The Lockwood Analytical Method For Prediction (LAMP) - A Method For Predictive Intelligence Analysis (PDFDrive)

The Lockwood
Analytical
Method for
Prediction
(LAMP)
BLOOMSBURY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World

By Anthony Olcott
Sociocultural Intelligence: A New Discipline in Intelligence Studies

By Kerry Patton
BLOOMSBURY INTELLIGENCE STUDIES
The Lockwood
Analytical
Method for
Prediction
(LAMP)
A Method for Predictive
Intelligence Analysis
JONATHAN S. LOCKWOOD
Bloomsbury Academic
An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc
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First published 2013
© Jonathan S. Lockwood, 2013
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lockwood, Jonathan Samuel, 1955-
The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) : a method for predictive
intelligence analysis / Jonathan S. Lockwood.
pages cm. -- (Continuum intelligence studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Intelligence service--Methodology. 2. International relations--Forecasting. 3. Terrorism--
Forecasting. 4. World politics--Forecasting. I. Title.
JF1525.I6L63 2013
327.12--dc23
2013012216
ISBN: ePDF: 978-1-6235-6782-8
Typeset by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN

CONTENTS
Foreword by Dr Mark M. Lowenthal vi

List of figures and tables ix
Introduction: The development of the LAMP xi
PART ONE The LAMP in theory 1

1 The philosophy and steps of the LAMP 3
2 A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques 23
3 The initial use of the LAMP: Case study of the former
Soviet nuclear republics and nuclear weapons 39
4 Limitations and potential applications of the LAMP 59
PART TWO The LAMP in practice 67

5 The future of Afghanistan: Democracy, Islamic Caliphate,
or warlord principalities? A predictive study on possible
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban responses 69
6 Candidate moves in the Levant: An analysis of the region’s
geostrategic future using the LAMP method 129
7 The adaptability of the FARC and ELN and the prediction
of their future actions 209
Select bibliography 321

Index 323
FOREWORD
Dr Mark M. Lowenthal
Few professions are beset by as many “flavors of the month” as is intel-

ligence analysis. New techniques come and go, many of which are
ephemeral, and many more of which are chimerical—all claiming that they
can improve intelligence analysis. That word itself, “improve,” is somewhat
problematic. If we were being honest about what is commonly meant by
the use of this term with regard to analysis, it would mean getting it right
more often than we do now. But given that we have no substantive sense of
an analyst’s batting average—or of the batting average of the larger analytic
community—we would be hard pressed to describe how much improved
analysis should be. What it really comes down to is not making analytic
errors even as we recognize that errors in analysis are part of the price of
being an intelligence analyst. We do not hand out omniscience pills in the
cafeteria.
As I write this Foreword in the spring of 2013, the latest analytic flavor of
the month is big data. Without any substantive proof, big data advocates—
most of whom are IT specialists and not analysts—claim that big data, that
is, the slicing, dicing and parsing of reams of data, will provide answers
we did not even know we were looking for. This is problematic on several
counts. First, although this may be true on Wall Street and in business
where data do drive many decisions, it is much less true in intelligence
analysis where the key questions are not going to be found in the data—big
or small. The questions that most bother policy makers are about the plans,
intentions, and capabilities of other actors. What will Kim Jong Un do
next? Will Iran decide to weaponize its nuclear program? Few would argue
against the centrality of these questions; few should be able to argue that
the answers lie in data. The second problem with our current data-mania
is this is exactly not what policy makers want. When you talk to senior
civilian or military policy makers about this they will be both frank and
consistent: they want knowledge and expertise, not data.
Which brings us to Jonathan Lockwood’s book, The Lockwood Analytic
Method for Prediction (LAMP). This book is appealing on many levels.
First, Jonathan Lockwood has worked as an intelligence analyst, always a
plus when trying to create a new analytic tool or technique and much more
Foreword vii
rare than many would suppose. Second, he recognizes some of the perils of
the field into which he is entering and, unlike many of his predecessors who
make exaggerated claims for what their technique will do, Dr Lockwood
approaches his with a charming degree of modesty. He states quite clearly
that the LAMP is not the be all and end all and that it is an analytic starting
point, not an all inclusive solution. In that same vein, there is something
to be said for a book that forthrightly compares its technique with others
in the field (offering very good explanations for each of them) and that
includes an entire chapter on the limitations of the technique. Three cheers
for intellectual honesty!
One of the most difficult aspects of intelligence analysis is that we are
dealing with other human beings—flawed, deceptive, uncertain, mercurial—
and trying to discern what they will do next. As I have written elsewhere,
our goal as intelligence analysts is to study and write about these difficult
creatures in such a way that we can reduce the uncertainty that our policy
makers face as they both react to these other players and as they try to craft
initiatives of their own. That is where the LAMP comes in. The LAMP is a
12-step analytical process clearly focused on potential political outcomes.
The “P” in the LAMP (prediction) is a bit misleading because the LAMP
will not come up with the one answer. But the LAMP is a very logical series
of analytic steps that will allow an analyst to come up with rank orders of
scenarios of possible outcomes. This is in essence what good intelligence is
about, laying out for policy makers which outcomes are more or less likely,
so that they can focus their attention on these as they see fit. This is a crucial
service as it avoids the “single threading” of analysis that too often is so
narrow that it tends to have a deadening effect on ongoing analysis. It also
recognizes that the most likely scenario may not be the one that actually
happens. The “scenario race” is full of successful dark horses.
I will not go through all 12 steps in the LAMP, which Dr Lockwood
lays out very neatly in Chapter 1. But there are several steps that are
worth noting. Step 4 has the analyst lay out all possible courses of action
by the actors in question. This is a key step as it does not assume that
the actor is rational, only that he can and will act. The assumption of
rationality is one of the biggest flaws in too much intelligence analysis,
especially in a world inhabited by such actors as the Kim family in North
Korea. Now, they may be rational by their own light, but if we only try
to analyze the actions that we find rational then we have committed the
analytic sin of “mirror imaging” and are likely to omit scenarios that
may prove to be important only because “we would never do that.” We
might not but they might. Step 10 requires the analyst to come up with
focal events that would have to occur for our alternate future outcomes to
happen. This is crucial as it creates a list of indicators that will allow the
analyst or policy maker to continue narrowing the field of likely outcomes
as events unfold.
viii Foreword
One of the other appealing aspects of the LAMP is that it is not, as Dr

Lockwood notes, a quantitative system. He lists this as a limitation; I see it
as a plus. When I teach analysis I often point out that the best analytic tool
is a knowledgeable analyst who can think and write and who needs little
more than pencil and paper. Admittedly, as one gets into the more complex
permutations and combinations of various LAMP scenarios, some sort of
IT assistance may be in order, but the bulk of the LAMP can be done in the
simplest ways imaginable. This is definitely a plus.
A great deal of the book is a series of well written essays by three of
Dr Lockwood’s students showing the LAMP in action. Most readers will
probably dip in and out of these chapters but they are useful guides to how
the LAMP works and of the range, subtlety, and sophistication of analysis
that the LAMP can support. A word of praise is also in order for the
authors of these chapters, Nicholas Lusas, Mary Boyle, and Drew Lasater.
Dr Lockwood appropriately gives them credit in his Introduction and I wish
to do the same.
So, let us welcome the LAMP into the lists of analytic tools and
techniques. As I have written elsewhere, good intelligence analysis is
competitive. I know that Dr Lockwood does not shrink from this compe-
tition and has offered up a worthy entrant. The proof will be in the doing
but I do hope that serious analysts will take the time to experiment with the
LAMP, to which this book is a useful guide.
LIST OF FIGURES
AND TABLES
Figures
1.1 Relationships between the analytic steps of the LAMP 8
1.2 The analytic map 20
5.1 Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity 76
6.1 72 month average retail price chart 131
7.1–7.3 Evolution of FARC actions 240
7.4–7.6 Evolution of ELN actions 258
Tables
1.1 Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo) 10
3.1 Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo) 42
3.2 Scenario 2 – Russian ultra-nationalists seize power 50
5.1 Alternate future permutations 88
5.2 Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG) 89
5.3 Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW) 91
5.4 Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC) 92
5.5 Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG) 94
5.6 Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW) 95
5.7 Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC) 96
6.1 Alternate future permutations 158
6.2 Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 1 159
6.5 Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 1 163
7.1 Matrix diagram and analysis (FARC) 238
7.2 Matrix diagram and analysis (ELN) 257
x List of Figures and Tables
7.3 Possible futures 273

7.4 Scenario 1 – The Colombian government withdraws from
fighting 274
7.5 Scenario 2 – The Colombian government imposes a
containment strategy 281
7.6 Scenario 3 – The Colombian government employs a
“victory” strategy 289
INTRODUCTION
The development of the LAMP
When I initially proposed in the Fall of 1991 to undertake a study of the

perceptions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nuclear
republics under the aegis of the DCI Exceptional Intelligence Analyst
program, the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) was
nowhere near the form to be presented in this book. The methodology has
gradually taken shape over a period of years since I first began my doctoral
dissertation research back in 1977 at the University of Miami’s Center for
Advanced International Studies. My emphasis then was on studying the
perceptions of the now former Soviet Union regarding US strategy, using
those perceptions as a basis for determining what were the primary factors
influencing their perception of it.1
In my 1983 book, The Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine: Implications
for Decisionmaking, I took the process one step further by predicting what
would be the best US strategy for deterring Soviet aggression based on
their past perceptions. I had recommended US adoption of a “three-tiered”
strategic defense system consisting of civil defense, ground-based antiair-
craft and antiballistic missile defense, and space-based defense, predicting
that this would be what the Soviets feared most. The subsequent Soviet
reaction to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) proved these predictions
accurate.2
In our 1993 book, The Russian View of US Strategy: Its Past, Its
Future, we were confronted with a new problem. While the past Russian
perception of US strategy was easy enough to document and analyze from
open sources, the collapse of the former Soviet Union forced us to consider
the likely future effects the previous Russian perception would have on their
relations with the other independent republics of the CIS, and particularly
those which had inherited portions of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal
(i.e., Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan). Our solution was to construct four
scenarios (or alternate futures, if you will) which reflected the interaction of
two main factors with two basic alternatives: 1) economic recovery versus
economic collapse, and 2) reunified republics versus independent republics.
We then discussed the consequences of each scenario’s occurrence, as
well as their relative likelihood.3 This particular approach is also called
xii Introduction
Alternative Futures or Hypothesized Scenarios, and is currently used within

the intelligence community.
The collapse of the former Soviet Union had not, despite the expectations
of most observers, made the problems of arms control and disarmament
easier to overcome. Nor had it lessened the problem of preventing nuclear
proliferation among the former Soviet republics, particularly Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The diverging perceptions of these four “nuclear
republics” of the CIS concerning the political utility of nuclear weapons had
become a source of political conflict among these republics, and particularly
between Russia and Ukraine.
My research on the perceptions of the CIS “nuclear republics” concerning
the nuclear weapons issue began in February 1992, shortly after The
Russian View of US Strategy had been cleared by the Defense Intelligence
Agency and submitted to Transaction Publishers for publication. Since I was
performing my research under the nominal supervision of what was then
the Defense Intelligence College (now the National Intelligence University),
the DCI project would also simultaneously fulfill the thesis requirements for
the Masters of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI). Its focus necessarily
would be the perceptions of the “nuclear republics” of the former Soviet
Union (that is, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) concerning the
political utility of nuclear weapons and how it affected relationships not
only among themselves, but between each of them individually and the
West. The period to be covered dated from immediately after the August
1991 coup attempt to the end of February 1993.4

Because of the rapidly changing nature of the situation within the nuclear
republics, however, I decided that it was necessary to create a new “hybrid”
methodology for predictive analysis, which is now known as the Lockwood
Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP).5 It was a hybrid because it
borrowed some of its elements from other analytical and planning method-
ologies, but combined them in a unique way to produce a different approach
to the problem of predictive analysis. Although the LAMP was utilized
only for the first time in the DCI study/MSSI thesis, the Commandant of
the Defense Intelligence College, Dr James G. Cunningham (Lieutenant
General, US Air Force, Retired), deemed the LAMP to have wider potential
applicability for the field of intelligence analysis, and encouraged me to
pursue its development.
In the intervening years, from 1993 to the present, the LAMP started to
take on a life of its own. As an adjunct professor at the National Intelligence
University from 1993 to 1998, I taught the LAMP initially as the center-
piece of a graduate elective course on Advanced Analytic Methods. Over 40
graduate students at the university found the LAMP sufficiently attractive
as a predictive methodology that they used it as the central method for their
Masters theses for the MSSI degree. In 1995, I also joined the faculty of
American Military University (AMU), where I taught for the next 16 years
Introduction xiii
as a graduate professor in their online Intelligence Studies degree program.

One of the first courses I developed for them was a graduate level course
in Analytic Methods, which covered several analytic methods, but which
emphasized the LAMP as the most potentially useful. In this way I was
able to reach thousands of students with the LAMP through the online
medium. One of my earliest LAMP enthusiasts was Mr Niklas Oxeltoft, a
British graduate of AMU who not only developed my first LAMP website
but also created an early prototype of LAMP software. He was succeeded
as the LAMP webmaster by Mr Mark Theby, another LAMP advocate
and graduate of AMU who refined the LAMP website into its current state
(www.lamp-method.org). More important was his contribution to the
development of the LAMP software you are now able to use. He obtained
the voluntary services of a programmer who created the LAMP software
prototype at no cost. My newest LAMP webmaster is Mr Gary Gallichio,
a highly skilled and experienced IT specialist who currently works for
Reading Is Fundamental (RIF). He has taken charge of uploading and
testing the LAMP software and further updating its host LAMP website.
It is to these gentlemen that I am deeply in debt for the service they have
provided in developing the LAMP and promoting awareness of it as a
methodology.
I am also indebted to the three students from American Military
University, Nicholas Lusas, Mary Boyle, and Drew Lasater, whose LAMP
papers appear in Part II of this textbook as practical applications of the
LAMP. Their papers survived a long winnowing process in which dozens
of LAMP papers were considered for inclusion in this first edition. They
should be justifiably proud of their selection.
Those who take the time to examine the LAMP website will notice a
number of papers in the LAMP library that cover a wide range of topics.
The LAMP library is not all-inclusive but is meant to demonstrate that the
LAMP can be applied to a wide range of topics, and not just those for intelli-
gence prediction. Three of the best LAMP papers have been selected for this
book, and were produced by my former students at AMU. The book itself
is organized into two main parts. Part I deals with the theory of the LAMP
itself, explaining the steps in the process in detail. Chapter 1 discusses the
12 steps of the LAMP and how it is used. Chapter 2 compares the LAMP
with several other analytic techniques, and shows how the LAMP either
differs or has elements in common with these methods. Chapter 3 discusses
how the LAMP was initially used in the case study of the nuclear republics
of the former Soviet Union. It has been updated to show how the nature of
LAMP analysis changes over time. Chapter 4 concludes the theory portion
of the book, and discusses the limitations and potential applications. Part
II focuses on the use of the LAMP in practice. Chapters 5 through 7 discuss
the application of the LAMP to three different intelligence problems. The
last chapter is especially noteworthy, as Drew Lasater demonstrates how
xiv Introduction
the LAMP can be integrated successfully with the Analyses of Competing

Hypotheses (ACH) method.
It is hoped that this book will serve as a starting point for the analyst
who wishes to test this predictive analytical method on other existing world
situations. While I make no claim that LAMP is an infallible predictive
method, I do argue that it is a fundamentally different and potentially
more powerful way of analyzing and utilizing existing information to make
realistic assessments of the possible alternate futures of any given situation.
This introduction would not be complete without two final acknowl-
edgments. The first is to Dr Mark Lowenthal, who graciously agreed to
write the Foreword to this first LAMP textbook. His expression of confi-
dence in the utility of the LAMP for the intelligence community is deeply
appreciated. And last but by no means least, I am deeply grateful to my
beloved wife of 24 years, Kathleen, who was instrumental in the review
and selection of the final LAMP papers for this textbook, as well as in the
editing and presentation of the LAMP. I am very glad that I married her.
Notes
1 See May, 1980 University of Miami doctoral dissertation by Jonathan Samuel
Lockwood, The Evolution of the Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine (1954–
1976): Its Implications for Future US Strategic Policy Decisionmaking (Ann
Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1981).
2 See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, The Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine:
Implications for Decisionmaking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
1983), 179–83.
3 See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood & Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood, The Russian
View of US Strategy: its Past, Its Future (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1993), 193–7.
4 See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, “The Nuclear CIS Republics and Nuclear
Weapons: Chess Game or Armageddon?” (unpublished Masters of Science
of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) thesis, National Intelligence University,
Washington, DC, 1993).
5 The first article on the LAMP was published in Volume 3, No. 2 of the Defense
Intelligence Journal (the publication of the Defense Intelligence College,
now the National Intelligence University) in the Fall of 1994. See Jonathan
S. Lockwood, “The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP),”
Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Fall 1994), 47–73.
PART ONE
The LAMP in theory

CHAPTER ONE
The philosophy and steps

of the LAMP
The LAMP assumes that the future is really nothing more than the sum
total of all possible interactions of “free will,” both on an individual as well
as on an international scale. In this paradigm, every action that is taken by
any free will actor has the power to affect the futures of all those around
it in ways both subtle and dramatic. Even a decision to “do nothing” has
its own unique impact on the future, since others around you are aware of
your existence, regardless of whether you interact or not.
At the individual level, in theory, this means that each one of us has a
nearly infinite array of possible alternate futures that lie before us during
the course of our lives. Every decision we make during each moment has
either a subtle or a decisive effect on which alternate future we eventually
experience, just as the actions of others each have their own subtle or
decisive influence on which alternate future we will eventually experience.
As we progress through our lives, the number of alternate futures before us
gradually diminishes, as the decisions we and others make forever close off
certain futures to us. This process continues, gradually in the majority of
cases, until we finally reach our one inescapable future, death.1
When we transfer this philosophy to the international arena, attempting
to predict future events using traditional quantitative methods or quali-
tative methods is a losing proposition; the potential array of possible
alternate futures based on the interactions of sovereign nations, each with
their own unique perspectives and political agendas, makes the process of
quantitative prediction almost as unreliable as assigning probabilities to
future weather conditions. For instance, when the weatherman says that
there is a 75 percent chance of rain occurring this afternoon, does he really
mean that he has managed to foresee all possible alternate futures that
lie before him that day concerning the interactions of the earth’s weather
systems? Has he been able to calculate how many of these potential
4 THE LOCKWOOD ANALYTICAL METHOD FOR PREDICTION (LAMP)
alternate futures, out of all that are theoretically possible, actually have
rain occurring in them? More often than not, his is a subjective judgment,
to which he has assigned a percentage probability for the sake of quanti-
fication. In fact, when someone tells you that something has a 50 percent
(or 50/50) chance of happening, he is really telling you that he doesn’t have
a clue as to how likely it is to happen, and that you might as well flip a
coin.
This is why predictive methods which attempt to quantify their results
in terms of percentages or probabilities have not been entirely successful.
Traditional probability theory assumes that you know the entire potential
universe of events, such as all possible ways that three coins can come
up either heads or tails. Such an approach is not possible in international
affairs; the potential interactions, even at the national level, are too chaotic.
The “coins” all have minds of their own.
The LAMP asserts that we can only know the probability of a given
alternate future relative to all other possible alternate futures. These
alternate futures are defined as the total of all possible interactions between
national actors on a given issue. Because an alternate future is based on
the sum total of interactions of free will, the relative probability of the
alternate futures will be constantly changing based on how each national
actor behaves as we move through history. In order to make more accurate
predictions, therefore, it is necessary to study each predictive issue from
the viewpoint of the national or organizational actor, since it is that actor’s
“free will” that will alter the future.
While not an infallible method for predicting the future, the LAMP is
designed to give the analyst a more powerful method for organizing all
available information based on the perceptions of the actors and using it
to make relevant predictions about which alternate future is most likely to
occur at a given moment in time.
In going through the 12 steps of the LAMP below, it is recommended
that the reader choose one of the three LAMP studies from Part II of this
book and use it as a guideline for loading the various steps into the LAMP
software.2
The 12 steps of the LAMP

Determine the issue for which you are
trying to predict the most likely future
This initial step is of crucial importance in the LAMP. If the issue
chosen is too broad, the analysts will have too many actors and courses
The philosophy and steps of the LAMP 5
of action to consider, thus causing the number of alternate futures to

explode exponentially. If the issue is vaguely defined, then analysts
will have difficulty focusing their perceptual study of each actor, and
will end up conducting too general an analysis, thus rendering his
subsequent comparison of alternate futures less reliable. Examples of
specific intelligence questions/scenarios which could lend themselves to
the LAMP are:
1 How will North Korea’s emergence as a nuclear power affect

nuclear proliferation in Southeast Asia?
2 What are the consequences of low-intensity conflict in Eastern
Europe?
3 What are the consequences for nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East should Israel declare itself a nuclear power?
4 What are the potential consequences if Iran becomes a declared
nuclear power?
5 Analysis of cyber threats in the United States.
6 Agroterrorism: a predictive study of America’s future food supply.
7 A predictive study on possible al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in the
United States.
8 A predictive analysis of the terrorist threat posed by collaboration
between al-Qaeda and South American theft groups.
9 What is the likelihood of Iran providing nuclear capability to
terrorist groups?
10 What are the potential future actions of the Mexican drug cartels
against the Mexican and US governments?3
Intelligence questions are not the only type of questions that can lend
themselves to the use of the LAMP. Virtually any question that can be
framed in terms of actors with potential courses of action in response to it
can apply the LAMP. For example, a corporation planning to introduce a
new product might ask the following question: “What are the most likely
responses of corporations X, Y, and Z (its competitors) in response to our
new product?” Or a corporation might ask: “What are the most likely
responses of our competitors to our business model over the next five
years?” This potential use of the LAMP will be addressed at greater length
in the final chapter.
As can be seen by the above examples, the issue question is always
framed in terms of “What are the consequences of X?”, “What is the
potential impact of X?”, or “What is the likelihood of X?” The issue
question should always be asked in such a way that the analyst can identify
the national actors that can directly affect this issue.
Specify the national “actors” involved

The student should then determine the number of “actors” who can
directly affect this issue. I am deliberately making a distinction between
“actors” at the national level and organizational level because not all
nations or organizations that are affected by an issue are necessarily
going to have courses of action available to them to do something about
it. If the student has been careful enough to limit the scope of his initial
question, the number of actors involved should be no more than five or
six. If it is more than this, the number of possible “alternate futures” to
be examined may become unmanageable, depending upon the number
of courses of action open to each actor. Unless the analysts are using the
LAMP software, they will not easily be able to handle the large number of
permutations that will arise.
Perform an in-depth study of how each

actor perceives the issue in question
This step involves the greatest amount of historical as well as current
research on the part of the analyst, and is obviously the most time-
consuming. Not only should the analyst examine “current history” from
the perspective of the national actor, but he should also look for historical
events, cultural factors, and even nuances of language that might have
an impact on a given nation’s view of an issue. Failure to conduct an
adequate perceptual study of each national actor simply increases the
danger that the analyst will fall into the “mirror-imaging” trap: that
of substituting his own logic for that of the national actor. If analysts
mistakenly substitute their own logic for that of any national actor, this
will naturally skew their calculations when they begin comparing the
likelihood of the various “alternate futures,” and their predictions will
have less reliability.
In my earlier books on the subject, I examined the Soviet/Russian
viewpoint concerning US strategic doctrine and the factors they believed
were responsible for influencing its development.4 As might be expected,
the Russians themselves projected their own logic, their own cultural biases,
and their own strategic objectives onto US planners and policymakers. With
this in mind, the analyst should always be careful to avoid the “mirror-
imaging” fallacy himself.
Using the nuclear republics of the former Soviet Union as an illustrative
example, analysts should center their perceptual study of the national
actors on the issue they are trying to predict. An example of how this would
be organized is given below.
The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the perceptions of the

nuclear republics of the CIS regarding the political utility of nuclear
weapons differ significantly enough to adversely affect arms control and
nonproliferation negotiations, and will eventually lead to armed conflict.
In the process of validating such a hypothesis, the following questions
must he addressed:
1 What is the Russian perception of the political utility of nuclear

weapons since the August 1991 coup attempt?
2 Does the Russian perception differ significantly from the
previous (that is, from 1954 to the August 1991 coup attempt)
unified “Soviet” perception of the political utility of nuclear
weapons?
3 What is the Ukrainian perception of the political utility of nuclear
4 What is the Belarusian perception of the political utility of nuclear
5 What is the Kazakh perception of the political utility of nuclear
6 How have these perceptions influenced the behavior of the republics
vis-à-vis one another and the US?
7 To what extent do the republics view nuclear weapons as
“bargaining chips” having little other value?
8 What are the implications of these interacting perceptions for the
future of arms control negotiations, nuclear nonproliferation, or the
likelihood of armed conflict between the republics?6
Note that the final question in the perceptual study is one which is most
likely to be answered during the course of comparing and analyzing
“alternate futures.” Once the perceptual study of each actor has been
completed, the analysts are then ready to proceed to the next step.
Specify all possible courses

of action for each actor
After completing the perceptual study for each actor, it should become
apparent to the analysts what the possible range of courses of action are
for each actor. The analysts should not exclude a course of action merely
because it seems unlikely to them that an actor will choose it, although they
should exclude choices that are clearly impossible or beyond the strength
of the actor in question.
Determine the major scenarios within which

you will compare the alternate futures
A scenario provides the major assumptions that will influence the actions of
all national actors concerned for that predictive issue. Often it will be based
on the actions of a major power outside the scope of an analyst’s initial
study. The second purpose of a scenario is to account for an additional
actor without having to calculate it as part of the permutations for the
alternate futures. For example, an analyst is studying the implications of a
change in Israel’s nuclear doctrine for nuclear proliferation in the Middle
East. The national actors are Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. The
scenarios would be based on the likely courses of action of Israel, which
could be as follows.
1 Continue ambiguous policy. Israel continues neither to confirm or

deny its nuclear capability.
2 Declared nuclear capability, but no nuclear weapons. Israel
acknowledges that it has the capability to produce nuclear weapons,
but does not declare itself a nuclear power.
3 Become a declared nuclear power. Israel both declares nuclear
capability and actual nuclear weapons possession with associated
delivery systems.
Scenarios
Alternative futures
Focal events
Indicators
FIGURE 1.1 Relationships between the analytic steps of the LAMP

Calculate the total number of permutations of possible

“alternate futures” for each scenario
This is where the necessity of limiting the number of actors and choices
becomes most apparent. The general formula for computing the number of
alternate futures is Xy=Z, where X equals the number of courses of action
open to each actor, and y equals the number of national actors involved
(assuming that each actor has the same number of courses of action open
to it). Z will equal the total number of alternate futures to be compared.
For example, if the analysts are looking at five actors with two courses
of action open to each, then they are looking at only 25, or 32 alternate
futures. If they include the US as a national actor with its three courses of
action, however, then the number of alternate futures becomes 25 X 31, or
96 possible alternate futures. The same result would apply to our Israeli
nuclear problem above. However, if there were three courses of action open
to all five national actors, then the number of possible alternate futures
explodes to 35, or 243 alternate futures! Obviously, the use of a scenario
helps the analysts keep the problem within manageable bounds.
Perform a “pair-wise comparison” of all

alternate futures within the scenario to
determine their relative probability
The formula for computing the number of pair-wise comparisons is shown
below.
n (n–1)
X=
2
Here, n equals the total number of alternate futures to be compared, and
X equals the total number of pair-wise comparison votes that must be
conducted.
A pair-wise comparison analyzes the alternate futures two at a time,
always assuming that the two futures being compared at the moment
are the only ones that exist. For example, in a problem with 27 alternate
futures, the alternate futures are numbered 1 through 27. Future number
1 is compared to future number 2. Based on all of the information that
the analyst is aware of at that moment, whichever future is deemed “more
likely to occur” is given one vote. Future number 1 is then compared to
future number 3, number 4, and so on in the same way until it has been
compared to all futures within the scenario. The analysts then begin the
process again with future number 2. But since you have already compared
it to future number 1, you will only be comparing it to futures 3 through

27. This process continues until you have compared and voted on the last
possible pairing of futures, numbers 26 and 27. This pair-wise comparison
of futures is then repeated for the other scenarios.5

Although analysts may be tempted to rule out certain alternate futures
as wholly implausible without voting on them, they must avoid this
temptation. The strength of the LAMP lies in forcing the analysts to make
a series of “either-or” decisions for the entire range of possibilities rather
than arbitrarily deciding beforehand which are plausible and which are not.
Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from

highest relative probability to the lowest based on the
number of “votes” received
What you have at the end of the pair-wise comparison is a series of futures
which have received different numbers of votes based upon their relative
probability. They are then rank-ordered from “most likely” to “least
likely” based upon the number of votes that each future received.6 An illus-
tration of this rank ordering is shown in Table 1.1 below using the example
of the 1993 CIS nuclear republics case study.
Advocates of more “traditional” approaches to probability will argue
that if the 27 alternate futures equal the whole potential range of alternate
futures, then their combined probabilities must equal 100 percent. They
argue that it should then be possible to assign percentage probabilities to
each of these alternate futures. The problem with this is that it is ultimately
meaningless. Since these futures represent all of the estimated permutations
of free will choices open to the national actors, any assigned percentage,
even if it were accurate, would only be true for that snapshot in time. Free
will makes such precise quantification impossible.
Table 1.1 Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo)7

Possible future # Ukraine Belarus Kazakhstan # Votes
24 IN CD CD 26
14 IN CD IN 25
9 CD CD CD 23
25 SN CD CD 23
16 SN CD IN 22
22 CD CD IN 20
1 IN IN IN 20
15 IN CD SN 20
18 IN IN CD 18
17 SN CD SN 16
5 SN IN IN 16
2 IN IN SN 15
20 SH IN CD 13
7 SN IN SN 13
26 CD IN CD 11
6 SN SN IN 10
10 CD IN IN 9
23 CD CD SN 9
4 SN SN SN 8
8 IN SN IN 8
19 IN SN CD 7
21 SN SN CD 7
3 IN SN SN 5
12 CD IN SN 4
27 CD SN CD 2
11 CD SN IN 1
13 CD SN SN 0
CD = Continue Disarmament; do not try to retain nuclear weapons

IN = Pursue Independent Nuclear Capability
SN = Preemptive Seizure of Soviet Nuclear Weapons
Because of the dynamic, constantly changing nature of the universe of

alternate futures, analysts using the LAMP must periodically “revote” the
alternate futures in order to accurately account for new information they
receive. How often this should be done depends on several things: how
many analysts are working the problem; whether or not one has computer
software support available for the LAMP; and how quickly the situation
itself appears to be changing based on new information being received.
Once the futures have been ranked, the analyst is ready to analyze the
alternate futures themselves in more detail.
Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each

alternate future in terms of its consequences for the
issue in question
This step does require some imagination on the part of the analysts, since
they are writing what could be considered a “future history” of things that
might be, assuming that the actors take the courses of action of a particular
alternate future. Depending on the prediction issue and the degree of
research the analysts are willing to undertake, the analysis of the conse-
quences of a given alternate future often will take longer than one or two
paragraphs.8
Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our

present in order to bring about a given alternate future
This step is not addressed in the consequences paragraph, since it cannot
really be accomplished until the analysts have thoroughly examined the
consequences of an alternate future. A “focal event” is an occurrence of
sufficient magnitude that it changes the relative probability of the universe
of alternate futures. If we were to “draw a line in time,” so to speak, from
our present into the future, a focal event would resemble an intersection
with two or more branches into other futures. Once the path is taken,
our sojourner in time soon would be confronted with a different array of
possible futures and branching-off points. The most likely future would
have the fewest (or most plausible) focal events leading into it; it would be
the alternate future offering the line of least resistance. In fact, our present
might so closely resemble that alternate future that no focal events need
occur.9 The more “bizarre” futures, on the other hand, would have more
focal events leading to them, since more such events would be required in
order to change our present into those futures. For the analysts, these will
be the alternate futures that received the fewest votes during their pair-wise
comparison in step 7. A good illustration of the use of “focal events” is

shown below in this excerpt from a LAMP paper by Erick J. Wallman.10
SCENARIO 1: Cuban Style Autocracy
Future #15 Cuba maintains a friendly diplomatic relationship with

Venezuela, the U.S. is openly hostile to the Venezuelan government
and Colombian government military forces engage Venezuelan military
forces. (63 votes)
FOCAL EVENT – Autocratic Control of Venezuela Achieved, viable
democratic institutions dissolved completely
FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses support for “new” Venezuelan
government
FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses displeasure with the demise of
democracy in Venezuela
FOCAL EVENT – Colombian and Venezuelan regular military forces
engage in combat
Future #9 Cuba maintains friendly diplomatic relationship with

Venezuela and both the United States and Colombia are openly hostile
to the Venezuelan government. (62 votes)
government
FOCAL EVENT – Colombia openly expresses displeasure with the
demise of democracy in Venezuela
Future #31 Cuba maintains a neutral stance towards Venezuela, the

United States maintains a hostile diplomatic response and Colombian
government military forces engage Venezuelan military forces. (60.5
votes)
engage in combat
Future #25 Cuba maintains a neutral stance towards Venezuela, the

United States and Colombia maintain hostile diplomatic stances. (60
votes)

Future #12 Cuba maintains a friendly diplomatic relationship with

Venezuela, the U.S. is openly hostile to the Venezuelan government and
Colombian government attempts to find some neutral ground. (60 votes)
government
SCENARIO 2: Functioning Multiparty System
Future #33 Cuba is openly hostile to developments of a functioning

“U.S. style” democratic system in Venezuela and Colombia and the U.S.
are openly enthusiastic and supportive. (63 votes)
FOCAL EVENT – Viable democracy established in Venezuela
FOCAL EVENT – Cuba openly expresses displeasure with “new”
Venezuelan government
FOCAL EVENT – U.S. openly expresses support for democracy in
Venezuela
FOCAL EVENT – Colombia openly expresses support for democracy
in Venezuela
Future #34 Cuba is openly hostile to developments of a functioning

“U.S. style” democratic system in Venezuela, the U.S. is openly enthu-
siastic and supportive, and Colombia attempts to remain neutral. (62
votes)
Venezuela
Future #17 Cuba is hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S. style”

democratic system in Venezuela, but maintains an officially neutral
stance because of fears of potential repercussions for not doing so.
Colombia and the U.S. are openly enthusiastic and supportive. (60 votes)

Venezuela
in Venezuela
Future #38 Cuba is hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S.

style” democratic system in Venezuela, the U.S. is openly enthusiastic
and supportive, but border tensions escalate between Colombia and
Venezuela resulting in some level of military force engagement. (59 votes)
Venezuela
engage in combat
Future #40 Cuba is hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S. style”

democratic system in Venezuela, the U.S. and Colombia maintain an
officially neutral position, leaving the internal politics of Venezuela up to
Venezuelans to decide. (59 votes)
Develop indicators for the focal events

This step links the LAMP with the more traditional “Indications and
Warning” function.11 For each focal event associated with an alternate
future, it should be possible to develop a list of indicators that such an event
either has occurred or is about to occur. Once these indicators are entered
into an automated database along with the focal events and alternate
futures, the analysts have completed the basic 12-step LAMP process.
Subsequent activity consists of periodic “revoting” of the alternate futures
as new information is acquired, refinement of the indicators associated
with particular focal events, as well as the identification of additional focal
events for the more exotic alternate futures. Ideally, the occurrence of a
single indicator would not only alert the analysts to the possible occur-
rence of a focal event, but would enable them to check all alternate futures
associated with that focal event, since its occurrence could increase their
relative probability as well. A further illustration of this step is shown
below, once again using the Wallman paper as an exemplar.12

KEY INDICATOR – Failure of a peaceful transition of power, political
power seized or maintained through military force (declaration of
martial law, violent coup d’état)
KEY INDICATOR – Loss of freedom of the press, newspapers and
political voices hostile to the political group in power are silenced or
noticeably censored
KEY INDICATOR – Amnesty International and other humanitarian
groups report gross repressions of individual freedom
KEY INDICATOR – Government takes control of key aspects of free
market economy
KEY INDICATOR – Prison population increases dramatically as
dissident groups are jailed

government
KEY INDICATORS – Open signs of amicable relationship continue
(Chavez/Castro baseball games, fatherly chats, red carpet state visits,
favorable economic arrangements maintained)

KEY INDICATOR – U.S. utilizes Organization of American States as a
forum to officially protest developments in Venezuela
KEY INDICATOR – U.S. openly considers and perhaps implements
economic sanctions against Venezuela
POSSIBLE INDICATOR – U.S. looks for alternate sources of oil and
reduces Venezuelan imports
KEY INDICATOR – U.S. places Venezuela on several “bad boy lists”
(refuses to consider most favored nation status, state declared sponsor
of terrorism, etc.)
KEY INDICATOR – U.S. severs diplomatic relations with Venezuela
(spectrum from evacuating most of embassy personnel, to closing U.S.
embassy in Caracas)
KEY INDICATOR – U.S. offers asylum to political refugees from Venezuela

KEY INDICATOR – Colombia voices concern at Organization of
American States (OAS), utilizing forum to express concern about devel-
opments in Venezuela
KEY INDICATOR – Colombia backs out of free trade agreement with
Venezuela
KEY INDICATOR – Colombia severs or scales back diplomatic relations

with Venezuela (less likely to occur than with the United States, especially
in the absence of open military conflict, the simple proximity of Venezuela
to Colombia dictates that they maintain a diplomatic dialogue, but this is
a valid indicator which would contribute to this focal event)
KEY INDICATOR – Colombia offers asylum to political refugees from
Venezuela

KEY INDICATOR – Successful peaceful transition of power, political
power transfers to opposite party without significant violence or the use
of military force (i.e. Chavez steps down on the 15 Aug 04 if the results
of the referendum dictate)
KEY INDICATOR – Toleration of opposing viewpoints in free press,
sample of Nations’ newspapers yields a balanced and variety of political
positions
KEY INDICATOR – Decreasing trend in accusations of violations of
human rights and government corruption
KEY INDICATOR – Laissez Faire economy and economic growth
instead of a trend toward total state control of the economy (privati-
zation of the oil industry)
KEY INDICATOR – Venezuelan military officers who protested at Plaza
Altamira, declare that current government is following the Constitution

KEY INDICATOR – Dramatic increase in political rhetoric blaming U.S.
interference for the demise the current Venezuelan executive adminis-
tration (note – Chavez need not fall out of power for a viable democracy
to exist, simply allow opposition a voice and respect the country’s consti-
tution … most likely however, a viable democracy will only be created
with Chavez out of power)

Venezuela
KEY INDICATOR – Obvious effort to improve economic situation in
Venezuela (increased trade, economic and military aid)
KEY INDICATOR – Most favored nation status granted, open praise
for people of Venezuela in diplomatic settings (state department press
briefings), official statements of support given in diplomatic forums like
the OAS or UN.

in Venezuela
KEY INDICATOR – Effort to increase cooperation towards solving

conflicts and common problems of border security
KEY INDICATOR – Open praise for people of Venezuela in diplomatic
settings (state department press briefings); official statements of support
given in diplomatic forums like the OAS or UN

engage in combat
KEY INDICATOR – Press reporting of military hostilities
KEY INDICATOR – Flurry of diplomatic activity to try to cast blame
and or perform “damage control”
KEY INDICATOR – Increase of military logistics activities
KEY INDICATOR – Depending on scale of conflict, possible refugees
from region at crisis levels
What the steps of the LAMP are collectively designed to do is to help the
analyst avoid a range of analytic fallacies. These are what I call the “Four
Sources of Error” in the intelligence process.13 These sources of error are
each difficult enough to avoid by themselves, and it is practically impossible
to avoid all of them on anything approaching a consistent basis. They are:
1 The Enemy (who can create error through either successful

deception or concealment of his intentions and capabilities).
2 The Analyst (who can fall victim to one or more analytical fallacies
in an attempt to derive actionable intelligence).
3 The System (which can create the conditions for strategic surprise
through either impeding the process of timely warning or rendering
the conclusions of analysts so vague as to be useless to the
policymaker).
4 The Policymaker (who can become a source of error by unduly
influencing the intelligence process in an effort to find support for
his or her chosen policy).
It is this last source of error that can be so problematic for the intelligence
analyst. For the policymaker is the wielder of power, with the luxury of
being able to choose to ignore or disregard intelligence assessments that
do not support, or even contradict, the desired policy course. And the
intelligence analysts, who are without power, must rely on the strength
and credibility of their analytic judgments in order to properly fulfill
their professional responsibility. It cannot really be otherwise, since the
intelligence analysts cannot become partisans of a given policy course based
on their analysis, for then they risk being perceived by the policymaker as
a nuisance at best, and a political adversary at worst.
What makes this even more problematic for the intelligence analyst is the
fact that, when assessments are presented to a policymaker, four things can
happen, and only one of them is good.
1 The intelligence analyst is correct, and the policymaker acts on the

assessment (the “good guys” win, and surprise is averted).
2 The intelligence analyst is wrong, but the policymaker acts on the
assessment (the “cry wolf” syndrome, which can erode credibility
over time if repeated).
3 The intelligence analyst is wrong, but the policymaker ignores the
assessment (technically nothing bad has happened, but this is the
result of the analyst having lost credibility over time).
4 The intelligence analyst is correct, but the policymaker ignores the
assessment (this is what can result in strategic surprise).
The foregoing discussion is not intended to discourage you, but is simply

intended to foster the recognition that the sources of error discussed above
are the occupational hazards of the intelligence profession.
State the potential of a given alternate future to

“transpose” into another alternate future
The concept of “transposition” is familiar to chess theorists as it pertains
to chess openings and their many continuations. Simply stated, transpo-
sition occurs when one chess opening’s line of play leads into a line of play
resembling a different (and more familiar) chess opening. For example,
a chess player may use a chess opening he believes is unfamiliar to his
opponent in order to gain an advantage. But his opponent may find a
move or series of moves which leads the game back into lines that are
more familiar to him. Transposition is said to have occurred in this case,
since the continuation of one chess opening has been replaced by that of
another.14

Much the same thing can occur in our array of alternate futures. Since
every act of free will has the potential to change the future, it has virtually
the same effect as transposition does in chess. Transposition does not have
to occur in every alternate future; some alternate futures have assumptions
which make them unique. In any case, once the analysts have described
the consequences of an alternate future, they should note concisely the
potential for transposition into another alternate future, since this may
affect the relative probability of these futures as events unfold. The trans-
position step is discussed in both the CIS nuclear republics case study and
the LAMP papers in Part Two.
Scenario – Status quo
Indicator
Indicator Indicator
Indicator Indicator
Indicator Indicator
Focal
event Indicator
Indicator
Focal
Indicator Indicator Indicator event Indicator Indicator
Focal Indicator Focal Focal

event event Indicator
event
Focal
event Focal
event
Alternative Alternative Alternative

Future 1 Future 2 Future 3
FIGURE 1.2 The analytic map
In conclusion, the LAMP is not an infallible method, nor will it grant

intelligence analysts the gift of prophecy by doing their thinking for
them. Judiciously used, however, the LAMP offers a powerful method for
examining the future’s many possible paths, and offers intelligence analysts
a new tool for assessing potential threats to the United States.
Notes
1 I was once asked by a student if I accounted for God in my philosophy of
the LAMP. My response was that, as a Christian, I considered God to be the
ultimate “Free Will Actor,” with the ability to intervene at any place or time
in history that He chooses. But attempting to predict the potential actions of
God with respect to any issue would require one to know the Mind of God.
Because finite human minds cannot begin to comprehend, let alone predict,
the most likely actions of an Infinite God, the future is, in the absolute
sense, inherently unpredictable. The LAMP must therefore operate on the
assumption that God will choose not to intervene actively with respect to any
given issue.
2 The LAMP website is at www.lamp-method.org
3 These topics have all been carried out as graduate term papers in the Masters
of Intelligence Studies degree program at American Military University.
4 See Jonathan Samuel Lockwood, The Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine:

Implications for Decisionmaking (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press,
1983). See also Jonathan Samuel Lockwood and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood,
The Russian View of US Strategy: Its Past, Its Future (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 1993), 194–7.
5 The pair-wise comparison voting can be performed by either a single analyst
or a group of analysts voting through a computer network. This latter
approach is more likely to avoid the “groupthink” fallacy that can occur with
face-to-face deliberations. The introduction of LAMP software makes this
process easier.
6 If a “tie vote” exists in the number of votes received, the simple tiebreaker
is to check the individual results of the pair-wise comparison voting to
see which alternate future was deemed more likely in the head-to-head
comparison.
7 For example, the alternate futures depicted in Scenario 1 represent an
assessment based on all information available as of the end of February
1993. While one could still have made a good case at the time of this writing
(December 1993) for Alternate Future #24 staying at the top, other analysts
might argue that the evidence since then has further decreased the relative
probability of Alternate Future #9 (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all
continue disarmament), while Alternate Futures #25 and #16, involving
Ukrainian seizure of its nuclear weapons, have further increased in relative
probability. Indeed, such analysts would be correct. Because of the dynamic,
constantly changing nature of the universe of alternate futures, analysts
using the LAMP approach must periodically “revote” the alternate futures in
order to accurately account for new information they receive. How often this
should be done depends on several things: how many analysts are working the
problem; whether or not one has computer software support available for the
LAMP approach; and how quickly the situation itself appears to be changing
in terms of new information being received.
8 Examples of this type of consequence analysis are show in the case study
chapter of the CIS nuclear republics, as well as in the LAMP papers in Part
Two of this book.
9 Lockwood discusses this in more detail with his concept of the Analytic Map
at www.lamp-method.org [accessed 15 January 2013].
10 Erick J. Wallman, “How will the US, Columbia, and Cuba respond to
the development of a Cuban Style Socialist Government in Venezuela?”
(Unpublished term paper for American Military University course INTL504
(Analytic Methods), Spring 2004).
11 The designation of indicators for the various focal events can be derived by
the same methods used in “traditional” Indications and Warning scenarios.
See “Indicators and Signposts of Change” in A Tradecraft Primer: Structured
Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis (US Government
publication, March 2009), 12–13.
12 Wallman, “How will the US, Columbia, and Cuba respond”, 30–1.
13 The original version of this concept appeared in the Spring 1994 issue of the
Defense Intelligence Journal (Vol. 3, No. 1) (Spring 1994) in Jonathan S.
Lockwood, “Sources of Error in Indications and Warning.”
14 For the chess enthusiast, transposition is explained further in Siegbert
Tarrasch, The Game of Chess (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1988).
CHAPTER TWO
A comparison of the LAMP

with other techniques
When the student first examines the LAMP method, the first question that
usually comes to mind is: “Why use this particular predictive analytical
method when there are other established analytical techniques that have
demonstrated merit?” In order to answer this question satisfactorily,
one has to look at related analytical techniques that have been used for
prediction. The LAMP will then be compared with these alternate methods
to show how it differs from these techniques.
The analytic hierarchy process (AHP)

The AHP technique was originally developed by Thomas L. Saaty as a
decision-making and conflict-resolution tool.1 As a starting point for the
analyst, the basic steps of the AHP are provided as stated in Saaty’s original
work:
1 Define the problem and specify the solution desired.

