Becoming an Orang Indonesia Sejati: The Political Journey of Yap Thiam Hien

Author(s): Daniel S. Lev

Source: Indonesia, , The Role of the Indonesian Chinese in Shaping Modern Indonesian Life
(1991), pp. 97-112
Published by: Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University
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 BECOMING AN ORANG INDONESIA
SEJATI:THE POLITICAL JOURNEYOF
YAP THIAM HIEN

Daniel S. Lev

DjikaloepranakanTionghoadenganmendengar soearahatinjamaoelengketken
nasibnjabersama-samaorangIndonesier
pada tana Indonesiaini,ia poenmoesti
dianggapIndonesier
sedjati.
-Liem Koen Hian, 1934.

Once thecurtainofcommonmythsaboutperanakan Chinesein Indonesiais partedsen-

siblyon reality,whatappears is a startlingly complexpresencein local history,filledwith
thekindsofcontradiction, tension,strength, vulnerability,and tragedythatseem always to
surroundsuch diasporas.To say thatIndonesianChinesehave enrichedIndonesiais a mis-
leadingcliche,foritsets themapartstillas somethingotherthanIndonesian.For themost
part,theyare understandablenowhereelse,as is trueofmostnationalminorities anywhere.
Iftheyare notunique,theyare at leastdifferent, as Indonesiansgenerallyare differentfrom
anybody else.
As ithappens,theman I discuss in thispaper is about as different fromanybodyelse,in
importantways, as one can imagine and yetis more or less understandablein Indonesia-
and to manyis an authenticIndonesianhero.One measureofhis achievementis thatby the
end of his life,in April1989,at age seventy-six, fewthoughthis Chineseoriginsrelevantto
anythingimportant or even all that For manyof the thousandswho mourned
interesting.
him, and certainly for those who createda small furorat his graveside-shoutingthatthis
man belongedto thenation,notjust his family--Yaphad becomean extraordinary symbol
ofthestruggleforpoliticalchangein Indonesia.It did notmatterthathis name was Yap.

Forcriticalcomments,information, and advice on thispaper,althoughI have notbeen able to absorball of it,I

am gratefulto T. Mulya Lubis, Oei Tjoe Tat, Siauw Tiong Djin, Leo Suryadinata,HarryTjan Silahi, Charles
Hirschman,and ArleneO. Lev.
The quotationfromLiem is translatedas follows:If peranakanChinese,heedingtheirhearts,want to join
fatestogetherwithIndonesians,thentheytoo mustbe consideredtrueIndonesians.

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98 DanielS. Lev

Yet Yap came to thenationalscene ofIndonesianpoliticsratherlate,onlyin the 1960s,

afteran apprenticeship in thesideshowofperanakanpolitics.By no means was he theonly
one to do so, but his coursewas peculiarenoughto meritattention, in partbecause one can
tracetheideas thatguided himthroughit. Althoughhis earlybiographyis sketchedhere,
the main focus will be on a few issues thatmarkedhis way out of a minorityperiphery
towardsthenationalcenter.For thesake ofcontrast, muchofthepaper is builtaround the
tensionbetweenYap and the late Siauw Giok Tjhan,chairmanof the peranakanpolitical
organizationBaperki(Badan Permusjawaratan KewarganegaraanIndonesia)fromitsincep-
tionin 1954 untilit was banned in 1966. For several years these two extraordinary men
dominatedone rangeofconflictovera widercontinuumofperanakanpoliticalexperience
and thought.

Yap ThiamHien

As a preludeto a discussionthatconcentrates on one or two leadingfigures,ratherthan

peranakansocietyin general,it maybe usefulto recallthatIndonesianChinese have never
formeda well-integratedcommunity.Othersimilarlypositioned minoritiesaround the
worldhave enjoyed(notalwaysto greatadvantage)morereligiousand culturalintegrity, or
at leastless diversity.PeranakanChinesein Indonesiaaredisparate:geographicallyspread,
religiouslyand culturallyvariegated,historicallyexperienced,and locally absorbed and
formedin different ways.Grouprecognition exists,ofcourse,along withethnicidentity-as
oftenas notenforcedby externalhostilityand pressure--butthereis relativelylittlevertical

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 Yap ThiamHien 99

and horizontalsolidarity,howeverdifferentlyoutsideimpressionsmay have it.The social

and politicalhistoryofIndonesianChinesedemonstrates thispointwell enough.Hard as it
is to avoid using theterm"theChinese" or some otherinadequate analogue--peranakan,
WargaNegara Indonesia(WNI), IndonesianChinese,keturunan-oneoughtto hold in mind
thatitalmostalwaysproducesa caricature, oftena racistone at that.1
In Yap Thiam Hien's case, exceptforthe presenceof an odd fostergrandmother, his
early lifewas in
unexceptional one stratumofperanakanChinesesociety,yet it would seem
peculiaranywherebut in thestreamoftwentieth-century Indonesianhistory.Threeor four
itemsfromhisbiographymayhelp toaccountforthekindofman he became.
He was well bornto thewealth,privilege,and comfortsof an officier familyin Banda
Aceh in 1913,but just at the timewhen the privilegesof the officieren were beginningto
disappear under thedual pressuresof middleclass Chinese politicalawakeningand colo-
nial social reforms. His great-grandfather,
theLuitenant, who had immigratedfromGuang-
to
dong Bangka and somehow ended in
up Aceh, did well mainly(one suspects)fromthe
opium monopoly, but once this disappeared, he, like many otherofficierenaround the
colony, lostthe family stakethrough commercial misadventure--in hiscase, coconutplanta-
tions, then an in
egregiouslybad investment Aceh. (Then and later,many peranakan,by
contrastwithimmigranttotok,gave the lie to the mythof Chinese business prowess,but
commercialineptitudeseems to have run especiallydeep in the Yap line.) Bankrupt,the
familylostitspositionin 1920to anotherfamily,theHan, importedfromEast Java.
Not long afterwards, whenhe was nine,Yap's youngmotherdied. He and his younger
brotherand sisterfellto the care of his grandfather'smistress,a Japanesewoman, Sato
Nakashima,whomtheYap childrencame to thinkofas mother,father, and grandmother all
in one. Ifnothingelse set Yap apartfromothers,a Japanesegrandmother did, but she was
evidentlya remarkablepersonin herown right.Thereis no space hereto traceherinfluence
on thecharacterofthethreechildren,butit was substantial.She providedthem,along with
muchelse, thekindofintimacythatextendedChinesefamiliesusually lacked,as well as a
fairlyfirmethicalsense thatmayexplaina greatdeal about thematureYap.
His father, Sin Eng,thefirstreal peranakanin theYap line,was a weak figurewho won
littlerespectfromhis son. A tritepsychoanalyst mightconcludethatthematureYap Thiam
Hien was quick to challengeauthoritybecause of his relationshipwithYap Sin Eng-and
mightbe right,thoughtheauthoritieswhomYap foughtalso deservesome credit.Ifnoth-
ing else,however,Sin Eng helped to mold ThiamHien's lifeby adoptingDutch legal status
forhis family.Europeanstatusguaranteedthechildren'srightsto a European
(gelijkstelling)
educationafterthe familylost its officier status.Yap's educationin the schools forEuro-
peans and privilegedotherswas superb,fromtheELS primaryschool in Kutaraja (Banda
Aceh),throughMULO in Batavia,wherehis fathermoved in the1920s,and on to theAMS-
A/2 (Westernlanguages) programin Bandung and Yogyakarta.His education,like his
advantagedbirth,lefthim confidentand ambitiousbut also sociallyat loose ends, forthe
European education and ethnicallymixed experiencewas followed by few appropriate
nonethniclines of opportunity.None of thiswas unusual in the small stratumof highly
educatednon-Europeansin thecolony.

