TC 19 Appellant.

~WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FOR APPELLANT ~
TEAM CODE- TC 19
Shri. J.P. GUPTA MEMORIAL – 3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT

COMPETITION, 2019
BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DATED THE 26TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2019
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO *****/2019
RAJENDRA…...………………………………………………………APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH………………………………...RESPONDENT
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FOR APPELLANT

3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,2019
Page |
~WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FOR APPELLANT ~ TC19
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................. iii
List of Cases.................................................................................................................... v
Books ........................................................................................................................... viii
Statutes ......................................................................................................................... viii
Online Sources ............................................................................................................... ix
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................... x
STATEMENTS OF FACTS............................................................................................ xi
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES......................................................................................... xiii
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ..................................................................................... xiv
ARGUMENTS ADVANCE.............................................................................................. 1
I. WHETHER THE STATEMENT MADE AMOUNTS TO CONFESSION AS

PER SECTION 164 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE? ................................. 1
I.A. Status of The Statement Made Before an Executive Magistrate. ........................ 1
I.B. Conduct of The Accused and The Voluntariness of The Statement .................... 5
I.C. Whether the Statement Is Admissible as Confession .......................................... 7
II. WHETHER FINDING BLOODSTAINED CLOTH AND KNIFE FORM

‘DISCOVERY’ AS MEANING UNDER SECTION 27 OF INDIAN EVIDENCE
ACT, 1872? .................................................................................................................... 9
II.A. Whether the Requirements of Section 27 are Fulfilled? .................................... 9
II.B. Admissibility of The Evidence Under Relevant Sections. ............................... 11
3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
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II.C. Whether the evidence produced by the police is scientifically proven?........... 12
III. WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TAKEN INTO

CONSIDERATION TO FIND THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED, BY THE
LOWER COURTS, WERE ENOUGH TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT?.......................................................................................... 14
III.A Whether there was intention and motive to commit the crime? ...................... 14
III.B Whether PW 3 Jai Prakash Jain is a credible witness? .................................... 16
III.C Whether Seizure of the chain from the possession of the accused admissible as
evidence?................................................................................................................... 18
THE PRAYER ................................................................................................................ 21
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
¶ Paragraph
A.P Andhra Pradesh
Adv Advocate
AIR All India Reporter
All Allahabad
Art Article
Cr. PC Code of Criminal Procedure
Cr. LJ Criminal Law Journal
Dr. Doctor
Ed. Edition
Etc. Etcetera
Gau Guwahati
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
HP Himachal Pradesh
IEA Indian Evidence Act
J. Justice
Page | iii
Jud Judicial
Karn Karnataka
LR Law Report
Mad Madras
Manu Manu Patra
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
No. Number
P&H Punjab and Haryana
PC Privy Council
PW Prosecution Witness
Raj Rajasthan
Rep. Represented
S. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
TADA Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act
U.P Uttar Pradesh
U/s Under Section
v. Versus
Page | iv
Vol Volume
LIST OF CASES
1. A.Dungdung v. Staté of Jharkhand, AIR 2004 SC 1397; 2004 (4) Crimes 136. .. 20
2. Abed Ali Jamadar v. State, 1988 CrLJ 354. ........................................................... 6
3. ABV Mujahid v. State of Maharashtra, 20121 Cri LJ 4770 (SC)........................... 8
4. Anant Chintaman v. State, AIR 1960 SC 500, 523; (1960) 2 SCR 460. .............. 17
5. Anasuyamma v. State of Karnataka, 2002 CrLJ 4401; ILR 2002 Kant 4106. ..... 19
6. Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 2865. ....................................... 10
7. Arun Kumar Banerjee v. State, AIR 1962 Cal 504............................................... 15
8. Ashim Das v. State of Assam, 1987 Cri LJ 1533 (Gau). ........................................ 9
9. Ashish Batham v State AIR 2002 SC 3206 .......................................................... 19
10. Ayyub v. State of U.P, AIR 2002 SC 1192. ........................................................... 2
11. Babasaheb alias Babu v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cri LJ 467. .......................... 9
12. Baboo Ram v. State, 1996 CrLJ 483 (All). ........................................................... 18
13. Balvinder Singh v. state of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 607. ........................................ 18
14. Bhagat Ram v State of Punjab AIR 1954 SC 621 ................................................ 19
15. Bodh Raj v. State of J & K, (2002), 8 SCC 45. ...................................................... 9
16. C Magesh v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 645 (655); AIR 2010 SC 2768.. 16
17. CCE v. Duncan Agro Industries, AIR 2000 SC 2901............................................. 4
18. Davedea Prasad Tiwari v. State of UP, AIR 1978 SC 1544. .................................. 8
19. Ganesh K. Gulve v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3068 ............................ 16
20. Govind Pradhan v. State, 1991 Cri LJ 269. ............................................................ 5
Page | v
21. Harendra Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 1842. ............................ 18
22. Hem Chandra Nayak v. State of Assam, 1989 Cri LJ 2058. .................................. 6
23. Hemraj Devilal v State of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462. ............................................ 5
24. Jarina Khatoon v. State of Assam, 1995 (1) JIC 1298 (All.) .................................. 2
25. Lakshmi Jain v. Stare, (1986) CrLJ 513, 516 (DB) Orissa (1986). ...................... 19
26. Madhu v. State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399. ...................................................... 11
27. Mangleshwari v. State, AIR 1954 SC 715............................................................ 17
28. Marimathu v. State, (2005) 3 Crimes 732 (Mad.)................................................... 7
29. Mika Ram v. State of HP, AIR 1972 SC 2077. ................................................... 4,7
30. Mohanlal v. State, AIR 1974 SC 1144. ................................................................ 16
31. Munna Kumar Upadhyaya v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2012 SC 2470 (2476);
(2012) 6 SCC 1741. .............................................................................................. 20
32. Musheer Khan v. State of M.P., MANU/SC/0065/2010: (2010) 2 SCC 748. ...... 13
33. Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119.......................................................... 1
34. Nandani Satpathy v. PL Dani, 1978 SCC (2) 424. ................................................. 2
35. Navaneethakrishnan v. The State, Inspector Of Police, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 378.
......................................................................................................................... 11, 13
36. Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, L.R. 63 I.A. 372................................................. 3
37. Nika Ram v. State of H.P., 1972 AIR 2077; 1973 SCR (1) 428............................. 3
38. Pacha Devendra Rao v. State of A.P., 1986 (3) Crimes 536. ................................. 2
39. Parmanand Katara v. State 1995 All LJ 396 (P&H). .............................................. 9
40. Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor, MANU/PR/0049/1946: 1947 PC 67............ 13
41. Pundi v. State of MP, 1993 Cri LJ 1881(DB) (MP). .............................................. 4
42. Ramesh Harijan v. State of UP, AIR 2012 SC 1979; (2012) 5 SCC 777. ............ 16
Page | vi
43. Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1955 2 SCR 206.............. 3
44. Rao v. State of A.P. AIR 2008 SC 2819. .............................................................. 19
45. Sardar Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 1766; 1988 SC 1766, 1768.
......................................................................................................................... 18, 19
46. Sashi Jena v. Khadal Swain, AIR 2004 SC 1492 (1496)...................................... 20
47. Sathyanarayanan v. State rep by Inspector of Police, (2012) 12 SCC 627........... 15
48. Sharad Birdichand Sharda v. State, AIR 1984 SC 1622....................................... 19
49. Sheo Shanker Singh v. State of Jharkhand (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 25 ...................... 15
50. Singharia Singh v. State of U.P., 1961 All LJ 617. ................................................ 7
51. State of Haryana v. Parmanand, 1995 Cri LJ 386................................................ 1,4
52. State of Haryana v. Ved Prakash, (2008) 13 SCC 268 (270); AIR 1994 SC 468. 18
53. State of Maharasthra v. Damu, AIR 2000 SC 1691................................................ 4
54. State of Punjab v. Harjagdev Singh, (2010) 16 SCC 91. ........................................ 2
55. State of Rajasthan v. Rajaram, AIR 2003 SC 3601 (3605). ................................. 16
56. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Sunil and Ors., MANU/SC/0557/2017. ......... 14
57. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358 ................................. 3
58. State Through CBI v. Mahindra Singh Dahiya, AIR 2011 SC 1017; (2011) 3 SCC
109......................................................................................................................... 15
59. Subhash Chand v. State (2002) 1 SCC 702 .......................................................... 19
60. Sudama Pandey v. State, AIR 2002 SC 293 ......................................................... 19
61. Taylor v Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch.D. 426 ...................................................................... 3
62. Thimma v. State of Mysore AIR 1971 SC 187..................................................... 11
63. Varun Chaudhary v. state of Rajasthan, AIR 2011 SC 72; (2011) 12 SCC 545 .. 20
64. Vijender v. State of Delhi, (1997) 6 SCC 171. ..................................................... 11
Page | vii
Books
1. DINSHAW FARDUNJI MULLA, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE VOLUME 1 (19th ed., LexisNexis 2017).
2. DR. AVATAR SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF LAW OF EVIDENCE (23 rd ed.,
Central Law Publications 2018).
3. K.I. VIBHUTE, DD BASU, COMMENTARY ON CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (12th ed., Whytes & Co 2016).
4. M. MONIR, TEST BOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (11 th ed.,
Universal Law Publishing 2018).
5. R. V KELKAR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (6 th ed., EBC 2017).
6. RAM JETHMALANI & D S CHOPRA, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 1973 (Thomas Reuters 2015).
7. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (24 th ed.,
LexisNexis 2016).
8. S C SARKAR COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 1973 VOLUME 1 (4 th ed., Diwedi Law Agency 2015).
9. SC SARKAR, LAW OF EVIDENCE ( 19 th ed., LexisNexis 2016).
10. VSR AVADHANI & V. SOUBHAGYA VALLI, SCIENCE OF
EVIDENCE (Vinod Publication (P) Ltd. 2016).
11. WOODROFFE & AMIR ALI, LAW OF EVIDENCE VOLUME 2 (20 th
ed., LexisNexis 2017).
STATUTES
1. The Code for Criminal Procedure, 1976