2 Structure the hierarchy from the overall managerial viewpoint (from
top levels to the level at which intervention to solve the problem is
possible).
3 Construct a pair-wise comparison matrix of the relevant
contributions of the impact of each element on each governing
criterion in the next higher level. In this matrix, pairs of elements
are compared with respective criterion in the superior level. In
comparing two elements most people prefer to give a judgment that
indicates the dominance as a whole number. The matrix has one
position to enter that number and another to enter its reciprocal.
Thus if one element does not contribute more than another, the
other must contribute more than it. This number is entered in the
appropriate position in the matrix and its reciprocal entered in the
other position. An element on the left is by convention examined
regarding its dominance over an element at the top of the matrix.
4 Obtain all judgments required to develop the set of matrices in step
3. If there are many people participating, the task for each person
can be made simple by appropriate allocation of effort, which we
describe in a later chapter. Multiple judgments can be synthesized
by using the geometric mean.
5 Having collected all the pair-wise comparison data and entered their
reciprocals together with unit entries down the main diagonal, the
priorities are obtained and consistency is tested.
6 Perform steps 3, 4, and 5 for all levels and clusters in the hierarchy.
7 Use hierarchical composition (synthesis) to weight the vectors of
priorities by the weights of the criteria, and take the sum over all
weighted priority entries corresponding to those in the next lower
level and sum. The result is an overall priority vector for the lowest
level of the hierarchy. If there are several outcomes, their arithmetic
average may be taken.
8 Evaluate consistency for the entire hierarchy by multiplying each
consistency index by the priority of the corresponding criterion
and adding the products. The result is divided by the same type of
expression using the random consistency index corresponding to
the dimensions of each matrix weighted by the priorities as before.
The consistency ratio of the hierarchy should be 10 percent or less.
If it is not, the quality of information should be improved—perhaps
by revising the manner in which questions are posed to make the
pair-wise comparisons. If this measure fails to improve consistency,
it is likely that the problem has not been adequately structured—
that is, similar elements have not been grouped under a meaningful
criterion. A return to step 2 is then required, although only the
problematic parts of the hierarchy may need revision.2
The most obvious feature of the AHP is its heavy reliance on quantitative
methods. Even though both the LAMP and AHP refer to “pair-wise
comparisons” as part of the process, they are used in radically different
ways in both methods. The other obvious characteristic of AHP is that it
is designed for use as a decision-making tool. For instance, Saaty proposes
four examples to illustrate how the AHP method may be applied to “real
world” situations. The first is an analysis of the decision-making process
involved in the Iranian hostage rescue operation. The second example
“challenges us to select the best product to manufacture from three
A comparison of the LAMP with other techniques 25
alternatives by using six criteria.” The third example shows how AHP
might be used “to estimate the impact of energy, recession, and inflation on
a company’s sales.” Finally, Saaty’s fourth example shows how AHP would
be used “to set priorities for stocks using several criteria.”3

In a later version of the AHP by Saaty and Alexander, the method is
employed in a number of case studies involving conflict resolution between
national actors. This application of AHP also bears brief examination, since
the casual reader might mistakenly assume there to be significant similarity
between the LAMP and AHP. In fact, since AHP purports to be a model
for resolving conflicts, this in itself distinguishes it in yet another way from
the LAMP, which is intended only to be a predictive model. Saaty and
Alexander sum up the essence of the AHP as a conflict resolution tool thus:
The Analytic Hierarchy process is an interactive process combining the

intuitive mental rationality of human beings without undue insistence
upon perfect consistency with equally human institutions of conflicting
groups. By utilizing the process, conflicting groups can trade off their
differences in a rational procedure that does not sacrifice individuality
but does produce a realistic solution. By requiring agreement upon goals
and subgoals by the participants in a dispute, from the very beginning
the process sets the stage for possible success in group dynamics. Because
none of the participants can envision the outcome of a vector of prefer-
ences derived from a matrix, the process also ensures that the weighted
preferences are honest and not given merely to produce a certain result,
when the outcome is achieved, the opponents feel that a fair and rational
solution has been reached.4
LAMP versus AHP

The foregoing overview of the Analytic Hierarchy Process is not intended as
a disparagement of the technique in any way. The intent is to show how the
LAMP differs in kind from the AHP, even though there is some superficial
similarity in some of the terms used.
For example, although both the LAMP and AHP use “pair-wise
comparisons” of projected outcomes, AHP assigns a nine-point value
scale to the probability of these outcomes for the purpose of selecting the
most desirable outcome for decision-making purposes, while the LAMP
emphasizes prediction of the relative probability of alternate futures.
LAMP deliberately eschews the assignment of any numerical values to
the relative probability of these alternate futures, since it assumes that
the probability of any given future will be constantly changing due to the
potentially infinite possibilities for free will of the national actors to affect
events. In practice, this means that the kind of quantification called for
by the AHP is not only impossible, but meaningless within the context of
the LAMP.
Additionally, the LAMP emphasizes analysis of the consequences for each
one of the alternate futures themselves, while the AHP looks at the “desir-
ability” of an outcome for decision making. LAMP looks at the potential
of an alternate future for transposition into other alternate futures, while
the AHP does not. Finally, the LAMP looks at potential “focal events”
which can lead from our present into a particular alternate future, and
subsequently uses these focal events as a basis for deriving indicators. AHP
was not designed to address these aspects. In its later applications, in fact,
it diverges even more significantly from the LAMP in that the AHP attempts
to become a prescriptive model for resolving conflict.
Other methods of forecasting attempt to make optimum use of “expert
opinion” in formulating predictions about the future. We will now look at
one of the best-known examples of this approach, the Delphi technique.
The Delphi technique

The Delphi technique is a method for systematically eliciting a set of
informed judgments from a group of experts about the timing, probability,
and implications of designated trends and events. Although its purpose is
often aimed at generating a consensus of opinion from the group, it also
identifies and clarifies divergences of opinion with respect to the majority
forecast—which is sometimes more important than getting the consensus of
opinion. The Delphi method is best suited for situations in which historical
objective information is lacking.
The Delphi technique is designed to overcome the disadvantages of a
traditional panel forecast: specious persuasion by the panel member with
the greatest authority or verbal agility; unwillingness to abandon publicly
expressed opinions; and the bandwagon effect of majority opinion. Instead
of using open discussion, the Delphi technique uses a carefully designed
program of sequential individual interrogations. These interrogations are
usually performed via questionnaires: a series of rounds, with opinion and
information feedback from the earlier rounds being used in the later rounds.
Respondents are able to revise their opinions, based on the feedback from
each round. The inquiry and feedback tend to stimulate the panel members
to consider factors not thought of previously. Results of a Delphi forecast
are presented in teams of median and quartile responses. In this way each
opinion within the group is taken into account in the median response, not
the “optimistic” and “pessimistic” extremes of the responses shown by the
size of the interquartile responses.5

A typical Delphi “prediction session” consists of four rounds of estimates,
with the ultimate aim being the creation of a “median” prediction on the
part of the group. A typical sequence of rounds might go as follows:
Round 1 Each expert estimates the year by which a certain projected

event will occur during the time interval, 2010–40. The interquartile range
(IQR)—that is, the interval containing 50 percent of the responses—and the
median are determined for each question.
Round 2 Summarized information is fed back to the panelists, who are

then asked to reconsider their previous estimates in light of the IQR and
the median. If a panelist desires, the previous answer can be revised. If the
revised answer lies outside the IQR, the panelist is asked to give the reason
why the answer is different from the majority consensus of the group. At
the end of the round, the Delphi monitor summarizes the arguments and
revises the IQR and median.
The necessity of justifying relatively extreme responses has the effect of
causing panelists without strong convictions to move their estimates closer
to the median. On the other hand, those respondents who feel they have
a good argument for a deviant opinion tend to retain the original estimate
and defend it.
Round 3 Panelists are given the revised summary of arguments and IQR and
median estimates. They are then asked to review and revise, if necessary,
the responses in light of the new information. Again, if the revised response
falls outside the IQR, the panelist is asked to provide a justification for that
response. The responses are collected by the Delphi monitor, who prepares a
concise summary of any new arguments and re-evaluates the IQR and median.
Round 4 In this final round, panelists are given the summarized and
evaluated responses from Round 3. They are again asked to reconsider the
IQR, median, and extreme position arguments, and are given the chance to
revise their estimates, if they so desire. The median of this final round can
then be taken as representative of the group consensus.
Results from the round are then presented in table form with a list of
the forecast events and their associated IQR and median estimates for date
of occurrence. A variation of the procedure above would be to ask for
probability ranges (that is, 50 percent and 90 percent) for each estimated
date of occurrence.6
According to authors Linstone and Turoff,7 the Delphi technique is
particularly useful in the following types of situations:
1 When subjective judgments on a collective basis can better benefit

the nature of the problem than using precise analytical techniques.
2 When the problem is complex and has no history of adequate

historical information.
3 When the individuals needed to contribute to the examination of
the problem have diverse backgrounds and expertise and have no
history of communication with each other.
4 When more individuals are needed than can effectively interact in a
face-to-face exchange.
5 When time and cost make frequent group meetings infeasible.
6 When the efficiency of face-to-face meetings can be increased by a
supplemental group communication process.
7 When individuals have disagreements so severe or politically
unpalatable that the communication process must be referred and/
or anonymously assured.
8 When the heterogeneity of the panelists must be preserved in order
to preserve validity and avoid the “bandwagon” effect.
LAMP versus Delphi

When the reader compares the characteristics of the Delphi technique to
that of the LAMP in Chapter 1, there are a couple of broad similarities, but
otherwise the methods are quite different. Like the LAMP, Delphi eschews
strict adherence to quantitative techniques, although not to the extent that
the LAMP does. Like Delphi, the LAMP can be used by a group of analysts,
although the LAMP can be used by just one analyst if necessary. And while
both techniques attempt to make predictions about possible future events,
the LAMP is designed to focus on the relative probability of alternate
futures for a more narrowly focused issue than the Delphi technique. Delphi
and the LAMP both share the virtue of minimizing the “groupthink”
syndrome to which groups of analysts are prone when they meet to discuss
a problem or engage in prediction.
There are other salient differences between the LAMP and Delphi as well.
Delphi attempts to assign fixed probability ranges to future events, while
the LAMP emphasizes relative probability of alternate futures. While Delphi
assumes that a problem may not have adequate historical information, this
is precluded under the LAMP approach, since it involves perceptual study of
all of the national actors concerning a particular issue, to include historical as
well as contemporary perceptions. Finally, Delphi strives for group consensus,
while the LAMP compels the analyst or group of analysts to make a series
of “either-or” choices when conducting a pair-wise comparison of alternate
futures. While there will be agreement, it will be by majority vote, with
provision made to record the votes of the individual analysts for later reference.
Again, while the Delphi technique shares some characteristics in common

with the LAMP, the foregoing overview of the Delphi technique, when
compared with the 12-step LAMP process in Chapter 1, demonstrates
that the LAMP differs both in kind and intent from the Delphi approach.
For our final comparison, we shall look at yet another predictive method
that should be familiar to every intelligence analyst, and which also shares
certain characteristics in common with the LAMP.
Hypothesized Futures and Scenarios

The use of Hypothesized Futures (also called Alternative Futures) and
Scenario analysis, while somewhat less structured than the LAMP, never-
theless have their place in predictive analysis, mainly when you are dealing
with predictive problems that are very broad in scope or that involve a large
number of actors, conditions that would overwhelm the LAMP (even with
the use of specialized computer software to augment the LAMP and facil-
itate voting by a group of analysts), which is designed more for examining
a narrower “slice” of the future rather than trying to encompass its totality.
Alternative Futures analysis8

Alternative Futures analysis is most useful when a situation is viewed as
too complex or the outcomes as too uncertain to trust a single outcome
assessment. First, analysts must recognize that there is high uncertainty
surrounding the topic in question. Second, they, and often their customers,
recognize that they need to consider a wide range of factors that might
bear on the question. And third, they are prepared to explore a range of
outcomes and are not wedded to any preconceived result. Depending on
how elaborate the futures project, the effort can amount to considerable
investment in time, analytic resources, and money. A team of analysts can
spend several hours or days organizing, brainstorming, and developing
multiple futures; alternatively, a larger-scale effort can require preparing
a multi-day workshop that brings together participants (including outside
experts). Such an undertaking often demands the special skills of trained
scenario-development facilitators and conferencing facilities.
This technique is a sharp contrast to contrarian techniques, which try
to challenge the analysts’ high confidence and relative certitude about an
event or trend. Instead, multiple futures development is a divergent thinking
technique that tries to use the complexity and uncertainty of a situation
to describe multiple outcomes or futures that the analyst and policymaker
should consider, rather than to predict one outcome.
Alternative Futures analysis is extremely useful in highly ambiguous

situations, when analysts confront not only a lot of “known unknowns” but
also “unknown unknowns.” What this means is that analysts recognize that
there are factors, forces, and dynamics among key actors that are difficult to
identify without the use of some structured technique that can model how
they would interact or behave. As the outcomes are not known prior to the
futures exercise, analysts must be prepared for the unexpected, and willing
to engage in a more free-wheeling exchange of views than typically occurs
in order to “imagine the future.” Given the time and resources involved,
Scenario Analysis is best reserved for situations that could potentially pose
grave threats or otherwise have significant consequences.
From past experience, analysts have found that involving policymakers
in the Alternative Futures exercise is the most effective way to communicate
the results of this exploration of alternative outcomes and sensitize them
to key uncertainties. Most participants find the process of developing such
scenarios as useful as any finished product that attempts to capture the
results of the exercise. Analysts and policymakers can benefit from this
technique in several ways:
MM It provides an effective means of weighing multiple unknown or

unknowable factors and presenting a set of plausible outcomes.
MM It can help to delimit a problem by identifying plausible
combinations of uncertain factors.
MM It provides a broader analytic framework for calculating the costs,
risks, and opportunities presented to policymakers by different
outcomes.
MM It aids analysts and policymakers in anticipating what otherwise
would be surprising developments by forcing them to challenge
assumptions and consider possible “wild cards” or discontinuous
events.
MM It generates indicators to monitor for signs that a particular future
is becoming more or less likely, so that policies can be reassessed.
Although there are a variety of ways to develop Alternative Futures, the

most common approach used in both the public and private sectors involves
the following steps:
MM Develop the “focal issue” by systematically interviewing experts

and officials who are examining the general topic.
MM Convene a group of experts (both internal and external) to
brainstorm about the forces and factors that could affect the focal
issue.
MM Select by consensus the two most critical and uncertain forces

and convert these into axes or continua with the most relevant
endpoints assigned.
MM Establish the most relevant endpoints for each factor; for example,
if economic growth were the most critical, uncertain force, the
endpoints could be “fast” and “slow” or “transformative” and
“stabilizing” depending on the type of issue addressed.
MM Form a futures matrix by crossing the two chosen axes. The four
resulting quadrants provide the basis for characterizing alternative
future worlds.
MM Generate colorful stories that describe these futures and how they
could plausibly come about. Signposts or indicators can then be
developed.
Participants, especially policymakers, can then consider how current

decisions or strategies would fare in each of the four worlds and identify
alternative policies that might work better either across all the futures or
in specific ones. By anticipating alternative outcomes, policymakers have a
better chance of either devising strategies flexible enough to accommodate
multiple outcomes or of being prepared and agile in the face of change.
A closely related technique to the Alternative Futures method is the
use of scenarios. Scenarios are essentially “stories” about the future
that describe hypothetical developments and conditions in a relatively
holistic manner. In traditional scenario theory, a scenario or set of alter-
native scenarios always has some point of focus. That focus might be as
narrow as tactical developments in a single theater of operations, or as
broad as descriptions of possible future societies. Although there are such
things as “single-scenario” forecasts, these are not really “forecasts” in
the predictive sense, although they are often used as a starting point for
examining the consequences of a particular set of assumptions about the
future.
Scenarios have proven advantageous in a number of situations where
prediction has been required. Among the sort of problems that scenarios
address are the success, failure, or unanticipated effects of a particular
decision or strategy; different lines or rates of development; various technol-
ogies; future demands for natural resources; and different patterns of social
and political change. Scenarios can reflect different and often competing
points of view about the future held by different experts in an area. Finally,
scenarios work well in spanning and encompassing a range of significant
alternatives when the future is highly uncertain. The approach generally
seeks to clarify genuinely uncertain situations rather than to predict where
it is not possible to so. In effect, scenario analysts develop alternative
forecasts based on explicit, significantly different, but nevertheless plausible

sets of assumptions and logics about the future.9.

Scenario advocates recommend using this approach under the following
circumstances:
1 If many different plausible contingencies must be identified and

analyzed.
2 When forecasting topics are so complex and so interconnected
with other factors that no formal models will adequately satisfy the
requirements of analysis.
3 Where no satisfactory formal models or quantitative methods exist.
4 When uncertainty is believed to be high.
5 When the time span of concern is very long.10.
The scenario approach requires interlinked descriptions of many different

factors. Scenario advocates warn that, although there is potential interest
in estimating the likelihood or probability of one scenario versus another,
attempting to do so can be misleading, asserting that only the analyst’s or
client’s judgments serve as the basis for assigning subjective probabilities.
Each scenario is seen as only one point in an infinite field of possibilities,
with no one scenario likely to describe the future that will actually occur. In
fact, one scenario specialist has gone so far as to say that “the most likely
scenario is very unlikely.” Instead, it is claimed that a “well done” set of
Alternative Futures scenarios will encompass and include the “most likely”
future.11. At the same time, however, scenario advocates claim that although
the Alternative Futures should encompass the range of future uncertainties,
fewer scenarios are considered better than more, and that the longer the
time span involved, the better it is to develop as few as possible significant
alternatives.12.

An example follows of how this scenario approach was applied to force
planning for US defense requirements in the Pacific for the 1990s. The
underlying geopolitical forces for generating these scenarios included such
factors as economic trends and interests, traditional alliance relationships,
ideological orientation, and military capability. Each scenario was then
based on different “plausible” patterns of change among such factors and
ultimately on the projected great power alignment for the 1990s (projec-
tions below were made in the early 1980s).
Scenario 1: East–West polarization

This scenario would assume inertia in the trends of the past 10 to 20 years.
Major nations or blocs in or concerned with East Asia would continue to
view their individual and shared interests as they have in the recent past.
This scenario, which represents something of an extrapolation from the
present, projects the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and North Korea opposed
by the United States, Japan, South Korea, and an informal community
of countries including Australia, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the
Philippines—and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).
Scenario 2: Triangular power politics

This scenario assumes gradual US–Chinese alienation over the issue of
Taiwan’s security. By the early 1990s, East Asian politics is dominated by
three powers. The United States remains allied to South Korea and the
Philippines. Japan ends its Mutual Security Treaty with the United States
and embarks on a neutralist course with no significant expansion of self-
defense forces. China extends its influence to Burma and North Korea. The
Soviet Union maintains a lower profile in Asia to avoid a rapprochement
between Washington and Beijing.
Scenario 3: Four-power politics

The logic of this scenario is similar to that in Scenario 2, except that Japan,
sensing increasing regional tension and diverging interests with the United
States, adopts a policy of armed neutrality. It expands its self-defense forces
and extends its defensive perimeter in north-east Asia. A new fleet of surface
combatants is launched to protect Japan’s vulnerable sea lanes as far south
as the Indonesian Straits. The result is a four-power balance in Asia with
the United States, Japan, and China in an informal alliance to contain the
Soviet–Vietnamese alignment.
Scenario 4: Sino–Soviet rapprochement

This scenario reverses a major trend that has been under way since the
1950s. The scenario logic is that economic disappointment in the PRC
leads to another dramatic shift in Chinese leadership politics, Sino–
American differences over Taiwan push Beijing and Washington further
apart, and the Soviet Union, beset by political and economic pressures at
home and in Eastern Europe, pursues detente with the PRC. The result is
a scenario in which polarization is sharp between the reborn Sino–Soviet
coalition on the one hand and the US and Asia’s market economies on the
other.
All of the above scenarios assumed no major conflicts in Europe or the

Middle East. Supposedly these scenarios were to have bounded regional
geopolitical uncertainty in the 1990s sufficiently so that US force planners
could begin identifying US defense requirements for the Pacific in that
decade. As we have seen, however, this scenario approach did not account
for the seemingly implausible future which in fact became the most likely
future.13.

In fact, the above example points out one of the main criticisms of the
scenario approach. Because there is no commonly accepted “grand theory”
of long-range change in existence, scenarios are invariably found to be
hazy, vague, too sweeping in the subjects they cover, and made up of overly
speculative rather than rigorous analysis. Scenarios are further criticized as
being more the product of inventive minds rather than the results of estab-
lished and proven “scientific methods.”
LAMP versus Alternative Futures and Scenarios

Unlike the above approaches, the LAMP is based on one key assumption
about the future: that it is the sum total of the interaction of free will of the
national actors involved. By taking all possible permutations of the actors
and courses of action involved, the LAMP develops a full range of possible
“alternate futures” based on this single hypothesis. It then goes one step
further than the scenario approach in that all alternate futures are then
matched against each other in a pair-wise comparison to determine which
alternate future has the highest relative probability.
The LAMP is similar to the scenario approach in that both methods speak
of events that might lead to alternate scenarios or futures. The scenario
approach, however, assumes that these events are singular “branching-off”
points which each result in a different future, while the LAMP treats such
“focal events” as merely changing the relative probability of the universe of
alternate futures that still exist. Moreover, these focal events are then used
by the LAMP as the basis for developing indicators for the I &W process,
while the scenario approach does not do this.14.
The Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)

Heuer’s Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) methodology has
become one of the most widely used structured methodologies in the
intelligence community. It is also one of the most highly structured method-
ological approaches to analysis, with only the LAMP arguably being even
more structured than ACH.
Most of you may think that you have never encountered a method
quite like ACH before in your experience. In fact, practically all of you
have encountered a form of ACH at one time or another. One of the
distinguishing features of ACH is that it seeks to use evidence to eliminate
various hypotheses rather than simply see which hypothesis is supported
best by the available evidence. The danger of the latter approach is that an
analyst may fall into the analytical trap known as “satisficing,” in which the
analyst decides on an initial hypothesis, then looks for evidence to support
it, disregarding evidence that may in fact contradict that initial hypothesis.
For those of you who have ever read the Sherlock Holmes novels by Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle, you may recall Holmes famous saying (paraphrased
here) that “when you have eliminated all other possible explanations, that
which remains, however improbable, must be the truth.” ACH works in a
similar manner, except that analysts must ensure that they have included
ALL possible hypotheses pertaining to their problem in order not to
inadvertently leave out the one hypothesis that may be the truth.
Looking at it another way, how many of you have ever played the
game of Clue (Colonel Mustard with the Knife in the Library)? When
you play the game of Clue, you are actually employing a rudimentary
form of ACH by gathering evidence that eliminates the various suspects,
locations, and means, until you arrive at the one true suspect by process of
elimination. Or for those of you who have watched such television crime
shows as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, NCIS, or Law and Order, you
will see the central principle of ACH being used (albeit in an artificially
accelerated manner) to eliminate other explanations and suspects for a
given crime.15
ACH has proved to be a highly effective technique when there is a large
amount of data to absorb and evaluate. While a single analyst can use
ACH, it is most effective with a small team that can challenge each other’s
evaluation of the evidence. Developing a matrix of hypotheses and loading
already collected information into the matrix can be accomplished in a
day or less. If the data must be reassembled, the initial phases of the ACH
process may require additional time. Sometimes a facilitator or someone
familiar with the technique can lead new analysts through this process for
the first time.
ACH is particularly appropriate for controversial issues when analysts
want to develop a clear record that shows what theories they have
considered and how they arrived at their judgments. Developing the ACH
matrix allows other analysts (or even policymakers) to review their analysis
and identify areas of agreement and disagreement. Evidence can also be
examined more systematically, and analysts have found that this makes the
technique ideal for considering the possibility of deception and denial.
ACH demands that analysts explicitly identify all the reasonable alter-
native hypotheses, then array the evidence against each hypothesis—rather
than evaluating the plausibility of each hypothesis one at a time. To create

a level playing field, the process must:
MM Ensure that all the information and argumentation is evaluated and

given equal treatment or weight when considering each hypothesis.
MM Prevent the analyst from premature closure on a particular
explanation or hypothesis.
MM Protect the analyst against innate tendencies to ignore or discount
information that does not fit comfortably with the preferred
explanation at the time.
To accomplish this, the process should follow these steps:
MM Brainstorm among analysts with different perspectives to identify all

possible hypotheses.
MM List all significant evidence and arguments relevant to all the
hypotheses.
MM Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and each piece of
evidence on the side. Determine whether each piece of evidence is
consistent, inconsistent, or not applicable to each hypothesis.
MM Refine the matrix and reconsider the hypotheses—in some cases,
analysts will need to add new hypotheses and re-examine the
information available.
MM Focus on disproving hypotheses rather than proving one. Tally the
pieces of evidence that are inconsistent and consistent with each
hypothesis to see which explanations are the weakest and strongest.
MM Analyze how sensitive the ACH results are to a few critical items
of evidence. Should those pieces prove to be wrong, misleading, or
subject to deception, how would it impact an explanation’s validity?
MM Ask what evidence is not being seen but would be expected for a
given hypothesis to be true. Is denial and deception a possibility?
MM Report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that
should still be monitored as new information becomes available.
MM Establish the relative likelihood for the hypotheses and report all
the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses that should still be
monitored as new information becomes available.
MM Identify and monitor indicators that would be both consistent
and inconsistent with the full set of hypotheses. In the latter case,
explore what could account for inconsistent data.16
LAMP versus ACH

Like ACH, the LAMP is more effective when performed by a group of
analysts as opposed to a single analyst. Also like ACH, the LAMP has
computer software available to both document the process and make
working of larger problems possible. For all of its strengths, however, ACH
has its shortcomings as well. For example, while the ACH method is known
for its thoroughness, an analyst who is using it as his or her sole instrument
has to contend with the difficulty in understanding the mental and bureau-
cratic processes of distant adversaries. Furthermore, the ACH method
fails to exploit the theoretical knowledge derived from the study of similar
phenomena in other places and other time periods. The principal concern is
that if analysts focus mainly on trying to confirm one hypothesis, which they
think is probably true, they can easily be led astray by the fact that there
is so much evidence to support their point of view. They fail to recognize
that most of this evidence may also be consistent with other explanations
or conclusions, and that those other alternatives have not been refuted.17
Conclusions
What the foregoing overview of four analytical techniques commonly used
for prediction should illustrate is the fact that the LAMP, if anything, is a
unique “hybrid” methodology that combines isolated elements from other
analytical techniques and utilizes them in a new and innovative way. While
all four of the examined methods can claim some resemblance to one
element or another of the LAMP, none treat the construction, prediction,
and analysis of alternate futures in the same way as the LAMP. As will be
demonstrated in succeeding chapters, the LAMP offers a fundamentally
different way of thinking about and analyzing the future’s different possible
paths.
Notes
1 See Thomas L. Saaty, Decision Making for Leaders: The Analytic Hierarchy
Process for Decisions in a Complex World (Belmont, CA: Lifetime Learning
Publications, 1982), and Thomas L. Saaty and Joyce M. Alexander, Conflict
Resolution: The Analytic Hierarchy Approach (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1987).
2 Thomas L. Saaty, Decision Making For Leaders: The Analytic Hierarchy
Process, 94–5.
3 Ibid., 95.
4 Saaty and Alexander, Conflict Resolution: The Analytic Hierarchy Approach,
11.
5 See Methodology Catalog: An Aid to Intelligence Analysts and Forecasters
DDE-2200-227-83 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1983),
III-9.
6 Methodology Catalog, III-10.
7 See H.A. Linstone and Murray Turoff, The Delphi Method: Techniques
and Applications (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Co., 1975), 4. Cited in
Methodology Catalog, III-13.
8 The description of the Alternative Futures method is taken from A Tradecraft
Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis,
34–6 (US Government publication, March 2009).
9 The foregoing description of scenario theory is taken from Methodology
Catalog, III-21.
10 Ibid., III-22.
11 Ibid., III-23.
12 Ibid., III-25.
13 Ibid., III-28, 29.
14 Ibid., III-26.
15 When I was teaching the INTL506 (Analytics II) course at American
Military University, I had my students all work the same subject for their
course term paper: A Critical Analysis of the Jon Benet Ramsey Murder
Case. What was important was that I was having them work on a case that
was still considered “unsolved.” Most of the students chose ACH as their
methodology of choice in analyzing the available evidence. Most of these
students reached the conclusion that an “unknown intruder” was responsible
for the murder, which differed widely from the conventional wisdom at the
time that Patsy Ramsey was the most likely suspect.
16 The explanation of the ACH method is taken from A Tradecraft Primer:
Structuring Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence Analysis, 14–15
(US Government publication, March 2009).
17 See discussion by Nwankama Nwankama at All Hands Business Solutions
website: http://allhandsmgt.com/intelligence-analysis-lamp.htm [accessed
16 January 2013].
CHAPTER THREE
The initial use of the LAMP:

Case study of the former Soviet
nuclear republics and nuclear
weapons
This chapter examines the original application of the LAMP within the
context of a case study of the perceptions of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) nuclear republics concerning the nuclear weapons
issue.1 In order to show the evolution of the alternate futures, the original
four hypothesized scenarios from The Russian View of US Strategy: Its
Past, Its Future are presented in abbreviated format here. This will be
followed by a detailed examination of two LAMP scenarios for the CIS
nuclear republics, and conclude with a retrospective analysis of how the
alternate futures in these scenarios changed with the passage of time since
the case study was concluded in 1993.
The future of the CIS republics:

Four scenarios
The four scenarios are derived from the interaction of two primary factors:
the success or failure of the Russian government to attain reunification of
the republics under its leadership by gaining complete control of its nuclear
arsenal, and the collapse or recovery of the economies of the CIS. Each
scenario is outlined below.2
Scenario 1: Reunified republics and economic recovery

This is the “best case” scenario from the standpoint of both the
Commonwealth republics and the rest of the world. It presupposes that
the republics are able to resolve the question of nuclear weapons control
without fear of sacrificing their own autonomy from Moscow. Moreover,
an economic recovery, or at least stabilization, within the republics would
go a long way towards preventing the return of authoritarian or extremist
regimes and give the peoples of the republics the best chance to establish
democratic traditions. It is practically a given that democracies have a
difficult time surviving, let alone flourishing, in a situation involving signif-
icant external threats and internal economic collapse.
The prospects for arms control and disarmament would be the best
of all possible scenarios, since the political objectives of a stable and
prosperous CIS with democratic governments would have the least use for
a large strategic nuclear arsenal. The CIS could join the US in progressively
paring back such forces to virtually symbolic levels, even while building
up or improving their respective strategic defenses in a collective effort to
discourage emerging Third World nuclear powers from engaging in political
adventurism or blackmail.
Scenario 2: Independent republics and

economic recovery
This scenario constitutes the next best case of the four possible scenarios,
and is at least somewhat more likely than the admittedly utopian first
scenario. This scenario presupposes that the independent republics are
able to gain control of their own nuclear forces (or at least prevent unified
control by one authority), and that the Russian republic does not resort to
armed force in an effort to gain control of the individual arsenals. The likely
make-up of these independent republics will be a mixture of democratic
and authoritarian regimes, depending on the cultural proclivities of the
individual republics and how well their individual economies fare in the
recovery.
Just as likely, however, will be the rise of several independent nuclear
states of widely varying strengths and technological capability for research
and development. Depending on the perceptions of the individual republics
concerning the utility of nuclear forces, this will greatly complicate arms
control negotiations. For even if the individual republics do not perceive
the US as the main threat, they will still wish to maintain, if not improve,
their individual nuclear arsenals and conventional forces as their guarantor
of sovereignty against a would-be “empire builder” among the republics,
The initial use of the LAMP 41
the Russian republic being the most obvious candidate. This will lead to
a period of the most byzantine “divide and conquer” diplomatic maneu-
vering in the history of Russia, as the independent republics strive to
maintain their sovereignty versus one another by forming alliances with
each other as well as with outside powers.
Scenario 3: Reunified republics and economic collapse

This is the next-to-worst case scenario, which assumes that the Russian
republic has been able to re-establish unified control over the breakaway
republics, which in turn presupposes that unified control over the entire
former Soviet nuclear arsenal has been regained. Unfortunately, the
economic collapse envisioned in this scenario also heralds the rise of a
hostile extremist regime which blames the West in general, and the US in
particular, for its economic woes. While such a regime would not neces-
sarily herald a return to the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ethos, neither
would it preclude a resurgence in influence and prestige for the former
Soviet military and KGB, who have been convinced all along that the US
has been poised to exploit their weakness, just as they themselves would
have done if roles had been reversed.
The effect of this scenario on arms control will be far from salutary;
in fact, arms control efforts will all but disappear, since the military hard-
liners will re-emphasize the strategic and political importance of strategic
nuclear weapons. The principal concern for the US will be to avoid being
stampeded into another costly arms race while safeguarding US security.
This will prove a difficult, but somewhat familiar, diplomatic balancing act
for the US; so much so that this scenario could be dubbed “Cold War II.”
Scenario 4: Independent republics and

economic collapse
This is the worst-case scenario of the four projected outcomes for the
former Soviet republics. This scenario presupposes either that the West fails
to provide sufficient economic aid to avert widespread economic collapse,
or that the aid provided will prove ineffectual. It also assumes that the
Russian republic will be unable to regain full control over the remainder of
the Soviet nuclear arsenal now situated within the “breakaway” republics,
and that these republics will be able to more firmly establish their sover-
eignty as a result.
Under these conditions, democracy is unlikely to survive for long, if
at all. The economic deprivation within the republics will foster the rise
of a number of extremist regimes, some armed with nuclear weapons, all
striving to maintain their independence or expand their influence vis-à-vis

one another, and all seeking to get the maximum diplomatic, economic,
and military support from outside powers. Of major concern here is the
possibility that some of the republics with large Moslem populations, such
as Kazakhstan, once in firm possession of even a few nuclear weapons
might use them as bargaining chips with other Moslem nations such as
Iraq or Iran, who could certainly provide much-needed expertise in nuclear
weapons development and production. Worse still, the exchange could also
take place in reverse, as many former Soviet nuclear researchers attempt to
seek gainful employment outside of Russia or the other CIS republics. This
will only accelerate nuclear proliferation.3

The implications for the US are obviously the most profound and
dangerous of any possible scenario. Additional arms control agreements
in this situation will be not only be impossible to negotiate, but irrelevant.
And without a credible strategic defense to discourage nuclear coercion by
an unknown number of independent nuclear powers, it will be virtually
impossible for the US to remain neutral in a conflict that it would best
avoid.
Scenario 1: Yeltsin stays in power (status quo)

The following discussion utilizes the final four steps of the LAMP outlined
in Chapter 1. For the purposes of this textbook, it will not be necessary to
discuss each of the alternate futures that are theoretically possible; these
alternate futures have been rank-ordered in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for the
curious reader. What follows is an analysis of each of the ten most likely
futures within two of the major scenarios for the CIS nuclear republics.
Looking now at Scenario 1 in our CIS nuclear republics problem, we
see an example of how these steps might be carried out in practice. The
Table 3.1 Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo)

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following are the ten alternate futures deemed most likely to occur (see
Table 3.1 above), given the information available as of the end of February
1993.
Alternate Future #24: Ukraine pursues independent

nuclear capability, while Belarus and Kazakhstan
continue disarmament process
This alternate future is the line of least resistance, the future which bears
the closest resemblance to the present “state of nature” among the CIS
republics. So long as Russia does not attempt to force the issue itself
with military action, and so long as Ukraine perceives Russia as its main
long-term enemy, Ukraine will seek to develop an independent nuclear
capability as its best guarantor of independence and sovereignty. By the
same token, Belarus and Kazakhstan, barring a radical change in their
own or Russia’s internal leadership, will not have an overriding incentive
to upset the current status quo until they see the resolution of the Russian–
Ukrainian conflict. The likelihood of armed conflict in this alternate future
is low, particularly if Ukraine makes its independent nuclear capability an
accomplished fact before Russia can react effectively. This alternate future
will lead to increased nuclear proliferation, however, with a high potential
for transposing into Alternate Future #14, below.
Alternate Future #14: Ukraine and Kazakhstan develop

their independent nuclear capabilities, while Belarus
continues its disarmament process
As mentioned above, Alternate Future #24 could easily transpose into this
alternate future if Ukraine succeeds in establishing itself as an independent
nuclear power. Emboldened by Ukraine’s example, Kazakhstan would
become even more loath to surrender its newly won prestige for the sake
of an abstract principle such as nonproliferation, particularly if the internal
political situation within Russia confirms its continuing trend back toward
its old imperial ways. This future also assumes that Belarus would remain
sufficiently intimidated by Russia and its own Chernobyl experience to
still choose appeasement through continued disarmament over the bolder
course of asserting its nationalism via nuclear weapons. If both Ukraine
and Kazakhstan successfully establish nuclear independence, it will have
the paradoxical effect of lowering the likelihood of decisive armed conflict
in general, even while exacerbating the problem of nuclear proliferation. In
this alternate future, Russia would realize that any attempt to reunify the
empire by armed force would be suicidal in the face of two new nuclear
powers on its immediate border. It also assumes that Yeltsin had become
reconciled to the loss of empire and still managed to remain in power to
pursue economic reform.
Alternate Future #9: Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan

all continue to pursue disarmament
This alternate future is not as unlikely as it seems. The critical focal point
which would distinguish it from Alternate Future #14 above is the Ukrainian
leadership’s recognition that the pursuit of independence could be achieved
through peaceful integration into European economic and political organi-
zations. Ukraine’s leadership would have to be convinced that the US and
Europe could offer credible security guarantees sufficient to deter a potential
Russian empire builder. Such a decision on Ukraine’s part would be helped
immeasurably by credible evidence that Russia had reconciled itself to the
loss of Ukraine as part of its former empire, evidence which unfortunately
does not currently appear to exist. The salutary effect which this future
ostensibly would have for nonproliferation and arms control is somewhat
debatable. Although the creation of three additional nuclear powers within
the former Soviet Union would be prevented, the resulting dominance of
Russia as the sole nuclear power would make disarmament of Russia itself
all the more difficult. This alternate future does not have the potential for
transposition into other alternate futures, as its assumptions are unique.
Alternate Future #25: Ukraine preemptively seizes the

nuclear weapons on its territory, while Belarus and
Kazakhstan continue disarmament
This alternate future is highly similar to Alternate Future #14 above. Its
critical divergence lies in the perception of the Ukrainian leadership that
its nuclear weapons are in imminent danger of seizure or destruction by
Russian military action; therefore Ukraine decides to forestall such action by
forcibly taking possession themselves and deporting the associated Russian
personnel. This would occur regardless of whether or not Ukraine had
actually managed to crack the computer codes for controlling and firing the
missiles themselves; indeed, such seizure would help reinforce any Russian
impression that the Ukrainians had already succeeded in breaking the codes.
The possibility of armed conflict rises sharply in this scenario, since Russian
ultra-nationalists would be putting maximum pressure on Yeltsin to take
decisive action to prevent the irretrievable loss of empire which would be
imminent at that point. The consequences of this future for nuclear prolif-
eration would obviously be more detrimental than those above; nations
outside the CIS would be emboldened to pursue nuclear capability more
aggressively than ever, particularly if Ukraine could get away with it and
still deter armed conflict with Russia. Belarus is still assumed in this future
to be sufficiently intimidated so as not to pursue a nuclear capability. In the
case of Kazakhstan, however, the likelihood of its continuing disarmament
in this alternate future for a prolonged period is uncertain. The potential for
transposition into Alternate Future #16 below is therefore high.

nuclear weapons on its territory, Belarus continues
disarmament, and Kazakhstan pursues an independent
nuclear capability
Of the five most probable alternate futures examined thus far under this first
scenario, this future has the greatest potential for armed conflict. In fact,
this scenario could itself trigger the overthrow of Boris Yeltsin by Russian
ultra-nationalists, resulting in an even more unstable set of alternate
futures. The key point of divergence from Alternate Future #25 would be
the Kazakh perception of its chances for successfully achieving independent
nuclear capability as covertly as possible without drawing Russian military
intervention directly against itself. This future assumes that Russia would
be so weakened by internal political divisions and economic collapse that
it could not intervene effectively to prevent Ukraine and Kazakhstan from
following their respective courses. The process of nuclear proliferation has
gone further in this alternate future than in #25 above; there is even the
potential for transposition of this alternate future into #17 if Kazakhstan
perceives an opportunity to take advantage of what would undoubtedly
have to be a critically weakened Russia.
Alternate Future #22: Ukraine and Belarus continue

disarmament, while Kazakhstan pursues an
independent nuclear capability
This alternate future, as we can see from the 20/20 hindsight of a December
1993 perspective, depends on the Ukrainian leadership accepting whatever
“security guarantees” and financial compensation it can get in exchange for
continuing disarmament. At the same time, however, Kazakhstan (already
showing signs of reluctance to surrender its physical control of strategic
nuclear weapons to Russia) feels sufficiently threatened by the nuclear

powers on its border to undertake steps to acquire independent nuclear
capability. Since Ukraine has been the linchpin of resistance to disarmament
thus far, it is unlikely that Kazakhstan could pursue this course for long
without also giving in to pressure from Russia and the US. The likelihood
of armed conflict in this future is therefore low. Likewise, the consequences
of this alternate future for nuclear proliferation are negative, but not nearly
so much as would be the case with an independent nuclear Ukraine. This
alternate future, barring either the emergence of a fascist dictatorship
in Russia or a more nationalistic and authoritarian one in Kazakhstan,
therefore has potential to transpose into Alternate Future #9 above.

all pursue independent nuclear capability
This future assumes that Yeltsin has been unsuccessful in his attempts to
coerce Ukraine into surrendering its nuclear weapons, and that Belarus and
Kazakhstan have become emboldened sufficiently to develop an independent
nuclear capability themselves. Ukraine has managed to crack the opera-
tional codes to the nuclear warheads, and decides to share this information
with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Alarmed by the political situation in Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan decide to take advantage of Ukraine’s successful
attainment of independent nuclear power status and do so themselves.
Obviously the consequences for nuclear proliferation are highly negative,
but the likelihood of armed conflict in this alternate future is relatively
low, since Russia would be much more restrained by the presence of three
additional independent nuclear powers on her borders than would be the
case if it were a single isolated power like Ukraine or Kazakhstan.
The potential for transposition into several other alternate futures is
definitely higher in this alternate future. The potential is greatest for futures
which involve going from independent nuclear capability to actually seizing
the nuclear weapons themselves. This would include a range of seven
alternate futures from #2 through #8, all with varying degrees of relative
probability.

nuclear capability, Belarus continues disarmament, and
Kazakhstan seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory
This future assumes that Yeltsin’s policies, combined with the deterio-
rating political and economic situation within Russia and the republics,
have led to the emergence of a more nationalistic Kazakh leadership. This

leadership, emboldened by the apparent success of Ukraine’s pursuit of
independent nuclear capability, but anxious for its own autonomy, takes
advantage of Russia’s internal weaknesses to seize the nuclear weapons
on its territory. Ukraine, having its own motivations for retaining nuclear
weapons, but still desiring to avoid decisive confrontation, continues with
a variation of Kravchuk’s ambiguous diplomatic strategy.4

Once again, the consequences for nuclear proliferation and arms control
are highly negative for this scenario. Russian compliance with START 1,
let alone START 2, would go out the window at this point. Other aspiring
nuclear powers within the Islamic community would be encouraged by
Kazakhstan’s action. This would have negative political repercussions
within Russia as well, since the ultra-nationalists would be demanding
Yeltsin’s head on a platter if he continued to take no action under these
circumstances. So not only does this future have the potential to transpose
into more radical ones such as Alternate Future #17 (described below), but
also to transpose into a scenario in which Russia takes military action to
seize the nuclear weapons.
Alternate Future #18: Ukraine and Belarus pursue

independent nuclear capability, while Kazakhstan
continues disarmament
This future assumes the rise of a stronger “pro-nuclear” faction within
the Belarusian parliament, one that is able to compel the Belarusian
leadership to reconsider its accommodating stance with Russia regarding
nuclear weapons on its territory. At the same time, it assumes that the
Kazakh leadership has decided the risks of nuclear power status outweigh
any conceivable gain, and so it decides to seek security by accommo-
dation, adopting the strategy that Belarus abandons. Ukraine’s perception
of the threat remains largely unchanged from other futures in which it
pursues independent capability, with the exception that it has succeeded
in convincing Belarus of the need for combined action to achieve greater
security.
While not as disastrous as those futures in which nuclear weapons are
seized, any move by Belarus to attain independent nuclear capability would
be a significant setback for arms control and nuclear nonproliferation,
particularly since this would be a dramatic reversal from its previous
behavior. Joint cooperation between Ukraine and Belarus would not
only anger the Russian leadership but further strengthen the hand of the
extremists and ultra-nationalists who desire reunification of the empire.
This future has definite potential for transposition into one of the ostensibly
more “bizarre” futures, Alternate Future #21, particularly if the ultra-

nationalists should overthrow Yeltsin or achieve victory in an election.
Alternate Future #17: Ukraine and Kazakhstan seize

the nuclear weapons on their territories, while Belarus
continues disarmament
This future is a potential continuation of Alternate Futures #14 and #15,
described above. In this future the threat perception by Ukraine and
Kazakhstan of Russia is much higher than in other scenarios. Indeed, the
assumption here is that they perceive Russia as being ready to take military
action to seize their nuclear weapons, and so they have decided to run the
risk of becoming de facto nuclear powers by seizing the nuclear weapons on
their territory. This scenario also presupposes that Ukraine and Kazakhstan
anticipate being able to break the operational codes and retarget their
nuclear weapons; in fact, the possibility of active collusion between Ukraine
and Kazakhstan is not precluded in this future.
This has obviously negative consequences for arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation, even more so than in Alternate Future #18 above. Just as
obviously, unless Russia is absolutely prostrate from economic collapse and
internal disorder, this situation is bound to provoke the extremist factions
within Russia, and could easily lead to the overthrow of Yeltsin or the
election of an extremist candidate such as Zhirinovsky.
Although we leave analysis of the consequences, focal events, and
indicators for the remaining alternate futures within this scenario as an
independent exercise for the student, it is self-evident that the number
of focal events necessary to bring about the various alternate futures has
the potential to increase as we progress through the spectrum of alternate
futures from highest relative probability to least. Next, we will see how
the alteration of a major assumption for a scenario can affect the relative
probability of the alternate futures.
Scenario 2: Russian ultra-nationalists

seize power
The following discussion covers the five alternate futures deemed most
likely to occur if Russian ultra-nationalists overthrow Boris Yeltsin. It
is assumed in this scenario that an ultra-nationalist government would
utilize increased diplomatic pressure, threats, economic blackmail, but
not military force, in an effort to intimidate the other nuclear republics
Table 3.2 Scenario 2 – Russian ultra-nationalists seize power

Possible future # Ukraine Belarus Kazakhstan #Votes
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into surrendering their nuclear weapons promptly without preconditions.

Admittedly, given the potential rise of fascists such as Zhirinovsky, any
scenario which involves the ultra-nationalists seizing power but taking
no military action may well prove to be a transitory one. It should
also be noted that, given the success of extremists in the recent Russian
parliamentary elections in December, the differences in the governing
assumptions in this scenario from Scenario 1 will lessen as conditions
within Russia worsen under Yeltsin.
Alternate Future #14: Ukraine and Kazakhstan

pursue independent nuclear capabilities, while Belarus
continues to disarm
The alert reader will immediately notice that the difference in the governing
assumption of this scenario has altered the relative probability of the
alternate futures. Specifically, Alternate Futures #14 and #24 are still the
two most likely alternate futures; they have simply switched places. This is
because Kazakhstan would be more likely to take its chances in pursuit of
an independent nuclear capability along with Ukraine if it perceived that
accommodation by disarmament would not achieve its political goals. And
an ultra-nationalist Russian government would be more likely to inflame
Kazakh nationalism by its very aggressiveness. The consequences for nuclear
proliferation are the same as described for these futures in Scenario 1.
However, the potential for armed conflict is greater in this alternate future
than under the first scenario, simply because an ultra-nationalist Russian
government will be more tempted to force the issue through military action
rather than allow Ukraine and Kazakhstan to consolidate their status as
nuclear powers.

nuclear capability, while Belarus and Kazakhstan
continue to disarm
As mentioned above, the key point of divergence in this alternate future
lies in a different Kazakh perception of the immediate threat from an
ultra-nationalist Russian government. In this alternate future, the Kazakh
leadership perceives less of an immediate threat to its interests, or thinks
that accommodation ought to be tried a little longer rather than run the
risks of pursuing nuclear capability. There is still a greater risk of armed
conflict in this future than under Scenario I, but less than that in Alternate
Future #14 above. As mentioned previously, this alternate future also has
the potential for transposition into Alternate Future #14 should the Kazakh
threat perception change.

nuclear weapons on its territory, Belarus continues
to disarm, and Kazakhstan pursues an independent
nuclear capability
For this alternate future, the relative probability has risen to make it the third
most likely within this scenario, as compared with its fifth place ranking
under Scenario 1. Like the first scenario, the focal point in this future would
be the Ukrainian perception of an imminent Russian action to seize nuclear
weapons on Ukrainian territory, a perception which would be more likely
with an ultra-nationalist Russian government in power. The presence of a
more aggressive Russia makes this alternate future a highly unstable one,
with strong potential for transposition into Alternate Future #17 or #7,
or even into another set of alternate futures altogether if Russia were to
undertake military action. The consequences for nuclear proliferation and
arms control efforts are obviously negative, with a high probability that
Ukraine and Kazakhstan would be collaborating with aspiring Third World
nuclear powers if they perceive little help forthcoming from the US.
Alternate Future #17: Ukraine and Kazakhstan

preemptively seize the nuclear weapons on their
respective territories, while Belarus continues to disarm
As mentioned above, this alternate future can easily transpose from #16
because of the instability resulting from the presence of an ultra-nationalist
Russia that is making threats and applying pressure, but not yet taking
decisive military action. Kazakhstan would be sufficiently emboldened
by both the Ukrainian example and the imminence of the threat to its
north and east to seize its nuclear weapons rather than covertly pursue
a nuclear capability as in #16 above. Arms control in general, and the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in particular, would be rendered ineffective.
Belarus, although increasingly nervous about its prospects, would still be
clinging to an accommodationist policy as its best hope for security.

Kazakhstan each pursue an independent nuclear capability
This alternate future is the first one in which we see Belarus finally move
away from its accommodationist policy (albeit very quietly) and take steps
to become a nuclear power in its own right. The key points of divergence
in this alternate future are:
a The “pro-nuclear” faction within Belarus, like the one within

Ukraine, finally gains sufficient political strength within the
Belarusian parliament to force the leadership to reconsider its
nuclear policy.
b Relations between Belarus and Ukraine are sufficiently strengthened
by the presence of an ultra-nationalist Russian threat that they
perceive the need for a united effort to achieve nuclear capability.
c Kazakhstan, emboldened by Ukraine’s example but not wishing
to draw a Russian attack directly upon itself, increases its
collaboration with the aspiring nuclear nations to its sooth.
It doesn’t take much reflection to conclude that arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation are a dead letter in this alternate future. There is also
significant potential for this alternate future to transpose into Alternate
Future #7, in which Kazakhstan decides to seize its nuclear weapons rather
than covertly pursue an independent nuclear capability.

nuclear capability, Belarus continues disarmament, and
Kazakhstan seizes the nuclear weapons on its territory
This future assumes that the rise of an ultra-nationalist government, due
to the deteriorating political and economic situation within Russia, has led
to the emergence of a more nationalistic Kazakh leadership in response.

This leadership, emboldened by the apparent success of Ukraine’s pursuit
of independent nuclear capability, but anxious for its own autonomy, takes
advantage of Russia’s internal weaknesses to seize the nuclear weapons
on its territory. Ukraine, having its own motivations for retaining nuclear
weapons, but still desiring to avoid decisive confrontation, continues with
a variation of Kravchuk’s ambiguous diplomatic strategy.
Once again, the consequences for nuclear proliferation and arms
control are highly negative for this scenario. Assuming that a Russian
ultra-nationalist government had not already repudiated existing arms
control agreements, any remaining possibility for Russian compliance
with START 1, let alone START 2, would go out the window at this
point. Other aspiring nuclear powers within the Islamic community
would be encouraged by Kazakhstan’s action. This would have negative
political repercussions within Russia, as well, since the ultra-nationalists
would be sorely tempted to take decisive military action under these
circumstances.

all pursue independent nuclear capability
This future assumes that the ultra-nationalists have been unsuccessful in
their attempts to coerce Ukraine into surrendering its nuclear weapons,
and that Belarus and Kazakhstan have become sufficiently alarmed by
the rise of ultra-nationalists to power to develop independent nuclear
capability themselves. Ukraine has managed to crack the operational
codes to the nuclear warheads, and decides to share this information
with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Alarmed by the political situation in
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan decide to take advantage of Ukraine’s
successful attainment of independent nuclear power status and do so
themselves. In addition to the consequences for nuclear proliferation
being highly negative, the likelihood of armed conflict in this alternate
future is relatively higher than its equivalent future under Scenario I, since
Russian ultra-nationalists would consider the presence of three additional
independent nuclear powers on her borders an intolerable threat to
Russian “great power” status.
The potential for transposition into several other alternate futures is
definitely higher in this alternate future. The potential is greatest for futures
which involve going from independent nuclear capability to actually seizing
the nuclear weapons themselves. This would include a range of seven
alternate futures from #2 through #8, all with varying degrees of relative
probability.

