Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Aliviado, Et Al. v. Procter & Gamble and PROMM-GEM, G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
Aliviado, Et Al. v. Procter & Gamble and PROMM-GEM, G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
Labor laws expressly prohibit "labor-only" contracting. To prevent its circumvention, the Labor Code
establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the employees of the `labor-
only' contractor.
The instant petition for review assails the March 21, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 52082 and its October 20, 2003 Resolution[2] denying the motions for reconsideration
separately filed by petitioners and respondent Procter & Gamble Phils. Inc. (P&G). The appellate court
affirmed the July 27, 1998 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which in turn
affirmed the November 29, 1996 Decision[3] of the Labor Arbiter. All these decisions found Promm-Gem,
Inc. (Promm-Gem) and Sales and Promotions Services (SAPS) to be legitimate independent contractors
and the employers of the petitioners.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G from various dates, allegedly starting as early as 1982 or
as late as June 1991, to either May 5, 1992 or March 11, 1993, more specifically as follows:
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
67. Rodolfo C. Toledo[, Jr.] May 14, 1991 March 11, 1993
68. Arnold D. [Laspoña] June 1991 March 11, 1993
69. Philip M. Loza March 5, 1992 March 11, 1993
70. Mario N. C[o]ldayon May 14, 1991 March 11, 1993
71. Orlando P. Jimenez November 6, 1992 March 11, 1993
72. Fred P. Jimenez September, 1991 March 11, 1993
73. Restituto C. Pamintuan, Jr. March 5, 1992 March 11, 1993
74. Rolando J. de Andres June, 1991 March 11, 1993
75. Artuz Bustenera[, Jr.] December, 1989 March 11, 1993
76. Roberto B. Cruz May 4, 1990 March 11, 1993
77. Rosedy O. Yordan June, 1991 May 5, 1992
78. Dennis Dacasin May, 1990 May 5, 1992
79. Alejandrino Abaton 1988 May 5, 1992
80. Orlando S. Balangue March, 1989 March 11, 1993[4]
They all individually signed employment contracts with either Promm-Gem or SAPS for periods of more
or less five months at a time.[5] They were assigned at different outlets, supermarkets and stores
where they handled all the products of P&G. They received their wages from Promm-Gem or SAPS.[6]
SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for reasons such as
habitual absenteeism, dishonesty or changing day-off without prior notice.[7]
P&G is principally engaged in the manufacture and production of different consumer and health
products, which it sells on a wholesale basis to various supermarkets and distributors.[8] To enhance
consumer awareness and acceptance of the products, P&G entered into contracts with Promm-Gem
and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its products.[9]
In December 1991, petitioners filed a complaint[10] against P&G for regularization, service incentive leave
pay and other benefits with damages. The complaint was later amended[11] to include the matter of their
subsequent dismissal.
SO ORDERED.[12]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of complainants is hereby DISMISSED and the
decision appealed from AFFIRMED.
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the November 19, 1998
Resolution.[15]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated July 27, 1998 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent Procter & Gamble Phils., Inc. is ordered
to pay service incentive leave pay to petitioners.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was also denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues
I.
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED [A] REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DID NOT FIND THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS TO HAVE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING THE
QUESTIONED JUDGMENT WHEN, OBVIOUSLY, THE PETITIONERS WERE ABLE TO PROVE AND
ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENT PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILS., INC. IS THEIR EMPLOYER AND THAT
THEY WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED BY THE FORMER.
II.
WHETHER X X X THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS COMMITTED [A] REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS HAD ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER DID NOT FIND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS LIABLE TO THE
PETITIONERS FOR PAYMENT OF ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS
LITIGATION COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.[17]
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) whether P&G is the employer of petitioners; (2) whether petitioners
were illegally dismissed; and (3) whether petitioners are entitled for payment of actual, moral and
exemplary damages as well as litigation costs and attorney's fees.
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners insist that they are employees of P&G. They claim that they were recruited by the
salesmen of P&G and were engaged to undertake merchandising chores for P&G long before the
existence of Promm-Gem and/or SAPS. They further claim that when the latter had its so-called re-
alignment program, petitioners were instructed to fill up application forms and report to the agencies
which P&G created.[18]
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
Petitioners further claim that P&G instigated their dismissal from work as can be gleaned from its
letter[19] to SAPS dated February 24, 1993, informing the latter that their Merchandising Services
Contract will no longer be renewed.