2. The Constitution of India, 1950
3. The Indian Evidence Act,1872
4. The Indian Penal Code, 1860
5. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
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ONLINE SOURCES
1. www.indiankannon.org.
2. www.lexisnexis.com
3. www.manupatra.com
4. www.scconline.com
5. www.scigov.in
6. www.westlaw.com
Page | ix
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is humbly submitted that the Petitioner approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India under Article 134 (1) of The Constitution of India, 1950. Provisions of
the constitution being invoked are the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court
where it can not only quash or set aside any said order, judgment or lower court
proceedings but also lay down directions and orders which the facts and
circumstances of the case so require.
The Art. 134 of the constitution of India, 1950 reads as hereunder:
“134: Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court in regard to criminal matters.
1) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or
sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India if the
High Court—
(a) has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an accused person and sentenced
him to death; or
(b) has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from any court subordinate to its
authority and has in such trial convicted the accused person and sentenced him to
death; or
(c) [certifies under article 134A] that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme
Court: Provided that an appeal under sub-clause (c) shall lie subject to such
provisions as may be made in that behalf under clause (1) of article 145 and to such
conditions as the High Court may establish or require.”
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STATEMENTS OF FACTS
For the sake of brevity and convenience of the Hon’ble Court the facts of the present
case are summarised as follows:
1. Dr. Rajesh Sharma lived with his wife and 2 daughters, namely Neha and
Shweta (deceased), 20 and 18 years of age respectively.
2. Dr. Sharma was practising in Indore for almost 25 years and also had cordial
relations within his locality. He was generous enough to conduct charity work and
rendered free medical aid to poor and needy people.
3. Neha, the elder daughter was pursing MBBS in government medical
college Indore and Shweta, the younger sibling was pursuing her intermediate in
Indore.
4. Within the same locality lived Mr. Ravindra Jatav, his wife Nilima Jatav
and their son Rajendra aged 25 years, who worked in Galaxy Pharmaceuticals as
assistant manager, lived.
5. Both the families had very good family relations and in course of time Neha
and Rajesndra fell in love and started meeting regularly even when Rajendra had to
shift to Bhopal. He used to roam between the two cities to meet Neha.
6. Rajesndra’s parents being aware of this called Dr Sharma proposing for
marriage, which was rejected by him after a truffle as to their caste.
7. On the morning of 8/5/2014, Dr. Sharma and his wife left their house at
about 6:15 A.M., for the morning walk and came back around 7:15 A.M when they
found both their daughters dead.
8. FIR was lodged before Vijay Nagar police station.
9. Preliminary Investigation was conducted. Dr. Sharma raised his suspicion
against said Rajendra Jatav after the statement of PW 3, Jai Prakash Jain was
recorded.
10. When a team was sent to the house of Rajendra, it was found that he had
gone to his sister’s in Mumbai, after which he was arrested, his statement was
Page | xi
recorded by executive magistrate and sent back when he produced a ticket of train
on the night of the offence.
11. In Indore and alleged disclosure was made by the appellant as to the blood-
stained clothes and knife. A golden chain was also seized from the possession of
the appellant which was identified by the parents of the accused.
12. During the trial, Accused Rajendra Jatav took the plea of alibi that he was
travelling to Mumbai on intervening night of 7th - 8th of May, 2014. He also denied
the confession that he made before the Executive Magistrate at Mumbai.
13. The TTE and Mr C K Verma, who arrested the accused, however, were not
examined.
14. The trial court convicted the accused. The matter went to appeal to the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh which sustained the judgement of the Trial Court.
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STATEMENTS OF ISSUES
ISSUE FIRST
WHETHER THE STATEMENT MADE AMOUNTS TO CONFESSION AS