Kazakhstan continue disarmament
This alternate future is highly similar to Alternate Future #14 above. Its
critical divergence lies in the perception of the Ukrainian leadership that
its nuclear weapons are in imminent danger of seizure or destruction by
Russian military action; therefore Ukraine decides to forestall such action
by forcibly taking possession themselves and deporting the associated
Russian personnel. This would occur regardless of whether or not Ukraine
had actually managed to crack the computer codes for controlling and
firing the missiles themselves; indeed, such seizure would help reinforce any
Russian impression that the Ukrainians had already succeeded in breaking
the codes. The possibility of armed conflict rises sharply in this scenario,
since Russian ultra-nationalists would be putting maximum pressure on
Yeltsin to take decisive action to prevent the irretrievable loss of empire
which would be imminent at that point. The consequences of this future
for nuclear proliferation would obviously be more detrimental than those
futures in which Ukraine simply pursues independent capability without
undertaking physical seizure of the weapons; aspiring nuclear powers
outside the CIS would be emboldened to pursue nuclear capability more
aggressively than ever, particularly if Ukraine could get away with it and
still deter armed attack by Russia. Belarus is still assumed in this future to
be sufficiently intimidated so as not to pursue a nuclear capability. In the
case of Kazakhstan, however, the likelihood of its continuing disarmament
in this alternate future for a prolonged period is uncertain. The potential for
transposition into Alternate Future #16 is therefore high.
Alternate Future #2: Ukraine and Belarus pursue

independent nuclear capability, while Kazakhstan seizes
the nuclear weapons on its territory
This is an alternate future which could be a continuation from Alternate
Future #1, particularly within the context of the highly unstable political
situation that would exist under this scenario. This alternate future assumes
that a more nationalistic Kazakh government is in place, and that it has
concluded that it cannot safeguard its own independence with an ultra-
nationalist Russia to its north and two other nuclear powers on its borders.
As mentioned in Alternate Future #1 above, this future also has the further
potential for transposition into Alternate Futures #3 through #8 within this
scenario.
As with virtually all futures involving seizure of nuclear weapons, this

would virtually torpedo arms control and disarmament agreements from
the Russian perspective, and could only exacerbate nuclear proliferation
within the Islamic nations.
Alternate Future #7: Ukraine and Kazakhstan seize

the nuclear weapons on their territories, while Belarus
pursues independent nuclear capability
A possible continuation from Alternate Futures #1 and #2 above, the
consequences and potential for transposition into the more violent alternate
futures of Scenario 3 is even greater here than for those previously discussed,
since such simultaneous seizure of nuclear weapons would be an intolerable
provocation to an ultra-nationalist Russian government. The transposition
potential into other alternate futures within this scenario is the same as for
Alternate Future #2 above.
As can be concluded from the previous discussion, the array of relative
probabilities can be significantly altered by the changing of a major
assumption governing a scenario, as this must exert a significant effect on
the perceptions of the national actors involved.
A retrospective on the CIS nuclear

republics case study
Looking back at this initial LAMP case study from a 20-year perspective,
we can see that a LAMP problem has a tendency to simplify itself over time
as the occurrence of certain events reduce the number of potential alternate
futures through the elimination of one or more courses of action for the
actors involved. If we were to examine this same problem with today’s
perspective and information, our table of potential alternate futures would
be reduced from 27 to 8, as shown opposite.
Russia’s establishment of complete control over the former Soviet
nuclear arsenal has greatly simplified this LAMP problem by perma-
nently removing one potential course of action by the republics. If we
were to revote the alternate futures in this simplified LAMP problem,
the alternate future that would be deemed most likely would be one in
which all three republics continue disarmament and make no effort to
become independent nuclear powers. We can expect the same simplifi-
cation process to occur in other LAMP problems, including the ones to
be presented in Part Two.
Possible future # Ukraine Belarus Kazakhstan
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Notes
1 This case study is not presented in its entirety, instead focusing on that portion
dealing with the application of the LAMP. The entire case study was originally
the author’s MSSI thesis, “The CIS Nuclear Republics and Nuclear Weapons:
Chess Game or Armageddon?” (unpublished MSSI thesis, National Intelligence
University, July 1993).
2 These four scenarios are also found in Lockwood and Lockwood, The Russian
View of US Strategy: Its Past, Its Future (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1993), 193–7.
3 Viktor N. Mikhaylov, Russian deputy minister for nuclear power and industry,
and Yevgeny Primakov, chief of Soviet foreign intelligence, had voiced this
worry, and it had already become a major issue of concern for the West. See
Fred Hiatt, “Third World Woos Soviet Arms Experts,” Washington Post,
November 28, 1991, A61, A66.
4 This strategy is described in Jonathan S. Lockwood, “The View From Ukraine:
The Aspiring Nuclear Power,” Strategic Review 21, 4 (Fall 1993), 27–8.
CHAPTER FOUR
Limitations and potential

applications of the LAMP
Having learned the 12-step process of the LAMP technique, and having
walked through a basic application of the method in a case study of the
CIS nuclear republics, the analyst should by now be aware not only of the
potential of the LAMP, but of its limitations as well.
Limitations of the LAMP

LAMP cannot easily handle a large number of actors
and courses of action
This criticism is valid, but only to the extent that the analysts are unable
to limit the scope of his predictive issue. If an issue is so complex and
so broad in scope that the LAMP generates an astronomical number of
alternate futures, the analyst might be well advised to break the problem
down into smaller issues. This criticism is also valid only if the analyst is
using the LAMP without computer support; that is, using the old “stubby
pencil” method. With the LAMP integrated into a computer software
program and tied into an existing intelligence database, then the process
becomes much easier to handle. It is also recommended that the LAMP
analyses be done with a group of analysts over a computer network. This
minimizes the potential for “groupthink” or dominance of the analytic
group by a single strong personality that might otherwise occur in face-
to-face meetings.
LAMP does not easily lend itself to

quantitative analysis
This criticism is based on the fact that the LAMP differs in kind from
traditional approaches to probability theory in that it assumes one can
never know the absolute probability of a given future. This is because only
the past is fixed and immutable; the present is transient, and the future is
infinitely fluid and dynamic. The LAMP, if you will, is probability theory’s
answer to “chaos theory.” Since the future can only be altered by the sum
total of interactions of free will, each actor is a potential random element.
This is not to say that the LAMP absolutely cannot be quantified.
Certainly its formulas for calculating the permutations of actors and
courses of action are simple enough, and lend themselves easily to
computer programming. But in order for the LAMP to be meaningful,
the probabilities of its alternate futures can only be relative to each other,
never as an absolute probability expressed as a percentage. Since the inter-
actions of “free will” result in subtle changes to the probabilities of the
alternate futures, any percentage probability would be rendered irrelevant
by subsequent events shortly after you assigned it to a particular future.
Furthermore, because traditional probability theory assumes that you know
the entire universe of potential outcomes beforehand, that all outcomes
within that universe are equally likely to occur, and that all such events are
inherently random, it is entirely incompatible with the LAMP. The LAMP
assumes that the existence of free will actors makes it impossible to know
the entire universe of potential outcomes. Because free will is inherently
both unquantifiable and nonrandom, each alternate future outcome will
not have the same absolute probability of occurring relative to the others
in that universe. This is the fatal flaw in such methods as Bayesian analysis,
which asks the analyst to assign subjectively the probabilities of individual
outcomes in order to determine the overall probability of an event.1 As long
as the actors in a problem possess free will, Bayesian analysis is essentially
worthless, and even misleading, since it may cause analysts to have false
confidence in conclusions that are derived from subjective determinations
of probability.
LAMP does not allow for ambiguity

By this I mean that the LAMP forces the analyst to make a series of
“either-or” choices during the pair-wise comparison of alternate futures.
The analyst cannot press the “waffle” button, so to speak, and refuse to
choose between alternate futures, no matter how bizarre or implausible
they may appear to be. This leads to a corollary criticism that the LAMP
Limitations and potential applications of the LAMP 61
compels the analyst to examine a range of alternate futures that may seem
wildly improbable. The analyst may well be tempted to “discard” the
alternate futures at the lower end of the relative probability scale, rather
than engage in the additional effort required to analyze their consequences
and potential for transposition.
Analysts should reject such a temptation. The reason for this is that they
have no way of knowing how future focal events will affect the relative
probability of their spectrum of alternate futures until they are revoted.
If they have not done a complete analysis to begin with, they may find an
alternate future emerging near the higher end of their relative probability
scale, the consequences of which they have not analyzed. This can be
embarrassing, not to mention potentially dangerous.
Potential applications for LAMP

Even with the limitations described above, the LAMP has a number of
applications beyond its uses in our initial case study. As we have seen, the
LAMP certainly has its uses for both the Indications and Warning (I&W)
function as well as for conducting long-range intelligence estimates. When
tied into existing computer databases, LAMP could alert the analyst when
either a minor indicator or a major focal event has occurred, call up the
calculated range of alternate futures with their effective date of entry,
and cue the analyst to which alternate futures the indicator or focal event
applies. The analyst could then examine the previous estimates of the
various consequences of these alternate futures, and thus render a more
comprehensive and useful report.
If, in the analyst’s determination, the alternate futures require revoting,
a group of analysts could then meet, review the available data, and revote
the futures. In this application, a majority of the analysts present would be
required to give a vote to an alternate future during the pair-wise comparison
step. The thinking here is that the combined knowledge of the analysts would
make the LAMP predictions more valid than would be the case if only one
analyst was doing the voting. Of course, the assumption here also is that the
LAMP has been programmed into the computer database, so that the analysts
can participate in a network, each voting from their individual terminals.
Although the analysts can never be replaced completely in the LAMP
process (nor should they be), advances in AI (Artificial Intelligence) hold
promise for further enhancing the effectiveness of the LAMP. Not only
could it make the link between ongoing events and alternate futures with
more efficiency and timeliness, but AI could also eventually aid in the
construction of alternate futures and their consequences, given a sufficiently
large historical database from which to draw.
The LAMP has a potential diagnostic and evaluative application as well.

Looking back at our group of analysts, their votes on the alternate futures
could be archived in the computer data base. There would thus be an
historical record for seeing how well the analytic group performed using the
LAMP technique by comparing their predictions with eventual results. If an
analytic group’s predictions are significantly out of line with eventual occur-
rences, the LAMP provides the means for identifying it and determining the
cause, such as lack of access to data available to other analysts. Because of
its highly structured nature, the LAMP has the virtue of rendering one’s
analysis transparent to an outside observer, making it possible to see how
the group got from Point A to Point B in drawing their conclusions. This
should greatly enhance the accuracy of predictive analysis at not only the
operational/theater level for I&W, but also the strategic/national policy-
maker level for long-range intelligence estimates.
The LAMP could be incorporated into strategic intelligence training for
use as a predictive technique in courses involving I&W as well as estimative
intelligence or political-military analysis. The students could either use the
LAMP against “real-world” situations, with information made available
to the students for their background research, or they could be given a
hypothetical world situation and asked to apply the LAMP to it. In either
case, the LAMP would enable intelligence analysts to integrate both their
research and intelligence skills into a single technique.
Along these same lines, the LAMP has significant potential for use in the
academic community. Since the LAMP is an unclassified methodology, any
college or university with a program in intelligence studies, international
affairs, or even political science can use the LAMP technique as an integral
part of its research into the uncertainties involved in prediction. It would
be especially useful in a university setting, since the LAMP emphasizes the
necessity for a thorough study of the cultural and historical (as well as
contemporary) perceptions of the national actors regarding a specific issue.
The LAMP could thus provide additional common ground for cooperative
analysis of national security issues by both the academic and intelligence
communities, certainly a worthwhile consideration during a period of
austerity in intelligence budgets and resources.
The LAMP can even be used to refine other structured analytic methods
such as “What If” Analysis2 and Red Team Analysis.3 Related analytic
methods such as Alternative Futures Analysis would be strengthened by
integrating it with the LAMP.4 By combining various LAMP studies of
related predictive issues within a broad general subject, it should be possible
to produce a more rigorous study of the future than would otherwise be
possible with the more traditional and less structured techniques.
Finally, is there the potential for the LAMP to be utilized at the tactical
level as well? When a young captain in the US Army’s Military Intelligence
Branch raised this question to me in one of my classes at the Joint Military
Intelligence College in 1994,5 I was very dubious at the time about the
LAMP’s practicality at the tactical (or even operational) level. On the one
hand, it would seem that the relatively fewer number of actors (friendly
force versus enemy force) might make the LAMP’s application easier. On
the other hand, we are talking about a much shorter time line for prediction
(e.g. “What is the enemy’s likely course of action within the next 24–48
hours?”), a much greater level of detail (potentially down to battalion
level), and therefore a much greater potential for “random events” to
complicate the predictive process. Carl von Clausewitz, in his book On
War, actually stated the essence of the problem best in his discussion of the
concept of “friction” in war:
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The
difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that
is inconceivable unless one has experienced war … Countless minor
incidents – the kind you can never really foresee – combine to lower
the general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the
intended goal. (Emphasis added.)6
Even with this admonition of Clausewitz’s in mind, it is conceivable that

the LAMP could be integrated into the predictive process at the tactical
level by integrating its functions into computer databases. This would
involve a significant amount of “pre-war” LAMP analysis of the selected
issue to minimize the need to create one “from scratch,” and would be
most effective if integrated with the existing Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield (IPB) method, which was first developed and taught at the US
Army Intelligence Center and School (USAICS) in February 1981.7

However, subsequent events have caused me to reconsider my earlier
doubts about the utility of the LAMP at the tactical and operational levels.
One of my students at American Military University, Paul Croom, wrote
what is arguably the best application of the LAMP to the tactical level,
“Shielding the Lion: A Predictive Study on the Prospects of Kinetic Attacks
against Al Asad Air Base through January 2010.” His predictive analysis
was designed to enable the tactical planner to anticipate the most likely
enemy against an American base and devise the best defense against it.8 And
in the only known application of the LAMP at the operational level, the
III Marine Expeditionary Force G2 used it extensively to focus on issues of
operational-level concern within Western Pacific Command in 2006.9

Finally, there is a new field of application for the LAMP that has the
potential to broaden its use into the civilian arena, that of competitive
business intelligence. Mr Nwankama, one of my former students at
American Military University, was the first to explore the potential of the
LAMP in this area. In his discussion of the application of the LAMP to
this area, Nwankama argues that using the LAMP would enable business
organizational leaders to foresee the various possible permutations of

responses by competitors for each alternate future. He uses the LAMP
as the basis for developing their Competitive Intelligence and Predictive
Analytics (CIPA) process.10
It is hoped that the reader of this book will come away with a new way
of thinking about the process of predictive analysis as it is applied to intel-
ligence in both the military and corporate arenas. The LAMP obviously will
not grant the gift of prophecy to its users, nor will it foretell the future with
infallible accuracy. With judicious application, however, the LAMP does
offer a logical method for illuminating the future’s many possible paths.
Notes
1 See the explanation of Bayesian probability at http://explorable.com/bayesian-
probability.html [accessed 24 January 2013].
2 The LAMP predates the “What If” technique by a number of years, since it
was developed in 1993 and first published in the Fall 1994 issue of Defense
Intelligence Journal (Vol. 3, No. 2), while the What If” method was published
considerably later. See A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques
for Improving Intelligence Analysis (US Government publication, March
2009), 24–6.
3 This author’s doctoral dissertation (“The Evolution of the Soviet View of
US Strategic Doctrine (1954–1976): Its Implications for Future US Strategic
Policy Decisionmaking,” University of Miami, 1980) and subsequent book,
The Soviet View of US Strategic Doctrine: Implications for Decisionmaking
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1983) represent the earliest
openly published examples of what is now known as Red Team Analysis. See
Red Team Analysis in A Tradecraft Primer, 31–3.
4 A Tradecraft Primer, 34–7.
5 The Joint Military Intelligence College is now the National Intelligence
University.
6 See Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119.
7 This author was part of the first class to be taught the IPB method at the
USAICS Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer course at Fort Huachuca in
February 1981. For a detailed portrayal of how IPB is used, see FM 34-130,
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (US Army publication, July 1,
1993).
8 See Paul Croom, “Shielding the Lion: A Predictive Study on the Prospects of
Kinetic Attacks against Al Asad Air Base through January 2010.” His paper
can be found in the LAMP E-Commons section of the LAMP website at
www.lamp-method.org
9 Interview with Eric Walters (Colonel, US Marine Corps, Retired). Colonel
Walters also cites this use of the LAMP in one of his in-class student
handouts, Intelligence Structured Analytical Techniques and Methods: A
Critical Examination, for his course at the Marine Corps Intelligence School’s
Intelligence Training Enhancement Program.
10 See Mr Nwankama’s complete discussion of this at http://allhandsmgt.com/
intelligence-analysis-lamp.htm [accessed 16 January 2013].
PART TWO
The LAMP in
practice
CHAPTER FIVE
The future of Afghanistan:

Democracy, Islamic Caliphate,
or warlord principalities? A
predictive study on possible
Afghanistan, United States,
and Taliban responses
“We are content with discord, we are content with alarms, we

are content with blood, but we will never be content with a
master.”
ELDERLY AFGHAN TRIBAL LEADER
“The pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan.”

OSAMA BIN LADEN
“This has to be a point in time in which we begin to write a new

chapter on improved governance, a much more serious effort
to eradicate corruption, joint efforts to accelerate the training of
Afghan security forces so that the Afghan people can provide for
their own security.”
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA
Author’s Note: This LAMP paper was written by Mary Boyle as her term
paper for my Analytic Methods course at American Military University. It
has been edited in order to focus more on her application of the LAMP than
on her depth of research, which was quite considerable.
Introduction
Afghanistan is based on a tribal society; it has never been completely
conquered by any outside force, nor has it ever fully been made into
a confederation of tribes. This is due to the numerous ethnic groups
that make up the tapestry of people who call themselves Afghan; with
Pashtuns being in the majority followed by Tajiks, Hazari, Uzbeki,
Turkmeni, and Nuristani. These varying ethnicities shed light on the
differing interpretations of Islam and the blending of local customs.
Afghanistan’s unique terrain along with its tribal customs and social
structure has prevented the Afghan people from unifying into a stable
government, just as it has prevented Afghanistan from being overrun by
an invading force.
The current efforts by the United States and NATO forces aim to have
Afghanistan transition from a corrupt oligarchy into a stable democracy;
at the same time, religious fundamentalists, al-Qaeda and the Taliban view
Afghanistan as the first step in recreating the Islamic Caliphate. The Afghan
population has dealt with war for over two centuries; the vast majority of
the public is looking for security, and the removal of corrupt rulers.
Prior to the US invasion, the Taliban had begun to lose some of its
Pashtuni-majority support due to corruption within their movement. The
Taliban controlled Afghanistan through fear tactics, but was ill-prepared to
govern administratively the entire nation (Rasanayagam 2005, 197). The
Taliban had started out as an Islamic reform movement, but has no real
connection to the Islamic ideas in Afghanistan (Rashid 2000, 87). Refusal
to recognize other forms of Islam isolated it from the rest of the Islamic
world. As Afghanistan is at the crossroads of the Islamic expansion, this
isolation does not benefit the country or its people. A longer-term view of
regional stability was needed.
The Bonn Agreement was signed in December 2001, and placed a
transition government in place with Hamid Karzai as the President. The
new government was unable to prevent warlords and regional leaders
from reemerging. The United States Institute of Peace published a special
report in 2003 entitled “Unfinished Business in Afghanistan, Warlordism,
Reconstruction, and Ethnic Harmony.” The report estimated that warlords
controlled 75 percent of Afghanistan. This lack of unity hinders the chances
of Afghanistan ever becoming a strong enough country to withstand
The future of Afghanistan 71
attempts by the Taliban to regain power. The porous border between

Pakistan and Afghanistan has allowed the Taliban and al-Qaeda to regroup,
just as the Mujahideen did during the Soviet–Afghan war in the not so
distant past.
Afghanistan’s neighboring nations have offered limited assistance to
Afghanistan as a developing nation. Pakistan has in the past favored
the concept of a pure Islamic state in Afghanistan; this allows for the
continuation of jihadist training to continue the fight in Kashmir as well
as neutralize Pashtun irredentism (Weinbaum 2006, 6). Iran on the other
hand is strongly opposed to the Taliban regaining control of Afghanistan
and persecuting the Hazaras. Iran’s government is rapidly devolving into a
police state, so the best that the Iranians could offer the Afghan government
is funding and infrastructure development assistance. The post-Soviet states
to Afghanistan’s north follow a similar policy to Russia, trying to contain
Islamic radicalism. Many of these countries will not admit additional
refugees and are placing requirements on current refugees to learn the local
language if they wish to be employed.
There has recently been an increase in debate “back at home” among
the citizens of countries currently fighting in Afghanistan, as to how much
longer they will continue providing troops to Afghanistan. After eight
years of fighting against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the Allied forces are no
closer to capturing Mullah Omar or Osama bin Laden. The lack of new
information on the whereabouts of these two individuals, combined with
the rising number of causalities and the increasing cost has led to greater
public awareness and opposition to the war. These new voices speaking
out against the war are forcing the governments of the Allied forces to
reexamine their objectives and goals for the near future in Afghanistan.
The British government has recently suffered heavy causalities due to their
patrolling of the opium fields in Helmand and Kandahar, which were tradi-
tionally heavily Taliban. President Obama has faced the same pressure from
the United States public.
The presence of Allied forces has not prevented continued attacks from
Afghanistan, however, and as a result of the war in Afghanistan many of
the Taliban are based in the Northwest Frontier in Pakistan. This surplus
of Taliban insurgents has placed Pakistan in a dire situation; there is a
strong need to eliminate the risk of the Taliban before Pakistan, a nuclear
armed country, is seen by the Taliban and al-Qaeda as the next potential
center for an Islamic Caliphate. The Pakistani government has begun to
fight back against the insurgency. Prior to this new initiative, the Taliban
moved their militants from the Swat Valley, which was controlled under
Sharia law, to Buner, which is 97 kilometers from the capital of Pakistan,
Islamabad. This kind of threat to the stability of a state, especially one
that has nuclear capability, is not allowable for the safety of the rest of the
world.
Throughout Afghanistan’s history, there has been a lack of unity among

the ethnic groups that has hindered their ability to live peacefully under one
government. The current international focus on Afghanistan has removed
any chance of it becoming the starting place for the next Caliphate. The
Afghan population has suffered greatly throughout history from heavy
handed usage by foreign nations. Adam Khan from Jalalabad stated the
Afghan belief best when he said that “we want democracy in the country
but not at the expense of our culture and religion. I believe they all could
be reconciled and that is what should happen” (Army Press 2004, 194).
The people of Afghanistan have shown that they are looking for an
environment free of war that will allow them to rebuild their country. The
ethnic divisions and inability of a central democratic government to gain
control of a majority of Afghanistan has led many Afghanis to deal with
their judicial, military, and economic needs on a local level. The inability of
the current central government to control the majority of Afghanistan has
led to the continuation of the practice of Afghans reverting to their local
traditional leaders to deal with and punish local criminals; this process is
all done outside of the criminal justice system (Stewart 2008, 33).
Afghanistan has never been conquered by a foreign power. In August
2009, Major-General Zahir Azimi, the Afghan Army spokesmen stated
that “where international forces are fighting, people think it is incumbent
on them to resist the occupiers and infidels. This feeling is strong in the
South and East and it may spread to other places” (Anonymous 2009, 22).
As long as the Afghan central government is unable to maintain control
and extend their control beyond the capital, local tribal communities will
look for protection and leadership from proven leaders and heroes in
their communities. Despite past history with warlords and corruption, the
Afghan people are tired of war. Ghafoor, from the Ahmadkhei village in
Paktia, captured this best by stating “We’re caught in the middle and we’re
sick of it. We need security. But the Americans are just making trouble for
us. They cannot bring peace, not if they stay for 50 years” (Anonymous
2009, 21). This is quickly becoming the consensus across Afghanistan.
This study examines the potential scenarios that could occur in
Afghanistan. The main actors for this study include the United States, the
Taliban and the Afghan population as a whole. This study will focus on the
ability of Afghanistan to stand on its own, and the questions arising. Will
the attempted democratic government being supported by the United States
and NATO forces remain in control? Will al-Qaeda and the Taliban regain
their control over the country and continue toward their goal of the new
center for the Islamic Caliphate? Or will the Afghan people turn to their
tribal traditions and resort back to warlords?
The majority of the available literature on Afghanistan’s current state
and history is written by Western or American authors. The biases of the
authors must be taken into consideration when reading their literature
regarding Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. With the advent of the war on terror,
authors from Central Asia have begun to write on Afghanistan giving a
different perspective on the events and conditions in that country.
Literature review
Michael Scheuer is the former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit. Mr Scheuer
spent nearly two decades in the CIA focusing on national security issues
related to Afghanistan and South Asia, as well as authoring three books
and more than ten articles concerning al-Qaeda and terrorism. His book,
Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the war on terror, was mentioned
by bin Laden in his September 2007 video, where bin Laden stated, “If you
want to understand what’s going on and if you would like to get to know
some of the reasons for you losing the war against us, then read the book by
Michael Scheuer” (Kelly and Block 2007). Mr Scheuer’s article “‘The Pious
Caliphate Will Start From Afghanistan’: Is al-Qaeda’s Long-Held Strategy
Now Unfolding?” (2005) focuses on Osama bin Laden and the message he
released concerning his visions for Afghanistan’s future.
Mr Scheuer also touches on the foreign conspiracies as to Osama bin
Laden and Mullah Omar’s locations, and the connection Pakistan might
have. Mr Scheuer closes with the need for a country-wide military initiative
and a massive increase in economic aid to the Afghan people. Throughout
Mr Scheuer’s books and articles he brings forward his experience as a CIA
agent. He does not shy away from disagreeing with the mainstream theories
on how the current war is going, or how the search for bin Laden is going.
Seth Jones is an adjunct professor of Security Studies at Georgetown and
a political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He is viewed as an expert
on Afghanistan, and has written 11 books and more than 15 articles. His
book, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (2008), is the fourth volume in the
RAND Counterinsurgency Study.
Mr Jones focuses on the counterinsurgency operations within Afghanistan,
and relied on primary sources and personal fieldwork for his writing. Within
this book, Mr Jones focuses on the misleading notions of trying to use the
same counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan as used in Malaya. Seth
Jones states that the current war effort needs to transition from winning the
hearts and minds to redirecting efforts to the military and political strategy
to ensure state building and security within Afghanistan. Mr Jones’ chapter
on the “Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare,” highlights the impact from
external actors (US military), indigenous leaders (insurgents), and the indig-
enous government.
Ahmed Rashid is considered an expert on Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Central Asia. With over 20 years of experience as a correspondent and
three best-seller books, he has travelled the world addressing universities,

think tanks and international meetings on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mr
Rashid’s Taliban (2000) focuses on the rise of the Taliban to power, and
their ideologies. Included in this book is the connection between al-Qaeda
and the Taliban.
Al-Qaeda’s monetary, political and ideological influence over the Taliban
led to the eventual invasion of Afghanistan. Prior to the invasion, the
Taliban had gained control over 90 percent of Afghanistan, following their
downfall, they have regrouped their forces in Pakistan and continue to
recruit and attack United States and NATO forces in an effort to regain
control of their territory.
Stephen Tanner is a military historian who has written several pieces
on Afghanistan. One of his most well known is Afghanistan: A Military
History From Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (2002). Unlike
the other authors, Mr Tanner not only highlights the war on terror in
Afghanistan, but also focuses on the other armies that have entered the
Afghan borders. This work covers the period of history from the time of
Alexander the Great through the British and Russian Empires.
Afghanistan is located in the crossroads of Central Asia, and holds
the distinction of having “superpowers” of their day, including those of
Alexander the Great and the Mongols, the British Empire, Soviet Union
and the United States and NATO forces invade their borders, but never
conquer and control the entire country. Mr Tanner also focuses on the
Afghan people: with the constant state of war the Afghan people have
learned to adapt to changes in locations and security. Mr Tanner also
validates the importance of the Afghan tribal system. Unlike much of the
world, Afghanistan’s society and government are still heavily affected by
their tribal traditions and customs.
The final author is Marvin Weinbaum, whose United States Institute of
Peace Special Report focused on Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: An Ever
Dangerous Neighborhood (2006). This report focuses on countries that
surround Afghanistan and their political and economic stability and their
interest in Afghanistan’s stability. Mr Weinbaum points out that external
interference has much to do with Afghanistan’s inability to become a thriving
industrial country, but he also points out that the internal wars between
tribes and warlords has affected their ability to industrialize the nation.
While Afghanistan has attempted to remain isolated, their lives are heavily
influenced by both Pakistan and Iran. Both are connected through various
religious and social ties. Pakistan heavily influences Afghanistan through the
Pashtu tribe, as well as through the large refugee camps on the Pakistan–
Afghanistan border. Iran, similarly supports the small Shiite population
inside Afghanistan, and continues to work to maintain safety for their people.
The five authors above encompass a diverse amount of information on
Afghanistan as it currently stands, and what it could potentially become in
the future. Some of these authors differ on what Afghanistan will become
once the Untied States and the NATO forces retreat, but they all agree that
there is a need to train the Afghan security forces so they can take over for
themselves. In addition, the need to eliminate corruption as a governance
strategy, and get aid to the remote tribal areas of Afghanistan, is critical to
prevent the Taliban and al-Qaeda from sweeping back into the vacuum left
by the departing Coalition forces.
Actors and perceptions

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, Afghanistan once again gained
international attention. There are few states that were not affected in some
way by the attacks on September 11. Nine years later, the international
community of leaders, and the general public have seen little progress in
capturing Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar. The mounting deaths of state
soldiers in Afghanistan have caused the public to rethink their involvement
in direct combat in the war on terror. While Afghanistan’s neighboring states
are interested in the outcome of the war on terror, there are three actors that
play the largest roles in the outcome of Afghanistan: the United States, the
Taliban, and the Afghan people. Each of these actors has their own interests in
the outcome of the current war in Afghanistan, and has their own viewpoints
on the key issues. To facilitate this predictive study on Afghanistan it is
imperative that an analysis is performed on each of the critical actors.
Afghanistan
The Afghanis are at the center of this predictive analysis. The Afghan
population as a whole plays a key role in the predictive outcome of
Afghanistan’s political stability as a state. When evaluating the Afghan
perspectives on Afghanistan’s future state, a number of issues impact the
decision-making process, including public perceptions, culture, history,
economics, politics, and national security concerns. In order to perform this
predictive study it is critical that every factor is carefully evaluated.
Culture
Afghanistan is a country deeply steeped in tradition. The Pashtun people
are the dominant ethnic group in Afghanistan, and the world’s largest
remaining tribal-based society (Tanner 2009, 26). The Pashun community
follows the philosophy of pashtunwali. Robin Ashby, Director General of
the UK Defence Forum, defined pashtunwali as the Pashtun code of honor
which has nine key principles: melmastia (hospitality), nang (solidarity

among the clan), isteqamat (persistence), turah (bravery), ghayrat (honor),
sabat (steadfastness), namuz (defense of one’s honor and women), nanawatai
(right of a fugitive to seek refuge), imandari (righteousness), and badal
(right of blood feuds). It is thought that through an appeal to the principles
of melmastia, sabat, nanawatai and turah, al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden
were able to gain and maintain asylum within Afghanistan.
The other key ethnic groups are the Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens,
and Nuristanis. The Afghanis’ ethnic identity is a critical piece of who they
are. While the Taliban made an effort to transplant Pashtuns throughout
Afghanistan to further their agenda, in reviewing Figure 5.1, it is clear that
the Taliban understood the need to infiltrate the diverse ethnic territories
in order to maintain control over them. The Afghan people are deeply
connected not only to their customs, but also to their religious beliefs. Islam
was introduced to the Afghan population in the tenth century (Ewans 2002,
22). Sunni Muslims make up about 80 percent of the Afghan population,
while Shiites make up about 19 percent and the remaining 1 percent
consists of Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, and Parsis (CIA 2010).
Afghanis remain weary (or wary) of outsider involvement in their
country. The strong ties to religion and traditional customs hinder the
progress that Afghanistan has made in creating a stable country.
History
Afghanistan has a rich and violent history. Over the past two centuries,
Afghanistan has been a crossroad for Central and Southern Asia. It is
because of its geographic location that Afghanistan has been invaded by
Uzbekistan Tajikistan
Turkmenistan China
Fayzabad
Kunduz
Mazari Sharit
Maymana
Jalalabad
Herat Kabul
Afghanistan
Ghazni
38% Pashtun
Farah
Iran 25% Talik
Kahandar 19% Hazara
8% Uzbek
10% Other
+
Pakistan
FIGURE 5.1 Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity

various armies, including Persians, Greeks, Mongols, British, Russians,

and most recently American and NATO forces (Tanner 2002, 22). While
Afghanistan has never been conquered by an outside force, this does not
mean that invading forces did not leave their mark on Afghanistan.
Alexander the Great’s imperialist desire did not seem to have been deterred
by tribal warfare. He crossed Afghanistan and founded Alexandria-Eschate
(Alexandria-at-the-end-of-the-world) on the Sri Darya before moving on
to India (Ewan 2002, 18). The ruler Mahmud, of the Ghaznavids dynasty,
advocated the conversion to Islam (Ewan 2002, 22). The Mongol invasion
of Afghanistan began in 1221. Many of the towns and farms in the
Mongols’ warpath have still not recovered. The nomadic and many of the
non-nomadic Afghan tribes moved into the hills to escape the Mongols’
destruction (Tanner 2002, 81). These conquering people and the technol-
ogies they brought with them, like gunpowder, created the modern day
Afghan man. Stephen Tanner states that “into this mix of former steppe
warriors turned kings and sedentary peoples simply trying to get along,
emerged the Afghans, who combined the tribal instincts of nomads with the
technology of civilization” (Tanner 2002, 110).
In the sixteenth century, the Safavid and Moghul dynasties once again
brought Afghanistan into the land power game. The struggle for control
between these dynasties continued until the eighteenth century. During
this time, Islam continued to spread throughout Afghanistan. The converts
brought local customs into their Islamic faith, which allowed for divisions
to continue within Afghanistan’s ethnic tribes. From an external view,
Afghanistan was unified under one religious faith, Islam; however, from
an internal view, Islam had different practices depending on the tribe you
were in (Goodson 2001, 12). It is also important to note that the Hazaras
constitute the majority of the Shiite Muslims in Afghanistan.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the British Empire had begun
to show an interest in Afghanistan. As a result of the fall of the Safavid
and Moghul Empires, the Afghanis returned to isolationism. The terrain
of Afghanistan as well as the diverse ethnicity of the Afghanis created a
sense of separateness for the smaller tribes; the lack of resources returned
the Afghan attention to internal disputes (Goodson 2001, 26). The British
Empire made its first official contact with Afghanistan in 1809 on a treaty-
making mission (Ewan 2002, 41). This was the era of the “Great Game,”
the term given to the imperialistic competition between the Russian and
British Empires. The Russian Empire’s continuous expansion had led the
British Empire to fear that the Cossacks would continue on to conquer
India, the “jewel in the crown” of the British Empire (Hopkirk 1990, 5).
The Russian Empire had two imperialistic goals: to weaken the British
Empire, both in India as well as the rest of the world, and to conquer the
Central Asian khanates, while the British Empire’s focus was on annexing
and pacifying the princely states of India (Goodson 2001, 33). The British
Empire’s Russophobia resulted in Afghanistan becoming a buffer zone

between the two empires.
During this time Afghanistan gained its national boundaries, Afghan
ethnic consciousness continued to flourish, and internally Afghanistan
began to see an increase in skirmishes brought on by tribal leaders looking
to extend their territory and exert their strength through firearms (Goodson
2001, 27). Despite the anarchy in Afghanistan as a result of Zaman Shah’s
death, Dost Mohammed Khan claimed the title of Amire ul-Mominin
(Commander of the Faithful) and presented the fighting as a jihad against
the Sikhs (Tanner 2002, 127). In 1838, tensions were running high in the
British Empire over Russia’s continued attempts to expand their borders.
As a result, the British Empire sent Alexander Burnes to Dost Mohammed’s
court giving Afghanistan the ultimatum: “desist from all correspondence
with Persia and Russia … never receive agents from them” (Ewan 2002,
57). This level of distrust led to the first of three Anglo-Afghan Wars.
The first Anglo-Afghan War was an attempt by the British to remove Dost
Mohammed from power and reinstate Shah Shuja. In a manifesto published
prior to the war beginning, the British promised that “when once he shall
be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan
established, the British army will be withdrawn.” Similar words were used
140 years later when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (Ewan 2002,
61–2). The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan did not sit well with
Mohammed Akbar Khan, the son of imprisoned Dost Mohammed Khan.
Internal opposition forced the British to retreat. Mohammed Akbar Khan
promised the British safe passage out of Afghanistan, but this was not to
be. On January 6, 1842, the British garrison left Shah Shuja to defend
himself against the Afghan people. In all, some 16,000 British left for the
Khyber Pass and the safety of India (Hopkirk 1990, 259–61). Mohammed
Akbar Khan joined with the ghazis, religious warriors, who temporarily
put aside tribal disputes to remove the infidel from Afghan soil (Tanner
2002, 140). The majority of the 16,000 people, which included women,
children, camp followers, servants, sepoys, and soldiers, were slaughtered
by the ghazis.
The British Empire responded to this devastating loses with the “Army
of Retribution” which destroyed the Kabul bazaar and sent smaller forces
to cities like Istalif, which had not been involved in the massacre of the
British, where the males were killed, the women raped and murdered, and
the city destroyed (Ewan 2002, 78). These acts of retribution on the part of
the British left a lasting mark on the Afghan population. The Afghan people
became xenophobic, and they still view foreigners as aggressors, infidels,
and immoral.
Following the first Anglo-Afghan War, the British Empire determined that
Afghanistan would be able to serve as a buffer state between the British and
Russian Empires. Afghanistan returned to a period of isolationism between
each of the Anglo-Afghan Wars. Under the leadership of Yakub Khan,

Afghanistan signed over foreign policy rights to the British and allowed
the British to have a permanent mission in Kabul in 1879. In response, the
Ghazni tribe’s elderly mullah, Mushk-i-Alam, proclaimed a jihad against
the infidel and thousands flocked to the call (Tanner 2002, 209). Amir
Abdur Rahman returned to tradition by being selected as Amir by a tribal
jirga. He also came to power with the backing of the British Empire. The
Amir Abdur Rahman took control of the waqf (religious trusts) and the
judicial processes, which included a unified system of Sharia courts, and
reserved the right to declare jihad for himself. Amir Abdur Rahman was
given the title Zia al-MIllat-I wa al-Din (Light of the Nation and Religion)
(Ewans 2002, 101–2).
The third Anglo-Afghan War was a result of the Great War (World War
I) occurring in Europe. Habibullah initially declared neutrality, but this
changed when the Caliph called for jihad. Many tribal and religious leaders
believed that Afghanistan betrayed its Islamic faith by not gaining its
independence following the Bolshevik Revolution. Following Habibullah’s
assassination, Afghanistan, under the leadership of Amanullah, declared
itself independent (Ewans 2002, 115–17). Amanullah was forced to agree
to the Durand Line and to release any claim he had to the tribal territories
in British India. The Durand Line, which was established to create an
official buffer between Afghanistan and British India (current day Pakistan)
thus divided the Pashtun ethnic tribal territory between the two countries
(Curtis and Phillips 2007). Nonetheless, modern Afghanistan had now been
formed.
For the next 50 years, Afghanistan maintained the claim of neutrality.
However, they remained economically dependent on the Soviet Union, who
bought the majority of their exports. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979 was an attempt to maintain communist control in Kabul, installing
Babrak Karmal as their puppet Prime Minister. The Afghan population
declared jihad against the Soviet infidel shortly after Babrak Karmal was
brought to Kabul.
The Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion was organized in the name of
Islam; this was a shift from the tribal affiliations. The United States collabo-
rated with Pakistan to provide arms to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.
Prior to this arrangement, Pakistan had already selected seven main groups
based in Peshawar with Sunni religious ideologies to support. The Islamist
organizations included Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami, Yuni Khalis’ Hezb-i-
Islami, Rabbini’s Jamiat-i-Islami, which included Ahmed Shah Massoud,
and Addal-Rab al-Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-i-Islami Bara-I Azadi Afghanistan
(Islamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan). The traditionalist organi-
zations included Maulvi Nabi Mohammedi’s Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami
(Islamic Revolution Movement), Sayyid Ahmad Gailani’s (who traced his
descent from the Prophet Mohammed) Mahaz-i-Melli-i-Islami (National
Islamic Front), and Sebghatullah Mjadidi’s Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Melli (National

Liberation Front) (Ewans 2002, 213–15). These organizations differed in
their essential beliefs, Hekmatyar and his followers were more extreme in
their beliefs than Rabbani and Massoud; as a result of their differences, they
were unable to come together under the banner of jihad to expel the Soviets
from Afghanistan.
Each Mujihadeen group took the weapons and money given to them
through the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence and waged their own war
against the Soviet Union. In conjunction with the funds and weapons that
were distributed, there was an initiative for Muslims from around the
world to fly to Afghanistan and help fight the infidel. Osama bin Laden
took up the call and began his lifelong jihad at that time. The Mujahideen
waged unconventional guerilla warfare against the Soviet forces, attacking
and then disappearing into society or the mountains; this made the Soviet
tactical style of warfare impossible.
The Soviets acknowledged defeat on February 15, 1989, following
the last Soviet tank crossing the Friendship Bridge on the Amu Darya
(Rasanayagam 2005, 125). The Communist party continued to rule over
Afghanistan until 1992, and during this time, the majority of financial aid
was used by the Communist government to buy support from the tribal and
Mujahideen leaders (Ewans 2002, 238).
The Mujahideen forces finally captured Kabul and proclaimed
Afghanistan to be an Islamic State (Gohari 1999, 9). This transition brought
Afghanistan into a period of civil war among the Mujahideen factions. The
Islamic Jihad Council named Majadid, head of one of the moderate parties,
as President; Massoud as Defense Minister; Gailani, another moderate, as
Foreign Minister; and Sayyaf as the Minister of Interior, Hekmatyar was
given the role of Prime Minister which he refused to hold with Massoud as
Defense Minister (Tanner 2002, 276). The idea of minorities holding the
majority of seats was unacceptable to Hekmatyar and many other Pashtun
mujihadeen. The Afghans reverted back to the policy they had followed
throughout their history. The common threat was gone, and so was the
short-term alliance that had existed between traditional tribal enemies and
rivals—chaos ensued.
The civil war enabled ethnic warlords to emerge and flourish. Mujahideen
fighters like Hekmatyar began turf wars to gain control over the most
territory in the vicinity of Kabul. The first three years of Mujahideen rule
was ineffective because of the scale of the infighting. The infighting was
a result of the leaders’ personal ambitions clashing, as well as ethnic,
tribal, and religious disputes (Ewans 2002, 249). Hekmatyar and the
majority of other Pashtuns were strongly opposed to ethnic minorities—
represented by the likes of Dostum, an Uzbek, or Rabbani and Massoud,
both Tajiks—having a say in the future development of Afghanistan.
Throughout Afghanistan’s history, ethnic leaders have allied themselves to
fight against a common enemy, but it could not work in the government
of the Mujahideen. Although these tribal leaders had done their country
a great service in removing the Soviet Union armed threat, they could not
allow a tribal rival to be awarded a role in the newly formed Afghanistan
Mujahideen government.
This anarchy of indecision existed not only in the capital, but in other
regions including Kandahar. But the power vacuum would not exist for
long. The Taliban originated from the madrassas, or religious schools,
in the North-West Frontier Province. These madrassas were attended by
mostly Pashtun Afghan refugees from the Soviet–Afghan War. The Taliban
emerged in Afghanistan as a result of the Pashtun Afghan refugees who
had become disillusioned with the fractious political wrangling of the
Mujahideen parties and their practices. These young men had no real
employment prospects following the completion of their schooling at the
madrassas, but they did get their dose of Taliban learning and propaganda.
Under the leadership of Mullah Maulvi Mohammad Omar, the Taliban
declared jihad against anyone who had betrayed Afghanistan (Ewans 2002,
253). Massoud, Dostum and Ismail Khan made a concerted effort against
the Taliban, but despite these attempts they were unsuccessful in stopping
the Taliban from gaining control.
As the Taliban conquered territory, beginning with Kandahar, they
implemented the strictest interpretations of Sharia law (Rashid 2000, 29).
By April 4, 1996, the Taliban had almost complete control of Afghanistan.
Mullah Omar removed the kherqa (piece of cloak claimed to have been
worn by the Prophet Mohammed) and wrapped it over his shoulders and
proclaimed himself commander of the faithful and leader of all Islam
(Weiner 2001). Despite the Taliban having control of the majority of
Afghanistan, on June 13, 1997, a new alliance called the United National
and Islamic Front for the Salvation of the Homeland was founded between
Massoud, Kalili, and Malik (Rasanayagam 2005, 155). This new movement
proposed a government that would include tribal leaders, Islamic leaders,
and technocrats.
It was also in 1996 that Mullah Omar gave Osama bin Laden asylum.
The Taliban’s alliance with al-Qaeda has added further substance to the
rumors of Mullah Omar as the new Caliph, bin Laden telling the Muslim
media that “the Taliban have established the rule of Allah in Afghanistan …
the pious caliphate will start from Afghanistan” (Scheuer 2006, 171). Some
Muslims believe that the recreation of the Islamic Caliphate will liberate
Muslims and non-Muslims from the oppression of those who are interested
only in international imperialism like the United States and its European
allies (Gohari 1999, 111).
The Taliban’s relationship with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda has
given them money and resources from people and countries around the
world. In 1998, however, the Taliban lost the support of Saudi Arabia when
it refused to turn Osama bin Laden over to the United States to face charges
in connection with the terrorist attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya. This enabled bin Laden to plan and carry out further international
attacks, including those on September 11, 2001. Following these attacks,
the United States along with NATO forces invaded Afghanistan with help
from the Northern Alliance. The Taliban and al-Qaeda forces quickly fell
beneath the technologically advanced armies of the West, Kabul being
captured by Western forces on November 13, 2001.
Despite the initial success, the United States and NATO forces
have had difficulty capturing the leader of al-Qaeda or the Taliban.
The continued civilian casualties have led to an increase in insurgency
fighters. In August 2009, Major- General Zahir Azimi, the Afghan Army
spokesman stated that “where international forces are fighting, people
think it is incumbent on them to resist the occupiers and infidels. This
feeling is strong in the South and East and it may spread to other places”
(Anonymous 2009, 22). The ethnic divisions and inability for a central
democratic government to gain control of all of Afghanistan has led many
Afghanis to return to their local leaders for their judicial, economic and
security needs.
Economics
The economic stability of Afghanistan is almost non-existent. After decades
of conflict, Afghanistan’s economy has begun to recover. This is largely due
to the influx of international aid. Despite this international aid, widespread
corruption has prevented the Afghan people from being given the basic
necessities: security, food, and shelter.
Afghanistan has also begun to see small amounts of recovery in
their service and agricultural sectors. Afghanistan remains an agricultural
country, representing 78.6 percent of the labor force (CIA 2010). Opium
remains the key crop of Afghanistan, and the country produces the largest
quantities of opium in the world. Despite initiatives from the United States,
NATO forces and the Afghan government, the transition from opium to
wheat is still in its infancy.
In 2010, the US Geological Services and USAID announced that
Afghanistan has trillions of dollars worth of untapped mineral deposits.
This money source continues to go untapped due to the lack of infra-
structure, including roads, railroads, electricity, and water.
Afghanistan’s lack of an established infrastructure prevents its economy
from becoming self-sufficient. This also prevents the Afghanis from transi-
tioning from a rural cultural setting to the cities where they would be able
to benefit from regular medical care and potentially profit from a more
stable environment.
Politics
Afghanistan’s current political situation is unstable. The current government
has been accused of corruption, and Afghanistan is now rated as the second
most corrupt country in the world. In 2009, an unattributed statement made
at The First Annual Bertelsmann Foundation conference, in Washington DC,
declared that “the government is imbued by patronage and corruption.”
The patronage within the tribes has prevented a unified government from
making progress within the rural areas of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan’s corruption is spread throughout the political system,
from public offices for sale, bribes to gain access to government services,
to the police and judiciary systems. This corrupt network that is woven
throughout the Afghan government and its security apparatus hinders
the Afghan people’s capability to stand alone once the foreign forces have
left the country. The Taliban came to power as a result of the Afghan
people looking for a force that would remove the corrupt government and
warlords. The Afghan people’s key focus is on their security and liveli-
hoods. They are concerned about stability and safety for themselves, their
children, their tribes, and villages. Developments in the large cities and
even the capital are of no value if they cannot promote protection of the
citizenry.
National security concerns

The Afghan population has suffered from decades of war and poverty. The
Afghan people have shown that they are looking for an environment free of
war that will allow them to rebuild their country. The ethnic divisions and
inability of the central government to control the rural areas of Afghanistan
has led many Afghanis to deal with their judicial, security, and economic
needs at local levels through their local tribal elders, or through warlords.
This reemergence of the warlord offers Afghanis protection on a local level.
With the resurgence of the Taliban, the withdrawal of the United States and
NATO forces could allow the Taliban to regain control over Afghanistan.
This could potentially lead to a backlash by the Taliban for the Afghan
support of the United States and NATO forces. The Afghan people want
the removal of the foreign fighters, but there is an understanding that they
need to have the capability to maintain their country’s security. Currently
they are not in a position to do this.
The United States

The United States and NATO forces first entered Afghanistan to begin the
war on terror following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Nine years
later, the United States and NATO forces are concerned about the future of
Afghanistan after the withdrawal of foreign troops. The concerns stem from
the Afghan government being able to maintain power, and offer national
security to the Afghan people. The unresolved issues and fighting with the
Taliban and al-Qaeda is another concern. The United States has openly
stated that it will begin to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by July 2014.
According to the BBC News, Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom
has stated that its armed forces’ combat role in Afghanistan will end in 2015.
Economics
The primary economic concern for the United States regarding Afghanistan’s
future state is in relation to the $29 billion worth of international aid that
has been disbursed on projects within Afghanistan. Despite the current
recession, the United States and NATO countries have continued to give
financial aid to Afghanistan in the hopes of building an infrastructure
that will prevent al-Qaeda and the Taliban from regaining control after
Afghanistan is left to itself.
Politics
The United States and the NATO forces are the leading forces behind the
current war on terror in Afghanistan. Following the attacks of September
11, 2001, the eradication of terrorism has been at the top of the United
States’ agenda. The United States and NATO forces continue to help foster
and grow the democratic government in Afghanistan. One of the most
systemic issues the Afghan government is facing is corruption. The United
States and NATO leaders have made their views on this subject clear, and
President Karzai has promised to work to eliminate corruption within the
government. Another concern is the ability to expand the Afghan govern-
ment’s reach throughout Afghanistan’s rural area. The United States and
NATO forces have allied themselves with Pakistan in an effort to eradicate
the Taliban presence in the North-West Frontier Province.

The United States and NATO nations’ prime concern is the potential
reemergence of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The purpose
of the current war and financial aid is to prevent Afghanistan from again
becoming a safe haven for terrorism. As a result of the war, al-Qaeda has
not been able to carry out another large-scale attack like that of September
11, 2001. The United States and NATO forces need only look back 20 years
to the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite the puppet
government the Soviet Union continued to fund, it had collapsed by 1992.

At this time the Afghan fighters had gained control of Kabul, and internal
fights commenced between the different ethnicities. This is one reason why
the United States and the NATO forces understand the need for a strong,
trusted Afghan government, as well as a stable, well-trained security
apparatus that is a respected part of the government.
Taliban
The Taliban and their ally al-Qaeda continue to collaborate and work
towards common goals, principally the removal of the infidel from their
country, and regaining control of Afghanistan. To some observers, the war
in Afghanistan is this century’s Vietnam, and al-Qaeda and the Taliban
see it as their right to bleed the foreign troops. The inability of the current
Afghan government to gain control over all of Afghanistan politically, and
create a security force that will be able to stand on its own, bodes well for
the Taliban and al-Qaeda.
Economics
The main financial resource for the Taliban’s has been the opium trade. The
Kandahar district was the birthplace of the Taliban and is also one of the
provinces that produce the most opium. This has not changed since the war
in Afghanistan began. It is estimated that through te drug trade, protecting
processing labs, and collecting payoffs, the Taliban generates anywhere
from $70 million to $500 million a year (Collins and Ali 2010). The reemer-
gence of the Taliban in the Pakistan North-West Frontier Province included
the take-over of the SWAT emerald mines. The Taliban now collects
one-third of each miner’s yield to fund their guerilla attacks in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The introduction of al-Qaeda in 1996 brought with it large
amounts of monetary funds. But al-Qaeda’s funds have decreased since
the attacks on September 11, 2001, and they no longer fund the Taliban.
Despite the disruption to al-Qaeda’s operations, they still maintain financial
solubility through financial facilitators in the Middle East, benefiting
through the transfer of funds via an untraceable means known as hawala.
Politics
The Taliban began to take control of Afghanistan in 1994, under the
leadership of Mullah Omar, and were originally seen as saviors. The story
that circulated about their emergence had to do with a corrupt warlord
that the Taliban killed. The Taliban enforced their ideology on all of
Afghanistan. This ideology was strict and anti-modern, comprised of

pashutunwali (Pashtun tribal codes) and Wahhabism (conservative Sunni
Islam from Saudi Arabia), and was influenced by Osama bin Laden’s
jihadist movement. The Taliban forces throughout the country enforced
the Sharia law, anti-modernity restrictions (no televisions, music, kites), and
restrictions on women (no school, no employment, wearing of burqas). The
Taliban is also known to have connections with the Pakistani Inter-Service
Intelligence Agency as well as the Pakistani military. The al-Qaeda organi-
zation still maintains its goals of bringing down the United States, but
the organization has changed as a result of the war on terror. Osama bin
Laden still views Afghanistan as the potential starting point for the pious
Caliphate (Scheuer 2006, 171). It is the hope of the Taliban and al-Qaeda
that following the withdrawal of the foreign forces, Afghanistan will once
again fall off the radar for many international nations, enabling the Taliban
and al-Qaeda to regain political control.