Petitioners further assert that Promm-Gem and SAPS are labor-only contractors providing services of
manpower to their client. They claim that the contractors have neither substantial capital nor tools
and equipment to undertake independent labor contracting. Petitioners insist that since they had been
engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of P&G,
then they are its regular employees.[20]
Respondents' Arguments
On the other hand, P&G points out that the instant petition raises only questions of fact and should thus
be thrown out as the Court is not a trier of facts. It argues that findings of facts of the NLRC,
particularly where the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are in agreement, are deemed binding and
conclusive on the Supreme Court.
P&G further argues that there is no employment relationship between it and petitioners. It was
Promm-Gem or SAPS that (1) selected petitioners and engaged their services; (2) paid their salaries; (3)
wielded the power of dismissal; and (4) had the power of control over their conduct of work.
P&G also contends that the Labor Code neither defines nor limits which services or activities may be
validly outsourced. Thus, an employer can farm out any of its activities to an independent contractor,
regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in nature. It insists that the determination of
whether to engage the services of a job contractor or to engage in direct hiring is within the ambit of
management prerogative.
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that on January 29, 2007, we deemed as waived the filing of
the Comment of Promm-Gem on the petition.[21] Also, although SAPS was impleaded as a party in the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, it was no longer impleaded as a party in the
proceedings before the CA.[22] Hence, our pronouncements with regard to SAPS are only for the
purpose of determining the obligations of P&G, if any.
Our Ruling
As a rule, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies
exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to
wade into factual matters when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence on record to support
those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete
facts appearing on record.[23] In the present case, we find the need to review the records to ascertain
the facts.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable
with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to
employees directly employed by him.
Rule VIII-A, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order
No. 18-02,[24] distinguishes between legitimate and labor-only contracting:
xxxx
xxxx
i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which
relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited,
supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which
are directly related to the main business of the principal; or
ii) [T]he contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the
work of the contractual employee.
The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248 (c) of
the Labor Code, as amended.
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
The "right to control" shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the
services of the contractual workers are performed, to determine not only the end to be
achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.
x x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, the law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the performance of
specific jobs, works or services. Indeed, it is management prerogative to farm out any of its activities,
regardless of whether such activity is peripheral or core in nature. However, in order for such
outsourcing to be valid, it must be made to an independent contractor because the current labor rules
expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.
To emphasize, there is labor-only contracting when the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits,
supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal[25] and any of the following
elements are present:
i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which
relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the employees recruited,
supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which
are directly related to the main business of the principal; or
ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the
work of the contractual employee. (Underscoring supplied)
has authorized capital stock of P1 million and a paid-in capital, or capital available for operations, of
P500,000.00 as of 1990.[27] It also has long term assets worth P432,895.28 and current assets of
P719,042.32. Promm-Gem has also proven that it maintained its own warehouse and office space with a
floor area of 870 square meters.[28] It also had under its name three registered vehicles which were
used for its promotional/merchandising business.[29] Promm-Gem also has other clients[30] aside from
P&G.[31] Under the circumstances, we find that Promm-Gem has substantial investment which relates to
the work to be performed. These factors negate the existence of the element specified in Section 5(i)
of DOLE Department Order No. 18-02.
The records also show that Promm-Gem supplied its complainant-workers with the relevant materials,
such as markers, tapes, liners and cutters, necessary for them to perform their work. Promm-Gem
also issued uniforms to them. It is also relevant to mention that Promm-Gem already considered the
complainants working under it as its regular, not merely contractual or project, employees.[32] This
circumstance negates the existence of element (ii) as stated in Section 5 of DOLE Department Order No.
18-02, which speaks of contractual employees. This, furthermore, negates - on the part of Promm-Gem
- bad faith and intent to circumvent labor laws which factors have often been tipping points that lead
the Court to strike down the employment practice or agreement concerned as contrary to public
policy, morals, good customs or public order.[33]
Under the circumstances, Promm-Gem cannot be considered as a labor-only contractor. We find that it
is a legitimate independent contractor.