PER SECTION 164 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE?
ISSUE SECOND
WHETHER FINDING BLOODSTAINED CLOTH AND KNIFE FORM

‘DISCOVERY’ AS MEANING UNDER SECTION 27 OF INDIAN
EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
ISSUE THIRD
WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TAKEN INTO

REASONABLE DOUBT?
Page | xiii
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE STATEMENT MADE AMOUNTS TO

CONFESSION AS PER SECTION 164 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE?
It is humbly contended before this Hon’ble court that the statement made by the
appellant before the Executive Magistrate of Mumbai does not amount to
confession as it does not fulfil the essentials as prescribed under Section 164 of
Code of Criminal Procedure which requires that every confession must be made
before the Judicial Magistrate and not the Executive Magistrate.
ISSUE 2: WHETHER FINDING BLOODSTAINED CLOTH AND KNIFE

FORM ‘DISCOVERY’ AS MEANING UNDER SECTION 27 OF INDIAN
EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
It is humbly submitted before this court that the findings of the bloodstained cloths
and knife does not attract Section 27 of the Evidence Act as the same does not form
part of Discovery. The essentials required for any evidence to form part of
discovery is that the same should be discovered by the police on the confession, of
the same evidence, by the accused to the police and on such confession, police so
acted and found the evidence. But in this case, no such confession was made and
police already knew where the evidence in question was.
ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TAKEN

INTO CONSIDERATION TO FIND THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED, BY
THE LOWER COURTS, WERE ENOUGH TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?
Page | xiv
It is humbly contended before the court that the circumstantial evidence taken into
consideration to find the guilt of the accused, by the lower courts is not enough to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As most of the evidence, forming part of
chain of circumstances does not provide a clear picture and also gives rise to two
stories on various occasions. Thus, providing the accused with the principal of
benefit of the doubt.
Page | xv
~WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FOR APPELLANT ~
ARGUMENTS ADVANCE
I. WHETHER THE STATEMENT MADE AMOUNTS TO
CONFESSION AS PER SECTION 164 OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE?
I.A. Status of The Statement Made Before an Executive Magistrate.
¶1. It is Humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that it is S. 164 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which provides for the recording of confession of an accused.
A confession is an admission of the offence by a person charged with the offence.1
The first sub-section which provides the power of recording confession uses the
words Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate specifically. It is submitted
before the hon’ble bench that the meaning of magistrate under other sub-sections
of section 164 is in consonance with the first sub section. To that regard it is again
submitted that Section 3 of Cr PC2 here requires special attention. The section gives
meaning to be construed of the references and clearly states that a reference made
to a magistrate under the code of Criminal Procedure is to be deemed to be referred
to a Judicial Magistrate in any area outside a metropolitan area or metropolitan
magistrate in relation to any metropolitan area. The proviso to S.3(1) further reveals
that the anxiety of the Legislature in barring other person than the Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate from recording the confessions is well apparent
as even a police officer on whom powers of the Magistrate have been conferred
under any law for the time being in force has been debarred from recording such
confessions. The scheme of the CrPC, 1973, itself provides that the Legislature in
its wisdom has classified courts of Executive Magistrate separately than those of
the Judicial Magistrate as is apparent from the provision of Section 6 of the Code.3
1 Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119.

2 S. 3 of Code for Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3 State of Haryana v. Parmanand, 1995 Cri LJ 386.
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¶2. The principle submission in light of the above law and what is being followed
is that since the section clearly requires only a judicial magistrate or metropolitan
magistrate to record confession, any confession recorded by any other person, in
this case an executive magistrate, is bad in law.
¶3. One of the major reasons the code specifies an office for the doing of the job is
that it is not a regular or mechanical job but requires the application of judicial mind
in terms of obtaining satisfaction as per the voluntariness of the statement etc. 4 . The
constitution itself stands as a safeguard against involuntary self-incrimination and
it has been a long-standing history around the world that the police may use extreme
means to excull out a confession as was pointed out by V Krishna Iyer, J., in
Nandani Satpathy v. PL Dani5 . “A judicial mind is needed, for example and mainly,
to take care to see the requirements of section 164 (2) are fully satisfied. It is
necessary in every case to put question as intended to be asked under S. 164 (2) of
CrPC. This was also the law decided by State of Punjab v. Harjagdev Singh6 .”
¶4. Highlighting the judicial nature, Pacha Devendra Rao v. State of A.P7 goes on
to say that the statement under this section is a judicial proceeding, as the procedure
of recording statement under this section has all trappings of recording evidence in
the court. In Jarina Khatoon v. State of Assam the importance of judicial mind is
well laid out by the Allahabad High Court. It was laid that before recording
confession of the accused under S. 164, CrPC, the questioning of the accused as to
whether it was voluntary is a matter of substance and not mere form. 8
¶5. Thus, the function of magistrate in recording confession under S. 164 of the
code is a very solemn act which he is obliged to perform by taking due care to
4 Ayyub v. State of U.P, AIR 2002 SC 1192.

5 Nandani Satpathy v. PL Dani, 1978 SCC (2) 424.
6 State of Punjab v. Harjagdev Singh, (2010) 16 SCC 91.
7 Pacha Devendra Rao v. State of A.P., 1986 (3) Crimes 536.
8 Jarina Khatoon v. State of Assam, 1995 (1) JIC 1298 (All.)
Page | 2
ensure all the requirements of this section are fully satisfied. The magistrate
recording such statement should not adopt a casual approach.9
¶6. Historically speaking, let alone an executive magistrate the court has on a
number of occasions not admitted a confession made to magistrate of 1st class. In
Nika Ram v. State of H.P.10 the court held as follows:
“… Such a confession, in the instant case, recorded by magistrate of second class,
not duly empowered, is inadmissible in evidence at the trial.’ In a case where a
confession had been recorded under S. 164(1) by a Magistrate of the second class
not specially empowered the court held that if a statute has conferred a power to do
an act and had laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it
accessorily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has
been prescribed.11 The principle of Nazir Ahmed's case12 which dealt with the
recording of a confession by a Magistrate of first class must also be considered. It
said that when a statute confers a power on certain judicial officers, that power can
obviously be exercised only by those officers and no other officer can exercise it.”
¶7. Though the history of a legislation is not the basis of interpreting its intention,
but it sure does help us understand the intention of the legislature. An analogy is
well devisable. The reasoning in Nazir Ahmad’s case is to be noted in that regard.
It is seen in the provision existing before that the intention was specifically to
provide for the three offices which must take confessions under section 164; the
court thereafter did not allow any other office to do so on the reasoning laid down
above.
9 RAM JETHMALANI & D S CHOPRA, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PR OCEDURE, 1973 468
(Thomas Reuters 2015).
10 Nika Ram v. State of H.P., 1972 AIR 2077; 1973 SCR (1) 428.
11 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358, see also Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1
Ch.D. 426
12 Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor, L.R. 63 I.A. 372, see also Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of
Vindhya Pradesh, 1955 2 SCR 206.
Page | 3
¶8. The present understanding, it is submitted by the counsels, is no different with