The Taliban and al-Qaeda’s prime concern is their ability to regain control
of Afghanistan after the United States and NATO forces have withdrawn.
In conjunction with this vision, they must be careful not to draw attention
to their actions. For the Taliban, the withdrawal of the foreign forces will
be a sign of victory by the Afghan Taliban. Al-Qaeda will also claim this as
a victory, just as Osama bin Laden claimed success with the Soviet Union
withdrawing from Afghanistan in 1989. In order to follow the ideologies
of both non-state actors, it is imperative that they be successful in returning
Islamic rule to Afghanistan.
Methodology
For this predictive study, the three actors are Afghanistan (people),
the United States, and the Taliban. The issue is the future stability of
Afghanistan as a result of the involvement of Western armies. Through
the LAMP process, the analyst will be able to take into consideration
Afghanistan, the United States, and the Taliban’s perceptions and potential
behaviors. Like any predictive study, the future scenarios are based on the
perceptions, which is only as good as the analysts’ understanding of the
actors’ perceptions. Despite the LAMP concept of free will, it is impos-
sible to cover every actor’s perception. With most of the literature having a
Western perspective, the analyst may infuse some of those thought processes
in the analysis unconsciously. It is the responsibility of the analysts to verify
their analysis and eliminate any biases.
Potential courses of action for

interested actors
In this predictive study, there are three actors that have an impact on the future
stability of Afghanistan: Afghanistan, the United States, and the Taliban.
Based on the issue of the future of Afghanistan, there are three actions:
1 Political influence used to reach agreement. The actor in question

uses political influence and clout in an effort to achieve agreements.
2 Continue to fight. The actor in question will continue to push
forward with their agenda and continue to fight against opponents
until their goal is achieved. There is no opportunity for negotiations.
3 Withdraw forces. The actor in question will withdraw their fighters.
Major scenarios
LAMP analysis enables the analyst to review multiple future scenarios to
determine the most likely future.
1 Democratic government. Afghanistan continues to exist with the

current government; and with Western backing continues to work
on removing corruption and expanding their influence throughout
Afghanistan.
2 Tribal warlords. Afghanistan’s current government fails to extend
its control beyond Kabul. The Afghan people opt to follow their
tribal elders and warlords who offer security and a means of living.
3 Islamic Caliphate. The Taliban along with their ally al-Qaeda regain
control through religion and the promise of a security.
According to the LAMP methodology, it is imperative that the analyst

analyze all potential actions by the three actors.
Permutations of behavior
Step 6 in the LAMP process calculates the total number of alternate futures
from the actors in this predictive study (United States, the Taliban, and
Afghanistan), which is XY = Z. For this equation, X is equivalent to the
number of actions offered to each actor, Y equals the number of actors
involved, and Z is equivalent to the total number of alternate futures to be
compared.1 For this analysis there are two available courses of action for
each of the three actors. The equation for this predictive study is as follows:
33 = 27. This means that there are 27 possible alternate futures to compare
for each of the actors in each of the three scenarios.
The abbreviations below are used to identify the courses of action:
PA = Political Influence used to reach agreement

CF = Continue to Fight
WF = Withdraw Forces
The three scenarios will likewise be identified by abbreviations:
DG = Democratic Government (Scenario 1)

TW = Tribal Warlords (Scenario 2)
IC = Islamic Caliphate (Scenario 3)
Table 5.1 Alternate future permutations

Possible future # United States Taliban Afghanistan
1 PA PA PA
2 PA PA CF
3 PA CF PA
4 CF PA PA
5 PA CF CF
6 CF PA CF
7 CF CF PA
8 CF CF CF
9 PA PA WF
10 PA WF PA
11 WF PA PA
12 PA WF WF
13 WF PA WF
14 WF WF PA
15 WF WF WF
Possible future # United States Taliban Afghanistan
16 CF CF WF
17 CF WF CF
18 WF CF CF
19 WF WF CF
20 CF WF WF
21 WF CF WF
22 PA WF CF
23 PA CF WF
24 CF WF PA
25 CF PA WF
26 WF CF PA
27 WF PA CF
Pair-wise comparisons for each scenario

Tables 2 through 4 below represent the alternate futures table and a votes
column which is a tally of the pair-wise comparison votes.
Table 5.2 Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG)

Possible future # United States Taliban Afghanistan Votes
1 PA PA PA 0
2 PA PA CF 1
3 PA CF PA 12
4 CF PA PA 9
5 PA CF CF 22
6 CF PA CF 9
7 CF CF PA 13
8 CF CF CF 6
9 PA PA WF 8
10 PA WF PA 15
11 WF PA PA 18
12 PA WF WF 22
13 WF PA WF 10
14 WF WF PA 17
15 WF WF WF 19
16 CF CF WF 22
17 CF WF CF 22
18 WF CF CF 21
19 WF WF CF 6
20 CF WF WF 16
21 WF CF WF 15
22 PA WF CF 8
23 PA CF WF 18
24 CF WF PA 18
25 CF PA WF 10
26 WF CF PA 13
27 WF PA CF 1
351

Table 5.3 Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW)

1 PA PA PA 0
2 PA PA CF 14
3 PA CF PA 11
4 CF PA PA 14
5 PA CF CF 15
6 CF PA CF 17
7 CF CF PA 16
8 CF CF CF 20
9 PA PA WF 12
10 PA WF PA 15
11 WF PA PA 22
12 PA WF WF 13
13 WF PA WF 9
14 WF WF PA 21
15 WF WF WF 2
16 CF CF WF 9
17 CF WF CF 18
18 WF CF CF 26
19 WF WF CF 25
20 CF WF WF 5
21 WF CF WF 10
22 PA WF CF 19
23 PA CF WF 6
24 CF WF PA 5
25 CF PA WF 5
26 WF CF PA 3
27 WF PA CF 19
351

Table 5.4 Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC)

1 PA PA PA 0
2 PA PA CF 11
3 PA CF PA 16
4 CF PA PA 13
5 PA CF CF 20
6 CF PA CF 18
7 CF CF PA 20
8 CF CF CF 24
9 PA PA WF 14
10 PA WF PA 10
11 WF PA PA 21
12 PA WF WF 7
13 WF PA WF 10
14 WF WF PA 6
15 WF WF WF 4
16 CF CF WF 9
17 CF WF CF 11
18 WF CF CF 20
19 WF WF CF 15
20 CF WF WF 3
21 WF CF WF 22
22 PA WF CF 13
23 PA CF WF 15
24 CF WF PA 2
25 CF PA WF 1
26 WF CF PA 22
27 WF PA CF 24
351

Using the results from step 7 (pair-wise comparisons) from the tables above
(Table 5.2 through Table 5.4), the analyst now moves to step 8. Step 8
ranks the alternate futures, based on the voting scores, in order of proba-
bility (highest to lowest). This will give the analyst the most likely actions
to occur specific to each scenario.
Ranking the alternate futures

The tables (5.2–5.4) from step 7 show the total number of permutations
of alternate future for each scenario, as well as the correlating number of
votes received during the pair-wise comparison. Step 8 in the LAMP process
is to rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest to lowest,
thus showing the most likely to least likely to occur. The alternate future
tables 5.5 through 5.7 represent each scenario and are arranged according
to their rank.
Table 5.5 Alternate futures, Scenario 1 – democratic government (DG)

5 PA CF CF 22
12 PA WF WF 22
16 CF CF WF 22
17 CF WF CF 22
18 WF CF CF 21
15 WF WF WF 19
11 WF PA PA 18
23 PA CF WF 18
24 CF WF PA 18
14 WF WF PA 17
20 CF WF WF 16
10 PA WF PA 15
21 WF CF WF 15
7 CF CF PA 13
26 WF CF PA 13
3 PA CF PA 12
13 WF PA WF 10
25 CF PA WF 10
4 CF PA PA 9
6 CF PA CF 9
9 PA PA WF 8
22 PA WF CF 8
8 CF CF CF 6
19 WF WF CF 6
2 PA PA CF 1
27 WF PA CF 1
1 PA PA PA 0
351

Table 5.6 Alternate futures, Scenario 2 – tribal warlord (TW)

18 WF CF CF 26
19 WF WF CF 25
11 WF PA PA 22
14 WF WF PA 21
8 CF CF CF 20
22 PA WF CF 19
27 WF PA CF 19
17 CF WF CF 18
6 CF PA CF 17
7 CF CF PA 16
5 PA CF CF 15
10 PA WF PA 15
2 PA PA CF 14
4 CF PA PA 14
12 PA WF WF 13
9 PA PA WF 12
3 PA CF PA 11
21 WF CF WF 10
13 WF PA WF 9
16 CF CF WF 9
23 PA CF WF 6
20 CF WF WF 5
24 CF WF PA 5
25 CF PA WF 5
26 WF CF PA 3
15 WF WF WF 2
1 PA PA PA 0
351

Table 5.7 Alternate futures, Scenario 3 – Islamic Caliphate (IC)

8 CF CF CF 24
27 WF PA CF 24
21 WF CF WF 22
26 WF CF PA 22
11 WF PA PA 21
5 PA CF CF 20
7 CF CF PA 20
18 WF CF CF 20
6 CF PA CF 18
3 PA CF PA 16
19 WF WF CF 15
23 PA CF WF 15
9 PA PA WF 14
4 CF PA PA 13
22 PA WF CF 13
2 PA PA CF 11
17 CF WF CF 11
10 PA WF PA 10
13 WF PA WF 10
16 CF CF WF 9
12 PA WF WF 7
14 WF WF PA 6
15 WF WF WF 4
20 CF WF WF 3
24 CF WF PA 2
25 CF PA WF 1
1 PA PA PA 0
351

Analysis of alternate futures

Scenario 1: Democratic government
In Scenario 1, Afghanistan would continue to exist with a democratic
government. Afghanistan will continue to receive financial aid and backing
from Western governments. The democratic government will continue to
make headway in removing corruption from the government as well as
the security and justice systems. As the Afghan government continues to
mature, it will expand its influence throughout Afghanistan.
Through the use of the pair-wise comparison, these five alternate futures
received the highest votes out of the 27 alternate futures. The five alternate
futures received at least 21 votes. These five alternate futures are considered
to be the most likely to occur. This section includes both the analysis of
the alternate future as well as potential consequences for this particular
alternate future.
Alternate Future #5: The United States pursues an

agreement through political influence with the Taliban while
the Taliban and Afghanistan continue to fight
Alternate Future #5 received 22 votes during the pair-wise comparison.
Four of the five alternate futures discussed in this section received 22 votes.
For this alternate future, the Taliban and Afghanistan continue to fight
against each other, while the Untied States attempts to use its political
influence to reach an agreement. It is likely that part of the continued fights
will be between ethnic groups within Afghanistan. This could happen as
a result of an ethnic group, most likely the Uzbeks or the Tajiks, feeling
that the Afghan government is not doing all that was possible to protect
the Afghan people. The Afghan government has to be able to prove to the
Afghan people, as well as their international peers, that they have the power
behind them to continue to fight the Taliban insurgency. If they have any
hope of gaining countrywide support and confidence, the government has
to prove they can keep the Afghanis safe. National security will remain an
issue for Afghanistan’s near future. This also proves to the international
community that the Afghan government is working to eliminate radicalism
from its society.
The Taliban will most likely continue to fight because of the weakness
and corruption within the government. To date, the Afghan government is
still lacking in national security capabilities as well as in their fight against
corruption. These are two key areas that need to be worked on in order
to maintain and expand the power and control they currently have. The
United States’ attempt to use political influence to reach an agreement with

the Taliban would also be seen by the Taliban as a weakness. This would
guarantee that the Taliban would not withdraw its forces from the Afghan
battlefield.
One consequence the United States could face from this initiative is the
perception that they are willing to negotiate with terrorists/insurgents. Up
till this point the United States has maintained a strict policy of no negotia-
tions. There is also the potential for pockets of fighting between the Afghan
government and the Taliban. This would cause unrest among the affected
provinces and could potentially lead to the men in those provinces rearming
themselves in order to protect their families and ways of life.

agreement through political influence with Taliban while the
Taliban and Afghanistan withdraws their forces
Alternate Future #12 also received 22 votes. This alternate future is very
similar to Alternate Future #5, except in this instance the Taliban and
Afghanistan withdraw their troops rather than continue to fight. The
justification for the Taliban withdrawing could be as simple as needing to
resupply its fighters with food and weapons, to having the fighters return
to the Pakistani border to recruit new fighters. The Taliban could also
withdraw in order to plan their next attack, most likely against Kabul,
while they wait to see what progresses from the United States negotiations.
Afghanistan’s withdrawal could be for the same reasons as the Taliban:
resupplying its troops, or seeing how the negotiations turn out. In addition,
the Afghan government could also withdraw in order to refortify key
areas like Kabul and the Bagram Air Base. It is imperative that the Afghan
government maintain an image of being both competent and able to defend
Afghanistan from enemies, both foreign and domestic.
The attempt by the United States to carry out politically influenced
agreements shows the dedication of the United States in attempting to
end the war in Afghanistan. It would also prove to the Taliban, Afghan
government and many critics from around the world that the United States
is not trying to create their own empire in Central Asia.
As previously stated in Alternate Future #5, the United States runs the
risk of opening themselves up to a loss of face for negotiating with a known
terrorist/insurgence group. This would set a new precedent for the American
negotiation system. This withdrawal of both the Taliban and Afghan
government forces could potentially lead the Afghans to feel as though the
security forces are focused on centralized cities instead of dispersed among
the people of Afghanistan. As a result, the Afghan government might lose
support from the Afghanis who are not located in a city.
Alternate Future #16: The Taliban and the United States

continue to fight both in Afghanistan and along the
Pakistani/Afghan border, while Afghanistan withdraws their
forces
Alternate Future #16 showcases an interesting dynamic. In this alternate
future, the Taliban and the United States use their political influence to
reach an agreement between each other while Afghanistan withdraws its
forces. The negotiations to reach an agreement between the United States
and the Taliban would be a long process. It is unlikely that the public would
ever receive full disclosure on the terms and conditions of the agreement.
This agreement would set a precedent for future dealings with insurgency/
terrorist organizations.
While these two actors are negotiating their agreement, the Afghanis
and their government would need to focus on building the security forces
and infrastructure and dealing with their internal corruption. When
and if the negotiations between the United States and the Taliban were
ratified, the Afghans would still have a radical organization to deal with.
The Afghan government has an uphill battle ahead of it for creating
an environment where the Afghan people feel secure and can see an
improvement in their lives. This does not mean that Afghanistan should
become isolated and try to ignore the potential problems that the Taliban
and al-Qaeda represent.
The United States faces similar complications to those which the Soviet
Army encountered in the 1980s. The Taliban has an amorphous capability
to melt into their surroundings and then emerge to carry out another guerilla
attack against the United States and NATO forces. While the United States
has begun to deploy new technologies that assist in tracking these guerilla
attacks, they still have not perfected a method to prevent I.E.Ds (improvised
explosive devices). The United States and NATO death tolls will continue
to rise against the Taliban. Continued fighting between the Taliban and the
United States could also end in the United States pushing the Taliban back
into Pakistan, thus causing the Taliban to focus its attacks on Pakistan
instead of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities multiply the risks
associated with this possibility.
Alternate Future #17: The United States and Afghanistan

continue to fight against Taliban insurgency, while the
Taliban is withdrawing its fighters
Alternate Future #17 has two of the three actors continuing to fight the
war on terror in Afghanistan. While the Afghan government and the United
States embroil themselves in warfare, the Taliban withdraws its forces back
to the Afghan–Pakistani border. The terrain along the Afghan/Pakistani
border is difficult to traverse; the Taliban and Afghanis have the benefit of
traveling through and living in the mountainous region.
The Taliban’s withdrawal of its forces could be for gathering new
supplies or recruits, or for planning the next large scale attack against
Afghanistan, the United States, and NATO forces. This withdrawal should
not be regarded as a quiet exit from the attempt to regain control of
Afghanistan.
It is the responsibility of the United States, its NATO forces allies, and
the Afghan government to be prepared for these potential attacks. The
need to ensure that Afghanistan has a strong security force is essential
to deterring attacks by the Taliban. The strengthening of the Afghan
security forces will also increase the Afghan opinion of both the Afghan
government and the stability and security of their country. After decades
of war, the Afghanis need to see their Afghan government as a valid system
of power.
The main consequence of this alternate future would be the failure of
the United States and Afghanistan to utilize the withdrawal of the Taliban
fighters to eliminate the single cells that have remained behind. This is also
an opportunity for the Afghan government to attempt to begin to rebuild
some of the destroyed infrastructure. If the Afghan government fails to
make the most out of this opportunity, where they are the hunter and not
the hunted, then they run the risk of the Afghanis looking to warlords and
local tribal elders for security and support.
Alternate Future #18: The United States begins its

withdrawal process, and the Taliban turn their focus to
Kabul and the current government. Afghanistan in turn
begins to fight against the Taliban
After reviewing the first four alternate futures, Alternate Future #18
might seem out of place, but it is not. Throughout history, Afghanis
have fought against a common enemy or invader (such as the Soviet
Union during the Soviet–Afghan War). Immediately after the enemy’s
withdrawal, the Afghan tribes and fighters return to internal skirmishes.
In this instance, the Taliban has been primarily focused on eliminating
the risk the United States and the NATO forces present. When the United
States and NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan, an opportunity
will present itself to the Taliban to turn its forces against the Afghan
government.
If this alternate future were to occur it would be almost identical to the
fall of the Afghan government supported by an outside country, and ensuing
tribal warfare would determine who has the power to maintain control of
Kabul and Afghanistan. If the United States and the NATO forces can
succeed in creating a stable and robust security council to maintain control,
the fledgling Afghan government would have a better chance of maintaining
control.
This alternate future would have serious consequences for Afghanistan.
The nations that were withdrawing from the country would potentially
be leaving Afghanistan open again for terrorist activities. The potential
infighting would prevent the Afghan government from improving its
national security. The Afghan people would have a sense of status quo,
constant warfare with no opportunity to better their lives.
Reviewing the five alternate futures above, the analyst can deduce that
the United States’ change in mindset to enable political influence to achieve
an agreement has significant consequences. While half of Afghanistan
may be in agreement with this option, the northern half of the country is
violently opposed to the Taliban reentering Afghanistan under any terms.
In each of these alternate futures, Afghanistan needs to see a united front
on the part of the government. Potential corruption, lack of security or
negotiations with the Taliban could potentially doom the democratic
government. The Afghanis and their government are currently navigating
a fine path between a democratic government, which is supported by
the international community, and traditional tribal elders, warlords, and
rural societies. The lack of infrastructure increases difficulties faced by the
Afghan democracy.
Scenario 2: Tribal warlords

Scenario 2 of this predictive study draws from Afghanistan’s tribal
population. The isolated nature of the country and various geographical
features have prevented the different ethnic populations from having
to associate and assimilate with each other, except in large cities.
Throughout Afghanistan’s history, there are few central governments that
have succeeded in extending their control across Afghanistan. The current
Afghan government is no exception. The strong tribal and ethnic connec-
tions and lack of national security have enabled the Afghanis to opt to
follow their tribal elders and warlords who are able to offer both security
and a means for living.
If this scenario were to occur, Afghanistan’s economy would come to
a standstill, with opium being their key export. Their national security
would devolve from a nationwide focus to rural territories. Afghan tribal
warlords would reappear. While these warlords would offer the Afghanis
security they desire, they would hurt the overall progress of the country.
Afghanistan would begin to lose the advances it has made.

Kabul and the current government. Afghanistan in turn
begins to fight against the Taliban
Alternate Future #18 received 26 votes, the highest score from the pair-wise
comparison. For Scenario 2’s analysis, this is the most likely alternate future
to occur.
As previously mentioned under Scenario 1, Afghan history is filled
with different instances where Afghan tribal enemies would form a
limited confederacy to eliminate a common external enemy. The Afghan
government does not view the United States and the NATO forces as the
enemy. The Afghan government’s perspective views the role of United
States and NATO forces as assistance in increasing the overall security of
Afghanistan, while working to eliminate a terrorist group and an Islamic
fundamentalist group.
Once the United States has withdrawn, the Afghan government will
receive financial assistance from its allies, but will essentially be left to
defend itself. This is the primary reason for the push towards increasing
Afghanistan’s security capabilities. The Taliban is currently aligned with
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a Mujahideen fighter from the Soviet–Afghan
War. Hekmatyar has lived and fought through this alternate future before,
following the end of the Soviet–Afghan War.
If this alternate future were to occur, there are two key consequences.
First, the attempts to create a secure and stable Afghanistan will be gone.
The return of turf wars drawn upon tribal-based lines, in hopes of gaining
territory and funds, would spread across Afghanistan, causing migration
issues for the already stressed surrounding nations. Second, there is the
potential for the reintroduction of al-Qaeda and terrorist training camps to
Afghanistan. With internal disputes taking place, it would not be difficult
for al-Qaeda to cross the Afghan border and establish a new training
facility.
Alternate Future #19: The United States and the Taliban

withdraw from Afghanistan, and Afghanistan continues to
fight with remaining Taliban insurgents and between ethnic
groups
Alternate Future #19 would begin with the withdrawal of the United States and
NATO forces from Afghanistan. The Taliban would then withdraw its forces.
The Taliban’s withdrawal may be an attempt to regroup its forces, replenish its
supplies and add recruits to the ranks. Without the constant warfare between
the United States, NATO forces, and the Taliban or insurgents, the lack of
infrastructure could lead ethnic groups to return to in-fighting to gain control
over prosperous territories. Afghanistan currently does not have the infra-
structure, national security or economic prosperity to ensure the long-term
survival of the Afghanis without economic aid from other nations.
The consequences of Alternate Future #19 could be as bleak as the elimi-
nation of the Afghan government that was founded and nurtured over the
last six years. If Afghanistan were to continue to fight against enemy forces,
either new or old, Mujahideen fighters with experience, including major
figures like Ismail Khan, Hekmatyar and Rashid Dostum, would again take
control of large sections of Afghanistan.
Alternate Future #11: Afghanistan and the Taliban work

through their political influences to reach an agreement and
the United States withdraw its troops from Afghanistan
This alternate future seems to cover the ultimate objectives of the three actors.
While Alternate Future #11 would seem to allow peace through negotiation,
it would in fact lead Afghanistan back into a civil war. In this alternate future,
the Afghan government and the Taliban would work together to reintegrate
the Taliban insurgents into Afghan society. It is anticipated that this reinte-
gration could work much like the denazification policy in Germany following
World War II, with major leaders being put on trial, and lesser participants
being given amnesty. The Afghanis in the northern half of the country have
already stated that if this occurs, they will rearm. The two main ethnic groups
in northern Afghanistan are the Tajiks and Uzbeks, under Taliban rule; both
ethnicities were punished and treated like second-class citizens. They will not
allow this to occur again. Some may fear that the reintegration of the Taliban
into Afghan society and government will lead to the minority ethnic groups
being removed from their positions of power.
Through this alternate future the Afghan government would take steps
towards reintegrating the Taliban into society and reaching an agreement
with the Taliban to eliminate the insurgency, thus increasing national and
regional security. The Taliban insurgents would benefit by returning to
their home provinces within Afghanistan, and could potentially be used
as a security detail. The northern half of Afghanistan would rearm and
rebel against the negotiations and any resulting agreement that is reached
between the two parties. The withdrawal of the United States and the
NATO forces would reduce security within Afghanistan. If Afghanistan’s
government security forces haven’t improved, this would give the northern
Afghanis further justification for rearming.
Potential consequences of this would be the Taliban regaining a majority
of the government and reenacting Sharia law. Another potential concern
would be the treatment of women and girls, both in terms of their

education and human rights. The roles of women is one area the Taliban
feels very strongly about, and could potentially cause tension. This could
also cause another civil war in Afghanistan; this would be very similar to
the aftermath of the Soviet–Afghan War. This could also potentially cause
mass migration of the Afghan people to neighboring countries due to the
fear of potential civil war. If a civil war were to break out it, is reasonable to
assume that warlords would once again emerge. Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek
warlord, would undoubtedly be the prime leader for the Uzbek tribe. It is
also reasonable, based on historical data, to assume that the Uzbeks and
Tajiks would ally themselves against the Pashtu fighters.

withdraw their forces while Afghanistan uses political
influence to try to achieve an agreement between the
Taliban and the Afghan government
Alternate Future #14 focuses on two of the actors removing themselves
from the equation. If the United States and the Taliban were both to
withdraw their forces from Afghanistan, despite the support that the
Afghan government would still receive from the international community,
they would be without forces to prove to the Afghan people that they
were capable of providing security. The Afghan government’s attempt
to use political influence to reach an agreement with the Taliban would
be seen by many in southern Afghanistan as a move to ensure peace and
increase the overall security of the southern provinces. The ethnic groups in
northern Afghanistan would not feel that their security had been increased;
if anything, they would feel more vulnerable as a result of the agreement.
This alternate future could very quickly turn into the next civil war. If this
were to occur, it is unlikely that the democratic government would be able to
sustain control over any of the country. If civil war broke out in Afghanistan,
Kabul would most likely be one of the first places to be attacked. A civil war
would cause mass migration as well as destruction of much of the infrastructure
created over the last nine years. Civil war would ultimately turn into a battle
for power, and this could potentially allow the Taliban to return to reclaim the
southern provinces before attempting to retake the northern provinces.
Alternate Future #8: The United States, Afghanistan and

the Taliban continue to fight
Alternate Future #8 appears as the fifth possible future for Scenario
2. This alternate future would consist of continuous warfare between
the Taliban and the United States and Afghanistan. This would cause
a lack of stability within Afghanistan and lead to lower approval
ratings not only for the Afghan government, but for the United States
government as well. Alternate Future #8 would force the Afghanis to
align themselves with a strong local force that could offer protection
against insurgents. The United States would most likely be forced to
eventually withdraw, much like the Soviets did during the Soviet–
Afghan War.
This alternate future would lead to a quagmire in Afghanistan. The
resulting long-term devastation would cause massive migration as refugees
flee to the surrounding nations, much like during the Soviet–Afghan War.
The opium trade would remain one of the key sources of funds within
Afghanistan, and production would most likely increase to fund the
insurgent fighters as well as local warlords.
Reviewing Scenario 2’s five alternate futures above, a trend appears
for Afghanistan. In order for Scenario 2 (tribal warlords) to potentially
occur, Afghanistan has two options: continue to fight or attempt to
publicly negotiate with the Taliban. The continued fighting can come
in two ways: either Afghanistan remains embroiled in warfare with the
Taliban and the United States, or internal skirmishes break out within
Afghanistan’s tribes as a result of the lack of infrastructure, economic
development, and stability. While many view the potential negotiations
as the solution to the current situation in Afghanistan, it is important
that the United States and the Afghan government take into account the
entire Afghan population, not just southern Afghanistan. It is unlikely
that the northern Afghanis will be willing to agree to any negotiations
that include the Taliban reentering the government or gaining power in
southern Afghanistan.
Scenario 3: Islamic Caliphate

Scenario 3 would cause international instability as well as damage the
success Afghanistan has made to date. Scenario 3 entails the Taliban and
their ally al-Qaeda regaining control of Afghanistan through religious
propaganda and the promise of security. By reinstating Sharia law, all of the
progress made by women will be reversed. Osama bin Laden and Mullah
Omar proclaiming Afghanistan to be the birthplace of the next Caliphate
will give credence to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda’s causes and could
potentially lead to additional large- and small-scale terrorist attacks around
the world.
Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 share two alternate futures. In order for this
scenario to come to fruition, the Taliban and its ally al-Qaeda need the
United States and the NATO forces to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Alternate Future #8: The United States, Afghanistan, and

the Taliban continue to fight
Unlike Scenario 2, Alternate Future #8 ties for first place with 24 votes in
Scenario 3. This is the most likely alternate future to occur for Scenario 3.
Alternate Future #8 tied for first place primarily due to Afghanistan’s
history. As previously stated in Scenario 2, if all three actors continued to
fight, it would eventually turn into a deadlock. Afghanistan’s economy,
democracy, infrastructure, and morale would suffer. With critics are already
comparing the war in Afghanistan to the Vietnam War, if the United States
were to continue down that path, with no way to withdraw while securing
victory, the American public would most likely demand the evacuation of
Afghanistan. If this were to occur, the Afghan government would not be
able to survive without external financial and security support. This could
potentially allow the Taliban and al-Qaeda to offer the Afghan people
security, while allowing them to practice their religious beliefs without
restriction.
If this future alternate were to occur, Afghanistan could once again
become a haven for terrorism. This would not only affect the three actors
discussed in this predictive study, but also the majority of the western
hemisphere. The ability to offer protection and economic security to the
Afghanis is important to ensuring their support.
Alternate Future #27: The United States withdraws from

Afghanistan while the Taliban uses political influence
to reach an agreement with the Afghan government.
Meanwhile, the Afghanis continue to fight
Alternate Future #27 focuses on the tendency for the Afghan population to
fight among themselves once the external enemy is gone. In this analysis,
the United States will withdraw from Afghanistan, and the Taliban will
use its political influence (in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) to negotiate an
agreement with the Afghan government. While this is occurring, the Afghan
population will resort back to skirmishes to gain food, water, money, and
weapons.
Afghanistan’s current government is incapable of impacting all of
Afghanistan. The vast majority of settlements in Afghanistan are rural, and
lack of infrastructure adds to the inability of the governmental to extend
its influence across all the geographic area of Afghanistan. As a result, the
current Afghan government is incapable of providing even the bare neces-
sities to the Afghan people.
Through pointed and deliberate negotiations, the Taliban could gain
control over potentially important areas within the government. The ethnic
connections of the Pashtun tribe could potentially assist the Taliban in

gaining control of important territories and funds. The internal skirmishes
would enable the Taliban once again to take over territory and remove
corrupt warlords and government officials.
As is the case for the five alternate futures in this scenario, if an Islamic
Caliphate were to begin in Afghanistan, the influence of Islamic extremists
would increase as they would now have a haven in which to operate. Concerns
would also be raised over the current state of security regarding Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons and the stability of their government and security apparatus
to ensure that nuclear weapons aren’t mishandled or easily accessible.
Alternate Future #21: The United States and Afghan

fighters withdraw from the war on terror, while the Taliban
continues to fight
In this alternate future, the withdrawal of both the United States and
Afghan fighters provides the Taliban with an opportunity to move into
strategic, unoccupied territory. This also opens the possibility for the
Taliban and its ally al-Qaeda to surround Kabul in an attempt to gain
control of the current government.
The Taliban does not have the same economic clout that it had in the
early 1990s. However, they have been able to maintain and expand their
recruitment base in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the United States
were to withdraw from Afghanistan without first preparing the Afghan
government with a security force that could protect it, and without elimi-
nating a percentage of the corruption within the government, it is unlikely
that the current Afghan government would be able to survive for an
extended period of time without intervention or defense from abroad.
By both the United States and the Afghan fighters withdrawing, it leaves
the Afghan people vulnerable to the Taliban forces. If the Taliban decides
to continue to fight, there is the potential for greater infiltration of Pakistan
and its various government apparatuses. This not only puts another nation
at risk, but a nation with nuclear capabilities.
Alternate Future #26: While the United States withdraws

from Afghanistan, the Afghan government attempts to use
political influence to reach an agreement with the Taliban.
At the same time, the Taliban continues to fight against the
current Afghan government
Alternate Future #26 consists of the United States withdrawing from
Afghanistan while the Taliban continues to fight against the Afghan
government, and the Afghan government uses political influence to reach

an agreement with the Taliban. Alternate Future #21 and Alternate Future
#26 are similar in the consequences and analysis, with one main exception.
Alternate Future #21 has the Afghan government withdrawing its forces,
while in alternate future #26, the Afghan government is using its political
influence to achieve an agreement with the Taliban.
Again, the Taliban is on the attack, while the Afghan government
appears to be on the defensive. The attempt to work with and accom-
modate the Taliban forces does nothing to divert the Taliban from their
ultimate goal of retaking Afghanistan: it only delays the takeover.

Afghanistan while the Taliban and Afghan government both
use their political influence to reach an agreement
Alternate Future #11 appears in both Scenario 2 and Scenario 3. This
alternate future offers the Taliban the opportunity to negotiate directly with
the Afghan government for a position of power without interference from
the United States.
While the Afghan government would not be willing to transform the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan into an Islamic Caliphate, the Taliban
would most likely be able to gain seats of power within the government.
This would be true for two reasons. First, the Taliban members come
primarily from the Pashtun tribe, and second, the common occurrence of
corruption within the government would make it relatively easy for the
Taliban representatives to bribe their way into possession of either infor-
mation or supplies.
If these agreements are conducted in secrecy, the Afghan government
runs the risk of upsetting the international aid organizations and nations
providing economic aid and relief to the Afghan people. In addition to
international repercussions, the Afghan government also runs the risk of
the ethnic groups from the northern provinces, primarily the Uzbeks and
Tajiks, rearming in preparation for a civil war. Negotiations between the
current Afghan government, which is run by Karzai, a Pashtun, and the
Taliban, which is a predominantly Pashtun organization, could be seen by
the northern provinces as a security risk to their way of life. After suffering
from Taliban rule, most Afghans are unwilling to entertain the idea of the
Taliban in the government.
The most likely consequence of this would be a civil war in Afghanistan.
This does provide the Taliban with the opportunity to emerge the victor
against the northern provinces, as they did in the civil war in the 1992.
In reviewing Scenario 3, in order for the Islamic Caliphate to stand
a chance of developing and taking root, the United States needs to be
removed from the equation. The only alternate future that has the United
States involved was the first alternate future where all three actors continue
to fight, thus resulting in a draw in Afghanistan.
Focal events and indicators

Steps 9 and 10 determine the focal events and develop the indicators for
the focal events. This analysis is different from the consequence analysis
in the previous section. A focal event is an event that affects the alternate
future enough that it changes the relative probability. The indicators are
associated with each of the alternate futures and focal events. The analyst
should produce a list of possible indicators that work as a checklist for
whether an event is about to occur or has already occurred. This checklist
allows the analyst to periodically review and revote on the alternate futures
as new information becomes available. In addition, it allows the analyst to
refine indicators that are associated with certain focal events and identify
new focal events for more extreme alternate futures.2
This predictive study focuses on Afghanistan, the United States, and the
Taliban in relation to the Afghanistan’s government. During this analysis
it is important to determine the options Afghanistan has, and understand
both what is currently going on, and what could potentially occur in the
future, and how Afghanistan would likely respond. It is important, as the
analyst, to keep in mind that not all the focal events need occur at the
same time in order to change the current future to an alternate future;
however, at least one focal point must occur to change the alternate
futures.
The current status of Afghanistan is Alternate Future #8: the United
States, Afghanistan, and the Taliban continue to fight. The United States
has approved a surge of US soldiers in an effort to disrupt and destroy
the Taliban insurgency in southern Afghanistan. The United States and
NATO forces have stated earlier this year that they do not plan to begin to
withdraw from Afghanistan until 2011.

agreement through political influence with the Taliban,
while the Taliban and Afghanistan continue to fight
Until the press release on July 19, 2010, the United States had been opposed
to participating in negotiations with the Taliban. While these issues are not
completely resolved, the United States and the Taliban have moved one step
closer to having an open dialog concerning a peace agreement.3
Focal events
United States
The United States population’s opposition to the war in Afghanistan
continues to grow. President Obama changes the United States strategy on
talking with and negotiating with the Taliban. The United States reduces
the Department of Defense budget.
MM Policy change. The United States makes an official statement on

their stance on negotiating with the Taliban.
MM The United States opens up diplomatic discussions with Russia,
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan concerning Afghanistan and Taliban.
MM WikiLeaks releases 92,000 classified military documents on the war
in Afghanistan.
MM Statistics on military suicide rates and military personnel suffering
from combat stress disorders released to the public.
International
NATO countries that are participating in the war in Afghanistan hold
elections, and new leaders are elected into office.
MM David Cameron was elected as the new Prime Minister of the

United Kingdom on May 11, 2010. His view regarding the war
in Afghanistan is that “is not a war of choice, it is a war of
necessity.”4
Central Asia
The Taliban openly discusses with the media the possibility of negoti-
ating with the United States.5 The Afghans in northern Afghanistan
begin to rearm and strategically position themselves for military action
if necessary.
MM President Karzai issues a press release to the Afghan people

informing them of negotiations with the Taliban.
Alternate Future #11: Afghanistan and the Taliban work

through their political influences to reach an agreement
and the United States withdraw its troops from
Afghanistan
The United States and NATO forces have made it clear that they have no
intention of leaving Afghanistan before it is capable of maintaining its own
security and governance.
Focal Events
United States
President Obama changes the United States Strategy on talking to and
negotiating with the Taliban.
MM Policy change. The United States “okays” Karzai taking the lead in
Taliban discussions.
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan concerning Afghanistan and Taliban
negotiations.
International
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia agree to facilitate the negotiations between the
Taliban and Afghanistan.
MM The United States changes their strategy on dealing with the Taliban.
MM Pakistan and the United Kingdom have openly commented on their
willingness to support discussions with the Taliban.
Central Asia
The Taliban openly discusses with the media the possibility of negotiating
with the United States. The Afghans in northern Afghanistan begin to
rearm and strategically position themselves for military action if necessary.
The 9th International Conference on Afghanistan is held in Kabul. At
the conference, President Karzai states that Afghanistan should have full
control of its own security by 2014.
MM Media discussion on open negotiations escalates. President Karzai
gives a press release to the Afghan people informing them that that
they are close to a settlement with the Taliban.
MM Statistics released involving the Afghan Army and their completed
training.
MM Transition plan for Afghan provinces to be handed over to Afghan
security forces.

agreement through political influence with Taliban while the
Taliban and Afghanistan withdraw their forces
There have been news articles recently about President Obama and the
government considering changing the strategy in Afghanistan in relation to
negotiating with the Taliban. Up to this point, the United States has been
against negotiations, despite support for the idea from the United Kingdom,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and President Karzai. The United States has not
released an official statement to change their strategy. Until that happens,
some of the future analyses, including this one, cannot occur.
Focal Events
United States
President Obama changes the United States strategy on talking to and
negotiating with the Taliban. The United States’ deploys the soldier surge.
MM There is a significant reduction in insurgency attacks and an

increase in detainments.
MM The United States announces its willingness to consider talks with
the Taliban through a third party (Saudi Arabia or Pakistan).
International
The 9th Annual Afghanistan Conference highlights Afghanistan’s current
state and the strategies in place to gain their independence from foreign
security by 2014.
MM 50 percent of the financial aid that goes to Afghanistan is funded

through the Afghan government.
Central Asia
Afghanistan focuses on the initiative to remove opium production from
southern Afghanistan, the bad weather contributing to the loss of opium
fields. Northern Afghans begin to rearm after word of potential peace talks
between the Taliban and the Afghan government circulate.
MM Northern Afghans (Uzbeks and the Tajiks) begin to rearm and

stockpile weapons and supplies.
MM Ceasefire between Afghanistan and the Taliban.
MM Karzai’s government along with help from aid organizations begins
to distribute hexaploid wheat seed to farmers affected by the loss
of their opium plants along with financial aid as an incentive to
transition their crops.
Alternate Future #16: The Taliban and the United States

continue to fight both in Afghanistan and along the Pakistani–
Afghan border, while Afghanistan withdraws its forces
The withdrawal of the Afghan forces would coincide with the training
regime currently run by the United States military. President Karzai has laid
out very aggressive security targets which will require intense training. This
would not be a permanent withdrawal.
Focal Events
United States
The United States and Pakistan begin a joint operation to close in on the
Taliban from both sides. Pakistan gives the United States permission to
enter the North-West Frontier Province. A portion of the United States
soldier surge is to increase the Afghan security training. The United States
and its allies gain valid intelligence on the location of Mullah Omar.
MM The United States releases the date for the transition from combat
to supporting the Afghan forces.
MM The United States increases the number of contracts for civilian
security agents for training purposes in Afghanistan.
MM Defection of key Taliban members to Afghanistan.
International
NATO states that until the Afghan government has a capable security force,
NATO forces will not be leaving.
MM NATO nations increase aid to Afghanistan.

MM NATO nations increase their training regiments with the Afghan
security recruits.
Central Asia
Afghanistan vows to have control of their country’s security by 2014.
This is done through increasing their recruiting numbers and allowing
insurgents to reintegrate into Afghan society. Unrest emerges in northern
Afghanistan.
MM Troops drawn back to increase their training.

MM President Karzai issues a press release vowing to allow insurgents
and dissidents back into the Afghan society, and allow them to
participate in the future security of Afghanistan.
MM Influx of insurgents returning to Afghanistan and joining the
security recruits.
MM Uzbeks and Tajiks begin to rearm due to fear of an influx of
insurgents reintegrating into Afghan society and the security
sector.
Alternate Future #17: The United States and Afghanistan

continue to fight against Taliban insurgency, while the
Taliban withdraws its fighters
The Taliban withdrawal from direct confrontation from the United States
and Afghanistan is not a permanent move. Based on the Taliban’s strategies,
it is most likely a move to preserve their forces while attacking in another
area. There is also the possibility that they are resupplying the forces in the
field.
Focal Events
United States
A drone attack in the North-West Frontier Province kills a key Taliban
leader. The United States and Pakistan agree to a joint military operation to
squeeze the Taliban hideout in the North-West Frontier Province.
MM Surge of troops is moved along the Afghan–Pakistan border.

MM Intelligence on meeting of Taliban leaders is leaked.
International
NATO forces participate in a military operation to eradicate the Taliban.
The agricultural initiative to transition from opium to wheat is rejuvenated
as a result of poor weather conditions.
MM Redistribution of troops along the Afghan–Pakistan border.

MM Importation of wheat seeds. Increase of economic aid to the
agricultural communities for changing crops.
Central Asia
The Taliban receives the lowest profits in its history from opium production.
The Afghan government distributes 50 percent of the economic aid coming
into the country, resulting in noticeable changes within Afghanistan, and a
larger support base for the Afghan government.
MM Bad weather and reemergence of the initiative to transition from

opium to wheat.
MM Guarantee from the international community to purchase the wheat
produced in Afghanistan.
MM At the 9th Annual Afghanistan conference the international
community promises to allow 50 percent of the aid to flow through
the Afghan government.

Kabul and the current government. The Afghan government
in turn begins to fight against the Taliban
The United States and NATO forces complete their promises to train
the Afghan forces. The United States and NATO forces are reduced to
supporting roles.
Focal Events
United States
The United States population’s opposition to the war in Afghanistan continues
to grow. The United States reduces the Department of Defense budget.
MM Increase in death toll of United States soldiers.

MM Study completed and released on the amount of aid given to
Afghanistan and the impact/infrastructure it has created.
MM Change in leadership, which promises change in the war in Afghanistan.
in Afghanistan.
International
NATO nations populations’ opposition to the War in Afghanistan grows.
MM NATO soldiers’ death toll rises.

MM Opposition movements within the NATO nations press for
withdrawal from the war in Afghanistan.
Central Asia
The Afghan government states that they are in control of the country’s
security operations. Insurgents attack from within Afghanistan’s security
forces. The Taliban attempts to undermine the Afghan government and
regain control of southern Afghanistan.
MM The United States and NATO forces increase the security training of
new Afghan recruits.
MM The United States and NATO forces transition from full scale forces
to smaller support forces.
MM Taliban insurgents reintegrate into Afghan society and join the
security forces.
MM Reemergence of Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan.

withdraw from Afghanistan, and Afghanistan continues to
fight with remaining Taliban insurgents and between ethnic
groups
The United States and NATO forces complete their training and security
obligations to Afghanistan. Afghanistan has resumed control of the
country’s security forces.
Focal Events
United States
The United States population’s opposition to the war in Afghanistan
continues to grow. President Obama changes the United States strategy on
talking to and negotiating with the Taliban.
MM Policy change. The United States makes an official statement on

their stance on negotiating with the Taliban.
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan concerning Afghanistan and Taliban.
in Afghanistan.
MM Statistics on military suicide rates and military personnel suffering
from combat stress disorders released to the public.
International
NATO countries have transitioned to a support role.
MM NATO forces increase their training of Afghan troops for security details.
MM Opposition to continued involvement in Afghanistan begins in
NATO countries.
Central Asia
The Taliban openly discusses with the media the possibility of negotiating
with the United States. The Afghans in northern Afghanistan begin to rearm
and strategically position themselves for military action if necessary.
MM President Karzai hints to the Afghan people that he would be

willing to negotiate with the Taliban.
MM The Uzbeks and Tajiks in northern Afghanistan begin to align
themselves under warlords for protection.
MM Taliban reintegration increases.
Alternate Future #21: The United States and Afghan

fighters withdraw from the war on terror while the Taliban
continues to fight
This alternate future would be the complete opposite of the current condi-
tions in Afghanistan. It would give the Taliban an advantage and allow
them to reclaim lost territory.
Focal Events
United States
The United States transitions from combat to support. The United States
reduces its total troop force.
MM The United States begins to withdraw troops.

MM The United States government promises its population a reduced
role in the war.
MM The United States trains the Afghan security forces.
International
The UN declares Afghanistan ready to have control over its security.
MM NATO forces and the United States increase training regiments for
Afghan security forces.
MM UN inspections for Afghan security forces.
MM UN reviews the Afghan government’s overall security.
Central Asia
The Taliban carries out a surge, and there are increasing attacks on remote
locations in southern Afghanistan. The Taliban carries out attacks from
within the newly installed security forces. Afghan security forces withdraw
from remote locations.
MM Increase in Pakistani Taliban recruits.

MM Taliban insurgents reintegrate and join the security branches of the
Afghan government.
MM Taliban carry out a surge of attacks along the fringe of the
Afghan government’s control. Gain control of several
outposts.
Alternate Future #26: While the United States withdraws

from Afghanistan, the Afghan government attempts to use
political influence to reach an agreement with the Taliban.
At the same time the Taliban continues to fight against the
current Afghan government
The attempt by the Afghan government to negotiate with the Taliban and
end the fighting is a realistic goal for President Karzai.
Focal Events
United States
The United States transitions from combat to support. The United States
reduces its total troop force.
MM The United States government promises its population a reduced
role in the war.
International
MM UN inspections of Afghan security forces.
Central Asia
The Afghan government begins peace talks with the Taliban. The Taliban
infiltrates the Afghan security forces. The Taliban regains territory in
southern Afghanistan and surrounds Kabul. Northern Afghan tribes rearm.
MM President Karzai receives support from international governments
including the United States to begin discussions with the Taliban.
MM Northern Afghans rearm themselves and begin skirmishes with local
insurgents.
MM The Taliban plans strategic attacks from within Afghanistan’s
security forces.
MM Taliban insurgents join the Afghan security forces.
MM The Taliban take control of territories that are sympathetic to the
Taliban.
MM The Taliban create a strategy to procure positions around Kabul.

Showcase their strength.