On the other hand, the Articles of Incorporation of SAPS shows that it has a paid-in capital of only
P31,250.00. There is no other evidence presented to show how much its working capital and assets
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
are. Furthermore, there is no showing of substantial investment in tools, equipment or other assets.
In Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,[34] the Court held that "[w]ith the current economic
atmosphere in the country, the paid-in capitalization of PMCI amounting to P75,000.00 cannot be
considered as substantial capital and, as such, PMCI cannot qualify as an independent contractor."[35]
Applying the same rationale to the present case, it is clear that SAPS - having a paid-in capital of only
P31,250 - has no substantial capital. SAPS' lack of substantial capital is underlined by the records[36]
which show that its payroll for its merchandisers alone for one month would already total P44,561.00.
It had 6-month contracts with P&G.[37] Yet SAPS failed to show that it could complete the 6-month
contracts using its own capital and investment. Its capital is not even sufficient for one month's
payroll. SAPS failed to show that its paid-in capital of P31,250.00 is sufficient for the period required
for it to generate its needed revenue to sustain its operations independently. Substantial capital
refers to capitalization used in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted
out. In the present case, SAPS has failed to show substantial capital.
Furthermore, the petitioners have been charged with the merchandising and promotion of the products
of P&G, an activity that has already been considered by the Court as doubtlessly directly related to the
manufacturing business,[38] which is the principal business of P&G. Considering that SAPS has no
substantial capital or investment and the workers it recruited are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of P&G, we find that the former is engaged in "labor-only
contracting".
"Where `labor-only' contracting exists, the Labor Code itself establishes an employer-employee
relationship between the employer and the employees of the `labor-only' contractor."[39] The statute
establishes this relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws.
The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to
the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the
principal employer.[40]
Consequently, the following petitioners, having been recruited and supplied by SAPS[41] -- which engaged
in labor-only contracting -- are considered as the employees of P&G: Arthur Corpuz, Eric Aliviado,
Monchito Ampeloquio, Abraham Basmayor, Jr., Jonathan Mateo, Lorenzo Platon, Estanislao
Buenaventura, Lope Salonga, Franz David, Nestor Ignacio, Jr., Rolando Romasanta, Roehl Agoo, Bonifacio
Ortega, Arsenio Soriano, Jr., Arnel Endaya, Roberto Enriquez, Edgardo Quiambao, Santos Bacalso,
Samson Basco, Alstando Montos, Rainer N. Salvador, Pedro G. Roy, Leonardo F. Talledo, Enrique F. Talledo,
Joel Billones, Allan Baltazar, Noli Gabuyo, Gerry Gatpo, German Guevara, Gilbert V. Miranda, Rodolfo C.
Toledo, Jr., Arnold D. Laspoña, Philip M. Loza, Mario N. Coldayon, Orlando P. Jimenez, Fred P. Jimenez,
Restituto C. Pamintuan, Jr., Rolando J. De Andres, Artuz Bustenera, Jr., Roberto B. Cruz, Rosedy O.
Yordan, Orlando S. Balangue, Emil Tawat, Cresente J. Garcia, Melencio Casapao, Romeo Vasquez, Renato
dela Cruz, Romeo Viernes, Jr., Elias Basco and Dennis Dacasin.
The following petitioners, having worked under, and been dismissed by Promm-Gem, are considered the
employees of Promm-Gem, not of P&G: Wilfredo Torres, John Sumergido, Edwin Garcia, Mario P.
Liongson, Jr., Ferdinand Salvo, Alejandrino Abaton, Emmanuel A. Laban, Ernesto Soyosa, Aladino Gregore,
Jr., Ramil Reyes, Ruben Vasquez, Jr., Maximino Pascual, Willie Ortiz, Armando Villar, Jose Fernando
Gutierrez, Ramiro Pita, Fernando Macabenta, Nestor Esquila, Julio Rey, Albert Leynes, Ernesto Calanao,
Roberto Rosales, Antonio Dacuma, Tadeo Durano, Raul Dulay, Marino Maranion, Joseph Banico, Melchor
Cardano, Reynaldo Jacaban, and Joeb Aliviado.[42]
Termination of services
We now discuss the issue of whether petitioners were illegally dismissed. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just[43] or
authorized[44] cause.