11InIndonesiafarmoreso thanin Malaysia,forexample,but closerto theThai,Vietnamese,and Philippinecases,

peranakanChineseare notalways easilydistinguishedfromethnicIndonesians.Sometimesthisis as truephysi-
callyas itis culturally,
formany,likeYap himself,
have mixedgenes,to putitbloodlessly.

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100 DanielS. Lev

In one way or anothermostwereculturallymarginalized.2 ForYap, however,therewas

littleto fallback on. Raised in AcehbuthavingmovedtoJakarta, he had no extendedfamily
in Javaand littleenough of a nuclearfamily,foronlyhe and his fatherand brotherwere
thereuntilSato Nakashimaand his sistercame in thelate 1930s.This may help to explain
his conversionto Protestantism in 1938,afterhis introductionto ita fewyearsearlierin the
loving Eurasian family with whom he lived in Yogya.3The church, a Chinese Hervormde
Kerk(ReformedChurch)in Jakarta, and associated nonethnicorganizationsprovidedhim
witha securebase thathe tookto enthusiastically, thoughhe understoodlittleof modern
Dutch Calvinismuntilhe began to read and talkabout it assiduouslyin Holland afterthe
war.
As in the church,his vocationalchanceswere also trackedintoa Chinese stream.The
colonialpolicyofseparatingand thuscreatingethniccamps made itdifficult to crosslines.
The mostobvious opportunity forYap, failingworkelsewhereduringthedepression,was
in theDutch-ChineseTeachersSchool (HCK) in Jakarta, whichpreparedhimto teachin the
Dutch-Chineseschools (HCS). Finishingthe HCK curriculumin one year,he taughtin
private(wildescholen)HCS in Cirebonand Rembangforfouryearsuntil1938.Returningto
Jakarta,he foundotherworkand enrolledin theRechtshogeschool to studylaw. Here too,
though he was thenunaware of it,he was also channeled
implicitly intoa Chinese tunnel.
AlthoughYap eventually became one of Indonesia's most prominentprofessionaladvo-
cates,neitherin theRechtshogeschool norat thelaw facultyin Leidendid he thinkofjoining
theadvocacy. It was not initiallya callingforhim but in timebecame one. As few ethnic
Chinese were recruitedintothecoloniallegal bureaucracy,theone professionclearlyopen
to ethnicChineselaw studentswas privatelawyering.
Afterworkinghis way to theNetherlandson a repatriation ship in early1946,Yap fin-
ished his law degreein Leiden in 1947.He did a greatdeal morethanstudylaw, however,
whichmayhave been less on his mindthanreligionand politics.Livingat theZendingshuis
in Oogstgeest,just outside of Leiden,he read widely in modernProtestanttheologyand
talkedendlesslywithstudentspreparingformissionwork.His commitment to thechurch,
but also to his own independentreadingof thereligion,deepened.The churchofferedhim
further trainingat SellyOakes in Englandifhe would commithimselfalso to churchwork
in Indonesia.He agreed and paid thatdebt manytimesover,beyonda period as a church
youthleaderin Jakartaduringthelate 1940s,in his dedicatedlaborsin thereorganization of
the Protestantchurches and in the ecumenical movement(including the Council of
Churches[DGI], now theAllianceofChurches[PGI]) in Indonesia.
Yap also becamea committednationalistduringhis Leiden period,opposingtheDutch
effortto restoretheircolonyand siding outspokenly(a tautologyin Yap's case) withthe
revolution.In thishe was neitheralone nor in the majorityamong peranakanstudentsin

2Yap firstgotan inklingofthediscomforts as hisname keptchanging:fromYap ThiamHien

of marginalization
toThiamHien Yap whenhis fatherconvertedto Europeanlegal status;Jaapwhenhe movedto Java;and Johnas
a nicknameduringthe1930s,when adoptingEuropeangiven namesor nicknameswas somethingofa fashion
amongtheeducated.
3Buthis youngerbrother, Bong,livedwiththesame familyand neverconverted.His sisterbecameCatholicafter
studyingin a Catholicschoolin Banda Aceh.Yap was one ofrelativelyfewperanakanconvertsto Protestantism
beforethe war, but explainingwhy he or othersadopted the religionis not easy. The missiologistHendrik
Kraemermay have fathomedone basic reasonforconversionamongethnicChinese,particularly in Jakartaand
Cirebon,by relatingitto thenoticeabledeclineoftheextendedfamilyin thoseareas. The Chinesefamily,
he rea-
soned, was fundamentally analogous to religionamong othergroups,and when it brokedown, its members
would be ready forconversion.See HendrikKraemer,FromMissionfield to IndependentChurch(The Hague:
Boekencentrum, 1958),pp. 149-58,on "TheChineseQuestion"in WestJava.

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 Yap ThiamHien 101

Holland. PeranakanChinesewere generallysuspiciousof politicsunder thebest ofcondi-

tions,and thenews fromhome of anti-Chineseviolenceduringtherevolutionwas upset-
ting.But forYap (as forhis brother,who followedhim to Holland) anticolonialismcame
easily,thoughthoughtfully, and nationalismno less so. Therewas neverany doubt thathe
would returnhomenorthattherevolutionwas right.At thesame time,he began todevelop
a politicalorientation,basically democraticsocialist,throughhis association with other
IndonesianstudentsconnectedwiththeDutchPartijvan de Arbeid(LaborParty).4
Afterreturning to Jakartain 1948,Yap packed a huge supply of lifecrisesintoa short
year or so. He married. His fatherSin Eng and Sato Nakashima both died in 1949. He
workedin the church.And he decided to practiceas a professionaladvocate, eventually
joininga small but prominentlaw firmall ofwhose partnerswere publiclyengaged in and
beyond Chinese affairs.5 Yap was not likelyto sit back. He saw himselfas a public man,
withtoo manyideas to ignorethemountainof difficult issues around him and too much
energy to sit quietlyin one office. Moreover, the relative lack of willingChinese leaders
a
placed premium on the few who were available. Yet he was utterlyunpreparedforpoli-
tics,withoutexperienceor essentialknowledge,contacts,understanding, or even thesup-
pleness of character and sense of easy compromise and humor thatwould have made hima
quickpoliticalstudy.
Althoughthe revolutioneliminatedthe explicitethnicsegregationof politicallife,this
changedid not mean a greatdeal. Only a fewperanakanChinese joined nationalparties.
Most ofthosewho wereat all inclinedto act politically,themselvesa small minority, knew
or sensed thattheyeitherwould notbe welcomeor would swing littleweight.Yap joined
neitherthe PSI nor the ProtestantParkindo,thoughhe was invitedinto the latterby Dr.
Leimena. Suspicious of insiderpoliticsand doubtfulabout the ethicsof politicallife,he,
moreover,refusedto be bound by partydiscipline.In addition,he was afraidthatethnic
Indonesianswould not accept him at face value, a burden of doubt fromwhich he was
relievedonlyin the1960sin thecircleofprofessional advocates.
Despite his own nonethnicpredilections,he had no choice but to retreatinto the few
Chineseopportunities forpublicservice.Whatwas available,apartfromone or two ineffec-
tual Chinese partiesin whichhe had no interest,was theSin Ming Hui, thesocial service
associationfoundedin 1946 thatfedintoeach of theChinesepoliticalorganizationsestab-
lished thereafter. Duringtheearly1950s,untilBaperkicame along,Yap workedfora legal
assistanceofficesponsoredby the Sin Ming Hui to advise ethnicChinese,particularlyon
citizenshipproblems.It was thecitizenshipquestion,more thananythingelse, thatdrew
Yap to grandissues ofIndonesianstateand society.
Citizenshipmarkedperanakanvulnerability as nothingelse could. It wentto theheartof
peranakanidentityand security,precedingeveryotherissue of significanceto thosewho
thoughttheybelonged in Indonesia and nowhereelse. No one could escape the abysmal
41twas not a surprisingchoice,of course. Many Indonesian professionalsand intellectualsmoved towards
democraticsocialismduringthisperiod.AmongperanakanChinese,a fewjoinedtheIndonesianSocialistParty
(PSI), but mostdid not,probablymainlyforethnicreasons.
5A11lmembersof thefirmwereChinese,as wereitsclients,a fairlycommonpatternuntilthe 1960s.Yap's more
seniorpartnersincludedLie Hwee Yoe, founderof thefirmin the 1930s,the WestJavaneseTan Po Goan, who
had activelysupportedthe revolutionand become a memberof the PSI, and the muchyoungerSolonese Oei
Tjoe Tat. Oei was prominentin theSin MingHui, and laterin Baperkiand Partindo,and a memberofSoekarno's
cabinetfrom1963throughearly1966,whenhe was imprisonedforovera decade. His politicallyactivepartners
no doubthelpedto educateYap and to encouragehis own publicbent.

