NEG BLOCKS TO DO LIST

AT: RUSSIAN ATTACK (MOST COMMON ONES)

AT.1: FORCES

AT.2: NUKE

AT.3: PROPAGANDA

AT.4: ETHNICS

AT.5: CYBER

AT: BALTIC SECURITY (LESS IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS)

AT.1: TRADE AND FDI

AT.2: ENERGY

AT.3: DEMOCRACY

AT.4: EU

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
FRONTLINE: *Georgia

*Ukraine

*Crimea

*Air

*Land

EXTRA CARDS
BRIEF REBUT: *CCP

*Bioweapons

*Whaling

*Weak Putin

*Arctic War

*Russian Interest

*A2/AD

*Kidnapping and spying

*NATO fundings
 CATEGORY I: RUSSIAN ATTACKS

Brief Thoughts: Overall, it is next to impossible to deny the real threats of Russia. Instead, I think we
should focus on FIVE main strategies:

1. Baltic is capable of self-defending against Russia (Pretty hard to argue this way honestly,
Baltic’s military forces are among the worst in Europe)
2. Russia has no interest (A regressive method, but will work)
3. NATO forces escalates, meaning that Russia will revenge tens fold (Common scheme for many
debaters)
4. NATO forces impend Baltic military growth/development (Better without NATO, but it is also
hard to argue since opponents could simply link turn our argument)
5. NATO is already losing interest withdrawing large amounts of troops from Baltics, why bother?
(Pretty rare, but heard some US debaters saying that)
 AT: RUSSIAN FORCES✔
我写了挺多 response 的，我觉得我们比赛挑部分好的说就好

They say that Russian invasion will defeat the Baltic troops…

1. First response, a quiet and unexpected attack from Russia is impossible. Our GERMAN
COUNCIL card tells u that Russia must have enough troops in order to invade, but they must
make their troops trespass Belarus’s territory before attacking, meaning that the Baltic
military can know the Russian invasion up to multiple weeks ahead, making it almost
impossible to have enough equipment to strike the Baltics. (Must trespass Belarus)

2. Second response, we deny. Russia is not going to attack directly with forces.

Two perspectives

Baltic forces are strong enough to pose a deterrence. Currently, Deveraux 21 shows that
the existing most advanced Artillery and rocket forces is already able currently to keep ALL
Russian infantries out. There is simply no need to deploy more of NATO troops. There is
enough time for any rocket defense system to react upon, so Russian troops will be
demolished once they entered the boarder. (ROCKET ELIMINATING THREAT)

LOGIC: Their 60 hours evidence is from the RAND’s 2016 report, where the Baltics are
still undeveloped with their militaries because OF NATO INTERFERENCE. But now is a
completely different case, since all three countries have their independent armies
now.  Mr Navys reckons that the defensive efforts of the Baltic states have multiplied
tenfold since that period. That was when Russia seized Crimea and, in Ukraine’s east,
set off separatist fighting that continues today. It is capable dragging and slowing a
Russia invasion for NATO reinforcements.

A. Russian won’t attack any NATO nations because attacking one member would mean
attacking all NATO members at once. The NATO doctrine shows that within hours, all the 30
NATO nations would respond. Russia doesn’t stand a chance since remember, the NATO has
three times the size of Russian military in Europe, and more equipped with both nukes
and missiles. (Russia won’t be that stupid-Attacking Baltics=Attacking US air& naval
bases=high chance of declaring war with US)

3.Third response, we turn the argument against them. The forces will only aggravate the Russian
attack. For example, in 2014, where NATO adds Poland and Baltic troops, Russia responded by adding
50,000 more newly trained Guards to the front, deterring possible NATO attacks. KOFMAN military
expert shows that this means that when NATO stack their military, Russia simply adds the border force
tenfold. As we already seen in Georgia and Ukraine, the dramatic increase of western actions and
intervention unprecedently caused the dramatic revenge coming from Russia.
 Furthermore/instead, we should break the mold. What they are merely telling us is that
the US and NATO should have COMPLETE control over the area.

But when Russia relies on the Baltic Sea for 60% of their marine export goods, it means
that they need to use it also. Rather than earning complete dominance over the region,
isn’t it better for all countries to corporate in peaceful actions that can benefit all
nations at once. What their side is saying, judge, is to substantially increase ALL
military unites, but such a big act is going to build up tension and Russia will and will
respond hard. Our side certainly don’t want a military race to happen. (NO MILITARY
RACE)

4.Final response. Even if war will be starting in the future, we simply don’t need that many forces to
defend. According to Deveraux 21, NATO itself says that we only need less than 5000 NATO soldiers to
protect the three states in the earlier stages of the war, in other words, we need far less soldiers than
the seven brigades that NATO is deploying. Thus, there is simply no necessity of deploying that many
idle military forces. (Don’t need that many soldiers)

6. Extra Impact turn: NATO is currently cutting their military frontline in the Baltics because it is
perceived that the Baltics is no longer important to both NATO and Russia. Contrary to
common believes, according to the Forbes, NATO already dismissed/withdrawal ten thousand
soldiers in the region. Since the Baltics is no longer worth attacking for the Russians. According
to CATO 16, invading the Baltics could cost Russia billions of dollars just in military costs, but
conquering the Baltic states can generate little or no economical and geological benefits for
the Russians.
For instance, in Ukraine, a pro-American member nation under attack by Russia, America not only
has not supported the Ukraine side in large scales, but it also withdraws the $400 million dollars aid
for the Ukraine military because President Biden perceives that such an act is no longer necessary
for the losing side. In other words, there is literally no chance that America and its western allies are
going to respond hard or revenge for the Balts.

Even vanquishing the entire Baltic serves no advantages for the Russians, since the allies could take
back the region within days. The Russian administration Office itself mentioned in a 2020 conference
that it pays more attention to Ukraine rather than the Baltic region. So, the Baltic has less importance
overall in the entire picture. (NO NEED)

6. Extra Impact turn: Even if war is starting, NATO can’t help. Rand Organization shows that the NATO
troops stationed in the Baltics takes more than 10 days just to assemble and react upon a Russian
attack. It doesn’t matter how many soldiers we sent there in the name of NATO, because the more
NATO troops there are, the more convoluted and disorganized it is. (NATO troops are loose and
unorganized)

Small extension: Finally…We should also consider about Baltic economy and consider
whether our act of threatening Russia with led to trade embargo. For instance, 20% of
 all imports and exports of the Baltics are with the Russians and the Belarusians,
meaning that the Baltic economy can be under deep recession. (Economic Embargo)
Battle of Lexington – who shot first and started the revolutionary war? Historians don’t know, but one
soldier = explosion of conflict

In the 21st century, we may have better communication abilities, but this means
domestic political pressure is incredible = further brinksmanship and escalation
STRUCTUARL UNSTABLE SITUATION makes war/conflict far more likely
CARDS

Their conclusion illustrates the folly years ago of treating NATO as a social club and inducting new
members which were irrelevant to the continent’s security and possessed minimal military
capabilities. Now the alliance realizes that it is obligated to war against nuclear‐armed Russia on behalf of essentially
indefensible countries. Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from
doing much for their own defense. Last year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14
percent, respectively, of GDP to the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the
official NATO standard. Yet the surging fear over Russian adventurism is misplaced. Vladimir Putin’s behavior is bad, but
poses little threat to America, “old” Europe, or even most of Russia’s neighbors.

https://www.cato.org/blog/russia-wont-attack-baltic-states

Although a significant conflict between NATO and Russia is unlikely, a war of limited aims remains a
distinct and dangerous possibility — and in almost any scenario in this context, the conflict will center
on the Baltic states. The RAND Corporation’s 2016 report on the Baltic scenario highlighted the region’s vulnerability, concluding that within
60 hours, Russia could seize enough terrain to “demonstrate NATO’s inability to protect its most vulnerable members and divide the alliance.”
While this grave prediction that Russia could overrun the Baltics in under three days has created
controversy and driven change within the alliance, it is no longer a valid conclusion, and rocket
artillery is the reason why. Rocket-artillery systems are vital to the Baltic defense plan because their
mobility allows the alliance to deploy a long-range precision capability across the theater and
prosecute vital targets such as Russia’s area-denial equipment, through a process known as a rapid
infiltration. This mission revolves around a C-130 or larger aircraft — preferably one capable of landing on an austere runway — transporting the
artillery launchers that subsequently execute long-range precision missions within 10 to 15 minutes of the aircraft landing. After completing the fire
missions, the crew can subsequently drive the launchers to follow-on operations or load back on the aircraft to reposition out of the potentially hostile
territory. This
unique raid provides the alliance a mobile asset capable of neutralizing Russian air defense
systems and facilitating NATO freedom of movement.

[…]
 He went on to note that “it creates an unpredictable advantage to move an army (rocket) system forward quickly.” Some of the new
Romanian and Polish launchers can train to conduct a similar mission at the alliance level to capitalize on this capability and assist
However, to truly leverage this capability as an alliance asset, the
the Baltic region’s rapid reinforcement.
United States, Poland, and Romania should all identify a rocket-artillery platoon to incorporate into
the already established NATO response force on a rotational basis.
[…]
In response to a potential Russian invasion of the Baltics, NATO created the Enhanced Forward Presence at
the 2016 Warsaw Summit, positioning combat power along the eastern border to deter a
conventional attack. Following the structure of RAND’s recommendations, though reducing the recommended size, this
rotational force positions multi-national mechanized units in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland . However, these four
battlegroups — roughly 1,100 to 1,400 troops each — are a dramatically smaller force than the seven
brigades that RAND concluded were necessary. NATO implemented the program in 2017, and
according to the Warsaw Summit official communique, they designed it to demonstrate the “[a]llies’
solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate [a]llied response to any
aggression.” The battlegroups combined have over 5,000 troops total, creating a large reinforcement
contingent just outside the Russian border. 

https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/rocket-artillery-can-keep-russia-out-of-the-
baltics/

Although validated by the three states, the agreement not to buy energy produced at the Belarusian NPP is essentially a token measure,
declarative in its nature.35 The parties did not outline any means through which they would implement the decision. According to Lithuania’s
energy minister Dainius Kreivys, as of early March 2021 the electrical energy trade volume between Latvia and Russia had tripled since the
launch of the Belarusian NPP,36 which
means the energy produced at the plant quite possibly reaches the
Baltic market and may be sold to Lithuanian companies. Should this trend continue, the total value of
electrical energy annually reaching the Lithuanian market of at least partially Belarusian production
could amount to 120 million euros.

[…]
With 1.377 billion dollars, trade volume at year-end 2020 was down by only 67 million dollars as
compared to 2019.38 Both exports and imports remained at levels comparable to the year before. The
first months of 2021 even demonstrated growth with trade volume rising to 120.3% in January-
February as compared to the same period of the previous year.39

http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ukraine/18025-20210623.pdf

Notwithstanding the above analysis, Belarus has been a close military ally of Russia ever since
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although the early 1990s saw was brief period when
neutrality was considered as a future security policy option, from 1994 on President
Lukashenko re-oriented Minsk to a pro-Russian security and defense policy course. Belarus
military doctrine explicitly names military cooperation with Russia as the primary guarantor of
the security and defense of the country. Military cooperation between the two countries has
been close ever since 1991. Russia is the main supplier of the military industry of Belarus, and its main market.
Conversely, Belarus produces a number of weapons components which Russia cannot manufacture alone. In addition,
Russia provides general staff level military education for the Belarusian military, since Minsk lacks the necessary
capabilities. Annually, more than 400 Belarusian officers study at Russian military higher education institutions, and
military-to-military ties are traditionally cordial. Russia has two pieces of crucial military infrastructure (voenniy obyekt) on
Belarusian soil:: a long-range radar, and a naval signal transmission station used to communicate with Russia’s
submarines. For several years, Moscow has been pushing Minsk to host a Russian military base (voennaya baza);
 however, the project was so far not realized due to the reluctance of the Belarusian leadership to
permanently base Russian fighting forces in the country. Nevertheless, Russia’s air forces are allowed to use
the military airports in Belarus; the only restriction being that they are not authorized to spend more than 24
hours on Belarusian territory. However, it is telling that when plans were made public for the
“Fort Trump” base in Poland, i.e. the ongoing deployment of a fully-fledged U.S. army division,
Belarusian officials were quick to emphasize that Belarus would need to reconsider its earlier
position on not hosting a Russian military base. On the contrary, it is safe to assume that
Russian forces would move into Belarusian territory and use it for its own strategic,
operational and tactical purposes, particularly moving in the direction of Kaliningrad. It is also
realistic to expect that the dominant majority of Belarusian forces would actively cooperate
with Russian forces, particularly in coordinating their operations with the use of Russian A2AD
assets. In addition to all this, Moscow may well try to use the weakened positions of the Lukashenko regime after August
2020 to again bring up the question of a permanent Russian military base in Belarus. The next strategic military exercise
of the Zapad series will take place in the autumn of 2021. The initial outline of the exercise has already been discussed by
the Russian and Belarussian ministries of defense. Details of the Zapad-2021 exercise will probably reveal the extent to
which Belaruscan manage to preserve its sovereignty in terms of military security, and also the
role Belarus might play in Russia’s military planning in case of a hypothetical NATO-Russia
confrontation in the Baltic region.

https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/russias-strategic-interests-and-actions-
baltic-region#2.2

No one believes the Baltic states are capable of defeating their large neighbor in a full‐scale war. But if they truly
believe themselves to be at risk they should spend sacrificially to create a military capable of inflicting substantial pain
on any invader. Being ill‐prepared militarily is the most important invitation to a Russian attack. Yet the surging
fear over Russian adventurism distorts Moscow’s interests and ambitions. Vladimir Putin is a nasty
fellow, brutal at home and abroad. However, he seems to well represent much of his country’s power elite and public.
There is little apparent support for Western‐style liberalism. Oust Putin and “le deluge” to follow would not likely be
pretty. Putin’s behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, “old” Europe or even most of Russia’s neighbors. He
is behaving like a traditional Tsar, not a reincarnated Joseph Stalin or Adolf Hitler. He has taken Moscow back to the
His government is not interested in an ideological crusade and
Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union.
sees no inherent conflict with the West. Rather, Moscow demands respect for its status,
 protection of Russia’s borders and consideration of its interests. In pursuing these ends Putin
is practical and measured, if perhaps imprudent and myopic—and, of course, dismissive of the
cost to others. Mikhail Saakashvili’s Georgia was actively anti‐Russian, pursued close ties with America and
sought membership in NATO—all certain to antagonize Moscow. Abkhazia and South Ossetia
had resisted Georgian control in the past, giving Russia an easy means to weaken Tbilisi and
pay back NATO over the latter’s dismemberment of Serbia, with historic ties to Moscow.
(Russia’s defense of Belgrade helped turn an assassination into World War I.) Ukraine always mattered more
to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval
base of Sebastopol. […] Shalapak and Johnson dismissed the cost, estimated at around $2.7
billion, but more commitments require more force structure, and that burden almost certainly
would fall upon America rather than the Europeans.
https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-baltics

—3.4 million NATO active military personnel versus roughly 800,000 active Russian military personnel.