Afghanistan while the Taliban uses political influence
to reach an agreement with the Afghan government.
Meanwhile the Afghans continue to fight
Based on the current conditions and open discussions, if the United States
were to agree to allow negotiations with the Taliban, this would be the most
likely future.
Focal Events
United States
President Obama changes the United States strategy on talking to and
negotiating with the Taliban. The United States transitions its armed forces
role from combat to support. The United States reduces its total troop
force.
MM The United States announces its willingness to consider talks with

the Taliban through a third party (Saudi Arabia or Pakistan).
International
NATO forces transition to a role of support instead of combat and begin
to withdraw troops.
MM UN inspections of Afghan security forces.
MM NATO forces are drastically reduced as a result of Afghan security
taking control.
Central Asia
The Afghan government begins peace talks with the Taliban. Northern
Afghan tribes rearm. Civil war breaks out between northern Afghanistan
and southern Afghanistan. The Afghan government loses control of the
Afghan population.
MM President Karzai receives support from international governments

including the United States to begin discussions with the Taliban.
MM Discussions begin between the Taliban and the Afghan government
with a third party mediator.
MM Northern Afghans rearm themselves and begin skirmishes with local
insurgents and security forces.
MM Northern Afghans ally themselves with strong warlords.
MM Old warlords like Rashid Dostum (an Uzbek) begin to gain
popularity and worldwide attention.
Transposition of alternate futures

Step 12 in the LAMP process is concerned with the transposition of
alternate futures. In this step the analyst reviews each scenario and the
corresponding top future alternates from the pair-wise comparison and
determines the possibility of transposition between them. Potential transpo-
sition between alternate futures occurs when one actor’s actions change the
perception of another actor. When this occurs, the actor whose perception
has been altered has the opportunity to transpose another alternate future.
It is important to keep in mind the actors’ historical backgrounds and
perceptions when reviewing the potential for transposition of alternate
futures. The analysis below will focus on the top five alternate futures for
each scenario as determined by the pair-wise comparison.
Scenario 1: Democratic government

The first four alternate futures (5, 12, 16, and 17) gained 22 votes and
would be considered the most likely to occur in order for Afghanistan to be
able to obtain its democratic government. For this analysis, the focus is on
alternate futures #5 and #12 which share the concept of the United States
changing its policy and opening negotiations with the Taliban; this provides
an opportunity for transposition between the two alternate futures.
Afghanistan holds the key to whether transposition may occur. Based on
current commentary on negotiating with the Taliban, the northern Afghans
have vocally opposed the idea, and commented on their commitment to
rearm if such discussions take place. This would lead to a transposition
from #12 to #5. The United States’ change in policy and willingness to
enter into discussions with the Taliban would first hinder the ability of the
two organizations to come to terms, which would most likely be a ceasefire
during negotiations. This ceasefire would originally include the Afghan

government, as they would have a significant role during the negotiations.
The northern Afghans, including the Uzbeks and Tajiks, have already stated
that they will not support negotiations between the Afghan government and
the Taliban. This is partly due to the historical relationship between the
northern Afghans and the Taliban and partly due to the Pashtun majority in
the country. The northern Afghans have a perception that the reintegration
of the Taliban will lead to a Pashtun government that will once again
exclude the minority ethnic groups.
Alternate Future #12 could also transpose into #16 if the attempted
negotiations fall through. The United States would again go on the offensive
against the Taliban. The withdrawal of Afghanistan would be a necessary
step to rebuild the broken connections with northern Afghanistan. The
Afghan government would need to dedicate a significant amount of energy
to regain the trust of nborthern Afghanistan. Alternate Future #16 does not
appear to have a link between the other top future alternates. As a result, it
has not been included in the analysis above. The two possible transpositions
above have the highest probability of affecting the alternate futures, based
on the perceptions of Afghanistan and its people.
Scenario 2: Tribal warlords

Scenario 2 offers the clearest transposition between the top three alternate
futures (11, 19, and 18). The fifth alternate future (#8) in this scenario is the
closest to the current situation in Afghanistan. The three alternate futures
listed above would be possible in Afghanistan due to the preconceived
perceptions that the Afghan population has formed over the last three
decades of war.
In Alternate Future #11, the Taliban and Afghanistan use political
influence to work towards an agreement while the United States begins to
withdraw. While these negotiations are taking place, a ceasefire would likely
be in place. The actions of the Afghan government in entering into discus-
sions with the Taliban would immediately cause the Northern Afghans
(Uzbeks and Tajiks) to rearm and begin to align themselves with powerful
leaders (warlords) like Rashid Dostum the Uzbek. This would lead to the
transposition between Alternate Future #11 and Alternate Future #19.
In Alternate Future #19, the United States would not change its
withdrawal strategies, but in addition to the United States, the Taliban
would also withdraw, in order to regroup and strategize. The Afghan
government’s battle to subdue and regain the trust of northern Afghanistan’s
population would enable the Taliban to develop a revised military strategy
against Afghanistan. In addition, the Afghan government’s attention would
be on northern Afghanistan, and skeleton forces would be left to protect
southern Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s perception of regaining

power in the north by focusing its attention there would enable Alternate
Future #18 to occur.
Alternate Future #18 continues the United States strategy of continuing
to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s focus on
reabsorbing and quelling the skirmishes in the north would leave southern
Afghanistan, and potentially Kabul, open to Taliban attacks. If the Taliban
uses its knowledge of the terrain, and its support networks through
southern Afghanistan and Pakistan, they would be able to catch the Afghan
government by surprise in Kabul and force the Afghan government to fight
on two fronts.
Under this scenario, many Afghanis would revert back to the protection
of tribal warlords. The Afghanis’ perception would be that the central
government has failed, by not providing the necessary protection that the
Afghans have received from their ethnically affiliated tribal warlords.
Scenario 3: Islamic Caliphate

Scenario 3, similar to Scenario 2, has Alternate Future #8, which is most
similar to the current state in Afghanistan. The top three alternate futures
that could lead to transposition are 11, 27, and 26. Much like Scenario
2, Alternate Future #11, the Taliban and Afghanistan would use political
influence to work towards an agreement while the United States would
begin to withdraw its troops. The withdrawal of United States troops
would also be accompanied by the withdrawal of NATO forces. Both
parties have agreed that a smaller portion of troops would remain to
support the Afghan security forces. By this point, the Afghans would have
been given control over all of Afghanistan. With this ongoing negotiation,
there would be an agreement on a ceasefire between the Taliban and
Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s disregard for the statements made
by the tribal leaders in northern Afghanistan concerning entering into
negotiations with the Taliban would lead the northern Afghans to rearm
due to their perception of being ignored and potentially shut-out from the
democratic government system. The ethnic tribes who rearmed would most
likely break the ceasefire, which they would not feel they were party to.
This would transpose the alternate future from 11 to 27.
Alternate Future #27 would have the Taliban continue to participate in
the peace negotiations, while the Afghan government attempts to subdue
the northern Afghanistan insurgency (Uzbeks and Tajiks). This effort would
require personnel and funds. It would draw attention away from southern
Afghanistan and embroil northern Afghanistan and the Afghan government
in a civil war. The Taliban’s perception of a weakening Afghan government
would transpose the alternate future from 27 to 26.
Alternate Future #26 would see the United States still withdrawing, while
Afghanistan is dealing with the civil war between northern Afghanistan and
the central government. The Afghan government would push to continue
the peace negotiations with the Taliban. This is due to their desire to
eventually bring peace to Afghanistan and prevent the government from
having to fight on two fronts. The Taliban perceive this as a weakness
within the Afghan government, and would exploit this weakness by
reentering the fight against Afghanistan.
Conclusion
Based on the above analysis, and through the LAMP process, it is clear
that Afghanistan has a long road ahead of it before it can truly exist peace-
fully and create the national security its people crave. While Afghanistan
is currently a democratic nation, this is largely due to the large presence
of NATO and United States soldiers patrolling and keeping the Taliban
at bay. The Afghan government continues to deal with corruption issues
throughout both the government and security branches. In addition, it
has been unable to garner either the support or the endorsement of the
rural Afghan communities. The continued focus on tribal connection and
ethnic prioritization hinders the Afghan government from presenting a
truly unified front against the Taliban and its ally al-Qaeda, as well as
to the United Nations. The people of Afghanistan have dealt with many
years of war, and have suffered from the destruction of their economy and
basic infrastructure. To the majority of Afghans, the international aid that
has flowed into Afghanistan over the past nine years has made little to no
impact on their daily lives.
The United States continues to deal with opposition at home, as well as
in Afghanistan, to their presence. The recent release of classified military
documents highlighting civilian deaths and operations only reinforces the
Afghan belief that the United States soldiers are not bringing peace but
instead more death. In the United States, the recent news release on the
rise of military suicides only drives home the need to bring United States
soldiers back from Afghanistan. Both the United States and the inter-
national community, including its NATO allies, are focused on training
Afghan security personnel to ensure there is an indigenous protection of the
Afghans and to create a security force independent of the United States and
NATO. Despite the aggressive strategies that are currently in place, this will
take years and a significant amount of effort from both the international
community and the Afghans themselves.
The Taliban continue to cause tension inside Afghanistan because of
their ethnic connections to the majority of the population, as well as their
alliance and protection of al-Qaeda. This connection has prevented peace

negotiations from taking place. As the war is close to entering its ninth year,
rumors have begun to circulate about a potential change in strategy by the
United States. This change in strategy would enable such discussions. The
Taliban still has reservations on the terms of such negotiations with the
United States, but they have not ruled out the principle of negotiation. The
Taliban’s ability to draw in the North-West Frontier Province, and expand
its ideology and recruiting throughout Pakistan, reintroduces the concept
of “Pashtunistan,” a nation-state that was abandoned following the third
Anglo-Afghan War. It is unlikely that the Taliban will be willing to allow
the current Afghan government to stay in control indefinitely. Even if the
Taliban was reintegrated into Afghan society, they would still achieve their
goal of upsetting the current Afghan dynamic. As a result of this reinte-
gration, it is logical to estimate that the northern Afghan tribes will rebel
and rearm. This will send Afghanistan back into a state of civil war.
This civil war would destroy the current democratic society and for a
time plunge the nation back under the control of tribal warlords. After
studying Afghanistan’s history, this is the timeline that has been repeated
after almost every international invasion of the country. This civil war
provides the Taliban with the opportunity to reinstate their control over
Afghanistan, if they can find the necessary funds to procure the weapons.
This could potentially lead to the rebirth of the Islamic Caliphate. The other
alternative would be the Afghan tribes once again breaking into ethnic
sectors, and each tribe having a council of elders to dispense justice while
warlords offer protection to the tribe.
Afghanistan’s cultural structure and social structure are not like those
of most modern countries. These distinct differences need to be taken into
consideration when viewing potential scenarios for Afghanistan’s future.
Afterthought
The Taliban has begun to recover some of its lost strength while remaining
in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Despite this reemer-
gence of the Taliban, they do not have the same following in Afghanistan
they previously held. The current government has been unable to perform
to the levels suggested, and is suffering from the same issues as previous
governments, including corruption. The majority of the Afghan population
is unhappy with the current conditions in Afghanistan, militarily, politi-
cally, economically, and socially. The current administration has been
unable to establish a sense of authority or credibility among the Afghan
population. In a recent poll, Afghanis across the country expressed a sense
of resentment towards President Karzai’s foreign-funded government, as
well as the NATO-led forces and the Western employees (Anonymous

2009, 21). There may also be a perception by the Afghanis that the current
Karzai government is only in place through the funding of the infidels and is
therefore no better than the foreign endorsed governments who attempted
to rule Afghanistan in the past.
Perhaps the Afghanis could learn from the oblast style of governance that
is currently used in Russia. There are local judicial, military, and economic
outposts in each oblast that report to the centralized oblast in Moscow.
However, each of the local leaders in the oblast comes from that community.
It is in this way that Russia has largely been able to weather the instability
of the post-Soviet collapse and continue to provide education and health
care for its people, as well as stability. As an observer, this much is clear,
Afghanistan cannot be allowed to descend into a Taliban-run safe haven for
terrorism again. It is this author’s sincerest desire that diplomacy and post-
World War II Marshall-style state assistance be given their fullest chance to
come to fruition and bring Afghanistan into the twenty-first century with
all the amenities that Afghanistan’s neighbors have and more of the stability
that the Afghan people deserve after almost two centuries at war.
Notes
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towards talks with Taliban.” The Guardian. July 19, 2010. http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/19/obama-afghanistan-strategy-taliban-negotiate
[accessed July 24, 2010].
4 Watt, Nicholas, “This is a war of necessity, David Cameron tells troops in
Afghanistan.” The Guardian. June 11, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/
politics/2010/jun/11/david-cameron-troops-afghanistan [accessed July 28, 2010].
5 Boone, Jon, “Taliban talks: the obstacles to a peace deal in Afghanistan.” July
19, 2010. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/19/taliban-talks-obstacles-
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December. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/world/nation-challenged-
leader-man-seizing-prophet-s-mantle-muhammad-omar.html [accessed June 10,
2010].
CHAPTER SIX
Candidate moves in the Levant:

An analysis of the region’s
geostrategic future using the
LAMP method
“Our primary assumption in our fight against Israel states that the
Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception, and built on lands
wrested from their owners, at the expense of the rights of the
Muslim people. Therefore our struggle will end only when this
entity is obliterated. We recognize no treaty with it, no cease fire,
and no peace agreements, whether separate or consolidated.”
“HEZBOLLAH PROGRAM,” 1988 (SHEIKH FADLALLAH?)
Author’s Note: This paper by Mr Nicholas Lusas was originally written as

his term paper requirement for my course in Analytic Methods at American
Military University. It has been edited to remove duplicative discussion of
the LAMP.
Introduction
The conflict between Israel and its neighbors has been one of the defining
conflicts of the last 70 years. The history of the state of Israel began inaus-
piciously in 1948 as the fledgling nation’s Arab neighbors declared war
and invaded on the very date of the nation’s formation. Since then, the
relationship between Israel and its neighbors has been contentious, and tens
of thousands have been killed in the wars that ensued after 1948.
The first stages of the conflict were carried out by nation-states. Nations
such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Morocco participated
in a series of wars in an attempt to destroy the Israeli government. These
wars against Israel proved disastrous for the Arab states, despite Soviet
sponsorship, superior numbers, and even tactical surprise in 1973. The war
in June 1967 resulted in Israel obtaining the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. It also marked the beginning
of a shift in the Arab strategy against the Jewish state.
The Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, in particular,
gave prominence to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, founded
in 1964 by the Arab League. Yasser Arafat’s chairmanship of the PLO
defined the movement as the chief non-state opposition to Israel, bolstered
by Arafat’s Fatah militia. As the PLO softened its stance vis-à-vis Israel in
the years preceding the Oslo Accords, other Palestinian groups emerged to
take on a more militant role against Israel, such as Gaza-based Hamas and
Islamic Jihad.
Fatah’s operations moved from Jordan to Lebanon during the 1970s.
The frequent attacks from Lebanon sparked an Israeli invasion in 1982, the
repercussions of which are still felt today. Fatah and the PLO were success-
fully driven out of southern Lebanon, but a host of new militias emerged,
the most significant of which is Hezbollah.
Hezbollah was founded in the years following the Israeli invasion with
the stated goal of driving Israel from Lebanon and establishing a stronger
Islamic voice within Lebanon ([Sheikh Fadlallah?] 1988, under “The
Necessity for the Destruction of Israel”). The Israeli government authorized
a partial withdrawal from Lebanon but maintained forces in a “security
zone” that spread out across southern Lebanon. The Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) found themselves constantly besieged by Hezbollah forces throughout
the duration of their deployment, and in 2000, Prime Minister Ehud Barak
authorized full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.
After Israeli withdrawal and UN certification, Hezbollah’s primary
raison d’être vanished. Israel had successfully been driven out of Lebanon.
It was at this time that a focus on “liberating Palestine” became a focus of
Hezbollah rhetoric against Israel, and Hezbollah continued to amass arms
for a future conflict with Israel (Wachter 2002, 2).
That conflict erupted in 2006 after a Hezbollah cross-border raid
resulted in the capture of two IDF soldiers. The Israeli response followed
quickly, and produced devastating effects on southern Lebanon, but the
33-day war against Hezbollah failed to recover the soldiers. Despite senti-
ments that Israel lost the war, Hezbollah suffered significant losses in both
manpower and goodwill among the Lebanese public. Extensive recovery
Candidate moves in the Levant 131
efforts revealed significant damage to the Lebanese infrastructure, for which

many Lebanese held Hezbollah responsible (Amnesty International 2006).
Hezbollah’s struggle against Israel and its allies has not been limited
to the battlefield. The FBI has named Hezbollah as the chief suspect in
the 1983 Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut that left 283 Marines dead
(Federal Bureau of Investigation 2005). The Argentine government has
accused Hezbollah of a series of bombings against Israeli and Jewish targets
in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 that left 114 dead (BBC News B 2006).
This conflict has a great deal of significance to the world at large.
Of Israel’s adversaries in the Arab world, only Hezbollah has both the
willingness and ability to fight Israel for a protracted length of time. The
conflict acts as perhaps the most destabilizing element in the Middle East,
owing to the high probability of renewed hostilities.
The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah drove gas and oil prices
up to record highs as speculators grew concerned that the conflict might
entice oil suppliers in the Arab world to crimp output in an attempt to
pressure the United States to reign in Israel (see Figure 6.1 below). The
conflict is disruptive to American efforts at rapprochement with Iran, who
uses Hezbollah as a means to expand its influence in the Middle East and
remains the group’s chief sponsor. Renewed conflict between Hezbollah and
Israel could further galvanize Arab opinion against Israel and the United
States, the latter of which is still perceived as the enabler of the former.
During the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, crude oil prices
rose to then-record highs and finally abated in the days following the end
of hostilities in August. Average prices for a gallon of unleaded gasoline
also reached highs that were just shy of the record high prices set in the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
72 Month avarage retail price chart

Crude oil Regular Gas
$US/barrel Price (US $/G)
146.39 8.72
134.15 7.99
121.91 7.26
Crude oil
109.67 6.53
USA Average
97.43 6.81
85.19 6.08
72.96 4.35
60.72 3.62
48.48 2.89
36.24 2.16
24.00 1.43
12/14
10/11
12/26
10/24
1/8
11/6
1/20
11/19
12/2
7/15
9/29
2/27
5/13
7/27
3/11
5/26
8/9
3/24
6/8
8/22
4/8
6/21
9/4
2/2
4/18
7/3
9/16
2/15
5/2
7/16
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Date (Month/Day)
FIGURE 6.1 72 month average retail price chart

The possibility of war between Hezbollah and Israel is of keen interest

to the global community, but Israel, the United States, and Lebanon in
particular. These three nations are more significantly impacted by the
prospects for another war than any other nation. Predicting possible
responses by these nations to Hezbollah’s actions serves as a capable
predictor of the actions that Hezbollah might take and should give an
indication of the designs that Hezbollah may have within Lebanon itself
after its March 8 Coalition failed to win a parliamentary majority during
the June 2009 election (Dickey 2009).
Literature review
There is a wealth of current information about Hezbollah and Israel’s
conflict, owing in large part to the dramatic nature of the 2006 conflict.
The vast majority of the English-language literature is written from the
perspective of Western authors, and Israelis in particular. Despite the
Western authorship, there is useful literature that addresses the conflict
from the Hezbollah perspective, which is no doubt a result of Hezbollah’s
extensive media efforts to legitimize its existence as a counterbalance to
Israel’s power in the Levant.
Literature that addresses the prospects for war between Israel and
Hezbollah is abundant, but out of date in some respects. Much of this
kind of literature was written in the aftermath of the assassination of
Imad Mugniyeh, with the prediction that his death might be the kind of
watershed event that would lead to imminent war between Hezbollah and
Israel. Despite Hezbollah threats for revenge, there have been no retaliatory
attacks. Rather, Hezbollah and Israel negotiated an exchange of prisoners
and bodies in 2008, apparently diffusing the pressure that had existed in the
aftermath of the Mugniyeh killing.
The amount of literature regarding Hezbollah’s relationship with the
Lebanese government is not as abundant as the literature addressing the
conflict with Israel. Hezbollah’s attempts to legitimize itself as a member of
the recognized Lebanese government are a relatively recent development,
the future of which is uncertain. This development is regarded as tertiary to
the group’s conflict with Israel and relationship with Iran, which explains
the relative paucity of literature on the topic.
The relationship between the United States and Hezbollah is scarcely
documented. The United States regards the group as a terror group and
has no official lines of communication open to them. While the United
States shares a history with Hezbollah because of the 1983 bombing, the
relationship between the two exists only through American influence on
Israeli decision-making regarding potential conflict with the group. The
United States has supported the March 14 Alliance, a political opponent of

Hezbollah.
Augustus Richard Norton (2007) takes perhaps one of the most compre-
hensive looks at Hezbollah. He argues that Hezbollah has become a fixture
in Lebanon, and that the future of the country is irrevocably connected
to the group. His extensively researched work chronicles the formation
of Hezbollah during the tumultuous Lebanese civil war in the 1980s, and
relates the developments within the group through the months following
the end of the 2006 war with Israel. A new afterword comments on the
events of early 2008, including the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh, the
May 2008 clashes between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government,
and the implications of the Doha Agreement. He uses primarily quali-
tative research methods including personal interviews with members of
Hezbollah, its supporters, and other key figures within Lebanon, which
is complimented by research from other scholarly sources. Norton states
that “the threat of a new war cannot be ignored, even if either Israel nor
Hezbollah seem particularly anxious for it to erupt” (Norton 2007, 172).
Norton’s work is remarkably balanced despite the Western origin of the
author, and his experience as a military observer in Lebanon and frequent
visitor to Lebanon, when combined with his extensive research, lend his
work a considerable amount of authority.
Paul Salem elucidates the situation in the weeks following the 2006 war
between Israel and Hezbollah. He argues that the probability for renewed
war is predicated on the extent of Lebanon’s recovery from the war in 2006.
Interestingly, he notes that this war ended with the signing of a diplomatic
resolution rather than simple military disengagement, which is a contrast to
the two previous Israeli actions in Lebanon. Salem addresses the perceptions
of regional players Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and also the United States.
In his analysis, he chooses to frame the 2006 war and prospects for future
hostilities through the lens of the destruction caused to Lebanon during a full-
scale invasion. In doing so, he is strongly implying that Lebanon’s recovery
from this destruction will play a significant role in the potential for new war
to erupt. Despite the extensive damage to Lebanon, Salem is optimistic in his
article that Lebanon will be able to overcome its predicament.
Antony T. Sullivan (2008) writes an article that aspires to provide
a picture of the geostrategic condition in the Levant. He argues that
Hezbollah is a key destabilizing factor in the region and that the group’s
rearmament bodes ill for prospects of peace in the future, stating that the
group has surpassed the capabilities it possessed during the 2006 war with
Israel (Sullivan 2008, 126). Sullivan argues that renewed hostilities between
Israel and Hezbollah will destabilize the Middle East, potentially to the
point where the war takes on wider, regional dimensions (Sullivan 2008,
132). Sullivan’s article is the result of research and interviews with “geostra-
tegic players inside and outside of Lebanon” (Sullivan 2008, 132).
Shmuel Bar (2007) focuses his analysis of the conflict on the role that
deterrence will play in the strategic decision-making of Israel and Hezbollah.
Bar asserts that the 2006 war erupted due to a failure, or negligence, by
Israel to effectively communicate the “rules of the game” (Bar 2007, 487).
He argues that Hezbollah received no signals that would have alerted them
to the fact that the scope of the July 12, 2006 raid was beyond that which
Israel would tolerate. He mentions Hassan Nasrallah’s now well-known
position that he would not have authorized the attack had he been aware
of the potential consequences. He argues that the 2006 war represented
an unusual level of escalation in the conflict and implies low probability
to the occurrence of another conflict on such a massive scale. Bar’s article
is the result of scholarly research and intuitive analysis, and provides a
perspective on the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah that is uncommon
in the existing literature on this topic.
Or Honig (2007) addresses the Israeli policy of deterrence. He gives
a brief history of the concept as developed by David Ben-Gurion, and
chronicles the changes in the doctrine as the Israeli defense establishment
learned from the experiences of decades of both large-scale conventional
war and low-intensity conflict. He divides the evolution of Israel’s deter-
rence doctrine into three distinct periods, which are demarcated by the
founding of the state of Israel, the signing of the Oslo Accords, and the
2006 war with Hezbollah. He argues that the Israeli policy of restraint
during the 1990s while pursuing a peace settlement with the Palestinians
ultimately failed. He characterizes the Israeli response that led to the 2006
war as a watershed moment, signifying a shift in Israeli strategy back
to the classic deterrence doctrine that exemplified Israeli military action
before the 1990s. He calls Hezbollah’s attack that precipitated the 2006
war a “miscalculation” by Nasrallah (Honig 2007, 70). Honig insists that
both Israel and the United States have lessons to learn from the “failure of
Western restraint on Hezbollah,” essentially endorsing strong responses by
Israel and the United States to Hezbollah’s provocations (Honig 2007, 71).
He recommends that Israel continue its policy of deterrence, but warns that,
If deterrence is to work, though, Israeli politicians must make a sustained

rather than episodic commitment to the doctrine. A disproportionate
response to terror should be the rule, not the exception. (Honig 2007,
71)
Honig’s article is unique among the majority of literature on this topic

because of its relatively unflinching advocacy of a strategic stance that is
likely to result in another large-scale conflict.
Much of the literature on this topic makes the rather grim prediction
that renewed hostilities are inevitable. Though much of the literature on
the topic makes general predictions of imminent war between Israel and
Hezbollah, predictions about how a new war would come about are scarce.
Moreover, predictions about exactly what a new war might look like and
the consequences of such a war are also very scarce. For this reason, this
analysis will focus on the potential causes for war and also seek to analyze
the consequences of the future decisions by Hezbollah, Israel, the United
States, and Lebanon. This type of analysis will require a methodology that
emphasizes the analysis of the decisions that these actors make and their
consequences for not only the future but also the decision-making process
of other actors.
This use of the LAMP to mitigate bias will affect the author’s choice of
terms when referring to past conflicts. One dynamic of the polarities that
exist within the Middle East is the frequent practice of both sides in using a
different name for a given conflict. For example, the war in 2006 between
Israel and Hezbollah is called by different names in Lebanon and Israel. In
Lebanon, this war is referred to as the “July War,” and in Israel it is called
the “Second Lebanon War.” Similar naming discrepancies occur when
referring to the Israeli–Arab wars in 1948, 1967, and 1973. In an effort to
demonstrate impartiality, these wars will simply be referred to by the year
in which the war occurred. For example, the war in 2006 will simply be
referred to as such or as “the 2006 war.” Fortunately, there are no cases
in this analysis during which there were two relevant wars in a given year.
However, the context of the war will be made apparent regardless of this
and all efforts have been made to ensure clarity while maintaining impar-
tiality in the terminology used in this analysis.
Actors and perceptions

While the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is of interest to the world
as a whole due to the wide repercussions of the conflict, there are four
actors that are most affected by the course the conflict may take in the
future. Hezbollah, Israel, the United States, and Lebanon are the actors
whose perceptions and decisions will directly affect the future of the
conflict. Studying and understanding the perceptions of each actor will
provide insight into how the prospects for war or peace affect them and
how their decision-making process is shaped by these perceptions and the
events that unfold.
Each actor’s perceptions will be analyzed through the lens of three
areas of consideration, which in this analysis are derived from each actor’s
political, economic, and security situation. Social considerations directly
affect the politics and security of each actor and the implications of social
sentiment will be addressed as it relates to those considerations. Including
social considerations as a separate element would provide little additional
utility to the study. The same applies to religious considerations, which are
obviously of immense importance in its own regard in the Middle East,
but merely an element, no matter how significant, in the wider political
and security considerations already outlined. Despite the intense media
and anecdotal focus on the religious background of the conflict, this study
has resisted the impulse to include these as individual considerations that
override or share equal an equal level of consideration with the more
pragmatic political, economic, and security considerations of each actor.
Hezbollah
The LAMP method specifically calls for national actors in its analysis.
Hezbollah presents an interesting dilemma in this regard because it is not
recognized by any organization as a national entity. However, Hezbollah
does possess many of the elements of a national actor. The group maintains
a standing military, with many times more that number of reserves available
for combat if required (Global Security A). The group has administrative
divisions that provide social programs, health facilities, and education
facilities for significant portions of the Lebanese population, particularly
in the southern part of the country. The group has also taken a proactive
posture in rebuilding parts of Lebanon devastated by the 2006 war with
Israel. In these regards, Hezbollah actually provides many services to the
people of Lebanon that the Lebanese government has difficulty providing,
including security in the southern and Bekaa Valley regions of Lebanon.
These characteristics have led observers in Israel and the United States to
call Hezbollah a “state within a state,” and serve to separate the group
from other groups that are merely military in nature, such as al-Qaeda, Abu
Sayyaf, and Islamic Jihad (Magouirk 2008, 358). It is for this reason that
Hezbollah represents a viable group for consideration as a national actor
for the purposes of the LAMP method.
Political situation
Despite Hezbollah’s perception as a military group first and foremost,
the group has struggled to attain and maintain political legitimacy within
Lebanon. The group first participated in Lebanese elections in 1992,
winning 12 seats out of 128 in the parliament (Norton 2007, 101).
Hezbollah has participated in each election since and currently holds 12
seats within the parliament following the June 2009 elections, having lost
two seats since the 2005 elections.
Despite the relatively low percentage of seats within the parliament,
Hezbollah is a very powerful group in Lebanese politics. This is partly
a result of the group’s military power and because the group enjoys
popularity that transcends the traditional sectarian divides in Lebanon. The
group’s participation in the Lebanese political process has not precipitated a
move to disarm its militia as the rival Amal movement has done. Hezbollah
regards itself as the defender of Lebanon against Israel, and has used this
pretense to maintain its vast arsenal of weapons.
Hezbollah is a leading member of the March 8 Coalition, which is
the antagonist to the Western-leaning March 14 Alliance. The March 8
Coalition was formed during the Cedar Revolution to counteract the rising
anti-Syrian sentiment in Lebanon following the assassination of outspoken
Syrian critic Rafik Hariri. The Coalition supports greater Syrian influence in
Lebanon, and despite winning the popular vote in Lebanon, did not obtain
a majority in the Lebanese parliament in the June 2009 elections. This
development has been perceived as a victory for the March 14 Alliance in
Western circles, but the results support the idea that popular sentiment in
Lebanon resides with Hezbollah and the March 8 Coalition.
Hezbollah was founded with aid from Iran, and retains strong connec-
tions to Tehran. The group’s initial membership trained under Iranian
auspices (Nasr 2007, 115). The Hezbollah chain of command recognizes
the Supreme Leader of Iran as the ultimate leader of the group, though
the Lebanon-based Shura oversees the group’s day-to-day activities. Few
decisions are actually made or approved by the Iranian Supreme Leader
and these are generally limited to military decisions regarding Hezbollah
engagement with Israel (Hamzeh 1993). Iran supplies Hezbollah with
financial and military support in the form of advanced weaponry.
Hezbollah maintains strong ties to Syria, a relationship that dates to
the days of heavy Syrian influence in Lebanon during the 1980s. Since the
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, the balance of power in the
relationship has tipped in favor of Hezbollah. This development stems in
part from Syria’s inability to directly affect Lebanese affairs as effectively as
it had in the past. The close relationship between Damascus and Hezbollah
allows the former to wield greater influence in Lebanon through the
increasing power of the latter. Hezbollah’s upper hand in the relationship
stems perhaps more poignantly from the insecurity of Bashar al-Assad,
whose hold on power is more tenuous than that of his late father, Hafez.
His support of Hezbollah enables him to retain legitimacy as the ruler of
Syria through the perception that he is supporting Islamist causes (Bar
2007, 471).
Hezbollah’s status as a Shia party with a well-known connection to
Iran and Syria has not stymied the group’s popularity with other religious
groups in Lebanon, the Christians and Druze in particular. This is the result
of the group’s more inclusive outlook that mirrors that of Khomeini rather
closely, but is also the result of a pragmatic approach by the group that
reflects the reality of Lebanese pluralism (Nasr 2007, 137). The group’s
steadfast devotion to protecting Lebanese territorial integrity in the face of

Israeli occupation before 2000, and invasion in 2006, has endeared them
to a significant and growing portion of the Lebanese population.
Economic situation
Hezbollah receives the lion’s share of its funding from Iran. The develop-
ments in Iran following the June 2009 elections could threaten the flow of
money and military support, particularly if the developments in Iran lead
to the eventual overthrow of the Islamic regime. Despite Tehran’s success
in quelling the protests in the streets, popular sentiment appears to have
irrevocably turned against the regime in a scene reminiscent of the months
preceding the overthrow of the Shah. However, despite these developments,
the flow of aid from Iran to Hezbollah remains steady as of July 2009.
Hezbollah has invested the aid in diverse ways, such as in social
programs and health facilities for Lebanese citizens who would otherwise
not have access to the level of care that Hezbollah’s facilities provide. The
group followed through on its promise after the 2006 war to take on a
lion’s share of the financial burden for the rebuilding and recovery process
(Siegel and Watson 2006).
The greatest threat to Hezbollah’s economic position would be a cut-off
in the flow of aid from Iran. While this development is not currently in the
offing, growing revolutionary sentiment in Iran poses a significant threat to
Hezbollah’s economic interest. While donations from wealthy sympathizers
in the Muslim world can fill some of the gap that would be left without
Iranian funding, it is likely to fall far short of meeting Hezbollah’s needs for
retention of its growing social responsibilities and military expansion.
Security situation
The most visible aspect of Hezbollah to observers outside Lebanon is its
military wing, Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or “The Islamic Resistance.”
The name of the military underscores its raison d’être. The group’s founding
purpose and continued mission is to confront and defeat the nation of Israel
in a bid to “liberate Palestine” in accordance with its mission statement
released in 1988 ([Sheikh Fadlallah?] “The Necessity for the Destruction
of Israel” ).
To this end, Hezbollah has obtained a significant arsenal of weapons. The
group allegedly maintains an arsenal of rockets, including tens of thousands
of Katyusha rockets, as well as Iranian mid- and long-range missiles such
as the Fajr-3 and Zelzal missiles, the latter of which are capable of striking
deep into Israeli territory, including urban centers such as Tel Aviv (Rao
2006). The group has significant anti-tank capabilities, possessing anti-tank
weaponry such as the AT-3 Sagger and Kornet anti-tank rockets, which
performed relatively well against the state-of-the-art Merkava IV (MkIV)
Israeli Main Battle Tank (MBT) during the 2006 war (Stratfor 2006).
Hezbollah relies on a strategy of mutual deterrence with Israel. Israel’s
immense military power and ability to deliver a punishing blow to Lebanon
represents the chief method of deterrence for Israel. Hezbollah’s deterrence
resides primarily in its ability to threaten Israeli population centers with
its vast rocket arsenal. This strategy proved dramatically successful during
the 2006 war, as Hezbollah’s rocket barrage against Israel effectively shut
down the northern third of the country throughout the duration of the
33-day conflict. Hezbollah’s other avenue for deterrence lies in the group’s
threats to carry out terror attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets around
the world. The successful bombing of Jewish targets in Argentina in 1992
and 1994 enhances these threats and provides the locus for this kind of
deterrence.
Hezbollah’s military strategy against Israel is best determined by the
actions the group has taken in the past to successfully engage Israel. The
theory is that the group would again use the methods that have proven
successful until the IDF can demonstrate the ability to defeat these
measures. Hezbollah’s engagement of Israeli forces in the years preceding
the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 and in 2006 provides the greatest insight into
the group’s methods for conducting future wars against Israel.
Hezbollah retains a two-tiered strategy for engaging Israel. One tier of
the strategy is applied to fighting within Lebanon, and the other is applied
to Hezbollah’s media strategy. The strategy for engaging IDF forces within
Lebanon appears to focus on drawing IDF soldiers into urban areas where
the potential for IDF casualties increases dramatically. Urban areas further
provide Hezbollah with an opportunity to kidnap IDF soldiers to use
as bargaining chips in prisoner exchanges not unlike the exchange that
occurred in 2008. As IDF casualties mount, the hope is that the war would
become less popular among the Israeli public who would demand a quick
end to the conflict.
The media strategy against Israel during a war is controversial and hotly
disputed. This is a topic with ample possibility to introduce bias. Despite
this, there are strong indications that Hezbollah’s strategy is to pursue a
media strategy in an attempt to turn global opinion against Israeli action
and put pressure on Israel to abandon its assault on Hezbollah. The strategy
involves placing fighters and targets in urban areas in an effort to either
deter Israeli engagement or invite Israeli fire that might inadvertently result
in civilian casualties, producing a media victory for Hezbollah by way of
Israeli culpability in the death of innocent civilians. While this strategy
appears to have been successful in turning global sentiment against Israel,
there is potential that such a strategy could backfire on Hezbollah if incon-
trovertible proof of the group’s intentions were to come to light. Israel’s
often-ineffective attempts to defend its actions have yet to mitigate the

effectiveness of this strategy.
Hezbollah does not have illusions that its military power can surpass or
even match that of Israel. Instead, the group operates on the premise that
it has sufficient military power to suppress Israel’s appetite for a protracted
war in such a way as to make Israeli action against Hezbollah unlikely
(Bar 2007, 471). The group’s steadfast refusal to disarm stems from the
perception that only with a well-armed militia in southern Lebanon can the
nation hope to retain its territorial integrity against the powerful IDF.
Israel
Israel is an obvious choice for inclusion in this analysis. Israel is Hezbollah’s
primary adversary, and Hezbollah represents a significant strategic threat
to Israel. The nation’s very existence provides Hezbollah with the grounds
for the maintenance of its military wing. Israel and Hezbollah have fought
each other for more than 15 years in a low-intensity combat situation until
the IDF withdrawal from Israel’s self-described Security Zone in southern
Lebanon in 2000. The war in 2006 with Hezbollah represents one of the
largest Israeli military operations in the last 25 years. No predictive analysis
of Hezbollah’s decision-making process would be considered valid without
a study of Israel’s perceptions and reactions to Hezbollah’s strategic and
tactical maneuvers.
Political situation
Israel’s political leadership has undergone significant change over the
last ten years as Israelis struggle to find the appropriate response to the
changing security situation in the country. The optimistic attitudes that
prevailed in the 1990s as the nation seemingly moved toward a peaceful
coexistence with its Palestinian neighbors was shattered in 2000 after the
Camp David summit ended with no agreement and triggered the second
Palestinian Intifada.
The political fallout from this development was the marginalization
of the Labor party, which had advocated a dovish approach toward the
Palestinians, in favor of the right-leaning and more hawkish Likud party.
In the 2009 general elections, the Labor party finished fourth among all
parties, while the right-wing Likud and Yisrael Beitenu parties achieved
significant gains in the Knesset (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009).
Israeli commentator Gil Troy attributes this shift in attitude to growing
Israeli cynicism regarding Palestinian and Hezbollah provocations, which
instead of softening Israeli resolve have had the reverse effect, pushing
Israelis toward the right (Troy 2009).
The 2006 war with Lebanon had profound effects on the political
make-up of the Israeli leadership, which at the time was dominated by
the center-right Kadima party. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who enjoyed
support for his decision to go to war, achieved anemic approval ratings that
hovered near 3 percent in the months following the war (Time 2007). The
Winograd Report, which provided a critique of the Israeli leadership during
the war, placed the blame for the war’s shortcomings on the shoulders of
Olmert, IDF Chief of Staff General Dan Halutz, and Defense Minister Amir
Peretz (Haaretz 2007). All found their political careers utterly derelict.
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni attempted to distance herself from the other
maligned members of the government, with limited success. Her run for
Prime Minister in 2009 fell short, narrowly losing to Likud candidate and
former Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. Her association with the
2006 war and the Kadima party undermined her defense credentials at a
time when Israel was looking for a solution to the many threats to Israel’s
security. The voting pattern of the 2009 election appears to indicate that the
Israeli populace would support a harder line on the Israeli security posture.
Israel has official relations with only two Arab nations: Jordan and
Egypt. Even the relationship between Israel and these two nations have
proved tumultuous at times, and neither head of state has visited Israel.
Some Arab nations have maintained communications with Israel on
unofficial channels, but normalization of relations between Israel and the
Arab world has not yet occurred.
Israel’s relationship with the European Union is cordial but, at times,
contentious. France and Spain are frequent critics of Israeli policy, while
nations such as Germany and Great Britain are not nearly as critical of
Israel. The concerns of European nations stem chiefly from perceptions that
Israel employs “disproportionate response” when responding to Palestinian
or Hezbollah provocations. The European Union firmly objects to the
Israeli blockade of Gaza, and the issue has become a stumbling block to
warmer relations between the two.
Israel’s chief allies are the United States and India. Of these two, Israel
has enjoyed a fuller and more fruitful relationship with the United States,
who has supplied aid, military supplies, and moral support at a higher
level than any other nation since the war in June 1967. Despite these close
relations, Israeli perceptions of the alliance with the United States have
grown pessimistic during the first months of the administration of President
Barack Obama. Contention centers on growing American insistence that
Israel abandon further construction of settlements in the West Bank.
The Israeli perception is that the United States is demanding that Israel
take more steps toward peace than it is willing to ask of the Palestinians.
Obama’s trip to the Middle East involved a keynote speech in Cairo but no
visit to Israel, which has annoyed and disturbed Israeli observers. Members
of the Likud party called on members of their party to boycott a traditional
July 4 celebration in Jerusalem as a show of frustration with American

policy.
Israel’s relationship with India existed only in an informal capacity until
1992. Since then, Israel has surpassed Russia as the chief arms supplier to
India, and the two nations have cooperated on a joint space program (BBC
News C 2008). India and Israel share a common enemy in the Islamist
threat, and have cooperated on counter-terror training and the sharing of
intelligence (India Defence 2008). The relationship between the two nations
should continue to solidify in the future, particularly if Israeli perceptions
regarding the alliance with the United States continue to sour.
Economic situation
Israel’s economy is strongly tied to the Western markets and has suffered as
a result of the global recession. Israel’s tourism industry, a key pillar of the
Israeli economy, has suffered since the start of the second Intifada in 2000
and has never fully recovered. The 2006 war with Hezbollah only exacer-
bated concerns that tourists could be trapped in a dangerous situation in
what is perceived as a volatile region.
As of the summer 2009, Israel remains embroiled in a water crisis due
to a severe drought. Desalination plants along the Mediterranean now
account for 15 percent of Israel’s drinking water production and this
number is expected to increase as the water levels decrease in the Sea of
Galilee (Mizroch 2008). The population of Israel is projected to increase
due to both immigration and the growing Arab population, compounding
the problem for the foreseeable future. The water crisis underscores the
Israeli presence on the Golan Heights, which prevents Syria from damming
off the run-off from Mount Hermon, which supplies the water for the Sea of
Galilee (Eshel 2008). As long as the water crisis remains a priority in Israel,
the country is unlikely to consider any peace deal with Syria that includes
the hand-over of the disputed territory.
Israel receives financial aid from the United States. The aid amount is
significant and constitutes 3 percent of the Israeli GDP (Feith 2003). During
his first term as Prime Minister during the late 1990s, Netanyahu attempted
to push through legislation to reduce the American contribution and
steadily phase it out (Feith 2003). However, this initiative did not survive
his term as Prime Minister, and Olmert actually pushed for increased aid
during his term as Prime Minister (Reuters UK 2007). Approximately
$2 billion of the American aid to Israel is earmarked for expenditure on
weapons manufactured within the United States (Feith 2003).
Israel still retains its reputation as a high-tech center. Israeli economic
connections with the United States have been further strengthened by
Israeli–American cooperation on high-tech projects in the computer science
field and medical profession in particular. Israeli exports of high-tech

equipment and knowledge are a significant boon to the Israeli economy.
Israeli dependence on foreign oil remains high, but the nation is taking
steps to curb its dependence on foreign energy. Renault and Nissan have
partnered a project to introduce an all-electric-powered car into the Israeli
market by 2010. The plan calls for the introduction of the vehicle as well
as infrastructure to make the vehicle viable for widespread use throughout
the country, including battery depots and charging stations at various
locations throughout Israel. The project’s development is in the interme-
diate stages (Nissan 2008). If Israel is able to implement this vision, it will
lend the nation considerably more flexibility in its decision-making process
on matters of national security.
Security situation
Israel possesses the most powerful indigenous military in the Middle East.
The military has held the reputation of invincibility when facing conven-
tional Arab armies due, in large part, to Israel’s stunning victory over
several Arab armies in 1967. Arab attempts to surprise Israel in 1973
achieved small gains that were later mitigated by the IDF counter-offensive.
The IDF possesses state-of-the-art equipment, the majority of which is
either indigenous or comes from the United States. The Israel Air Force
(IAF) consists primarily of United States-produced aircraft augmented with
Israeli targeting and navigation systems (Global Security B). IAF pilots are
highly regarded internationally and enjoy the perception of invincibility,
a perception that also has roots in the 1967 war. IAF pilots are widely
regarded as being among the best in the world.
The IDF armored corps largely consists of indigenous tanks or retro-fitted
tanks that were captured in previous wars with Soviet-sponsored Arab states.
The current Israeli MBT is the MkIV, an indigenous design that emphasizes
crew survivability in the event that the tank is hit by rocket fire (Hughes
2006). The performance of the MkIV in 2006 was generally good despite
some stiff Hezbollah resistance, with a few MkIV tanks lost to Hezbollah
rocket fire. In a country that cannot tolerate excessive attrition, the surviv-
ability of the MkIV provides commanders, soldiers, and the Israeli public
with assurance that casualties will be further decreased in future designs.
Israel possesses extensive collections capability through its airborne and
satellite reconnaissance programs. This capability affords IDF commanders
the capability of being able to spot enemy positions and accurately allocate
IDF resources on the battlefield. This collections capability affords IAF
planners the ability to plan out air missions and campaign strategy well in
advance of the actual renewal of hostilities, permitting the IAF to spring
into action quickly. The IAF demonstrated this ability in the early hours of
the 2006 war, hitting key targets in Lebanon within hours of the Hezbollah
ambush on and kidnapping of IDF soldiers.
Despite the IDF’s extensive capabilities, the military has not found a
satisfactory way to address indiscriminate rocket fire. Hezbollah fired
rockets indiscriminately into Israel during each day of the 33-day conflict,
inflicting minimal damage, but having a tremendous psychological impact
on Israeli residents in the northern part of the country. Hamas has made
use of indigenously produced Qassam rockets to achieve the same affect on
Israeli towns near Gaza, particularly Sderot. The IDF’s inability to halt the
rocket fire coming from either group has unnerved the Israeli public and
provides both Hezbollah and Hamas with a way of attacking Israel that is
effective and inexpensive.
The rocket fire notwithstanding, the IDF performance in the 2006
war against Hezbollah was lackluster. While Israel formed the Winograd
Commission to investigate the war, Hezbollah claimed to have shattered
the myth of IDF invincibility through its self-described “divine victory”
(MSNBC 2006). The psychological impact of this development has had a
lasting effect on the Israeli public, though the generally solid performance
of the IDF in the war against Hamas in December 2008 and January 2009
mitigated many concerns about the IDF’s fighting capability. Though the
IDF suffered a blow to its reputation, the Israeli public remains confident
that the IDF has been able to correct its shortcomings. The election of
Netanyahu, who would ostensibly be more apt to put the IDF into action,
underscores the renewed confidence that the Israeli public places in the IDF.
Israel’s intelligence establishment has a reputation for excellence in both
its collections and operations capabilities. While there is debate on the
true nature of Israel’s intelligence capabilities, the counter-terror record
is generally good. Recently, Azerbaijani intelligence helped uncover a
Hezbollah plot to carry out a terror attack against a Jewish target in Baku,
Azerbaijan (Trend News). The 2007 operation to destroy an alleged Syrian
nuclear facility surprised many observers and is regarded as a success for
Israeli intelligence and special forces (Sanger and Mazzetti 2007). Hezbollah
has attributed the assassination of its commander Imad Mugniyeh to the
Israeli intelligence agency Mossad. Despite the fact that Mossad has not
claimed responsibility for the killing, the perception that Israeli intelligence is
capable of carrying out such an operation demonstrates the confidence that
both Israel and its adversaries place in the capabilities of Israeli intelligence.
Israel depends on a policy of strategic deterrence. David Ben-Gurion,
who believed that Israel could not survive a war of attrition on its own
soil, formulated this strategy in the days following the first Israeli–Arab
war in 1948. He postulated that the best way to prevent a constant barrage
of Arab assaults was to retaliate for attacks in such a way as to discourage
further assaults against the Jewish state (Honig 2007, 63). To implement
this strategy, the IDF has relied on a policy of disproportionate response to
Arab attacks and provocations in an effort to reduce their likelihood in the

future. Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity adds another dimension to its
deterrence posture.
Israel’s strategic deterrence doctrine has enjoyed a degree of success.
The 2006 war’s affect on Israeli deterrence is difficult to determine. While
the IDF’s performance in the war was lacking, the scope of the Israeli
response surprised Hezbollah, and the group’s Secretary General, Hassan
Nasrallah, commented that had he foreseen the response, he would not have
authorized the attack that triggered the war (Naharnet 2006). Hezbollah’s
disinclination to attack IDF forces in the first three years after the end of
hostilities, coupled with the IDF’s show of force in Gaza in January 2009,
indicate that Israel enjoys a at least a modicum of strategic deterrence.
United States
The United States has retained a keen interest in the Middle East and Israel
in particular since the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. The Soviet Union’s support
for Arab governments during the 1960s compelled the United States to
support Israel, as the lone democracy in the region. Since the 1960s, Israel
has been the United States’ chief ally in the region, and American influence
on the Israeli decision-making process has been significant, even if not
always consistent.
The United States and Hezbollah have a limited but bloody history. The
1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, blamed on Hezbollah,
spurred the departure of American forces from Lebanon. Hezbollah
occupies a spot on the American list of terror groups, chiefly as a result of
the 1983 bombing and 1994 bombings of Jewish targets in Argentina.
American perceptions of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah are
significant. Because the United States designates Hezbollah as a terror group
and enjoys a strong alliance with Israel, the United States naturally supports
Israeli efforts to combat Hezbollah, but traditionally stops short of taking
part in the action itself. Whether or not the United States supports Israeli
action or is of the opinion that Hezbollah’s actions warrant a response
plays a large role in whether or not Israel will go to war with Hezbollah.
Hezbollah is likely to consider heavily the effect that their provocations and
attacks have on American opinion, and are likely to carefully toe the line
that determines American calls for restraint versus American endorsement
of Israeli action.
Economic situation
As of the summer of 2009, the United States is enduring the worst economic
crisis in the nation’s history since the Great Depression. Unemployment
numbers in July 2009 indicate that the recession is likely to continue for
a lengthy amount of time. The American government has approved two
separate stimulus packages since the start of the economic collapse in
September 2008, with a total investment of over $1 trillion (Recovery.
gov). The success of these measures is still unclear, but there is justifiable
concern that if these stimulus packages fail to jumpstart the economy, then
the American economy could fall farther into recession, perhaps sparking a
prolonged economic depression.
Exacerbating concerns about the economy are the unstable oil prices.
Since reaching a high of $147 a barrel in July 2008, oil prices tumbled to
lows of $33 a barrel in December 2008. However, between December and
July 2009, oil prices have jumped back up to over $60 a barrel (see Figure
6.1 above). Instability in Iran failed to push prices higher, but a new war in
the Middle East may put irresistible upward pressure on oil prices, which
could further cripple the American economy and crimp any attempt at
economic recovery.
The United States has spent billions of dollars on wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and while there is a planned withdrawal from Iraq, American
government investment in that country will probably continue. As the war
in Afghanistan intensifies, the financial burden of conducting the war in
Iraq may simply shift to Afghanistan rather than abate. As the American
economy continues to decline, economic concerns are likely to weigh ever
more heavily on American foreign policy decisions.
Political situation
The American political scene has undergone significant changes in the last
six years. Republican gains in the House and Senate in the 2002 mid-term
elections have been reversed by the 2006 mid-term and 2008 general
elections. The Democratic party enjoys a “filibuster-proof” majority in the
Senate and a significant majority in Congress, and also control of the White
House with the victory of Obama over Republican opponent John McCain
in the presidential election.
Obama set out his Middle East policy, which entails an emphasis on recon-
ciliation with the Muslim world, whose perception of the United States has
soured because of the Iraqi invasion and stalwart support for Israel. Naturally,
Obama’s overtures to the Muslim world have alienated the nation’s Israeli
allies, and Obama has had to find a way to strike a balance of reconciliation
with the Muslim world and ensuring that Israel’s security needs are under-
stood and met. Arab states and Muslims in general responded positively to
Obama’s speech in Cairo on June 4, 2009 (Asharq Alawsat 2009).
The American alliance with Israel, recent Israeli cynicism notwith-
standing, has been strong for over 40 years. The United States and Israel
share not only a common enemy in violent Islamism, but more impor-
tantly a shared democratic vision and tradition. In response to Israeli
criticism that the United States is favoring Palestinian demands, Obama has
reiterated that the United States takes interest in the security and well-being
of Israel. Despite the small shift in American policy toward Israel, American
perceptions of the Israeli–Arab conflict will continue to be shaped by what
Israel and the United States have in common. In the event of a threat to
Israeli security, Vice President Joe Biden has expressed the opinion that
Israel has the “sovereign right” to act in the best interests of its national
security, indicating at least tacit American support for a more assertive
Israeli strategic posture, particularly with regard to Iran (Benhorin 2009).
The United States’ strong support for Israel has enabled it to act as a
mediator in the Middle East peace process. Though the United States is
perceived across the Muslim world as having a strong bias toward Israel,
the Palestinians recognize that the United States also has an interest in
catering to its Arab allies and the ability to strongly influence Israeli
decision-making to this end. As a result, the United States has taken the lead
in trying to push for a settlement in the conflict between the Israelis and
Arabs. Despite sometimes intense effort from the United States, peace has
remained elusive, and doubts have emerged about the United States’ ability
to broker agreements in the Middle East.
Obama had indicated willingness to begin a process of rapprochement
with Iran during the presidential campaign, and Iran may feel compelled
to take advantage of the softer line from the United States and encourage
Hezbollah to take a more aggressive stance against Israel, especially if it might
deflect attention away from Iran’s continuing nuclear program. However,
prospects for rapprochement with Iran dimmed in the aftermath of Iran’s
controversial June 12 elections, during which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won
by an apparent two-to-one margin over reformist candidate Mir Hussein
Mousavi (Al-Jazeera 2009). The regime’s brutal suppression of post-
election protests and accusations of American interference sparked a war
of words between Obama and Ahmadinejad (Kreiger and Amidi 2009).
The perception that Obama is a dove is not necessarily accurate. During
the presidential campaign, he expressed a willingness to take the fight
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban into Pakistan if necessary, and American
missile attacks on Pakistani territory in early 2009 confirmed his position
(Mazzetti and Sanger 2009). While Obama is willing to withdraw from
Iraq, he appears, at the same time, rather willing to use force to ensure the
national security and interests of the United States.
Despite the many concerns that the United States has in its foreign
policy, the economy has captured the focus of the American public and its
government. This development was a crucial factor in pushing the American
vote away from Republican candidates, who are perceived as possessing
stronger national security priorities. The Obama administration has passed
a stimulus package, but worries that the administration is faltering in its