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102 DanielS. Lev

threatposed in theups and downs ofthelegal rulesas theychangedunderpoliticalpres-

sure nor,forthatmatter,themiserable,costly,and humiliatingchargesand treatment that
accompaniedthedocumentaryrequirements of each change.But any seriousconsideration
ofthecitizenshipquestionwas bound to raiseothersabout how and whereperanakanChi-
nese fitin Indonesia.
During the early 1950s,such questionsarose more insistently and openly thanat any
timethereafter in the thenstill-activeperanakanpress,above all Star Weeklyin Jakarta.It
was a timeofuncertainty and surprise,whenChinese,lumpedtogetherwithoutdifferentia-
tion,became fairpoliticalgame as an accessible,live symbolofcolonialprivilege.6Chinese
responsesto the unsettlingsituationsortedalong a continuumthatincluded emigration,
hard-nosedrefusalto recognizeany need foradaptation,and reflective, oftenpainfulsoul
searching,largelyin the pages of Star Weekly,about peranakanChinese history,culture,
sins, virtues,exigencies,and about what must be done to adapt as a legitimatepart of
Indonesianlife.In themselves,thediscussionsofthatperiodare a fascinatingstudyin intel-
lectual historyas commentatorsexplored peranakan historyand culture,the invidious
effectsof colonialismin moldingthe minority, and the problemof who had to adjust to
whom and over what obstructionscreatedeitherby ethnicIndonesian or ethnicChinese
mentalities.Yap himselfwrotemainlyabout the law of citizenshipbut as an avid and
thoughtful readermusthave been absorbedin thedebates.

Baperkiwas establishedin March1954as pressuregrewon peranakanChinese-above

all thequestionofcitizenshipbutalso Chineseschoolsand commercialinfluence--andtheir
lack of preparationto deal withit became apparent.7It was thefirstorganizationto bring
togethernearlyall strandsofperanakanpolitics,thoughnotall thateffectively norforlong.
Yap was a founding member, primarily as a representative of the Protestantstream.
Auwyong Peng Koen, another HCK graduate, the capable and influentialeditor of Star
Weekly, was thereforCatholics.Stillothersspoke for theold and
right,left, centerof a thin
political traditionbegun in the 1910s. No less than before the war, successfulperanakan
Chineseleadershipfellto thosebestconnectedwiththeregime,whichin thecolonialperiod
meanttheestablishedwealthof theChung Hua Hui but in the 1950smeant,in a dramatic
shiftofpersonneland ideology,thosewho had joinedtherevolution.
A naturalchoiceforchairmanofBaperkiwas Siauw Giok TjhanfromSurabaya,a jour-
nalist,politicallyexperiencedon theleftin theprewar,pronationalistPartaiTionghoaIndo-
nesia (led by Liem Koen Hian), and brieflya ministerin therevolutionary
AmirSjarifuddin
cabinetin Yogya. Politicallyacute,well connectedwithand respectedby nationalpolitical
leaders,Siauw turnedBaperkiintothemosthighlymobilizedpoliticalorganizationeverof
61n August 1951,Liem Koen Hian (quoted at the beginningof thisarticle),long a supporterof Indonesian
nationalismand of the revolution,was arrestedin the Sukimananti-Communist razzia. Angryand bitter,he
publiclyrejectedIndonesiancitizenship.He remainedin the countryas a businessmanbut died soon afterin
Medan. The tragicincidentrockedpoliticallyconscious peranakanChinese,makingany who were confident
about theiracceptancemoreaware ofjusthow vulnerableeven themostpatrioticperanakanactuallywere.
70n Baperkisee, amongothers,MaryF. Somers,"PeranakanChinesePoliticsin Indonesia"(Ph.D. diss.,Cornell
University,1965);idem,Peranakan ChinesePoliticsinIndonesia,(CornellModernIndonesiaProjectInterimReports
Series,Ithaca,N.Y. 1964);CharlesA. Coppel, "PatternsofChinesePoliticalActivity in Indonesia,"in TheChinese
in Indonesia:FiveEssays,ed., J.A. C. Mackie (Honolulu: University Pressof Hawaii, 1976);and Go Gien Tjwan,
"De historische wortelsvan de Baperki-beweging," in Buitende Grenzen:
Sociologische aangeboden
opstellen aan Prof.
Dr. W.F. Wertheim (Amsterdam:Boom Meppel,1971).