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1800/RR1879/R
AND_RR1879.pdf

The quickest-responding NATO heavy armor force would likely be a U.S. combined arms battalion, the
personnel for which would fly in and mate up with the prepositioned equipment of the European
Activity Set stored in Grafenwoehr, Germany. 14 Getting this unit into the fight is a complicated process that will not be
instantaneous. Breaking out the equipment—24 M-1 main battle tanks, 30 M-2 infantry fighting vehicles, assorted support vehicles—
preparing it for movement, transporting it by rail across Poland, offloading it, and roadmarching it
forward into the battle area are unlikely to take less than a week to 10 days. The annual operating and
support costs for three ABCTs plus enabling units—the price tag to own and operate the units—are
roughly $2.7 billion.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html

but apparently only had 10 days’ notice to

Paradoxically, according to RAND’s wargame, Russia planned to seize the Baltics,

organize its own invasion. As a consequence, the Russian army was only able to bring a total of 27
battalions (22 from the Western Military District) to this epic battle with NATO, and that total includes units
already stationed in Kaliningrad. Between February and April 2014, the Russian General Staff demonstrated its
competence in  deploying a force of roughly 40,000 to 50,000 on Ukraine’s borders and dispersing it
over the course of several weeks. There are lessons to be learned from the Russian war in Ukraine, but we should take great care in
extrapolating them to a hypothetical high-end fight in the Baltics between Russia and NATO. In contrast to Ukraine, it is unlikely that Russia

would invade NATO as a response to an unexpected contingency with little more than an ad hoc grouping of battalion tactical groups. It is
equally unlikely that an ad hoc grouping of Russian battalions — the army RAND built — would easily invade and occupy the Baltics, which have been
working quite hard on conscription and mobilization to make themselves difficult to digest in such a scenario.

https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-
learned-to-stop-worrying-and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/

The tip was sent by a city tech worker: a single person could, in one fell swoop,
disable almost every traffic light in Vilnius, Lithuania’s capital. It proved true,
says Aurimas Navys, a former officer at Lithuania’s State Security Department. Mr Navys, who
had received the tip despite his recent retirement, made sure the vulnerability
was fixed. Lithuania and the other Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia,
all nato members, are scrambling, he says, to identify such weaknesses and the
individuals who might exploit them on behalf of Russia. Mr Navys reckons that the
defensive efforts of the Baltic states have multiplied tenfold since 2014. That was when Russia seized
Crimea and, in Ukraine’s east, set off separatist fighting that continues today.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2019/08/01/how-the-baltic-states-spot-the-
kremlins-agents
 AT: NUKE/MISSILE✔
They say that the threat of a full nuke/missile war would mean that NATO have to deploy defense
systems in the Baltics…
前三个 response 整合到一起 

1. Increasing NATO missile deployment is largely unnecessary. The Baltics already has enough missiles. And
the Russian Rocket Army said that NATO’s current deployment of Missiles in the Baltics posed a
threat to Russia, since Baltic missiles could reach Moscow within 3-4 minutes and Russia has no
way currently of intercepting it. So, Russia is already willing to negotiate and demolish nuclear
sites on its Western border.
2. Turn. More missiles would be dangerous. Russian Rocket Army said that if NATO proceeds with its
Missiles Deployment, Russia will do WHATEVER is possible to defend its border. This is true as
Luisa Rodriguez 19 found that, if the Baltics increase their missile storage, Russia will increase ITS
OWN storage 10 fold. The consequence is disastrous as Rod 19 shows that Russia proliferation
makes the chance of having a nuke war triple.
Plus, the detonation of a Russian warhead in the Baltic region will 100% result in a fallout
inside the Russian territory. The Baltic is dangerously close to the Russians that any means of
attacking with missiles or nukes would mean a high radioactive fallout as far as in Moscow and
Tula. In other words, the Russians are being severely harmed in this case by their own missiles.
(Russian won’t attack the Baltic)

1. Third response. Even if war break out, anti-missiles system can be established with in a range
of area to protect the Baltics rather than directly in the Baltic states. NATO don’t have to
deploy the missiles in front of Russia, where the missile bases can be easily undermined by the
Russians. Instead, NATO can fire the missiles from the submarines in the Baltic public sea or
even in Poland or Germany. America, for instance, already built 20 nuclear bombers in Poland,
and it is enough to scare off Russian invasions in the first place. We simply don’t have to build
nuclear bases INSIDE the Baltic. (NUKES OUTSIDE)

2. Final response. We link turn. NATO missiles are useless in deterring or protecting the Baltic
regions, it has no use overall to the defense system because of the geographical and
technological disadvantages of the Baltics. Developing Ballistic Missiles are costly, and even
deploying infantry is more preferable than deploying missiles in this case. Thus, using NATO to
defend the Baltic from Russian nukes or missile attacks is irrational and ludicrous. (USELESS)

3. Conclusion: Now think about this, why should Russia waste metallics or nukes in Baltics in the
first place? Shifrinson 17 shows you that the Baltics is one of the least developed areas, with the
no.1 least importance in NATO as a whole, crude geographic features, and literally no major
energy sources available.
CARDS

But the people who were affected by the blast itself will not be worrying about the fallout just yet. A 1
megaton nuclear bomb creates a firestorm that can cover 100 square miles. A 20 megaton blast's
firestorm can cover nearly 2500 square miles.

https://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/no_nukes/tenw/nuke_war.htm

Each guided rocket is equipped with a 200-pound warhead and can travel over 70 kilometers, and the
precision Army Tactical Missile is tipped with a 500-pound warhead that can travel up to 300
kilometers. While the 2020 exercise was officially designed to test the unit’s readiness and build interoperability within NATO, it
also conveyed some strategic messages, as the live fire took place within 70 miles of the Russian border.
Recognizing the strategic implications of these weapon systems, a spokesperson for the Russian Federation called the
activity “provocative and extremely dangerous for regional stability.” He went on to ask rhetorically, “Who is actually fueling tensions
in Europe?”

https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/rocket-artillery-can-keep-russia-out-of-the-
baltics/

Where h(t) is the hazard rate, t is time, and PO + xiBx are the estimated coefficients and variables. P is a shape parameter estimated from the
data: when p equals 1, the baseline hazard is constant over time; if p is less than 1, it decreases monotonically; and if p is greater than 1, hazard
increases with time at risk. Because survival models are nonlinear, interpretation of coefficients is not straightforward. Unlike those in standard
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models, the beta coefficients do not represent the marginal effect on the dependent variable of a one-
unit change in the independent variable. To ease interpretation, we estimate the models in both standard and log relative-hazard forms; in the
latter case, the coefficient can be read as the number by which we would multiply the odds of, for
example, the initiation of a
nuclear weapons program for a one-unit increase in the independent variable. For example, a
coefficient of 4 on the enduring rivalry dummy variable would imply a 300% increase in the likelihood
of starting a nuclear weapons program (in other words, the chance is four times as great). In
interpreting results, we present the standard coefficients and their standard errors in main tables but
discuss these relative risks in the text to ease interpretation of the substantive meaning of the
findings. Thus, although we have broken new ground in bringing state-ofthe-art statistical methods
and new data to bear on proliferation research, we have just opened the toolbox: exploring
interactions, conditional relationships, and two-way transition models are additional tools that must
be brought out of the box in the future.

https://sci-hub.se/https://www.jstor.org/stable/4149798
 The U.S. Air Force maintains 20 B61 nuclear gravity bombs at Buchel Air Base in Germany (as
well as B61 bombs on the territory of four other NATO members). Kept under U.S. custody,
the bombs could, with proper authorization in a conflict, be made available for delivery by
German Tornado fighter-bombers. This is part of NATO’s “nuclear sharing” arrangements. The Tornados are aging,
and the German Ministry of Defense is considering purchasing F-18 aircraft to continue the
German Air Force’s nuclear delivery capability. That has reopened debate within Germany about the presence of
U.S. nuclear arms there, with Social Democratic Party (SPD) parliamentary leader Rolf Mützenich calling for their removal.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/05/18/us-nukes-in-poland-
are-a-truly-bad-idea/

On February 7, a Russian news agency TASS quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov who said that Russian diplomats and
servicemen would do everything to prevent the deployment of the USA’s missiles in the Baltic states. Ryabkov
warned that such a consequence of the USA’s exit from INF (deployment of the medium-range weapons in the
Baltic states) might disturb peace in Europe for many decades. Earlier, the same agency quoted Gen. Viktor Yesin,
advisor of the Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (land-based nuclear arsenal), former commander of this formation of
the Russian Federation. Yesin said that if Americans deployed medium-range ballistic missiles in the Baltic states, they
would be able to reach Moscow in three to four minutes. General claims that the location of American missiles in the
easternmost NATO states is already decided. He does not eliminate the possibility of deploying Tomahawk cruise missiles
instead of ballistic missiles – these, according to the general, would reach Moscow in an hour.

https://warsawinstitute.org/tomahawks-baltic-states-russia-making-fuss/

The LRSO, not yet developed, could pay for 10 years of real-world protection of the Baltic States. Instead, the report concludes that a
NATO force of about seven brigades, including three heavy armored brigades – adequately supported by airpower, land-based fires, and other enablers on
the ground and ready to fight at the onset of hostilities – might prevent such an outcome. NATO has already created a conventional Spearhead Force
brigade of about 5,000 troops. Seven brigades of that size would include about 35,000 troops. Creating and maintaining such a force, RAND estimates,
might cost on the order of $2.7 billion per year. Put in perspective, the
$30 billion the Pentagon plans to spend on a new
nuclear air-launched cruise missile (LRSO) that is not needed could buy NATO more a decade
worth of real protection of the Baltic States. The central nuclear observation of the report is that NATO nuclear forces do
not have much credibility in protecting the Baltic States against a Russian attack . That conclusion is, to
say the least, interesting given the extent to which some analysts and former/current officials have been arguing that NATO/US need to have more/better
limited regional nuclear options to counter Russia in Europe. The report is very timely because the NATO Summit in Warsaw in six months will decide
on additional responses to Russian aggression. Unfortunately, some of the decisions might increase the role or
readiness of nuclear weapons in Europe.

https://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/02/nato-nukes-rand/

My previous posts address how bad a nuclear war is likely to be, conditional on there being a nuclear war (see this post on the deaths caused directly by a US-Russia
nuclear exchange, and this post on the deaths caused by a nuclear famine), but they don’t consider the likelihood that we actually see a US-Russia nuclear exchange
unfold in the first place. In this post, I
get a rough sense of how probable a nuclear war might be by looking at
historical evidence, the views of experts, and predictions made by forecasters. I find that, if we
aggregate those perspectives, there’s about a 1.1% chance of nuclear war each year, and that the chances of a nuclear war
between the US and Russia, in particular, are around 0.38% per year.
Luisa Rodriguez 19, research fellow at the Forethought Foundation for Global Priorities Research, M.A.
from The Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University, “How likely is a nuclear
exchange between the US and Russia?”,
https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/PAYa6on5gJKwAywrF/how-likely-is-a-nuclear-exchange-
between-the-us-and-russia

(Alliances function when states decide that their mutual preservation adds to each side’s national security and can be attained at a cost
proportional to the benefit. For better or worse, NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement altered this equation by notionally committing the
United States to defend a host of states in Eastern Europe of questionable
relevance to U.S. security. Indeed, those states most
immediately threatened by Russia—Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, followed by Poland—are among the least
important allies in crude geopolitical terms. The three Baltic states combined accounted for only 0.13 percent of
total NATO defense expenditures and 0.26 percent of NATO members’ GDP as of 2016; Poland represented 1.17 and 1.54 percent,
respectively.14 American exchange with these states is similarly limited: trade with the Baltic states as a whole came to less than $3
billion in 2015 against over $3.75 trillion in total U.S. trade.15 Baldly stated, these states could disappear without compromising
the United States’ economic security or NATO’s military viability. The questionable value of these states alone thus renders the U.S.
commitment to their defense highly contestable.16 The American public, meanwhile, seems to recognize this very dynamic at some basic
level, with 37 percent of U.S. citizens in a 2015 Pew Global Attitudes survey expressing reluctance with aiding a NATO ally threatened by
Russia.17 Political geography further compounds NATO’s problems. Not only can countries threatened by Russia be lost without
compromising NATO’s ability to defend the rest of Europe, but even an expanded Russia would be poorly placed to dominate
the continent. Belarus and Ukraine, after all, lie across any Russian advance into Central Europe, while simply retaining
control of a unified Germany affords NATO a defense-in-depth it never enjoyed during the Cold War. Add in the reality that
Russia is an economic, political, and military pygmy compared to the Soviet Union everywhere except in
the nuclear realm, and the United States’ intrinsic interest in those states most immediately threatened by Russia is substantially less than
during the Cold War.18 Simply put, unlike the situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Russian dominance over the Baltic states, Poland, and
other new(er) NATO members would not
result in the United States’ eviction from Europe and concomitant
loss of the region’s economic or military strength . )
Shifrinson 17 [Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson is an Assistant Professor of International
Affairs with the Bush School of Government at Texas A&M University, where his
research interests include international security, U.S foreign policy, and diplomatic
history. His work has appeared in International Security, Foreign Affairs, and other
policy and academic venues. “Time to Consolidate NATO?”, The Washington Quarterly
• 40:1 pp. 109–123, SPRING 2017]
 AT: PROPAGANDA/HYBRID WARFARE✔
They say that Russian influence is deeply damaging the structure of the Baltics…