reference to the present S. 164 of CrPC. It is seen by a notification brought in
Mizoram specifically. An executive magistrate of 1 st class in the Mizoram has a
power to record a confessional statement under S. 164 CrPC as he has been
authorised to do so vide S. 3 of Cr PC13 . It is obvious that if executive magistrate
was to be empowered to take confessions, there would have not been need for the
government to pass any such notification. Another example could be the TADA
Act which requires the confessions to be made under S. 164 of CrPC, specifically
provides for the construction of the word magistrate to include executive
magistrate.14
¶9. In a number of cases has it been held that he provisions of this section
empowering the judicial magistrate only to record confessional statements are
mandatory having no exception.15 In Pundi v. State of MP16 and Mika Ram v. State
of HP17 it was held that the provision of section 164 is clear and according to the
section such statement (confessional statement) can only be recorded by a Judicial
Magistrate. So, the statement recorded by executive magistrate had no value in the
eyes of law. It has also been stated clearly in Sarkar’s Commentary on Criminal
Law citing Parmanand’s case18 that “the provisions of Section 164 of the Code,
reproduced above absolutely leave no scope of doubt that the recording of a
confession of the accused person during investigation of the case, has been left
exclusively to the Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate and not to any
Executive Magistrate.”
13 Notification No. Jud. 25/74 of 2.4.1974.

14 Section 20(3) of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987.
15 CCE v. Duncan Agro Industries, AIR 2000 SC 2901; State of Maharasthra v. Damu, AIR 2000
SC 1691.
16 Pundi v. State of MP, 1993 Cri LJ 1881(DB) (MP).
17 Mika Ram v. State of HP, AIR 1972 SCC 2077.
18 S.C. SARKAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 137
(Dwivedi Law Agency 2014); see also State of Haryana v. Parmanand, 1995 Cr LJ 386.
Page | 4
¶10. In the opening comments for S. 164 CrPC, explaining the legislative changes
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal19 says that “Now, only Judicial Magistrates have the power to
record statements as well as confessions.” D.D. Basu20 clearly states that the
following will not be competent to record a confession i.e. any Executive magistrate
and any police officer empowered to exercise the power of a magistrate.
The counsels for appellant therefore submit before this hon’ble court that it is, thus,
a settled principle of law that when a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain
manner, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.
I.B. Conduct of The Accused and The Voluntariness of The Statement
¶1. It is submitted that in order that the evidence of a confession by a accused

maybe admissible, it must be affirmatively proved that such confession was free
and voluntary and that it was not preceded by any inducement to the accused to
make a statement held out by a person in authority or that it was not made until
after such inducement had clearly been removed. 21 It is submitted, in the words of
Adv. Ram Jethmalani, that when in a capital case the prosecution demands a
conviction of the accused primarily on the basis of his/ her confession recorded
under S. 164, CrPC, the court must apply a double test i.e. firstly, whether the
confession was perfectly voluntary and if so, whether it is true and truth worthy.22
¶2. Satisfaction (judicial) of the first is a sine qua non for its admissibility in
evidence. If the first test is satisfied, the court must, before acting upon the
confession reach the finding that what is stated therein is true and reliable.
Highlighting the importance of “duty” it was held in Govind Pradhan v. State23 ,
that it is the duty of the magistrate to satisfy himself that the accused was
19 RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (24 th ed., LexisNexis 2016).
20 K.I. VIBHUTE, DURGA DAS BASU CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 851 (6 th ed.).
21 Hemraj Devilal v. State of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462.
22 RAM JETHMALANI & D S CHOPRA, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 468
(Thomas Reuters, 2015).

23 Govind Pradhan v. State, 1991 Cr LJ 269.
Page | 5
completely freed from any possible police influence. Focus must be given to the
word “possible” used here.
¶3. The counsel in the present case rebuts the presence of the very first
circumstance in light of the reasons herein mentioned. This is, firstly, in light of the
conduct of the accused. It was contended that a confession was made by the accused
in Indore after he was arrested. However, it seems highly improbable that at one
time a person would subject himself to self-incrimination and at the same time he
will produce a document giving alibi. He produced ticket in front of the police
officers to signify he was not there at the time of the incident and also at the same
time he accepts that he committed the crime. Both of the events happening at the
same time seem unnatural. The voluntariness of the alleged confession, thus, seem
unnatural.
¶4. Secondly, a confession recorded under S. 164 of CrPC becomes voluntary and
free when it is made by the accused out of repentance, after due caution with
reasonable time for reflection in order to remove completely any threat or torture,
inducement or promise by the arresting agency and it precludes the possibility of
tutoring.24
¶5. Thirdly, after taking the alleged confession, the appellant was reverted back to
police custody. This is a serious lacuna. It is a duty casted upon the magistrate not
to revert the accused back to the police custody, even in case the accused does not
confess the offence. This is to remove all the fear from the mind of the accused to
ensure voluntariness. Let alone being told so, the executive magistrate reverted him
back to the police. In addition, it is also not known whether the accused was
informed of his right to consult a lawyer by the magistrate.25
¶6. In State of Maharashtra v. Bukhmini, the court held that in case of confessional
statements which are otherwise admissible, the court has still to consider whether
24 Hem Chandra Nayak v. State of Assam, 1989 Cr LJ 2058.