handling of the economy have driven Obama’s approval ratings below 60
percent according to a Gallup poll (Gallup 2009).
Security situation
As of July 2009, the United States is entangled in two wars, in Iraq and
Afghanistan. While the United States military is in the midst of a phased
withdrawal from Iraq, those resources may be allocated to the intensifying
conflict in Afghanistan with a resurgent Taliban. The ability of the United
States to withdraw from Iraq on a timely basis and confront the Taliban
will determine the degree to which American forces are free to pursue action
elsewhere to further the national security and interests of the United States.
The conflict in Afghanistan has spilled into Pakistan, and Obama has
made clear that Afghanistan must be a priority for allocation of the military
(Cooper and Schmitt 2009). The American national security interest in
the conflict with the Taliban is a result of the possibility that a Taliban
take-over in Pakistan will result in nuclear weapons falling into the hands of
an Islamist faction. The revival of al-Qaeda in the region is another major
concern for the United States, amid fears that the revitalized group may
attempt another attack on the continental United States, possibly with the
use of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD). For this reason, this conflict
will likely be considered a priority over any other conflict until the threat
to American national security is mitigated.
The United States possesses a military that is capable of meeting a variety
of challenges. The American military remains the most potent in the world
and is capable of quick deployment due, in large part, to the ability of
naval carrier groups to move quickly to trouble spots around the world.
The United States possesses many options to have military forces ready to
respond to a Middle East crisis between Israel and Hezbollah, if necessary.
The intelligence collection capabilities of the United States are unsur-
passed. This affords American strategists the ability to detect indicators of
enemy action quickly and either take appropriate action or alert allies to
these developments as needed. American collection capabilities, image intel-
ligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) in particular, provide
the United States with the ability to logistically support any military action
undertaken by an ally in a manner that is both significant and deniable. In
the Middle East, such a capability is extremely useful if the United States
wanted to aid Israel without utterly destroying its credibility as a mediator
of negotiations.
Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States has shifted many of its
intelligence assets toward countering the terror threat to the country. The
continued American pursuit of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda underscores
the American focus on mitigating the terror threat. Though Hezbollah has
yet to attack American targets on American soil, the 1983 Marine barracks
bombing remains etched in the minds of Americans. Any Hezbollah attack
that directly affects Americans or American interests is sure to draw some
kind of response from Washington.
The United States would certainly have doubts about committing to
another military operation while still deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
sheer costs of those operations make the opening of another war prohibitive,
if not politically suicidal, in the current economic climate. As the Iraqi
withdrawal draws toward completion, and if the military can make headway
against the Taliban in Afghanistan, American options for engagement open
up significantly. However, given the amount of war fatigue among the
American public, it would likely have to take a direct attack against the
United States or American interest to draw American into a full-scale attack
against Hezbollah. Despite this, the United States may be enticed to assist
Israel on some logistical level in the event of renewed hostilities, especially if
there is an indication that Iran ordered Hezbollah to initiate hostilities.
Lebanon
Lebanon will host any new conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. The nation
certainly warrants analysis for this predictive study. However, Lebanon, as
defined by this study, is not necessarily limited to within the borders of the
state, or the entirety of the government, but rather the ruling coalition of the
government, the March 14 Alliance and other parties that are not aligned
with Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a member of the Lebanese government and, as
such, would ostensibly be part of any analysis of the Lebanese government
as a whole. Despite their presence in the government, Hezbollah does not act
in concert with, or even with the tacit approval of, the Lebanese government.
The decision-making processes of the two groups differ widely and each
answer to a considerably different constituency, with Hezbollah answering
primarily to Shias and Iran, and the government to a wide cross-section of
Lebanese society as a whole. Simply analyzing the March 14 Alliance alone
is not sufficient for the study, because the decision-making process of the
government vis-à-vis Hezbollah also involve parties not aligned with the
Alliance. For the purposes of this study, Lebanon includes the parts of the
Lebanese government that include the March 14 Alliance, parties that are
non-aligned with the March 8 Coalition, and the Lebanese public as a whole.
This group is a valid choice for this analysis because their perceptions
and decisions will have a profound impact on Hezbollah’s decision-making.
Though Hezbollah is arguably the most powerful party within Lebanon,
the group cannot ignore the aggregate voice and will of the various cross-
sections of Lebanese society and aspire to retain wide support. Hezbollah
demonstrated their consideration for the wider Lebanese opinion in the

weeks and months following the 2006 war by implementing an intense
media campaign promoting their case for retaining arms and promoting
their promise to aid in the rebuilding and recovery efforts in the country.
Lebanon plays a significant part in Hezbollah’s decision-making process
and is certainly worth studying and understanding for this analysis.
Economic situation
Lebanon’s economy has faced significant obstacles in recent years. After a
steady recovery following the end of the civil war in 1990, the Lebanese
economy was dealt a severe blow by the 2006 war between Israel and
Hezbollah. The IAF followed through on Halutz’s promise to set Lebanon
back 20 years through an extensive bombing campaign that targeted key
parts of the Lebanese infrastructure (BBC News A 2006). The economy
has yet to fully recover from the devastation of the war, due to the slow
timetable and high cost of recovery and rebuilding, despite Hezbollah’s
efforts to foot some of the bill.
Lebanon is considered a significant financial center in the Middle East
even with the recent turmoil within the country. However, yet another war
between Hezbollah and Israel could prove very devastating to Lebanon’s
recovery efforts, and the Lebanese government has tried to take steps to
ensure that it is complying with UN Resolution 1701 with as much vigor
as the government can politically afford. The fragile state of the Lebanese
economy has made avoidance of a new war between Hezbollah and Israel
a key goal for the Lebanese government. The degree to which the Lebanese
government can influence Hezbollah is not significant, except through
appealing to the Lebanese people about the dangers of a new war to the
state of the national economy.
Political situation
Lebanon is governed according to the provisions of the Taif Agreement.
The Taif Agreement is the result of a compromise following the civil war
between Lebanon’s major religious groups—the Christians, Sunni Muslims,
and Shia Muslims—which divided government authority in a way that
was more proportional to the size of each group. However, representation
in government is still retain based on a census taken in 1932 (United
Nations 2006). No census has been taken in the intervening years, amid
Christian fears that they will lose the high percentage of the share in power
that they currently enjoy. The CIA estimates that the Shias are the largest
faith group in Lebanon (Central Intelligence Agency). Hezbollah and the
Amal movement have been pushing for Shia power in proportion to their
population, but have faced significant opposition in Beirut.
From 1975 through 2005, Syrian troops and intelligence officers were
a significant presence in Lebanon, and significantly influenced Lebanese
politics. Lebanese resentment over Syrian interference grew until, after
Hariri’s assassination, it reached fever pitch. The killing was blamed on
Syria, who maintained innocence. Nevertheless, Lebanese citizens turned
out for massive protests that resulted in the Syrian government deciding
to pull its troops and intelligence agents out of Lebanon in 2005. This
watershed event is now known as the Cedar Revolution, and the political
bloc that formed from this event is known as the March 14 Alliance, a
reference to the date of the protest.
Though Syria pulled out of Lebanon in 2005, accusations of Syrian inter-
ference in Lebanon continued. The 2007 assassination of Pierre Gemayel
was widely attributed to Syria or Syrian-aligned elements in Lebanon. The
March 8 Coalition formed in opposition to the March 14 Alliance, and
supported a greater role for Syria within Lebanon. Hezbollah is a leading
member of this Coalition.
Lebanon recently enjoyed the second general elections held since the
Syrian withdrawal from the country. Despite losing the popular vote to
the March 8 Coalition, the Western-leaning March 14 Alliance obtained a
majority of seats in the parliament, which has been perceived as a victory
among their supporters within Lebanon and in Western circles. However,
the victory rings hollow as the March 8 Coalition proved that it has wide
support from the Lebanese public, giving Hezbollah greater leverage
against the Lebanese government.
Politically, the Lebanese government has a legal advantage over
Hezbollah. This is not altogether insignificant, since Hezbollah has demon-
strated willingness to work within the Lebanese legal framework to
achieve its goals. However, Hezbollah wields the power that comes with
the support of the Lebanese public. The March 14 Alliance can claim
the majority of seats in parliament, but cannot claim a mandate from the
Lebanese people. The Lebanese government has limited political options
to reign in Hezbollah in the event that the government feels threatened by
Hezbollah’s provocative behavior toward Israel.
Security situation
The Lebanese army is notoriously anemic. It still suffers from internal
division along sectarian lines, and an attempt by the government to
use the army to quell a Lebanese militia could cause a great deal
of dissension among the ranks of soldiers in the military. Without
a mandate, or even unity within its own ranks, the Lebanese armed
forces lack the political capacity to maintain peace among the various
Lebanese militias.
Compounding the problem presented by sectarian divide is the paucity

of modern military equipment. The Lebanese military lacks an effective air
force, relying on helicopters to provide limited support for its ground forces
(Lebanese Air Force). The Lebanese navy is also ineffective, with limited
equipment and training. Lebanese armor is limited to second-generation
MBTs such as the M60 Patton (Defense News 2008). Lebanon is currently
in negotiations with Russia to obtain the advanced T-90 MBT, but no deals
have been concluded as of July 2009 (An-Nahar 2008).
The Lebanese are impotent against not only the IDF, but even Hezbollah
and other Lebanese militias. The army fought a protracted war with the
Palestinian Fatah-al-Islam in May 2007, which was poorly conducted, but
resulted in a Pyrrhic victory for the Lebanese military (YaLibnan 2007).
In May 2008 clashes between Hezbollah and the government, the army
proved unwilling and unable to confront the group, instead acting as an
executor of Hezbollah’s will in restoring the group’s communications that
had been shut down by the government (France 24 2008).
The Lebanese army has a limited presence in southern Lebanon, where
its mandate is semi-officially supplanted by the UNFIL (United Nations
Interim Force In Lebanon) mandate as part of UN Resolution 1701, and
unofficially by a rejuvenated Hezbollah presence in the region. The army
did not play a role in confronting Israel during the war in 2006, and is
not likely to confront Israel in the case of a new war. Meanwhile, the
military has limited capability to suppress Hezbollah and demonstrated no
willingness to attempt such engagement of the group.
The leverage that the Lebanese government holds over Hezbollah is legal
and moral in nature. If Hezbollah wishes to make inroads into the Lebanese
government through legal means, the group will have to submit to legal
authority, even if only as a pretense. While the government does have a
standing army that has a larger number of soldiers than Hezbollah, the
military is poorly equipped, of divided loyalty, and of low morale. The military
cannot be trusted or used to confront Hezbollah militarily, and any attempt by
the Lebanese government to do so could likely trigger a new civil war.
Possible courses of action

Each actor can have a significant impact on the prospects for war between
Hezbollah and Israel. The next part of the LAMP method is to determine all
possible courses of action for each actor. While there is an infinite set of possible
courses of action for each actor, a deeper study of the situation reveals that there
are a limited number of actions that are available to the actors in this study.
There are four possible courses of action for each actor. One of the four
possible courses of action is for each party to do nothing. While this is
always a possibility, it is a very low probability in this scenario. Hezbollah,

by virtue of its charter and vision and by virtue of its need to maintain a
pretense for its status as an armed militia, will continue to seek out avenues
to engage Israel. Israel is extremely unlikely to do nothing in the face of
a Hezbollah attack or provocation. Because of Hezbollah’s inclination to
act and Israel’s inclination to react, the United States and Lebanon are
extremely unlikely to do nothing in response to the continued development
of a new conflict. While the latter two actors could simply ignore the
growing indicators of a new war, decisions made by Israel and Hezbollah
are very likely to transpose inactivity by the United States and Lebanon
into activity of some kind, even if it is a condemnation issued through
diplomatic channels. It is for these reasons that the course of inactivity was
omitted from this analysis.
In an effort to make the analysis more palatable for both the analyst
and for the reader, courses of action were adjusted to fit into a paradigm of
three choices. The initial analysis called for five courses of action, including
the option to do nothing. This made the analysis unwieldy, and courses of
action were merged to create a new course of action that represents levels of
response. The limited response course of action is the result of the conver-
gence of two courses of action that were previously independent: these
were represented by a limited military option and a limited covert option.
Because both of these represented a limited response, these are presented in
this analysis as two possibilities within the scope of limited response.
Hezbollah is the catalyst for a renewed conflict. While it is possible
that Israel may take the initiative to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon, this
scenario is highly unlikely. The political cost of starting a war without
clear reason with as powerful an enemy as Hezbollah, which can rain
rockets down upon Israel with alarming frequency, would undoubtedly
prove so unpopular domestically as to make the option prohibitive and
politically suicidal. Moreover, the Israeli operation in 2006 was carried out
in response to a Hezbollah attack and was still roundly condemned inter-
nationally and eventually domestically as it began to bog down. If Israel
is going to war with Hezbollah, it is most likely that it will require either
a strong provocation or attack of some kind from Hezbollah. It is for this
reason that Hezbollah’s decisions will serve as the major scenarios to which
the other actors respond.
While not all possible courses of action may necessarily make sense for
each actor, it is important to consider it as a possible future in an effort
to mitigate bias in the study. Considering the seemingly illogical alternate
futures is an important manifestation of the divergent thinking that is
required to ensure that the study has considered all possibilities, even if they
may be dismissed on logical grounds.
It is noteworthy that each actor according to its capabilities and percep-
tions manifests each possible course of action differently. The manner in
which the United States would execute a full assault is drastically different
from the manner in which the Lebanese government would undertake the
same course of action. In light of this, clarifications on what each course of
action entails for each actor will be included in the analysis.
Diplomatic engagement
Israel
Israeli diplomatic engagement of Hezbollah would not be direct because
Israel will not negotiate with the group, nor will Hezbollah negotiate with
Israel. Rather, Israeli options for diplomatic engagement would take the
form either of condemnations or threats issued against Hezbollah in the
media, or against Lebanon on the pretext that Lebanon holds ultimate
responsibility for the actions of one of its member parties. Depending on the
circumstances, Israel may offer an arbitration option through a third party.
Because Israel has no official relations with Lebanon and does not trade
with the nation, the option of political or economic sanctions is moot. Israel
could choose to place a formal complaint with the United Nations. Lastly,
Israel could mass troops near the Lebanese border in an effort to intimidate
Hezbollah or the Lebanese government.
United States
The United States wields considerable diplomatic power in the Middle East
and has the option to pursue diplomatic sanctions against the Lebanese
government, or economic sanctions in a bid to pressure the Lebanese
government to take a harder line with Hezbollah. The United States, as a
permanent member of the UN Security Council, wields influence within
the United Nations and may choose to pursue other legal actions against
Lebanon. It can also choose to condemn Hezbollah for its actions. The
United States could choose to deploy a carrier group into the eastern
Mediterranean in a show of force to intimidate Hezbollah or the Lebanese
government.
Lebanon
The Lebanese government has limited options for diplomatic engagement.
The government could issue a condemnation of Hezbollah’s actions on the
pretense that their actions recklessly endanger the territorial and economic
integrity of the nation. The government could also choose to withhold or
otherwise restrict Hezbollah’s legislative ability in the parliament, but risks
raising the stakes in the situation by doing so.
Limited response
Israel
This course of action affords Israel a great degree of flexibility in their
response to Hezbollah’s actions. Israel’s options in a limited response
include a singular or small amount of bombing missions against key
Hezbollah targets within Lebanon. Israel could embark on a targeted killing
campaign, focusing on top Hezbollah political or military leaders. It could
likewise opt for a special forces raid into Lebanon to either kill or abduct
key members of Hezbollah’s leadership. Israel could focus its intelligence
operations capabilities on attempting to kill or abduct Hezbollah agents
and operatives outside the Middle East.
United States
The United States can either offer logistical support for Israeli action,
or logistical and moral support for wider Lebanese action. The United
States could choose to bomb key Hezbollah targets within Lebanon, or
provide assistance to the Israeli military in blocking Iranian attempts to
ship or transport arms to Hezbollah. The United States could choose
to turn its counter-terror operations focus toward Hezbollah, pursuing
Hezbollah operatives not only in Lebanon but elsewhere around the
world.
Lebanon
The Lebanese government has limited options for this course of action. The
government could choose to conduct covert operations against Hezbollah
leadership, particularly in the form of assassinations of Hezbollah
leadership. The government may opt to cut Hezbollah’s communications
in Beirut again, but runs the risk of repeating the unrest of May 2008. The
government could also take the risky action of logistically supporting an
Israeli or American action against Hezbollah.
Full assault
Israel
A full assault from Israel entails a comprehensive bombing campaign and
eventual ground invasion of Lebanon, in conjunction with a blockade
around Lebanon.
United States
An American full assault would entail an extensive bombing campaign and
a possible deployment of American troops within Lebanon. The extent of
the deployment would be subject to the status of American operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Lebanon
A full assault would entail an attempt by the Lebanese army to push
Hezbollah’s military wing from strategic footholds in Lebanon, such as the
Bekaa Valley, south Beirut, and southern Lebanon. The government may
also choose to expel Hezbollah from the Lebanese Parliament, though the
legality of such a move is highly questionable.
Major scenarios
For the purposes of this study, the actions of Hezbollah will serve as the
baseline and provide the major scenarios according to which the other
actors will respond with one of the three courses of action outlined above.
The fourth option of inaction is not applicable to this analysis. If Hezbollah
were to do nothing, the level of interaction between the three nations and
Hezbollah would be dramatically altered in such a way as to be irrelevant
to this study.
Further, it is highly unlikely that Hezbollah would not continue its
struggle with Israel. Such an idea runs counter to the organization’s
mission statement issued in 1988, and to the group’s claims that its arms
are necessary for the struggle to “liberate Palestine.” Hezbollah is also
motivated by the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh to seek an avenue of
revenge against Israel, whom Hezbollah holds responsible for the killing.
There are three courses of action that Hezbollah could pursue, producing
three distinct major scenarios to which the actors will respond.
1 Hezbollah conducts terror attack against Israeli or Jewish targets

outside Israel.
2 Hezbollah launches a direct military attack against Israel.
3 Hezbollah provokes Israel to attack.
The first two scenarios require little explanation, but the third scenario
requires clarification. Hezbollah’s provocation of Israel could involve a
variety of actions, ranging from issuing threats against Israel or the IDF,
staging exercises near the Israeli border, moving troops and equipment close
to the Israeli border, and even launching a very small number of Katyusha
rockets across the border into Israel. The latter example would constitute
an attack in the strictest sense of the word, but falls short of the premedi-
tation and planning behind the operation that triggered the 2006 war.
Calculation of total alternate futures

Each action by Hezbollah is likely to elicit a very different response from
each actor. In order to predict the most probable alternate future, one must
analyze all possible permutations of the actions taken by Israel, the United
States, and Lebanon to each of the possible scenarios that are created by
Hezbollah’s decisions. The equation for calculating the total number of
alternate futures in a LAMP analysis is XY = Z, where X equals the number
of actions available to each actor, Y equals the number of actors, and Z
equals the total number of alternate futures to be compared (Lockwood
2008). When calculating this formula, Hezbollah’s choices are not counted
among the actions available, nor is the group counted among the total
number of actors, since the group and its actions represent the catalyst and
three scenarios respectively.
There are three possible courses of action for each actor, and three actors
in the analysis, which renders the equation as 33 = 27. This means that there
are 27 possible futures between Israel, the United States, and Lebanon when
responding to any one of the scenarios that results from Hezbollah’s own
courses of action. Each of the 27 alternate futures will be submitted to a
pair-wise comparison for each scenario and ranked according to the results.
In an effort to render the comparison charts more easily decipherable, the
following abbreviations for each course of action will be used:
DIP = Diplomatic Engagement
LIM = Limited Response
FUL = Full Assault.
Pair-wise comparison of alternate

futures for each scenario
Using Table 6.1 as a template, the alternate futures will be submitted to
a pair-wise comparison for each scenario. The method behind this type
of comparison is simple and involves comparing each alternate future
against each other alternate future in an effort to determine the most
likely scenarios. To provide an illustration of the process, Table 6.1 will be
utilized. Using alternate future #1, the analyst will compare that alternate
Table 6.1 Alternate future permutations

Possible future # Israel United States Lebanon
1 FUL FUL FUL
2 FUL FUL LIM
3 FUL FUL DIP
4 FUL LIM FUL
5 FUL LIM LIM
6 FUL LIM DIP
7 FUL DIP FUL
8 FUL DIP LIM
9 FUL DIP DIP
10 LIM FUL FUL
11 LIM FUL LIM
12 LIM FUL DIP
13 LIM LIM FUL
14 LIM LIM LIM
15 LIM LIM DIP
16 LIM DIP FUL
17 LIM DIP LIM
18 LIM DIP DIP
19 DIP FUL FUL
20 DIP FUL LIM
21 DIP FUL DIP
22 DIP LIM FUL
23 DIP LIM LIM
24 DIP LIM DIP

Possible future # Israel United States Lebanon
25 DIP DIP FUL
26 DIP DIP LIM
27 DIP DIP DIP
future to alternate future #2 and assign a vote to the more probable future.
Then, the analyst will compare alternate future #1 against alternate future
#3 and assign a point to the more probable scenario. Alternate future
#1 will be likewise compared with each of the remaining futures. Once
alternate future #1 has been compared to each other future, the analyst
will start with alternate future #2 and compare to alternate future #3,
since futures #1 and #2 have already been compared. Alternate future #2
will be compared with each other future until it has been compared with
each future. This process will continue for each alternate future until all
futures have been compared. At the end of the pair-wise comparison, the
more probable futures will be apparent due to the larger number of votes
in relation to the other less probable futures.
The equation used to determine the total number of pair-wise compar-
isons for each scenario is X = n(n-1)/2, where n equals the number of
alternate futures to be analyzed, and X equals the total number of pair-wise
comparisons for each scenario (Lockwood 2008). In the case of this
analysis, the equation is rendered as 351 = 27(27-1)/2, meaning there are
a total of 351 pair-wise comparisons to be made for each scenario, which
are represented as votes in the tables below. The following tables present
the results of the pair-wise comparisons of each alternate future for each
scenario.
Table 6.2 Alternate futures pair-wise comparison – Scenario 1

Hezbollah Conducts Terror Attack
Possible futures Israel United States Lebanon Votes
1 FUL FUL FUL 6
2 FUL FUL LIM 16
3 FUL FUL DIP 20
4 FUL LIM FUL 12

5 FUL LIM LIM 18
6 FUL LIM DIP 22
7 FUL DIP FUL 15
8 FUL DIP LIM 19
9 FUL DIP DIP 25
10 LIM FUL FUL 7
11 LIM FUL LIM 13
12 LIM FUL DIP 15
13 LIM LIM FUL 4
14 LIM LIM LIM 19
15 LIM LIM DIP 24
16 LIM DIP FUL 2
17 LIM DIP LIM 16
18 LIM DIP DIP 26
19 DIP FUL FUL 3
20 DIP FUL LIM 6
21 DIP FUL DIP 7
22 DIP LIM FUL 2
23 DIP LIM LIM 11
24 DIP LIM DIP 11
25 DIP DIP FUL
26 DIP DIP LIM 9
27 DIP DIP DIP 23
Total 351

Hezbollah Military Attack on Israel
1 FUL FUL FUL 15
2 FUL FUL LIM 20
3 FUL FUL DIP 22
4 FUL LIM FUL 16
5 FUL LIM LIM 20
6 FUL LIM DIP 23
7 FUL DIP FUL 15
8 FUL DIP LIM 24
9 FUL DIP DIP 26
10 LIM FUL FUL 2
11 LIM FUL LIM 10
12 LIM FUL DIP 12
13 LIM LIM FUL 9
14 LIM LIM LIM 15
15 LIM LIM DIP 20
16 LIM DIP FUL 7
17 LIM DIP LIM 19
18 LIM DIP DIP 24
19 DIP FUL FUL 4
20 DIP FUL LIM 5
21 DIP FUL DIP 6
22 DIP LIM FUL 3
23 DIP LIM LIM 7

24 DIP LIM DIP 8
25 DIP DIP FUL 1
26 DIP DIP LIM 3
27 DIP DIP DIP 15
Total 351

Hezbollah Provokes Israel
1 FUL FUL FUL 8
2 FUL FUL LIM 11
3 FUL FUL DIP 19
4 FUL LIM FUL 8
5 FUL LIM LIM 12
6 FUL LIM DIP 20
7 FUL DIP FUL 12
8 FUL DIP LIM 18
9 FUL DIP DIP 23
10 LIM FUL FUL 6
11 LIM FUL LIM 12
12 LIM FUL DIP 15
13 LIM LIM FUL 3
14 LIM LIM LIM 16
15 LIM LIM DIP 24

16 LIM DIP FUL 4
17 LIM DIP LIM 20
18 LIM DIP DIP 25
19 DIP FUL FUL 1
20 DIP FUL LIM 8
21 DIP FUL DIP 10
22 DIP LIM FUL 2
23 DIP LIM LIM 12
24 DIP LIM DIP 16
25 DIP DIP FUL 2
26 DIP DIP LIM 18
27 DIP DIP DIP 24
Total 351
Ranking the alternate futures

Using the results from Tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4, the futures for each scenario
will be ranked in order of probability with the highest probability futures at the
top and the lowest probability futures at the bottom. The following tables illus-
trate the ranked pair-wise comparison of alternate futures for each scenario.
Table 6.5 Alternate future probabilities by rank – Scenario 1

18 LIM DIP DIP 26
9 FUL DIP DIP 25

15 LIM LIM DIP 24
27 DIP DIP DIP 23
6 FUL LIM DIP 22
3 FUL FUL DIP 20
8 FUL DIP LIM 19
14 LIM LIM LIM 19
5 FUL LIM LIM 18
2 FUL FUL LIM 16
17 LIM DIP LIM 16
7 FUL DIP FUL 15
12 LIM FUL DIP 15
11 LIM FUL LIM 13
4 FUL LIM FUL 12
23 DIP LIM LIM 11
24 DIP LIM DIP 11
26 DIP DIP LIM 9
10 LIM FUL FUL 8
21 DIP FUL DIP 8
1 FUL FUL FUL 6
20 DIP FUL LIM 6
13 LIM LIM FUL 4
19 DIP FUL FUL 3
16 LIM DIP FUL 2
22 DIP LIM FUL 2

25 DIP DIP FUL 0
Total 351

9 FUL DIP DIP 26
8 FUL DIP LIM 24
18 LIM DIP DIP 24
6 FUL LIM DIP 23
3 FUL FUL DIP 22
2 FUL FUL LIM 20
5 FUL LIM LIM 20
15 LIM LIM DIP 20
17 LIOM DIP LIM 19
4 FUL LIM FUL 16
1 FUL FUL FUL 15
7 FUL DIP FUL 15
14 LIM LIM LIM 15
27 DIP DIP DIP 15
12 LIM FUL DIP 12
11 LIM FUL LIM 10
13 LIM LIM FUL 9
24 DIP LIM DIP 8

16 LIM DIP FUL 7
23 DIP LIM LIM 7
21 DIP FUL DIP 6
20 DIP FUL LIM 5
19 DIP FUL FUL 4
22 DIP LIM FUL 3
26 DIP DIP LIM 3
10 LIM FUL FUL 2
25 DIP DIP FUL 1
Total 351

27 DIP DIP DIP 26
18 LIM DIP DIP 25
15 LIM LIM DIP 24
9 FUL DIP DIP 23
6 FUL LIM DIP 20
17 LIM DIP LIM 20
3 FUL FUL DIP 19
8 FUL DIP LIM 18
26 DIP DIP LIM 18
14 LIM LIM LIM 16

24 DIP LIM DIP 16
12 LIM FUL DIP 15
5 FUL LIM LIM 12
7 FUL DIP FUL 12
11 LIM FUL LIM 12
23 DIP LIM LIM 12
2 FUL FUL LIM 11
21 DIP FUL DIP 10
1 FUL FUL FUL 8
4 FUL LIM FUL 8
20 DIP FUL LIM 8
10 LIM FUL FUL 6
16 LIM DIP FUL 4
13 LIM LIM FUL 3
22 DIP LIM FUL 2
25 DIP DIP FUL 2
19 DIP FUL FUL 1
Total 351
Analysis of alternate futures

Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 show a clear demarcation in the behavior patterns
of Israel and the United States in response to Hezbollah’s decisions. The
next part of the LAMP method calls for an analysis of the alternate
futures within each scenario, how these futures will affect Hezbollah’s
decision-making process, and a prediction of how these alternate futures

will affect each scenario. In order to make this analysis more concise,
palatable, and relevant for the reader, only the five most likely futures in
each scenario will be analyzed.
Scenario 1: Hezbollah terror attack against Israeli

or Jewish target abroad
In this scenario, Hezbollah will choose to conduct an attack against an
Israeli or Jewish target in a country other than Israel. The potential targets
are varied. Israeli embassies, Jewish recreation centers, synagogues, and
other places where Israelis or Jews may congregate are all possibilities for
targeting by Hezbollah. Hezbollah has shown a willingness to conduct
attacks against “soft targets” like these in the past, most notably in 1992
and 1994 when the group allegedly carried out a series of bombings
against Jewish targets in Argentina. Recently, Azerbaijani counter-terror
efforts uncovered a Hezbollah plot to bomb a Jewish center in Baku,
Azerbaijan.
While the targeting of Hezbollah attacks may appear random to the
casual observer, there are two distinct characteristics that Baku and Buenos
Aires share. They are both significant areas of Jewish population, and are
located in countries that lack the willingness or capacity to strike Hezbollah
in retaliation for the attacks. Both of these characteristics are advanta-
geous to Hezbollah. It ensures a higher number of casualties and provides
Hezbollah with reasonable assurance that the group will not have to suffer
existential consequences as a result of the attack. Assuming that these two
factors are of high importance to the group in planning an attack, certain
sites that don’t meet one of the criteria can be regarded as having a dimin-
ished threat.
International outcry would likely follow after a successful Hezbollah
attack, and it is highly likely that the group would go to some length
to conceal its involvement. Because of Hezbollah’s call for revenge in
the death of Imad Mugniyeh, any sophisticated terror attack against
a Jewish target would be potentially regarded in Jerusalem as a
Hezbollah operation, and blame would be fixed accordingly. American
reaction to the attack would depend on the scope of the attack and
the location of the attack. An attack in a Western allied city would
likely draw stronger condemnation than an attack in a city that lay
in a non-aligned nation. In the case of a Hezbollah terror attack, the
group runs the risk of inviting a wide international response of some
kind and could potentially throw the Middle East into a perilous state
of instability.
Alternate Future #18: Israel conducts a limited response

to the terror attack, while the United States and Lebanon
choose to handle the situation through diplomatic channels
This future received 26 votes, making it the most likely future to occur
within this scenario. This future has played out with frequency over the
course of Israeli history, as Israeli responses to terror attacks within Israel
tend to focus on small attacks and assassination attempts. Israel did not
immediately retaliate for the pair of bombings that occurred in Argentina
during the early 1990s, but the Mossad has been blamed for the assas-
sination of Imad Mugniyeh, named by the Argentine government as the
architect of two bombings (Norton 2007, 79).
In this future, Israel pursues a targeted killing strategy and assassinates
a ranking member of Hezbollah. Between the options of a limited military
strike or an assassination, the former is less likely to elicit a response from
Hezbollah, but is also likely to have less impact on Hezbollah’s operations.
Hezbollah would likely be prepared for the eventuality of a limited military
strike and would take precautions to ensure that any exposed targets
are clear of key Hezbollah leaders or equipment before the execution of
the terror attack. An Israeli attack on these “empty targets” would be a
best-case scenario for Hezbollah, who would lose little in such an attack.
If an Israeli strike on empty targets represents a best-case scenario, the
assassination of a key member of Hezbollah’s leadership might be a worst-
case scenario for the group. Israel’s targeted killing strategy has proven
rather effective at reaching key leaders of the targeted groups. Israel has
proven that it has the capabilities to carry out such attacks through its
successful operations against Hamas leaders such as Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
and founder Ahmed Yassin, as well as Hezbollah leaders Imad Mugniyeh
and Sayed Abbas al-Musawi. However, such actions introduce greater
instability and the danger that the situation could spiral further out of
control. Hezbollah would be highly unlikely to permit such an attack to
go unanswered. The potential for the conflict to grow in its scope could
increase significantly in the event of a successful Israeli operation to assas-
sinate a member of Hezbollah’s leadership.
In this future, the American and Lebanese responses would be diplo-
matic in nature. The United States issues a statement condemning the
attack. The strength of the language in such a statement will depend on
the degree to which Hezbollah culpability could be proven. The higher
the likelihood of Hezbollah involvement, the more likely the United States
would be to issue a strongly worded statement against the action. The
United States looks the other way in the case of a limited response from
Israel, only urging caution in the event that Israel’s actions appear to
further destabilize the region.
The Lebanese government issues a condemnation of the attack, but it

is not strongly worded. Public statements from Lebanon would extol the
virtues of dialogue. However, in private the Lebanese government commu-
nicates with Hezbollah its concerns that Hezbollah’s actions could threaten
the national security of Lebanon.
Alternate Future #9: Israel launches a full military assault

against Hezbollah, while the United States and Lebanon
In this scenario, this alternate future received 25 votes, meaning that this
future is the second most likely future compared to the other alternate
futures. This future has been made more likely with the election of the
hawkish Likud party in February 2009. This future represents a significant
escalation of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.
In this future, Israel attacks Hezbollah with the full might of the IDF.
The reasoning behind such an undertaking by Israel in this future is to
further bolster its strategic deterrence against Hezbollah. This reaction has
precedent in Israeli history, dating to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon that
was launched after the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov (Guardian
2003).
The operation begins in the same manner as the 2006 war, with a full
complement of IAF sorties over Lebanon in an effort to destroy key points
in the Lebanese and Hezbollah infrastructure. Unlike 2006, the ground
invasion is undertaken sooner in the campaign and more forcefully, with
clear objectives from the IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.
Hezbollah’s response to this invasion mirrors the group’s response in
2006, with a regular volley of Katyusha rockets being fired into Israel. The
IDF’s ability to limit or halt these attacks altogether will be a major deter-
mining factor in both the length of the war and perceptions of the IDF’s
performance. In this future, the IDF is unable to stem the flow of Katyushas
falling on Israel, and the army is forced to quit the operation early due to a
jaded Israeli public.
The war results in a diminished military capability for Hezbollah.
However, the group retains popularity among the Lebanese most affected
by the Israeli operation, and more importantly, bolsters its case for retaining
its arms. The war increases Israel’s deterrence posture against Hezbollah
and quells Hezbollah’s appetite to engage Israel so blatantly in the future.
The American response to the terror attack is to issue a condemnation,
the language of which would be crafted to the situation. If Hezbollah’s
culpability were proven, the language of an American condemnation would
be markedly stronger. The American response to the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon is ambivalent. The United States urges Israel to show restraint,
and there are calls from within the Senate and House to issue a condem-
nation of Israel’s escalation, citing Israel for its “disproportionate response”
to the terror attack. While the Obama administration does not heed those
calls, such sentiment prompts the administration to take a tougher line with
Israel and pressure the nation to recall its forces from Lebanon.
The Lebanese government issues a thinly worded condemnation of the
Hezbollah attacks at the outset. However, as Israeli aircraft begin flying
sorties over Lebanon and Israeli tanks cross into the south, the government
becomes inclined to chide Hezbollah for its reckless behavior, while
condemning Israel for its “disproportionate response.” The government
complains to the United Nations and pushes for a condemnation from the
UN Security Council, which does not pass unanimously due to the United
States. However, the United Nations begins to put pressure on Israel as the
operation begins to move beyond the first week. The Lebanese government
issues warnings to the Israeli government that the Lebanese army may be
used to engage the IDF if the latter pushes too far into Lebanon.
Alternate Future #15: Israel and the United States pursue a

limited response to the terror attack, while Lebanon chooses
to handle the situation through diplomatic channels
This future received 24 votes and is the third most likely future to occur in
this scenario. This future represents a major departure from the two more
probable scenarios in that the United States is taking a more active role
against Hezbollah. Lebanon, unsurprisingly, retains the use of diplomatic
channels to engage Hezbollah.
In this future, Israel has the option to pursue either the option of a
limited military strike or an assassination attempt against a key member of
Hezbollah’s leadership. The latter could further destabilize the region, while
the former is unlikely to seriously affect Hezbollah. Israel’s inclination in
recent years has been to pursue targeted killing campaigns against hostile
non-state entities, as has been demonstrated with its assassinations of key
leaders in both Hamas and Hezbollah. Thus, Israel elects to assassinate a
key member of Hezbollah’s leadership.
The United States, in this future, pursues the option of a limited response.
However, unlike Israel, the options that the United States pursues in this future
are less overt, with the avoidance of international condemnation in mind.
The United States takes a two-pronged approach in this future that entails
logistical support for Israeli action against Hezbollah, and a boost to counter-
terror efforts against Hezbollah around the world as part of the general
American strategy against global terrorism. Both of these options afford the
United States an ability to engage Hezbollah below the surface, therefore less
likely to be reported in the media but still effective in engaging Hezbollah.
Hezbollah’s response to these actions by the United States and Israel

depends on two factors: the degree to which the action is successful against
Hezbollah, and whether or not Hezbollah is able to detect American assis-
tance to Israel. Because the action is successful, Hezbollah becomes inclined
to respond with either another terror attack or an escalation of the conflict
by striking Israel directly. If American assistance to Israel is detected,
Hezbollah may exercise options it has to confront the United States. These
include targeting American troops in Iraq and conducting terror attacks on
American interests abroad or perhaps even within the continental United
States.
The Lebanese government’s response is very similar to the response in
Alternate Future #18. While the Lebanese government perceives Israeli
action against Hezbollah, American involvement remains outside its view.
Alternate Future #27: Israel, the United States, and

Lebanon all pursue diplomatic options to respond to
Hezbollah’s terror attack
This future received 23 votes and is the fourth most likely future to occur
in this scenario. This future is perhaps the most beneficial to prospects
for peace in the Middle East, due primarily to Israel’s decision to eschew
a forceful response in deference to a diplomatic and peaceful alternate.
Despite this fact, there are three futures that are more likely to occur than
this one.
In this future, Israel issues a strongly worded condemnation of the
attack. The government feels compelled to put the IDF on high alert in an
effort to demonstrate the degree to which Israel is displeased with the attack
and in an effort to intimidate Hezbollah. Israel issues threats to attack
Hezbollah targets or even Lebanese targets in an effort to pressure Beirut to
either likewise condemn Hezbollah or work harder to reign in the group.
Israel pursues this option in a bid to demonstrate to the United States and
the wider global community that it is dedicated to peace, even in the face
of concerted provocation.
The United States issues a condemnation of the attack, the language of
which is determined by the degree to which Hezbollah is found culpable
for the attack. The Obama administration lauds Israel for its restraint and
encourages further restraint in its dealings with Hezbollah and likewise
with Hamas and other Palestinian factions. This is coupled with a warning
to the Lebanese government that unless the government takes steps to put
pressure on Hezbollah, the risk of escalation in the region runs high. The
United States sends signals to all parties in the Middle East that while it
supports Israel’s restraint in this scenario, that it will be less apt to do so if
Israel is further provoked.
The Lebanese government issues a condemnation for the attack and

behaves similarly to the way it might in Alternate Futures #18 and #15. In
private, the government expresses to Hezbollah that the nation is fortunate
that Israel did not respond more forcefully and encourages Hezbollah to
refrain from such continued provocation.
While such a future portends a more peaceful Middle East, it is also a
best-case scenario for Hezbollah. The group is unlikely to be moved by
condemnations or even troop build-ups within Israel. The lack of response
will be perceived by Hezbollah as a victory against Israel, which the group
sees as having a weakening resolve. This development may open doors to
further Hezbollah aggression.
Alternate Future #6: Israel launches a full assault against

Hezbollah in response to the terror attack, while the United
States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon pursues
diplomatic channels to address the situation
This future received 22 votes and is the fifth most likely future within this
scenario. The scenario represents the most intense level of response that
Hezbollah is likely to receive in the wake of a terror attack according to the
pair-wise comparison. As such, this future is the most likely among the five
most probable futures to destabilize the region.
In this future, Israel launches a full assault that resembles that of
Alternate Future #9 almost exactly. The key change in this scenario is that
Israel’s response would be in concert with a limited American response. In
this future, the United States lends Israel overt logistical support for its war
against Hezbollah under the pretense that this war is an extension of the
global strategy against Islamist terrorism. The logistical support takes the
form of the sharing of intelligence on Hezbollah’s movements and American
support in crimping Hezbollah’s supply line of weapons and resources from
Iran. The United States Navy is deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to
assist in an Israeli blockade of Lebanon, under the pretense of cutting off a
source of Hezbollah’s weapons.
The United States goes to some length to assure the Lebanese government
that its actions are aimed only at confronting Hezbollah. To this end, the
United States takes steps to discourage Israeli targeting of Lebanese civilian
infrastructure and encourages an easing of the blockade to allow all vessels
through after a search to ensure that no weapons are aboard.
In this future, the Lebanese government issues a stronger condemnation
of the attacks, though still weak in comparison to condemnation from
other nations. The Lebanese government privately expresses extreme
displeasure with Hezbollah for provoking not only a full Israeli assault, but
also American assistance. Meanwhile, the government publicly condemns
the Israeli aggression and “disproportionate response” while calling on

the United States to halt its assistance and complicity in the unwarranted
aggression. The United States counters that its only mission is to confront
Hezbollah, and that it would strive to preserve Lebanese territorial integrity
to the extent possible under the circumstances.
Hezbollah’s reaction to this response is to express surprise that a terror
attack could warrant such a response. This would no doubt be an attempt
by Hezbollah to obtain sympathy and perhaps even establish a moral high
ground by citing a “disproportionate response.” As the United States proves
unrelenting in its material support for the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah looks
to frame the conflict as a clash of civilizations, and evokes the imagery
of the Crusades in an attempt to rally the Arab street to its banner. The
diplomatic pressure created by such a strategy tempers American support
for the mission, and further destabilizes the Middle East, while threatening
remaining American troops in Iraq.
The war results in a diminished military capability for Hezbollah.
However, the group retains popularity among the Lebanese most affected
by the Israeli operation, and more importantly, bolsters its case for retaining
its arms. The war increases Israel’s deterrence posture against Hezbollah
and quells Hezbollah’s appetite to engage Israel so blatantly in the future.
In this scenario, among the five most probable futures, there is an 80
percent chance that Israel would respond violently to a Hezbollah terror
attack, and a 40 percent chance that such a response would entail a
full-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon. There is a 40 percent chance that
the United States might provide some sort of response to the attack, the
degree of which would be determined by the level of Israeli response.
Unsurprisingly, the Lebanese government is 100 percent certain to do
nothing more than issue a weak condemnation and express dissatisfaction
to Hezbollah through private channels. According to the futures in this
scenario, there is an incredibly high chance that a Hezbollah terror attack
against an Israeli or Jewish target would elicit the type of response from
Israel that could bring serious instability to the Middle East.
Scenario 2: Hezbollah conducts direct

military attack against Israel
Scenario 2 resembles the events of July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah members
crossed the border into Israel and ambushed an IDF patrol, taking IDF soldiers
Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser with them back to Lebanon. The event
triggered a massive Israeli operation that lasted for 33 days and devastated
southern Lebanon and parts of the southern suburbs of Beirut. As a result of
this recent historical precedent, the reactions of Israel, the United States, and
Lebanon are perhaps more easily analyzed and predicted, based not only on
previous courses of action but the lessons learned from the events in 2006.
The top five most probable alternate futures for this scenario contain
three alternate futures that are also present in Scenario 1. Not surprisingly,
those three alternate futures represent the strongest probable responses
from each of the three actors in that scenario.

This future received 26 votes, making it the most likely of the 27 alternate
futures to occur in this scenario. This future is among the five most
probable futures in each of the three scenarios. This future is also identical
to the situation that occurred in 2006. This future is a prediction that if
Hezbollah were to carry out another military attack directly against Israel,
that Israel would respond in the same manner that it did in 2006.
In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, starting
with a heavy aerial bombing campaign, followed quickly by a ground
invasion. The IDF will have learned lessons from the war in 2006 and does
not make the same mistakes that the army did in the previous round of
hostilities. Despite the increased efficiency and level of performance, the
IDF will be unable to completely stem the rain of rockets falling on Israel,
evoking memories of the 2006 conflict in the eyes of the Israeli public.
The United States will condemn Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, while
extolling the virtue of Israel’s right to defend itself. However, as interna-
tional pressure builds amid the rising civilian casualty count in Lebanon,
the Obama administration will begin to change its tune, urging the IDF
to wrap up its operation quickly. Israel will test the limits of American
patience and support, eventually leading to calls from Washington for Israel
to show restraint, with the more vociferous critics calling Israel’s operation
an example of “disproportionate response.” The United States will also
chide the Lebanese government for failing to abide by UN Resolution 1701
and disarming Hezbollah, which would be characterized as a step that
could have prevented the war.
The Lebanese government will criticize Hezbollah’s decision to launch
an attack against Israel, citing the grave threat that Lebanon faces in the
midst of the Israeli onslaught. However, the Lebanese government will issue
threats to the IDF that if the operation tarries for too long or if IDF troops
push too deep into Lebanon, that it will reserve the right to defend itself by
sending the Lebanese army into action.
The chief differences in this future from the scenario that played out
in 2006 are twofold. The IDF is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of 2006,
and as a result, will increase the measure of deterrence that Israel enjoys
in the Middle East. However, support from the Obama administration will
be more tepid than that given by the Bush administration. Israel will not
have the leeway to let the operation extend to the protracted 33-day length
of the 2006 operation. Without such American support, Israel will feel
compelled to shorten the operation, lest the political cost of the war become
prohibitive.
The war will result in a diminished military capability for Hezbollah.
However, the group will retain popularity among the Lebanese most
affected by the Israeli operation, and more importantly, will bolster its
case for retaining its arms. The war will increase Israel’s deterrence posture
against Hezbollah and likely quell Hezbollah’s appetite to engage Israel so
blatantly in the future.
Alternate Future #8: Israel launches a full-scale invasion of

Lebanon, the United States pursues a diplomatic option, and
Lebanon pursues a limited response to Hezbollah’s attack on
Israel
This future received 24 votes, tying with Alternate Future #18 as the
second most likely future in this scenario. This future and future #3 are
the only futures not among the five most probable futures in the other two
scenarios. The striking element in this future is the introduction of action
from the Lebanese government as a result of Hezbollah’s decision to attack
Israel. This is the only of the five most probable alternate futures in any
of the three scenarios that features Lebanese action beyond the scope of
diplomacy.
In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon akin
to Alternate Future #9. The chief difference in this future is found in
the actions of the Lebanese government, who would conduct a limited
response of their own. In this future, the Lebanese government decides that
Hezbollah’s reckless “adventurism” against Israel represents a constant
and existential threat to the national security and territorial integrity of
Lebanon. While the government cannot engage in overt action for fear of
Hezbollah reprisals, the government elects to provide Israel with logistical
support. This action involves the government covertly passing infor-
mation on Hezbollah’s key military positions and known locations where
Hezbollah’s leadership may be hiding.
Whatever action the Lebanese government takes will be unilateral to the
parties that execute the action. In other words, the government knows that
any decision to engage Hezbollah will not enjoy broad support and will
only use agents that can be completely trusted to conduct the operation
with utmost secrecy. The overriding concern is that if the government is
implicated in efforts to fight Hezbollah, particularly if aiding Israel, the

country could slide into civil war. This concern is enhanced by American
pressure on the Israelis to shorten the duration of the operation, enhancing
the possibility that Hezbollah will emerge from the conflict largely capable
of waging war with the government. Thus, the severe risk of this course of
action is mitigated in the minds of the Lebanese government only by the
concern that Hezbollah’s continued provocations against Israel will lead to
the ultimate demise of the Lebanese state.

to Hezbollah’s direct military attack, while the United
States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through
diplomatic channels
This future received 24 votes, tying it with Alternate Future #8 as the
second most likely future in this scenario. This future is included among
the five most probable futures in each of the three scenarios. This represents
the best-case scenario for peace in the Middle East, as Israel’s response is
limited in its scope.
In this future, Israel responds to Hezbollah’s attack by launching a
counterattack against the specific Hezbollah unit that is responsible for the
attack. This will take the form of an IDF helicopter attack, coupled with a
limited number of sorties over Lebanon, which target Hezbollah weapons
depots and communication centers in the southern part of Lebanon. All
Israeli action is limited to targets south of the Litani River. Israel follows
these attacks with a warning to Hezbollah that if the group responds
further, it could escalate the conflict and potentially trigger a full-scare war.
The United States will strongly condemn the Hezbollah provocation,
while advocating the Israeli response on the pretense that Israel has a
right to self-defense. The Obama administration will contact Netanyahu
and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, expressing satisfaction with the
Israeli response, which they will call “balanced” and “proportionate.” The
United States will publicly urge both sides to take steps to prevent further
escalation in the conflict, while reminding Lebanon of its duty to disarm
Hezbollah according to UN Resolution 1701.
The Lebanese government will publicly express disappointment with
Hezbollah’s attack on Israel, calling it a “reckless provocation.” In private,
the government will express the desire that Hezbollah refrain from such
attacks in the future, and mention the potential for extensive damage to
the Lebanese nation. The government will try to entreat Hezbollah to
consider the welfare of the Lebanese public before undertaking such an
action in the future. Lebanese comments on the Israeli counterstrikes will
be limited to a desultory condemnation without further comment, in an
effort to avoid fanning the flames of Israeli resentment over Hezbollah’s
actions.

Hezbollah in response to the group’s direct military attack
on Israel, while the United States pursues a limited response,
and Lebanon pursues diplomatic channels to address the
situation
This future received 23 votes, making it the fourth most likely future in this
scenario. This future is among the five most probable futures in each of the
other three scenarios. This future is nearly identical to Alternate Future #9
except that the United States is taking a course of limited response.
In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon identical
to that in Alternate Future #9. However, in this future, the United States
takes part in the effort with a limited response. Due to Hezbollah’s brazen
attack against Israel, the United States will feel less reservation about
providing logistical support to the Israelis. The logistical support takes the
form of the sharing of intelligence on Hezbollah’s movements and crimping
Hezbollah’s supply line of weapons and resources from Iran. The United
States Navy will be deployed to the eastern Mediterranean to assist in an
Israeli blockade of Lebanon, under the pretense of cutting off a source of
Hezbollah’s weapons.
The United States will go to some length to ensure the Lebanese
government that its actions are aimed only at confronting Hezbollah. To
this end, the United States will take steps to discourage Israeli targeting of
Lebanese civilian infrastructure and encourage an easing of the blockade
to allow all vessels through after a search to ensure that no weapons are
aboard.
In this future, the Lebanese government issues a stronger condemnation
of the attack, though still weak in comparison to condemnation from
other nations. The Lebanese government will privately express extreme
displeasure with Hezbollah for provoking not only a full Israeli assault,
but also American assistance. Meanwhile, the government will publicly
condemn the Israeli aggression and “disproportionate response” while
calling on the United States to halt its assistance and complicity in the
unwarranted aggression. The United States will counter that its only
mission is to confront Hezbollah, and that it will strive to preserve Lebanese
territorial integrity to the extent possible under the circumstances.
Hezbollah’s reaction to this response would likely be to express regret
that their attack could warrant such a response. This would no doubt be
an attempt by Hezbollah to obtain sympathy and perhaps even establish a
moral high ground by citing “disproportionate response” at the hands of
two of the world’s most powerful militaries. The United States will prove
reliable in its material support for the Israeli invasion, and Hezbollah will
surely look to frame the conflict as a clash of civilizations, evoking the
imagery of the Crusades in an attempt to rally the Arab street to its banner.
The diplomatic pressure created by such a strategy will certainly temper
American support for the mission, and further destabilize the Middle East,
while threatening remaining American troops in Iraq.
Alternate Future #3: Israel and the United States launch

a full-scale assault against Hezbollah in response to the
group’s attack on Israel, while Lebanon engages Hezbollah
through diplomatic channels
This future received 22 votes, making it the fifth most likely future in this
scenario. This future and Alternate Future #8 are the only futures not
among the five most probable futures in the other two scenarios. This is
no doubt the result of this future being among the direst results of any
Hezbollah action, as both Israel and the United States would bring the full
brunt of their militaries down on Hezbollah.
In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. Unlike
the other futures, the United States joins Israel in this full-scale assault.
The tactical ramifications become immediately apparent as the two nations
struggle to decide which nation should take the lead in such matters as
bombing sorties, troop deployment, and command of the combined force.
The two nations agree to allow the IAF to conduct sorties over Lebanon,
while IDF and American troops share the burden of conducting the
ground operation under joint control of Israeli and American generals.
The United States Navy takes the lead in forming the blockade around
Lebanon, while the United States Air Force takes the lead in patrolling
the eastern border of Lebanon in an effort to halt the flow of weapons
into Lebanon. The plan is made that after the offensive is completed, the
American troops will withdraw and the IDF troops will remain to conduct
clean-up operations within southern Lebanon. The United States will
insist that the timetable for the operation is less than two weeks. Israel
reluctantly agrees.
The operation proves successful at dislodging Hezbollah’s main elements
in southern Lebanon, but armed militias make life difficult for the IDF
troops deployed there. Hezbollah’s stronghold in the Bekaa Valley is devas-
tated, and Hezbollah’s offices in Beirut are destroyed. However, Hezbollah’s
leadership evades the bombs and raids of the IDF and American troops. The
two-week deadline expires and the American troops begin their withdrawal
as pressure mounts on the IDF to do the same. After a few days of lingering
in Lebanon to find remaining elements of Hezbollah, the IDF withdraws
under heavy international pressure and condemnation for the “dispropor-
tionate response” to Hezbollah’s attack.
By virtue of the group’s survival against the onslaught of the world’s
two most powerful militaries, Nasrallah will claim victory for Hezbollah.
However, unlike 2006, the group sustains major damage and possesses only
a fraction of its military power from before the war. The political cost of
the operation is extremely high for Israel and the United States, who are
both roundly condemned in the Middle East and by many other countries
around the world. The United States loses its credibility as an arbitrator in
the Middle East peace process, and Iran gains credibility across the Muslim
world as the only Islamic nation-state willing to confront American and
Israeli “imperialism.”
The Lebanese government condemns Hezbollah’s attack on Israel as well
as the Israeli and American response, calling it “exceedingly dispropor-
tionate.” The government cuts off communications with Hezbollah for fear
of being linked with the group during the intense onslaught. The economic
effect of the war in Lebanon proves too much for the government, and the
government is eventually ousted in the next general election, as Hezbollah
and the March 8 Coalition are swept into power amid a tide of anti-
Western sentiment in Lebanon.
In this scenario, among the five most probable futures, there is a 100
percent chance of an Israeli military response to the Hezbollah attack on
Israel, with an 80 percent chance that the response will involve a full-scale
invasion of Lebanon. There is a 40 percent chance that the United States
will respond with at least logistical support for an Israeli attack, and a 20
percent chance that the American response will be a full-scale assault in
concert with Israel. There is a 20 percent chance that Lebanon might pursue
a cautious limited response against Hezbollah if the group directly attacks
Israel. According to the most probable futures in this scenario, a Hezbollah
attack against Israel nearly assures that a full-scale war will erupt between
the two actors.
Scenario 3: Hezbollah provokes Israel to attack

In this scenario, Hezbollah attempts to actually provoke an Israeli attack.
The reasons for Hezbollah to provoke an attack are varied and include a
desire to reinforce their raison d’être by reminding the Lebanese of the threat
that Israel poses, a desire to lure the IDF into well-laid traps in southern
Lebanon, or at the insistence of Iran to deflect international attention from
their nuclear program or other contentious issue. Hezbollah’s provocation
of Israel is made with the group holding three assumptions about a conflict
with Israel:
1 The IDF cannot destroy Hezbollah.