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 Yap ThiamHien 103

Indonesian Chinese, thoughwithoutmuch more influencein the political systemthan

before.
Baperki,whichprovided the settingforthe Siauw-Yap debates,closelyapproximated
generalIndonesianpoliticalpatterns.It was, forexample,utterlydominatedby Javanese
peranakanand, significantly,by the politicallydynamic,experienced,and mobilizedEast
Javaneseperanakan. No less BaperkithanthePNI, forinstance,local, family,and per-
in
sonal intimaciesbore weight,and oftencould be tracedback over decades.8 Finally,like
otherparties,Baperkitendedto circleincreasingly around thepersonalleadershipof
tightly
Siauw.
The peculiarsituationoftheperanakanminority entrappedBaperkiin inextricable
con-
tradictions.In one example, oftencited,Siauw persuaded thefoundersthat theorganization
mustbe presentedas multiethnic; henceits name,whichemphasizes the citizenshipissue
but does not mentionChinese.Yap disagreedat first,typicallyon groundsthatifit was a
Chineseorganization, itshouldsay so, buthe quicklycame to recognizethesymbolicsignif-
icance ofSiauw's stroke.A fewnon-Chinesewere recruitedintoBaperki'scouncils,as the
Sin Ming Hui beforeit had also done forthesake ofprotection.But thegestureremaineda
gesture.Baperkicould be no moremultiethnic thanethnicantagonismswould allow it to
be, which was verylittle.Overwhelmingly, it was, and was understoodto be, a Chinese
organization.
Beyondthisfundamentalproblemwas another.Founded not as a partybut as a "mass
organization"in order to avoid ideological conflictamong its members,in a shorttime,
nevertheless, itwas behavingmuchlikea politicalpartyand payingthepricein defections,
internalconflict-muchof itcaused by Yap-and politicaldisunitywithinthecommunityit
meantto represent. Buttheadvantagesofactinglikea partyweretoo attractive to ignore,as
was truealso oftheapparentrewardsforchoosingideologicalsides in thepoliticalsystem
at large.The tensionscaused by thesedevelopmentsdefinedthe issues over whichSiauw
and Yap fought,and theirbitter,protractedbattlesin turnhelped to locate the varying
dimensionsand limitsofperanakanparticipation in theIndonesianuniverse.
Oddly, despiteappearances,the two men were muchalike and in agreementon a few
fundamentals thatset thembothapartfromothers,includingclose associates.Siauw, by far
the more politicallyknowledgeableand experienced,was supple, personable,emotional,
and intimate.The bettereducated and intellectuallyavid Yap, religiouslydevout,a loner,
and notmuchgivento small talk,tendedtowardrigidand uncompromising (and occasion-
principle,rigorouslogic,and detachedargument.But both men were
ally self-righteous)
personallymodest,unself-serving, serious,and responsible-qualitiestheyrecognizedand
respectedin one another.Siauw was probablymore comfortablewitha Chinese identity,
whereasYap, who did notregretbeingChinese,neverthelesstookit morelightly.But nei-
therwas naive or particularlychauvinisticabout theperanakanminorityin Indonesia nor
to
given justifying privilegesmanyChinese had gained in the colonyand maintained
the
thereafter.Both,indeed,tendedto be censoriousofbloated wealth,Chinese or other.They
defendednotChinesecommercialadvantagebutChineseminority rights.9

8One example is the relationshipbetweenSiauw and Go Gien Tjwan. Given the closeness of manyJavanese
peranakanand priyayifamilies,it is notsurprisingthatpersonalconnectionsextendedintothe PNI and a few
otherorganizations.Siauw himself,whateverhis ideologicalaffinity
to the PKI, was personallyquite close to
Sartono,thePNI speakerofParliament.
9Yap was bothimpressedand puzzled by Siauw's defenseofChinesericemillerswhen theycame underattack
bygovernmentpolicy,forit indicatedSiauw's even-handednessin protecting all Chinese,even ifthisseemed to

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104 DanielS. Lev

Moreover,theirdefenseof theminority'shumanrightsdid not stop thereat all. From

different startingpoints-Siauw's a Marxistcritique,Yap's a more eclecticallydemocratic
socialistand idiosyncratically Christian-bothassumed thatIndonesianeconomyand soci-
ety had to in
change principle.On whatkindofchangewas needed theydisagreedmonu-
mentally, each had principlesthatweresignificant
but beyondmerelydefendingperanakan.
Siauw, however,who won hands down in everyconflictwithYap, ultimatelycould not
escape theperanakancircletospeak toa largerIndonesia.Yap did.
Yap lostout in theBaperkistruggleslargelybecause ofSiauw's greaterpoliticalskilland
appeal but also because he was ratheralone,withouteffective support,withoutany of the
connectionsthatcounted,and withoutmuchunderstanding ofeverydaypolitics.Alwaysan
outsiderand a persistentstrangerto thestylesofJavaneseperanakanpolitics-which is to
say,Javanesepolitics-Yap neverfiguredout how toplay thatgame well.1oHe had nothing
more,really,thansubstantialresourcesofpersonalcourage,principle,and learning.Several
of theliberalallies he foundin Baperkiin 1954fledsoon afterthecompletenessofSiauw's
controlof theorganizationbecameclear.Partlyout ofunrealisticoptimismbutalso froma
stubborndisinclination to give up on anything, Yap stayed,bitingheels untilhe was swept
away in 1960. But Yap lost too because his vision of peranakanproblemsand solutions
made less sense to manyethnicChinesethandid thoseofSiauw.
The issues in theSiauw-Yap debaterana gamutfromthosehavingto do withBaperki,
reflecting differencesover how bestto representtheperanakanminority, to politicalprin-
ciplesoftheIndonesianstate.Of thefirstorderwas Baperki'ssteadyevolutionintoa politi-
cal party,as Yap saw it,thatassumed increasingresponsibility forChineseaffairs.Yap did
notobjectto thedecisionto contesttheelectionsof1955,whichinstalleda specificvoice for
peranakaninterestsin Parliamentand theConstituentAssembly.He himselftooka seat in
theConstituentAssembly,thoughtechnically not in Baperki'sdelegationbut in theFraksi
Lima Orang, all of themBaperkimembers.But he did oppose any furtherextensionof
Baperki'spoliticalreach.
Why?The answerillustratesa fundamental disagreementoverconceptionsof therela-
tionshipbetweencommunityand leadershipand, by extension,betweensocietyand state.
Siauw sought to mobilizeunifiedsupport--evenat the cost of defections-in defenseof
peranakan interests,forthis seemed essentialparticularlyduring the period of Guided
Democracy.Yap was moreskepticalthanSiauw aboutpoliticalpossibilitiesand less willing
to take riskson behalfof the peranakancommunity.In addition,however,he was con-
vincedthatthecommunityitself,as muchas possible,had to assume responsibility forits
own affairs."This issue came to a head over theestablishment of Res Publica University,
sponsoredby BaperkioverYap's fierceopposition.12

contradicthis Marxistcommitment to deprivedclasses. It is worthnotingthatSiauw got along quite well with

the totokcommunity,whichtrustedhimand fromwhichhe evidentlyobtainedsubstantialcontributions for
variousBaperkiprojects.Yap had fewcontacts,ifany,amongtotokChineseand tendedto distancehimselffrom
them.NeitherYap norSiauw spokeChinese.
10Although Yap's wifeKhingwas a JavanesespeakerfromSemarang,and servantsin theirhomewereJavanese,
he neverlearnedto speak or understandJavanese.
11InYap's mind theremay have been an analogybetweenthe peranakanconditionand thatof the Protestant
churchesimmediatelyafterindependence.In thechurchhe had been instrumental in establishinga school sys-
temindependentofthecorporatechurchto separatetheirfates,and assuretheschools' survivalifthechurches
came underattack.
12Theissue of principlewas mixed with personal pique on Yap's part. Beginningin 1957,as alien Chinese
schoolscame underattack,Baperkiwas able to takeoverand runmanyofthemunderitsown umbrella.At the