25 Abed Ali Jamadar v. State, 1988 Cr LJ 354.
Page | 6
they can be accepted as true. If the facts and circumstance surrounding the making
of confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity is voluntariness of the
confession, the court may court may refuse to act upon the confession even if it is
admissible in evidence.
¶7. It is the appellant submission, that admissibility apart, the facts of the present
case gravely puts a doubt on the veracity as well as voluntariness of the statement.
It is not unknown that the law against self-incrimination was a submission onto the
popular will of the people mainly because of the suppression of those in charge of
investigation. It is not a distant possibility that force or unlawful means could have
been used to extract out a confession form the accused and to ensure that this is not
the case, presence of a judicial officer is necessary so as to ensure that the statement
is being made voluntarily. In its absence there is nothing in the facts of the case to
point towards the voluntariness of the statement. In fact, the conduct of the
appellant as well as surrounding statement indicates otherwise.
I.C. Whether the Statement Is Admissible as Confession
¶1. The counsels for the appellant submit before this court that confessions in
criminal law have been categorised to be either judicial or extra judicial. The
prosecution is obliged to rely on the alleged confession in any of the aforesaid
categories. As extrajudicial cannot be regarded as judicial confession, similarly an
alleged judicial confession proved to have not been legally recorded cannot be used
as extra judicial confession.26 It was again said in Marimathu v. State,27 that in that
case the document containing the statement of the accused falls short of a judicial
confession. It is of no legal significance in the hands of the court and the same was
repeated in the case of Singharia Singh v. State of U.P. 28
26 RAM JETHMALANI & D S CHOPRA, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

(Thomas Reuters 2015).
27 Marimathu v. State, (2005) 3 Crimes 732 (Mad.).
28 Singharia Singh v. State of U.P., 1961 All LJ 617.
Page | 7
¶2. It is submitted that the absence of infirmities has to be affirmatively proved by

the prosecution. In Mika Ram v. State of H.P.,29 it was held that the statement could
only be recorded by a judicial magistrate and so the statement record ed by the
executive magistrate had no value in the eyes of law. In Davedea Prasad Tiwari v.
State of UP,30 it has to be noted here, that though the confession was in front of a
judicial magistrate but since the compliance with S. 164 was not affirmatively
established, the alleged confession was discarded.
¶3. In furtherance appellant submits that in the case of ABV Mujahid v. State of
Maharashtra31 , the court rejects the admissibility on the basis of doubt by saying
that if a doubt is created regarding its (alleged confession) voluntariness, it has to
be trashed but is a confession is established as voluntary, it must be taken into
account.
¶4. In order to render a confession worthy of belief regard must be had to:
a. The person to whom it was made

b. The connection, is any, of the accused with him
c. The occasion or the reason for the accused to make such confession
d. The circumstances in which it was made
Clearly, the person in front of whom it was made was the wrong person. It was not
a judicial confession and since infirmity arises when following S. 164 CrPC, it
cannot be treated as extra judicial confession also. There may have been no
connection with accused but the occasion and circumstances for making the
confession is surrounded with infirmities and point to involuntary statement.
¶5. DD Basu says that where a confession is to be made to a person other than a
police officer while the person is in the custody of a police, it shall not be admissible
unless it is made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, otherwise S. 26 or 27
29 Ibid., 4.
30 Davedea Prasad Tiwari v. State of U.P., AIR 1978 SC 1544.
31 ABV Mujahid v. State of Maharashtra , 2012 Cr LJ 4770 (SC).
Page | 8
of IEA is attracted. And the same book defines magistrate under this section as only
judicial magistrate.32
¶6. In furtherance it is submitted that the case of Babasaheb alias Babu v. State of
Maharashtra33 gains much importance in this regard. The court says that if the
contents of S. 164(3) of CrPC, together with the principle states in the ruling stated
in Parmanand’s case34 and the ruling in Ashim Das v. State of Assam 35 are to be
taken into consideration, in that case the only inference that can be drawn is that a
witness might be holding a part of special judicial magistrate at that time, had
absolutely no power to record confession which task is specially assigned to the
Judicial Magistrate and/or Metropolitan Magistrate and hence the so called
confession recorded by him is illegal and cannot be relied upon.
This is where, the counsel for the appellant humbly and simply pleads that the
alleged confession is no confession and is inadmissible.
II. WHETHER FINDING BLOODSTAINED CLOTH AND KNIFE FORM

‘DISCOVERY’ AS MEANING UNDER SECTION 27 OF INDIAN
EVIDENCE ACT, 1872?
II.A. Whether the Requirements of Section 27 are Fulfilled?
¶1. It is humbly submitted before this court that the S. 27 of the IEA,1872 is taken
as a proviso to the exclusionary rules enacted in S. 24,25,2636 which are themselves
exception to the general rule that the confession is probable against its maker as an
exception. As an exception, S. 2737 of the IEA provides that a confessional
statement made to a police officer or while an accused is in police custody, can be
proved against him, if the same leads to a discovery of an unknown fact.
32 K.I. VIBHUTE, DURGA DAS BASU CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 850 (6 th ed.).
33 Babasaheb alias Babu v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cri LJ 467.
34 Parmanand Katara v. State of Haryana, 1995 All LJ 396 (P&H).
35 Ashim Das v. State of Assam, 1987 Cri LJ 1533 (Gau).
36 Bodh Raj v. State of J & K, (2002) 8 SCC 45.
37 Section 27 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Page | 9
¶2. As regards discovery of evidence, S. 27 requires that only statements made by