2 The IDF cannot sustain an operation against Hezbollah
without eventually running up an ever-increasing political
cost.
3 The group’s resistance against the IDF will endear it to a
wider population within Lebanon and the Muslim world.
This understanding is necessary in order to consider the act of provocation

to be one that is rational and entirely probable.
Hezbollah’s options for provoking Israel to attack are multifaceted. The
group can provoke an Israeli attack through either provocative statements
or provocative actions. Provocative statements would include threats to
attack Israeli or Jewish targets abroad, threats to launch longer-range
missiles toward Tel Aviv, or loudly declaring the capability to launch
rockets at Israel’s primary population centers. More significant than
statements, Hezbollah could elect to perform provocative actions such
as approaching the border with heavily armed units, taking shots at IDF
border patrols, or even launching a limited number of Katyusha rockets
into Israel through a proxy group. While all of these examples are provoc-
ative, the provocative actions, more so than provocative statements, are
much more likely to elicit a strong Israeli response that reaches beyond the
scope of diplomacy.
This scenario is unique compared to the previous two scenarios. In the
other two scenarios, one would be hard-pressed to make an argument against
Hezbollah as the aggressor, despite the level of proportionate response
offered by Israel. However, in this case, the international community will
perceive any Israeli response beyond the realm of diplomacy as unwar-
ranted Israeli aggression in the face of ostensibly harmless saber rattling
from Hezbollah. This scenario’s five most probable futures are all present
in either one of the two other scenarios. However, the context of these
responses is considerably different given the lack of substantial aggression
from Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s provocations
This future received 26 votes, making it the most likely future in this
scenario. This future more or less represents the status quo as of July 2009,
and the calmest state of relations between Israel and Hezbollah. Hezbollah
frequently issues provocative statements, which are either ignored by Israel
or responded to with provocative statements from Jerusalem. This future is
also among the top five most probable futures in Scenario 1.
In this future, Israel chooses to give little heed to Hezbollah’s provoca-
tions. The decision is a calculated one on the part of Israel, as an Israeli
response would likely garner widespread condemnation from the inter-
national community. Instead of responding to Hezbollah threats, Israel
chooses to issue threats of its own and wait for Hezbollah to provide a
more substantive reason to pursue military action against the group.
The United States issues a statement calling on Israel to continue its
display of restraint, while chiding Hezbollah for its provocations and
accusing the group of being the primary catalyst for instability in the
Middle East. Washington uses the opportunity to remind Beirut of the
responsibility that it has to disarm Hezbollah under the provisions in
UN Resolution 1701. The Lebanese government dismisses the American
statement but otherwise remains publicly silent on the issue. However,
the government expresses reservations to Hezbollah in private about the
dangers of escalating the conflict.
While this future appears to avert war, the degree to which Hezbollah is
willing to pursue a wider conflict with Israel will determine whether or not
the group will continue to provoke Israel. In this future, Hezbollah continues
to provoke Israel to attack using increasingly provocative methods, until
Israel begins considering action beyond the scope of diplomacy to address
the situation. This future represents the greatest potential of any future to
be “transposed” into a scenario that represents an escalation of the conflict.
Alternate Future #18: Israel conducts a limited response to

provocations, while the United States and Lebanon choose
This future received 25 votes, making it the second most likely future in
this scenario. This scenario is among the top five futures in the other two
scenarios. This future represents an escalation of the situation on the part
of Israel, but only on a limited basis. The United States and Lebanon retain
their distance from the conflict and attempt to address the issue through
diplomatic channels only.
In this future, Israel issues a limited response in the form of an assas-

sination attempt on a key Hezbollah military commander. The attempt
is successful, and while Israel remains silent on its culpability, Hezbollah
publicly blames Israel for the killing and vows revenge. Israel warns that
any Hezbollah attack against Israel or Jewish targets abroad will draw a
sharp Israeli response. The situation threatens to spiral out of control.
The United States chides Hezbollah for its rhetoric and criticizes its
role as a destabilizing element in the Middle East. After the assassination
of the key Hezbollah commander, the United States remains silent on the
issue, choosing to withhold judgment until the facts of the case come
to light, but expresses disappointment that such an event will further
destabilize the region. Washington warns both sides against escalating the
conflict, and warns Lebanon and Hezbollah to abide by UN Resolution
1701.
The Lebanese government refuses to address Hezbollah’s provocations
publicly, but privately expresses reservations about Hezbollah’s actions.
The government joins in the condemnation of the assassination, but stops
short of blaming Israel directly for the killing.

limited response to the provocation, while Lebanon chooses
This future received 24 votes, making it the third most likely future in this
scenario. This future is among the five most probable futures in Scenario 1,
and represents a deepening of the response to Hezbollah’s provocations as
the United States joins Israel in the limited response.
In this future, Israel elects to pursue a limited response nearly identical
to that of Alternate Future #18 in this scenario. The chief difference in this
scenario is that the United States also elects to pursue a limited response.
The two nations work in concert to elicit the response. Because of the prohi-
bition in American law against American intelligence agencies partaking in
assassination attempts, the United States elects to provide Israel with intel-
ligence on Hezbollah operatives in Europe. Israel proceeds to target a key
member of Hezbollah’s intelligence apparatus in Europe, successfully assas-
sinating the operative.
Hezbollah issues a strong condemnation of the assassination and
publicly accuses Israel of the killing, vowing revenge. However, the group is
not aware of the connection that the United States has to the operation, and
mentions the United States only as an enabler of Israeli “malfeasance.” The
Lebanese government remains silent on the issue publicly, only confronting
Hezbollah in a private setting and expressing its reservation about the
group’s provocative actions.

This future received 23 votes, making it the fourth most likely future in this
scenario. This future is present in the five most probable futures in each of the
other two scenarios and represents a significant escalation of the conflict by Israel.
In this future, Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, completely
taking Hezbollah and the world by surprise. The surprise attack causes
Hezbollah to be caught off-guard, having left key targets vulnerable to
sorties by the IAF, and the damage to Hezbollah’s military capability is
substantial during the first 48 hours of the conflict. The Israeli ground
invasion begins within 72 hours of the first bombs falling on Lebanon, and
the IDF is able to overwhelm and drive back the underequipped Hezbollah
forces in southern Lebanon, chasing elements of Hezbollah across the Litani
River. Within the first five days of the conflict, the IDF has dealt a severe
blow to Hezbollah’s forces in southern Lebanon. However, Hezbollah uses
the time it takes the IDF to advance in the south to firm its defenses in the
Bekaa Valley and in positions north of the Litani River.
The United States chides Hezbollah for its provocation, but urges Israel
to show restraint. As the operation drags into its fifth day, the Obama
administration expresses disappointment that Israel is responding “dispro-
portionately” to the Hezbollah provocation and begins to exert significant
pressure on Israel to withdraw its troops back across the border. Due to
intense international and American pressure, the IDF withdraws from
Lebanon seven days after the start of the conflict, never having capitalized
on the initial momentum of the campaign.
The war proves unpopular in Israel and is seen as “adventurism” by a
wide cross-section of Israeli society, which is embarrassed by the level of
international condemnation of the Israeli invasion. Hezbollah and Iran
strongly condemn Israeli “aggression” and express the need for Israel to be
removed from the Middle East. Hezbollah pledges to redouble its efforts to
recover from the onslaught and continue its fight against Israel. The Lebanese
government condemns the Israeli invasion and files a complaint with the
United Nations. Beirut threatens to deploy the Lebanese army on the border.

Hezbollah in response to the group’s provocations, while
the United States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon
pursues diplomatic channels to address the situation
This future received 20 votes, tying it with Alternate Future #17 for the
fifth most likely future in this scenario. This analysis will only examine the
effects of Alternate Future #6, rather than both futures. The reasons for
this are twofold. With only 20 votes, both futures are significantly below
the four more probable futures in this scenario, and an examination of
two futures that are so much less likely is not likely to contribute to the
analysis in a meaningful way. More importantly, when performing the
pair-wise comparison, Alternate Future #6 was chosen as more probable
than Alternate Future #17.
In this future, Israel launches a surprise full-scale invasion of Lebanon
in a manner identical to Alternate Future #9. The key difference in this
future is that the United States is pursuing the course of limited response
by providing Israel with covert logistical support. The United States
provides Israel with its satellite imagery as well as SIGINT in an effort to
bolster Israel’s capability to conduct a quick and effective campaign against
Hezbollah. The United States provides this assistance on the condition that
the operation will last less than seven days, and Israel reluctantly agrees.
Publicly the United States urges both sides to show restraint and calls
on Israel to limit its operation to Hezbollah targets. During the fifth day
of fighting, the United States and Israel publicly declare that the Israeli
operation will be over within 48 hours. Israel expresses a desire to have
an additional 48 hours to conduct operations but is rebuffed by the United
States.
Hezbollah suffers extensive damage to its military capability. The group
publicly condemns the Israeli invasion with the strongest possible language.
The group is unaware of the American involvement in the conflict but criti-
cizes the United States for failing to reign in their ally sooner. Hezbollah
pledges to redouble its efforts to rearm and further pledges to continue the
fight against Israel. The Lebanese government condemns the Israeli invasion
and files a complaint with the United Nations. Beirut threatens to deploy
the Lebanese army on the border.
In this scenario, among the five most probable futures, there is an 80
percent chance that Hezbollah’s provocations will elicit something stronger
than diplomatic engagement from Israel. There is a 40 percent chance
that Israel will launch a full-scale invasion of Lebanon, and a 40 percent
chance that Israel will provide a limited response. The scope of the limited
response will be covert and unlikely to result in an immediate escalation of
the conflict. There is only a 40 percent chance that the United States will
respond with something stronger than diplomatic engagement, and a 20
percent chance that the American response would be limited to covert logis-
tical support, provided on condition of a quick Israeli withdrawal. Lebanon
is 100 percent certain to keep its responses completely within the realm
of diplomacy. While Hezbollah provocations represent a threat to Middle
East stability, the threat is substantially smaller than in other scenarios, but
could quickly escalate depending on the responses of the other actors. This
scenario most closely resembles the current situation in the Middle East.
Focal events
Focal events are occurrences that are significant enough to alter the relative
probability of alternate futures (Lockwood 2008). Determining focal
events is an important step in determining the probability of a possible
future occurring. This step helps the analyst understand the present and the
impact that future events will have on the responses of the affected actors.
Generally, the alternate futures that differ the least from the status quo will
require the fewest focal events to bring about the future (Lockwood 2008).
The future that most resembles the status quo is Alternate Future #6, in
which Israel, the United States, and Lebanon all pursue diplomatic avenues
to address the actions of Hezbollah. The scenario that most resembles the
present is Scenario 3, where Hezbollah is issuing provocative statements and
threats against Israel. In this case, the focal events will address the events
that could change the probability of the alternate future for which the least
resistance is needed to occur—in this case, Alternate Future #6 in Scenario
3. Only one of these events may be necessary to change the probability of an
alternate future, but more of these events may be required to occur before
some of the less likely futures occur. The focal events are listed below and the
indicators for these events are italicized and listed beneath each focal event.
Focal events and indicators

Hezbollah attacks Israeli or Jewish targets outside Israel
MM Hezbollah moves vital targets and personnel in Lebanon to safety in
anticipation of Israeli response.
MM Hezbollah issues a threat to attack Israeli or Jewish targets.
MM Hezbollah operatives are spotted or arrested in a city with a large
Jewish population.
MM Allusions to “coming victory” or “imminent good news” are
present in Nasrallah’s speeches.
MM Nasrallah makes extensive mention of Imad Mugniyeh’s
assassination in his speeches.
Hezbollah directly attacks Israel with premeditation and

in force
MM There is increased Hezbollah reconnaissance activity near the Israel–
Lebanon border.

MM UNFIL personnel report increased Hezbollah activity in southern
Lebanon.
MM Iran is involved in domestic or international controversy.
Hezbollah launches a small number of rockets into Israel

through a proxy group
MM Hezbollah issues threats to Israel.
Hezbollah harasses IDF border patrols or kidnaps IDF

personnel
MM Increased Hezbollah reconnaissance activity near the Israel–
Lebanon border.
MM Nasrallah makes extensive mention of the Shebaa Farms in his speeches.
MM Nasrallah praises 2008 prisoner exchange or makes mention of
Lebanese and Hezbollah prisoners being held in Israel.
Hezbollah attacks Jewish targets in the United States,

killing American Jews
MM Hezbollah issues a threat to attack Israeli or Jewish targets.
MM Hezbollah operatives are spotted or arrested in an American city
with a large Jewish population.
MM The United States intelligence community issues an alert that a
terror attack is either imminent or of increased probability.
MM Allusions to “coming victory” or “imminent good news” are
present in Nasrallah’s speeches.
MM Nasrallah makes extensive mention of Imad Mugniyeh’s
assassination in his speeches.
The United States completes withdrawal from Iraq

MM Troop deployments continue on schedule.
MM The Iraqi security apparatus performs adequately.
The United States successfully crushes rising Taliban

threat in Afghanistan
MM Taliban forced to retreat from Pakistan.
MM Obama makes less mention of the Taliban threat when discussing
matters of national security.
The Lebanese government adopts an assertive course of

action against Hezbollah
MM The Lebanese government perceives an existential threat to Lebanon
due to Hezbollah’s actions and the threat of Israeli response.
MM The Lebanese government becomes more outspoken in its criticism
of Hezbollah.
MM Hezbollah’s actions draw strong indications of far-reaching Israeli
response.
Iran orders Hezbollah to provoke hostilities with Israel

MM Iran is involved in domestic or international controversy.
MM Ahmadinejad makes frequent reference to his skepticism over
Holocaust and his desire to see Israel erased from the map.
MM Iran is nearing completion of a crucial stage in its nuclear program.
MM Iran achieves capability to build and deliver nuclear weapons as far
as Israel.
Hezbollah threatens American personnel in the Middle

East
MM The United States becomes more outspoken in its criticism of
Hezbollah.
MM The United States is involved in a battle with Shia militants in Iraq.

MM Security for American personnel remaining in Iraq is diminished due
to troop withdrawal.
Hezbollah kidnaps or kills American personnel

MM Hezbollah issues threat to American personnel.
MM The United States becomes more outspoken in its criticism of
Hezbollah.
MM The United States is involved in a battle with Shia militants in Iraq.
MM Security for American personnel remaining in Iraq is diminished due
to troop withdrawal.
MM Nasrallah makes extensive mention of American culpability with
regard to Israeli actions.
Hezbollah kills Lebanese politicians or members of the

Lebanese armed forces
MM The Lebanese government becomes more outspoken in its criticism
of Hezbollah.
MM Hezbollah and Lebanese armed forces clash.
MM Members of the Lebanese government become outspoken critics of
Syria or Iran.
MM The Lebanese government attempts to stifle Hezbollah attempts to
organize protests.
Israel launches full-scale assault on Hezbollah

MM The IDF is placed on high alert.
MM Heavy IDF mobilization begins in northern Israel.
MM IDF patrols on the Lebanese border cease.
MM Weapons, food, and medical supplies are moved toward the
Lebanese border.
MM IDF units in training are recalled from exercises.
MM The IDF calls up reserve units.
MM IAF pilots’ leave is cancelled.

MM Preparations for Jewish Shabbat or other High Holiday are
eschewed (if applicable).
MM The IAF increases the number of reconnaissance missions over
Lebanon.
MM The Israeli Navy moves toward Lebanese waters.
MM Israeli residents in the north are advised to remain near protective
bunkers.
MM The United States upholds Israeli right to self-defense.
Israel carries out limited military strikes

MM The IAF increases the number of reconnaissance missions over
Lebanon.
MM Moderate IDF mobilization begins in northern Israel.
MM IDF patrols on the Lebanese border decrease.
MM The IDF is placed on high alert.
MM The United States upholds Israeli right to self-defense.
Israel carries out targeted killing operations

MM Israel issues threats and warnings to Hezbollah leadership.
MM The IAF begins reconnaissance flights over the homes and known
hideouts of Hezbollah leaders.
MM Hezbollah leaders are killed under suspicious or violent circumstances.
Israel limits its response or withholds from attacking

Hezbollah at all
MM Israel declares a willingness to work as equal partners with the
United States toward a general settlement with the Arab world.
MM The United States indicates a willingness to reduce the level of
economic aid going to Israel.
MM The United States agrees to fund the building of more desalination
plants in Israel.
MM The United States supports Israel’s claim on the Golan Heights.

MM The United States agrees to deemphasize opposition to Israel’s
program of building settlements in the West Bank.
MM Israeli public opinion is strongly against another war.
MM The IDF does not mobilize its troops.
MM The IDF is engaged in another war.
MM The ruling center–right coalition falls apart and Netanyahu
government fails to secure support in the Knesset for major policy
decisions.
The United States pursues a military option against

Hezbollah
MM Hezbollah attacks Jewish targets in the United States, killing
American citizens.
MM The Obama administration gains Congressional support for action
against Hezbollah.
MM The United States Navy deploys in the eastern Mediterranean.
MM The United States has completed the withdrawal from Iraq.
MM The United States successfully crushes rising Taliban threat, freeing
resources for use against Hezbollah.
MM The United States pledges to support the integrity of Israeli security.
MM Obama makes reference to Hezbollah as a catalyst for instability in
the Middle East.
The United States tones down its response

MM The Obama administration fails to gain Congressional support for
action against Hezbollah.
MM The timetable for the Iraq withdrawal is extended.
MM The war in Afghanistan takes a turn for the worse, occupying more
resources.
MM The Obama administration and Democratic Congress suffer from
low approval ratings during either the 2010 mid-term or 2012
presidential election year.
MM Oil prices begin to spike as a result of the increasingly volatile

situation.
The number of focal events and indicators associated with this situation
are vast and potentially infinite. Only the most probable focal events and
indicators have been included here in an effort to make this analysis more
concise, palatable, and relevant. However, as events continue to unfold in
the future, this list of focal events and indicators will undoubtedly need to
be updated, and so this list should be considered as nothing more than a
snapshot of the situation in late July 2009.
Transposition of alternate futures

The final step of the LAMP method involves analyzing the possibility of
the transposition of one alternate future into another alternate future.
Transposition occurs when the events of one future change the perceptions
and courses of action for the actors, transposing the original alternate
future into another alternate future. After a possible future has trans-
posed into another, the probabilities for each possible future change. The
opportunities for transposition between any two alternate futures may not
necessarily be as abundant as the opportunities for transposition among a
separate pair of futures. The opportunities for transposition among the five
most probable futures in each scenario will be analyzed.
Scenario 1: Hezbollah terror attack against

Israeli or Jewish target abroad
to the terror attack, while the United States and Lebanon
This future is the most likely future in this scenario. This future provides
ample opportunity to transpose into Alternate Future #9 if Hezbollah
chooses to escalate the conflict by retaliating against Israel’s limited response
by either launching a military attack or conducting another terror attack
against an Israeli or Jewish target abroad. Israel chooses in this future to
escalate the level of its response accordingly and launch a full-scale invasion
of Lebanon. Meanwhile, the United States condemns the escalation by
Hezbollah, while urging restraint and a speedy operation by Israel. The
Lebanese government will publicly chastise Hezbollah for its “reckless
adventurism,” and will condemn the Israeli response as “disproportionate.”
Conversely, this future could transpose into Alternate Future #27 if

Hezbollah were to refrain from retaliating for the limited Israeli response.
In this future, Hezbollah publicly condemns the Israeli action and threatens
revenge. Israel responds by warning Hezbollah that further provocations
will draw another Israeli response, the degree of which will be determined
later. The United States will urge both sides to exercise restraint, and the
Lebanese government will remain silent publicly, while privately expressing
reservations to Hezbollah about the group’s provocative behavior.

The second most likely future in this scenario does not have as much
potential to transpose into another future. This is due in large part to the
nature of Israel’s response, which represents the highest level of escalation
in the conflict. Therefore the only possibility in this conflict is for both sides
to tone down the level of aggression, transposing into Alternate Future #27.
In this future, Israel faces immense pressure from the international
community to put an end to the operation. Eventually, the Obama admin-
istration will feel intense pressure to urge Israel to withdraw its forces
from Lebanon. Israel reluctantly agrees, phasing the withdrawal out over a
72-hour period. Hezbollah, trying to recover from the onslaught, makes no
effort to engage or provoke the IDF further. Once the IDF has returned to
Israel, Hezbollah and the Israeli government will exchange warnings and
threats, as both sides seek to frame the conflict in a manner that portrays
their side in a better light to the international community.

limited response to the terror attack, while Lebanon chooses
This future provides some opportunity to transpose into either Alternate
Future #9 or Alternate Future #27. The potential for transposition stems
from the response that Hezbollah provides to the limited response of Israel
and the United States. Due to the covert nature of American participation,
Hezbollah will not be aware of the role that the United States played in the
assassination of one of its operatives.
Hezbollah can elect to respond with another terror attack abroad or
with a direct military attack on Israel. In this future, Israel responds to
the escalation with a full-scale assault on Hezbollah, transposing this
future into Alternate Future #9. If Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate for
the limited response, this future will transpose into Alternate Future #27,
as Hezbollah will issue a condemnation and threaten revenge. Israel will
respond with threats and warnings of its own.

Hezbollah’s terror attack
This future, due to its low level of escalation, provides ample opportunity
for transposition. If Hezbollah wishes to provoke Israel to attack, the
group can escalate the conflict by either taking more provocative courses
of action, conducting a terror attack abroad, or directly attacking Israel.
Israel’s responses to these actions will determine the degree of transposition.
If Israel elects to provide a limited response, the future will transpose
to Alternate Future #18. If Israel decides to launch a full-scale invasion of
Lebanon, this future will transpose to Alternate Future #9.

Hezbollah in response to the terror attack, while the United
States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon pursues
diplomatic channels to address the situation
This future provides ample opportunity for transposition despite the high
state of escalation that this future represents. The United States can either
further its involvement in the conflict, transposing this future into Alternate
Future #3, or withdraw from the conflict, transposing this future into
Alternate Future #9.
In Alternate Future #3, Hezbollah will decide to engage American forces
in Iraq, killing several in ambushes. The United States responds by escalating
its involvement in the Lebanese conflict, in essence declaring all-out war
against Hezbollah. The United States decides to coordinate the invasion with
Israel, providing naval security and aerial monitoring of eastern Lebanon in
an effort to stem the flow of weapons from Syria and Iran. After enduring
significant international pressure to halt the operation, the United States
and Israel withdraw. Hezbollah’s leadership survives the war, but the group
sustains a severe blow to its military capacity. However, the United States
and Israel pay a significant political cost to achieve this objective.
In Alternate Future #9, the United States begins to suffer higher-than-
expected casualties in Lebanon. This development sours the American
public and government on the merits of continued American involvement
in Lebanon, and the United States withdraws from the country. The IDF
continues the fight, but the confusion caused by the sudden American
withdrawal stalls the IDF operation, and Israel withdraws its military from
Lebanon. Hezbollah suffers damage to its military capabilities, but is able
to claim a victory, pointing to the haphazard nature of the American and
Israeli withdrawals.
The last opportunity for transposition stems from an Israeli decision
to halt its operation in Lebanon, transforming this future into Alternate
Future #27. In this future, Israel begins to suffer higher-than-expected
casualties and pressure mounts among the Israeli public to end the war. The
government, afraid of its tenuous hold on power, acquiesces to the public
demand and withdraws from Lebanon. The United States, which limited
its response to logistical support, no longer has a mission in Lebanon and
leaves the region. Hezbollah claims a victory despite the extensive damage
done to Lebanon, while Israel begins the process of examining its short-
comings in yet another flawed invasion of Lebanon.
In addition to the analysis of each of the top five most likely futures in
this scenario, there is a special consideration for transposition. If Hezbollah
attacks an Israeli or Jewish target within the United States, and American
citizens are killed, any of the given alternate futures could transpose into
Alternate Future #3, which is a joint full-scale invasion of Lebanon by the
United States and Israel, or Alternate Future #6, in which the United States
provides a limited response in the form of support for an Israeli invasion.
Alternate Future #15, a joint limited response by the United States and
Israel is possible, but it is likely that, if given the free reign and overt moral
support by the United States to pursue a full-scale invasion of Lebanon,
Israel will adopt this course of action. The same opportunities for transpo-
sition exist in the event that Hezbollah kidnaps, kills, or otherwise overtly
engages American forces or personnel in the Middle East.
Scenario 2: Hezbollah conducts direct military

attack against Israel
The most likely future in this scenario does not have as much potential
to transpose into another future. This is due in large part to the nature
of Israel’s response, which represents the highest level of escalation in the
conflict. Therefore the only possibility in this conflict is for both sides to
tone down the level of aggression, transposing into Alternate Future #27.
This possibility exists primarily because a state of war between Israel and
Hezbollah is unsustainable for either side and cannot last indefinitely.
In this future, Israel faces limited but increasing pressure from the inter-
national community to put an end to the operation as it begins to drag out
into its fourth week. Despite supporting Israel’s right to self-defense, the
Obama administration will eventually feel intense pressure to urge Israel
to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. Israel reluctantly agrees, phasing the
withdrawal out over a 72-hour period. Hezbollah, trying to recover from
the onslaught, makes no effort to engage or provoke the IDF further. Once
the IDF has returned to Israel, Hezbollah and the Israeli government will
exchange warnings and threats, as both sides seek to frame the conflict
in a manner that portrays their side in a better light to the international
community.
Alternate Future #8: Israel launches a full-scale invasion of

Lebanon, the United States pursues a diplomatic option, and
Lebanon pursues a limited response to Hezbollah’s attack on
Israel
This future presents limited opportunity for transposition. Like Alternate
Future #9 above, this future has the potential to transpose to Alternate
Future #27. The unique case of transposition for this future will emerge
out of Lebanon’s hesitancy to involve itself in a struggle against Hezbollah.
In this future, Lebanon regrets its decision to take the course of limited
response by cooperating with Israel. Spurred on by regret and fear of
reprisal by Hezbollah, the Lebanese government cuts off communication
with the IDF, and instead encourages Hezbollah to take steps to end the
war with Israel. The IDF does not suffer as a result of Lebanon’s decision
and continues with the operation until it is pressured by the United States
to withdraw its forces from Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s military capability will be diminished, but the group will
retain the popularity it has achieved in Lebanon. Israel, having evidence
of Lebanon’s cooperation with the IDF, explores options to blackmail the
Lebanese government by threatening to release the evidence of its collusion
with Israel during the invasion.

to Hezbollah’s direct military attack, while the United
States and Lebanon choose to handle the situation through
diplomatic channels
This future provides ample opportunity to transpose into Alternate Future
#9 if Hezbollah chooses to escalate the conflict by retaliating against
Israel’s limited response. Because Israel will perceive its initial response
as one defined by its restraint, retaliation by Hezbollah will decrease

Israeli inhibitions about expanding its response. Israel chooses in this
future to escalate the level of its response accordingly and launch a full-
scale invasion of Lebanon. Meanwhile, the United States condemns the
escalation by Hezbollah, while urging restraint and a speedy operation
by Israel. The Lebanese government will publicly chastise Hezbollah
for its “reckless adventurism,” and will condemn the Israeli response as
“disproportionate.”
In this future, Hezbollah threatens revenge but also claims that Israel’s
limited response was proof of the nation’s “lack of resolve.” Israel
responds by warning Hezbollah that further provocations will draw
another stronger Israeli response, the degree of which will be determined
later. The United States will urge both sides to exercise restraint, and the
Lebanese government will remain silent publicly, while privately expressing
reservations to Hezbollah about the group’s provocative behavior.

Hezbollah in response to the group’s direct military attack
on Israel, while the United States pursues a limited response,
and Lebanon pursues diplomatic channels to address the
situation
In Alternate Future #3, Hezbollah will decide to engage American
forces in Iraq, killing several in ambushes. The United States responds by
escalating its involvement in the Lebanese conflict, in essence declaring
all-out war against Hezbollah. The United States decides to coordinate
the invasion with Israel, providing naval security and aerial monitoring
of eastern Lebanon in an effort to stem the flow of weapons from Syria
and Iran. Despite a strong casus belli for both Israel and the United States,
significant international pressure builds to halt the operation as it enters
its third week. After brief negotiations between the United States, Israel,
Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the United Nations, the United States and Israel
withdraw. Hezbollah’s leadership survives the war, but the group sustains a
debilitating blow to its military capacity. The United States and Israel pay a
significant political cost for the operation, but enjoy a modicum of private
support from world leaders who perceive that both nations had reasonable
cause to invade Lebanon.
public and government on the merits of continued American involvement
in Lebanon, and the United States withdraws from the country. The
IDF continues the fight without American assistance, but international
pressure builds more quickly as a result of the American pull-out. The
IDF halts the advance of its ground invasion and focuses on destroying
Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. After the
conflict enters its fourth week, the United States begins to join the chorus
of nations that are urging Israel to wrap up its operation. Israel unilat-
erally withdraws from Lebanon less than five weeks after the start of
hostilities.
The last opportunity for transposition stems from an Israeli decision
to halt its operation in Lebanon, transforming this future into Alternate
Future #27. In this future, Israel begins to suffer higher-than-expected
casualties and pressure mounts among the Israeli public to end the war. The
government, afraid of its tenuous hold on power, acquiesces to the public
demand and withdraws from Lebanon. The United States, which limited
its response to logistical support, no longer has a mission in Lebanon and
leaves the region. Hezbollah claims a victory despite the extensive damage
done to Lebanon, while Israel begins the process of examining its short-
comings in yet another flawed invasion of Lebanon.
Alternate Future #3: Israel and the United States launch

a full-scale assault against Hezbollah in response to the
group’s attack on Israel, while Lebanon engages Hezbollah
through diplomatic channels
This future provides little room for transposition into another probable
future. The only reasonable transposition is into Alternate Future #27.
This possibility exists primarily because a state of war between Israel and
Hezbollah is unsustainable for either side and cannot last indefinitely.
However, there are opportunities for a premature end to the hostilities that
results in Alternate Future #27.
In this future, the United States and Israel launch a devastating invasion
of Lebanon. The combined forces of the United States and Israel quickly
overwhelm Hezbollah forces in the south, and the operation begins to
spread toward the Bekaa Valley and the southern outskirts of Beirut.
The alarming rate of the advance stuns the Lebanese government. The
government condemns the invasion, calling it “exceedingly dispropor-
tionate,” and threatens to put the Lebanese army between the combined
American–Israeli force and further advancement into Lebanon. The

United States and Israel halt their advance, unwilling to directly challenge
Lebanese sovereignty and trigger a regional war by engaging the national
army.
With little recourse to expand the operation, the United States and
Israel begin preparations to wrap up the operation amid growing interna-
tional pressure on the two nations to quit Lebanon. Within three weeks
of invading Lebanon, the United States and Israel withdraw their forces,
leaving a battered country. Hezbollah sustains considerable damage to its
military apparatus, and pledges to redouble its efforts at rearmament and
to continue its struggle against Israel.
As with Scenario 1, any Hezbollah attack that directly affects American
citizens or personnel is likely to steel the American resolve to confront
Hezbollah. However, because a Hezbollah terror attack is off the table in
this scenario, the strong sentiment and conviction that such an event would
stir among the American public and government is absent.
Scenario 3: Hezbollah provokes Israel to attack

Hezbollah’s provocations
This future, due to its low level of escalation, ostensibly provides ample
opportunity for transposition. However, upon closer inspection, this
scenario constricts Hezbollah’s inciting course of action to mere provo-
cation. If Hezbollah wishes to provoke Israel to attack, the group can
escalate the conflict only by taking more provocative courses of action until
Israel finally responds with force, transposing this future into Alternate
Future #18.
In this future, Hezbollah’s provocations continue until the group finally
launches a small number of Katyushas that fall near the northern Israeli
town of Nahariya. Israel responds with a short series of bombing sorties,
targeting Hezbollah communications and command centers in southern
Lebanon.
Alternate Future #27 can transpose into Alternate Future #9, but only
incrementally, through a series of escalations during which the future is
first transposed into Alternate Future #18, as demonstrated in the previous
paragraph. Hezbollah’s reaction to this response escalates the conflict. A
group of Hezbollah members crosses the border into Israel and ambushes
an IDF patrol, killing several IDF personnel. Israel decides to pursue a more
expansive response and launches a full-scale assault on Hezbollah, trans-
posing this future in Alternate Future #9.

to provocations, while the United States and Lebanon
choose to handle the situation through diplomatic
channels
This future provides ample opportunity to transpose into Alternate Future
#9 if Hezbollah chooses to escalate the conflict by retaliating against
Israel’s limited response. Israel chooses in this future to escalate the level
of its response and launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon. Meanwhile,
the United States condemns the escalation by Hezbollah, while expressing
disappointment with the operation by Israel. The Lebanese government will
publicly chide Hezbollah for its provocations, and will condemn the Israeli
response as “disproportionate.”
In this future, Hezbollah threatens revenge but also claims that Israel’s
limited response was proof of the nation’s “lack of resolve.” Israel
responds by warning Hezbollah that further provocations will draw
another stronger Israeli response, the degree of which will be determined
later. The United States will urge both sides to exercise restraint, and
the Lebanese government will remain silent publicly, while privately
expressing reservations to Hezbollah about the group’s provocative
behavior.
Alternate Future #15: Israel and the United States pursue

a limited response to the provocation, while Lebanon
chooses to handle the situation through diplomatic
channels
This future provides some opportunity to transpose into either Alternate
Future #9 or Alternate Future #27. The potential for transposition stems
from the response that Hezbollah provides to the limited response of Israel
and the United States. Due to the covert nature of American participation,
Hezbollah will not be aware of the role that the United States played in the
assassination of one of its operatives.
Hezbollah can elect to respond with a terror attack abroad or with
a direct military attack on Israel. In this future, Israel responds to the
escalation with a full-scale assault on Hezbollah, transposing this future
into Alternate Future #9. If Hezbollah chooses not to retaliate for the
limited response, this future will transpose into Alternate Future #27, as
Hezbollah will issue a condemnation and threaten revenge. Israel will
respond with threats and warnings of its own.

This future does not have as much potential to transpose into another
future in this scenario. This is due in large part to the nature of Israel’s
response, which represents the highest level of escalation in the conflict.
Therefore the only possibility in this conflict is for both sides to tone down
the level of aggression, transposing into Alternate Future #27.
In this future, Israel faces immense pressure from the international
community to put an end to the operation, and is widely condemned for
its “disproportionate response” to Hezbollah saber rattling. Eventually, the
Obama administration will feel intense pressure to urge Israel to withdraw
its forces from Lebanon. Israel reluctantly agrees, phasing the withdrawal
out over a 72-hour period. Hezbollah, trying to recover from the onslaught,
makes no effort to engage or provoke the IDF further. Once the IDF has
returned to Israel, Hezbollah and the Israeli government will exchange
warnings and threats, as both sides seek to frame the conflict in a manner
that portrays their side in a better light to the international community.
However, Israel will suffer a significant political cost for carrying out the
operation, because of global perceptions that Israel “overreacted” to the
threat posed by Hezbollah.

Hezbollah in response to the group’s provocations, while
the United States pursues a limited response, and Lebanon
pursues diplomatic channels to address the situation
In Alternate Future #3, Hezbollah will decide to engage American forces
in Iraq, killing several in ambushes. The United States responds by escalating
its involvement in the Lebanese conflict, in essence declaring all-out war
against Hezbollah. The United States decides to coordinate the invasion
with Israel, providing naval security and aerial monitoring of eastern
Lebanon in an effort to stem the flow of weapons from Syria and Iran. After
enduring international condemnation for the “irresponsible escalation” of
the conflict and facing significant pressure to halt the operation, the United
States and Israel withdraw. Hezbollah’s leadership survives the war, but the
group sustains a severe blow to its military capacity. However, the United
States and Israel pay a significant political cost to achieve this objective.
public and government on the merits of continued American involvement in
Lebanon given the weak casus belli, and the United States withdraws from
the country. The IDF continues the fight, but the confusion caused by the
sudden American withdrawal stalls the IDF operation, and Israel withdraws
its military from Lebanon. Hezbollah suffers damage to its military capabil-
ities, but is able to claim a victory, pointing to the haphazard nature of the
American and Israeli withdrawals.
The last opportunity for transposition stems from an Israeli decision to
halt its operation in Lebanon, transforming this future into Alternate Future
#27. In this future, Israel begins to suffer higher-than-expected casualties
and pressure mounts among the Israeli public to end the war especially in
light of the weak casus belli. The government, afraid of its tenuous hold
on power, acquiesces to the public demand and withdraws from Lebanon.
The United States, which limited its response to logistical support, no
longer has a mission in Lebanon and leaves the region. Hezbollah claims a
victory despite the extensive damage done to Lebanon, while Israel begins
the process of examining its shortcomings in yet another flawed invasion
of Lebanon. Unlike in the aftermath of the 2006 war, Israel will determine
that there was not sufficient reason to initiate such an ill-fated operation,
and the Likud party will suffer significantly during the next general election.
Conclusion
It is extremely unlikely that Hezbollah will abandon its mission to struggle
against Israel. The struggle against Israel was a fundamental element
behind the group’s formation and has come to define the group’s role
within Lebanon and, increasingly, within the Muslim world as a whole.
Unlike the nation-state militaries that marched on Israel under the banner
of Pan-Arabism during the 1960s and 1970s, Hezbollah has enjoyed a
reasonable level of success against the IDF.
Hezbollah’s provocations are likely to draw an Israeli response of some
kind in the future. In 2006, Hezbollah failed to recognize the proverbial
“line in the sand” that Israel had drawn, and the group’s seemingly
innocuous provocation prompted a staggering Israeli response. There is
potential that the group could cross this line again by attacking an Israeli
or Jewish target, particularly if the attack results in a high casualty count.
Hezbollah has issued threats that it would conduct such an attack, and a
thwarted attack in Baku earlier in 2009 is an ominous indicator that the
group is pursuing a line of engagement that could push it and Israel to the
brink of war.
Israel’s utter unwillingness to define what action would warrant a limited
response or a full-scale assault is a principled decision that is made in an
effort to enhance strategic deterrence. Hezbollah, by virtue of its mission
to confront Israel, is likely to try and strike a balance between a level of
provocation that weakens Israeli resolve to resist concessions in the peace
process and avoids provoking Israel to a full-scale assault. The chances
that Hezbollah will succeed in this effort in the long term are almost
non-existent. The analysis of alternate futures and the potential for trans-
position eventually points to a full-scale Israeli operation against Hezbollah
at some time in the future.
The United States is likely to exercise a degree of patience when
confronting the prospects for war between Israel and Hezbollah. The
potential for war in the Middle East is a concern for the United States as it
begins a phased withdrawal from Iraq, and attempts to regain legitimacy
as an arbitrator in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians.
A spike in oil prices that would accompany renewed hostilities between
Israel and Hezbollah would adversely affect the deep recession that the
United States is facing. In the event of a strong Hezbollah provocation, the
Obama administration will find itself in the unenviable position of trying
to coerce an increasingly suspicious and cynical ally to show restraint. If
Israel launches a full-scale invasion, the United States would find itself in
the position of trying to balance its promises to respect Israel’s right to
self-defense with its efforts to regain the goodwill of the Muslim world and
the European Union, who would surely condemn any far-reaching Israeli
response.
The Lebanese government is not enamored of Hezbollah’s attempts
to confront Israel, but is essentially powerless to confront the group in
any meaningful way. The Lebanese government is likely to be spurred to
action only if it senses an existential threat to its existence or if it enjoys
the full support of the United States. The latter is extremely unlikely, and
Hezbollah will take steps to ensure that the government does not perceive
the former to be the case. The greatest asset of the Lebanese government
is its ability to put its army between an invading force and Hezbollah
positions. Such a move is extremely risky, but likely to impair efforts to
further engage Hezbollah, as an attack against the Lebanese army would
draw round condemnation from across the world.
Because of the prospect for American retaliation in concert with Israel,
Hezbollah is extremely unlikely to conduct a terror attack against a Jewish
target in the United States, or attack American interests overseas. The
group apparently recognizes this truism and has attempted attacks in cities
of countries such as Argentina and Azerbaijan, which lack the willingness
or capacity to retaliate. Due to the international distribution of the Jewish
population, Hezbollah’s potential list of targets is long, and while the

Baku attack was thwarted, a determined campaign to conduct such an
attack is likely to achieve success eventually. Such an attack is likely to
be Hezbollah’s best chance to inflict a significant wound on Israel while
avoiding a significant Israeli response.
Whether Hezbollah intends to simply maintain its current level of rhetoric
and provocation, or whether the group decides to take more aggressive
actions, such as conducting a terror attack or launching a military attack
of some kind against Israel, the group will continue to hold the world’s
interest. In particular, Israel, the United States, and Lebanon will be signifi-
cantly affected, and the courses of action of each actor will have a direct
effect on Hezbollah. The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is of vital
strategic interest to all four actors, and represents the most significant threat
to stability in the Middle East.
Instability in the Middle East has global repercussions. The sharp divide
in world opinion notwithstanding, conflicts in the Middle East put signif-
icant upward pressure on crude oil prices. This makes the promotion of
peace a high priority among the world’s leading consumers of oil, especially
the United States, which remains the world’s leading oil consumer. As long
as Hezbollah retains its core mission of struggle against Israel, that peace is
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The adaptability of the FARC

and ELNand the prediction
of their future actions
Author’s Note: This comprehensive predictive study by Mr Drew Lasater

was originally his independent Capstone thesis for his Masters of Strategic
Intelligence degree from American Military University, for which I served
as his thesis chair. What is especially noteworthy about this study is its
successful integration of the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)
with the LAMP, thus demonstrating that the two methods are not contra-
dictory, but complementary.
Introduction
Colombia is Latin America’s oldest democracy yet the nation has faced
continual violence and a guerrilla war that has made the nation weak
and fragmented. This violent foundation of the Colombian state made it
open to a new wave of political ideologies in the twentieth century. The
movement of Marxism-Leninism spread across Latin America, especially
among the intellectuals, peasants, and priests in Colombia. The purpose
of this chapter is to provide an analysis of the two main guerrilla
factions in the country—the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia) and the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)—and
predict the future of these groups. Studying the history of these organi-
zations and their adaptability within the Colombian context provides
insight into the emergence of guerrilla warfare and the problems for the
state.
Colombia has been in social and political turmoil since independence.

