaksofwhatI have called "socially-integrated
action" as "communicativeaction." But thisgivesrise to confusion.For Habermas
also uses thislatterexpressioninanother,strongersense,namely,foractionsin which
coordinationoccursbyexplicit,dialogicallyachievedconsensusonly.(See below,this
section).In order to avoid repeatingHabermas' equivocation on 'communicative
action,' I adopt the followingterminology:I reservethe term'communicatively-
achievedaction' foractionscoordinatedby explicit,reflective, dialogicallyachieved
consensus. I contrastsuch action, in the firstinstance,with'normatively-secured
action' or actionscoordinatedby tacit,prereflective, pregivenconsensus(see below,
thissection).I take'communicatively-achieved' and 'normatively-secured' actions,so
defined,tobe subspeciesofwhatI herecall 'socially-integrated action'oractionscoor-
dinatedby anyformof normedconsensuswhatever.This lastcategory,in turn,con-
with'system-integrated
trasts action'or actionscoordinatedbythefunctional interlacing
ofunintendedconsequences,determinedby egocentriccalculationsin themedia of
moneyand power,and involvinglittleor no normedconsensusofanysort.These ter-
minologicalcommitmentsdo not so much representa departurefromHabermas'
usage - he does in factfrequently use thesetermsin thesensesI havespecified.They
represent,rather,a stabilizationor renderingconsistentof his usage.
9. Habermas, TCAI,. pp. 341, 357-359; TCAII, p. 256, 266. McCarthy,TI, p.
xxX.
10. In "Complexityand Democracy,or the Seducementsof SystemsTheory,"
New GermanCritique, thisissue, McCarthyargues thatstateadministrative bureauc-
raciescannotbe distinguishedfromparticipatory democraticpoliticalassociationson
the basis of functionality, intentionality and linguisticalitysince all threeof these
featuresare foundin bothcontexts.Thus, McCarthyarguesthatfunctionality, inten-
tionalityand linguisticalityare not mutually exclusive.I find these arguments per-
suasive.I see no reasonwhytheydo nothold also forthecapitalistworkplaceand the
modern,restricted, nuclearfamily.

Once again, I thinkit useful to distinguishtwo possible inter-

pretationsofHabermas' position.The firsttakesthecontrastbetween
thetwokindsofactioncontextsas registering an absolutedifference.
Thus, system-integrated contextswouldinvolveabsolutelyno consen-
sualityor referencetomoralnormsand values,whilesocially-integrated
contextswould involve absolutelyno strategiccalculationsin the
mediaofmoneyand power.This"absolutedifferences" interpretation
is at odds witha second possibilitywhichtakesthecontrastratheras
registeringa differencein degree.On thissecondinterpretation, system-
integratedcontextswould involvesome consensualityand reference
to moralnormsand values,butless thansocially-integrated contexts.
In the same way, socially-integrated contextswould involve some
strategiccalculationsin themedia ofmoneyand power,but less than
system-integrated contexts.
Now I wantto argue thattheabsolute differences interpretationis
too extremeto be usefulforsocial theoryand that,in addition,it is
potentiallyideological.In fewifanyhumanactioncontexts areactionsco-
ordinatedabsolutelynonconsensually and absolutelynon-normatively.
Howevermorallydubious theconsensus,and howeverproblematic
thecontentand statusofthenorms,virtually everyhumanactioncon-
textinvolvessome formofbothofthem.In thecapitalistmarketplace,
forexample, strategic, utility-maximizing exchangesoccur againsta
horizonofintersubjectively sharedmeaningsand norms;agentsnor-
mallysubscribeat least tacitlyto some commonlyheld notionsof
reciprocity and tosome sharedconceptionsabout thesocialmeanings
of objects, includingabout what sortsof thingsare exchangeable.
Similarly,in thecapitalistworkplace,managersand subordinates,as
well as coworkers,normallycoordinatetheiractionsto some extent
consensuallyand withsome explicitor implicitreference tonormative
assumptions,thoughthe consensus be arrivedat unfairlyand the
normsbe incapableofwithstanding criticalscrutiny."Thus, thecapi-
talisteconomic systemhas a moral-cultural dimension.
Similarly,few if any human action contexts are whollydevoid of
strategiccalculation.Gift rituals
in noncapitalist societies,forexample,
previously taken as veritable crucibles of solidarity,are now widely
understoodto have a significant calculative
strategic, dimension,one
enactedin themedium of power,ifnot in thatofmoney."2And, as I
11. Here,again,I followMcCarthy, Ibid.He arguesthatin modern,stateadminis-

trativebureaucracies,managersmustoftendeal consensuallywiththeirsubordinates.
This seems to be equally the case forcorporateorganizations.
12. I have in mind especiallythebrilliantand influential discussionofgifting
by
PierreBourdieu in Outline ofa Theory trans.RichardNice (New York:Cam-
ofPractice,

NancyFraser 105
shallarguein moredetaillater,themodern,restricted, nuclearfamily

is not devoid of individual,self-interested,strategiccalculationsin
eithermedium.These actioncontexts,then,whilenotofficially count-
ed as economic,have a strategic, economic dimension.
Thus, the absolute differences is not of much use
interpretation
in social theory.It fails to distinguish,for example, the capitalist
economy - let us call it "the officialeconomy" - from the modern,
restricted,nuclearfamily.For both oftheseinstitutions are melanges
of consensuality,normativity If theyare to be dis-
and strategicality.
tinguishedwithrespectto mode ofaction-integration, thedistinction
mustbe drawnas a difference ofdegree.Itmustturnon theplace,pro-
portionsand interactionsof the threeelementswithineach.
Butifthisis so, thentheabsolutedifferencesclassification oftheoffi-
cial economyas a system-integrated actioncontextand ofthemodern
familyas a socially-integratedactioncontextis potentially ideological.
It could be used, forexample, to exaggeratethe differences and oc-
clude thesimilarities betweenthetwoinstitutions. It could be used to
constructan ideological opposition which posits the familyas the
"negative,"the complementary"other," of the (official)economic
sphere,a "haven in a heartlessworld."
Now whichofthesepossible interpretations ofthetwodistinctions
are theoperativeones in Habermas' social theory?He assertsthathe
understandsthereproductiondistinction accordingto thepragmatic-
contextualinterpretation and notthenaturalkindsone." Likewise,he
assertsthathe takestheaction-context distinctiontomarka difference
in degree,notan absolute However, proposeto bracket
difference.'" I
theseassertions and to examine what Habermas actuallydoes with
thesedistinctions.
Habermas maps the distinctionbetweenactioncontextsonto the
distinctionbetween reproductionfunctionsin order to arriveat a
definitionofsocietalmodernizationand ata pictureoftheinstitution-
al structureofmodem societies.Habermasholdsthatmodem societies
bridgeUniversity Press,1977). By recoveringthe dimensionof time,Bourdieu sub-

revisestheclassicalaccountbyMarcelMauss in TheGift:
stantially FormsandFunctionsof
ExchangeinArchaic trans.Ian Cunnison(New York:W.W. Norton,1967). Fora
Societies,
discussionof some recentrevisionistworkin cultural-economicanthropology,see
ArjunAppadurai,"Commoditiesand thePoliticsofValue," in TheSocialLifeofThings:
CommoditiesinCultural ed. ArjunAppadurai(NewYork:CambridgeUniver-
Perspective,
sityPress,forthcoming in 1986).
13. Habermas, TCA II, pp. 348-349. McCarthy,TI, p. xxvi-xxvii.The terms
'pragmatic-contextual'and 'naturalkinds'are mine,not Habermas'.
14. Habermas,TCAI, pp. 94-95,101; TCAII, pp. 348-349;RC,p. 227,237,266-68;
and 'dif-
LC, p. 10. McCarthy,TI, pp. xxvi-xxvii.The terms'absolute differences'
ferenceof degree'are mine,not Habermas'.

differfrompremodernsocietiesin thattheysplitoffsome materialre-

productionfunctions fromsymbolicones and handovertheformerto
two specialized institutions- the (official)economy and state -
whichare system-integrated. Atthesame time,modem societiessituate
theseinstitutions in thelargersocial environmentby developingtwo
otherones whichspecializein symbolicreproductionand are socially-
integrated.These are themodem,restricted, nuclearfamilyor "private
sphere" and the of
space politicalparticipation,debate and opinion
formationor "public sphere"; and together,theyconstitutewhat
Habermas callsthetwo"institutional ordersofthemodernlifeworld."
Thus, modernsocieties"uncouple" or separatewhatHabermas takes
to be twodistinct,but previouslyundifferentiated aspectsof society:
"system" and "lifeworld." And so, on his view, the institutionalstruc-
tureofmodernsocietiesis dualistic.On theone side standtheinstitu-
tionalordersofthemodernlifeworld, thesocially-integrated domains
specializingin symbolicreproduction, thatis,in socialization,solidar-
ityformationand culturaltransmission.On theotherside standthe
systems,the system-integrated domains specializingin materialre-
production.On theone side,thenuclearfamilyand thepublicsphere.
On the otherside, the (official)capitalisteconomyand the modern
administrative state.'5
Now whatare thecriticalinsightsand blindspotsofthismodel? Let
us attendfirstto the question of its empiricaladequacy. And let us
15. Habermas,TCAI, pp. 72, 341-342,359-360; TCAII, p. 179; RC,pp. 268, 279-
80; LC, pp. 20-21. McCarthy,TI, pp. xxvii-xxix.Thompson,RSR, pp. 285, 287.
It should be noted thatin TCAHabermas drawsthecontrastbetweensystemand
lifeworldin twodistinctsenses. On theone hand, he contraststhemas twodifferent
methodologicalperspectives on thestudyofsocieties.The systemperspectiveis objec-
tivating and "externalist,"
whilethelifeworld perspectiveis hermeneutical and "inter-
nalist."In principle,eithercan be applied to the studyof any given set of societal
phenomena.Habermasarguesthatneitheralone isadequate. So he seekstodevelopa
methodologythatcombinesboth.On theotherhand,Habermasalso contrastssystem
and lifeworldin anotherway,namely,as twodifferent kindsof institutions. It is this
second system-lifeworld contrastwhichI am concernedwithhere.I do notexplicitly
treatthefirstone inthisessay.I am sympathetic withHabermas' generalmethodologi-
cal intentionof combiningor linkingstructural(in the sense of objectivating)and
interpretive approaches to thestudyof societies.I do not,however,believethatthis
can be done by assigningstructural propertiesto one set of institutions(theofficial
economyand thestate)and interpretive ones toanotherset(thefamilyand the"public
sphere").I maintain,rather,thatall oftheseinstitutions
havebothstructural and inter-
pretive dimensions and that all should be studied both structurallyand her-
meneutically.I have triedto develop an approach whichmeetsthesedesideratain
"Feminismand theSocial State,"Salmagundi (forthcoming), and in "Women,Welfare
and thePoliticsof Need Interpretation," Hypatia:AJournal ofFeministPhilosophy (forth-
coming). I have discussed thegeneralmethodologicalproblem in "On the Political
and theSymbolic:AgainsttheMetaphysics ofTextuality," Boundary 2, 14:1 (Fall 1985).