1. First response, we deny. Today is nonidentical with the past. Baltic is already capable of dealing
with a Russian Information Attack. The elves system can filter/censor around 30,000 articles
daily and identify the most extreme cases of disinformation or propaganda by the Russians.
Russia publicities have no chance of entering. (CENSORSHIP)

2. Second response, but even if some Russian info do trespass the censorship, it doesn’t promote
any dramatic damages to the Baltic hinterlands. This is due to the fact that only a small
percentage of Russian Media can even enter the market in the first place. 90 percent of Baltic
content must be produced inside the EU and broadcast in other EU nations as well, so Russia,
not part of EU has few medias entered in the first place. The market is also so competitive for
Russian channels that almost none can survive in the Baltics in more than months. (SCALE TOO
SMALL)

3. Last response, even if there are certain protests caused by Russian falsification, NATO
involvement only aggregates it. Wilson Center 21 shows that this is because NATO increase
national defense or militarization against Russian misinformation increases anti-Americanism in
the area, thus resulting in uproars in the area becoming several times more severe. Thus, NATO
is simply not the remedy against Russian propagandas. (NATO DOES NO GOOD)
CARDS

Fighting disinformation attacks remains a crucial aspect of Baltic security . For example, in
late April, Lithuanian National Defense Minister Raimundas Karoblis, Lithuanian media outlets, state institutions, and addressees at the NATO headquarters in
Brussels received a falsified email from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announcing an alleged decision to withdraw NATO troops from Lithuania. In other
instances, fake news was spread about a U.S. soldier allegedly infected with the coronavirus in Lithuania, and the allegedly expressed intention of the Ministry of
National Defense not to halt international military exercises. In late May, some Russian-backed media outlets in Baltic and Eastern European countries reported false
information that the Canadian-led NATO battle group in Latvia had “a high number” of cases of the deadly virus. These instances fit into a pattern of previous
attempts seeking to discredit NATO in the eyes of the Baltic citizens, as well as seeding doubt about the Baltic countries’ full-fledged membership in the alliance.
However, Baltic
states are relatively well prepared for this kind of threat. Due to multiple previous
instances of disinformation attacks, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians have become resilient. A
number of initiatives, such as Lithuanian “elves”—volunteers who set out to combat
Russian online trolls—seek to tackle the problem. With the use of artificial intelligence tools, “the elves” can
filter around 30,000 internet articles daily and identify the most extreme cases of disinformation or
propaganda. It acts as an early warning system, swiftly identifying and responding to disinformation threats. Recently, the initiative gained
international recognition and expanded to Latvia and Estonia. Hence, the efforts of
malign actors are usually ineffective in significantly shifting the public opinion. For
instance, the population of the Baltic countries are among the most supportive of membership in the EU and NATO.

Linas 20 [Linas Kojala is the Director of the Eastern Europe Studies Centre, a think tank
in Vilnius, Lithuania, and Lecturer at the Institute of International Relations and
Political Science at Vilnius University. 2020,
https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/05/baltic-security-the-same-challenges-remain-
even-during-a-pandemic/

Since 2015, Lithuania and Latvia have utilized temporary bans on Russian media outlets that violated media laws. In most cases,
such as with RTR Planeta in Lithuania and RTR Rossiya in Latvia, the bans lasted a matter of about three months. In
2017, the Lithuanian parliament adopted a law restricting media content produced in Russia on Lithuanian television. According to
the new law,90 percent of Lithuania television content must be produced inside the EU and broadcast in
one or more of the official languages of the EU. In June 2018, the Lithuanian parliament adopted new amendments to
the Public Information Law, according to which television channels in Lithuania must translate programs into
Lithuanian if these programs are produced in Russian or other non–EU languages and broadcast for
longer than one and a half hours. The amendments are aimed at Russian television productions. In September 2015,
Estonia launched an alternative channel for Russian language news and entertainment targeting
Russian-speaking minority populations. The channel, which falls under Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR), was
designed to undercut the dominance of pro-Kremlin narratives in programming for Russian-speakers, and thereby
reduce Russia’s influence on this audience.

https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/02/defeating-disinformation-threats/

Although the likelihood of conflict between Russia and the Baltic States is low, it is still possible. There
is a risk of accidental conflict and unintended escalation primarily because of the proximity of forces
and the increased militarization of the region. Tensions have remained heightened since Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine in 2014 while Russian jets continue to engage in unsafe maneuvers near NATO ships and jets, Russian large-scale military
exercises leave cause for concern, and Russia currently lacks robust diplomatic channels with the Baltic States.
Wilson Center, August 2021,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Russia
%20%26%20Baltics%20FINAL.pdf, The Relationship Between Russia & the Baltics
 AT: ETHNICS✔
They say that the Russian identities inside the Baltic would mean more revolts/riots…

1. First response. We de-link their impact. The drawback of Russian ethnicity is only temporary
and in the short term. The Russian population in the Baltics is decreasing at a stunning rate.
Princeton University illustrates that more than 1/3 of the Russians were already gone, while 90%
of the current Russians are actually mix-blooded native Balts and Russians, and survey shows
that mix-blooded would not endure their homeland being captured by Russian armies.

2. Second response. We turn their argument. Even if there might be single/sole protests in the
past, it doesn’t convey that Baltic is threatened by Russians. In fact, the Baltic is among the
safest nations in the entire world in dealing with violence, ethnicity uprising and terrorism,
Warsaw Institution shows. Furthermore, RAND organization proclaims that 50% of the Russian
ethnics in Baltics actually hate their Russian Motherland. They are willing to condemn Russia
and even defend the Baltics against America.

This shows that the Baltic is overall secured and safe. (OVERALL SAFE)

Plus, A significant majority of the population—60 percent—is ready to participate in defense activities
if Estonia is attacked, while 90 percent of the population supports an assault back at Russia, INSS IDU
17 shows, so it means that the population there is already diverse, and so it means that the Baltic are
almost impossible to revolt or form revolutions to integrate back to Russia.

3. Third response. We turn the argument again them. Anti-NATO ism and Anti-Americanism is
much more severe comparatively. Chua 03 shows that an increase NATO and American
involvements in member countries see the violence only increasing among the ethnics after
NATO support arrives. (ANTI-AMERICANISM)
Further, people in the Baltics actually oppose further militarization – Anti-American sentiment
has increased by 5% in the past few years, and 50% of the country opposes further western
militarization because they view it as a way to spread “western propaganda.” This is a huge part
of why the UN Happiness Index shows just a few years ago the Baltic states averaged 30 th in the
world for overall happiness, but they’ve dropped to 70 th after years of increased NATO
militarization has increased political tensions in the region, and as we all know, increasing
military presence when the locals don’t want you there is a recipe for a disaster.

4. Final response. But even if there might be Russian uprisings in the future. Bandow 16
conducted a poll intimating that the majority Baltic population actually oppose Russia, and any
Russian revolts would face greater population exodus and anti-Russianize public anger. (It will
face bigger oppose from the anti-Russian side)

AT: BRONZE NIGHT RUSSIAN REVOLT

US: What happens in 2007 will not happen again in 2021! Baltics already have percussions against
Russians. They already escalated tens of thousands of Russian potential criminals, and set up security
monitoring systems throughout the nation, doubled their police forces, and have a specific procedure
against hybrid warfare. That’s why we ceased to see ethnic uprising after the 2007 bronze night event.
And that’s why the NATO doesn’t have to step in to solve ethnic problem.
CARDS

The level of threat from terrorism is low in all three Baltic nations––and so is the likelihood of a
terrorist attack. Although other European countries note higher threats levels from right-wing militants, Islamic insurgents, and
terror groups, the Baltic countries are now a little interesting target for terrorists. In their reports, security services in Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia cast a spotlight on a couple of examples where foreign-inspired political and religious extremism came to the fore,
with other powers or groups like IS. 5. The military facet of hybrid threats wholly addressed to the North Atlantic Alliance refers
notably to the Baltic nations. In
the Russian deterrence strategy, Kremlin senior officials do not resort
exclusively to dispatching troops to the Western Military District and carrying out full-scale offensive
drills[12]. Russia consequently creates perilous situations by holding Baltic Fleet war-gaming exercises right off
the coasts of other countries or by repeatedly intruding their airspace.

https://warsawinstitute.org/baltic-states-versus-russian-hybrid-threats/

The Rand researchers recommended a substantial allied military presence to deter Moscow. Shalapak and Johnson dismissed the cost, estimated at around $2.7 billion

more commitments require more force structure, and that burden almost
annually, but

certainly would fall upon America rather than the Europeans. Just like the administration’s new initiative
for Eastern Europe involving a single brigade. Their conclusion illustrates the folly years ago of treating NATO as a social club and inducting new members which
were irrelevant to the continent’s security and possessed minimal military capabilities. Now the alliance realizes that it is obligated to war against nuclear‐armed
Russia on behalf of essentially indefensible countries. Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from doing much for their own
defense. Last year Latvia and Lithuania devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn

met the official NATO standard. Yet the surging fear over Russian adventurism is misplaced. Vladimir Putin’s
behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, “old” Europe, or even most of
Russia’s neighbors. He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government demands respect for its status,
protection of Russia’s borders, and consideration of its interests. Mikhail Saakashvili’s Georgia was actively anti‐

Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO —all certain to
antagonize Moscow. Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for

historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol . Putin acted only after
Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against the elected president
who leaned toward Russia. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with
U.S. interventions. Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia’s tender mercies. Seizing
the Baltic states likely
would generate substantial popular resistance. Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics
pose no potential threat to Russia. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant,
demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia . They prefer cultural connection to
political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics
deployed against Ukraine. So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non‐ethnic Russian population. A
possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short‐lived victory over the West. As I argue in National Interest: “The costs would be far

greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and trigger economic collapse.
Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might
leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come .” Worse, Moscow certainly
would rupture economic and political relations with the U.S. and Europe and
probably start a losing conventional war with NATO. Even more frightening would be the prospect of a nuclear
conflict. The U.S. should stop making defense promises which serve the interests of
other nations rather than America. The Europeans should prepare their own
defense.
Bandow 16 [Bandow, Doug. 02-10-2016, “Russia Won’t Attack the Baltic States,” CATO
Institution, https://www.cato.org/blog/russia-wont-attack-baltic-states]

A characteristic feature of the ethnogeography development after regained independence is the decrease of the population (depopulation) both the titular
ethnicities and minorities. The total number of populations in the Baltics decreased from 7.9 million in 1990 to 6.4 in 2011, or by 19%. Thus, the Baltic States have
one of the highest population loss indicators in the world. According to the 1989 and 2011 censuses, the population of three titular ethnos has decreased from to
5.3 million to 4.8 million, or by 10% but the population of different minorities has decreased more substantially (by 37%). At the beginning of 2013, in the Baltics
lived 2.7 million ethnic Lithuanians, 1.2 million ethnic Latvians and about 900 thousand ethnic Estonians. The share of population for minorities which formed one
-third of total population in the Baltics in 1989 has decreased to one - fourth with
a clear tendency to further drop. Thus, the
population in every Baltic State has become less diverse. The referendum took place on February 18, 2012 and ¾ voted
against making Russian the official state language.Their total number within intercensuses period
(1989 -2011) decreased by one-third (almost by 660,000) and during the first decade of this century-by
one-fifth (by about 200,000).

https://epc2014.princeton.edu/papers/140364

When democratic reforms give voice to this previously silenced majority, opportunistic
demagogues can swiftly marshal majoritarian animosity into powerful ethnonationalist
movements that can subvert both markets and democracy. That’s what happened in
Indonesia and is happening around the world. The same dynamic–in which markets and
democracy pit a poor, frustrated majority against a rich outsider minority–has produced
retaliation, violence, and even mass slaughter of market-dominant minorities, from Croats in the
former Yugoslavia to Ibo in Nigeria.
Amy Chua is a professor of law at Yale University in New Haven,
Connecticut, and Business Review; Aug2003, Vol. 81 Issue 8, p14, 3p, 1c

