Case Digest related to PNP

Submitted by: Laurence Salupen

Submitted to: Sir Virgilio Ablaza

1 G.R. No. 180141

RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC), THE

CHIEF OF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, ARIEL G. RONQUILLO, J.
WALDEMAR V. VALMORES, JOSE F. ERESTAIN, JR., and KARINA
CONSTANTINO-DAVID, ALL NAMED INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR CAPACITY AS
OFFICERS OF THE CSC, RICARDO BARIEN, INOCENCIO M. NAVALLO,
LIGAYA M. GANDO, LEA MOLLEDA, FE R. VETONIO, PRIMO V. BABIANO,
PATIGA J., JOSE TAEZA, G. DELOS SANTOS, LOSBAÑES, W., AVE
PEDIGLORIO and CRESENCIA ROQUE, 

SUMMARY:
 In April 1995, UWTC started operating MMTCs buses. At about the same
time, petitioner was allegedly employed by Atty. Gironella, the general
manager appointed by the Board of Directors of UWTC, as his personal
bodyguard.

Respondents further alleged that upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses
regularly driven by them were confiscated by a group led by petitioner.
Armed with deadly weapons petitioner and his group intimidated and
harassed respondents. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the preventive
suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his
termination.

The complaint passed an investigation with The Inspector General, Internal

Affairs Office (TIG-IAO) of the PNP. In his answer, petitioner denied the
allegations of the complaint and averred that it was his twin brother,
Reynaldo Gannapao, who worked as messenger at UWTC.In a
memorandum, it was recommended that the complaint be dismissed.

Subsequently, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Memorandum

was issued, and a summary hearing on the complaint was conducted.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The same was denied.

PNP Chief Sarmiento rendered his Decision finding petitioner guilty as

charged and suspending him for three months from the police service
without pay.

Petitioners MR was likewise denied, thus, he elevated the case to the

NAPOLCOM National Appellate Board. His appeal, however, was dismissed.

Aggrieved, petitioner brought his case to the DILG but his appeal was
denied.

Petitioner then appealed to the CSC, it was dismissed but the penalty of
suspension was increased to dismissal from service.

Petitioner thus filed with the CA a Petition for Review but it was later on
denied because petitioner cannot claim denial of due process since he was
given ample opportunity to present his side.

CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

RULING:

We have held that due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or,

as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he was not denied due process. Here, it is clear that
petitioner was afforded due process since he was given his fair opportunity
to present his case. As a matter of fact, petitioner actively participated in
the proceedings thus negating his contention that he was unfairly deprived
of his chance to present his case.

We hold that the CA did not err in affirming the CSC ruling which modified
the penalty imposed by the PNP Director General as affirmed by the DILG
Secretary, from three months suspension to dismissal. Under
Memorandum Circular No. 93-024(Guidelines in the Application of
Penalties in Police Administrative Cases), the following acts of any member
of the PNP are considered Grave Offenses

ISSUE:

Was petitioner denied due process?

Did the CA correctly affirm the CSC's decision modifying the penalty from
suspension to dismissal from service?

2. G.R. No.123299

PEOPLE V. CARUNGAL AND ESPINOSA

SUMMARY

This is a hold-up but a passenger was a policeman. He was stabbed. Later a

tabloid reported that his gun was found with a killed hold-upper not a party
to the case.

RULING:
In the light of positive identification, appellant’s defense of alibi and denial
must fail. Positive testimony is stronger that negative testimony, and alibi
becomes worthless in the face of positive identification of the accused. For
alibi to prosper it must be shown that it was physically impossible to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (place of alibi was only
5 minutes away).

Even if there are flaws in the testimony as to who stabbed the victim is
immaterial because conspiracy was proven. They masqueraded as
passengers, positioned themselves strategically inside the jeep, pulled out
their knives simultaneously, concertedly inflicted stab wounds upon
learning that he was a policeman. It is no moment that an accused has not
taken part in the actual commission of every act constituting the crime. The
precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator
becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of all.

As to the report of the gun, it is merely hearsay. The authors of the

newspaper reports had no personal knowledge of the identity of the
perpetrators. Such was only obtained from the police investigators handling
the case. This fact is of no moment for a possession thereof could have
reached this person for a number of reasons.