the accused that lead to a discovery are admissible as evidence. The various
requirements of the section were summed up in the case of Anter Singh v. State of
Rajasthan38 as follows:
i.The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue.
ii.The fact must have been discovered: Information given by the accused must lead
to the discovery of a fact, which is the direct outcome of such information which is
not fulfilled in the instance case.
iii.Not within the knowledge of police: The fact discovered must be one which was
not within the knowledge of the police and the knowledge of the fact was for the
first time derived from the information given by the accused. The murder weapon
and the cloth were already recovered in the preliminary investigation and it cannot
be said that this essential is fulfilled.
iv.The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused in
custody must be deposed to: This section contemplates that consequent to the
information given by the accused; it leads to the discovery of some facts stated by
him. In the instant case, the discovery of the weapon and cloth was not consequent
to the information provided by the accused.
v.The persons giving the information must be accused of any offence.
vi.He must be in the custody of a police officer.
vii.Thereupon only that portion of the information which relates distinctly or strictly
to the fact discovered can be proved. The rest is inadmissible.
¶3. From a perusal of the above provision of law, it can be seen that a fact
discovered on information supplied by the accused in his disclosure statement, is a
relevant fact and that is only admissible in evidence if something new is discovered
or recovered from the accused which was not within the knowledge of the police
38 Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 2865.
Page | 10
before recording the disclosure statement of the accused while the case in hand
police has already recovered the blood-stained clothes and knife in preliminary
investigation39 and hence it does not fulfil the requirements of the S. 27 of this act
which require something new to be discovered.
II.B. Admissibility of The Evidence Under Relevant Sections.
¶1. It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that under S. 27 of the IEA if
an information given by the accused leads to the discovery of a fact which is the
direct outcome of such information then only it would be evidence but when the
fact has already been discovered as in the instant case evidence could not be led in
respect thereof.40 There is no discovery of the facts when the facts were already
known to the police from other sources. The discovery that the section contemplates
must be of some fact, which the police have not previously learnt from other source
of knowledge of the fact should be first derived from information given by the
accused 41 .
¶2. A grave travesty of justice must be brought to the notice of this court that
nothing could be re-discovered as a consequence of the evidence already recovered
by the police in preliminary investigation. In the case of Madhu v. State of Kerala42
it is explained by the apex court while deciding mandate of Section 27 that the
exception postulated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is applicable only if the
confessional statement leads to the discovery of some new fact. The relevance
under the exception postulated by Section 27 aforesaid, is limited. Section 27 of
the Evidence Act is applicable only if the confessional statement leads to the
discovery of some new fact. The relevance is limited as relates distinctly to the fact
thereby discovered.43
39 ¶Para 6, Moot Preposition, Shri J.P. Gupta Memorial Moot Court Competitio n, 2019.
40 Vijender v. State of Delhi, (1997) 6 SCC 171.
41 Thimma v. State of Mysore, AIR 1971 SC 187.
42 Madhu v. State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399.
43 Navaneethakrishnan v. The State by Inspector of Police 2018, SCC OnLine SC. 378.
Page | 11
¶3. In the present case police during preliminary investigation recovered the knife
and blood-stained clothes from the bushes, behind Holkar Hospital and a memo u/s
27 of evidence was prepared subsequently in which it was shown that accused has
confessed the act and disclosed the same that he kept behind the Holkar Hospital44
is not admissible and also it cannot be said to discovery. The recovery already been
made, the inference that the statement of the accused could have been planted also
assumes significance.
¶4. It is further contended that, the impugned judgement was passed on the basis of
the alleged disclosure statement which has not led to discovery of any fact and also
no recovery at the instance of the petitioner. Thus, it is also clear that the disclosure
statement of the accused is not at all admissible in evidence where it has not led to
discovery of any fact which was not known to the police.
¶5. Therefore, it is humbly submitted that, the learned judge of Session Court has
erred in sentencing an innocent person and affirming the same by the High Court
is grave miscarriage of justice. In the light of above discussion, it is prayed that the
evidence is not sufficient to convict the appellant and sentence cannot be sustained.
II.C. Whether the evidence produced by the police is scientifically proven?
¶1. It is submitted before this hon’ble court that the veracity of evidence produced
by the prosecution in trial court i.e., bloodstained cloth and knife from the Holkar
Hospital is doubtful in the light of fact that a hospital is a place where these kinds
of things can be easily found. However, these evidences were not even properly
examined scientifically as bloodstain were found to be of human blood and there is
nothing conclusive to prove the same that it was of respondent. Session Court in
reaching its conclusion on the basis of presence of human blood in the chemical
examination of knife and bloodstained cloth seized from the accused is
unsustainable and injustice.
44 ¶Para 7, Moot Preposition, Shri J.P. Gupta Memorial Moot Court Competition, 2019.
Page | 12
¶2. In the case of Navaneethakrishnan v. The State By Inspector Of Police45 Sikri

J. explained that the law is well settled that each and every incriminating
circumstance must be clearly established by reliable and clinching evidence and the
circumstances so proved must form a chain of events from which the only
irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn and no
other hypothesis against the guilt is possible.
¶3. It is submitted that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence,

there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal
proof. The court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events
must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused.
When the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the
other circumstances cannot, in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused
beyond all reasonable doubt.
¶4. In furtherance is is pleaded that the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. King
Emperor46 held that S. 27 of the IEA is not artistically worded but it provides an
exception to the prohibition imposed under the preceding sections. However, the
extent of discovery admissible pursuant to the facts deposed by accused depends
only to the nature of the facts discovered to which the information precisely relates.
¶5. In the case court held that the limited nature of the admissibility of the facts
discovered pursuant to the statement of the accused under Section 27 can be
illustrated by the following example: Suppose a person Accused of murder deposes
to the police officer the fact as a result of which the weapon with which the crime
is committed is discovered, but as a result of such discovery no inference can be
drawn against the accused, if there is no evidence connecting the knife with the
crime alleged to have been committed by the accused.47 When basic foundation in
45 Ibid., 44.
46 Pulukuri Kottaya v. King Emperor, MANU/PR/0049/1946; 1947 PC 67.
47 Musheer Khan v. State of M.P., MANU/SC/0065/2010; (2010) 2 SCC 748.
Page | 13
criminal cases is so collapsed, the circumstantial evidence becomes

inconsequential. In such circumstances, it is difficult for the Court to hold that a
judgment of conviction could be founded on the sole circumstance that recovery of
weapon and other articles have been made. 48
¶6. The counsels for the appellant therefore submits that, unless and until it is
forensically examined that the found weapon was used for murder, finger print of
accused were present on the weapon and bloodstained cloth found belongs to the
appellant only, the court could not reach on the conclusion that the accused is guilty.
A complete chain without a snap and pointing to the hypothesis that except the
accused, no one had committed the offence is required which in the present case is
not proved. It leads to a great miscarriage of justice to hold an innocent man guilty
of the crime which he did not commit.
¶7. Therefore in the light of above arguments it is submitted before this court that
the requirements of S. 27 of IEA, 1872 is not fulfilled, The evidence produced under
S. 27 is not admissible as it does not lead to any discovery and the evidence
produced by the police/prosecution is not beyond reasonable doubt to prove the
guilt of the appellant.
III. WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TAKEN INTO