Russian citizens (6.8 percent of the total population of Estonia and 2.1 percent in Latvia in 2015)11
and stateless individuals who were eventually issued aliens’ passports that permitted visa-free travel and work throughout the EU
(6.2 percent in Estonia and 12.2 percent in Latvia in 2015).12 The negotiations surrounding EU accession in 2004 as well
as subsequent decisions have led to significant improvement in integration efforts of these
populations, including easing the process of naturalization for the children of noncitizens and introducing Estonian or
Latvian language education in Russian-language schools. There is some evidence that Russian influence and
geopolitical instability can shift the opinions, and perhaps behavior, of Russian speakers over time. An
Estonian think tank report, for example, links the extensive variation in support for NATO among Russian-
speaking Estonians from 2000 to 2014 (between 20 percent and 52 percent) to coverage of political
events in the Russian-language media.39 An additional challenge is the presence of organized criminal networks with links to
Russia. Mark Galeotti notes that organized criminal networks in the Baltics likely have ties with Moscow and can be used “as an instrument to
gather intelligence and exert influence abroad.”40

https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1
577/RAND_RR1577.pdf
In 2010, Estonia introduced a new long-term national defense strategy that emphasized “psychological defense,”
which it defined as “the development, preservation and protection of common values associated
with social cohesion and the sense of security.” The government also launched a Russian-language
domestic television channel aimed at “empower[ing] the local identity,”  in the words of Ilmar Raag, a
filmmaker who helped devise the psychological defense efforts. Now, the small nation is experimenting with
training a portion of new draftees as “cyberconscripts,” focused on information security,
rather than on conventional warfare. The country’s domestic and foreign security services issue annual reports
detailing the state of national security operations inside and outside its borders, which more often than not focus on Russian
attempts at interference. Since 2007, Estonia has emerged as one of the leading players in
detecting and combating Russian meddling, both online, where it arrives in the form of coordinated cyber
attacks and propaganda campaigns, as well as through more conventional forms of espionage. The severity of the 2007
attacks forced the government to enhance cooperation […] “to raise awareness of [the] Kremlin’s means and methods,” as Harrys
Puusepp, press officer for the Estonian Internal Security Service, wrote in an email. The trick, he said, is to prepare for the “lies
and half-truths are going to be used against you.”
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/russia-
disinformation-baltics/515301/

Banning Russian Ethnic will likely to escalate, Wilson Center 17 shows. A complete
In some cases, the vulnerability of Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic States to Russian media’s anti-
Western tone is exacerbated by the local governments’ ham-fisted responses. In Latvia, for example,
Riga Mayor Nils Ušakovs was fined several times by the State Language Center for using Russian
language in social media accounts belonging to the Riga city government.[20] His cutting social media response,
mocking the State Language Center, went viral among Russian speakers in both Latvia and
Estonia. Although not necessarily intended to target Russian speakers, when Russian-language schools have been
closed in Latvia,[21] and or when Russian-language newspapers were shuttered in Estonia, Russian
press coverage helped fuel similar social media mockery and angry protests.
Russian ethnics can easily escalate,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-policy-toward-the-baltic-states-
matthew-rojansky-testifies-house-foreign-affairs
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ethnic_groups_in_Baltic_States_by_share_
of_total_population.jpg

A significant majority of the population—60 percent—is ready to participate in defense activities if

Estonia is attacked, while 91 percent of the population believes that conscription is necessary.20

https://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-307.pdf
 AT: CYBER✔
They say that the Baltic undergo a Russian cyber assault, but…

1. First response. We deny. Today is unlike 2007, and Baltic is already prepared to face a long-
term cyber assault from Russia. CNN 21 shows that the Baltic is totally capable of defending
itself against state-sponsored top hackers of the world. If the top hackers and associations
cannot hack into Baltic security, then it proves that Russia is not competent of conducting a
cyber war. (Best Security)

Furthermore, the same source illustrates that Estonia is operating much more offensive attacks on
Russian then Russia on Estonia. Estonia is much more powerful internet-wise than Russia that it can
even initiatively attack Russia.

2. Second response. We turn their argument against them. NATO involvement only deteriorates
Baltic internet safety. TB TECH 21 shows that the Baltic is ranked the first seven in European
internet security, far better than Poland, France, and Germany. Nevertheless, NATO taking over
the computational fields only exaggerates the problem. NATO computer system are much more
inferior to the Baltic’s, and letting NATO take over could substantially mean a daily attack,
Bruce 21 shows that. (Worse off)

3. Third response. We turn again. The NATO is actually impending the cyber developments of
Baltics. The NATO coerce/force the Baltics to adapt new security systems with 5G, a system
which is less safe, less secured, and contains less privacy. Nevertheless, Bojan 21 explains that
such an act from NATO greatly jeopardizes the internet development of the Baltic. For instance,
the entire auto transportation system is being threatened due to the worse systems
implements by NATO. (5G threat)

4. Third response. Even if there might be a cyber-attack coming from Russia or elsewhere, NATO
can’t help. Dossier 21 shows that NATO security does nothing in deterring a potential Russian
cyber bombarding. Russian strategists predict that there will not be a revenge coming from
America or NATO, and the Russian are fearless in provoking cyber insecurity among the NATO
supported systems. So, NATO would mean that things don’t get any better. (NATO can’t help)

AT: 2020-2021 ENERGY HACKING PROGRAM

Russian/Ukrainian claimed hackers distort the overall energy supply system, US steps in. No further
reports on the subject.

Brief response: No, the only prove of this happening is some unusual signals detected. The hack has
been unsuccessful even in the first place, and a data breach in the energy system is almost impossible.
CARDS

The research found that Portugal scored highest for cyber safety with a result of 8.21 out of 10,
followed by Lithuania and Slovakia, who produced scores of 7.99 and 7.21 respectively. Notably, the United
Kingdom finished outside of the top 10, placing 16th out of 24 with a score of 5.59.
Rank     Country Cyber Security Score (/10)
1          Portugal           8.21
2          Lithuania          7.99
3          Slovakia            7.21
4          Greece 7.03
5          Spain    6.82
6          Estonia 6.75
7          Latvia   6.20
8          Finland 6.09
9          Denmark          6.08
10        Slovenia            6.05
The top 10 countries with the best cybersecurity
Tech July 11, 2021, https://tbtech.co/news/which-european-countries-have-
the-best-and-worst-cybersecurity/, Which European countries have the best
and worst cybersecurity?

In 2018, a
29-country NATO exercise, Trident Juncture, that included cyberweapons was
disrupted by Russian GPS jamming. NATO does try to test cyberweapons outside such
exercises but has limited scope in doing so. In May, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary-
general, said that “NATO computer systems are facing almost daily cyberattacks.”
Bruce Scheiner, June 4, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/hacked-
drones-and-busted-logistics-are-the-cyber-future-of-warfare/, Hacked drones
and busted logistics are the cyber future of warfare

,
However, during the last few years  NATO
member states across the region have also been hit hard by
various cyberattacks. In 2019, neighboring Bulgaria suffered the largest theft of personal data
in the region, after its National Revenue Agency was hacked. More than 5 million Bulgarians
have had their personal data exposed, and the hacked database was shared on various
hacking forums. And Tech, July 11 indicates, “The United Kingdom has the lowest exposure rank in
Europe.” The UK is a leading NATO member.  The US another NATO member, is known to experience
cyber-attacks all the time 
Bojan Stojkovski is a freelance journalist covering foreign policy and technology
based in Skopje, North Macedonia., 1-21,
21, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/04/flawed-cybersecurity-is-a-ticking-
time-bomb-for-the-balkans/, Flawed Cybersecurity Is a Ticking Time Bomb for
the Balkans
 However, 5G security risks should not be addressed simply as a technical issue. The Prague Proposals,
presented by government officials and security experts from the European Union (EU), NATO, and other countries in May of 2019,
address the issues involved in ensuring a secure 5G rollout and identify that 5G security threats might also be caused by specific
“political, economic or other behavior of malicious actors which seek to exploit our dependency on communication technologies.”4 In
this context, privacy issues, such as location tracking, collecting user information and personal
data, are not the biggest concern — rather it is the possibility of services and networks being
disrupted or taken over that stands as the greatest threat with 5G networks. It is not difficult
to imagine the damage that could be done to a smart city by disrupting its, say, autonomous
transportation services or heating and water supply systems. The pressures of 5G rollout have forced
immediate action with regard to 5G networks, but there is a strong consensus that tougher security measures and uniform security
requirements are necessary for all critical infrastructure. This is especially important as public services undergo greater digitization
and become increasingly dependent on information and communications technology.
https://cepa.org/how-can-the-baltic-states-support-5g-security-through-
transatlantic-cooperation/

the government needs to understand the

To understand what a country can do to secure its critical infrastructure,

motivations of its potential attackers, Tzifas said. "There are government-sponsored hackers that are attacking, then you have the
fraudsters trying to get an economic gain and then you have the 'script kiddies' or low level hackers who are trying to see whether they can
do it," he explained. Some governments and companies encourage the last group to take a swing at their

systems, offering prizes to those who are successful in hopes they will help them discover weaknesses they may not be aware of,
he added. There has been a large spike in state-sponsored attacks in the last few years, with governments using hacks to disrupt

their adversaries. Estonia, a small country on the edge of the EU, is well aware of that. "Estonia has been very active in cyber
diplomacy, it is using its voice to talk about what should and should not happen in the cyberspace," Naylor said. "Something Estonia did last year when
it joined the UN Security Council, and this was the first time this happened at the UN Security Council, it aligned with the UK and the US to call out
Russia on a cyberattack on Georgia," she said, adding that while the step "won't necessarily solve all of our problems in cyberspace, it does send a
message." "We share our success stories and our mistakes so that other countries don't have to reinvent the wheel," said Florian Marcus, a digital
transformation adviser at the center. The government's infrastructure relies on several layers of security, Marcus
continued. "One aspect is that we've always made sure that we store as little data as possible, and that when we store data that we store it as
separately as possible," he said, explaining the government's "once only" principle. "There is no
duplicated data within the
government service, so for example, only the population register is allowed to store my address, and if any other register, like the tax
authority or the voting committee, needs my address, they have to ask the population register through an encrypted data exchange that uses
blockchain to verify the data integrity." Tzifas said this approach is much more secure compared to having large super databases that contain
all kinds of data -- from addresses and ID numbers to dates of birth and heath care and insurance data -- all on one platform. "We are talking the
banking system, insurance companies, government databases where all this data is gathered, this is real gold for hackers, because this data can be
very easily used for impersonation attacks. When you want to create [a] fake identity, you need all this data," he said. Estonia has built
secure IT systems, fostered international cooperation and spent a lot of money and time training its citizens. But in a world where hackers are,
most of the time, one step ahead of governments, the country is constantly trying to find ways to improve its system ." Being purely

defensive is not going to protect you from all of the wide range of cyber incidents that can occur.
Because of the changing nature of the techniques that are used by criminal groups, you need to think about resilience and take proactive mitigation
measures," Naylor said. One
example she gives is Estonia's focus on cyber incident response. "They are
simulating cyberattacks on either critical infrastructure or in an industry, so that [they] are better
prepared to respond to a potential attack."

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/06/18/tech/estonia-cyber-security-lessons-intl-
cmd/index.html
The two sources with knowledge of the STEC attacks said they had detected the presence of Sandworm in the Baltics, but they did not
give evidence for their suspicion. One of them said Sandworm was still active in the Baltic states. “It’s the same kind of
slander as all the other similar accusations,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said when asked by Reuters about the
possible hacks. Russia has never cut power flows to the Baltic states or threatened to do so. Lithuanian grid
operator Litgrid said attacks on IT systems and the grid were constant but it had not seen DDoS attacks. Litgrid maintains
constant monitoring and runs regular tests to detect any cyber break-ins as part of its network
defenses, the utility said in an emailed statement. Latvia’s grid operator, AST, said it had not seen incidents in the last
year. Estonia’s Elering said only that it had not seen any attacks at the time of the Ukraine incursions in
2015. Lietuvos runs drills to prepare for cyber attacks, including switching to manual operation of the
grid, Alisauskas said. In Ukraine, operators of older and technologically simpler networks were able to send workers out into the field to
manually bring grids back up. This would be more difficult to achieve in modern, digitized networks, cyber
consultants said.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-cyber-insight-idUSKBN1871W5
CATEGORY II: BALTIC SECURITY
 AT: TRADE+FDI✔
They say that NATO encourages the flow of foreign assets in the Baltic region, but…

1. First response, we deny their impact. The Baltic already has more than enough FDI and foreign
investments. The Baltics contain 5 times more foreign investors or companies than expected.
Plus, IMF report shows that investors don’t add on to the Baltic economic growth because they
are losing interest in the Baltics, indicating that the NATO act of encouraging foreign
investment is next to useless. (Useless act)

Furthermore, the article V report by IMF also shows that investors are anxious against the risk
of escalation in the Baltic area…… Investors also have fears. Investors hire geopolitical analysts
who will tell them that deploying more Western forces, especially US forces, on Russia’s borders
will make the status quo less stable and less attractive toward investing.
Investors have other issues, too. As long as there are more secure places to invest., such as in
Canada, China, and the US, they aren’t going to invest in small countries that are still unstable,
even with greater commitments.  And if NATO is that important, they’ll invest more in Poland.
(Escalation deprives investors and FDI)

2. Second response, even if there NATO does increase foreign investments or trade, it is still
harming the entire economy. Having foreign investments don’t mean that you have a
prosperous nation. NATO member nations suffocate from a 60% to 80% increase of constraint
on their economy. Institution for Policy Studies show us that in majority of the cases, NATO
countries actually end up having less economic opportunities because of high military cost and
the trade embargo faced worldwide. (Worst Economy)

3. Third and final response, foreign investments can actually traumatize the national defense of
the Baltics. IRT NEWS 19 shows that as a result of trading and FDI investments, China directly
manipulates the transportation system of Baltics. What’s worse? NATO soldiers and Baltic native
military uses the transportation system controlled by Chinese governments to mobilize.
Indicating that in the big picture, such an act of FDI undermines the entire political and
economic of the Baltics. That’s why harms of NATO encouraging trades outweigh the benefits.
(CHINESE MOVEMENT)
CARDS

Even if Russia should suddenly change its mind, NATO expansion still represents a step backward for Eastern and
Central Europe. On the heels of Soviet withdrawal, expansion would reverse the trend toward demilitarization in the region. New NATO
members would have to devote enormous funds to buy the weapons and communication systems necessary to mesh with the Western command
structure–an increase by one estimate of at least 60 percent and possibly 80 percent over current military
expenditures. These defense budget hikes would put enormous pressure on strained budgets and divert money from the
reform of productive sectors at a time when the region is cutting its military spending (Hungary has pared its defense spending
by 60 percent since 1988, Poland by 44 percent). Expansion will also undo the steps, however
tentative, that these countries have taken toward military conversion.