3. G.R. No. 213500

PS/SUPT. RAINIER A. ESPINA VS OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and THE

FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION BUREAU (FFIB), OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICES (MOLEO)

SUMMARY:
 On July 11 and 17, 2012, petitioner the Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau
(FFIB) of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other
Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) filed before the Ombudsman an
affidavit-complaint and a supplemental complaint, respectively, charging
Espina and several other PNP officers and private individuals
for: (a) violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, RA 3019, RA 9184 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), and Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b)  Grave
Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty; arising from alleged anomalies that
attended the Philippine National Police's (PNP) procurement of 40 tires,
and repair, refurbishment, repowering, and maintenance services of a total
of 28 units of V-150 Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and the related
transportation and delivery expenses of 18 units of LAV s between August
and December 2007.1 It averred that the PNP did not comply with the
bidding procedure prescribed under RA 9184 and its IRR, in that: (a) copies
of the bid documents were not furnished to possible bidders; (b) no pre-
procurement and pre-bid conferences were held; (c) the invitation to bid
was not published in a newspaper of general circulation; (d)  the procuring
agency did not require the submission of eligibility requirements as well as
the technical and financial documents from the bidders; and (e)  no post
qualification was conducted. Further, it claimed that there were "ghost
deliveries," i.e.,  the tires were never delivered to the PNP and no repair and
refurbishment works were actually performed on the LAVs. The alleged
anomalous transactions are as follows:

Transactions Amount

1. Procurement of 40 tires for 10 LAVs ₱2,940,000.00

2. Repowering and refurbishing of 10 LAVs 142,000,000.00

3. Repair and maintenance of 18 LAVs 255,600,000.00

4. Transportation and delivery expenses 9,200,000.00

Total ₱409, 740,000.00

Espina, as the Acting Chief of the Management Division of the PNP

Directorate for Comptrollership at the time the procurements were
made, was impleaded in the aforesaid complaints for noting/signing the
Inspection Report Forms (IRFs), which confirmed the PNP's receipt of the
tires and other supplies, and the performance of repair and refurbishment
works on the LAVs. According to the FFIB-MOLEO, by affixing his signature
on the IRFs, Espina supposedly facilitated the fraudulent disbursement of
funds amounting to ₱409,740,000.00 when no goods were actually
delivered and no services were actually rendered.

In defense, Espina denied any participation in the bidding and/or

procurement process and maintained that he belonged to the Management
Division which is responsible for the inspection of deliveries made to the
PNP after the bidding and procurement process. He also pointed out that
pursuant to the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) No. XXA dated
November 17, 1993, his only duty, as the said division's Acting Chief, was to
note the reports. According to him, it was not his responsibility to
personally inspect and confirm deliveries and go beyond the contents of
the IRFs submitted by his subordinates, absent any irregularity reported by
the property inspectors who are tasked to check and examine deliveries.

RULING:
 The petition is partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that as a general rule, factual

findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when
affirmed by the CA. In this case, except as to the legal conclusion on what
administrative offense was committed by Espina, the Ombudsman and the
CA both found that Espina signed the IRFs even if there were actually no
tires delivered to the PNP and no repair and refurbishment works
performed on the LA Vs. Accordingly, these findings of fact are conclusive
and binding and shall no longer be delved into, and this Court shall confine
itself to the determination of the proper administrative offense chargeable
against Espina and the appropriate penalty therefor.

In the case at bar, Espina was charged with grave misconduct and serious
dishonesty before the Ombudsman which found him guilty as charged, and
imposed on him the supreme penalty of dismissal from government service
with all its accessory penalties, while the CA adjudged him guilty only of
simple misconduct and punished him with a three-month suspension.

USSUE:

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Espina should
be held administratively liable for the charges imputed against him.

4 G.R. No. 179370

EUGENIO S. CAPABLANC vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

SUMMARY :

Uniformed members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are

considered employees of the National Government, and all personnel of
the PNP are subject to civil service laws and regulations.1 Petitioner cannot
evade liability under the pretense that another agency has primary
jurisdiction over him. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law.2 When it clearly declares that a subject matter
falls within the jurisdiction of a tribunal, the party involved in the
controversy must bow and submit himself to the tribunal on which
jurisdiction is conferred.