In the instant case, the termination letters given by Promm-Gem to its employees uniformly specified
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
xxxx
This informs you that effective May 5, 1992, your employment with our company, Promm-
Gem, Inc. has been terminated. We find your expressed admission, that you considered
yourself as an employee of Procter & Gamble Phils., Inc.... and assailing the integrity of the
Company as legitimate and independent promotion firm, is deemed as an act of disloyalty
prejudicial to the interests of our Company: serious misconduct and breach of trust
reposed upon you as employee of our Company which [co]nstitute just cause for the
termination of your employment.
x x x x[45]
Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct; the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful in character implying wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious must be of such grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant.[46] To be a just cause for dismissal, such
misconduct (a) must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c)
must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.[47]
In other words, in order to constitute serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal of an
employee under paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act or
conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important and
required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent.[48] In the instant
case, petitioners-employees of Promm-Gem may have committed an error of judgment in claiming to be
employees of P&G, but it cannot be said that they were motivated by any wrongful intent in doing so. As
such, we find them guilty of only simple misconduct for assailing the integrity of Promm-Gem as a
legitimate and independent promotion firm. A misconduct which is not serious or grave, as that
existing in the instant case, cannot be a valid basis for dismissing an employee.
Meanwhile, loss of trust and confidence, as a ground for dismissal, must be based on the willful breach
of the trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Ordinary breach will not suffice. A breach of
trust is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.[49]
Loss of trust and confidence, as a cause for termination of employment, is premised on the fact that
the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility or of trust and confidence. As such, he must
be invested with confidence on delicate matters, such as custody, handling or care and protection of
the property and assets of the employer. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be work-related and must show that the employee is unfit to continue to work for
the employer.[50] In the instant case, the petitioners-employees of Promm-Gem have not been shown to
be occupying positions of responsibility or of trust and confidence. Neither is there any evidence to
show that they are unfit to continue to work as merchandisers for Promm-Gem.
All told, we find no valid cause for the dismissal of petitioners-employees of Promm-Gem.
While Promm-Gem had complied with the procedural aspect of due process in terminating the
employment of petitioners-employees, i.e., giving two notices and in between such notices, an
opportunity for the employees to answer and rebut the charges against them, it failed to comply with
the substantive aspect of due process as the acts complained of neither constitute serious misconduct
nor breach of trust. Hence, the dismissal is illegal.
With regard to the petitioners placed with P&G by SAPS, they were given no written notice of
dismissal. The records show that upon receipt by SAPS of P&G's letter terminating their
"Merchandising Services Contact" effective March 11, 1993, they in turn verbally informed the
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
concerned petitioners not to report for work anymore. The concerned petitioners related their
dismissal as follows:
xxxx
5. On March 11, 1993, we were called to a meeting at SAPS office. We were told by Mr.
Saturnino A. Ponce that we should already stop working immediately because that was
the order of Procter and Gamble. According to him he could not do otherwise because
Procter and Gamble was the one paying us. To prove that Procter and Gamble was the one
responsible in our dismissal, he showed to us the letter[51] dated February 24, 1993, x x x
Gentlemen:
Based on our discussions last 5 and 19 February 1993, this formally informs
you that we will not be renewing our Merchandising Services Contract with
your agency.
Very truly
yours,
(Sgd.)
EMMANUEL M.
NON
Sales
Merchandising
III
6. On March 12, 1993, we reported to our respective outlet assignments. But, we were no
longer allowed to work and we were refused entrance by the security guards posted.
According to the security guards, all merchandisers of Procter and Gamble under S[APS]
who filed a case in the Dept. of Labor are already dismissed as per letter of Procter and
Gamble dated February 25, 1993. x x x[52]
Neither SAPS nor P&G dispute the existence of these circumstances. Parenthetically, unlike Promm-
Gem which dismissed its employees for grave misconduct and breach of trust due to disloyalty, SAPS
dismissed its employees upon the initiation of P&G. It is evident that SAPS does not carry on its own
business because the termination of its contract with P&G automatically meant for it also the
termination of its employees' services. It is obvious from its act that SAPS had no other clients and
had no intention of seeking other clients in order to further its merchandising business. From all
indications SAPS, existed to cater solely to the need of P&G for the supply of employees in the latter's
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
merchandising concerns only. Under the circumstances prevailing in the instant case, we cannot
consider SAPS as an independent contractor.