NancyFraser 107
focus,forthetimebeing,on thecontrastbetween"the privatesphere

ofthelifeworld"and the(official)economicsystem.Considerthatthis
aspect of Habermas' categorialdivide betweensystemand lifeworld
institutions faithfullymirrorstheinstitutional separationoffamilyand
officialeconomy,householdand paid workplace,in male-dominated,
capitalistsocieties.It thushas someprimafaciepurchaseon empirical
social reality.Butconsider,too,thatthecharacterization ofthefamily
as a socially-integrated, symbolicreproductiondomain and of the
paid workplace,on the otherhand, as a system-integrated material
reproductiondomain tendsto exaggeratethedifferences and occlude
the similaritiesbetweenthem.For example,it directsattentionaway
fromthefactthatthe household, like the paid workplace,is a siteof
labor, albeit of unremuneratedand oftenunrecognizedlabor. Like-
wise,itdoes notmakevisiblethefactthatin thepaid workplace,as in
the household, women are assigned to, indeed ghettoizedin, dis-
tinctively feminine,service-oriented and oftensexualizedoccupations.
Finally, itfailsto focalizethefactthatin bothsphereswomenare sub-
ordinatedto men.
Moreover,thischaracterization presentsthemale-headed,nuclear
family,qua socially-integrated institutionalorderof the modernlife-
world,as havingonlyan extrinsicand incidentalrelationtomoneyand
power.These "media" are takenas definitive ofinteractionsin theoffi-
cial economyand stateadministration but as onlyincidentalto intra-
familialones. But thisassumptionis counterfactual.Feministshave
shown via empirical analyses of contemporaryfamilial decision-
making,handling of financesand wife-battering that familiesare
thoroughly permeatedwith,in Habermas' terms,themedia ofmoney
and power. They are sitesof egocentric,strategicand instrumental
calculationas wellas sitesofusuallyexploitativeexchangesofservices,
labor,cash and sex, not to mentionsites,frequently, ofcoercionand
violence.'6But Habermas' wayofcontrasting themodernfamilywith
theofficialcapitalisteconomytendstoocclude all this.Itoverstatesthe
differencesbetween these institutionsand blocks the possibilityof
analyzingfamiliesas economic systems,that is, as sites of labor,
exchange,calculation,distribution and exploitation.Or, tothedegree
thatHabermaswould acknowledgethattheycan be seen thatwaytoo,
his framework would suggestthatthisis due to theintrusionor inva-
sion ofalien forces;to the"colonization"ofthefamilybythe(official)
16. See, forexample, the essays in Rethinking

theFamily:SomeFeminist
Questions,
BarrieThorne and MarilynYalom, eds. (New Yorkand London: Longman, 1982).
Also, Michle Barrettand Mary McIntosh, TheAnti-SocialFamily(London: Verso,
1982).

economyand thestate.This,too,however,is a dubious proposition.I

shall discuss it in detailin sectionIII below.
Thus Habermas' model has some empiricaldeficiencies.It is not
easilyable tofocalizesome dimensionsofmale dominanceinmodern
societies.On the otherhand, his framework does offera conceptual
resource suitable for understandingotheraspects of modern male
dominance.ConsiderthatHabermassubdividesthecategory ofsocially-
integratedaction-contexts intotwo subcategories.On theone hand,
thereare "normatively-secured" formsof socially-integrated action.
These are actions coordinatedon the basis of a conventional,pre-
reflective,taken-for-granted consensus about values and ends, con-
sensus rooted in the precriticalinternalizationof socializationand
culturaltradition.On the otherhand, thereare "communicatively-
achieved" formsof socially-integrated action.These involveactions
coordinatedon the basis of explicit,reflective, achieved consensus,
consensusreachedby unconstraineddiscussionunderconditionsof
freedom,equalityand fairness.'7This distinction, whichis a subdis-
tinctionwithinthe categoryof socially-integrated action, provides
Habermas withsome criticalresourcesforanalyzingthemodern,re-
stricted,male-headed,nuclear family.Such familiescan be under-
stood as normatively-secured ratherthancommunicatively-achieved
action contexts,thatis, as contextswhere actions are (sometimes)
mediatedbyconsensusand sharedvalues,butwheresuch consensus
is suspectbecause prereflective or because achievedthroughdialogue
vitiatedby unfairness, coercionor inequality.
To whatextentdoes the distinctionbetweennormatively-secured
and communicatively-achieved actioncontextssucceed in overcom-
ingtheproblemsdiscussedearlier?Onlypartially, I think.On theone
hand, thisdistinctionis a morallysignificant and empiricallyuseful
one. The notionofa normatively-secured actioncontextfitsnicelywith
recentresearchon patternsofcommunicationbetweenhusbandsand
wives.This researchshows thatmen tend to controlconversations,
determining whattopicsare pursued,whilewomen do more "inter-
action work" like askingquestions and providingverbal support.'"
Researchalso revealsdifferences in men's and women's uses of the
bodily and gestural dimensions of speech,differences whichconfirm
17. Habermas,TCAI, pp. 85-86,88-90, 101, 104-105;TCAII, p. 179.

McCarthy,
TI, pp. ix, xxx. In presentingthedistinctionbetweennormatively-secured and com-
municatively-achieved action,I am.againmodifying,
or ratherstabilizing,thevariable
usage of TCA.See footnote8 above.
18. Pamela Fishman,"Interaction:The WorkWomen Do," SocialProblems 25:4.
398-406. Cited in BarrieThorne,op.cit.

NancyFraser 109
men's dominance and women's subordination.'9Thus, Habermas'

distinctionenables us to capturesomethingimportantabout intra-
familialdynamics.What is insufficiently stressed,however,is that
actionscoordinatedby normatively-secured consensus in the male-
headed, nuclearfamily are actions regulatedbypower.It seemsto me
a gravemistaketo restrict theuse oftheterm'power' to bureaucratic
contexts.Habermas would do betterto distinguishdifferent kindsof
power, for example, normative-domestic-patriarchal power,on the
one hand,and non-normative-bureaucratic-patriarchal power,on the
other,not to mentionvarious otherkindsand combinationsin be-
tween.
But even thatdistinctiondoes not by itselfsufficeto make Haber-
mas' frameworkfullyadequate to all the empiricalformsof male
dominancein modernsocieties.For normative-domestic-patriarchal
poweris onlyone oftheelementswhichenforcewomen'ssubordina-
tion in the domesticsphere.To capturethe otherswould requirea
social-theoreticalframeworkcapable of analyzingfamiliesalso as
economic systemsinvolvingthe appropriationof women's unpaid
labor and interlockingin complexwayswithothereconomicsystems
involvingpaid work. Because Habermas' framework drawsthemajor
categorialdivide between and
system lifeworld and hence
institutions,
between(among otherthings)officialeconomyand family,it is not
verywell suitedto thattask.
Let me turnnow fromthe question of the empiricaladequacy of
Habermas' model to the question of itsnormativepoliticalimplica-
tions.Whatsortsofsocial arrangements and transformations does his
modernizationconceptiontendto legitimate?And whatsortsdoes it
tendtoruleout? Here itwillbe necessarytoreconstruct some implica-
tionsofthemodel whichare notexplicitlythematizedby Habermas.
Considerthattheconceptionofmodernizationas theuncouplingof
systemand lifeworldinstitutions tendsto legitimatethemoderninsti-
tutionalseparationof familyand officialeconomy,childrearingand
paid work.For Habermas claimsthatthereis an asymmetry between
symbolicand materialreproduction withrespectto system-integration.
Symbolicreproductionactivities,he claims,are unlikematerialre-
productionactivities,in thattheycannotbe turnedoverto specialized,
system-integrated institutions set apartfromthe lifeworld.Their in-
herently symbolic character requiresthattheybe socially-integrated.20
It followsthatwomen'sunpaid childrearing workcould notbe incor-
19. NancyHenley,BodyPolitics(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1977).

