The Burdens of Love

Author(s): Amelie Rorty

Source: The Journal of Ethics , December 2016, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 2016), pp. 341-
354
Published by: Springer

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44077337

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J Ethics (2016) 20:341-354 /fiv
DOI 10.1 007/s 10892-01

The Burdens of Love

Amelie Rorty1,2

Received: 7 December 2015/ Accepted: 4 March 2016 /Published online: 30 April 2016
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Abstract While we primarily love individual persons, we also love our work, our
homes, our activities and causes. To love is to be engaged in an active concern for
the objective well-being - the thriving - of whom and what we love. True love
mandates discovering in what that well-being consists and to be engaged in the
details of promoting it. Since our loves are diverse, we are often conflicted about the
priorities among the obligations they bring. Loving requires constant contextual
improvisatory adjustment of priorities among our commitments. Besides delighting
in - and being enhanced by - the presence and existence of another person (a place,
an institution, profession), love requires extended reflection and work.

Keywords Ambivolence • Choice • Commitment • Conflicts • Love • Priorities

...[L]ove (Liebe) is not to be understood as feeling (aesthetisch)...[or]

delight. . .It must rather be thought as. . . active benevolence, . . .which results in
beneficence... Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, H, 1.1. 25-30 (450)
...[L]ove of any variety... consists basically in a disinterested concern for the
flourishing or the well-being of the beloved. It is not driven by any ulterior
purpose. It seeks the good of the beloved as something that is desirable for its
own sake.... The lover identifies with his belo ved.... [He] takes the interests of
his beloved as his own, and consequently he benefits or suffers depending
upon whether those interests are or are not adequately served. Frankfurt
(2001)

CE3 Amelie Rorty

amelie_rorty@hms.harvard.edu

1 Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA

2 Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA

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 342 A. Rorty

1 Loving an

Although Imm
contexts, with
true love in its
sexually obsess
the point of in
about the love
referring to M
the mutual lov
Anthony and C
Beatrice, Socr
Such love can -
or o diminution
love can expres
needs and attit
childhood dep
functional/ex
contingent att
expressed, as it
or cautiously. L
Love affects a
and attention
because it requ
Whom or what
turn out: it aff
we receive and
Eulogies to lov
presence of an
jealousies, its f
question the le
distrust radic
psychologists a
etiology and
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person or some
is it fungible?
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1 In isolating love
complexities and
the Human Unde
character of any p
2 See the essays b
3 See, for exampl
4 See, e.g., Kraut
(2014), Jollimore

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 The Burdens of Love 343

and expression? What

play in our lives? Wh
is feared when we think of its ordeals or loss?
If Kant and Frankfurt - are right, it is no wonder that we want to be loved and
that we fear its loss. Being loved brings an ally to facing the vicissitudes that are the
substance of daily life; we find ourselves lost without the active attentive concern
that is at the core of love. Still, though we want to have the reliable support of
someone who loves us as a species of insurance, we do not want to be loved by just
anybody. The desire for love has its ambivalences: it can be risky to love and be
loved. Even though we long to be loved, we are often rightly hesitant, finicky about
whom we want to love us. It can be dangerous to be loved by someone who does not
understand us, or by someone who does not understand what love commands. It
takes a great deal of intelligent insight - and certainly a lot of time and work - to
love well. We might reasonably want to avoid being led astray by the love of a fool
or a villain who is sincerely and attentively committed to promoting (what they take
to be) our well-being. We want - we need - those who love us to support what is
genuinely best in us and best for us, even if it means trying to redirect or even
eradicate our floating desires. Kant and Ralph Waldo Emerson observed that we
want those who love us to see - to respect and admire-what is best in us; and yet we
also want them to know - and still lovingly to accept - us as we really are foibles,
faults and all.5 We may even want them to find our weaknesses endearing. It is this
tension that marks some of the complex terrain of love - the tension between
wanting those who love us to see us in the persona of our best selves and yet also to
cherish the flawed selves we actually are. With some trepidation, we want those who
love us to respect what is genuinely respect-worthy in us and yet to accept the fact
that we are often unable to live up to their expectations. Love is greedy and
demanding: we want those who love us to express their love appropriately calibrated
to our needs and moods. We also want them to want to love us, to be glad of loving
us, to think of their love as a blessing rather than an entrapment. We want them to
love us steadfastly, for our sakes and not because they love the duties, the pleasures
or the virtues of loving.6
What we want from those who love us may give us some indication of what we
implicitly commit ourselves to undertake when we love. To be sure, what we
want - what we hope to receive from being loved - may be so irrational as to have
no bearing on what we owe to those we love. What is even more unsettling, those
who take themselves to love someone sincerely, might well find themselves ceasing
to love, when they fully realize what it demands of them. In any case, love comes in
many varieties, for example, high passion love and comfortable old shoe love,
possessive love and laissez faire love.7 While dramatic differences in the tonality
and modality of love are centrally significant to its experience and to the role it plays
in the entire economy of a person's life, they do not affect its central core: insofar as
all these varieties of attachments and relationships are varieties of love , they evince