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 Yap ThiamHien 105

The same problem-to Yap's mind,how best to representperanakanChinese without

makingthemmorevulnerable-attachedto thequestionofBaperki'ssupportfortheCom-
munistparty(PKI). A fewcomplexitiesaround thisissue need sorting.Much was made of
Siauw's Communistsympathies,not least by Yap, but Siauw's communismcame witha
lowercase "c," and itis likelythattheChinesefactorcountedformorein his commitments
thanideology.'3Yap was anti-Communist but notrabidlyor unthinkingly so. His religious
educationin Oegstgeestand trainingforchurchwork thereafter in Holland and England
containeda stronganti-Communist bias. But he doubted partyideologies of any sort.He
placed his trust in
mainly personalcharacter, whichallowed himto respectSiauw as a man
while challenginghis politicalviews and attachments. (Siauw reciprocated,admiringYap
forhis honestyand courageeven as he thoughthima terrific pain.)14Beforethe 1955 elec-
tions,Yap and Go Gien Tjwan, who he knew was Communist,campaigned as a team to
demonstratethatmen of different politicalviews could work together.Yap thoughtthis
provedthatBaperkiwas nonideological.
He foughtbitterlywiththeSiauw groupas Baperkiseemed to move closer to the PKI
after1956. For Siauw, ideological attractionapart,what counted was thatonly the PKI
among themajorpartiesexplicitlyrejectedethnicbigotryand publiclysupportedBaperki
initiatives.Moreover,PKI supportforSoekarno,to whomSiauw attachedgreatimportance,
also made sense ofa politicalalignmentwiththeparty.But forYap, thoughhis own ideo-
logicalbiases naturallymade a difference, theprimaryconsiderationwas thattheChinese
minority must not risktakingideologicalsides. To do so would splitthecommunitymore
thanit was alreadyand envelopit in politicaldanger.Baperki'sdriftto theleftdrove some
of its most prominentcentristfiguresout and alienated more, yet it alone symbolically

same time,because ofinformalquota restrictions on thematriculation ofethnicChinesestudentsin theuniversi-

ties,it was agreed thata new universityshould be createdin whichtherewould be no discrimination against
Chinesestudents.Yap was a memberofthecommittee thatsetaboutorganizinga privateeffort. Beforeitgot far,
however,the Baperkiinnercouncil-Siauw himself,Go Gien Tjwan,and the secretary, BuyungSaleh-quietly
butquicklyundertooktheirown effort, undercutthatofYap's committee, put togethertheland
and successfully
and fundsto set up Res Publica University.Apartfromhis personaloutrageat the flankingmaneuver,Yap
thoughtthatby establishingitsown university, Baperkiendangeredtheschool(and peranakaninterestsgener-
ally) by association.In thishe eventuallyprovedto be right.At thetime,however,along withthe urgentneed
fora university-andas well theabilityof Siauw et al. to mobilizequicklythe fundsand energyit required-
educationwas too important a politicalissue forBaperkileadersto allow anyoneelse to takecreditforresolving
it.
13Siauwevidentlyhad been attractedto communismsincethe1930s,whenTan LingDjie, to whomhe remained
quiteclose,influencedhis ideologicaleducation.Until1953,he editedHarianRakyat, afterithad been sold to the
PKI. Questionswereraisedabout whetherhe was a secretmemberoftheparty,butin facthe may have resented
theAiditleadershipforhavingoustedTan LingDjie, ifSiauw thoughtthiswas inspiredbyanti-Chineseanimus
or too muchsensitivity to anti-Chinesesentiments. See Siauw GiokTjhan,LimaJaman:Perwujudan IntegrasiWajar
(Jakartaand Amsterdam:Yayasan Teratai,1981),pp. 296-97.My point,however,is thatSiauw was rathermore
devoted to the survivalof peranakanChinesethanhe was to communism.One of theissues betweenYap and
Siauw had to do withthelatter'ssupportof thePeople's Republicof China, whichhe visited,and to whichhe
sentsome ofhis childrento study.Yap thoughtSiauw's connectionswithChina were wrong,partlyon ideologi-
cal groundsbut also because it reinforced the myththatIndonesianChinese were loyal to China. Yap himself
refusedto go to China,thoughhe was intellectually interestedin it,preciselyforthisreason.It is an interesting
questionwhetherSiauw was attractedto China forideologicalor ethnic-cultural reasons.Yap evidentlythought
theformerinfluencemoreimportant, butitmaywell have been thelatter.
14Siauw,LimaJaman, p. 241.

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106 DanielS. Lev

representedthe entireminority.15 The dangerwas thatin case of ideological warfare,the

Chineseminority would be politicallyexposedand withouta meansto defenditself.16
The tensestbattlebetween Siauw and Yap took place in 1959 over the issue of the
restorationof the 1945 Constitution,which clearlydemarcatedtheirunderstandingsof
stakesand possibilities.Yap's thinking about minorityissues tooka criticalturnas a result
of thisdebate,whichstartedin late 1956and early1957,as the parliamentary systemcol-
lapsed and Soekarnopressed his To the
Konsepsi. clarify implications of theirdivergence,
however,it mayhelp to call attentionto theprincipleson whichtheyagreed.Because they
shared a commitmentto human rights,includingthe Universal Declaration,both quite
naturallyassertedtherightsof minorities. Withdifferent emphases,bothalso were essen-
tiallyegalitarian.Neitherhad any tasteforthecorruption, economicwaste,and
inefficiency,
self-aggrandizing tendenciesofpartyconflict duringtheparliamentary period.'7
ButSiauw supportedSoekarno,whereasYap condemnedGuided Democracy.In neither
case was the position simple. Siauw was convinced thatthe parliamentarysystemhad
failed,thatitsinsolubleconflictofideologiesand partisanadvantagewould lead to national
disaster,and thatadequate evidenceforitsdangersexistedin theescalatingattackson the
Chinese minority.Soekarno he knew to be freeof prejudice,as were many PNI leaders
associatedwiththepresident,and so was thePKI, whichSoekarnoinsistedshould be in the
government. Butbeyondall this,Siauw was no less drawnto Soekarnoand his visionthan
weremanyotherJavanese.It is essentialto recognizethisJavaneseinfluencein thetrustthat
Siauw placed in Soekamo's person.Siauw believed thatIndonesia needed revolutionary
change,whose principleswould securetheChineseminorityin a political-economic order
fromwhichethnicissues would disappear,and thatSoekarnowas thekeyfiguretobringall
this about. Consequently,as Guided Democracy evolved, Siauw consistentlybrought
Baperkialong behind the president.Whateverhis doubts about the 1945 Constitution, of
which theremust have been many,like othershe brushed them aside for the sake of
Soekamo's ascendancy.
Yap, however,workedfromthe lawyerlyassumptionthatpersonsare less promising
thansound institutions and legal processes.He too admiredSoekarnoas unprejudicedbut
stopped shortof wantingto vest moreauthorityin the man. Rather,he insistedthatthe
most secure hope forIndonesia and its Chinese minorityrestedin effectivelaw, which
requiredtheconstitution tobe takenmoreseriouslythanpoliticalfigures.On thisissue Yap
and Siauw splitcompletely.In theConstituentAssembly,everymemberofBaperkiexcept
Yap voted to restorethe1945Constitution. Yap was theonlymemberoftheKonstituante to
vote "no" contraryto hisfraksi.Yap's oppositionto the1945Constitutionwas notfocused
solelyon Article6, whichprovidesthatonlyan indigenousIndonesianmaybecomepresi-
dent.18This was an importantissue, and one thathad to troubleBaperki,which,as Yap

15Inhis dramaticspeechto theBaperkicongressofDecember1960in Semarang,Yap angrilyaccused theSiauw

leadershipof having drivenout manyof the respectedfoundersof the organization.In fact,those who left
initiallyweremainlyfromtheKengPo group:AuwjongPeng Koen,Khoe Woen Sioe,and Injo BengGoat. Others
on thecenterand center-right remainedalmostto theend but withlittleinfluence.
16Asithappened,after1%5, Chinese suffered less thanYap fearedpreciselybecause thecommunitywas politi-
callydivided. Baperki,suddenlynaked on the left,was obliterated, but itsdefectorsand opponentswere safe,
active,and, in some cases,remarkablyinfluential.
17ThevoluminousevidenceforSiauw's views can be foundin his LimaJaman. Yap developed his argumentsin
writings scatteredover theyearsfrom1959 through 1988,but I am relying also on interviewswithhim.
the on
18Actually, objection grounds of discrimination was to both Articles6 and 26,thelatterofwhichprovides
that"(1) Citizensare indigenousIndonesiansand otherscertified [disahkan]as citizensby statute."