20. Habermas,TCAII, pp. 523-24,547; TJ,p. 3; RC,p. 237. Thompson,RSR,pp.
288, 292.

andGender
110 Habermas
porated into the (official)economic systemwithout"pathological"

results.On the otherhand, Habermas also holds thatit is a markof
societalrationalizationthatsystem-integrated institutions
be differen-
tiatedto handle materialreproductionfunctions.The separationofa
specialized(official)economic systemenhancesa society'scapacityto
deal withits naturaland social environment."Systemcomplexity,"
then,constitutes a "developmentaladvance."21Itfollowsthatthe(offi-
cial) economic systemofpaid workcould notbe dedifferentiated with
to,
respect say,childrearing, without societal "regression." Butifchild-
rearingcould notbe nonpathologically incorporatedintothe(official)
economic system,and ifthe (official)economic systemcould not be
nonregressively dedifferentiated, then the continued separationof
childrearing from paid work would be required.
Now thisamountsto a defenseofone aspectofwhatfeminists call
"the separationof public and private,"namely,theseparationof the
officialeconomicspherefromthedomesticsphere,and theenclaving
of childrearingfromthe restof social labor. It amounts,thatis, to a
defenseofan institutional arrangement whichiswidelyheldtobe one,
ifnotthe,linchpinofmodernwomen'ssubordination.And itshould
be noted thatthe factthatHabermas is a socialistdoes not alterthe
matter.For the (undeniablydesirable)eliminationof privateowner-
ship,profit-orientation and hierarchical commandin paid workwould
not of itselfaffectthe official-economic/domestic separation.
Now I wanttochallengeseveralpremisesofthereasoningI havejust
reconstructed.First,thisreasoningassumes the naturalkindsinter-
pretationof the symbolicvs. materialreproductiondistinction.But
since,as I haveargued,childrearing and since
is a dual-aspectactivity,
itis not categoriallydifferentin thisrespectfromotherwork,thereis
no warrantfortheclaimofan asymmetry vis-a-vissystem-intergration.
That is, thereis no warrantforassumingthatthe system-integrated
organizationofchildrearing would be anymore(or less) pathological
thanthatofotherwork.Second, thisreasoningassumes theabsolute
differences interpretationof the social vs. systemintegration distinc-
tion. But since,as I have argued,themodem, male-headed,nuclear
familyis a melange of (normatively-secured) consensuality,nor-
and
mativity strategicality, and since itis in thisrespectnotcategorially
different fromthe paid workplace,then privatizedchildrearingis
already, to a not insignificant extent,permeatedby the media of
21. McCarthypursuessome ofthenormativeimplicationsofthisforthedifferen-

tiationof theadministrative
statesystemfromthepublic spherein "Complexityand
Democracy,"op.cit.

NancyFraser 111
money and power. Moreover,there is no empiricalevidence that

childrenraised in commercialday care centers(even profit-basedor
corporateones) turnout anymorepathologicalthanthoseraised,say,
in suburban homes by full-timemothers.Third,the reasoningjust
sketchedelevatessystemcomplexitytothestatusofan overridingcon-
siderationwitheffectiveveto-powerover proposed social transfor-
mationsaimed at overcomingwomen's subordination.But thisis at
odds withHabermas' professionsthatsystemcomplexityis onlyone
measureof"progress"among others.22 More importantly,itis at odds
withany reasonable standardofjustice.
What, then, should we conclude about the normative,political
implicationsof Habermas' model? If the conceptionof moderniza-
tionas theuncouplingofsystemand lifeworld institutions
does indeed
have theimplicationsI havejustdrawnfromit,thenitis in important
respectsandrocentricand ideological.
II. Public and Privatein Classical Capitalism:
Thematizingthe GenderSubtext
The foregoingdifficultiesnotwithstanding, Habermas offersan
account of the interinstitutionalrelationsamong various spheresof
public and privatelifein classicalcapitalismwhichhas some genuine
criticalpotential.Butin orderfullyto realizethispotential,we need to
reconstruct the unthematizedgendersubtextof his material.
Let me returnto his conceptionof the way in whichthe (official)
economic and statesystemsare situatedwithrespectto thelifeworld.
Habermas holds thatwithmodernization,the(official) economicand
statesystemsare not simplydisengagedor detached fromthe life-
world;theymustalso be relatedto and embedded in it.Concomitant
withthe beginningsof classicalcapitalism,then,is the development
withinthelifeworldof"institutional orders"whichsituatethesystems
ina contextofeverydaymeaningsand norms.The lifeworld, as we saw,
gets differentiatedinto two spheres which provideappropriatecom-
plementary environments forthetwosystems.The "privatesphere"or
modern,restricted, nuclearfamilyis linkedto the(official)economic
system. The "public sphere"or space ofpoliticalparticipation, debate
and opinion formationis linked to the state-administrative system.
The familyis linkedto the (official)economyby means of a seriesof
exchangesconductedinthemediumofmoney;itsuppliesthe(official)
economywithappropriatelysocialized labor-powerin exchangefor
of the state
22. McCarthymakes thispointwithrespectto the dedifferentiation
systemand the public sphere.Ibid.
administrative

wages;and itprovidesappropriate,monetarily measureddemandfor

commodifiedgoods and services.Exchangesbetweenfamilyand (offi-
cial) economy,then,are channeledthroughthe"roles" ofworkerand
consumer.Parallelexchangeprocesseslinkthe"public sphere"and
thestatesystem.These,however,areconductedchiefly in themedium
of power. Loyalty,obedience and tax revenuesare exchanged for
"organizationalresults"and "politicaldecisions."Exchangesbetween
public sphere and state,then,are channeled throughthe "role" of
citizenand, in late-welfare-capitalism, thatof client.
Thisaccountofinterinstitutional relationsin classicalcapitalismhas
a numberofimportant advantages.First, ittreatsthemodern,restricted,
nuclearfamilyas an historically emergentinstitution withitsownposi-
tive, determinatefeatures. And it specifiesthat this typeof family
emergesconcomitantly with and in relation to the emergingcapitalist
economy, administrative stateand (eventually)the politicalpublic
sphere.Moreover,itchartssome ofthedynamicsofexchangeamong
theseinstitutions.And itindicatessomewaysinwhichtheyarefitted to
theneeds of one anotherso as to accommodatetheexchangesamong
them.
Finally,Habermas' account offersan importantcorrectiveto the
standarddualisticapproachesto theseparationofpublic and private
in capitalistsocieties. He conceptualizesthe problem as a relation
amongfourterms:family, economy,stateand "publicsphere."
(official)
His viewsuggeststhatin classicalcapitalismthereare actuallytwodis-
tinctbut interrelatedpublic-private separations.There is one public-
privateseparationat thelevelof"systems,"namely,theseparationof
the stateor public systemfromthe (official)capitalisteconomy or
privatesystem.There is anotherpublic-private separationat thelevel
of the "lifeworld,"namely,the separationof the familyor private
lifeworldspherefromthe space of politicalopinion formationand
participationor public lifeworldsphere. Moreover,each of these
public-private separationsis coordinatedwiththeother.One axis of
exchange runs betweenprivatesystemand privatelifeworldsphere,
thatis, between(official)capitalisteconomyand modern,restricted,
nuclearfamily.Anotheraxis ofexchangerunsbetweenpublic system
and public lifeworldsphereor betweenstateadministration and the
organs of public opinion and will formation.In both cases the ex-
changescan occurbecause oftheinstitutionalization ofspecificroles
whichconnectthedomainsin question.Thus, therolesofworkerand
consumerlinkthe (official)privateeconomyand the privatefamily,
23. Habermas, TCAI, pp. 341-342, 359-360; TCA

II, pp. 256, 473; RC, p. 280.
McCarthy,TI, p. xxxii.Thompson,RSR, pp. 286-88.

NancyFraser 113
whiletherolesofcitizenand (later)clientlinkthepublic stateand the

public opinion institutions.
Thus, Habermasprovidesan extremely sophisticated accountofthe
relationsbetweenpublic and privateinstitutions in classicalcapitalist
societies.At the same time,however,his account has some weak-
nesses. Many of thesestemfromhis failureto thematizethegender
subtextof the relationsand arrangementshe describes.24Consider,
therelationsbetween(official)
first, privateeconomyand privatefamily
as mediatedby therolesofworkerand consumer.These roles,I sub-
mit,are genderedroles.And thelinkstheyforgebetweenfamilyand
(official)economyare adumbratedas much in themediumofgender
identityas in the medium of money.
Take theroleoftheworker.25In male-dominated,classicalcapitalist
societies,thisrole is a masculine role and notjust in the relatively
superficialstatistical sense.There is rathera verydeep sense in which
masculineidentity inthesesocietiesis bound up withthebreadwinner
role.Masculinityis inlargeparta matterofleavinghomeeach dayfora
place ofpaid workand returning witha wagewhichprovidesforone's
dependents. It is thisinternalrelation betweenbeinga man and being
a providerwhichexplainswhyin capitalistsocietiesunemployment
can be so psychologically, as well as economically,devastatingfor
men. It also sheds lighton thecentrality of the strugglefora "family
wage" in thehistory of theworkers'and trade unionmovementsofthe
19thand 20thcenturies.Thiswasa struggle fora wageconceivednotas
a paymentto a genderlessindividualfortheuse of labor-powerbut,
rather,as a paymentto a man forthe supportof his economically
dependentwifeand children.A conception,of course,whichlegiti-
mized the practiceof payingwomen less forequal or comparable
work.
The masculinesubtextoftheworkerroleis confirmedbythevexed
and strainedcharacterof women's relationto paid work in male-
dominatedclassicalcapitalism.As Carole Patemanputsit,itis notthat
women are absentfromthe paid workplace;it's ratherthattheyare
presentdifferently26 - forexample,as feminizedand sometimessex-
ualized "service" workers(secretaries,domestic workers,salesper-
24. I borrowthephrase"gendersubtext"fromDorothySmith,"The GenderSub-

textof Power,"unpublishedtypescript.
25. The followingaccount of the masculinegender subtextof the workerrole
drawsheavilyon Carole Pateman,"The Personaland thePolitical:Can
Citizenshipbe
Democratic?"LectureIII of her"Women and Democratic
Citizenship,"The Jeffer-
son MemorialLectures,deliveredat theUniversity
of California,Berkeley,February
1985, unpublishedtypescript.
26. Pateman,Ibid.,p. 5.