https://ips-dc.org/the_costs_and_dangers_of_nato_expansion/

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia have each received just 0.1 billion euros in FDI from China in the 19-year period,
according to Politico. When
normalised by GDP, Estonia’s share of China’s FDI was the highest
among the four countries with 3.6 percent – which overtook Poland’s 2.6 percent and
Austria’s 2.8 – followed by 3.3 in Latvia, 2.1 in Lithuania, and 1.1 in Slovakia. Read more: Beijing
eyes Rail Baltica investment – analysis The United Kingdom remains the largest recipient, which ballooned from 8.97
billion euros in 2016 to 20.9 billion euros in 2017 following the Brexit referendum. A train from China carrying parcels
bound for 30 European countries arrived in Lithuania on Sunday A train from China carrying parcels bound for 30
European countries arrived in Lithuania on Sunday. / Lithuanian Post/Facebook screengra Trade relations between
Lithuania and China have recently intensified, with the Lithuanian post and railway operators signing a deal with China’s
postal service to become a regional hub for parcel deliveries. However, the
country’s leaders, including
Defence Minister Raimundas Karoblis, have previously warned that China’s investment into
the country’s strategic infrastructure may pose security risks.
LRT News, September 15, 2020, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-
english/19/1232689/baltics-among-eu-s-smallest-recipients-of-chinese-
investment-statistics

Lithuania is fighting off China’s attempts to gain a foothold in the country’s only seaport in Klaipėda,
according to Lithuanian Defence Minister Raimundas Karoblis. “We will not allow them the controlling [stake],” Karoblis
told the Washington Examiner, adding that the status of Klaipėda has been on NATO’s agenda throughout 2019.
“We
can’t afford that China controls Klaipėda port.” As the majority of US and overseas NATO
forces arrive via Klaipėda, Chinese entrenchment may pose strategic risks. Beijing could
“create obstacles for the arrival of military cargoes, military equipment, [or] reinforcements”
in a crisis, according to Karoblis. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda also said in July that Chinese
investments presented national security risks, even while the negotiations for Klaipėda’s 800-million-euro
port expansion have dragged on for a decade.
IRT News, November 26, 2019, https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-
english/19/1119707/china-s-push-for-lithuanian-port-poses-risk-to-nato

Foreign direct investment from China is on the rise in Europe and Lithuania, the country would
also like to invest in a strategic object – Klaipėda port, however behind such investment there
may lie the intent to take over high technologies, spy and increase influence in other
countries. This was the argument presented to lrt.lt by European Economics and Social Affairs Committee member
Gintaras Morkis and Seimas National Security and Defence Committee (NSGK) deputy chairwoman Rasa Juknevičienė.
Over the past 10 years, China has invested and obtained property in Europe worth at least 318 billion US dollars. The
extent and traits of certain investments, starting with important infrastructure in Eastern Europe to high technologies in
the West has raised red flags at the EU level. Leaders such as Germany’s Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel
Macron are urgently demanding a joint strategy on how to handle China’s relentless push into Europe. Based on data from
Bloomberg, Chinese state and private companies have been involved in at least 255 billion US dollars’ worth of
transactions in Europe since 2008. China has obtained around 360 companies in Europe, Chinese subjects are also
owners or co-owners of at least four airports, six seaports,, as well as wind power plants in nine European countries, while
also owning 13 European football teams…Who
exactly is dealing with investment and procurements in
Europe shows that Chinese entry into Europe is not simply business – behind the purchases
and investment there may lie official or unofficial Chinese foreign policy goals.
The Lithuania Tribune, May 3, 2018, https://lithuaniatribune.com/lithuania-
celebrates-growing-chinese-investment-but-does-it-consider-potential-risks/,
Lithuania celebrates growing Chinese investment, but does it consider potential
risks?

The reason why FDI remains depressed is very likely linked to the dismal economic
performance of the EU as a whole over the period 2010-2016. For small open economies, market
conditions in trade partners can have an important impact on local  business
perspectives…. ….Indeed, there is evidence that in the short term it is business conditions or prospects that are the
main determinants of FDI. A glance at the business cycle (Table A.1) shows that both investment and FDI are
strongly procyclical but while investment clearly leads the cycle, for FDI it is less clear cut. A contemporaneous or
even lagging FDI would indicate that economic activity has to pick up in order to attract foreign
investment again.15 …Conclusion The evidence available suggests that uncertainty about
business conditions is the main reason why investment in general and FDI in particular
remains depressed in the Baltics. The article says the main reason investment is low is because of BUSINESS
CONDITIONS related to the strength of the economies in those countries, which is driven by the strength\ of the European
Union’s economy
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/economy-finance/eb043_en.pdf,
t: Jorge Durán, European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and
Financial Affairs,
 AT: ENERGY DEFENSE✔
They say that the Baltics rely on NATO to achieve energy independency, or else Russia and Belarus can
easily influence the Baltic market…

1. First response, we deny. The Baltics also is reliant on Russia as the largest export nation.
Russian economic activities take up 10% of the entire market of all three countries. Yes, the
Baltic market can move away from Russian imported patrols and oil resources, but certainly
not from exports and daily items. Harvard Kennedy School 20 shows that the impacts of trade
embargoing the Russian proportion of the Baltic market will result in devastating
consequences in the Baltics. (Still dependent on Russia)

Plus, NATO interfering with Russian products indicates that a trade war will escalate. The
same source shows that Russia has sanctioned Baltic transportation systems, and
transportation systems in the Baltic region lost more than 40% of their revenue with Russia
as a result. Study shows that a commercial war can cause far more damage for the Baltics
than for the Russians. (Trade war escalation)

2. Second response. We turn their argument. NATO’s energy is worse in terms of quantity and
quality. Normal Balt citizens interest outweighs in this debate. If transferring to NATO energy
sources mean WORSE living experiences and WORSE satisfactions, then we shouldn’t transfer.
During the covid, for instance, supply of energy resources in NATO supported nations (Europe)
dropped by nearly 70%, and with price soaring up more than 80% for coals. This means that the
Balts must pay for double the price but face countless times worse outcome as a result of
redirecting energy away from Russia. (Worse outcome)

3. Third response. Even if war starts, Russia is reluctant to stop the energy support. Cutting off
the energy support net in the Baltics also indicates ZERO energy for Finland and Kaliningrad as
well, since multiple transportation systems to Kaliningrad and Finland pass through the Baltic
territory. Plus, the Russian energy enterprises are private, and FPRI 17 shows that the Russian
FED Government is totally unable to interfere or manipulate the company. Thus, simply no
worries. (Russia will not act) (This article is more PRO-based, but there are good CON cards
extractable. If opponents check card, simply bundle the card with the euro news card, send
them two cards to prove this argument)
CARDS

Without doubt, Kremlin strategists also view Russia’s status as an important trading partner for all the Baltic states
as another enduring instrument in its toolbox for retaining influence in the region. Although Estonia’s imports to
Russia declined by 63 million euros in 2019, in
Latvia, Russia remains a major export destination, worth
9.2 percent of its market in 2019. For Lithuania, Russia is also one of its major export partners, taking
up 13.4 percent of the market share. Russia’s shifting economic relationship with the Baltic states appears to
be reflective of some of its own economic security concerns. Russia is keen to avoid depending on NATO member
states for trade and is wary of its reliance on Baltic ports to handle cargo. As oil prices, upon which the ruble largely
depends, remain depressed, and projected economic growth in Russia is set to remain at just 1.8 percent in 2021,
Russia is increasingly reluctant to pay the Baltics for using the region’s ports for exports of oil. This shift began after
Crimea’s annexation, when Russia began prioritizing cargo flows through its own ports, while also
pressuring countries such as Belarus to use Russian ports instead. The reduction in Russian oil
exports and coal trans-shipments through almost all Baltic ports has impacted the Baltic
states, who have lost out on transit fees. Turnover at ports across the Baltics has declined. In the first half
of 2019, Russian traffic through ports in the Baltic states fell by 12.4 percent but increased through Russian
ports in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic basin; in 2020, 110.9 million tons of cargo passed through Russian ports in
this region. Rail
networks in the Baltics have also been affected, as they typically rely on Russian
spending. Russia seems determined to continue to reroute this trade and is investing significant sums in doing so.
Construction of a new port complex is underway at the Primorsk oil port in the Leningrad
region, scheduled to be operational by 2022. This port will accept all trans-shipments that would have
usually traveled via the Baltic ports, with major Russian exports including coal and grain handled there.
Russia can also make use of its existing Ust-Luga port off the Gulf of Finland, one of the deepest ports in the Baltic
region. The Ust-Luga port has the capacity to accept a cargo turnover of 180 million tons annually.
https://russiamatters.org/analysis/unplugging-baltic-states-why-russias-
economic-approach-may-be-shifting

On the one hand, the EU sets a cap on the maximum amount of greenhouse gases that the installations can
release. On the other hand, it creates permits for each unit of emitted carbon. Companies can buy these permits
and trade them among each other to fulfil their annual needs. The cap is tightened over time and permit
prices gradually increase. This trend creates an incentive for the energy sector to ditch fossil fuels and
embrace sustainable alternatives. But since the green transition is still in its early stages, companies under the ETS
are bound to keep buying and trading carbon permits. The booming recovery and energy crunch have
pushed the carbon price by about 80%, from €34 in mid-January to more than €60 in
September. Consumers risk becoming the final recipients of that additional cost, particularly in coal-
dependent countries. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki recently said the energy price crisis was to
blame on the EU climate policy. The European Commission, which is fiercely protective of the ETS, is trying to
counter these attacks, arguing the dominant factors behind the price crisis are the global economic recovery and
the strong demand from Asian countries. Brussels estimates permits under the ETS are contributing only to a small
percentage (over 20%) of the overall surge. "The irony is if we had had the green deal five years earlier we would not
be in this position because then we would have less dependency on fossil fuel natural gas," "Electricity
prices
have increased across the EU. This is due to a combination of factors, but mostly high natural
gas prices and the increasing post-crisis demand. This is a global development, with most
countries affected, regardless of their location or market arrangements," she said after the
meeting. Simson suggested the EU should have a "more structured toolbox" to tackle the situation at
the national level but underlined domestic action should respect the EU's overarching climate objectives. Prices
of natural gas are skyrocketing: at the Dutch Title Transfer Facility, Europe's leading
benchmark, prices have risen from €16 megawatt per hour in early January to €75 by mid-
September, a hike of more than 360% in less than one year. Although the European Union is
gradually cutting down on its long-time dependency on fossil fuels – renewables became the
bloc's main source of electricity for the first time in 2020 – the shift has not been fast and
widespread enough to contain the fallout from the crunch.
https://www.euronews.com/2021/09/23/why-europe-s-energy-prices-are-
soaring-and-could-get-much-worse

The fact that many of these projects are still ongoing means that the way forward is still somewhat unclear. There is cause

for optimism, however. Russia has thus far only minimally attempted to impede changes in the gas sector, mainly via

Gazprom. Indeed, the Baltic countries represent a very small market for the Russian company, so it could cope with
losing their business. Nonetheless, Russia can be expected to fight such measures to retain its
gas investments to use for future foreign policy purposes. Because Finland represents a much
larger market, however, with an annual demand larger than that of the Baltic states
combined, attempts to draw Finland into the Baltic gas network, as is planned, could rouse
greater Russian resistance. Indeed, Gazprom has tried to ensure that any EU-supported regional LNG terminal
would be located near Finland, where it has greater influence. Russia has only cut off gas to a Baltic
country once.

https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/06/baltic-energy-sources-diversifying-away-
russia/
 AT: DEMOCRACY✔
They say that NATO interference allows the inflow of Western Culture and political pluralism, but…

1. First response, we deny. There is no reason to imply more democratic values to the Baltics.
The Baltics is ranked the first 20th countries in the Quality of Democracy 2020 report, while
America, Britain, and France are ranked among the 30 th and 40th. There is simply no reason to
inoculate the Baltics to adapt an American way, which means worse democratic values and
worse rankings for the Baltics. (Rankings)

2. Second response, we turn the argument against them. Democracy in the Baltics is another form
of neo-colonialism. Yes, we do see an 80% support of liberal party in the Baltics, but what we
don’t see is how the libertarians in Baltics excluded nearly all people with different political
views, compromising nearly 1/3 of the entire population. This is certainly far from democracy,
but a form of manipulation and extractive economic system. (Votes only for the protagonists)

Moreover, the same source shows that NATO foreign ministers examines and pre-determine the leaders
of the Baltics before the actual voting process, offering the Baltics minimum to no political freedoms.
(Manipulation)

3. Third response, even if we need democracy desperately, NATO enforcement only aggravate
the situation. In majority nations with NATO interference, we see more violence or ethnical
conflicts, more protests and riots compared with before, Amy Chua 03 shows.

This is especially true in the Baltic region, where it yields pressure toward the government,
forces them to coinage the law, and increases the suppression of officials.