5 See Kant (1963); Emerson (1841).

6 See Stocker (1976, 1979).
7 I am grateful to MindaRae Amiran and Richard Schmitt for stressing this point.

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 344 A. Rorty

care and concer

propose to set
Frankfurt are
"Love is not...
were, it would
attentiveness t
another person
protects." If lo
they are in fo
end with good
will call our l
for Ella's thriv
her life-long, a
successful exer
thought, we do
finding himsel
apprehensive a
life trajectory
interests. It sh
growing love f
a matter of gr
loves someone
What happens
theirs.
Suppose that Abe does come to love Ella, and that he does so as whole heartedly
as anyone does. He becomes actively concerned to protect her, but - independently
of whether his love is returned-, that concern is surely not the end of the matter. As
Frankfurt puts it, "he identifies with [her] ... takes her interests as his own." For
this, much more than a gallant concern for her protection is required. Abe's love sets
him on an extended examination: to begin with, he needs to be fairly clear about his
own interests and commitments, his own conception of thriving and how it might
skew his understanding of Ella's best interests. After all, his conceptions of
happiness might be cast in the frame of his relatively limited understanding of its
general conditions - as it might be for wealth, fame or political power. If he loves
Ella, he cannot just project his own half-baked ideas of happiness on her: he needs
to understand her interests and preferences, her conception of what conduces to her
happiness. But since he is concerned for her objective happiness - her eudaimonia ,
all things considered, - he should not simply be directed by her ideas of her
conceptions of her happiness, her primary interests. After all, her ideas might be just
as half-baked as his. Independently of whether she returns his love, his concern for
her would mandate an attempt to engage her in reflecting on the objective conditions

8 Although personal love by no means exhausts the range of our loves, I shall, for the sake of simplicity,
initially use the example of romantic love to examine the structure and dynamics of generic love. In Sect.
4, I will turn to other, familiar but less often analyzed expressions of love - the love of home, of a
profession or of an activity.

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The Burdens of Love 345

for happiness, for e

philosophical inquiry.
Initially this would
constitutes thriving in
time. Reflections of
integrate his active
organize a symposium
the devotion that is p
courses in higher m
conditions for thrivin
of significant choices
city center or in the s
York where she is beg
the process of mutual
success is a matter of
Ella's taste in music an
would be better off, h
an Opera singer. Abe
becomes complex: be
tions, it mandates bo
überhaupt and specific
the contingencies of t

2 Love and Philoso

...Love (cpiMoc) is th
inquiry (epcoTTļcnļ)
Heuristicus, Fragmen

As I have told Abe's

Socrates' report of D
mythological ancestry
beautiful boy, an attr
In a set of quick trans
love from an initial a
possess immortal Beau
proper object. A cru
reproduce or preserve
calls a desire for imm
creativity, in philoso
Beautiful/Good in the
just laws. (209 A, 21 1C
of inquiry that echoe

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 346 A. Roity

will also take

moves from t
political expr
focus. (209 A-
lover's desire

3 Love is in the Details

... An ounce of performance is worth pounds of promises. . . It isn't what I do,

but how I do it. It isn't what I say, but how I say it, and how I look when I do it
and say it. Mae West