Going back to the matter of dismissal, it must be emphasized that the onus probandi to prove the
lawfulness of the dismissal rests with the employer.[53] In termination cases, the burden of proof rests
upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause.[54] In the instant case, P&G
failed to discharge the burden of proving the legality and validity of the dismissals of those petitioners
who are considered its employees. Hence, the dismissals necessarily were not justified and are
therefore illegal.
Damages
We now go to the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to damages. Moral
and exemplary damages are recoverable where the dismissal of an employee was attended by bad
faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor or was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.[55]
With regard to the employees of Promm-Gem, there being no evidence of bad faith, fraud or any
oppressive act on the part of the latter, we find no support for the award of damages.
As for P&G, the records show that it dismissed its employees through SAPS in a manner oppressive to
labor. The sudden and peremptory barring of the concerned petitioners from work, and from admission
to the work place, after just a one-day verbal notice, and for no valid cause bellows oppression and
utter disregard of the right to due process of the concerned petitioners. Hence, an award of moral
damages is called for.
Attorney's fees may likewise be awarded to the concerned petitioners who were illegally dismissed in
bad faith and were compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect their rights by reason of the
oppressive acts[56] of P&G.
Lastly, under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, inclusive of allowances,
and other benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time the compensation was withheld up to
the time of actual reinstatement.[57] Hence, all the petitioners, having been illegally dismissed are
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages and other benefits
from the time of their illegal dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 52082 and the Resolution dated October 20, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Procter &
Gamble Phils., Inc. and Promm-Gem, Inc. are ORDERED to reinstate their respective employees
immediately without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages and other benefits from the time
of their illegal dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement. Procter & Gamble Phils., Inc. is
further ORDERED to pay each of those petitioners considered as its employees, namely Arthur Corpuz,
Eric Aliviado, Monchito Ampeloquio, Abraham Basmayor, Jr., Jonathan Mateo, Lorenzo Platon, Estanislao
Buenaventura, Lope Salonga, Franz David, Nestor Ignacio, Rolando Romasanta, Roehl Agoo, Bonifacio
Ortega, Arsenio Soriano, Jr., Arnel Endaya, Roberto Enriquez, Edgardo Quiambao, Santos Bacalso,
Samson Basco, Alstando Montos, Rainer N. Salvador, Pedro G. Roy, Leonardo F. Talledo, Enrique F. Talledo,
Joel Billones, Allan Baltazar, Noli Gabuyo, Gerry Gatpo, German Guevara, Gilbert Y. Miranda, Rodolfo C.
Toledo, Jr., Arnold D. Laspoña, Philip M. Loza, Mario N. Coldayon, Orlando P. Jimenez, Fred P. Jimenez,
Restituto C. Pamintuan, Jr., Rolando J. De Andres, Artuz Bustenera, Jr., Roberto B. Cruz, Rosedy O.
Yordan, Orlando S. Balangue, Emil Tawat, Cresente J. Garcia, Melencio Casapao, Romeo Vasquez, Renato
dela Cruz, Romeo Viernes, Jr., Elias Basco and Dennis Dacasin, P25,000.00 as moral damages plus ten
percent of the total sum as and for attorney's fees.
Let this case be REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for the computation, within 30 days from receipt of
this Decision, of petitioners' backwages and other benefits; and ten percent of the total sum as and for
attorney's fees as stated above; and for immediate execution.
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
SO ORDERED.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 86-95; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices
Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and Mario L. Guariña III.
[2]
Id. at 97-98.
[3]
Id. at 298-312.
[4]
Id. at 30-31.
[5]
Id. at 434-435.
[6]
Id. at 438-440.
[7]
Id. at 441-442.
[8]
Id. at 105.