RULING:

On October 3, 1996, the PNP-Regional Office 10 appointed petitioner

Eugenio S. Capablanca into the PNP service with the rank of Police Officer 1
(PO1) with a temporary status and was assigned at the PNP Station in
Butuan City. On November 29, 1998, petitioner took the PNP Entrance
Examination conducted by the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and passed the same. On July 28, 2000, he took the Career
Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSP-CAT) given
by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and likewise passed the same.
Thereafter, or on October 3, 2000, the Regional Director of Police Regional
Office XIII conferred upon petitioner the permanent status as PO1.

ISSUE:

The case at bar boils down to the issue of whether the CSC Caraga has
jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of a possible
administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for alleged CSP
examination irregularity.
 5. GR 130522

PEOPLE V. PAGDAYAWON

SUMMARY:

Accused, a police officer was charged of raping his 11yr. Old stepdaughter.
Both circumstances, minority and relationship was indicated in the
complaint. The trial court sentenced the accused to death.

RULING:

The accused are guilty of murder. There was abuse of superior strength
shown through superiority in number and the use of arms. To take
advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the
means available to the person attacked to defend himself. Conspiracy was
also present. It is not necessary that there be a previous plan or agreement
to commit the assault. It is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all
the accused, by their acts, gave evidence of common intent to kill the
victim, so that the act of one becomes the act of all and all of them will thus
be liable as principals.

6. G.R. No.148431

SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan and Office of the Special

Prosecutor

SUMMARY:
 Police officers CABANLIG, PADILLA, ABESAMIS, MERCADO and ESTEBAN
were all charged for the MURDER of Jimmy Valino before the
Sandiganbayan. Jimmy Valino was a detained prisoner who was escorted to
retrieve the effects of the crime to the place where he hid the same.
Aboard the police vehicle, Jimmy Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 rifle
and about to jump out of the jeep. CABANLIG shouted “hoy!”And without
issuing any warning of any sort, CABANLIG fired at Valino, hitting his head,
left side of the chest and left lower back.
CABANLIG admitted shooting Valino during the trial. However, Cabanlig
justified the shooting as an act of self-defense and performance of duty.
Nevertheless, Sandiganbayan CONVICTED CABANLIG but acquitted his 4
companions.
Upon appeal, the SUPREME COURT eventually ACQUITTED CABANLIG

ISSUE:

Whether or not, is there an OVERKILL?

RULING:
RULING 1: Because the killing was justified and that the same was done in
the fulfillment of duty
A policeman in the performance of duty is JUSTIFIED in using such force as
is reasonably (and absolutely)necessary to (1) secure and detain the
offender, (2) overcome his resistance, (3) prevent his escape, (4) recapture
him if he escapes, and (4) protect himself from bodily harm. (People v.
Oanis, 74 Phil 257 [1943]; People v. Lagata (83 Phil 150 [1949]).
Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in
performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is NOT a
requisite.
In People v. Delima,(46 Phil 738 [1992]) where the killing of a fugitive who
lunged at a policeman with a bamboo-makeshift lance, the SC ruled that
the same was done in the fulfillment of duty. The fugitive’s unlawful
aggression, in that case, had already ceased when the policeman killed him,
however, the policeman's act of shooting at him is justified because he was
running away from him when he was shot. Ordinarily, it may appear that
the policeman, acting in the fulfillment of duty, is the aggressor, but his
aggression is NOT UNLAWFUL, it being necessary to fulfill his duty. But IF
the policeman was a PRIVATE PERSON, not in the performance of duty, and
the same situation was given, there would be NO self-defense because
there would be NO unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.
RULING 2: Because Cabanlig did not exceed the fulfillment of duty when
he IMMEDIATELY SHOT Valino without issuing a warning.
The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at
all cost to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a
warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available
to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances where the threat to the
life of a law enforcer is already imminent AND there is NO OTHER option
but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer’s failure to issue a
warning is EXCUSABLE.

7. GR NO. 153795

MA. ESTRELITA D. MARTINEZ v. DIRECTOR GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA

SUMMARY:

Petitioners are the mother and wife, respectively, of Michael Martinez, a

resident of 4570 Cattleya Road, Sun Valley Subdivision, Paranaque City,
who was allegedly abducted and taken away by seven (7) persons around
7:30 in the morning of November 19, 2001 while he... was walking along
Magnolia Street, on his way to his mother's house at 3891 Marigold Street
of the same subdivision.

In the evening of November 19, 2001, the Criminal Investigation and

Detection Group (CIDG) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) presented
before the media a certain Phillip Medel, Jr., who allegedly executed a
statement confessing to his participation in the... killing of Dorothy Jones,
a.k.a. Nida Blanca, naming Michael Martinez as the person who introduced
him to Rod Lauren Strunk, the husband of Nida Blanca and alleged
mastermind in her killing.

Medel... narrated that he saw Michael Martinez at the CIDG at Camp Crame
where he was being detained, and which the former allegedly reiterated
when he talked to Robert Paul Martinez, a brother of Michael, on
November 27, 2001 and he even described the clothes Michael was then
wearing,... which were the same clothes worn by him when he was
abducted.

In view thereof, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Quezon City against respondents PNP
Director General Leandro Mendoza; Chief Superintendent Nestorio
Gualberto, Sr., Chief of the CIDG; Senior Superintendent Leonardo
Espina, Sr. and Senior Superintendent Jesus Versoza of the CIDG and
members of Task Force Marsha, which is investigating the Nida Blanca
murder case, for them to produce before said court the person of Michael
Martinez or to justify the continued detention of his liberty.

Respondents submitted a RETURN wherein they vehemently and

categorically denied any participation or involvement in the alleged
abduction or disappearance of Michael Martinez as the latter was never
confined and detained by them or in their... custody at any given time.

At the hearing conducted by the court a quo, respondents reiterated their

claim that Michael Martinez is not and was never in their custody. On the
other hand, petitioners presented Phillip Medel, Jr. who insisted that he
saw Michael Martinez inside a room at the

CIDG where he was brought before midnight of November 19, 2001 or the
wee hours of November 20, 2001, that Sr. Supts. Verzosa (sic) and Espina
were also in said room and that the latter even boxed Michael in the
stomach.

Finding that respondents denial pale beside Medel's positive assertion that
Michael Martinez is in their custody, the court a quo, in a Decision dated
December 10, 2001 directed respondents to produce the body of Michael
Martinez before it on December 11, 2001 at 2:00 o'clock... in the afternoon.

ISSUE:
 Whether the CA erred in reversing the trial court and dismissing the
Petition for habeas corpus.

RULING:

Petitioner’s anchor for the present case is the disappearance of Michael.

The matter of his alleged detention is, at best, merely consequential to his
disappearance.

His disappearance has been established. However, the grant of relief in a

habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance of a
person, but on his illegal detention. Habeas corpus generally applies to "all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by... which any person is deprived
of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto."

If the respondents are neither detaining nor restraining the applicant or the
person on whose behalf the petition for habeas corpus has been filed, then
it should be dismissed. This Court has ruled that this remedy has one
objective to inquire into the cause of detention of a... person:

"The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally

deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the
court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven
lawful, then the habeas corpus... proceedings terminate. The use of habeas
corpus is thus very limited.
When respondents making the return of the writ state that they have never
had custody over the person who is the subject of the writ, the petition
must be dismissed, in the absence of definite evidence to the contrary.

When forcible taking and disappearance not arrest and detention have
been alleged, the proper remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but
criminal investigation and proceedings.

Abduction or kidnapping is a crime punishable by law. Investigations with

regard to crimes are first and foremost the duty of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), not the courts.
There are instances when members of the PNP the... agency tasked with
investigating crimes are suspected of being responsible for the
disappearance of a person, who is the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings.

This fact will not convert the courts into or authorize them through habeas
corpus proceedings to be forefront... investigators, prosecutors, judges and
executioners all at the same time.

This proceeding for habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for a

thorough criminal investigation.

In view of the established fact of Michael's suspiciously felonious

disappearance, we exhort the NBI and the National Anti-Kidnapping Task
Force (NAKTAF) to continue their investigation into the matter, so that all
persons responsible can be prosecuted for whatever crime they... have
committed.