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 Yap ThiamHien 107

argued, was establishedto fightagainstall formsof discrimination. What could be more

discriminatory thanArticle6? Unlikeothersin theorganization,includingSiauw, who tried
to defusetheissue by wavingitaside, Yap refusedon principleto dismissit.19But Article6
was not theend ofYap's case againstthe 1945Constitution, as he made clear in May 1959
during the Konstituantedebate:
The historyof constitutionalstates is the historyof the struggleof people against
tyranny, despotism,and absolutism.The struggleforfundamentalhuman rightsand
freedomsagainstabsolute power. The constitution is a manifestation of the victoryof
justiceover arbitrariness,thevictoryof "Recht"over "Macht."Thereforea constitution
is intendedto establishand guaranteein itsbody fundamentalhuman rightsand free-
doms, to formulateand limitGovernmentauthority, and to controlthe exerciseof that
authority....
The historyof the struggleforindependence of the Indonesian people is also a
struggleforthesupremacyof "Law" over "Power,"ofjusticeoverarbitrariness. There-
fore,the IndonesianConstitutionmustshare the same characterand purpose as other
constitutions.
What good were the sacrificesof the Indonesianpeople forthe sake of indepen-
dence,ifIndonesianscan stillbe detainedat will,withoutknowingwhattheyare guilty
of,withouttrial,and thenreleasedjustlikethatwithouttherightto sue forrevisionand
damages,justas in thecolony?
What good are the sacrificesof the Indonesianpeople in the struggleforindepen-
dence, if,as in thecolonial period,Indonesiansdo not have the rightand freedomto
think,to write,to organize,to hold meetings,to join politicalparties,to act in opposi-
tion,to strike,and so on.20
And so on in thesame vein.Yap detailedtheshortcomings ofthe1945Constitution, par-
ticularlywith respectto executive and
authority, sharply criticizedthe limitationof rights
alreadyevidentin theearlyGuided Democracyperiod.Finally,he excerptedfromhis ear-
lierspeechin theConstituent Assembly:
In EnglishI once quoted thesayingthat... ifhumanbeingswere angels,thenGovern-
mentwould be unnecessary.And I added: Therewould also be no need forConstitu-
tions. But humans are not angels. Indeed, humans oftendo evil things,and do not
always do virtuousthings.We realize thatall authoritymay be abused, and thatas
authorityincreases,so does its abuse. Consequently,humans in authoritymust have
limitsimposedon theirauthority in orderto protectthemagainstthemselvesand to pro-
tectothersagainstthem.

19Inhis memoirs,Siauw pointsout thatin thepreparatory committee discussionsin August1945,theinitialdraft

of Article6 requiredthe presidentto be both Muslimand asli. On August 18, it was agreed thatthe religious
qualificationshouldbe removed,forit was understoodthatas Indonesia's populationis overwhelmingly Mus-
lim,the presidentwas bound to be a Muslimanyway.The same reasoningshould have applied to the ethnic
qualification,Siauw agrees, but no one raised the issue. At that session of the preparatorycommitteeone
peranakanmemberwas present,Yap Tjwan Bing,lateron thePNI council,butaccordingto therecordhe did not
object.See MuhammadYamin,Naskah-Persiapan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945(Jakarta: Yayasan Prapantja,1959) 1:
402,418.Siauw claimedin 1959,repeatingthepointin his memoirs,thatone reasonfortheasli qualificationwas
to avoid thepossibilitythata Japanesepresidentmightbe imposed.Siauw, LimaJaman, p. 286. I know ofno cor-
roborating evidenceforthisassertion.
20RisalahKonstituante,
1959,Sidang ke-I, Rapatke-12,May 12,1959,612-19,at 613-14.

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108 DanielS. Lev

The debate over this issue, among others,transplantedto the Baperki Congress in
Semarangin December1960led toYap's departurefromtheorganization.21 Italso indicated
Yap's departurefromthe strategicthinkingof many peranakan leaders about the rela-
tionshipof the Chinese minorityto the Indonesian state.Siauw represented-or better,
formulated-thechoiceofa substantialJavaneseperanakanintellectualstratumto bet opti-
misticallyon theabilityofSoekarnoand his supporton theleftto bringabout thefunda-
mentalchangethatwould secureperanakanchances.ButYap, skepticaloutsiderand much
puzzled by theintricaciesofJavanesepoliticalhabits,had littlefaithin thiskindofprogno-
sis. Moreover,he was alreadymovingbeyond peranakangroundstowardthe largerand
less confining arena ofIndonesianstateand society,a pointto returnto later.
One lastdebate overperanakanissues is worthrecounting, in whichYap confronted not
onlySiauw but Siauw's critics,made up largelyof "assimilators."It came to a head in the
pages ofStarWeekly in 1960,at a timewhentheChineseminority was underattack,uncer-
tain,and tense,largelyas a resultof the turmoilover thealien tradersrestrictions of 1959
(PP 10 [government regulation 10, 1959])but also, in
still, connection with issues of citizen-
ship and education.In thisperiodofangst,thelong debateover peranakanchoicessharp-
ened considerably.
In Star Weekly,a group of ten well-knownperanakanfigurespublished a statement
favoringvoluntary"assimilation"as the way out of theminoritydilemma.By thisview,
peranakanshould in effectdisappearthroughabsorptionby adopting"Indonesian"names,
sheddingChinese distinctions, and becomingessentially"Indonesian."22Afterall, said its
proponents,Chinese had long mixedbiologicallyand culturallywithindigenousIndone-
sians, and artificialobstacles to the continuingprocess,whetherin the formof Chinese
"exclusiveness"or anti-Chineseprejudice,should be eliminated.It was not an insensible
position.
But it clashed frontally
withtheequally compelling"integrationist" view, whichhad it
thattheChineseminority, no less thanany otherminority in a countrymade up of minori-
ties,should be accepted as partof theIndonesianuniverse,withoutadditionalprejudicial
encumbrances.This was Baperki'sargument.Here Yap and Siauw were agreed,and both
were particularlyincensed by the proposal that Chinese should adopt "Indonesian"
names.23But agreementstopped there,forhow integrationwas to be achieved divided
Siauw and Yap (and manyothers)sharply.Siauw, again,was convincedthatonlya radical
restructuring ofIndonesianeconomyand societywould makeeffective integrationpossible,
forthe problem,he believed,was a side effectof the economicinjusticeand exploitation

21AttheSemarangCongress,Yap delivereda speechin whichhe attackedSiauw unremittingly forsupporting

thePKI and Soekarno.Siauw did notreply,but Yap was hooteddown mercilessly by themembershipand vili-
fied personallyin a speech by BuyungSaleh. Yap attendedno meetingsof Baperkithereafter, but he never
resignedhis vice-presidency or membership, insistingthathe would have to be ousted formally,
whichSiauw
and otherofficers refusedto do. In 1968,whenYap was accused ofCommunistassociationsthroughhis connec-
tionwithBaperki,his speechat the1960Congresshelpedto vitiatethecharge.
22StarWeekly, March26, 1960.
23Again and again in his memoirsSiauw returnsto the name-changingissue, which he mistakenlyattributes
entirelyto Catholicperanakan,castigatingits proponentsin undisguisedangerand contempt.Duringthelate
1960s,when the pressureon peranakanto adopt "Indonesian"names became particularlyheavy,both from
withinand withoutthecommunity, no one opposed it morefiercely
thanYap, thoughtheissue will notbe taken
up in detailhere.I use quotationmarksaround "Indonesian"heresimplyto makethepointthat,fromone per-
spective,in Indonesia "Chinese" names are no less "Indonesian" than "Batak," "Javanese,""Balinese," or
"Menadonese"names.