andmorerecently,
sons,prostitutes, as members
attendants);
flight of
the"helpingprofessions"
utilizingmotheringskills(nurses,social
childcareworkers,
workers, primary schoolteachers);
as targets
ofsex-
ual harassment;as low-wage,low-skilled,low-statusworkersin sex-
segregated as part-time
occupations; workers;as workers
whoworka
doubleshift
(bothunpaiddomestic labor and as
paidlabor); "working
wives"and "workingmothers," i.e. as primarily
wivesand mothers
whohappen,secondarily,also to"go outtowork";as "supplemental
earners."These differences
in thequalityofwomen's presencein the
paidworkplace testifytotheconceptual dissonance between femininity
and theworker roleinclassicalcapitalism. Andthisin turnconfirms
themasculinesubtextof thatrole.It confirms thattheroleof the
worker whichlinkstheprivate (official) and
economy theprivate family
in male-dominated, capitalistsocieties, is a masculinerole;and that,
paceHabermas,thelinkitforges iselaborated as muchinthemedium
of masculinegenderidentity as in the mediumof gender-neutral
money.
Conversely,theotherrolelinkingofficial economyand family in
Habermas'schemehasa feminine subtext. Theconsumer, all,is
after
theworker's companionandhelpmateinclassicalcapitalism. Forthe
sexualdivisionofdomestic laborassignstowomenthework- anditis
indeedwork,thoughunpaidand usuallyunrecognized work- of
and
purchasing preparing goods and services fordomesticconsump-
tion.You can confirm thiseventodaybyvisiting anysupermarket or
department store. Or by looking at the history of consumer goods
advertising.Suchadvertising has nearlyalwaysinterpellated itssub-
theconsumer,
ject,27 as feminine. In fact,ithas elaboratedan entire
phantasmatics of desire on
premised thefemininity ofthesubjectof
It is
consumption. onlyrelatively recently, and with somedifficulty,
thatadvertisershavedevisedwaysofinterpellating a masculinesubject
ofconsumption. Thetrick wastofindmeansofpositioning a malecon-
sumerwhichdidnotfeminize, emasculate orsissifyhim.In TheHearts
ofMen,BarbaraEhrenreich quite shrewdly, I think,creditsPlayboy
magazinewithpioneering suchmeans."2Butthedifficulty andlateness
oftheprojectconfirm thegenderedcharacter oftheconsumer rolein
classicalcapitalism. Menoccupyitwithconceptualstrainand cogni-
27. I am hereadaptingAlthusser'snotionoftheinterpellationofa subjecttoa con-

textin whichhe, ofcourse,neverused it.Forthegeneralnotion,see Louis Althusser,
"Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses(Notes towardan Investigation),"in
Leninand Philosophy
and OtherEssays,trans.Ben Brewster(New York:MonthlyReview
Press,1971).
28. BarbaraEhrenreich,TheHeartsofMen:American DreamsandtheFlightfromCom-
mitment (Garden City,NY: AnchorBooks, 1984).

NancyFraser 115
tivedissonance, muchas womenoccupytheroleofworker. So therole

ofconsumerlinkingofficial economyand family is a feminine role.
PaceHabermas,itforgesthelinkin themediumoffeminine gender
identity as much as in the apparently gender-neutral mediumof
money.
Moreover, Habermas'accountoftheroleslinking family and (offi-
cial)economy contains a significant omission.There is no mention in
hisschemaofanychildrearer role,although the material clearlyre-
quiresone. Forwhoelseisperforming theunpaidworkofoverseeing
theproduction ofthe"appropriately socializedlabor-power" which
thefamilyexchangesforwages?Of course,thechildrearer role in
classicalcapitalism (as elsewhere) ispatentlya feminine role.Itsomis-
sionhereisa markofandrocentrism, andithassomesignificant conse-
quences. A consideration of the childrearerrolein this context might
wellhavepointedtothecentral relevanceofgendertotheinstitutional
structure ofclassicalcapitalism. Andthisinturncouldhaveled tothe
disclosureofthegendersubtextoftheotherrolesand oftheimpor-
tanceofgenderidentity as an "exchangemedium."
What,then,of the otherset of rolesand linkagesidentified by
Habermas?Whatof thecitizenrolewhichhe claimsconnectsthe
publicsystemof theadministrative statewiththe publiclifeworld
sphereofpoliticalopinionandwillformation? Thisrole,too,isa gen-
deredroleinclassicalcapitalism, indeed,a masculinerole.29 Andnot
in
simply the sense that women did notwin the vote for
in, example,
theU.S.andBritain untilthe20thcentury. Rather,thelateness anddif-
of
ficulty that are
victory symptomaticdeeper of strains.As Habermas
understands it,thecitizenis centrally a participantinpoliticaldebate
andpublicopinionformation. Thismeansthatcitizenship, inhisview,
dependscrucially on the capacities forconsent and speech,theability
toparticipate on a parwithothersindialogue.Butthesearecapacities
whichare connectedwithmasculinity in male-dominated, classical
capitalism. are
They capacities which are in myriadways denied to
womenand deemedat odds withfemininity. I havealreadycited
studiesabouttheeffects ofmaledominance andfemalesubordination
on thedynamics ofdialogue.Nowconsiderthateventodayin most
jurisdictionsthereis no suchthingas maritalrape.Thatis,a wifeis
legallysubjecttoherhusband;sheisnotan individual whocangiveor
withhold consenttohisdemandsforsexualaccess.Consideralsothat
evenoutsideof marriagethelegaltestof rapeoftenboils downto
whether a "reasonableman"wouldhaveassumedthatthewomanhad
29. The followingdiscussionof themasculinegendersubtextof thecitizenrole

drawsheavilyon Carole Pateman,op.cit.

consented.Considerwhatthatmeans when both popular and legal

opinionwidelyholdsthatwhena womansays"no" shemeans"yes."It
means, saysCarole Pateman,that"women findtheirspeech ... per-
sistentlyand systematicallyinvalidatedin the crucialmatterof con-
sent,a matterthatis fundamentalto democracy.[But] if women's
wordsabout consentare consistently reinterpreted, howcan theypar-
ticipatein the debate among citizens?""3
Thus, thereis conceptualdissonance betweenfemininity and the
dialogicalcapacitiescentralto Habermas' conceptionof citizenship.
And thereis anotheraspectofcitizenshipnotdiscussedbyhimthatis
even more obviouslybound up withmasculinity. I mean thesoldier-
of the
ingaspect citizenship, conception ofthecitizen as thedefender
ofthepolityand protectorofthose- women,children,theelderly-
whoallegedlycannotprotectthemselves.AsJudithStiehmhas argued,
thisdivisionbetweenmale protectors and femaleprotectedintroduces
furtherdissonanceintowomen'srelationto citizenship."It confirms
the gendersubtextof the citizenrole. And theview of women as in
need ofmen'sprotection"underliesaccessnotjustto ... themeansof
destruction,but also [to]the means of production- witnessall the
'protective'legislationthat has surroundedwomen's access to the
workplace - and [to] the means of reproduction [- witness]women's
statusas wivesand sexual partners."32
Thus, the citizenrole in male-dominatedclassicalcapitalismis a
masculinerole. It linksthestateand thepublic sphere,as Habermas
claims. But italso linkstheseto theofficialeconomyand thefamily.
And ineverycase thelinksare forgedinthemediumofmasculinegen-
der identityratherthan,as Habermas has it, in the medium of a
gender-neutral power.Or, ifthemediumofexchangehereis power,
then the power in question is masculine power. It is power as the
expressionof masculinity.
Thus,thereare some majorlacunae in Habermas'otherwisepower-
fuland sophisticatedmodel of the relationsbetweenpublic and
pri-
vate institutionsin classicalcapitalism.The gender-blindnessof the
model occludes importantfeaturesof the arrangementshe wantsto
understand.Byomittinganymentionofthechildrearerrole,and
by
failingto thematizethegendersubtextunderlying therolesofworker
30. Pateman,op.cit.,p. 8.
31. JudithHicksStiehm,"The Protected,theProtector, theDefender,"in Women
andMen'sWars,editedbyJudithHicksStiehm(NewYork:
PergamonPress,1983) and
"MythsNecessaryto thePursuitofWar," unpublishedtypescript. This is not to say,
however,that I accept Stiehm's conclusions about the desirabilityof integrating
women fullyintothe U.S. militaryas presentlystructuredand
deployed.
p. 10.
32. Pateman,op.cit.,

NancyFraser 117
and consumer,Habermas failsto understandpreciselyhow thecapi-

talistworkplaceis linked to the modern, restricted,male-headed,
nuclearfamily.Similarly, byfailingtothematizethemasculinesubtext
ofthecitizenrole,he missesthefullmeaningofthewaythestateislinked
to thepublic sphereof politicalspeech. Moreover,Habermas misses
importantcross-connectionsamong the four elementsof his two
public-privateschemata.He misses,forexample, the way the mas-
culine citizen-soldier-protector role linksthestateand public sphere
not onlyto one anotherbut also to the familyand to the paid work-
place, thatis,thewaytheassumptionsofman's capacitytoprotectand
woman'sneed ofman'sprotectionrunthroughall ofthem.He misses,
too, the way the masculine citizen-speakerrole links the stateand
public spherenotonlyto one anotherbut also thefamilyand official
economy,thatis, thewaytheassumptionsofman's capacityto speak
and consentand woman's incapacitythereinrunthroughall ofthem.
He misses,also, thewaythemasculineworker-breadwinner rolelinks
thefamilyand officialeconomynotonlytoone anotherbutalso to the
stateand thepoliticalpublicsphere,thatis,thewaytheassumptionsof
man's providerstatusand ofwoman's dependentstatusrunthrough
all ofthem,so thateventhecoin inwhichclassicalcapitalistwagesand
taxesare paid is notgender-neutral. And he misses,finally, thewaythe
femininechildrearerrole linksall fourinstitutions to one anotherby
overseeingtheconstructionofthemasculineand femininegendered
subjectsneeded to fillevery role in classicalcapitalism.
Once thegender-blindness ofHabermas' model is overcome,how-
ever,all theseconnectionscome intoview.It thenbecomes clearthat
feminineand masculinegenderidentity runlikepinkand blue threads
through the areasofpaid work, stateadministration, and citizenshipas
wellas throughthedomain offamilialand sexual relations.This is to
saythatgenderidentityis livedout in all arenasoflife.It is one (ifnot
the)"medium ofexchange"amongall ofthem,a basic elementofthe
social glue thatbinds themto one another.
Moreover,a gender-sensitive readingoftheseconnectionshas some
important theoreticaland conceptualimplications.Itrevealsthatmale
dominance is intrinsicratherthanaccidentalto classicalcapitalism.
For theinstitutional structure ofthissocial formationis actualizedby
means ofgenderroles.It followsthattheformsofmale dominanceat
issue here are not properlyunderstoodas lingeringformsof pre-
modern statusinequality.They are, rather,intrinsically modern in
Habermas' sense,sincetheyare premisedon theseparationofwaged
laborand thestatefromfemalechildrearing and thehousehold.Italso
followsthata criticalsocial theoryofcapitalistsocietiesneeds gender-
sensitivecategories.The foregoinganalysisshowsthat,contrary to the