REASONABLE DOUBT?
III.A Whether there was intention and motive to commit the crime?
¶1. It is Submitted that motive is the moving power which impels one to action for
a definite result, it helps the prosecution to reaffirm the chain of circumstances
which they are willing to prove. But in the present case the lower courts f ailed to
48 State of Uttar Pradesh a nd Ors. v. Sunil and Ors., MANU/SC/0557/2017.
Page | 14
acknowledge absence of motive of the appellant. In the case of State through CBI
v. Mahindra Singh Dahiya49 where the case of prosecution has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt on the basis of the material produced before the court, the motive
loses its significance. But in the cases based on circumstantial evidence, motive for
committing the crimes assumes great importance. In such circumstances, absence
of motive would put the court on its guard to scrutinize the evidence very closely
to ensure that suspicion, emotion or conjecture do not take place of the proof. Then
again, in Sathyanarayanan v. State rep by Inspector of Police50 same was
supported. The counsels submit that a sufficient notice is not present in the case,
what is present can be at most be a mere suspicion.
¶2. In a case of Arun Kumar Banerjee v. State51 , where it has been held
question of motive is of great importance in circumstantial evidence and where
there is absence of such motive, the court should carefully examine
his absence of motive as a circumstance in favour of the accused. It is well
established that there is a clear distinction between cases where the prosecution
relies upon the circumstantial evidence on the one hand and those where it relies
upon the testimony of eyewitnesses on other. In the former category of cases proof
of motive is given the importance it deserves, for proof of motive itself constitutes
a link in the chain of circumstances upon which the prosecution may rely52 .
¶3. It is submitted that in the present case the motive that lower courts accepted
was that the accused as a result of failed love story went on and killed not only the
love of his life but also her sister. The accused, Rajendra and the deceased, Neha
were madly in love with each other. When Rajendra lived in Indore, they both used
to frequently meet in Ganesh Temple. And when Mr. Jatav was transferred to
49 State Through CBI v. Mahindra Singh Dahiya , AIR 2011 SC 1017; (2011) 3 SCC 109.
50 Sathyanarayanan v. State rep. by Inspector of Police, (2012) 12 SCC 627.
51 Arun Kumar Banerjee v. State, AIR 1962 Cal 504.
52 Sheo Shanker Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 25.
Page | 15
Bhopal, Rajendra still used to move between Bhopal to Indore only to meet the girl
whom he loved the most. The distance between the 2 cities is more than 190kms
which would take around 4 hours to reach from one city to another but Rajendra
irrespective of this fact went to meet her usually. When proposal was turned down
by Mr. Sharma this may have made Rajendra unhappy for the time being but this
particular incident will never lead Rajendra, the accused to give sufficient motive
and intent to kill Neha as well as her sister. Rajendra had no motive to kill Shweta
whatsoever.
III.B Whether PW 3 Jai Prakash Jain is a credible witness?
¶1. It is submitted that as per prescribed law, in order to appreciate the evidence,
the Court is required to bear in mind the set up and environment in which the crime
is committed. The inference of guilt can only be justified when all the incriminating
facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the
accused or the guilt of any other person53 . In criminal jurisprudence, evidence has
to be evaluated on the touchstone of 'Consistency.54 Bearing in mind the broad
principles, the evidence is required to be appreciated to find out what part out of
the evidence represents the true and correct state of affairs. It is for the courts to
separate the grain from the chaff. 55 The portion found worthy of credence on
appreciation can be relied upon56 .On this premise the statement given by the PW3
must be adjudged.
¶2. The counsels for the appellant contend that it must be qualitatively such that on
every reasonable hypothesis the conclusion must be that the accused is guilty; not
fanatic possibilities nor freak inferences but rational deductions which reasonable
minds make from the probative force of facts and circumstances 57 . It is pleaded that
53 State of Rajasthan v. Rajaram, AIR 2003 SC 3601 (3605).

54 C Magesh v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 5 SCC 645 (655); AIR 2010 SC 2768.
55 Ramesh Harijan v. State of UP, AIR 2012 SC 1979; (2012) 5 SCC 777.
56 Ganesh K. Gulve v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3068 .
57 Mohanlal v. State, AIR 1974 SC 1144.
Page | 16
the veracity of statement made by PW3 should be revaluated on the lines that
whether PW3 was a credible witness or not.
¶3. PW3 stated that the accused was seen jumping over the compound wall but the
point which should be taken into consideration is that when Dr. Sharma came back
to his house with his wife at around 7:00 am to 7:15 am, the out door was open. If
the same was the case then why did the culprit would go on lengths to jump over
the compound wall when he could easily have moved out from the crime scene
through the opened door. Circumstantial evidence must be a combination of facts
creating a network through which there is no escape for the accused because t he
facts taken as a whole do not admit of any inference but of his guilt 58 .
Circumstantial evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused,
but should be inconsistent with his innocence59 .
¶4. Another doubt raised is that why the PW3 who was the neighbour didn’t do
anything to stop the accused when he found him jumping through the compound
wall of his neighbour’s house. It was early morning when he allegedly saw him, a
reasonable prudent man after seeing such a site where a person who used to live in
that particular area and also had amiable relationship with the family from whose
compound wall he was seen jumping, creates a great amount of suspicion.
¶5. It is well known to the court that the father of the deceased was a reputed doctor
in the city of Indore. He also had cordial relations within his locality. He was very
particular about the charity work. Thus, making him a well-established name in the
society in which he lived in. Witness, thus may not be free from undue influence of
a highly reputed surgeon who happens to be his neighbour and who lost not only
one but both of his daughters.
58 Anant Chintaman v. State, AIR 1960 SC 500, 523; (1960) 2 SCR 460.
59 Mangleshwari v. State, AIR 1954 SC 715.
Page | 17
¶6. As per the case of Harendra Narain Singh v. State of Bihar60 it was stated that
if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in a case of circumstantial
evidence, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence,
the one in favor of the accused must be-accepted 61 . Thus, the appellant urges before
the court that these contention of it should be taken into consideration and the
accused be thereby, released on the lack of conclusive proof and evidence which
earlier were taken into consideration by the lower courts.
III.C Whether Seizure of the chain from the possession of the accused
admissible as evidence?
¶1. It is submitted that a chain was also taken as evidence in proving the case
against the appellant as the chain seized from the possession of the accused and the
same was identified by the mother and the father of the deceased to be that of the
deceased.
¶2. The counsels for the appellant submit that circumstantial evidence which falls
short of the required standard on all material particulars is not sufficient to convict
a person62 . In a case based on circumstantial evidence the court has to be on its
guard to avoid the danger of being swayed by emotional considerations, however
strong they may be, to take the place of proof 63 . The court must adopt cautious
approach while basing its conviction purely on circumstantial evidence64 .
¶3. What is more important in law that as that it has to be established that the items
were on the person of the deceased when the offence was committed. A highly
probable (S. 11(2) of IEA) instance could be that the appellant and deceased were
in love, Neha could have given it to appellant on any earlier occasion.
60 Harendra Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 1842.