Diotima's lover moves to ever higher, ever more generic and abstract love, love of
Beauty and the Good. Abe's love also moves him beyond his immediate attraction
to Ella, his desire for her company and affection. If it did not, if all he desired was t
be in her presence, his would be a fantasy of love rather than the real thing. Abe's
love also involves what Frankfurt describes as "a disinterested concern for [her]
flourishing [and] well-being... He "identifies with [Ella and]... take her interests as
his own." In loving Ella, Abe's interests and priorities change (for better or fo
worse) no matter what. His happiness is affected by hers. Without his always being
aware of how much he has changed, her concerns affect his significant choices and
priorities - where he lives, his choice of a profession, his friends and politics, his
recreation and tastes.10
Developing a taste for music or becoming actively interested in politics need not
be caused by his love, as if Abe first found himself loving Ella and then cast abou
finding ways of expressing it by becoming interested in politics and Opera. His lov
is not a psychological event or state, followed by protective care for her well-being
Both his new interests and his active concern for Ella's happiness are constitutive
expressions of his love, rather than effects of his attachment: they grow
simultaneously with his growing love (and vice versa). Like other psychologic
attitudes, it consists in, and is in part identified by its content and characteristic
expression.11
It might seem that in drawing an analogy between Abe's love and that o
Diotima's lover, I have intellectualized and idealized love, claiming that it mandate
considerable focused thinking and deliberation. But as Mae West pungently

9 Plato himself has Socrates describe the Divided Line without introducing the political analysis tha
forms the bulk of the rest of the work. {Republic VI, 509D-513E.) I'll return to the connection between
love and political activism in Sect. 4.
10 See Rorty (1986b).
1 1 The distinction between the causes and constituents of love presupposes a full dress analysis of the
content, structure and dynamics of intentional attitudes that I cannot undertake here. See e.g. Anscomb
(1957), Thalberg (1993), Aquila (1975).

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 The Burdens of Love 347

observed in a somew
pounds of promises."
of everyday life, read
the middle of the nigh
her to hear a perfor
persuading her to see
it... It isn't what I say
Kant may have been t
work of love: the (s
expressed - spontaneou
ing - is typically as in
pervasive, subtle atten
he acts on her behalf
In the best of circum
does on her behalf.
conflict with his, ev
entertaining friends h
in watching late nigh
reasonably sometimes
again. He can fully ac
having to convince hi

4 Love's Conflicts

I would not love thee half so much,

Loved I not Honour more.
Richard Lovelace, "To Lucasta, Going to the Wars"

When things go well, when Abe and Ella are well-matched, their primary interests
are compatible, if not actually identical or complementary. With luck, they can
coordinate their respective occupations and preoccupations reasonably well enough.
However happy their love may be, it is after all only part of their lives. The role it
plays in the total structure and economy of their interests and activities varies: in its
early stages it may be all-consuming. When its patterns are relatively stable, it can
remain in the background of their concerns. Changed as Abe may be by Ella, he
does not become wholly focused on her. He is not a monomaniac. Ella may be the
"love of his life," but she is not his only love. He also loves his ailing parents and
his brother, his work on public radio and the Town Council. He takes their interests
as his own and is actively committed to their thriving: his sense of his well-being is
affected by theirs.
Personal love - the love between parents and children, intimate friends, romantic
love - is only one strand in the rich and complex taxonomy of love that plays a
significant role in a person's priorities. The language of everyday speech is
revealing: "Abe loves going fishing with his brother," "Sam died in the service of
the country he loved," "Laura loved the old home-place," "Arthur loved the

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 348 A. Rorty

Tintorettos in
of love varies
loves like the l
(preserving e
distinctive obje
they resemb
attentiveness.13
Abe's love of m
concerns: his e
tastes are chan
falters, his sen
or cause has a
understanding
whether thes
commitment, o
play in the ent
structure and d
examination of
Just as Abe's
objective condi
critical reflect
or political dis
classical music? How should it raise funds? Such reflections affect the details of his
work: it will affect his relation to his colleagues, to the station's financial supporters.
(Similarly Ella's love of singing opera commits her into critical reflection about
how to interpret her role as Brünnhilde: does she represent a benign or malignant
force? Is Wagner using the opera to make a political point? As she interprets the
role, her singing - and perhaps even her voice - changes. Reflecting on the details
of her role, her understanding of - and her relation to - the opera change. Her sense
of the integrity of Opera - and to its cultural and moral impact-change as well.)

12 I am grateful to Bill Ruddick for this example and to Berislav Marusic for objecting that love of causes
and country, activities and professions do not carry the same kind of care and concern of personal love. It
is true, Arthur does not move to Venice or undertake to become a professional art conservationist. But his
love does not just consist in a passing elation during a visit to Venice. For it to be an authentic love rather
than generalized elation, it must be expressed, (as it might be) by his contributing to the Save Venice
Fund and organizing a campaign to prevent the Scuola di san Rocco from selling "The Raising of
Lazarus" to Donald Trump for his private collection. Less dramatically and more subtly, Arthur's love of
Tintoretto would be expressed by changes in his perceptual range, by his increased sensitivity to the
dramas of light and shadows, by his doing some research on Tintoretto's palette and studio.
13 Because I do not understand them, I have omitted two significant directions of love: the love of
God (and God's love of Mankind) described by Augustine (1950, 2002) and the love of Humanity
described by Kant (1996). Augustine thinks the ability to recognize and fulfill the obligation to love
God is itself a gift of grace; Kant believes that fulfilling the duties of the love of Humanity falls to the
rational will.

14 I am grateful to Avner Baz for pointing out that "a commitment to [one's] job is a part of a
commitment to [oneself], while a commitment to one's partner is a commitment to her/him." It's true that
Abe's commitment to Ella is focused on her, rather than on himself as a media consultant, still his
commitment to Ella is an essential part of his self-understanding, to himself-as-loving-Ella.

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 The Burdens of Love 349

Being actively engaged

contextualized deliberation about how best to fulfill - and sometimes to revise - its
aims. (I shall return to the re visionary work of love in Sect. 5.)
In loving both Ella and working at NPR, Abe is impelled to yet another level of
critical reflection, one that goes beyond attempting to understand and serve what
best promotes their respective thriving. Loving Ella does not automatically make his
commitment to her happiness his dominant concern, any more than loving his job
makes its demands over-ride his other primary commitments. The fact that their
relative claims on him fluctuate - that their needs for his attention vary - makes his
reflections on his priorities even more complex. Abe's many commitments - his
many loves - stand in a continuous dynamic relation to one another within the entire
configurations of his primary-identity defining interests. Richard Lovelace has his
lover say to his beloved Lucasta as he goes off to war:

True, a new mistress now I chase,

The first foe in the field;
And with a stronger faith embrace
A sword, a horse, a shield.

Yet this inconstancy is such

As thou too shalt adore;
I would not love thee half so much,
Loved I not Honour more.

Faced by a similar choice, E.M. Forster expresses a very different sentiment. "If I
had to choose between betraying my country and betraying my friend, I hope I
should have the gut to betray my country."
The work of love extends beyond that engaged in each individual love: it
involves maintaining the dynamic equilibrium and harmony among the competing
demands of multiple loves. Besides the internal good works that each of Abe's loves
mandate, there is the work of balancing his active engagement among them. In
loving, Ella, music and his work at NPR, Abe is - whether or not he is fully
consciously aware of it - continuously actively assessing and reassessing the
priorities whose satisfaction constitutes his happiness. Since he wants the genuine
objective flourishing of all that he loves, he is effectively trying to determine - and
successfully integrate - their relative importance within a fulfilled eudaimon life.
Because Abe's priorities shift contextually with the contingent concerns of his
loves, the work of prioritizing is never done. Although it is unlikely to be finally
resolved by a careful study of the connection between the Symposium and the
Republic, it is nevertheless a philosophic inquiry into the conditions for eudaimonia,
as it were right on the ground, at a grass level.
Even with the most reflective and sensitive good will, even when their interests
are harmonious and they deliberate well together, Abe and Ella's love may strain
under the weight of its care and concern. The most finely adjusted love can falter if
Ella's singing career takes her Bayreuth for 2 years, or if Abe undertakes the care of
his beloved crack-crazed schizophrenic brother, or if their political loyalties change
radically. That is just on the personal side. The dramas of personal relationships - of

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 350 A. Rorty

marriage, frien
scenarios profo
might be affec
degree of surv
individual achi
may heighten a
detailed work o
beyond lovers'
best expression
Suppose Abe an
their differenc
engage Ella in
eudaimonia. At
to improvise w
Exploring and
they may be p
indifferent to
unrequited love
sometimes it c
But as long as h
Sometimes th
overwhelming
Ella's happiness
His own primar
to Ella's needs
continue to lov
can then becom
work for NPR:
station, for ex
concern for pu
attempting to
commitments.
into mutual dis
impervious to t
dramas of trag