usual androcentricunderstanding,the relevantconceptsof worker,

consumer and wage are not, in fact, strictlyeconomic concepts.
Rather,theyhave an implicitgender subtextand thusare "gender-
economic" concepts.Likewise,the relevantconceptof citizenshipis
notstrictly a politicalconcept;ithas an implicitgendersubtextand so,
rather,is a "gender-political"concept.Thus, thisanalysisrevealsthe
inadequacyofthosecriticaltheorieswhichtreatgenderas incidentalto
politicsand political-economy.It highlightsthe need fora critical-
theoreticalcategorialframework in whichgender,politicsand political-
economyare internally integrated."3
In addition,a gender-sensitive readingof these arrangementsre-
veals the thoroughlymultidirectional characterof social motionand
causal influencein classical capitalism.It reveals,thatis, the inade-
quacy oftheorthodoxMarxianassumptionthatall or mostsignificant
causal influencerunsfromthe(official) economytothefamilyand not
vice-versa.It shows thatgender identitystructurespaid work,state
administration and politicalparticipation.Thus, itvindicatesHaber-
mas' claim that in classicalcapitalismthe(official)economyis notall-
powerful is, rather,in some significant
but measureinscribedwithin
and subjectto the normsand meaningsof everydaylife.Of course,
Habermasassumed thatin makingthisclaimhe was sayingsomething
more or less positive.The normsand meaningshe had in mindwere
not the ones I have been discussing.Still,the pointis a valid one. It
remainsto be seen, though,whetherit holds also forlate, welfare
capitalism,as I believe; or whetherit ceases to hold, as Habermas
claims.
Finally,this reconstructionof the gender subtextof Habermas'
model has normativepoliticalimplications.It suggeststhatan eman-
cipatorytransformation of male-dominatedcapitalistsocieties,early
and late, requiresa transformation of thesegenderroles and of the
institutions theymediate.As long as theworkerand childrearerroles
are suchas to be fundamentally incompatiblewithone another,itwill
notbe possibleto universalizeeitherofthemtoincludebothgenders.
Thus, some formof dedifferentiation of unpaid childrearingand
otherworkis required.Similarly, as long as thecitizenrole is defined
33. Insofaras the foregoinganalysisof the gender subtextof Habermas' role

theorydeployscategoriesin whichgenderand politicaleconomyare internally inte-
grated,it representsa contributionto theovercomingof "dual systemstheory"(see
note7 above). Itis also a contributionto thedevelopmentofa moresatisfactory wayof
linkingstructural(in the sense of objectivating)and interpretive approaches to the
studyofsocietiesthanthatproposed byHabermas. For I am suggestingherethatthe
domesticspherehas a structural as wellas an interpretive
dimensionand thattheoffi-
cial economicand statesphereshavean interpretive as wellas a structural
dimension.

NancyFraser 119
toencompassdeath-dealingsoldieringbutnotlife-fostering childrear-
as
ing, long as itis tiedto male-dominated modes of dialogue,thenit,
too,willremainincapableoffullyincludingwomen.Thus, changesin
theveryconceptsofcitizenship,childrearing and paid workare neces-
sary.As are changes in therelationshipsamong thedomestic,official-
economic, stateand political-publicspheres.
III. The DynamicsofWelfare-Capitalism:
A FeministCritique
Let me turn,then,to Habermas' accountoflate,welfarecapitalism.

Unlikehis account of classicalcapitalism,itscriticalpotentialcannot
be released simplyby reconstructing the unthematizedgendersub-
text.Here, the problematicalfeaturesof his social-theoreticalframe-
worktendto inflecttheanalysisas a wholeand diminishitscapacityto
illuminatethestrugglesand wishesofcontemporary women.In order
toshowhowthisis thecase, I shallpresentHabermas' viewin theform
of six theses.
1) Welfarecapitalismemerges as a resultof and in response to
instabilitiesor crisis tendencies inherentin classical capitalism.It
realignstherelationsbetweenthe(official)economyand state,thatis,
betweenthe privateand public systems.These become more deeply
intertwined withone anotheras the stateactivelyassumes the taskof
"crisismanagement."It triesto avertor manage economic crisesby
Keynesian"market-replacing" strategieswhichcreatea "public sec-
tor." And it triesto avertor manage social and politicalcrises by
"market-compensating" measures,includingwelfareconcessionsto
tradeunionsand social movements.Thus welfare-capitalism partially
overcomes the separationof public and privateat the level of sys-
tems.34
2) The realignmentof (official)economy-staterelationsis accom-
panied bya changein therelationsofthosesystemsto theprivateand
publicspheresofthelifeworld.First,withrespecttotheprivatesphere,
thereis a majorincreasein theimportanceoftheconsumerroleas dis-
satisfactionsrelatedto paid workare compensatedbyenhancedcom-
modityconsumption.Second,withrespectto thepublic sphere,there
is a major decline in theimportanceof thecitizenrole as journalism
becomes mass media, politicalpartiesare bureaucratized,and par-
ticipationis reduced to occasional voting.Instead,therelationto the
state is increasinglychanneled througha new role, the social-wel-
fareclient.35
34. Habermas, TCAII, pp. 505ff;LC, pp.33-36, 53-55. McCarthy,TI, p. xxxiii.
35. Habermas, TCA II, pp. 522-4; MIC, pp. 1-2; TJ,pp. 1-2; LC, pp. 36-37.
McCarthy,TI, p. xxxiii.

3) These developmentsare "ambivalent."On theone hand, there

are gains in freedomwiththe institution of new social rightslimiting
the heretoforeunrestrainedpowerof capitalin the (paid) workplace
and ofthepaterfamilias in thebourgeoisfamily;and social insurance
programsrepresent a clearadvanceoverthepaternalismofpoor relief.
On the otherhand, the means employed to realize these new social
rightstendperversely toendangerfreedom.These meansare bureau-
craticprocedureand themoneyform.Theystructure theentitlements,
benefitsand socialservicesofthewelfaresystem.Andin so doing,they
disempowerclients,renderingthemdependenton bureaucraciesand
therapeutocracies, and preemptingtheircapacitiesto interpret their
own needs, experiencesand life-problems.36
4) The mostambivalentwelfaremeasuresare thoseconcernedwith
thingslikehealthcare,care of theelderly,education,and familylaw.
For when bureaucraticand monetarymedia structurethese things,
theyintrudeupon "core domains" of the lifeworld.They turnover
symbolicreproductionfunctionslikesocializationand solidarityfor-
mationto system-integration mechanismswhichpositionpeople as
strategicallyacting,self-interested monads. But giventhe inherently
symboliccharacterofthesefunctions, and giventheirinternalrelation
tosocial-integration, theresults,necessarily,are"pathological."Thus,
these measuresare more ambivalentthan,say,reformsof the paid
workplace.The latterbear on a domain which is already system-
integrated via moneyand powerand whichservesmaterialas opposed
to symbolicreproductionfunctions.So paid workplacereforms, un-
like,say,familylaw reforms,do not necessarilygenerate"pathologi-
cal" side-effects.37
5) Welfare-capitalism thusgivesrisetoan "innercolonizationofthe
lifeworld."Moneyand powercease to be meremedia ofexchangebe-
tween systemand lifeworld. Instead,theytendincreasingly to penetrate
thelifeworld's internaldynamics.The privateand publicspheresceaseto
subordinate(official)economic and administrativesystemsto the
norms,values and interpretations of everydaylife.Rather,the latter
are increasingly subordinatedto theimperativesofthe(official) econ-
omyand administration. The rolesofworkerand citizencease tochan-
nel the influenceof the lifeworldto the systems.Instead,the newly
inflatedrolesofconsumerand clientchanneltheinfluenceofthesys-
36. Habermas,TCAII, pp. 530-40;MIC, pp. 9-20; TJ,pp. 12-14.McCarthy,TI,pp.

xxxiii-xxxiv.
37. Habermas, TCAII, pp. 540-47; MIC, pp. 20-27; TJ,pp. 15-25. McCarthy,
TI, p. xxxi.

NancyFraser 121
tem to the lifeworld.Moreover,the intrusionof system-integration

mechanisms into domains inherentlyrequiring social-integration
givesrise to "reificationphenomena." The affecteddomains are de-
tached not merelyfromtraditionalnormatively-secured consenses,
but from"value-orientations perse.' The result is the "desiccation of
communicativecontexts"and the "depletion of the nonrenewable
culturalresources"needed to maintainpersonaland collectiveidenti-
ty.Thus, symbolicreproductionis destabilized,identitiesare threat-
ened, and social crisistendenciesdevelop.38
6) The colonizationofthelifeworldsparksnewformsofsocialcon-
flictspecifictowelfare-capitalism."New socialmovements"emergein
a "new conflictzone" at the"seam ofsystemand lifeworld."Theyre-
spond to system-induced identitythreatsbycontesting theroleswhich
transmitthese.They contestthe instrumentalization of professional
laborand theperformatization ofeducationtransmitted via thework-
er role; the monetarizationof relationsand lifestyles transmitted via
theinflatedconsumerrole; thebureaucratization of servicesand life-
problemstransmitted via theclientrole;and therulesand routinesof
interestpoliticstransmitted via the impoverishedcitizenrole. Thus,
theconflictsat thecuttingedge ofdevelopmentsin welfarecapitalism
differboth fromclass strugglesand frombourgeoisliberationstrug-
gles. They respond to crisistendenciesin symbolicas opposed to
materialreproduction;and theycontestreification and "thegrammar
of formsof life"as opposed to distributionor statusinequality.39
The variousnew social movementscan be classifiedwithrespectto
theiremancipatorypotential.The criterionis theextenttowhichthey
advance a genuinelyemancipatoryresolutionof welfare-capitalist
crisis,namely,the"decolonizationof thelifeworld."Decolonization
encompasses three things:first,the removal of system-integration
mechanismsfromsymbolicreproductionspheres; second, the re-
placementof (some) normatively-secured contextsby communica-
tively-achieved ones; and third,thedevelopmentof new,democratic
institutions capable ofassertinglifeworldcontroloverstateand (offi-
cial) economic systems.Thus, those movementslike religiousfun-
damentalismwhichseekto defendtraditional lifeworldnormsagainst
systemintrusions are notgenuinelyemancipatory; theyactively oppose
the second elementof decolonizationand do not takeup the third.
Movementslikepeace and ecologyare better;theyaim both to resist
38. Habermas,TCAII, pp. 275-277,452, 480, 522-24; MIC, p. 2; TJ,pp. 1-3;RC,

pp. 226, 280-81; OSSA, pp. 11-12, 16-20. McCarthy,TI, pp. xxxi-xxxii.Thompson,
RSR,pp. 286, 288.
39. Habermas, TCAII, pp. 581-83,NSM, pp. 3388-37; OSSA, pp. 18-19,27-28.