[9]
Id. at 406-414.
[10]
Id. at 158-164.
[11]
Records, Vol. I, pp. 345-346, 373-392; Records, Vol. II, pp. 396-412.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 112-113.
[13]
Id. at 115-135.
[14]
Id. at 135.
[15]
Id. at 137-157.
[16]
Id. at 94-95.
[17]
Id. at 668.
[18]
Id. at 679.
[19]
Id. at 192.
[20]
Id. at 693-697.
[21]
Id. at 652.
[22]
Id. at 89.
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G.R. No. 160506, March 09, 2010
[23]
Pascua v. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division), 351 Phil 48, 61 (1998).
[24]
RULES IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 106 TO 109 OF THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED, approved February 21,
2002.
[25]
Escario v. National Labor Relations Commission, 388 Phil. 929, 938 (2000).
[26]
Records, Vol. I, p. 208.
[27]
Id. at 211.
[28]
Rollo, p. 453; TSN, February 22, 1994, p. 9.
[29]
Rollo, pp 580-582.
[30]
a. Adidas Division, Rubberworld Phil., Inc.; b. CFC Corporation; c. Focus Enterprise, Inc., d. Procter &
Gamble Phil., Inc., e. Roche Phil., Inc.; f. Sterling Products Int'l., Inc.; g. Southeast Asia Foods, Inc.; h. Pepsi
Co., Inc.; i. Kraft General Foods Phil., Inc.; j. Universal Robina Corp.; k. Wrigley Phil., Inc.; l. Asia Brewery,
Inc.; m. Ayala Land, Inc.; n. Citibank, N.A.; o. S.C. Johnson, Inc.; p. Glaxo Phil., Inc.; q. Bank of the Phil. Island-
Loyola Branch; r. Republic Chemical, Inc.; s. Metrolab, Inc.; and, t. First Pacific Metro Corp. Records, Vol.
I, p. 192.
[31]
Id.
[32]
Records, Vol. II, pp. 599-623.
[33]
The act of hiring and re-hiring workers over a period of time without considering them as regular
employees evinces bad faith on the part of the employer. San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 147566, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 181, 189; Bustamante v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G. R. No. 111651, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 145, 150.
[34]
381 Phil. 460 (2000). This case involved an employee who was dismissed and filed a labor case in
1991, about the same time frame as that involved in this case for purposes of taking judicial notice of
the economic atmosphere in the country.
[35]
Id. at 476.
[36]
Records, Vol. I, p. 556.
[37]
Rollo, p. 412.
[38]
Tabas v. California Manufacturing Co., Inc., 251 Phil. 448, 454 (1989).
[39]
Neri v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 97008-09, July 23, 1993, 224 SCRA 717, 720,
citing Philippine Bank of Communications v. National Labor Relations Commission, 230 Phil. 430, 440
(1986).
[40]
San Miguel Corporation v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 392, 422.
[41]
Records, Vol. I, p. 340. SAPS has admitted that the complainants are its employees.
[42]
Records, Vol. I, p. 193; Vol. II, pp. 666-692.
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[43]
LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ART. 282. Termination by employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
[44]
ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may also
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof x x x
ART. 284. Disease as ground for termination. - An employer may terminate the services of an
employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: x x x
[45]
Records, Vol. II, p. 447.
[46]
National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, G.R. No. 164376, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 361, 375;
Molina v. Pacific Plans, Inc., G.R. No.165476, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 498, 518; Samson v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 386 Phil. 669, 682 (2000).
[47]
Bañez v. De La Salle University, G.R. No. 167177, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 691, 700; Phil. Aeolus
Automotive United Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 387 Phil. 250, 261 (2000).
[48]
National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, supra at 376.
[49]
Velez v. Shangri-La's Edsa Plaza Hotel, G.R. No. 148261, October 9, 2006, 504 SCRA 13, 25.
[50]
Id. at 26.
[51]
Rollo, p. 192.
[52]
Records, Vol. II, p. 413.
[53]
National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, supra note 46 at 383.
[54]
Royal Crown Internationale v. National LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 78085, October 16,
1989, 178 SCRA 569, 578.
ART. 279. - Security of Tenure. − In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate
the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
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