4. Furthermore, TANDFONLINE 14 shows that NATO actually encourages and promotes the
Russian minority and the pro-Russian politicians to participate in the election and ballot
procedure, which directly conflicts their Russian aggression contention, indicating that their
entire case backfires. (Contradiction)
CARDS

Latvia held its first free and fair parliamentary election in 1993, won by a coalition of moderate nationalists from a pool of 23 parties.
With a turnout of over 80 percent the election was considered a democratic success.71 However,
the numbers could
not disguise the flawed nature of a democratic process in which more than one-third of
Latvia’s population—mostly ethnic Russians who did not hold Latvian citizenship—could not
participate.72 Members of the winning parties pledged to make citizenship legislation the first
order of business in the new legislature. Calling Latvia a “serious candidate” for membership, senior U.S. officials,
including U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns and Assistant Secretary of State Heather Conley, emphasized that preparations
for NATO membership went beyond raising military expenditures and also included “democratic
values which are at
the heart of [the] alliance.” 120 In April 2002, the European Human Rights Court ruled that Latvia’s election
laws did not adhere to democratic standards and “unequivocally affirmed” NATO Secretary General Robertson’s
demands for changes to those laws.121 Shortly before the May 2002 meeting at which NATO foreign ministers were
to discuss candidates for the next round of enlargement, the Latvian parliament voted against the language proficiency clause and
allowed non-Latvian speakers to run for office.122 However, criticssoon questioned the significance of the
changes because parliament also decided to make Latvian the sole working language of all
local and national governments.123 In any event, six months later, Latvia received a formal invitation to join NATO
during the Prague summit in November 2002; it became an official NATO member in April 2004. the Latvian parliament
was reluctant to adopt these new amendments. As the national debate became more heated,
NATO Secretary General George Robertson reminded lawmakers that, “NATO nations will be
watching Downloaded by [University of Connecticut] at 10:35 28 October 2014 NATO and
Democratization 215 very carefully what you do in relation to the election laws so that they
conform to the standards throughout [the] NATO countries and the wider international
community.”

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17419160600954466?
src=recsys&journalCode=fdas20

When democratic reforms give voice to this previously silenced majority, opportunistic
demagogues can swiftly marshal majoritarian animosity into powerful ethnonationalist
movements that can subvert both markets and democracy. That’s what happened in
Indonesia and is happening around the world. The same dynamic–in which markets and
democracy pit a poor, frustrated majority against a rich outsider minority–has produced
retaliation, violence, and even mass slaughter of market-dominant minorities, from Croats in the
former Yugoslavia to Ibo in Nigeria.
Amy Chua is a professor of law at Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, ard Business
Review; Aug2003, Vol. 81 Issue 8, p14, 3p, 1c

Rank Country Total Value Index

1 Denmark 0.958
Rank Country Total Value Index

2 Norway 0.956

3 Finland 0.946

4 Sweden 0.946

5 Germany 0.944

6 Switzerland 0.934

7 Netherlands 0.93

8 New Zealand 0.928

9 Belgium 0.925

10 Costa Rica 0.914

11 Spain 0.912

12 Luxembourg 0.905

13 Australia 0.904

14 Estonia 0.903

15 Iceland 0.899

16 Ireland 0.898

17 United Kingdom 0.892

18 Austria 0.89

19 France 0.889

20 South Korea 0.883

21 Lithuania 0.879

22 Italy 0.871

23 Portugal 0.864

24 Canada 0.86

25 Japan 0.857

26 Taiwan 0.847

27 Uruguay 0.847

28 Cyprus 0.846

29 Chile 0.84
 Rank Country Total Value Index

30 Slovakia 0.836

31 Greece 0.834

32 Czech Republic 0.834

33 Latvia 0.83

34 Barbados 0.83

35 Israel 0.821

36 United States of America 0.811

37 Cape Verde 0.792

38 Jamaica 0.787

39 Trinidad and Tobago 0.784

40 Slovenia 0.782

41 Tunisia 0.779

42 Malta 0.774

43 Vanuatu 0.769

44 Argentina 0.763

45 Croatia 0.763

46 Romania 0.731

47 South Africa 0.72

48 Botswana 0.719

49 Seychelles 0.716

50 Peru 0.716

https://www.democracymatrix.com/ranking

 Why then do U.S. officials and politicians expect that China and Russia, without similar democratic
legitimacy and without legal safeguards to protect their elites in case of defeat, are prepared to
accept foreign interference in their fundamental internal arrangements? China and Russia are hardly natural allies,
but this fact does not mean that the creation of an assertive “alliance of democracies” would not push
a reluctant Xi and Putin together. The perception of an imminent common threat might force both leaders to conclude that whatever
their differences in tactics, political cultures, and long-term interests, in the short run at least, they must work together to oppose

the danger of democratic hegemony. Most importantly, democracy promotion is unnecessary (at least on

geopolitical grounds) because
there is little evidence that China and Russia, when left to their own devices,
would be eager to form a global authoritarian alliance. Neither power shows much inclination to view
geopolitics or geoeconomics primarily through the prism of a presumed great democracy-autocracy
divide. China seems perfectly willing to establish close economic ties with the European Union and,
for that matter, even the United States. Chinese objectives appear quite traditional—gaining influence, developing friends and
clients, without being particularly concerned one way or the other about their standard of liberty. 

Dimitri K. Simes is president of The Center for the National Interest and publisher &
CEO of The National Interest, Danberous Illusions,
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/dangerous-illusions-192078?page=0%2C1
 AT: EU✔
(Pretty ludicrous argument honestly, only write 2 responses for that)
They say that if the NATO doesn’t deploy troops, then it harms the Western general popularity, but…

No, it’s ludicrous

1. First response. We turn the argument (against them). NATO doesn’t have to safe keep the
Baltic region, since other EU nations already lost interest in the Baltics. Instead, many
nations urge for a withdrawal. For instance, Brussel, Berlin, and London has already lost
economic interest in the Baltic, reluctant to provide any forms of help. America is similar,
and it already dismisses 2 billion military fundings and tens of thousands of troops in the
Baltic region. National Interest 20 shows that the mass majority of European countries
oppose supporting the Baltic security. (Not Interested)

2. Second response. We turn again. Baltic defense actually distresses the EU relationship
with America. While it is true that America pays for the largest amount of BSR (Baltic Sea
Region) defense, Germany is the second most fritterer. Germany, as the closest Baltic
Neighbor, shares the unnecessary burden. Danish Institution 20 shows that Germany spends
billions of dollars just on Baltics, while having only out-date military to defend the mainland.
Germany leaders are already opposing NATO and American ministers and is hesitant in
paying more to outside defense. What we see currently, is that Baltic military operations
leads to a 60% widespread anti-Americanism. Thus, the BSR defense causes significant
dismay and conflict within NATO itself. (Germany burden)
CARDS

Shalapak and Johnson dismissed the cost, estimated at around $2.7 billion, but more commitments
require more force structure, and that burden almost certainly would fall upon America rather than
the Europeans.

https://www.cato.org/commentary/why-earth-would-russia-attack-baltics

The lack of infrastructure across the Baltic region, therefore, creates two main problems. Firstly, it limits NATO’s
credibility to respond to a crisis on the border with Russia. Secondly, infrastructure serves a dual purpose in both war and
peacetime. The lack of European investment and interest in the region creates opportunities for Russia to undermine
the societies of the three Baltic nations. The European Union needs to do more to show its commitment to the East.
Continual expansion eastwards has not had the de-securitizing effect once expected. The lack of
German commitment and Brussel’s interest in the region is also effecting NATO’s ability to defend the
Baltics.

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-nato-and-eu-really-defend-baltic-states-
against-russia-121711

Germany’s role in BSR security also highlights the big questions: in order to take on more
responsibility, Germany has significantly increased its defence spending since 2014, spending $49.3 billion in 2019, a
10 percent increase from 2018. Yet, Germany is still falling short of the 2 percent of GDP threshold reaffirmed at
the NATO Wales summit in 2014, spending only 1.36 percent in 2019 and 1.57 percent in 2020 (this reflects a lower GDP in 2020
due to COVID-19, which at least partially explains the rise in the percentage). While there is widespread agreement in Berlin that
Germany and Europe need to do more on defence, with German political leaders stressing the importance of
multilateralism and complementarity with NATO, allies accuse Germany of not meeting its ambitious
rhetoric with proper action or concrete steps: the failure to reach the 2% goal is often seen as reflecting a lack of
alliance solidarity on Germany’s part, as is Germany’s preference for stabilization, training and support missions
over combat operations. Despite the increase in defence spending, the German armed forces continue to be plagued
by low levels of readiness, aging and limited equipment, and procurement problems.  ‘[w]ithout
eliminating these gaps, Germany will not be able to contribute to the thoroughly ambitious
capabilities to NATO that Berlin has long since promised’ (Zeitenwende, p. 89). While reforms to the Bundeswehr
are planned, they are not adequately represented in Berlin’s budget plans. security and defence policy
within Germany are highly problematic, reducing security in the BSR.  

https://www.diis.dk/en/research/germanys-approach-to-baltic-sea-security

Basing on these assumptions, the Department of Defence estimated that NATO enlargement would
cost between 27 and 35 billion dollars

https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/98-00/sapronas.pdf
Leaving aside the specific costs of the pandemic on Western cohesion, the transatlantic relationship faces long-term problems. Failed wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq and the excesses of the “global war on terror” corroded the legitimacy of U.S. leadership in many eyes, including in Europe.
So too did the 2007-2008 financial crisis and its aftermath. During the Trump administration, a majority of German public opinion saw the U.S.
president as the greatest threat to world peace — a greater danger than that posed by Russia or China.3 A Körber Foundation opinion poll in 2020
suggested that 82% of Germans would prefer to remain neutral in any new Cold War between the United States and China.4 Asked if they
would back military action in support of a NATO ally attacked by Russia, 60% of Germans were
opposed. European countries take a distant or even adversarial approach to U.S. policy on trade and technology.5 For its part, the United
States faces pressure to reduce its overseas commitments in general and to deal with the rise of China in particular. This creates a double squeeze
on the U.S. commitment to Europe.

https://cepa.org/baltic-sea-security-the-bigger-picture-the-strategic-context/
CATEGORY III: SPECIFIC EXAMPLES TURBO
 Russia Wins Quickly✔

They say that Putin’s able to capture the Baltics within 90/60 days and prevent NATO from defending,
but there’s two problems with this argument.

First, they recognize that NATO’s stronger than Russia overall – it doesn’t matter if NATO responds 90
days later or immediately, the result if NATO sends hundreds of thousands of troops into the Baltics is
still a humiliating Russian defeat. In this case, Russia doesn’t want to suffer a humiliating loss even if it
happens 90/60 days later, not immediately, so it makes no sense to say that such a delay in a response
would mean no response whatsoever.

Second, we have more recent evidence suggesting that with NATO troops in the Baltics, NATO could
respond far more rapidly. RAND wargame simulations this year suggests that while Russia could win
against troops in the Baltics and capture them, they would suffer immediate costs from NATO’s superior
military dismantling the Russian navy and air force. This is what we illustrate in our constructive – that
no matter the time frame, Russia’s domination of the Baltics is very short lived.
 A2AD TRIPWIRES✔

Go to our argument on the troops already in the Baltics functioning as a tripwire.

First, on anti-access missiles deny backup troops. The problem here is that their scenario is IF Russia is
going to invade. But remember our escalation scenario?

According to Barnes of the NY Times, that actually ALMOST happened in 2019. But it didn’t. why?
Because Russia would recognize the move as a preparation of attack, and that would cause escalation
leading to a wider war, possibly nuclear war which causes extinction.

In the Con world though, Russia won’t invade because it knows that NATO can defeat it in the long
term and the high POSSIBILITY of NATO invading alone deters Russia.

That’s why their second argument on timeframe doesn’t matter as long as NATO has resolve and it
can and will win eventually. Remember, the war WILL be bloody for NATO, but even BLOODIER for
Russia and Belarus because it doesn’t have superior troops to counterattack NATO and it’s only two
countries. Even worse, Bergmane20 found that grabbing the Baltics likely would spur literally population
exodus and trigger economic collapse.

And that’s why their last argument on less troops signals low commitment is far from the truth.
Instead of focusing on the number of troops, we should be focusing on the composition of them. Our
Hamilton20 evidence from our case articulates that 24 of 30 of the troops stationed in the Baltics are
from different NATO member states, meaning those states will be angered if their soldiers get killed and
their governments would also face domestic political pressure to organize a counter-attack on Russia.

The point being, we need a low number of troops in the Baltics that are not capable of invading so as
to not alarm Russia, but troops from different states to showing NATO’s resolve and making a counter-
attack on the Russia if they do invade, more likely.
 Popularity/Diversionary War✔
Three responses to this argument.

First is the rebounding economy. There’s a clear difference between the crashing Russian economy they
talk about and the actual Russian economy. Reuters from July explains that oil prices are at an all-time
high because of huge demand to restart the global economy from COVID, which is why the IMF forecasts
a 4.5 percent growth in Russia’s GDP this year, the highest in the past decade.

Second, Putin is under no serious pressure to begin a diversionary war. Besides the rebounding
economy, they mention that Putin’s popularity is at a new low but neglect to mention that it’s still 61
percent, as Russian surveys find, meaning that there’s no such thing as Putin suddenly becoming
unpopular to the point where he has to start war to gain popularity. Furthermore, the Guardian writes
this year that Navalny, the political enemy they mention, is in prison with a low likelihood of survival,
with his entire opposition group being prosecuted by the Kremlin. This clearly isn’t enough of a threat to
Putin for him to start a war.

Finally, let’s look at the reason why Russia actually starts wars. They claim that Russia’s carried out all
these invasions into Ukraine and Georgia to boost Putin’s popularity, but when you analyze the
similarities between these invasions, you’ll find that both invasions happened directly after Ukraine and
Georgia tried to join NATO. When Ukraine attempted to join NATO in 2014, Russia deterred its
membership with a physical invasion and in the midst of the political chaos it was denied membership.
Popularity isn’t the reason why Putin starts these wars, it’s to prevent NATO from expanding, and
considering the NATO membership of the Baltics that’s a further reason why no conflict will occur.

