TOPIC Free speech

CONSTI II

489 SCRA 160

David v Arroyo
DATE OF PROMULGATION 3 May 2006
PONENTE Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the  Edsa
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation
of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa
People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments. These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General
Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that PP 1017, among others, violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its "overbreadth."
They claim that its enforcement encroached on both unprotected and protected
rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a "chilling effect" to
the citizens.

ISSUE/S

Whether or not PP 1017 violates free speech.

RULING

No. A facial review of PP 1017, using the “overbreadth” doctrine, is uncalled for.
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases, also known under the
American Law as First Amendment cases. A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it
is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a
call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Thus,
claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by
their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and again, that "overbreadth”
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not
free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Fear of serious injury
cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of
speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of
free speech there must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
evil to be prevented is a serious one. But even advocacy of violation, however
reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the
advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the
advocacy would be immediately acted on. 
DOCTRINE

Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational
fears.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted.