An Analysis of Collaboration amid Crisis: The Department of Defense during Hurricane Katrina

When disaster strikes, we rely on our government, agencies, to step in and provide order

and relief. At the end of the day our government was created for the people, by the people.

Hurricane Katrina helped highlight the many flaws of The Department of Defense crisis response

policy. All their admin failures could have easily been mitigated by a simple system of checks

and balances.

Background

Ideally the Department of Defense would fulfill all the responsibilities associated with a

crisis on American soil. It’s a large government agency that was specifically created to provide

military forces when and where they are needed in the United States of America. Today, the

Department of Defense Secretary states that the agency is focused on three main areas: defending

the nation, succeeding through teamwork, and taking care of our people (Our story). The

organization works on pre-crisis training, it has its own set of predesignated responsibilities and

a great understanding for the ICS system.

Hurricane Katrina was one of the times that the Department of Defense was called upon

for support. Katrina made landfall in late August 2005 and “the hurricane and its aftermath

claimed more than 1,800 lives, and it ranked as the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history”

(Hurricane Katrina). Louisiana, specifically New Orleans, was a hard-hit area. While most

citizens evacuated before the storm, on September first there were still about 30,000 people

sheltering at the superdome and another 25,000 at the convention center. Aid for those displaced

came very slowly (Hurricane Katrina). They experienced food shortages, a lack of clean drinking

water, heat of 90 degrees and poor sanitation due to the high flood levels. Where was the help?
 Of course, the Department of Defense wasn’t the only organization to provide aid during

this time. “Over 500 organizations were identified as involved in the immediate post-Katrina

response” ( Moynihan). Most of those 500 organizations did not participate in any pre-crisis

training, but the Department of Defense did. Throughout the days that followed Hurricane

Katrina, the Department of Defense seemed hesitant to get involved and once involved seemed

to get stuck in a paperwork bottle neck. Those issues led to a gross failure to fulfil their duties.

The Department of Defense’s Hesitancy to Intervene

The Department of Defense had a pre-designated role for almost every sector of

emergency relief. However, due to the lack of agreed understanding in their role, we saw

extreme hesitancy to get involved. We see this during the days immediately following the

hurricane through an extensive list of self-imposed rules and policies. The Department of

Defense’s policy states that it’s involvement was only required “when other local, state or

Federal resources are unavailable and only if Defense support does not interfere with DOD‟s

primary mission or ability to respond to operational contingencies.” ( Moynihan). Because of this

internal policy, the Department of Defense took a more reactive position than a proactive one.

The Paperwork Bottleneck

As agencies such as FEMA (which falls under The Department of Homeland Security)

made requests for aid and support, the overly paperwork-based request system set up by The

Department of Defense created a bottle neck. The original process used to make a request for aid

was created in 1997 and wasn’t effective in mediating the need for support. It took The

Department of Defense at least 24 hours to even process any requests. Scott Wells, a FEMA

Federal Coordinating Officer with 30 years of military experience, described the JDOMS process

as “more than awkward. It's more than cumbersome. It just takes a long time to
execute( Moynihan). At one point, when told Pentagon rules did not allow for the quick

procurement of a boat to house the homeless, FEMA Director Michael Brown asked: “Why isn't

red tape being cut?” ( Moynihan). However, JDOMS directives allow local military commanders

to make use of resources without prior permission to “save lives, prevent human suffering, or

mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions.” ( Moynihan). Eventually

the Department of Defense ditched the paperwork for vocal requests, but that wasn’t until after

extreme delays.

Solution and Implementation

The initial reactive stance may seem like the beginning of the gross mismanagement, but

I would argue otherwise. During my research I found that the “DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI,

NSA, and CISA” often release joint statements (Department of Defense (DOD)).

I believe that a lot of the aftereffects of this disaster could have been avoided

simply with checks and balances. While the case study states that the Department of Defense is

hesitant mainly to get involved with non-military agencies and civilian affairs, extreme

circumstances should break that hesitancy. As shown above the DHS (Department of Homeland

Security) is often included in those joint statements. The DHS is over agencies such as FEMA.

Requiring a simple joint set of definitions and a few key pieces of policy, telling who to step in

and where could have solved many of the issues seen. Things such as a chain of command

cannot be assumed in times of crisis. Having each agency involved in joint plans/statements sign

off on one another’s roles, would take away the guessing game and could have saved lives

during August of 2005.

 References

Moynihan, Donald P. Collaboration amid Crisis: The Department of Defense during Hurricane
Katrina Introduction1. 

“Department of Defense (DOD).” Department of Homeland Security,

www.dhs.gov/taxonomy/term/4216/all/feed. 

“Hurricane Katrina.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.,

www.britannica.com/event/Hurricane-Katrina. 

“Our Story.” U.S. Department of Defense, www.defense.gov/our-story/.