Extending on the economy specifically, invading the Baltics would doom Russia’s economy even further.
The Atlantic Council writes that Western sanctions as a result of Russia’s Ukraine invasion led to a
reduction in Russia’s economic growth by 3 percent a year, leading to its economy only growing at 0.3
percent annually, a major factor leading towards economic stagnation and the Russian economy’s
failure right now. This mean

Matovski20—Russia cannot afford defeat

Matovski20 [Aleksandar Matovski, Russian Federation Slovenia Ukraine Yugoslavia Aleksandar Matovski holds a Ph.D. in Government
from Cornell University and an M.A. in War Studies from King’s College London. His research focuses on the dynamics of popular
opinion, voting behavior and protest in autocracies, as well as on civil wars and internal conflicts, “The Logic of Vladimir Putin’s Popular
Appeal”, Researchgate, May 2020,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/340873892_The_Logic_of_Vladimir_Putin's_Popular_Appeal]

First, he cannot afford to suffer a humiliating defeat, or a bloody quagmire while pursuing a crusade to reassert Russia’s great
power status. Second, he cannot compromise and bargain away the gains of this struggle (like Crimea and other Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine), or allow further infringements
into Russia’s “sphere of influence” (think potential “color” revolutions in other countries in the former Soviet Union), without los[e] ing credibility . Finally, and most importantly, he
cannot afford peace for long. Too much time off the struggle for Russia’s rightful place in the world will divert public attention from an area where Putin is perceived to be at his best (foreign
affairs) back to festering domestic issues (like the fixing the economy, or tackling corruption and inequality), where he is bound to be seen as a failure.
 Uniting Mother Russia✔
Two problems with their narrative.

First is Russian intention. Thalis18 explains that Russia doesn’t want to rebuild an empire and reunite
more Russian speakers—the Kremlin is just trying to safeguard its security, which will definitely be
threatened if NATO is provoked.

Second is disconnection with the Baltics. Bergmane 20 explains that Russia has lost much of the
leverage that it previously enjoyed in the Baltics. Deep integration in the EU and NATO has pulled the
Baltic states from the Russian zone of influence, so Russia can’t rally up the Baltic people even if it
wanted to.

In fact, since the Soviet union collapsed the Baltics have remained committed liberal democracies and
have been straying away from Russian influence through joining NATO, which means that whatever
propaganda figure they cite is neutralized by the anti-Russian political atmosphere. Compare this with
Crimea, which had a 60 percent ethnic Russian population and was historically Russian – obviously the
Baltics, being NATO members, are far more disconnected. When Russia looks at the Baltics, it sees NATO
and Europe.

This disconnection is so extreme that the Baltics are likely going to revolt after Russia invades. The
CATO institute writes in 2016 that if Russia were to invade the Baltics, there’s no convincing pretext like
there was in Ukraine and Georgia, meaning that the Baltic people would quite literally leave the country,
leading to immense resentment both from the Baltic people and from inside Russia. This is a desirable
scenario for no one.
 Putin Aggression✔

They argue that Putin is offensive and aggressive in Europe, but there’s a better way of understanding
his past invasions.

When Putin invaded Ukraine, Ukraine was just about to become a NATO member state and wanted to
prevent NATO from expanding. When Putin invaded Georgia in 2008, Georgia was not even on the verge
of becoming a NATO member. This is the crucial similarity between all of Putin’s invasions – Putin
responds to NATO actions he perceives as aggressive, and he doesn’t launch invasions on his own.

Bandow16—grabbing the Baltics would be a bad move

Bandow 16 [Bandow, Doug. 02-10-2016, “Russia Won’t Attack the Baltic States,” CATO
Institution, https://www.cato.org/blog/russia-wont-attack-baltic-states]
The Rand researchers recommended a substantial allied military presence to deter Moscow. Shalapak and Johnson dismissed the cost, estimated at around $2.7 billion
annually, but more
commitments require more force structure, and that burden almost certainly would fall
upon America rather than the Europeans. Just like the administration’s new initiative for Eastern Europe involving a single brigade. Their
conclusion illustrates the folly years ago of treating NATO as a social club and inducting new members which were irrelevant to the continent’s security and
possessed minimal military capabilities. Now the alliance realizes that it is obligated to war against nuclear‐armed Russia on behalf of essentially indefensible
countries. Equally striking is how NATO membership has discouraged the Baltic nations from doing much for their own defense. Last year Latvia and Lithuania
devoted 1.06 percent and 1.14 percent, respectively, of GDP to the military. Estonia was 2.04 percent—the first time Tallinn met the official NATO standard. Yet the
surging fear over Russian adventurism is misplaced. Vladimir Putin’s behavior is bad, but poses little
threat to America, “old” Europe, or even most of Russia’s neighbors. He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not
the Soviet Union. His government demands respect for its status, protection of Russia’s borders, and consideration of its interests. Mikhail Saakashvili’s
Georgia was actively anti‐Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO—all
certain to antagonize Moscow. Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical
and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient
Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against the elected president who leaned toward Russia. Even then, Putin
sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. Putin continues to
demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia’s tender mercies. Seizing
the Baltic states likely would generate
substantial popular resistance. Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics pose no potential
threat to Russia. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little
sentiment for joining Mother Russia. They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a
poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine. So what would Russia gain from attacking the
Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non‐ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short‐lived victory over the West. As I argue
in National Interest: “The
costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population
exodus and trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in
the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain
to come.” Worse, Moscow certainly would rupture economic and political relations with the U.S. and
Europe and probably start a losing conventional war with NATO. Even more frightening would be the prospect of a nuclear
conflict. The U.S. should stop making defense promises which serve the interests of other nations rather than
America. The Europeans should prepare their own defense.
CATEGORY IV: FRONTLINING
 CON CONTENTION 1 SUBPOINT A-ENERGY
1) Whether NATO oil/gas is more expensive than Russia’s
They question that our sources are unreliable and provided examples of Russia’s increasing cost of oil.

PRICE: But no, G.E.T. Baltic market 21 perceives the initial cost of energy to be 68 Euros this week, and
ICIS shows that the price is going to soar all the way until 2025 if Baltic states keep using NATO or EU
provided energy. Nevertheless, joining the Russian Nord Stream Project can mean driving down the
price toward around 30Euros, a near 40Euros cost decrease

QUANTITY: Furthermore, Russian energy solves the supply issue easily. For instance, Europe experiences
a 20% shortage, and Russia energy can solve more than 15% of the supply problem easily. That’s why
judge, we show you that NATO banning Russian energy, especially during the pandemic and the
recession, is going to drag down the entire Baltic and European economy.

2) AT: Russia often imposes economic sanctions on nations it has an influence on.
Our opponents say that Russia imposes economic sanctions and price controls on nations…

But however, if Russia really have the incentive of ending the Baltic energy market, then they should
have sanctioned it during the economic recession earlier this year. They can cease delivering energy to
the Baltics, where it is already experiencing an economic downturn and shortages in energy.

But instead of trade embargoing the Baltics during the shortage, Russia grants access to low priced
energy to the Baltics, CNBC 21 shows that. As a result, the Baltic energy price starts to decrease at an
astonishing rate, ending the energy crisis early. This simply shows that Russia has no intention of
cutting off the Baltic energy production, but to engage in further trade partnerships with the Baltics.

3) AT: Crimea and Ukraine.

They say that Russia could trade embargo nations, and they provided with the example of Crimea and
Ukraine…

But we deny. While Putin might be himself hostile to Crimea and Ukraine, private energy companies
actually value Ukraine and Crimea businesses. SKY NEWS 21 shows that Ukraine has been making
billions of dollars every year allowing Russia to transport gas across its territory in pipelines.
Furthermore, Russia Energy Industry intensively lower the cost of energy for firms willing to cooperate.
Governments’ altitude doesn’t mean economic sanction, since Russian private sectors dominate the
energy market, and they are not manipulated by the government.
 4) PROOF: Russia pulls away from Baltics because the NATO & Baltics did it first
REUTERS 20 SHOWS THAT Russia has pulled away from the Baltics only after the NATO sanction on
Russian energies in Latvia and Russia does counter-sanction rather than sanction itself. Thus, the
evidence shows you that the EU and NATO actions on prohibiting the NORD 2 projects come first, prior
to the Russian sanctions. Russia energy embargo comes much more later.
CARDS

The timetable for beginning commercial flows via the 55 Bcm/year capacity Nord Stream 2 is a key
factor currently affecting the European gas market, with benchmark prices having broken through the
Eur58/MWh mark on continued supply concerns. Russia's Gazprom said last month that it could flow
5.6 Bcm of gas via Nord Stream 2 in 2021. Once BNetzA publishes its draft decision, it then passes to the European Commission
to give its opinion before being returned to the German regulator for a final decision, a process that could also take up to four months.

https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-
gas/101421-certified-natural-gas-midstream-sector-begins-embracing-concept-
standards

https://www.getbaltic.com/en/

Based on the ICIS  long-term price forecast, after the rapid price increase that Baltics have been
experiencing in 2018, prices will remain at the current level until 2020 and then will increase further
(please see the graph below) Having paid for electricity on average €33-36/MWh in NordPool in
2017, in 2018 the Baltics experienced price upsurge: from the beginning of the year until mid-
December 2018, average NordPool spot prices were around 43-45% higher than a year before (around
€48-52/MWh) Horizon modelling shows that the average hourly wholesale power price will remain
close to the current levels in 2019 and 2020, but will subsequently increase to around €54/MWh in
2021 Power prices in each Baltic state are expected to continue increasing to a peak in 2025 above
€60/MWh and will remain around that level for a couple of years before declining, but not reaching
the 2017 or 2018 levels
https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2019/01/04/10302109/icis-power-
horizon-baltic-states-to-enter-higher-power-price-period/

The International Energy Agency’s Executive Director Fatih Birol seemed convinced that Russia could raise gas supplies to
Europe, telling the Financial Times on Thursday that the IEA’s analysis suggested Russia could raise exports by roughly 15% of
peak winter supply to the continent.

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/08/doubts-over-whether-russia-will-pump-more-
gas-to-europe-as-promised.html

In 2014, amid the Crimea crisis, there were fears south and central Europe could be impacted if Russia stopped
sending gas through Ukraine - something that in the end did not occur, even though the West imposed sanctions.
Currently, Moscow remains Europe's primary provider, supplying 43% of the 27-nation European
Union's needs. It is expected this will increase as the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is switched on. Before Nord Stream 1, most Russian gas imports came through a
decades-old pipeline network that ran across Eastern Europe - especially Ukraine. Ukraine has been making billions of dollars every year

allowing Russia to transport gas across its territory in pipelines. He also reiterated that Russia has
been a reliable supplier of energy to Europe and added that the amount of gas sent via Ukraine would
be higher than that previously agreed, backing up theories the price spike is more to do with the vulnerabilities of the more competitive EU gas
market and, as Dr Sharples says, the "inelasticity of demand", than any attempt to exert pressure.

https://news.sky.com/story/gas-price-crisis-is-putin-using-energy-supply-as-a-
weapon-and-what-is-its-new-nord-stream-2-pipeline-12428338

LONDON — Winter isn’t even upon us yet and Europe is already experiencing a gas market crisis with bumper demand and limited supply, prompting
So when Russian President Vladimir Putin stepped in on Wednesday, offering
a squeeze on prices in the region.
to increase Russia’s gas supplies to Europe, regional gas prices (up a staggering 500% so far this year)
fell and markets breathed a sigh of relief. Calling on Russia to prove itself to be a “reliable supplier,” Birol said the
gas exporter could live up to its word if it wants to. “If Russia does what it indicated yesterday [Wednesday] and increases the
volumes to Europe, this would have a calming effect on the market,” he said.

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/08/doubts-over-whether-russia-will-pump-more-gas-
to-europe-as-promised.html

VILNIUS (Reuters) - Lithuanian transmission system operator Litgrid has ceased all power trading with Belarus, saying on
Tuesday it had detected the start of production at Belarus’ Astravets nuclear power plant which Vilnius deems unsafe. Lithuania bans
imports of power from nuclear power plants it deems unsafe, such as Astravets, an allegation which
Belarus denies. “Astravets is a geopolitical project, but the ban is meant to reduce motivation for it, to
keep it from becoming profitable,” Lithuanian Energy Minister Zygimantas Vaiciunas told reporters. “At the moment, the
law keeps Belarus from getting money from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia”. The decision also bans
Baltics power trade with mainland Russia, which exports its power to Lithuania via Belarus. […] There was no
immediate reaction from Moscow and Minsk. Lithuania is the entry point for Russian and Belarus power exports to the Baltic
States, which also include Latvia and Estonia. Russian electricity import and export monopoly InterRAO said that the termination of trade with
Belarus by Lithuania “was no surprise”. The
company planned to continue supplying Russian electricity to the
Baltic states market in the open commercial section with Latvia, it said in a statement. Latvian transmission
system operator Augstspriegumu Tikls (AST) said in a note to NordPool power market it plans to restart trade with Russia on Nov. 5.
Separately, the Latvian government on Tuesday voted to ban sales of Belarus energy in the country,
and said it would require origin certificates for any Russian power imports, separating them from Belarus power,
the local BNS newswire reported.

https://www.reuters.com/article/litgrid-belarus/lithuania-stops-baltics-power-trade-
with-belarus-russia-over-nuclear-plant-idUSKBN27J2CA
 CON CONTENTION 1 SUBPOINT A-TRADE
1) AT: NATO sanction Russia because of Ukraine
They say that NATO sanctions is a retaliation form of the Ukraine attack. Nevertheless, this is exactly the
reason why the Baltic is becoming the tool of Europe Union to illegalize Russian activities in the region.
We should care more about the quality of life of native Balt’s people, including providing them with
more goods and more choices of food and product.

Our impact simply outweighs theirs. Russia serves as a potential competitor, but trade embargoing
only aggregates and worsen the result. Better products, no matter whether Russian or western, as
long as it improves the life quality of the Balts, then we shouldn’t ban it.

Furthermore, anti-American sentiment has increased by 5% in the past few years, and 50% of the Baltic
opposes further western embargo and sanctions because they view it as a way to spread “western
propaganda.” This is a huge part of why the UN Happiness Index shows just a few years ago the Baltic
states averaged 30th in the world for overall happiness, but they’ve dropped to 70th after years of
increased NATO dominance has increased political tensions in the region.