systemintrusions and also to instatenew,reformed,communicatively-

achieved zones of interaction.But even theseare "ambiguous" inas-
much as theytend to "retreat"into alternativecommunitiesand
identities,
"particularistic" therebyeffectivelyrenouncingthethirdele-
mentof decolonizationand leavingthe (official)economic and state
systemsunchecked.In thisrespect,theyare more symptomatic than
emancipatory: the
theyexpress identity disturbancescaused bycoloni-
zation.The feministmovement,on theotherhand,representssome-
thingof an anomaly.For it alone is "offensive,"aimingto "conquer
new territory";and it alone retainslinksto historicliberationmove-
ments.In principle,then,feminismremainsrooted in "universalist
morality."Yet it is linkedto resistancemovementsby an elementof
"particularism."And ittends,at times,to "retreat"intoidentitiesand
communitiesorganized around the naturalcategoryof biological
sex.40
Now whatare thecriticalinsightsand blindspotsof thisaccountof
the dynamicsofwelfare-capitalism? To whatextentdoes it servethe
ofthestrugglesand wishesofcontemporary
self-clarification women?
I shall takeup the six thesesone by one.
1) Habermas' firstthesisis straightforward and unobjectionable.
Clearly, thewelfare statedoes in
engage crisis-management and does
partially overcome the of
separation public and at
private the level
of systems.
2) Habermas' second thesis contains some importantinsights.
Clearly,welfare-capitalism does inflatetheconsumerroleand deflate
the citizenrole, reducingthe latteressentiallyto voting- and, we
shouldadd, also to soldiering.Moreover,thewelfarestatedoes indeed
increasingly positionitssubjectsas clients.On theotherhand,Haber-
mas again failsto see the gendersubtextof thesedevelopments.He
failsto see thatthe new clientrole has a gender,thatit is a para-
digmaticallyfemininerole. He overlooksthatit is overwhelmingly
womenwho aretheclientsofthewelfarestate:especiallyolderwomen,
poor women,singlewomenwithchildren.He overlooks,in addition,
thatmanywelfaresystemsare internally dualized and gendered.They
includetwobasic kindsofprograms:"masculine"ones tiedto primary
labor forceparticipationand designed to benefitprincipalbread-
winners;and "feminine"ones orientedto what are understoodas
domestic"failures,"thatis, to familieswithouta male breadwinner.
Not surprisingly, thesetwowelfaresubsystemsare bothseparateand
unequal. Clientsof feminineprograms,virtuallyexclusivelywomen
40. Habermas, TCAII, pp. 581-83; NSM, pp. 34-37; OSSA,pp. 16-17,27-28.

NancyFraser 123
and theirchildren,are positionedin a distinctive,feminizingfashion

as the"negativesofpossessiveindividuals":theyare largelyexcluded
fromthemarketboth as workersand as consumersand arefamilialized,
thatis, made to claim benefitsnot as individualsbut as membersof
"defective"households.Theyare also stigmatized, deniedrights,sub-
jected to surveillanceand administrative harassment, and generally
made intoabject dependentsof statebureaucracies.41 But thismeans
thattheriseoftheclientroleinwelfarecapitalismhas a morecomplex
meaningthanHabermas allows.It is notonlya changein thelinkbe-
tween systemand lifeworldinstitutions.It is also a change in the
characterofmale dominance,a shift,in Carol Brown'sphrase,"from
privatepatriarchyto public patriarchy."42
3) This givesa ratherdifferent twistto the meaningof Habermas'
thirdthesis.It suggeststhathe is rightabout the "ambivalence" of
welfarecapitalism,but notquiteand notonlyin thewayhe thought.It
suggeststhatwelfaremeasuresdo have a positiveside insofaras they
reducewomen'sdependence on an individualmale breadwinner.But
dependenceon
theyalso have a negativeside insofaras theysubstitute
a patriarchaland androcentricstatebureaucracy. The benefitspro-
vided are,as Habermas says,"system-conforming" ones. Butthesys-
41. FortheU.S. social-welfare system,see theanalysisofmalevs.femaleparticipa-

tionrates,and theaccountof thegenderedcharacterofthetwosubsystemsin Nancy
Fraser,"Women,Welfareand thePoliticsofNeed Interpretation," Also,Barbara
op.cit.
J. Nelson, "Women's Povertyand Women's Citizenship: Some Political Conse-
quences of Economic Marginality," Signs:JournalofWomen in Cultureand Society, 10:2
(1985); Steven P. Erie, MartinRein and Barbara Wiget,"Women and the Reagan
Revolution:ThermidorfortheSocial WelfareEconomy,"inFamilies, Politics
andPublic
Policies: DialogueonWomen
A Feminist andtheState,ed. IreneDiamond (NewYork:Long-
man, 1983); Diana Pearce,"Women,Workand Welfare:The Feminizationof Pover-
ty,"in WorkingWomen andFamilies, ed. KarenWolk Feinstein(BeverlyHills,CA.: Sage
Publications,1979) and "Toil and Trouble: Women Workersand Unemployment
Compensation,"Signs:Journal ofWomen in Culture 10:3 (1985), 439-59; Bar-
andSociety,
bara Ehrenreichand FrancesFox Piven,"The Feminizationof Poverty," Dissent,Spr-
ing1984, 162-70.Foran analysisofthegenderedcharacteroftheBritishsocial-welfare
system,see HilaryLand, "Who CaresfortheFamily?"JournalofSocialPolicy, 7:3 (1978),
257-84. For Norway,see theessaysin Patriarchy ina Welfare
Society,ed. HarrietHolter
1984). See also twocomparativestudies:MaryRuggie,The
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,
Stateand WorkingWomen: A Comparative Study andSweden(Princeton,N.J.:Prin-
ofBritain
cetonUniversity Press,1984);and BirteSiim,"Womenand theWelfareState:Between
Privateand Public Dependence" (unpublishedtypescript).
42. Carol Brown,"Mothers,Fathersand Children:From Privateto Public Pat-
riarchy,"Women op.cit.Actually,I believe Brown'sformulationis the-
and Revolution,
oreticallyinadequate,sinceitpresupposesa simple,dualisticconceptionofpublicand
private.Nonetheless,thephrase'fromprivateto public patriarchy' evokesin a rough
but suggestiveway the phenomena a socialist-feminist criticaltheoryof the welfare
statewould need to account for.

temtheyconformto is notadequatelycharacterizedas thesystemof

theofficial,state-regulated capitalisteconomy.It is also thesystemof
male dominancewhichextendseventothesocio-cultural lifeworld. In
otherwords,theambivalenceheredoes not onlystem,as Habermas
implies,fromthefactthattherole of clientcarrieseffects of "reifica-
tion."It stemsalso fromthefactthatthisrole,qua femininerole,per-
petuatesin a new,let us say"modernized" and "rationalized"form,
women's subordination.Or so Habermas' thirdthesismightbe re-
writtenin a feminist criticaltheory- without,ofcourse,abandoning
his insightsinto thewaysin whichwelfarebureaucraciesand thera-
peutocraciesdisempowerclientsby preemptingtheircapacitiesto
interprettheirown needs, experiencesand life-problems.
4) Habermas' fourththesis,by contrast,is not so easilyrewritten.
This thesisstatesthatwelfarereformsof,forexample,the domestic
sphereare moreambivalentthanreformsofthepaid workplace.This
is trueempirically in thesenseI havejustdescribed.Butitis due tothe
patriarchal character ofwelfaresystems, nottotheinherently symbolic
characterof lifeworldinstitutions, as Habermas claims. His claim
depends on twoassumptionsI have alreadychallenged.First,it de-
pends on the naturalkindsinterpretation of the distinctionbetween
symbolic and material reproduction i.e., on the false
activities,
assumption that is
childrearing inherently more symbolicand less
materialthanotherwork.And second,itdepends upon theabsolute
differences interpretation ofthesystemvs.socially-integrated contexts
distinction, i.e.,on thefalseassumptionthatmoneyand powerare not
alreadyentrenchedintheinternaldynamicsofthefamily.Butonce we
repudiatetheseassumptions,thenthereis no categorial,as opposed to
empirical,basis fordifferentially evaluatingthetwokindsofreforms.
Ifitisbasicallyprogressive thatpaid workersacquirethemeanstocon-
fronttheiremployersstrategically and matchpoweragainstpower,
rightagainstright,thenitmustbejust as basicallyprogressive inprinci-
plethatwomenacquire similarmeansto similarends in thepoliticsof
familialand personallife.And ifitis "pathological"that,in thecourse
of achievinga betterbalance of power in familialand personal life,
women become clientsof statebureaucracies,thenit mustbe just as
"pathological"inprinciple that,in thecourseofachievinga similarend
at paid work,paid workers,too,become clients.(Whichdoes notalter
thefactthatinactuality theybecome twodifferent sortsofclients.)Butof
course the real point is thatthe term'pathological'is misused here
insofaras itsupposes theuntenableassumptionthatchildrearing and
other work are asymmetrical with respect to system-integration.
5) This sheds new lightas well on Habermas' fifththesis. This thesis
states thatwelfarecapitalism inaugurates an inner colonization of the

