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Locus Standi
Locus Standi
S.31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981(Hereinafter SCA 1981) was a significant turning
point in english administrative law insofar as it provides individuals to bring a public law
matter to the courts without the involvement of the crown.The obvious effect of locus
standi rules in any legal system is to exclude some people from obtaining the
assistance of the courts declaring and enforcing the law in circumstances where other
could obtain that assistance.It follows that whenever someone is thus excluded by
reason of locus standi rules, the law regards it as preferable that an illegality should
continue that that the person excluded should have access to the courts Moreover, S.31
was interpreted in a liberal fashion in cases such as IRC.The answer will discuss the
standing requirement for bringing a public law claim which existed prior to the 1978
reforms, the change brought forward by 1978 reforms and its application by the courts.
Prior to S.31, a public law claim could only be brought forward by the Attorney
General.The Attorney General being the representor of the crown brought actions
against public bodies for public law matters.However, over a period of time the Attorney
General’s permission became a mere formality as the individuals were allowed to file
writs for which different standing rules applied.
Before the Reforms,For Declaration and Injunction, the aggrieved had to have a private
legal right and had to suffer a special damage(Boyce v Paddington).Conversely, for
Certiorari and Prohibition, the person concerned had to be directly affected in someway,
the rules were narrower still for mandamus because the applicant had in addition to
show the infringement of a right(Lord Denning in Greenbaum)
Moreover, in view of the above, there was a need to clarify the rules of standing as they
were complex and confusing,as there were multiple remedies available and the
intervention of the Attorney General was a must.However according to Professor Cane
“the “old” law of standing was, it is true, couched in terms of greater or lesser
vagueness—legal rights, special damage, genuine grievance. But the content of these
vague concepts was in principle and in practice capable of being rendered relatively
concrete and certain.Nevertheless, due to different standing requirements it was
necessary to bring a new layer of standing rules which would be uniform for all
remedies.
Following S.31(3), An individual applicant is allowed standing for Judicial Review matter
ad this was done on the recommendation of the Law Commission.S.31(3) states that
“The Court shall not grant leave to make an application for Judicial Review unless it
considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the
application relates”.According to S.31(3), the locus standi needs to be evaluated at the
leave stage.This acts as a filter against claims made by mere busy bodies and
safeguards the public bodies’s time and resources which would had otherwise being
spent on frivolous and vexatious litigations.
However, S.31(3) does not further explain as to what would be considered as sufficient
interest, leaving it open for judges to interpret.Thus, in the era of Lord Diplock as the
judiciary was interventionist,the judges showed their true colours in the seminal case of
IRC where they fused the merits and standing which meant that the requirement of
Sufficient Interest will be seen at both the stages.According to IRC, the standing at the
leave stage will only be refused to anyone who appears to be a mere busy body or a
mischievous maker.Once the leave is granted the court may consider locus standi again
as part of the hearing on merits, where the judges may decide whether the applicant
has sufficient interest or not.Thus, the IRC creates a fusion between the merits and
standing.Lord Diplock had relaxed the sufficient interest requirement for the leave
stage.He stated that sufficient interest should be seen at both the stages.At the leave
stage the sufficient interest test will only be limited to exclude mere busy bodies.The
real scrutiny whether a person actually has Sufficient interest or not will be seen at the
principle hearing.
Moreover,Post IRC the test was made easier to uphold rule of law, as Lord Diplock said
that standing can be granted not only to individuals but even to pressure groups, He
states “It would in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure
group, like the federation or even a public spirited tax payer were prevented by outdated
technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the court to
vindicate rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped”.However Peter Leyland
criticizes this statement and states that this grave lacuna is a bit of mystery, Lord
Diplock’s talk of “Bringing the matter to the attention of the court” suggests that the
courts have a general responsibility to listen to anyone in order to vindicate rule of law
whenever a public authority has acted unlawfully.Moreover, Professor Wade suggested
that the House of Lords in IRC gave a new and liberal but somewhat uncertain
character to the law of Standing.
This is true in the sense that as to some challenges, the courts act in a restrictive
manner or in a generous manner otherwise.With regard to individual challenges,
Smedley shows us courts are generous in giving standing(Only at the leave stage) to
tax-payers,contrary to this, In Bateman the standing was refused to an applicant who
was contesting the taxtation of her solicitor’s cost.Nevertheless, The courts distinguish
this as in Smedley, the applicant was not seeking any confidential information about
another individual(Slade LJ).
Additionally,After Lord Diplock’s statement in IRC, the courts have leaned towards
claims brought in favour of public interest.As, in Leigh, the standing was accorded(Merit
Stage) to a journalist as they are considered as the guardians of the public interest in
the maintenance and preservation of open justice in the magistrates’ courts which is a
matter of vital concern in the administration of justice.
At its core, The fusion approach as set out in the IRC has let to a problem of difference
of opinion on Standing.In the Equal Opportunities Commission, itself, there were
three different opinions.Nevertheless, the relaxation of locus standi rules, together with
the House of Lords subsequent retreat from the strict public/private dichotomy
propounded in O”Reilly v Mackman gives a clear indication that the procedural
obstacles to the enforcement of a rigorous notion of the Rule of Law in respect of
government action have become less substantial in recent years.Post IRC, more
citizens are now able to question the legality of government action in court and more are
able to do so under a procedural regime which enhances their prospects of ultimate
success(Harlow and Rawlings)
However, in a carefully argued critique, it is pointed out by Harlow that judicial review
has become a political tactic, with permission being routinely granted to a broad range
of organizations without regard to whether they have consulted their membership.He
further argues that the relaxed policy should now be modified to prevent Judicial review
from becoming a free for all and that the courts should in effect, move towards the Rose
Theatre approach rather than that in World Development Movement.
Conclusively, as stated above S.31 SCA 1981 was a revolutionary point for english
administrative law as it brought more claims for judicial review to the courts which is
sometimes conflicting and complex(Professor Craig).However,Post-IRC the courts have
adopted ways and developed the law which is in favour of Public Interest and vindicates
Rule of Law.