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 Yap ThiamHien 109

caused by colonialismand imperialism.24Yap was equally convincedthattheCommunist

curehe believedSiauw offeredwould killall thepatients.
In a seriesofarticlesforStar Weekly entitled"The ThreeTherapies,"whichstimulated
more (and more acrimonious)correspondencethan the journal had ever received,Yap
attackedwhat he probablyconceivedas leftand rightextremes.25 In the firstpiece, pub-
lishedas a briefletter, Yap dismissed Siauw's "Communist" therapypartlyon groundsthat
it was totalitarian and, therefore,ideologicallyunacceptablebut also more subtlybecause
opposition to it by themajority Islamicand ChristianIndonesiansmade it unrealistic.In
of
thesecond letter,he challengedthe"assimilationist" positionofthetentokoh(prominents).
First, wrote,althoughvoluntaryassimilationwas one way of resolvingthe minority
he
problem,therewere othermeans ofdoing so: thelegal eliminationofall formsofdiscrimi-
nationand educationin democracyand humanrights,policiesthatwould fostergood racial
and ethnicrelations.Second, and more emphatically,social-politicalconditionsand the
temperofthecountrywere notconduciveto assimilation.In his criticismofboththerapies,
Yap eventuallyprovedquite right,even prescient.
The thirdarticle,in whichYap offeredhis own solution,is remarkableforitsacuteanal-
ysisof the peranakanproblemand ofminorityrelationsgenerally.In some ways it repre-
sentsYap at hisbest:detached,analytical,rigorous,even-handed,and unremittingly critical.
Yap was mostconcernedherenotwithSiauw's argumentbut withthatof theassimilators,
whichhe probably(and correctly)thoughtthemoredangerousillusionbecause it seemed
moreobvious and compellinglysimple.Drawingon theworkof Louis Wirth,ArnoldRose,
Levi-Strauss,the Declarationof Human Rights,and muchelse, he presentedminoritiesas
the creationof dominantmajorities--defined by theirpower,as in the case of the Dutch
colonial"majority"-thatwould themselvesbe affected by theirtreatment ofminorities. In a
concise comparativereview of the experienceof minoritiesaround the world-Jews in
Europe and blacks in the United States,among others-he pointed out thatphysical or
culturaldifferences were thebases on whichgroupsofcitizenswereturnedintominorities.
For thisreason,he wrote,thetentokohwantedto getridofthedifferences theyperceivedto
be groundsfordiscrimination againstperanakan. But were theyright supposingthatthis
in
was the only way to do it? No, forSwitzerland,Hawaii, the Soviet Union, and China
demonstratedthat national unity and coexistencewere possible without a culturally
destructiveleveling(nivellering) in thekindof"bravenew world"Hitlersoughtto create.26
Replying to the arguments of Lauw Tjoan Tho, one of thetentokoh,Yap agreed thatunder
optimumcircumstancesassimilation,as a multidirectional process of give-and-take,was
desirable,but
assimilationofa minority intoa "dominantgroup" cannotpossiblybe achieved ifonly
theminoritywishes it while thisobjectiveis rejectedby the "dominantgroup." And if
we do not hesitateto pointout thatat presentthereis a partof the "dominantgroup"
thatrejectsassimilationof theChinese minority, it is because the factsspeak loud and

24Siauw's commitment to thisanalysiswas genuine.In his memoirshe returnsto it endlessly,to the pointof
makinghis autobiography morepedanticand boringthanitoughtto have been.Siauw, LimaJaman, passim.
25Yap'sthreearticlesappearedin StarWeekly on April16 and 30 and May 21,1%0. The criticalresponses,includ-
ingone by Siauw, wenton throughJune.BuyungSaleh wrotea generallyvituperative but occasionallyreasoned
reply in thepages of BeritaBaperki,May 15,1960.
26Nazi Germany,whichYap thoughttheepitomeof evil,was muchon his mindduringthisperiod.In an origi-
nal draftof the firstinstallmentof the "ThreeTherapies,"a long introductory paragraphdeals with "Nazi-
fascists"and theirtreatment of Indonesiancitizensof Chinesedescent.In thepublishedversion,thisparagraph
and all references
to "Nazi-fascists"are excised,probablyat therequestofStarWeekly's publishers.

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110 DanielS. Lev

clear. Up to the present Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent still experience

"restriction of employmentopportunities, lack of access to facilitiesthatare meantto
serve the population in general, the presence of bias and antagonismamong law
enforcementofficialsand many other manifestationsof prejudice" (Arnold Rose,
UNESCO study).Can this"discrimination and exclusion"be regardedas signs of the
acceptance of theproposal of Lauw Tjoan Tho et al.? Ifthereis no discrimination
based
on physical and cultural differences,then there are no more minoritiesand no
"dominantgroup."And ifthereare no minorities and dominantgroup,isn'ttheprob-
lem done with?... We do notoppose assimilationan sich.We are onlytryingto explain
thatassimilation,as a meansofresolvingtheminority problem,is not now appropriate.
For discriminationhas damaged the relationsbetweengroups,and bad interrelations
are nottherightsoil and climateforthecultivationand sproutingofassimilation.27
Afterfollowinga clearheadedand sustainedargumentforseveralimpressivepassages,
however,suddenlytheconclusiontakesan astonishingleap intoan abyss of confusionas
Yap proposes his own way out. It may indicatehow manyblind alleys thinkersabout the
minorityproblemran intoand how desperatetheywere forpromisingsolutions.Having
rejectedsimplestructural and simplerassimilationist analyses,Yap decided that"theprob-
lem is man himself,"and his diagnosis was thatthehuman soul is sick. The remedywas
"Not 'brainwashing'but 'heart-cleansing'; not a change in the structureof societybut a
change from the materialistic
and homocentric to a Christocentric view of man; not the
eliminationof physicaland culturaldifferences, but the eliminationof prejudice,egoism,
and hypocrisy;thatthereno longerbe a 'dominantgroup' but insteada 'ministering elite'
(dienende not
elite); the of
retooling man, butthe rebirth of man in Jesus Christ."28

Yet in the dizzyingunrealityof thisstatement,thereis an inklingof anothersolution

thathelped to pave Yap's road out oftheconfinement ofethnicpoliticsand attachments.
Evena.mong peranakanintellectualsand professionals,Yap was less well suited than
most,and uncomfortable, in a world definedmainlyby ethnicboundaries.By upbringing,
education,culture,and experiencehe had littlereasonto feelat home in a Chinese,or even
"Indonesian-Chinese," setting.He foundhimselfthere,as a publicman,largelyforlack of
an alternativethatofferedno resistanceeitherin a largerIndonesianuniverseor in his own
mind.Siauw, moreexperiencedand familiarin theperanakan(and totok)world,used his
knowledge of and connectionsin the political systemto incorporatethe minorityinto
nationalpolitics.Ultimately, however,his positionin Baperkiand his devotionto itscauses,
though it did not narrow his ideologicalcommitments, did limitthereachof his voice. He
donned an identityand was held to it. Yap, who had more reluctantly accepted thesame
identity,was less bound by it and freer
to an
pursue ideological course thatwas not exactly