NancyFraser 125
lifeworld bysystems.Itdependson threeassumptions.The first twoof

theseare thetwojustrejected,namely,thenaturalkindsinterpretation
of the distinctionbetweensymbolicand materialreproductionacti-
vitiesand theassumed virginity ofthedomesticspherewithrespectto
money and power. The third assumptionis thatthe basic vectorof
motion in late-capitalistsocietyis fromstate-regulated economy to
lifeworldand not vice-versa.But the femininegendersubtextof the
clientrole contradictsthisassumption.It suggeststhateven in late-
capitalismthe norms and meaningsof gender identitycontinueto
channeltheinfluenceofthelifeworldontosystems.These normscon-
tinue to structurethe state-regulated economy,as the persistence,
indeed exacerbation,of labor forcesegmentationaccordingto sex
shows.4SAnd thesenormsalso structurestateadministration, as the
gender segmentationof U.S. and European social-welfaresystems
shows.44Thus, it is not the case thatin late-capitalism"systemin-
trusions"detachlife-contexts from"value-orientationsper se." On the
contrary, welfare-capitalism simply uses othermeans to uphold the
familiar"normatively-secured consensus" concerningmale domi-
nanceand femalesubordination.ButHabermas' theoryoverlooksthis
counter-motionfromlifeworldto system.Thus, it posits the evil of
welfare-capitalism as the evil of a generaland indiscriminate reifica-
tion. So it fails to account forthe factthatit is disproportionately
women who sufferthe effectsof bureaucratizationand monetariza-
tion.And forthefactthat,viewedstructurally, bureaucratizationand
monetarizationare, among other things,instrumentsof women's
subordination.
43. The mostrecentavailable data fortheU.S. indicatethatsex segmentationin

paid workis increasing,notdecreasing.And thisis so in spiteoftheentryofsmallbut
significantnumbersofwomenintoprofessionslikelawand medicine.Evenwhenthe
gainswon bythosewomenare takenintoaccount,thereis no overallimprovement in
theaggregatedcomparativeeconomicpositionofpaid womenworkersvis-a-vismale
workers.Women'swagesremainlessthansixtypercentofmen'swages.Whichmeans,
ofcourse,thatthemassofwomenare losingground.Nor is thereanyoverallimprove-
mentin occupationaldistribution bysex. The ghettoizationofwomenin low-paying,
low-status"pink collar" occupationsis increasing.For example,in the U.S. in 1973,
women held 96% ofall paid childcarejobs, 8 1% ofall primaryschool teachingjobs,
72%ofall healthtechnicianjobs, 98% ofall RegisteredNursejobs, 83% ofall librarian
jobs, 99% ofall secretarialjobs, and 92% ofall waitpersonjobs. The figuresfor1983
were,respectively, 97%,83%,84%,96%,87%,99% and 88%. (BureauofLabor Statistics
figurescitedby Drew Christie,"Comparable Worthand Distributive Justice,"paper
read at meetingsof theAmericanPhilosophicalAssociation,WesternDivision,April
1985.) The U.S. data are consistentwithdata fortheScandinaviancountriesand Bri-
tain. See BirteSiim, "Women and the WelfareState: BetweenPrivateand Public
Dependence," op.cit.
44. See note 41.

6) This entailstherevision,as well,of Habermas' sixththesis.This

thesisconcernsthe causes, characterand emancipatorypotentialof
social movements,includingfeminism,in welfarecapitalistsocieties.
Since these issues are so centralto the concernsof this essay,they
warranta more extendeddiscussion.
Habermas explainstheexistenceand characterofnewsocial move-
ments,includingfeminism,in termsofcolonization,thatis, in terms
oftheintrusionofsystem-integration mechanismsintosymbolicrep-
roductionspheresand theconsequenterosionand desiccationofcon-
textsof interpretation and communication.But giventhe multidirec-
tionalityofcausal influenceinwelfarecapitalism,theterms'coloniza-
tion,''intrusion,''erosion,'and 'desiccation'are too negativeand one-
sidedtoaccountfortheidentity manifestedin socialmovements.
shifts
Let me attemptan alternativeexplanation,at least forwomen, by
returningto Habermas' importantinsightthatmuch contemporary
contestationsurroundstheinstitution-mediating rolesofworker,con-
sumer, citizenand client.Let me add to thesethechildrearerroleand
thefactthatall ofthemare genderedroles.Now considerin thislight
themeaningof theexperienceof millionsofwomen,especiallymar-
riedwomenand womenwithchildren,who haveinthepostwarperiod
become paid workersand/or social-welfareclients.I have already
indicated thatthis has been an experience of new, acute formsof
domination.Butithas also been an experienceinwhichwomencould,
oftenforthe firsttime,tastethe possibilitiesof a measure of relative
economicindependence,an identity outsidethedomesticsphere,and
expanded politicalparticipation.Above all, ithas been an experience
ofconflictand contradiction as womentrytodo theimpossible,name-
ly,tojuggle simultaneously theexistingrolesofchildrearerand work-
er, clientand citizen.The cross-pullsof thesemutuallyincompatible
roleshave been painfuland identity-threatening, but notsimplyneg-
ative.45Interpellatedsimultaneouslyin contradictory ways,women
have become split subjects; and, as a result,the roles themselves,
heretoforeshielded in theirseparate spheres, have suddenlybeen
opened to contestation.Should we, like Habermas, speak here of a
"crisisin symbolicreproduction"?Surelynot,ifthismeans thedesic-
cationofmeaningand values wroughtby theintrusionofmoneyand
organizationalpowerintowomen'slives.Emphaticallyyes,ifitmeans,
rather,the emergenceinto visibilityand contestability of problems
45. Thisaccountdrawson some elementsoftheanalysisofZillahEisensteinin The

RadicalFuture Feminism
ofLiberal (Boston:NortheasternUniversityPress,1981),chapter
9. Whatfollowshas some affinitieswiththeperspectiveofErnestoLaclau and Chantal
Mouffein Hegemony and Socialist (New York:Verso, 1985).
Strategy

NancyFraser 127
and possibilitieswhich cannot be solved or realized withinthe es-

tablishedframework of genderedroles and institutions.
If colonization is not an adequate explanationof feminism(and
othernew social movements),thendecolonizationcannotbe an ade-
quate conceptionofan emancipatorysolution.FromtheperspectiveI
have been sketching,thefirstelementofdecolonization,namely,the
removalofsystem-integration mechanismsfromsymbolicreproduc-
tionspheres,is conceptuallyand empirically askewoftherealissues.If
thereal pointis themoralsuperiority ofcooperativeinteractions over
strategicones, then it mystifies matters to single out insti-
lifeworld
tutions;thepointshould hold forpaid workand politicaladministra-
tion as well as fordomesticlife.Similarly,the thirdelementof de-
colonization,namely,the reversalof the directionof influenceand
controlfromsystemto lifeworld,needs modification.Since thesocial
meaningsofgenderstillstructure late-capitalistofficialeconomicand
statesystems,the question is not whether lifeworldnormswillbe de-
cisivebut, rather,whichlifeworldnormswill.
This implies thatthe keyto an emancipatoryoutcome lies in the
second elementofHabermas' conceptionofdecolonization,namely,
the replacementof normatively-secured contextsof interactionby
communicatively-achieved ones. The centrality ofthiselementis evi-
dentwhenwe considerthatthisprocessoccurssimultaneously on two
fronts.First,in the strugglesof social movementswiththe stateand
officialeconomic systeminstitutions:these strugglesare not waged
oversystemsmedia alone; theyare also waged overthemeaningsand
normsembedded and enacted in governmentand corporatepolicy.
Second, this process occurs in a phenomenon not thematizedby
Habermas: in thestrugglesbetweenopposing social movementswith
conflictinginterpretations of social needs. Both kinds of struggles
involveconfrontations betweennormatively-secured and communi-
catively-achieved action.Both involve contestation forhegemonyover
thesocio-cultural"means ofinterpretation and communication."For
example,inmanylate-capitalist societies,women'scontradictory, self-
of
dividingexperience trying to be both workers and mothers, clients
and citizens,has givenriseto notone but twowomen'smovements,a
feministone and an anti-feminist one. These movements,along with
theirrespectiveallies,are engaged in struggleswithone anotherand
withstateand corporateinstitutions over thesocial meaningsof'wo-
man' and 'man,' 'femininity' and 'masculinity';overtheinterpretation
ofwomen's needs; over the interpretation and social constructionof
women's bodies; and over the gender norms whichshape the major
institution-mediating social roles.Of course,themeans ofinterpreta-
tion and communicationin termsof which the social meaningsof

thesethingsare elaboratedhavealwaysbeen controlledbymen.Thus

feministwomen are strugglingin effectto redistribute and democ-
ratizeaccess toand controloverthemeans ofinterpretation and com-
munication.We are, therefore, struggling forwomen's autonomyin
the followingspecial sense: a measure of collectivecontrolover the
means ofinterpretation and communicationsufficient to permitus to
participate on a par with men in all typesof social includ-
interaction,
ing political deliberation and decision-making.46
The foregoingsuggeststhata cautionis in orderconcerningtheuse
oftheterms'particularism' and 'universalism.'RecallthatHabermas'
sixththesisemphasizedfeminism'slinksto historicliberationmove-
mentsand itsrootsinuniversalist morality. Recallthathe wascriticalof
those tendencieswithinfeminism,and in resistancemovementsin
general,whichtryto resolvethe identityproblematicby recourseto
particularism, thatis, by retreating fromarenas of politicalstruggle
into alternativecommunitiesdelimitedon the basis of naturalcate-
gorieslikebiologicalsex. Now I wantto suggestthatthereare really
threeissueshereand thattheyneed tobe disengagedfromone another.
One is the issue of politicalengagementversus apoliticalcounter-
culturalactivity.Insofaras Habermas' pointis a criticismof cultural
feminismitis well-takenin principle,althoughitneeds thefollowing
qualifications:separatism,while inadequate as long-termpolitical
strategy,is in manycases a shorter-term necessityforwomen's physi-
cal, psychological and moral survival; and separatistcommunities
have been the source of numerousreinterpretations ofwomen's ex-
perience which have provedpolitically fruitfulin overthe
contestation
means ofinterpretation and communication.The second issue is the
statusofwomen's biologyin theelaborationof new social identities.
Insofaras Habermas' point is a criticismof reductivebiologismit is
well-taken.But thisdoes not mean thatone can ignorethe factthat
women's biologyhas alwaysbeen interpreted by men; and thatwo-
men's struggle forautonomynecessarily and properlyinvolves,among
other things,the reinterpretation of the social meanings of our
bodies.The thirdissueis thedifficult and complexone ofuniversalism
versusparticularism.Insofaras Habermas' endorsementof univer-
salism pertainsto the meta-levelof access to and controlover the
means of interpretation and communicationit is well-taken.At this
level,women's struggle autonomycan be understoodin termsofa
for
46. I develop thisnotionofthe"socio-culturalmeans ofinterpretation

and com-
munication"and the associated conceptionof autonomyin "Toward a Discourse
EthicofSolidarity,"
PraxisInternational,
forthcoming.Bothnotionsare extensionsand
modificationsof Habermas' conceptionof"communicativeethics."