5 The Politics of Love

"Philosophers have interpreted love in various ways; the point, however, is for
us to try to bring it about." Andrea Miranda, "A Social History of Love"

As I have told Abe's story so far, it might seem that there is a determinate fact o
the matter about what would best conduce to Ella's eudaimonia; and that in loving
her, Abe is committed to understanding the conditions of her happiness and helpin
her to achieve them. But besides being more mundane and domestic, besid

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The Burdens of Love 35 1

remaining relatively co
in its improvisatory dr
object of his love is e
ramified and dynamic,
becomes a poet or legis
instance, a philosophic
a political activist. By c
to construct as well as
discover and adhere t
pattern; they themselv
process of unexpected
Ella's eudaimonia are,
must for instance be m
integrating their intere
life, they continue to
satisfaction constitutes
at the Met, her love of
folk or rap. If they ha
programming, Ella wou
of the Holy Cross. The
change. The adaptive
further determine the
As we cannot choose
loving wisely and well.
by his early experience
affected by the luck o
learns the nuances of h
expression of love from
literature as they repre
in which love is expres
him whether and when
tactful silence or distan
Prone to imitation and
models of the expressi
Someone like Abe can,
appropriateness of co
moral norms; he can re
political and economic
with luck, he can ref
generally, he can revalu
in his political and c
consumer economy aff

15 I am grateful to Richard S
cit. and Benjamin Bagley (2
16 See Held (2006), Haslang

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 352 A. Rorty

helpful coopera
marriage, inh
stereotypical r
His being activ
love for Ella... and of his culture.
But we must be careful not to claim too much for love; it does not exhaust the
entire scope of active concern. After all, Abe and Ella have commitments to the care
and well-being of people and causes they do not love. As a dutiful nephew, Abe
undertakes the care of his curmudgeon uncle whose politics and way of life he
despises. As a good citizen Ella is actively concerned about the conditions of the
parks and schools for which she has no particular attachment or affection. They will
do their best to fulfill their obligations because they take it as their duty to do so, like
it or not. As a lover, Abe acts on behalf of Ella's well-being for her sake; for him,
the concerns of love are not a self-imposed moral duty. Like it or not, he acts on her
behalf even when doing so imposes a burden on him, and he does so, as an
expression of his love rather than as a duty imposed by civic concern or
commitment. Abe may continue to be committed to Ella's care and well-being out
of duty even though he has ceased to love her. Ironically, he may be even more self-
exacting and attentive in caring for her out of duty than he was when he loved her.

6 On the Other Hand: Summary Conclusion

One the one hand, I have implied that love is virtually ubiquitous, encompassing
love of professions, places and activities as well as friends and family. On the other
hand, I seem to have made the conditions for its attribution hopelessly stringent,
arguing that love demands challenging care and work. In short, I have tried to show
that we love widely, but rarely wisely and well. I have suggested that certain kinds
of cultural models of love - those presented in highly competitive societies focused
on individual achievement, for instance - may make the work of love difficult. It
might seem that in developing the implications of our authorities' characterization
of love, I have not only idealized its commitments, but also made its work seem so
onerous as to make it appear undesirable.17 After all good-enough love is good
enough: it can be supportive without being self-denying; it can be companionable
without becoming all-encompassing; it can be constructive without being commit-
ted to philosophically based social criticism. Certainly the celebrations of love are
well founded: love brings joy and delight in the reality of another person (a place, an
institution, profession); lovers can be strengthened and enabled, enlarged and
enhanced by their love. For all of that, the upbeat features of love largely depend on
the contingent and continuing mutual compatibility of the lovers, on the luck of the
harmony of their respective modes of thriving in their social-cultural-economic
contexts. The eulogies of love may be so elevated, its commitments so idealized
precisely because its tasks are so difficult.

17 I am grateful to Richard Schmitt and to Robert Frederick for raising this concern.

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 The Burdens of Love 353

If Kant and Frankfu

distinguished from fa
and detailed care and
conditions for the thr
institution or environ
sometimes revising it
reflection need not t
although it is norma
negotiations of daily
significance. Love is n
when it is well and
eudaimonia. The intrin
distorted expressions.
lived, as well as a guid
after all, on key, an
eudaimonia is among i

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18 I am grateful to MindaRa
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