8. G.R. No. 130442

THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL BOARD AND THE REGIONAL APPELLATE

BOARD, PNP, REGION VI, ILOILO CITY vs. C/INSP. LAZARO TORCITA

SUMMARY:
On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita,
with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front seat and his wife with two ladies at the
backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by
Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four
(4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal,
Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa.
After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a
vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to
Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The
red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda
where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with del Rosario and
Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect.
PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and
that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed
for back-up.
Torcita, upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded
to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were.
On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against
Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave
Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and
Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban.The 12 administrative complaints were
consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police
officer.
The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to
establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious
confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating
incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and
illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was
"in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he
allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being
in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was
suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time.
Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the
Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court
of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an
offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of
law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive
portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of
simple irregularity in the performance of duty.
The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the
respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the
12 cases were eventually dismissed.
The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:
 Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of
internal discipline, when the original charges against him were for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority
and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of
COMELEC Gun Ban.

RULING:
Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be
informed of the specific charges against him. The absence of specification
of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper
observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process.
While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-
encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for
which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced
without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.
Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include
charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of
being drunk while in the performance of official duty.

There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal

proceedings that Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal
discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of
his duties.
The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the
offense for which he was not notified nor charged.
Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita
"committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the
performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings
referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular
performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or
smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on
duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor  because he was on a private
trip fetching his wife.
Hence, the decision of the petitioners Board was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction. Petition dismissed.

9. G.R. No. 148431

SPO2 Ruperto Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan and Office of the Special
Prosecutor

SUMMARY:
Police officers CABANLIG, PADILLA, ABESAMIS, MERCADO and ESTEBAN
were all charged for the MURDER of Jimmy Valino before the
Sandiganbayan. Jimmy Valino was a detained prisoner who was escorted to
retrieve the effects of the crime to the place where he hid the same.
Aboard the police vehicle, Jimmy Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 rifle
and about to jump out of the jeep. CABANLIG shouted “hoy!”and without
issuing any warning of any sort, CABANLIG fired at Valino, hitting his head,
left side of the chest and left lower back.
CABANLIG admitted shooting Valino during the trial. However, Cabanlig
justified the shooting as an act of self-defense and performance of duty.
Nevertheless, Sandiganbayan CONVICTED CABANLIG but acquitted his 4
companions.

Upon appeal, the SUPREME COURT eventually ACQUITTED CABANLIG

ISSUE:
DOES killing was justified and that the same was done in the fulfillment of
duty?
RULING:

RULING 1: Because the killing was justified and that the same was done in
the fulfillment of duty

A policeman in the performance of duty is JUSTIFIED in using such force as

is reasonably (and absolutely)necessary to (1) secure and detain the
offender, (2) overcome his resistance, (3) prevent his escape, (4) recapture
him if he escapes, and (4) protect himself from bodily harm. (People v.
Oanis, 74 Phil 257 [1943]; People v. Lagata (83 Phil 150 [1949]).

Unlike in self-defense where unlawful aggression is an element, in

performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is NOT a
requisite.

In People v. Delima,(46 Phil 738 [1992]) where the killing of a fugitive who
lunged at a policeman with a bamboo-makeshift lance, the SC ruled that
the same was done in the fulfillment of duty. The fugitive’s unlawful
aggression, in that case, had already ceased when the policeman killed him,
however, the policeman's act of shooting at him is justified because he was
running away from him when he was shot. Ordinarily, it may appear that
the policeman, acting in the fulfillment of duty, is the aggressor, but his
aggression is NOT UNLAWFUL, it being necessary to fulfill his duty. But IF
the policeman was a PRIVATE PERSON, not in the performance of duty, and
the same situation was given, there would be NO self-defense because
there would be NO unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.

RULING 2: Because Cabanlig did not exceed the fulfillment of duty when
he IMMEDIATELY SHOT Valino without issuing a warning.

The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at
all cost to the detriment of the life of law enforcers. The directive to issue a
warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available
to the law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances where the threat to the
life of a law enforcer is already imminent AND there is NO OTHER option
but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer’s failure to issue a
warning is EXCUSABLE.

RULING 3: Was there an OVERKILL?

There was none.

10. G.R. No. L-64279

PESIGAN vs. ANGELES
SUMMARY:
 Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers,
transported in a 10-wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf,
from Camarines Sur to Batangas.  Despite the health certificate, permit to
transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial
veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command,
respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of Basud,
Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents,
Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr.
Miranda.  The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which
prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another. 
Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of
Basud.  Petitioners filed for recovery of the carabaos and damages, against
private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet and later
transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action. 

ISSUE
   Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the
Official Gazette. 

RULING:
Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans
on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette
dated June 14, 1982.  It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars
and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.