61 Baboo Ram v. State, 1996 Cr LJ 483 (All).
62 Sardar Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 1766.
63 Balvinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 607.
64 State of Haryana v. Ved Prakash, (2008) 13 SCC 268 (270); AIR 1994 SC 468.
Page | 18
Circumstantial evidence which falls short of the required standard on all material
particulars is not sufficient to convict a person 65 .
¶4. Therefore, if the deceased had parted with these items earlier even if they had
been stolen from his Possession earlier, that would not be good enough to establish
a nexus with the murder unless it is established conclusively that the items were on
his person at the time when the offence was committed 66 . Finding of some article
from the person or possession of an accused or from the house stained with human
blood, by itself, cannot lead to the conclusion that the accused committed the
crime67 .
¶5. There is a test laid down in the landmark case of Sharad Birdichand Sharda v.
State68 and been reaffirmed in various other cases which incorporates five golden
principals that needs to be exhaustively proven for conviction and the same are:
(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should
be fully established.
(2) The facts so established should be consistent not only with the hypothesis of the
guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypotheses except that the accused is guilty.
(3) The circumstances should be of conclusive nature and tendency.
(4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved.
(5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable
ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability, the act must have been done by the accused.
¶6. After going through the above-mentioned guidelines that the Apex Court as
well as other courts gave, we need to substantiate the same guidelines in the present
case. There must be a complete chain of evidence which would lead to a conclusion
65 Ibid., 63.
66 Anasuyamma v. State of Karnataka, 2002 Cr LJ 4401; ILR 2002 Kant 4106.
67 Lakshmi Jain v. Stare, (1986) Cr LJ 513, 516 (DB) Orissa (1986).
68 Sharad Birdichand Sharda v. State, AIR 1984 SC 1622; See also Sudama Pandey v. State, AIR
2002 SC 293; Subhash Chand v. State (2002) 1 SCC 702; Ashish Batham v. State AIR 2002 SC
3206; Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR 1954 SC 621; Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 2008 SC 2819.
Page | 19
that the accused was the only person, who could have committed the offence and
none else69 . From the intention which was the first step in the chain of circumstance
to the confession by the accused to the executive magistrate every step which was
taken as important evidence in proving the guilt of the accused, cannot be proved
beyond any reasonable doubt and thus falling short of the principles laid down in
above mentioned case.
¶7. Therefore, it is the final submission that a solitary circumstance cannot form
basis of conviction70 . Missing link in chain of circumstance cannot form basis of
conviction. Suspicion, howsoever, strong cannot take the place, of proof 71 . A case
of circumstantial evidence is primarily dependent upon the prosecution story
established by cogent, reliable and admissible evidence. Each circumstance must
be proved like any other fact which will, upon their composite reading, completely
demonstrate how and by whom the offence had been committed 72 .
¶8. It is humbly submitted before this hon’ble court that the session court and the
high court have erred in recording the reasoning in the present case. In a case where
the evidences are of a circumstantial nature it should be duly noted that such
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first
instance, be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Therefore, the accused should
be acquitted.
69 Varun Chaudhary v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2011 SC 72; (2011) 12 SCC 545 .
70 Sashi Jena v. Khadal Swain, AIR 2004 SC 1492 (1496).
71 A.Dungdung v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2004 SC 1397; 2004 (4) Crimes 136.
72 Munna Kumar Upadhyaya v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2012 SC 2470 (2476); (2012) 6 SCC
1741.
Page | 20
THE PRAYER
IT IS HUMBLY SUBMITTED BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME

COURT OF INDIA THAT IN THE LIGHTS OF THE ABOVE
ARGUMENTS, CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED, THIS HON’BLE
COURT, MAY BE PLEASED TO:
1. REVERSE THE DECISION OF HON’BLE HIGH COURT. AND,

2. ACQUIT OUR CLIENT FROM THE CHARGES U/S 302 AND U/S
449 OF INDIAN PENAL CODE,1860.
AND PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT IT

MAY DEEM FIT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, FAIRNESS,
EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE APPELLANT SHALL DUTY

BOUND FOREVER PRAYS.
(RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED)
-COUNSELS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-
(______________)
Page | 21

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~WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FOR APPELLANT ~

Shri. J.P. GUPTA MEMORIAL – 3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

DATED THE 26TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2019

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO *****/2019

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH………………………………...RESPONDENT

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS FOR APPELLANT

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... iii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS................................................................................................. iii

Books ........................................................................................................................... viii

Statutes ......................................................................................................................... viii

Online Sources ............................................................................................................... ix

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................... x

STATEMENTS OF ISSUES......................................................................................... xiii

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS ..................................................................................... xiv

I. WHETHER THE STATEMENT MADE AMOUNTS TO CONFESSION AS

I.A. Status of The Statement Made Before an Executive Magistrate. ........................ 1

I.C. Whether the Statement Is Admissible as Confession .......................................... 7

II. WHETHER FINDING BLOODSTAINED CLOTH AND KNIFE FORM

II.A. Whether the Requirements of Section 27 are Fulfilled? .................................... 9

II.B. Admissibility of The Evidence Under Relevant Sections. ............................... 11

3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

II.C. Whether the evidence produced by the police is scientifically proven?........... 12

III. WHETHER THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TAKEN INTO

III.B Whether PW 3 Jai Prakash Jain is a credible witness? .................................... 16

THE PRAYER ................................................................................................................ 21

3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

A.P Andhra Pradesh

AIR All India Reporter

Cr. PC Code of Criminal Procedure

Cr. LJ Criminal Law Journal

IEA Indian Evidence Act

3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Manu Manu Patra

M.P. Madhya Pradesh

P&H Punjab and Haryana

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reports

TADA Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act

U.P Uttar Pradesh

U/s Under Section

3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

2. Abed Ali Jamadar v. State, 1988 CrLJ 354. ........................................................... 6

3. ABV Mujahid v. State of Maharashtra, 20121 Cri LJ 4770 (SC)........................... 8

6. Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2004 SC 2865. ....................................... 10

7. Arun Kumar Banerjee v. State, AIR 1962 Cal 504............................................... 15

8. Ashim Das v. State of Assam, 1987 Cri LJ 1533 (Gau). ........................................ 9

9. Ashish Batham v State AIR 2002 SC 3206 .......................................................... 19

10. Ayyub v. State of U.P, AIR 2002 SC 1192. ........................................................... 2

12. Baboo Ram v. State, 1996 CrLJ 483 (All). ........................................................... 18

13. Balvinder Singh v. state of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 607. ........................................ 18

14. Bhagat Ram v State of Punjab AIR 1954 SC 621 ................................................ 19

15. Bodh Raj v. State of J & K, (2002), 8 SCC 45. ...................................................... 9

17. CCE v. Duncan Agro Industries, AIR 2000 SC 2901............................................. 4

19. Ganesh K. Gulve v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 3068 ............................ 16

20. Govind Pradhan v. State, 1991 Cri LJ 269. ............................................................ 5

3RD AUMP NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

23. Hemraj Devilal v State of Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462. ............................................ 5

26. Madhu v. State of Kerala, (2012) 2 SCC 399. ...................................................... 11

27. Mangleshwari v. State, AIR 1954 SC 715............................................................ 17

28. Marimathu v. State, (2005) 3 Crimes 732 (Mad.)................................................... 7

30. Mohanlal v. State, AIR 1974 SC 1144. ................................................................ 16

33. Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119.......................................................... 1