NancyFraser 129
universalistconceptionof distributive justice. But it does not follow

thatthesubstantivecontentwhichis thefruitofthisstruggle,namely,
the new social meaningswe giveour needs and our bodies, our new
social identitiesand conceptionsof femininity, can be dismissedas
particularisticlapses from universalism. For these are no more par-
ticularthanthesexistand androcentricmeaningsand normstheyare
meanttoreplace.Moregenerally, atthelevelofsubstantive content,as
opposed to dialogical form, the contrast between universalism and
particularism is out of place. Substantive social meanings and norms
are alwaysnecessarilyculturallyand historically specific;theyalways
expressdistinctiveshared,but nonuniversalformsof life.Feminist
meaningsand normswillbe no exception.But theywillnot,on that
account,be particularistic in any pejorativesense. Let us simplysay
thattheywillbe different.
I have been arguingthatstrugglesof social movementsover the
means of interpretation and communicationare centralto an eman-
cipatoryresolutionof crisistendenciesin welfarecapitalism.Now let
me clarifytheirrelationtoinstitutional change.Suchstruggles, I claim,
are implicitlyand explicitlyraisingthe followingsortsof questions.
Should the roles of worker,childrearer,citizen and clientbe fully
degendered?Can theybe? Or do we, rather,requirearrangements
whichpermitwomen to be workersand citizensas women, just as men
have alwaysbeen workersand citizensas men?And whatmightthat
mean? In anycase, does notan emancipatoryoutcomerequirea pro-
foundtransformation of the currentgenderroles at thebase of con-
temporary social organization?And does thisnot,in turn,requirea
fundamentaltransformation of the content,character,boundaries
and relationsof the spheresof lifewhichtheseroles mediate? How
should the characterand position of paid work,childrearingand
citizenshipbe defined vis-a-visone another? Should democratic-
socialist-feminist, self-managed,paid workencompass childrearing?
Or should childrearing, rather,replace soldieringas a componentof
transformed,democratic-socialist-feminist,
participatory citizenship?
Whatotherpossibilitiesareconceivable?
Let me concludethisdiscussionofthesix thesesbyrestating the
mostimportant critical
points.First,Habermas' account to
fails the-
orize thepatriarchal,
norm-mediated character oflate-capitalistof-
ficial-economicand administrativesystems. Likewise, itfailsto the-
orize thesystemic,money-and power-mediated character of male
dominanceinthedomestic sphereof the lifeworld.
late-capitalist Con-
sequently,his colonizationthesisfailsto grasp thatthe channels of
influencebetweensystemand lifeworldinstitutions are multidirec-
tional.And ittendsto replicate,ratherthanto problematize,a major

institutionalsupport of women's subordinationin late-capitalism,

namely,thegender-basedseparationof the state-regulated economy
of sex-segmentedpaid work and social-welfare, and the masculine
public sphere,fromprivatizedfemalechildrearing. Thus, whileHab-
ermaswantstobe criticalofmale dominance,hisdiagnosticcategories
deflectattentionelsewhere,to the allegedlyoverridingproblem of
gender-neutral reification.
Consequently,his programmaticconcep-
tion of decolonization bypasses key feministquestions; it fails to
address the issue ofhow to restructure
therelationofchildrearingto
paid workand citizenship.Finally,Habermas' categoriestendto mis-
representthe causes and underestimatethe scope of the feminist
challengetowelfarestatecapitalism.In short,thestruggles
and wishes
ofcontemporary womenare notadequatelyclarifiedbya theorywhich
drawsthebasic battleline betweensystemand lifeworldinstitutions.
Froma feministperspective,thereis a morebasic battleline between
the formsof male dominance linking"system"to "lifeworld"and
us.
Conclusion
In general,then,theprincipalblindspotsofHabermas' theorywith
respectto genderare traceableto his categorialoppositionbetween
systemand lifeworldinstitutions. And to the two more elementary
oppositions fromwhich it is compounded, thereproductionone and
theaction-contexts one. Or rather,theblindspotsare traceableto the
way in which these oppositions,ideologicallyand androcentrically
interpreted, tendto overrideand eclipseother,potentially morecriti-
cal elementsof Habermas' framework. Elementslike thedistinction
betweennormatively-secured and communicatively-achieved action
contexts.And like thefourtermmodel of public-private relations.
Habermas' blindspotsare instructive, I think.They permitus to
conclude somethingabout what the categorialframeworkof a so-
cialist-feminist
criticaltheoryof welfarecapitalismshould look like.
One crucialrequirementis thatthisframework not be such as to put
themale-headed,nuclearfamilyand thestate-regulated officialecon-
omyon twooppositesides ofthemajorcategorialdivide.We require,
rather,a frameworksensitiveto the similaritiesbetweenthem,one
which puts themon the same side of the line as institutions which,
albeit in different
ways,enforcewomen's subordination,since both
familyand officialeconomy appropriateour labor, shortcircuit our
participation in the interpretation of our needs and shield norma-
tively-secured need interpretations from political contestation. A
second crucial requirement is that this frameworkcontain no a priori

NancyFraser 131
assumptionsabout the unidirectionality of social motionand causal

influence,thatitbe sensitiveto thewaysin whichallegedlydisappear-
inginstitutionsand normspersistin structuring social reality.A third
crucial requirement,and the last I shall mentionhere, is thatthis
frameworknot be such as to posit the evil of welfarecapitalismex-
clusivelyor primarilyas theevilofreification.
It must,rather,be cap-
able offoregrounding the evil of dominance and subordination.47
47. My own recentwork attemptsto constructa conceptual frameworkfora

criticaltheoryof thewelfarestatewhichmeetstheserequirements.
socialist-feminist
See Fraser,"Women,Welfareand thePoliticsof Need Interpretation," "Femi-
op.cit.,
and "Toward a DiscourseEthicofSolidarity,"
nismand theSocial State,"op.cit., op.cit.
Each oftheseessaysdrawsheavilyon thoseaspectsofHabermas' thoughtwhichI take
to be unambiguouslypositiveand useful,especiallyhisconceptionoftheirreducibly
socio-cultural,interpretivecharacterof human needs,and his contrastbetweendia-
logical and monologicalprocessesof need interpretation. The presentessay,on the
otherhand,focusesmainlyon thoseaspectsof Habermas' thoughtwhichI findpro-
blematicalor unhelpful,and so does notconveythefullrangeeitherofhisworkor of
myviewsabout it.Readersare warned,therefore, againstdrawingtheconclusionthat
Habermas has littleor nothingpositiveto contributeto a socialist-feminist critical
theory of thewelfarestate.They are urged, to
rather, consulttheessayscitedabove for
theotherside of the story.


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What's Critical about Critical Theory?

The Case of Habermas and Gender

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To mymind,no one has yetimprovedon Marx's 1843 definition of

*I am gratefultoJohnBrenkman,Thomas McCarthy,Carole Patemanand Martin

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theorywhichI havejustoutlined.In addition,I am goingtotakeas the

2. JiirgenHabermas,TheTheory ofCommunicative I, trans.Thomas McCarthy

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one read theworkin questionfromthestandpointofan absence; that

I. The Social-TheoreticalFramework:A FeministInterrogation

Let me begin by consideringtwodistinctionswhichare centralto

3. I shallnottakeup suchwidelydebatedissuesas Habermas' theoriesofuniversal

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held to serveexclusivelyor primarily. Thus, accordingto Habermas,

5. Habermas, TCAII, p. 208; RC, pp. 223-5. McCarthy,TI, pp. xxiv-xxv.

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thebiologicalsurvivalofthesocietiestheybelongto. Thus, childrear-

6. I am indebtedto MartinSchwab fortheexpression'dual-aspectactivity.'

This content downloaded from 128.239.99.140 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 13:09:55 PM

Thus, the distinctionbetweenwomen's unpaid childrearingwork

analysiswhichrelyon conceptsand categoriesthatinternally integrategenderand

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theparadigmcase ofa system-integrated actioncontext.Bycontrast,

ogyofTCA.Or, rather,I am selectingone oftheseveralvaryingusagesdeployedin the

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Once again, I thinkit useful to distinguishtwo possible inter-

11. Here,again,I followMcCarthy, Ibid.He arguesthatin modern,stateadminis-

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shallarguein moredetaillater,themodern,restricted, nuclearfamily

bridgeUniversity Press,1977). By recoveringthe dimensionof time,Bourdieu sub-

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differfrompremodernsocietiesin thattheysplitoffsome materialre-

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focus,forthetimebeing,on thecontrastbetween"the privatesphere

16. See, forexample, the essays in Rethinking

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economyand thestate.This,too,however,is a dubious proposition.I

17. Habermas,TCAI, pp. 85-86,88-90, 101, 104-105;TCAII, p. 179.

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men's dominance and women's subordination.'9Thus, Habermas'

19. NancyHenley,BodyPolitics(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall,1977).

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porated into the (official)economic systemwithout"pathological"

21. McCarthypursuessome ofthenormativeimplicationsofthisforthedifferen-

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money and power. Moreover,there is no empiricalevidence that

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wages;and itprovidesappropriate,monetarily measureddemandfor

23. Habermas, TCAI, pp. 341-342, 359-360; TCA

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whiletherolesofcitizenand (later)clientlinkthepublic stateand the

24. I borrowthephrase"gendersubtext"fromDorothySmith,"The GenderSub-

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27. I am hereadaptingAlthusser'snotionoftheinterpellationofa subjecttoa con-

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tivedissonance, muchas womenoccupytheroleofworker. So therole

29. The followingdiscussionof themasculinegendersubtextof thecitizenrole