2) AT: Defense Commitments have nothing to do with Trade

They say that the current topic of defense commitments is not associated with trade …

No, defense commitments and our activity involve portioning the Baltic economy and trade. Plus,
Wilson 21 shows that the ‘grey-zone’ nature of trade coercion by NATO makes it difficult to precisely
quantify the practice. Trade practices of NATO are becoming more common and are being driven by
some of the global economy’s largest actors. Plus, sanctioning and trade embargoing of potential
enemies of NATO is actually part of its intention and objective.

3) AT: FDI covers up

They say that FDI can cover up and gradually replace Russian goods and services in the Baltic states…

No, FDI can’t. WEDC 20 shows that FDI cannot replace the significance of Russian investments.
Furthermore, even after all of those FDI foreign investment inflows, we still see a -8% market economic
downturn of the Baltic states. It takes much more effort and damages to substitute it with NATO or EU
promoted FDIs, it is too risky, especially during the pandemic.
 4) PROOF: Russia pulls away from Baltics energy systems because the NATO &
Baltics did it first
ECONSTOR 15 SHOWS THAT Russia has pulled away from the Baltics only after the NATO sanction on
Russian goods and energies and Russia does counter-sanction rather than sanction itself. Thus, the
evidence shows you that the EU and NATO actions come first, prior to the Russian sanctions.
CARDS

The Russian government banned in August 2014 imports of different food and agricultural products from the European Union as
a
countermeasure to sanctions introduced by the EU and several other countries after Russia’s actions
in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. This paper assesses the effect of Russia’s counter-sanctions on the economies of the
Baltic states using different statistics sources and an international input–output model, while taking into account possible data problems in
international trade data due to re-exports. The amount of trade affected by Russia’s counter-sanctions varies across the Baltic states. In
2013, the exports of goods affected amounted to 2.6% of GDP in Lithuania, 0.4% of GDP in Estonia,
and 0.3% of GDP in Latvia, but re-exports are included in these numbers. The overall impact of the
sanctions on GDP once intra-EU supply chains are taken into account is below 0.5% of GDP in all the
Baltic states. Several countries have introduced economic sanctions against Russian firms and
individuals. On 6 August 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed Decree no. 560 to announce economic
countersanctions against the EU, Australia, the USA, Norway, (Baltic State) and Canada. These sanctions
involved an embargo on several agricultural and food products, including meat, dairy products, fruit, and vegetables. The list of products
affected by the sanctions and other details of the sanctions were made public by the Russian government on 7 August 2014 (Russian
Government, 2014). The sanctions came into force at the time they were made public and were planned to remain in place for one year. Any
extension of the sanctions will depend on the political decisions of the Russian government, and the expected duration of the sanctions remains
uncertain.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/180081/1/bje_v15_i1_p038-049.pdf

The Baltic States have followed similar trajectories of economic development, reaching steady growth in real GDP in recent years
(Latvia: 4.3% in 2018 and 2.2% in 2019; Lithuania: 3.6% in 2018 and 3.9% in 2019; Estonia: 4.8% in 2018 and 4.3% in 2019).
However, the pandemic led to a sharp drop in GDP in the Baltics in the first quarter of 2020 (Latvia: -8.6%; Lithuania: -8.1%;
of the whole Euro zone in that period (-8.3%), the
Estonia: -7.5%). Still, in comparison with negative GDP growth
Baltic states were no different. However, the pandemic led to a sharp drop in GDP in the Baltics in the first quarter of 2020
(Latvia: -8.6%; Lithuania: -8.1%; Estonia: -7.5%). Still, in comparison with negative GDP growth of the whole Euro zone in that
period (-8.3%), the Baltic states were no different.

https://wedc.org/export/market-intelligence/posts/strong-growth-in-baltic-
economies-creates-opportunities-for-wisconsin-companies/

Trade coercion involves the application of arbitrary trade measures – such as quota, anti-dumping
and/or sanitary barriers – with the deliberate intent of economically harming a partner. It differs from
garden variety protectionism, in that the objective is not to protect local industry. Instead, the goal is to impose punishment as part of
a broader political dispute. Trade coercion is a serious threat to the integrity of the rules-based trading system, as it flagrantly
breaches the non-discrimination and most-favoured-nation principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The ‘grey-zone’
nature of trade coercion makes it difficult to precisely quantify the practice. Few governments admit
their tariffs are politically motivated, let alone breach WTO rules. However, coercive trade practices
are becoming more common, and are being driven by some of the global economy’s largest actors. In
this context, a new mechanism has emerged – colloquially labelled as “NATO for trade”. Such a configuration has
been proposed to respond to the trade coercion challenge. The name is a deliberate reference to the
‘collective defence’ provisions of the NATO treaty and reflects its origins as a western idea specifically
aimed at deterring Chinese behaviour. While the proposal remains embryonic, its core premise is the need for a
collective defence mechanism that can rapidly respond to instances of trade coercion. A group of likeminded countries would
form an agreement to defend each other. If any of its members were subject to politically motivated
trade barriers the group would collectively and promptly respond to the aggressor.

https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/article/sustainable/nato-for-trade/
 CON CONTENTION 1 SUBPOINT B-GERMANY
1) AT: Germany not the only choice.
No, other nations are not feasible, but even if they are, their anti-Americanism rate wouldn’t become
lower. Germany is currently the only nation in Europe capable of providing military to the Baltics. Other
nations simply are struggling with its own defense and Germany is the only choice, FPRI 16 shows that.
But if Germany is currently experiencing such a dramatic fracture in NATO, then letting other countries
means worse outcome and much more anti-Americanism rates.

AT: France. No, France is simply not an option. FPRI 16 shows that the French government is
reluctant in providing further support to the Eastern plank, and it even supports the Russian navy in
manipulating the Baltic Sea region. Thus, their point in France taking over is ludicrous.

2) AT: It must be done

They say that we must provide German infantries to deter Russia. They say that it is on the we-must-
do list…

But no, it is unnecessary because Russian won’t attack any NATO nations because attacking one
member would mean attacking all NATO members at once. The NATO doctrine shows that within hours,
all the 30 NATO nations would respond. Russia doesn’t stand a chance since remember, the NATO has
three times the size of Russian military in Europe, and more equipped with both nukes and missiles.
Keeping the Baltic states for a few hours is not going to change anything is Russia is eventually going
to be blown up by NATO. It is causing shame on Putin himself, and so there is simply no necessarily of
deploying more troops to the Baltics.

3) AT: US reform (169M)

They try to deny our America withdrawing point by saying that currently things are different. Judge,
they mention that US is much more supporting than ever before…

No, America’s politicians state that this is impossible. For instance, Washington Examinator 20 shows
that America has being withdrawing thousands of troops per year annually. There is no further evidence
that US has stopped the trend.

No, for the US handing out 169 Million dollars argument, it actually shows that the US is contributing
less and less to the Baltic states. Since January 2015, the United States authorized more than $350
million in defense articles to the Baltic states via the Direct Commercial Sales process. In other
words, this also shows that the US is losing interest by deploying less and less money and
soldiers in the Baltic region.
CARDS

As relations between the Baltic states and Russia remain tense, Germany has had to balance the need
to demonstrate solidarity with its Baltic allies while also attempting to salvage Europe’s ties with
Russia. Germany is the pivotal player in many EU decisions, and the Baltic states have prioritized
relations with Berlin. However, this does not mean that Berlin and the Baltic states always see eye to eye. Germany prefers a
more accommodative policy towards Russia compared to Poland and other European states. The reasons for Germany’s desire to

maintain a working relationship with Moscow include its lack of a direct border with Russia, as well as strong trade ties.

Moreover, Germany’s strategic culture focuses on economic rather than military levers. Many in

Berlin are uncomfortable with military options. Because of this, German preferences often diverge
from the Baltic states’ preferred policies. For example, many in the Baltic states advocated sending lethal weapons to
Ukraine in spring 2015. This was strongly opposed by Berlin. Despite a vote in favor from the US House of Representatives, this

policy was also declined by President Obama. Whereas German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Obama ultimately feared that such

a policy would escalate the conflict, many Baltic leaders argued that supplying Ukraine with defensive weapons would deter Russia

from expanding its military operations in Ukraine. A second disagreement relates to the permanent stationing of NATO troops in the

Baltic states. Visiting Latvia in August 2014, Merkel reaffirmed that NATO would defend the Baltic states, but she ruled

out permanently stationing combat troops. Berlin argues that such a move would violate the 1997 NATO-Russia
Founding Act which stated that the alliance would not station additional large-scale combat forces as
NATO integrated new allies. This provision was agreed in light of the “current and foreseeable security
environment” foreseen at the time of the Founding Act’s signature. […] Disagreements over how to do
this, however, represent an ongoing challenge in security relations between Germany and the Baltic
states.

However, some doubts hang over fledgling Baltic-French security relations. First, French security engagement with the
east has frequently focused narrowly on relations with Moscow. The Baltic states strongly backed the EU’s
Eastern Partnership, which promotes regional stability through the promotion of liberal political and economic reforms in Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, France placed little diplomatic energy into the
Eastern Partnership. Instead, Paris wants the EU to focus on stability around the Mediterranean.
Second, following the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, France’s decision to sell two Mistral assault vessels to Russia
in 2009 was roundly criticized by Baltic politicians. Indeed, three months after Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, 400 Russian naval officers arrived at the French port of St. Nazaire in late June 2014 to receive
the training required to operate the vessels. Eventually, Paris was persuaded to cancel the deal, but the Mistral
episode did little to foster greater trust in security relations between the Baltic states and France.
Finally, France and the Baltic states emphasize different threat perceptions. As early as January 2015, for example, President
François Hollande said he would consider dropping EU economic sanctions against Russia.  

https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/01/france-and-germany-must-work-with-the-us-
on-baltic-security/

Since January 2015, the United States authorized more than $346.3 million in defense articles to the
Baltic states via the Direct Commercial Sales process. Since 2015, the United States' FMF contribution
to the Baltic states exceeded $250 million.

https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-the-baltic-states/#:~:text=Since
%20January%202015%2C%20the%20United,Baltic%20states%20exceeded
%20%24250%20million.

As indicated by NATO commanders, there are well over 300,000 Russian troops in Moscow that are
ready to be deployed. A sum that would totally destroy the soon-to-be 4,000 strong NATO force in the
Baltic States next year. Jonas Zukas, Lithuania’s current Chief of Defence was adamant in his statement that an “attack
against one is an attack against all,” making note of the collective identity that NATO portrays. NATO’s peacekeeping mission acts
as a deterrent to the Russian-induced warfare, which needs to be highly commended in the global fight to cease aggressive and
combative measures.
The withdrawal of the United States from NATO would significantly weaken their
presence as a collective military body. Despite the obvious deterrent, the Defence Minister stressed that they “have to be
ready every day” in the case of Russian attacks. The Baltic States have repeatedly made known their desire to have increased air
defence systems. The underlying principle of NATO’s operation in Eastern Europe is to discourage conflict, however, the numbers
are not encouraging, which means that potential Russian attacks should never be taken lightly.
The removal of the US from
NATO would not help the cause and would result in chaos in the international political arena. Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania will all be well looked after from 2016 onwards, not just by NATO, but by German, Canadian, American, and
British battalions who are dedicated to the cause of maintaining harmonious relations in Eastern Europe. Estonia is entering their
26th year of independence from Russia, the longest ever streak of independence for them. A milestone, such as this could not have
been achieved without the continued efforts of NATO and Atlantic militaries.
Placing allied Nation States (Baltic States)
at risk of losing their sovereignty and independence to Russia would prove to be a selfish move by the
US, should Mr. Trump effectively withdraw the US from these danger zones.
 SHELL

Moving on. Now let’s weigh and extend the impact to see why we should win.

Our contention 1 impact is on NATO dissolution and fracturing. We show you, that Germany, one of
the most important NATO members in this event, did not want to defend the Baltic states, because
doing so would largely sacrifice their own benefits. Defense and increasing militarization have already
jeopardized the Baltic people’s happiness and triggers a 50% anti-Americanism rate. Voting for PRO,
judge, is exactly what Russia wants to see from us. A disunited, weak NATO correlation as a result means
that the threat posed by Russia is greater overall.

Now our contention 2 impact extension. They keep focusing on the benefits if the invasion succeeds,
but there’s no success story ever. In the present, with current NATO troop levels in the Baltics, the Pro
case is entirely solved. NATO is committed to the Baltics because the 3500 troops there consist of 24
NATO members – enough to signal that a Russian invasion would provoke all of NATO, Russia cannot
violate because killing these troops triggers war with all of NATO that Russia would lose. Half of all
Russians can’t afford shoes, the economy has halted in growth, Putin can’t use a prolonged,
unsuccessful war to divert people’s attention, we also tell you in rebuttal that more people want to fix
the economy before seeing Russia as a military power.

Thus, for regional and global stability, we proudly negate.

 TURBO
First, let’s deal with their narrative that Russia somehow crushes NATO. Putin isn’t stupid – he
understands that whether it be immediately or 90 days later, Russia will suffer a crushing defeat at the
hands of NATO’s superior military.

Next, let’s talk about Putin’s willingness for invasion. They say history, but there are two distinctions that
they aren’t drawing between Ukraine and the Baltics. First is NATO presence – understand that when
Putin invaded in 2014, there was no NATO support for Ukraine and no fortification, meaning no threat of
retaliation, while in the Baltics there’s a tripwire made up of 24 out of 30 NATO members, the threat of
retaliation is immense. Second is Russian ethnicity – while Crimea has historically been Russian territory
and has 80 percent Russian populations, the Baltics are fundamentally disintegrated from Russia
because they’re liberal democracies and speaking the language doesn’t necessarily mean that they’ll
ever support Putin.