27Yap,"ThreeTherapies,"fromthetypescript version,p. 7. Yap goes on: "Thatassimilationof individualshas

occurred in the past, now too, and will in the future,despite everything,cannot be denied. But these...
exceptionsprovetherule."
28StarWeekly,May 21,1960,p. 6; p. 7 oftheoriginaltypscript manuscript.Whatexactlywas in Yap's mindwhen
he wrotethisand to whom preciselyhe directedit is notat all clear. Did he mean thatChinese had to turnto
Christor thatall Indonesiansshould do so? Did he reallybelieve any of thismade sense? or did he, failingall
else, simplyfallback on the religiouspurposethathad become so importantin his own life?We nevertalked
about thearticle,at leastnotdirectly,
and so I have no idea whathe meant.It was, however,a timeofgreatstress
forhimbecause of his battlewithinBaperki,his angerat the politicsof Guided Democracy,and his anxieties
over the persecutionof Chinese.The church,in which,as always, he was hard at workon othermatters,may
have been theone place wherehe foundany satisfaction.

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 Yap ThiamHien 111

divorcedfrom,butindependentof,theaccidentofhavingbeen bornChinese.Ideologically,
he was capable of thinkingbeyondtheinterestsof theChinesecommunityto considerthe
characterofIndonesianstateand society,as hisdiscussionsin the "ThreeTherapies"show.
So, clearly,was Siauw, thoughpoliticallySiauw riskedprincipleforwhat appeared to be
politicalnecessity.Yap stuckto principle,partlybecause he was in a betterpositionto do so
butalso because he had littleelse to fallback on.
The ideology thatfinallycounted,however,was not Christianity, which was another
blindminorityalley,but law. Once squeezed out ofBaperki,Yap did not put theperanakan
problemout ofmindbut,witha slightpush,leapt toa different, Indonesian,stageon which
minorityquestionswere significant but submergedin a morecomplexnetworkfashioned
fromruleoflaw and humanrightsissues.
If,as he argued in Star Weekly, theminorityproblemwas largelya "dominantgroup"
problem, then it had to be approached throughan openingof principleto the Indonesian
stateand its responsibilities to Indonesiansociety.This turnof thoughtentailedanother,
which was perhaps more important-theproblemsof the Chinese minoritywere not sui
generis.Theycould not,orshouldnot,be construedseparatelyfromhumanrightsproblems
generally.The appropriatestrugglewas notforChinesealone,butforall Indonesians.
Yap's own openingwas throughthe professionaladvocacy.He became widely known
beyond the peranakancommunityquite suddenly,in 1966,forhis defenseof Subandrio
beforetheMilitaryTribunal-Extraordinary. Insteadof a pro formashow,Yap turnedout a
stunning defense repletewith fine legal edges, which the judges ignored,and powerful
politicalcriticism,which the audience did not.Yap had appeared,withanotheradvocate,in
the name of PERADIN, the Indonesian Associationof Advocates. Althougha founding
memberofPERADIN in 1963-64,he remaineduncertainthatindigenousIndonesianadvo-
catescould everaccepta peranakancolleagueon equal terms.It was morehis problemthan
theirs.Few senioradvocates of thatgeneration-ofthecharacterof LukmanWiriadinata,
Hasjim Mahdan, SoemarnoP. Wirjanto,Ani Abas Manoppo, Suardi Tasrif,and others-
were much infectedby ethnicbigotry.29 Or, to the extentthattheywere infected,profes-
sional and collegialloyaltiesneverthelesstookprecedence.In PERADIN, at long last,even
more perhaps thanin thechurch,whichitselfremainedtroubledby ethniccleavage, Yap
found the kind of nonethnicsettingthathelped freehim fromthe suffocating asthma of
ethnicidentity.The proofcame in 1968, when Yap himselfwas illegallydetained by a
corruptprosecutorand police officialwhom he had accused of extortion. Afterhis release,
they had him prosecuted for criminal libel. His PERADIN colleagues-Zainal Abidin,
and
DjamaluddinSingomangkuto, Hasjim Mahdan-stepped forward todefend
voluntarily
him. For the skepticalYap, who always respectedaction,more than words alone, it was
revelationand liberation,more importantto him,I suspect,than he ever admittedto his
attorneys. Thereafter,hisclosestfriendscame fromtheintimatecircleofseniorprofessional
advocates.
Thereafter,too, he spent less and less timeon Chinese issues and more and more on
thoseoflegal processand humanrights.The last majorChineseissue he tookup had to do
29Thepointis worthmakingthatin general,the higherreachesof thepriyayiclass to whichmostsenioradvo-
withJavaneseperanakan.It was forthis
cates were bornhad always gottenalong quite well,even intimately,
reason thatduringthe parliamentaryperiod,when priyayiscions dominatedthe politicalelite,the Chinese
minority, thoughunderpressure,could expectmoresympathyand help thanwas thecase later,when middle-
class elementsthathad long competedwithand were hostileto Chinese economicadvantage rose to promi-
via thearmy.
nence,particularly

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112 DanielS. Lev

withthe controversyover pressureto adopt "Indonesian"names,which he continuedto

excoriateunequivocally.30 by anymeans,and whenthe
It was notthatYap had lostinterest,
occasion arose, he remainedadamant in defenseof Chinese citizensbut now as citizens
morethanas an isolatedminority and moreas a generalprincipleofhumanrightsthanas a
specificissue in ethnicrelations.This positionfollowednaturallyfromhis own political
evolution.Liberatedfromthe rigidlimitsof ethnicidentity,he himselfnow spoke as an
Indonesiancitizen.
He spoke,moreover,and acted withall thecourage,bluntness,forthrightness, passion,
and tenacitythathad drivenhis antagonistsin Baperki(and occasionallyin churchcircles)
to distraction.In PERADIN, theLegal Aid Institute, theInstitutefortheDefenseofHuman
Rights,in thepress,parliament, in court,in theWorldCouncilofChurchesand theInterna-
tionalCommissionof Jurists, and elsewhere,he simplyneverstopped-to the day of his
deathin April1989--defending imperativevalues ofhumanrightsand justice.He becamea
livingsymbol of thehuman rightsstruggle,widelyknownand appreciatedforhisintegrity,
courage, and refusal to be quiet. Beyonda certainpoint,fewthoughtofhimany longeras
theChinese Yap. The thousandswho paid respectsat his funeraland theactiviststudents
who shoutedthenthatYap belongedto thenationclearlythoughtofhim as a special kind
of Indonesian,not a peculiarkindof Chinese.By theend of his life,Yap himselffeltcom-
fortablewiththisview.

30Bythis time,in the early New Order,Baperkiwas gone, its leadershipscatteredamong various jails and
prisons.Siauw was detaineduntilthemid-1970s,when he was releasedand wentto Holland,wherehe died in
the 1980s.He and Yap had one last,rathermiserableconfrontation
in 1980,in Holland, whereYap had gone to
receivean honorarydegreefromtheVrijeUniversiteit. Ata meetingofIndonesianChineseimmigrants to which
Yap was asked to speak, withSiauw present,he harshlycondemnedthe politicalconsequencesthatBaperki
bequeathedto thecitizensofChinesedescent.Siauw, perhapsangrybutundoubtedlyhurt,brieflydefendedthe
organization'sachievements.

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