Like most Latin American countries, Colombia developed a political system
based on an oligarchy between the political and landed elite, with the
working poor and peasantry at the bottom. As Colombia began interacting
with international markets and businesses it produced economic growth
and prosperity for the elite while leaving the impoverished and margin-
alized populace open to the spread of revolutionary political ideologies.
The FARC and ELN emerged as the masses at the bottom of the social strata
were alienated by the ruling elite and their political system. While Colombia is
a popularly elected democracy there was little participation or reward for those
outside of the Liberal and Conservative parties. With the spread of revolu-
tionary ideals across Latin America due to the success of the Cuban Revolution,
the FARC and ELN found within Colombia the political and social context
necessary to employ revolutionary strategies that continue today.
Looking at these two revolutionary groups, their emergences, capacities
for change, and durability, provides insights on revolutionary groups and
their survival. The FARC and ELN have faced incredible odds due to the
rejection of the local people, lack of external support, or weak organiza-
tions in general. But these two organizations have been able to strengthen,
adapt, and expand even as public support has waned. They have survived
with little or no external support and they have learned to become self-
sufficient over time. Not only are these groups a model for the study of
modern revolutionary movements but of the prevention of revolutionaries
and counterinsurgency tactics as well. Very few revolutionary movements
in history have been able to achieve the level of success and adaptability of
these two organizations over nearly half a century.
In the process of studying these groups, the political environment of Colombia
and the twentieth-century background are also of great importance. The
movement of Marxism throughout the world created hope for a utopian ideal
which spoke to the disenfranchised and sparked the belief that the revolution
was possible. The workers of the world only needed a cohesive leadership
structure. In Colombia, the revolution was based on land redistribution and an
equitable sharing of wealth. These ideals, coupled with the lack of social change
in Colombia, have led to a long-standing revolutionary climate.
Beginning in Part One, the chapter looks at the emergence of Marxism as
a political ideology in the late 1800s. By 1917, Lenin interpreted Marxism to
create what would be the first socialist country, Russia, after the Bolshevik
Revolution. Part One then moves on to Stalinism and the spread of socialist
ideology all over the world. After an overview of Stalin and Mao, the
analysis takes up the Soviet and Mao influence in Latin America and the
Cuban Revolution. This moves the work through the influence of the Cuban
Revolution and the emergence of revolutionary ideology in Colombia.
Part Two focuses on the FARC and the origins of the revolutionary group.
Using liberalism as the theoretical approach and through rational choice
The adaptability of the FARC and ELN 211
modeling, the work will test hypotheses using a matrix diagram. The purpose
of Part Two is to show the adaptability of the FARC as an explanation for
their survival and ability to compete with the Colombian government. This
also explains the ideology that formed the FARC and how that ideology has
changed with the evolution of the revolutionary group. This research and
framework will be the basis for the next part on the ELN as well.
Part Three discusses the ELN and its origins as a revolutionary movement.
This part also uses liberalism as its theoretical approach with the testing
of hypotheses completed through rational choice modeling and a matrix
diagram. The purpose of Part Three is to show the origins and ideology of
the ELN and how that ideology changed as the political and social dynamic
changed in Colombia. The ELN’s adaptability for survival and its ability to
stay a strong revolutionary group is also discussed. This leads into the final
part of the chapter on predicting the future of these groups.
Part Four is a LAMP (Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction) study
conducted on both the FARC and ELN using the actions of the government
as a backdrop. Beginning with the political history of the government,
Part Four explains how the government acts in Colombia and its motiva-
tions. By utilizing the liberalism theoretical approach that acknowledges
the importance of non-state actors, the LAMP study focuses on the FARC
and ELN actions and predicts the future actions and behaviors of these
groups vis-à-vis actions by the state of Colombia. The study will outline the
scenarios possible and provide a prediction of how the FARC and ELN will
act based on past behaviors.
This chapter sets out to present a chronological and historical analysis of
the FARC and ELN and their effectiveness as revolutionary organizations.
Through this process, the political and ideological events during the life
spans of these groups will be considered and used to predict their possible
futures. One cannot revolutionary activity in Colombia without considering
the FARC and ELN. By studying the emergence and adaptability of both
guerrilla groups, insights are to be gained in understanding the role of the
revolutionaries in the Latin American social and political climate. It is the
intent of this chapter to add to the literature on Colombia revolutionaries
and through the use of new methods, offer new insights to the conflict in
Colombia.
Part One: Marxist roots of the FARC and ELN

Introduction
In post-World War II Latin America, Marxist-inspired insurgency groups
formed in response to the unequal distribution of land ownership and wealth,
and ongoing state-sponsored violence. This part forms the background

necessary to trace the Marxist influence from the 1800s through Lenin,
Stalin, and Mao, as applicable to Latin America, particularly in Colombia’s
FARC and ELN. Karl Marx planted the seeds of revolution in his creation
of a comprehensive social and political philosophy that would become
known as classical Marxism. While the creation of what became Marxism
was the result of many philosophers, Marx was the dominating philosophy
from which the political form of communism from Lenin, Stalin, and
Mao was created. Marxism was never applied during his lifetime, but
Marx’s writings became the root system for the practical applications of
communism by nations and revolutionaries throughout the world. These
communist/socialist ideologies were similar in that they stemmed from
Marx’s ideas of class struggle and class equity. With Marxism providing
the philosophical side of the communist movement, Lenin and Stalin inter-
preted Marx’s ideology through the application of his principles and ideals
in Russia. While the actual result of the Soviet experience was far from
what Marx had hoped for or predicted, the Russian Revolution became the
springboard for the expansion of communist and socialist ideologies around
the globe, where they were employed especially in the Third World. Once
communism reached China and Latin America, revolutionary movements
began that are still active today.
Marxism
Marx’s social and political philosophy was a grand narrative, a critique
of modern capitalism in European industrial society. One looking at Karl
Marx and his work must understand that “Marx was not an academic
writer but a humanist in the Renaissance sense of the term: his mind
was concerned with the totality of human affairs, and his vision of social
liberation embraced as an interdependent whole, all of the major problems
with which humanity is faced.”1 This explains how the writings of Marx
were more romantic and less practical, where his works tended to follow
general ideas rather than practical means for attaining social and political
goals. As editor of Rheinische Zeitung, Marx focused on political abuses
and socio-economic inequality.2 He decried the monopolization of wealth
and property, declaring the poor “the elemental class of human society.”3
The works of Marx follow “three fields of speculation—basic philosophic
anthropology, socialist doctrine, and economic analysis—and point to three
corresponding sources in German dialectics, French socialist thought, and
British political economy.”4 Marx was introduced to Hegelianism which
“was the interpretation of history as a progressive rationalization of the
world in accordance with the ineluctable laws of the spirit; the chief purpose
of philosophical thought was to observe this evolution, in which empirical
reality was seen gradually to conform to universal reason.”5 Hegel’s “idea”

of the state was turned by Marx into the “reality” of the “crass pursuit of
self-interest and slavish service to aristocratic and bourgeois interests” by
the Prussian bureaucracy.6 Marx took from Hegel the notion of history
unfolding, but rather than by “laws of the spirit” the unfolding was a
function of historically material processes. Marx’s criticism of religion is
evident in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right on man and religion
as they pertain to politics:
Man is the world of man, the state, and society. This state, this society
produce religion’s inverted attitude to the world, because they are an
inverted world themselves. Religion is … the imaginary realization of
human being, because human being possesses no true reality. Thus the
struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world
whose spiritual aroma is religion … Religion is the opium of the people.
The real happiness of the people requires the abolition of religion, which
is their illusory happiness. In demanding that they give up illusions
about their condition, we demand that they give up a condition that
requires illusion … Once the holy form of human self-alienation has
been unmasked, the first task of philosophy, in the service of history, is
to unmask self-alienation in its unholy forms. The criticism of heaven
is thus transformed into criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into
the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of
politics.7
Marx looked at the state of Germany for example and discussed its
liberation:
We must make the actual oppression even more oppressive by making

people conscious of it, and the insult even more insulting by publicizing
it … We must force these petrified relationships to dance by playing their
own tune to them. To give people courage, we must teach them to be
alarmed by themselves.”8
For Marx, it was necessary for the oppressed classes to be relieved of

their religion as an opiate, which kept them from acting on their collective
alienation. Marx explains how the “social revolution can only be carried
out by a class whose particular interests coincide with that of all society,
and whose claims represent universal needs.”9 With that, Marx portrays the
liberation of the proletariat and its abolition as a separate class resulting
in the subsequent destruction of class distinctions by abolishing private
property.10
Marx first discussed socialism not as a substitution of one political life
by another but as the “abolition of politics altogether.”11 He looked at
socialism as the “full emancipation of the individual by the destruction

of the web of mystification which turned community life into a world of
estrangement presided over by an alienated bureaucracy.”12 According to
Marx, capitalism separates the individual from their means of production,
concentrates production and its means in the hands of capitalists, and
achieves cooperative activity through coercion.13 This unrestrained pursuit
of self-interest generates tension between the individual activity and cooper-
ation.14 These ideas make the assumption that there can be a perfect union
between collective and individual interests and that a society where all
sources of conflict, aggression, and evil have been removed was thinkable
and historically imminent.15 Marx held that the bourgeois “freedom
dissolves feudal ties and extends formal rights, but neither sustains
community nor provides adequate opportunities for those below the middle
class.”16 Marx intended a “practical philosophy” over the “contemplative”
attitudes of his predecessors and peers: “The philosophers have only inter-
preted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it”17
Marx believed that the primary source of social conflict lies within the
division of labor and the resulting class antagonisms.18 Since this division
of labor is the primary cause of social inequality and private property, the
chief goal of communism is to abolish the division of labor and allow men
to take part in all types of work and thus achieve all-round development.19
Leveling social divisions by abolishing property ownership and class distinc-
tions promotes the conditions for revolution. “First, the state of servitude
must become intolerable and the masses must be deprived of possessions
totally opposed to the existing order20… Second, technical development
must have reached an advanced stage: communism in a premature state
would only be generalized poverty.”21
Communism must also occur on the global stage where each county
is economically interdependent on each other, which is brought about by
simultaneous revolution in the most dominant and advanced countries.22
While “previous revolutions have altered the division of labor and distri-
bution of social activity,” communism as a revolution will abolish labor and
class divisions in the human race.23 Thus it will “bring about a universal
transformation in the terms of production and exchange.”24 Marx’s materi-
alist analyses stress class struggles over the forms of property and his focus
was on the social relationships associated with material factors rather than
material conditions “per se.”25
Materialism, according to Marx, points to productive forces as the
“ultimate causal agent” of major change but class struggle is the immediate
“motor.”26 Marxist ideas of historical materialism give rise to class
antagonism; against which Marx encourages the proletariat to resist, but
Marx also realized that as production yields surpluses capable of freeing a
significant portion of the populace from labor a fundamental “class split”
arises into the “ruling classes” and “direct producers.”27 This “split” is
the foundation for “class struggle” which creates new class structures and
reshapes social life.28 The problem is that complex splits between fragments
in single classes and cross-class alliances through legal “orders” and status
groups causes “internecine” conflict.29 For that reason, Marx’s portrayal
of extremely fragmented class relations through ethnic, racial, gender,
religious, and other socio-cultural divisions hinder class struggles.30 While
it was not until years after Marx that Latin America adopted his revolu-
tionary ideology, there are distinct class fragmentations in the region that
epitomize the problems Marx saw in class struggles.
In 1847–48, Marx and Engels31 were asked to join a League of
Communist bodies from many European nations.32 On the advice of Marx
and Engels, the name was changed to The Communist League and coined
the motto ‘Proletarians of all countries, unite!’33 It was at this time that the
league created the “Principles of Communism.”34 These principles “dealt
with capitalist exploitation and the inevitability of crises and described
the future society based on community of goods, political democracy,
equal wages, and planned industrial production” and also explained the
necessity of simultaneous revolution in civilized countries.35 In 1848, the
first Manifesto of the Communist Party was published, where relationships
“between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between the communists and
the proletariat, and between communism and existing socialist doctrines”
are dealt with.36 The Communist Manifesto makes the call for global
communism in a proletarian “conquest of political power” through the
abolition of private property and social classes.37 The Manifesto also antici-
pated critiques of communism with these rebuttals38 [in italics, added]:
1 The abolition of private property will lead to general idleness and

the collapse of production. But private property does not exist
today for the masses, yet society exists and maintains itself.
2 Communism is the denial of individuality. Yes—of such individuals
as are enabled by the system to use their own property as an
instrument for the enslavement of others.
3 Communism destroys the family. It destroys the bourgeois family,
based on property-ownership on the one hand and on prostitution
and hypocrisy on the other. Big business has destroyed the family
life of the proletariat.
4 Communism is against nationality. But the working man has no
fatherland, so how can he be deprived of one? In any case the
world market is effacing national differences, and the victory of
the proletariat will intensify this process. When the exploitation of
man by man is abolished we shall also see an end of exploitation,
oppression, and enmity among nations. National oppression is the
outcome of social oppression.
5 Communism seeks to destroy the eternal truths and sublime ideas

of religion, ethics, and philosophy. But all the ideas bequeathed by
history are absolute only in so far as exploitation and oppression
have persisted despite all changes in political systems. The spiritual
output of mankind is as changeable as the conditions of human
existence; ideas are permanent in so far as particular relations
have hitherto been permanent. Communism overthrows “eternal”
ideas by destroying the class system which, by existing from time
immemorial, gave them the appearance of eternity.39
Marxism focused on the domain of social philosophy and while Marxism was
being used as an ideology for a political movement, the philosophy required
interpretation and specification which caused tensions and contradictions
within Marxism previously unnoticed.40 Even more difficult was the appli-
cation of Marx’s prophecies concerning the nature of communism.41 Since
Marx explained that “socialism deposes objective economic laws and enables
men to control the conditions of their lives, it is easy to infer that a socialist
society can do anything it likes,” and thus Marx’s dream of unity could
“take the form of a despotic party oligarchy.”42 Marx asserted that the “first
phase of communist society would carry the defects of capitalism’s limited
economic and cultural development.”43 He contended that the “first step in
the revolution … is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win
the battle for democracy.”44 However, Marx realized that in this first phase
the “state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the prole-
tariat” and that the political wing of the proletariat would “expropriate the
bourgeoisie and centralize primary means of production and infrastructure.”45
On another occasion, Marx used the term “dictatorship of the prole-
tariat” and never explained what it meant but he “had in mind the
class content of the power system and not, as Lenin did, the liquidation
of democratic institutions.”46 The implication of the first phase was a
total centralization of power which would employ “despotic” force to
implement its modernization plan.47 According to Marx, the communist
state authorities had to monopolize power and ignore calls for “freedom
for the communities” or “self government” in order to create a productive
and socio-cultural infrastructure for a break with bourgeois society.48 “The
Leninist-Stalinist version of Marxism was no more than a version, i.e.
one attempt to put into practice the ideas that Marx expressed in a philo-
sophical form without any clear principles of political interpretation.”49
Leninism
By the 1890s Marxism came into public debate in Russia but was used
mainly to denounce capitalism and its effects, and to support Russia
choosing a path of its own.50 It was through the October Revolution that
Lenin’s presence and activity in forming the Bolshevik Party was an indis-
pensable condition of the revolution’s outbreak and success.51 Leninism
has been disputed as a variant of Marxism; some see it as “a ‘revisionist’
ideology in relation to the Marxist tradition,” and others see it as a
“faithful application of the general principles of Marxism to a new political
situation.”52 Lenin looked only at the singular aim of the revolution “and
the meaning of all human affairs, ideas, institutions, and values resided
exclusively in their bearing on the class struggle.”53 While Marx and Engels
supported these ideas, their focus was much broader than the Lenin focus:
“Is this good or bad for the revolution?”54
There are three specific points that call into question the fidelity of
Lenin to the Marxist tradition.55 First, Lenin “advocated an alliance
between the proletariat and the peasantry as the basic strategies for the
‘bourgeois revolution,’ while his opponents contended that an alliance
with the bourgeoisie would be more in accordance with the doctrine in
this case.”56 “Secondly, Lenin was the first to see the national question
as a powerful reservoir of energy that social democrats could and should
use to further their cause, instead of merely an awkward hindrance.”57
Third, Lenin created his own organizational rules and his own version of
the party attitude towards resistance by the workers.58 As critical as his
opponents were about these policies, they were necessary to the success of
the Bolshevik Revolution.59
Lenin’s ideas of the party were considered despotic and are considered
by some historians as the beginning of the entire “hierarchical, totalitarian
structure in which the socialist system was subsequently embodied.”60 Lenin
was accused of elitism; he desired to substitute a revolutionary organization
for the working class and that the power should reside with the intelligentsia
rather than proletariat.61 It was understood that socialism’s theoretical
foundations had to be laid by intellectuals and it was also accepted that the
workers’ party differed from the working class since nothing in the writings
of Marx showed the two as one and the same.62 To Lenin, the working-
class movement in the true sense of the term was a movement of the right
ideology, not a movement of workers.63 While it was important for Lenin
to have as many workers in the party as possible, he looked at the party as
an entity where the distinction of intellectuals and workers disappeared if
provided with the correct theoretical consciousness.64 The “consciousness
of the proletariat” would be embodied despite what the general proletariat
thought of the party.65 Hence, it was the premise of Lenin that “requires
us to believe that the interests and aims of the social class, the proletariat,
can and indeed must be determined without that class having any say in the
matter.”66 This hegemonic idea developed into an authoritative party role,
which was a “despotism” based on the idea that the “party always knows
better the interests, needs, and even desires” of the community than do the
“backward people” themselves.67 “In this way Lenin laid the foundation
of what was to become the Communist Party—a party distinguished by
ideological unity, efficiency, a hierarchic and centralized structure, and the
conviction that it represents the interest of the proletariat whatever the
proletariat itself may think.”68 This party deems its own interests to be
that of the working class and of “universal progress” due to its “scientific
knowledge” that entitles it to ignore the “actual wishes and aspirations of
the people it appointed itself to represent.”69
Lenin was the first and only important social democrat in Europe
to invoke the idea that the proletariat would militarily overthrow the
government to turn the war from imperialist to civil.70 Lenin believed that
the Russian Revolution would spark an international or at least a European
revolution based on the “rising tide of revolution and the outbreaks in
Bavaria, Hungary, and Estonia, but also on Lenin’s conviction that the
European war could only be stopped by overthrowing capitalism.”71 When
it became clear that the greater European proletariat would not follow
Lenin or “would fail trying” and that the end of the war could be brought
about by alternative means there was the question of what the party was to
do with their new found power.72 Thus began the dispute with Stalin and
Trotsky over socialism in one state and “whether the building of socialism
in Russia should be subordinated to the cause of the world revolution or
vice versa.”73 It is evident, however, that after Russia’s Revolution Lenin’s
attention was dedicated to policy as the head of state and not the leader of
a worldwide revolution.74 While the Russian Revolution was a communist
revolution in the sense that it transferred power to the Communist Party,
it did not follow the Marxist predictions for the downfall of capitalist
society.75
Stalinism
This brings the final phase of communism in Russia to the forefront since
the era of Stalin was significant in the international scene with both the
expansion of Soviet influence and the onset of the Cold War. The rule of
Stalin was horrific but largely accidental in its application.76 For many
communists, the emergence of Stalinism occurred as a result of the circum-
stances of the era, such as the cultural and industrial backwardness in
Russia, the failure of an anticipated European revolution, external threats to
Russia, and the political exhaustion of the Soviet state after the revolution,
rather than the despotism of Stalin himself.77 Many observers see the Soviet
system under Stalin as the continuation of Marxism and Leninism, which
can be best described as an “all-powerful authority competent to declare
at any given moment what Marxism was and what it was not.”78 Marxism
meant nothing more or less than what Stalin currently pronounced and
unlike Lenin, the regime of Stalin was unique in that it became an interna-
tional phenomenon.79 Stalin used pieces of work from Marx, Engels, and
Lenin to support his ideology, which seemed to change frequently. Upon
Stalin’s rise to power it became clear that the Russians needed to set forth a
socialist transformation in their own country first before they could inspire
revolutions around the world.80 This was very similar to the circumstances
Lenin found after the revolution when he realized his efforts had to be
directed to head the state. Essentially, Marxism under Stalin differed from
Leninism by adding the two main tenets: 1) socialism could be built in one
country alone; and 2) “that the class struggle must become fiercer as the
building of socialism progressed.”81 These tenets were unique in that Stalin
was the first to realize the importance of Soviet support for communism
around the world rather than waiting for world support of communism.
Stalin’s ideology made exportation of Marxist-inspired revolutionary ideas
possible.
Stalinism subsequently began spreading throughout the international
communist movement and revolutionary groups began forming in Europe.82
These international ties were fueled in the Second Communist International
when Lenin stated that colonial and backward countries needed commu-
nists to enter into alliances with national revolutionary movements, yet
remain separate and keep the bourgeoisie from controlling the revolutionary
movement.83 This would support a Soviet republic from the outset, and
under the Soviet leadership, these backward countries would not have to go
through a capitalist phase.84 A document called the Twenty-One Conditions
was also created to make joining communist parties adhere to the forms
of Leninist organization of the movement.85 These conditions stated that
communist parties must subordinate their propaganda activities to the
decisions of the Communist International (Comintern), the communist
press was under party control, and the “sections” must combat reformists
by removing reformists and centralists from workers’ parties.86 Within
their country’s armed forces, the “sections” must carry out systematic
propaganda.87 “They must combat pacifism, support colonial liberation
movements, be active in workers’ organizations and especially trade unions,
and make efforts to win peasant support.”88 In parliament, communist
agents must make revolutionary propaganda their primary concern and
“parties must be centralized to the maximum, observe iron discipline, and
periodically purge their ranks of petty-bourgeois elements.”89 All parties
had to unquestioningly support Soviet republics, their programs had to
be endorsed by a congress of the Comintern or its Executive Committee,
and such decisions were binding on all sections.90 Finally, all parties must
call themselves communist and those in countries where they can operate
openly must also maintain clandestine organizations for actions at the
“decisive moment.”91 This document underpinned international support for
the movement of communism from Soviet Russia to Europe and beyond.
Third World
By the end of World War II, Marxism-Leninism became the ideology of
the Soviet state, which meant little more than Stalin’s version of the two
with the characteristic feature of “the interests of the governing stratum of
a totalitarian state” and “its combination of extreme rigidity and extreme
flexibility.”92 After Stalin, the “New Left” could be characterized by
European and North American student organizations that believed that the
concept of a society ready for revolution is a “bourgeois deceit and that any
properly organized group can make a revolution” and bring social change
to any country.93 For the “New Left,” the ideology reverted to classical
Marxism and renewed attacks on the imperialism of the West, the arms
race, and colonialism.94 “The revolution must be worldwide, total, absolute,
unlimited, and all embracing.”95 For the New Left, the working class could
not be relied on since they had been co-opted by the bourgeoisie under
what Marx would call “false consciousness.” Finally, the patterns for total
revolution were to be found in the Third World where the heroes of the New
Left were Asian and Latin American revolutionaries.96 Due to imperialism,
colonialism, poverty, and oppression, the Third World Marxian ideology
resonated with the social and political struggles of the area.
Shortly after World War II, Maoism began influencing the communists
of Latin America and in many respects transported ideologies. Traditional
communist parties borrowed Maoist ideology due to the movement of
Chinese “franchises” into Latin America and the idea of a prolonged
revolution.97 Another reason for the movement of Maoism into the region
was as a result of the appeal to those of the far left that were disillusioned
by the pro-Soviet communist parties, an example being “Castroism.”98 The
guerrilla warfare of the Chinese Maoists became the guidebook for Ernest
“Che” Guevara and Fidel Castro in Cuba. Even though the revolution in
Cuba did not begin as a communist revolution, by 1961 Cuba was firmly a
socialist country.99 It would be the Castro shift to Soviet socialist ideology
that would eventually force Guevara to leave Cuba and spread his own
revolutionary ideology.
The 1960s brought acute global problems into view that needed to be
solved on a widespread basis: overpopulation, environmental pollution, and
the poverty, backwardness, and economic failures of the Third World.100
These structural deformities gave rise to guerilla movements throughout
Latin America. But the many failures of Latin American movements paral-
leled the failures of Lenin in his experience with the Bolshevik Revolution.
The failure of guerrilla movements in Latin America was attributed not
to the “objective and subjective” conditions that were central to early
Marxists but a failure of organization and an inability to “act intelli-
gently and cohesively in mobilizing the population” for the struggle.101
This thinking directly parallels the problems Lenin faced in the Russian
Revolution and as a result Latin American guerrilla activity is simply a
“latter-day, rurally oriented union of Leninist theory and praxis.”102 The
emphasis on intelligent organization proposed by Lenin fueled the debate
between the followers of Che Guevara and Mao.103 Che developed his
revolutionary ideology from the Mao example of prolonged revolution,
but he would later diverge into his own revolutionary ideology. Despite
differences, both schools of thought believed that the “masses are there,
waiting to be mobilized” and revolutionaries simply have to “push the right
buttons” to create a revolution.104 Upon the rise of the New Left in the
Third World, two new major communist forces would be established—in
the form of Maoism in China, and its influence on Guevara and Castro in
revolutionary Cuba.
At the beginning of Castro’s rise to power, support for the region was
coming from both the Chinese and the Soviets.105 Since Castro’s emergence
was based on the use of guerrilla warfare, Maoist support seemed
evident.106 However, shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, Castro developed
a deep dependency on the political, military, diplomatic, and economic
aid from the Soviet Union due to the conflict with the United States.107 By
1966, Castro publicly split from the Chinese over their refusal to aid Cuba,
and through 1968, Castro began rallying revolutionary parties in the Third
World, organizing a rough equivalent to the Comintern.108 It would be the
reliance of Castro on the Soviets and his shift in ideology that drove Che to
create his own revolutionary ideology.
In Latin America the Cuban Revolution set the model for revolutionary
groups, as well as throughout the Third World.109 Guevara had synthesized
the lessons of the Cuban Revolution into three principles: “1) popular
forces can win a war against the army; 2) it is not necessary to wait until
all the conditions for revolution exist; the insurrection can create them;
3) in underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed
fighting.”110 Throughout his works, Guevara explained how the necessary
elements for revolution existed across Latin America including poverty,
oppression, and class conflict.111 Bypassing the possibilities for peaceful
insurrection, Guevara declared that the subjective conditions to the belief
in revolution and the will to revolt could be created by the “insurrectional
foco.”112 As Guevara set his guerrilla ideals into motion, many revolu-
tionary groups throughout Latin America began taking up arms. Colombia
was not exempt from the spread of revolutionary uprisings.
Colombia
In “The Possibility of Nonviolent Revolution,” an 1872 essay, Marx
asserted that the proletariat can attain goals by peaceful means but for
most countries this is not the case and the “lever of our revolution must
be force.”113 This is more applicable to Colombia than any other country
today. In 1917 the Bolshevik Revolution engineered by Lenin was watched
closely in Colombia.114 By 1924 a Marxist study group which called itself
a “Communist Party” was formed with the help of Vicente Staviskya, a
Russian immigrant, and was related to the Liberal Party, which by 1926
became the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) of the Third Communist
International.115 After ideological divisions, the PSR became the Communist
Party of Colombia (PCC), a pro-Soviet party with the intention of
improving workers’ rights and organizing “peasant leagues” in rural areas
and “popular fronts” in urban areas.116 PCC members watched the Castro
takeover of Cuba and the division that was caused by the USSR–China
split over Maoism.117 This disrupted the unity of the PCC and it divided
into various factions following different ideologies of the time.118 As a result
of the “Sino-Soviet crisis,” two leading divisions emerged from the PCC:
the pro-Moscow or mainstream PCC, and the pro-Peking Marxist-Leninist
Communist Party (PCML).119 It was the radical, militant members of the
PCML that split into the Marxist “Southern Block” in the late 1940s which
became the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) less
than 15 years later.120
During the time of the Cuban Revolution, Colombia was in an era known
as La Violencia. This era is important because of the changes in Colombia
during and after the period due to the loss of over 200,000 lives in 15 to 20
years.121 This era can be broken into four periods. The first period witnessed
the 1948 assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, leader of the Liberal Party,
which was the galvanizing moment of political tension.122 The second
period was marked by the quick spread of guerrilla warfare throughout
the country as revolutionary groups armed themselves against partisan
attack.123 To make matters worse the conservative controlled government
used the national police and the army for partisan ends which further
mobilized the liberal peasantry.124 It was at this point that General Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla overthrew the government and installed a military dictatorship
to regain control of the country.125 In the third period of La Violencia, this
dictatorship started to see a downward trend as progress stalled, corruption
increased, pockets of violence were met with repression, and guerrilla
warfare began to spread again.126 The fourth period of La Violencia saw
the first “split” National Front government (a two-party, four-year alter-
nating power system) which, with the help of the United States, instituted
the best counter-guerrilla operations in the Western hemisphere.127 This
marked the end of La Violencia but with the Cold War in full swing, the
Marxist/Stalinist/Soviet-inspired FARC and Castro/Che Guevara-inspired
ELN represented a new era in Colombian revolutionary activity.
The new era of Colombian revolutionary activity began in earnest in the
1960s, when communism was fully operable in Russia and China. During
this time the first nuclei of the FARC formed which followed a Soviet-
communist ideology.128 The ELN, which followed a Che Guevara-type of
communist ideology, built their support among the marginalized campesinos
due to the failure of agrarian reforms and the political exclusion imposed
by the bi-party system of the National Front.129 Shortly after the Cuban
Revolution, the Movimiento Obero-Estudiantil-Campensino (MOEC) was
formed using Fidelista teachings by setting up a guerrilla “foco” in Vichada,
Colombia.130 There is no doubt that the MOEC was the ideological and
organizational base for the ELN.131 A number of Latin American radicals
made the trip to Cuba, which became a revolutionary “Mecca” where
revolutionaries were spiritually prepared and militarily trained for the
struggle.132 This was especially effective when groups of revolutionaries
such as the ELN went to train together and returned to follow “The Cuban
Road.”133 Like many revolutionary groups of the era, the FARC and ELN
had similar goals even though their means differed greatly.
Aside from some middle-class leaders and a priest who joined the
ELN, both the FARC and ELN have remained isolated from the urban
social currents of Colombia and have remained distant from the political
leadership.134 Due to the lack of “stable and systematic alliances with
the urban sectors of the trade unions or university fronts” the guerrillas
have been politically weak on the national scale.135 On the local scale
the guerrillas have been able to form networks of supporters and sympa-
thizers.136 For the FARC, their agrarian tradition and ties to the Communist
Party are a testament to their pro-Soviet/Stalinist ideals, but their rural
origins puts them closer to “secular caciquismo” and clientelism.137 The
FARC has survived the years due to the Leninist “Democratic Centralism”
inherited from the Communist Party, which maintains the unity of
command even though the combatants are scattered over a fragmented
geography.138 The ELN has adopted a more federalist approach.139 For the
FARC, the focus is on a clear chain of command that requires cohesion,
while the ELN leaders on their respective fronts have more autonomy. It
is the organization, culture, and behavior of these two organizations that
make them so unique.
Having traced the Marxist inspired trajectories of the Colombian FARC
and ELN from classical Marxism through the model Latin American
Marxist revolutionaries, Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, the focus now
turns to an analysis of the development of the FARC (Part Two) and the
ELN (Part Three). Marxism is at the core of both organizations but their
differing ideologies and revolutionary styles created very different outcomes
for these organizations. After the Cold War and the fall of Marxist
communist ideologies around the world in the late twentieth century, both
of these groups were faced with the question of viability. The problems of
adaptation in the post-Cold War era produced very different outcomes for
the FARC and ELN as they exist today.
Part Two: The FARC’s adaptability

Introduction
The history of Colombia has been fraught with violent conflict and an
unstable political system. The peasants in the country have been impov-
erished, marginalized, and oppressed by the military and the government
to the point that they have banded together to defend themselves against
their enemies. The galvanizing point for revolution was reached during
the period of La Violencia, when in 1947 Manuel Marulanda Velez began
the nucleus of liberal guerrilla units that would become the FARC.140 This
occurred as communism was fully operable worldwide, as the Chinese
revolution emerged and the Soviet Union became a global superpower.141
The Cuban Revolution served as a great inspiration to the FARC because
the war was based on land reform and redistribution of wealth.142 It was
at this point the FARC was founded in 1966 within the peasantry to create
a parallel state that could provide basic services to the rural areas where
the Colombian government had been failing. The FARC was founded upon
pro-Soviet communist principles and slowly expanded into new territories
as their ranks swelled with those that had lost faith in the Colombian
state. Areas of quasi-independence were soon under the influence of the
Colombian Communist Party and bases of “peasant republics” were
created.143 As the organization grew it was forced to change in many ways
to survive at a time when the government and military were determined to
eradicate the group and its followers. These changes within the FARC and
its structure allowed it to grow in size and strength, enabling it to create a
power struggle with the government for control of the rural areas and the
people residing in them.
As the FARC gained strength in numbers while increasing control of land
and resources, their ability to branch out into illicit commerce and trade
created a state within a state. The FARC has succeeded where many failed
in the sense of survival because of this ability to adapt and change. Due to
flexibility in their structure, political, and economic ties, the organization
has been able to thrive over the years where hundreds of other guerrilla
groups have dwindled away. But along with adaptation the group has also
changed its goals. After gaining strength in numbers and land, their ability
to wage war against the national government has increased and they have
been able to create partnerships with other criminal and political entities
that have expanded the reach of the organization.144 As a result of their
flexibility, the group has become increasingly independent despite some
support derived from the communist nations during the Cold War. The
FARC has separated its cause from the international communist movement
and forced the world to treat it as an independent entity.145 Also, since
the Cold War illicit crop production has become an increasing part of the
funding and capabilities of the regional guerrilla groups thus furthering
their independence.
Together with the US government, the Colombian government has
fostered an extensive effort to contain and eradicate the FARC insurgency,
of which Plan Colombia is the latest incarnation. The US involvement in
fighting the FARC has foreign policy implications for the region which
makes the study of the organization an imperative. By looking into the
history of the organization and its structure, the adaptive strategies can be
analyzed. By understanding these fundamentals of the organization there is
a better understanding of the FARC and how to use that knowledge against
the organization for the purpose of negotiations and possible eradication.
For the purpose of this part of the chapter, the focus will be on the organi-
zational structure of the FARC and how it has changed since the Cold War.
More specifically, the focus will be on how the organization has adapted its
structure to survive and thrive in Colombia.
Literature review
The following works represent an important portion of the literature on
the FARC and their evolution in Colombia over the years. The literature
demonstrates the history of the FARC and their growth as a guerrilla group.
The literature will also show the changes in the operations of the FARC
over the years and their ability to adapt and survive where other groups
have been dissolved.
In Colombia: A Brutal History, Geoff Simons gives a thorough history
of the violence from the historical roots to modern times as a result of
government and non-governmental actors. Simons positions the emergence
of the FARC in the struggle for the state to become stable and secure after
the La Violencia era from 1948 to 1965.146 The guerrilla group expanded
and gained in stature during the early years,147 while it played a role in
subversion as the government was preoccupied with cartels and the war
on drugs.148 At this point the FARC and their actions were described in
the context of the beginning of the Ernesto Samper administration and
how the group used kidnapping and military action to influence political
actions.149 The work moves to 1996–7 where the government was dealing
with the onset of a full guerrilla war and the ties between the illicit drug
trade and the guerrillas.150 Throughout these years in Colombia the US had
tremendous influence in the military and political aspects of Colombia’s
wars and the author shows how even with the help of the US the multi-
front battle was becoming too much for the Colombian government to
handle.151 The next portion of the Colombian timeline is represented by
the Pastrana administration (1998–2001) and the beginnings of the long
attempts to negotiate peace with the FARC.152 This period really marked a
turning point where the guerrilla groups demanded recognition as political
entities within the country and the government was forced to negotiate.
These peace talks with the Pastrana administration and the US involvement
brought on by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are detailed, as
are the subsequent changes in US–Colombia relations.153 While this work
gives some great insight to the history of the conflict in Colombia, it is a
broad look at all of the conflicting groups and focuses on the Colombian
and US governments.
The following three works establish the effect of the Cold War and
its end on the revolutionaries in Colombia. In “Insurgent Strategies in
the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia,” Roman D. Ortiz discusses the adaptation of the guerrillas in
Colombia to begin a new style of armed conflict.154 The work begins with a
look at the insurgent groups as they developed during the Cold War.155 The
ineffectiveness of the groups during these years and their strong ideological
foundations necessitated the evolution of the FARC movement with their
political ideology into a position as an alternative public manager.156 Ortiz
looks at the growth and expansion of the FARC and discusses their split
from the Communist Party thus giving the organization a unique identity.157
At this point the FARC changed their model of military action and increased
their capabilities as they were able to build up their arsenal to a size unseen
in guerrilla groups and increase the income of the organization to hundreds
of millions of dollars.158 Finally, Ortiz covers the current problems the large
organization is now facing and their emerging vulnerabilities.159 This work
provides an in-depth look at the changes in the ideology of the group and
their emergence as a military force in Colombia.
In the article “Why the end of the Cold War doesn’t matter: The US
war of terror in Colombia,” Doug Stokes discusses US involvement in the
region and the Cold War style of intervention that came to Colombia as a
result.160 Stokes establishes the links between the guerrillas and the illicit
drug trade after the Cold War and how these organizations support the
illicit activities.161 The author concludes with a look at how the new US war
on terror has produced a dual purpose battle in Colombia where fighting
the illicit drug trade has become a tactic in counterinsurgency.162 While
the work focuses on US–Colombian relations, it also explains the past and
current methods to combat both the guerrilla war and the drug war at the
same time.
“A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence: Non-Governmental Terrorism
in Latin America since the end of the Cold War,” by Andreas Feldmann,
demonstrates how terrorism is currently used by guerrilla groups to exert
influence on governments.163 The work focuses on terrorism alone and
thus the content is subject to the author’s interpretation of terrorism.
While the study looks at Latin America as a whole, Feldmann points out
that the FARC repeatedly uses terrorist actions in their overall strategy to
their advantage.164 He outlines the use of bombings and massacres by the
FARC as a method of control and spreading fear among the populace in
Colombia.165 This work helps to explain the evolution of the group’s tactics
from military actions to terrorist actions since the Cold War.
The next four works focus on the increasing criminality of the armed
rebel groups in Colombia and their ability to combat the government and
military. In “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
the Illicit Drug Trade,” by Ricardo Vargas, the author attempts to explain
how the cartels have become anti-guerrilla yet since the farmers of coca
plants are in guerrilla areas they have been assumed to be one and the
same.166 The dynamic between the farmers, the guerrillas, the cartels, and
the military is a result of these intertwining operations.167 In “The role of
the state in the international illicit drug trade: the case of Colombia and
external intervention,” Julius Walker explains the roles the guerrilla forces
play in this dynamic and their actions in the country.168 It is imperative for
understanding how these organizations are operating in this new climate
to compare their more ideological beginnings. That brings up the next
work, “Criminal Rebels? A Discussion of war and criminality from the
Colombian experience” by Francisco Gutierrez Sanin. The author discusses
the beginnings of the guerrilla organizations in Colombia and how they
turned to criminal activities for profit.169 Sanin breaks down the beginning
activities of the FARC and how the new enterprises of drugs, kidnapping,
and extortion have turned the organization into a thriving money-maker.170
The author concludes the study by applying ten tenets for being a member
of the guerrilla organizations and how these apply to the debate about
whether these groups are rebels or criminals.171 Finally, Colombian Army
Adaptation to FARC Insurgency by Thomas Marks describes the beginning
of the FARC as a military force, its dynamic as a rebel group, and how it
was able to combat the military as it expanded in operational capability
and scope.172 At this point, the military and police response to combating
the FARC is discussed but more importantly the adaptability of the FARC
in their actions in order to thwart military and police attempts to recapture
guerrilla zones.173 While the military or police portions of the work are not
relevant to this study, his work provides invaluable information on how the
FARC has developed financially, operationally, and militarily.
In “Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and the
Hemisphere” Max G. Manwaring describes the war in Colombia being
fought on three fronts. Manwaring breaks down and discusses each of the
three groups and focuses on how the FARC has taken control of rural land
and populations, along with the linking factors within these groups that
make them so difficult to combat.174 This research is useful in terms of the
goals and objectives of the FARC and how their growth is possible despite
the factors competing against the organization.
In the final work, “A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence

in the 1990s,” Jennifer S. Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres,
and Kevin M. Curtin use the scientific method to test theories of insur-
gencies.175 Using a Poisson model, the authors look to examine traditional
factors purported to explain insurgencies and then “extend the analysis to
reveal the role of coordination and contagion using spatial econometric
techniques.”176 The study begins with the origins and growth of the FARC
and all of the contributing factors to the insurgency.177 Through a subna-
tional level analysis, the increase in violence with the advent of the drug
trade is discussed while looking at the underlying factors that continue
to support the explanation of violence within the country.178 The study
concludes with the preliminary spatial analysis that tests the hypotheses
against the fixed factors of the insurgency, thus determining the insig-
nificant effects of the drug trade against the violent actions of the FARC.179
The scientific methods used in this study test the factors contributing to
the FARC violence and through this it is easier to understand the guerrilla
group and their actions. The literature collected all has points interlinking
with the questions to be evaluated in this study but are lacking in answers
to the specific research question.
Looking at the individual studies above, there is a useful amount of
information concerning the changes within the FARC as an organization
and the variables surrounding those changes. The links that are missing are
the bureaucratic structure and organizational culture of the FARC and how
these two features have changed, as well as the major factors that produced
these changes. Many of the studies look at the end of the Cold War and its
effects on the FARC, and the beginnings of the drug trade and its effects.
But what is missing is how these factors as well as changes in the populace,
government, and militaries have all culminated to affect the FARC and their
structure and culture collectively. While all of these works attempt to single
out factors affecting all of the competing groups in Colombia, this study is
going to focus on how these factors affected one group, the FARC.
Methodology
To explain the factors involved and their effect on the FARC, the chapter
will use liberalism as the theoretical approach. The FARC is a non-state
actor and has proven to have both military and economic strengths
that make it a formidable opponent to the state. It is also important to
understand that the actions of the state directly affect the FARC as an
organization and its culture. Taking that into account, the focus on the
state, the populace, the military, and the other organizations competing for
power all play into the liberal cobweb approach to social science theory.
This will be a more effective approach for explaining how the independent
variables, such as the international drugs trade, the actions of the state,
and the end of the Cold War, affect the organization, whereas in the above
literature the focus is on the FARC as an independent variable and how it
affects the state. Since the changes within the FARC as an organization is
the focus of the study, all of the surrounding factors of the government,
military, populace, and competing organizations will be treated as
independent variables.
Through rational choice models this chapter proposes competing
hypotheses which will individually be major contributing variables to the
organizational and structural changes to the FARC.
Hypothesis 1: The changes to the organizational culture

and bureaucratic structure of the FARC are a direct result of
the end of the Cold War
Since the Cold War ended it is possible that the FARC has changed its
identity and structure to turn the organization into a successful offensive
operation that is completely self-sufficient. This is important to this study
since many other cases of insurgencies immediately failed after the end of
the Cold War.
Hypothesis 2: The FARC adapts itself to the policies of the

government
It is an interesting dynamic where the government can change its mind on
military action or inaction and whether or not to participate in peace talks.
As a result, the years of FARC actions appear to have a direct correlation
with the government and military actions in regard to the FARC.
Hypothesis 3: The FARC changed its organizational culture

and behavior to take advantage of the drug trade
The advent of the drug trade in Colombia and its affect on the FARC has
been widely debated. This study will look at this variable and discuss what
effect it has had on the organization if any.
Through the analysis of these hypotheses using liberalism as the
theoretical approach the goal will be to understand the importance of the
independent variables on the FARC. By treating the FARC as the dependent
variable, this part of the chapter will look at the Cold War, the state, and
the drug trade. The goal is to show what affect these variables have on
the FARC individually and then show the links between the independent
variables. This analysis will show the most definitive variables contributing
to the organization’s structural and cultural changes over time and how
effective these changes were in the survival of the organization.
As a result of the readings, it is realistic to say that the organiza-
tional behavior, structure, and culture of the FARC changed over time.
The variables will be considered to determine the time and severity of
the changes. For some of the organizational adaptations outlined in the
hypotheses, the change was gradual and took place over periods of time
while in other cases the changes were dramatic and fast. Pursuant to the
literature, part of this research will be conducted in order to determine
why some instances or variables caused immediate change whereas the
impact of other variables caused a more gradual change over time. Since
the focus of the research is based on one organization, the changes will
be measured by the independent variables and how their increase or
decrease of influence on the FARC caused or did not cause change to the
organization.
The importance of this research lies in the organizational changes to the
FARC created by internal and external factors. For the sake of eradication
of the group or to provide for an advantage in negotiations, understanding
the effects these variables have on the group may prove insightful. It is
likely that through understanding how independent variables affect the
organization these independent variables could be manipulated to direct or
control the organizational changes of the FARC in the future.
To help the discussion of the variables in the study some secondary
sources will be used that focus on the data side of the hypothesis testing.
Three of the secondary sources used for the study focus on statistical,
geographical, and operational data. Systems of Violence covers the gender
and demographic composition of the FARC, the state-making capabilities
of the organization, and the economic and military assets of the organi-
zation.180 This data provides changes in these elements of the organization
from the mid-1960s to the late-1990s.181 A more recent version of the statis-
tical and geographic data set comes from “Conflict, Decentralization, and
Local Governance in Colombia, 1974–2004” by Fabio Sanchez and Maria
del Mar Palau. This covers the geographic and operational capabilities of
the FARC over the 30-year window and how that has changed over time.182
Finally, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and
its Implications for Regional Stability by Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk
also covers the economic and geographic expansion of the FARC and looks
at the involvement of the illicit drug trade and arms trade with the organi-
zation.183 These secondary sources represent the statistical compilations of
the activity of Colombian guerrilla groups and the geographic expansion of
FARC operations over the years. Since these sources encompass all guerrilla
activity they will only be used for their limited portions that focus on the
FARC alone and any data that is compared to past and present FARC
operational abilities.
For the analysis portion of this research, the data and competing
hypotheses will be constructed into a matrix diagram to analyze the
“diagnosticity” of the data and its effect on the hypotheses. The study will be
completed with an analysis of the sensitivity of the data to each hypothesis.
The analysis will consist of an explanation of each hypothesis and all of the
factors that are consistent and inconsistent with each hypothesis. Through
a systematic approach, each of the factors will be described in detail and
the effect of each factor will be explained. The end of each section will
include a summation of whether the hypothesis is consistent with the data
or if the data produced inconclusive results. The section will finish with a
matrix diagram focusing on the major themes of evidence as compared to
each hypothesis. The data will be coded as consistent (C), inconsistent (I),
and not applicable (N/A). The diagram will be discussed as the evidence
is weighed for diagnosticity, which will lead to the conclusions. Aside
from limitations, the biases involved in the study arise in looking at the
competing hypotheses where the subject (FARC) is discussed based on the
presumed actions the organization will take in each hypothetical scenario.
While this is counteracted by the data and actions known and documented
about the group, there is still some question of certainty when estimating
how the organization reacted to specific variables. For the purpose of this
research it will be assumed that the organizational actions are true to the
studies used in the analysis.
The limitations result from missing first-hand information from the
guerrillas and the civilians involved or directly affected by the guerrillas.
Most of the works used in this particular research were compiled by military
sources, government, and non-governmental organizations. While some of
the works incorporate data collected from former guerrillas and civilians
in the region, this data is very limited. There are new works coming out of
the region from “inside” sources, but they have yet to be translated and are
beyond the limits of this chapter.
First hypothesis and analysis: The changes to the

organizational culture and bureaucratic structure of the
FARC are a direct result of the end of the Cold War
Since the 1959 Cuban Revolution until a 1992 truce in El Salvador the
armed groups of Latin America were founded on a revolutionary doctrine
based on Marxist-Leninist ideology and a military strategy combining
guerrilla and terrorist activities.184 The Cuban Revolution inspired these
rebel groups that revolution was possible, but one difference for the FARC
is their long and endogenous process of accumulating peasants for armed
resistance.185 Since its beginnings as a self-defense peasantry organization,
the FARC reached a point of radicalization and became close to the

pro-Soviet Communist Party.186 Within these communist ideologies there
was little room for the armed groups to adapt to a changing environment,
and militarily they relied on the support of communist states for logistical
needs.187 As a result of the alienation of the public, the Marxist-Leninist
group formed a military organization to achieve “armed colonization” and
took an approach to dominate “human terrain” much like the strategy
of the Viet Cong.188 The FARC broke from these limitations and with
considerably flexible politics, military sophistication, and increasing logistic
autonomy the organization increased its chances for survival.189 After
adopting a less rigid political ideology, the FARC increased its complaints
that the government was incompetent in dealing with social inequality,
crime, and deficient public services, and presented the organization as a
“good alternative.”190 As a result, the FARC expanded its administrative
capacity and its ability to provide services such as health care, education,
and public order.191 While this type of parallel state creation is common for
guerrilla groups, the FARC achieved a balance by “sidelining any dogma
that promises the achievement of some utopia, and giving way to a purely
pragmatic strategy for gaining power.”192 Through this change, the insur-
gents have overcome the crisis arising from the collapse of the Soviet bloc
and have created an ideology that is simply more efficient, thus increasing
the political appeal of their message.193 Since the foundations of the
FARC were establised during the period of La Violencia (1948–65), with
its organization focused on armed insurrection, the FARC was “defined
by a pragmatic ideological evolution and complex relationships with
the Communist Party.”194 While the FARC did follow Marxist rhetoric
in its analytical texts, its publicly stated political aims were designed
to gain support from the rural community at the cost of distancing
themselves from communist orthodoxy.195 The awkward relationship with
the communist parties of Colombia led to the rise of a communist leader
of the FARC, Jacobo Arenas, and as a result, communist leaders stated that
the leadership of the FARC followed the party line in public statements.196
By this time, however, the leadership of the FARC was not in line with the
communist orthodoxy, and the Colombian Communist Party preferred not
to link itself to the FARC because it did not have complete control, and
proximity to the FARC could affect the communists in the legal political
arena.197
In the mid-1980s the FARC joined the electoral alliance Union Patriotica
(UP) and appeared to be bolstering their relationship with the Communist
Party but their continued military actions created a division, so the organi-
zations kept their distance and looked at the situation as two independent
groups that shared some political ideology.198 By this time the FARC
considered itself an armed guerrilla organization that “opens its doors to
all political, philosophical, religious, and ideological tendencies, and which
brings together people with the common ideal of liberating this country.”199
The final division of the FARC with the Communist Party occurred with the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the death of Jacobo Arenas in 1990.200 As
a result of these occurrences, the FARC was no longer led by an ideologue
with a vision close to communist orthodoxy hence the loss of control of the
FARC by the Communist Party.201 The organization was able to offer a light
ideological payload and an advance toward a highly pragmatic program.202
The collapse of the Soviet Union also discredited the guerrillas’ ideology
and as a result the dialogue with the leftist intellectuals in urban centers was
severed, limiting their mobility within cities.203
After the end of the Cold War, officials expected guerrillas to face
a diminished capacity. However, a degree of financial autonomy was
achieved, with the impact of anti-drugs policies on the peasantry offering
unexpected bases of support and political legitimacy to the guerrillas.204 For
studies looking at violence in the form of terrorism, the expectation that
the end of the Cold War would have a positive effect in terms of reducing
terrorism proved overly simplistic.205 While in many countries there
appeared to be a decline in non-governmental terrorism between 1968
and 1992, in Colombia the trend proved equivocal—between 1993 and
1999 the country accounted for more than 50 percent of the total terrorist
incidents in the region.206
As a result of the peasant and self-defense foundations of the FARC,
it appears that the organization was very different from the common
communist revolutionaries in Latin America. With no evidence to conclude
that the bureaucratic structure changed outside of the militaristic founda-
tions of the organization, the data suggests that the end of the Cold War
had no effect. Aside from the change in leadership from Jacobo Arenas to
a more ideologically open leadership, there is no evidence to suggest that
at any time did the structure of the organization change. While some of
the data collected points to the end of the Cold War as a turning point in
the organizational culture as a political ideological group, the majority of
the data suggests that the FARC split from these parameters before the
end of the Cold War. Since its foundations were based on land reform and
the peasantry, the data suggests that the FARC alignment with communist
ideology was beneficial, but as soon as that benefit no longer existed, there
was no need to keep the FARC attached to a rigid ideology. Since the
FARC preferred an armed movement to a political movement, the data
suggests that the military drive of the organization alienated the group
from the other ideological organizations and thus it was forced to develop
its own ideology and organizational culture. The data does suggest that
with end of the Cold War the FARC made the final split from exclusive
communist ideology by accepting members of all ideologies, religions, and
social classes in public statements, but the roots of this development had
existed in the group since its beginning. All of the data seems to bring
inconsistency to the hypothesis, and the information studied suggests that

the organizational culture change of the FARC was not a result of the end
of the Cold War.
Second hypothesis and analysis: The FARC adapts

itself to the policies of the government
Since its beginnings the FARC developed as a defensive organization that
was militarily weak and had no offensive capabilities.207 By the mid-1960s,
President Guillermo Leon Valencia transferred judicial and other powers
to the military, and “suspect” civilians were tried in secret hearings, with
their legal and political rights suspended.208 In spite of this, by the 1970s
the FARC was expanding and was adjudicating legal disputes, overseeing
public works, and carrying out police functions.209 By the mid-1980s,
the “long lasting social and political exclusion, an uneven distribution
of wealth, corruption, and a culture of impunity” all played a role in the
expansion of the guerrilla groups.210 Colombia has been notoriously weak
and has low defense spending, with only 3.1 percent of GDP spent on the
military in 1998.211 Homicides, used as an indicator of weak governmental
control, are associated with high levels of FARC violence, and higher levels
of state repression are linked to higher levels of insurgent violence.212
When President Cesar Gaviria declared a state of emergency in 1992,
the government cracked down by banning ransom payments or protection
payments and seized land and bank accounts associated with guerrilla
money laundering.213 Within three days, three of the top commanders
of the Colombian armed forces resigned, leading to speculation that
the new crackdown generated only further dissent and turmoil.214 With
the onset of presidential and congressional elections in 1994 the FARC
stepped up their kidnapping and terrorist acts to affect the elections, and
while Rafael Pardo the Colombian defense minister tried to downplay
the actions, around 70 percent of the electorate would not vote.215
This is important due to the higher electoral participation and mayoral
support having a negative effect on FARC armed activity.216 The higher
electoral participation and government support indicate the legitimacy of
local government and to an extent hamper the illegal activities of armed
groups.217

Over the next few years, corruption in the political system began receiving
attention as a survey by Semana magazine indicated that corruption cost
Colombia $40,000 a day in public funds.218 By 1996, Colombia was in
pieces. As the guerrilla war raged on, President Samper was absolved by
congress on corruption charges and the military and guerrillas were fighting
a tit-for-tat battle.219 By late 1996 the FARC and other guerrilla groups
tried to take control of major cities and towns by burning trucks, creating
physical obstructions, and creating roadblocks, which affected food prices,

that rose by 10 percent, with the impact reaching the Caribbean coast and
northern provinces.220 Samper tried to bring the FARC to negotiations
and ended up publicly stating that the government was willing to concede
demilitarized zones in order to begin talks.221 The FARC “acknowledged
the offer as ‘a substantial’ first step” but many other conditions would also
have to be met.222
In the late 1990s the FARC demanded a demilitarized zone and while
this was conceded by President Andres Pastrana it has done little to curb
FARC actions as now the organization has earned recognition for its
sovereign power, affirmation of the FARC as a parallel state.223 By 1998, as
the FARC descended on its newly acquired demilitarized zone, five mayors
were fired for embezzlement, helping to end corruption.224 A local priest
declared the previos five months to be a “paradise of peace.”225 The FARC
was “showing the government we can run our own state.”226 Since that
time, FARC and government actions against one another have increased,
while attempts at peaceful resolution have dissolved.227 By the end of 1999,
President Pastrana and the US were under criticism for allowing priorities
to get sidelined while continuing the war, even though the government was
preparing for peace negotiations.228 Upon the kidnapping of Senator Jorge
Gechem Turbay, President Pastrana halted all peace talks with the FARC
and began “Operation Death,” a full scale military war on the FARC.229
With no breaks in the carnage and increased US support, President Alvaro
Uribe was elected, and after 9/11, Colombia’s “George W. Bush” was
warned with a prophecy of “Blood, blood, and more blood … maybe even
some gringo blood.”230
All the data seems to support the hypothesis. The overall actions of the
government in terms of repression and violence in turn seem to provoke
more actions from the FARC. Yet according to some examples in the data,
there were instances where the government was attempting peace negotia-
tions or was committing to peace negotiations while the FARC was not.
The difficulty here is the limited information. While on the one hand the
government claims it has stopped all military actions, there is no guarantee
as in the case of the FARC. The majority of the data supports the idea
that as the government has increased its actions the FARC in turn has
increased theirs. The other specific problem when looking at this data is
trying to ignore the paramilitary and cartel effects on the situation. What
might be considered an act of violence toward the government may in fact
not be as a result of government action, but rather their failure to fight
the paramilitaries, and it is possibilities like this that make the cause–effect
data unclear. In some cases it seems clear that actions by the government
dictate the frequency or severity of FARC actions; however, the other
variables of narcos and paramilitaries make the overall picture less than
definitive.
Final hypothesis and analysis: The FARC changed

its organizational culture and behavior to take
advantage of the drug trade
Over the last few decades the FARC has evolved from a small peasant
organization to an organization of unprecedented military strength as a
result of the illicit drug trade.231 There is little evidence to support the
idea that the FARC is directly involved in coca growing or refining but
since their areas of control are also the main coca cultivation areas,
the FARC does tax the various stages of production and export.232 The
FARC did not become a major actor through mobilization of an alienated
base; they became major actors through the power that came from the
cultivation of drugs by a marginalized population.233 While illicit crop
cultivation and protection was originally forbidden by the FARC, the
movement of paramilitaries into the area to support the now dominant
economic activity forced the FARC to protect and support coca culti-
vation in order to keep their social base from working with their political
enemies.234
In the early 1980s the FARC reached an impasse where no matter how
much the ideological message changed there was no increased support for
the organization, and though the negative aspects of involvement in the
drug trade were known, the offsetting advantages of involvement were too
great.235 The FARC went from ten fronts to 26 during the first three years of
the 1980s, in large part as a result of their now stable and lucrative sources
of financing through the illicit drug tax system.236 This involvement between
the FARC and the drug cartels has also helped establish a unique framework
where the FARC is not only acquiring income but also connections to the
international black market for arms since it is closely related to the drug
market.237 This connection has created instances of drugs for guns swaps
and has bolstered the FARC logistical framework through building arms
supply sources in neighboring countries.238 The FARC established a stable
economic base for the colonos (colonizing migrants) and small peasants by
regulating market prices, and providing financial and technical assistance
and protection.239 This forces the narco traffickers to pay the peasants and
wage laborers raspachines—the market price of coca leaves and labor.240
The FARC “made it possible for the sustenance economy to incorporate
into the international markets with minimum ‘structural adjustment.’”241
As a result of this policy of protection and regulation between peasants,
narco traffickers, and merchant intermediaries, the FARC has faced the
changing dynamics of the armed conflict among guerrillas, the state, and
organized crime.242
The FARC was able to use the illicit drug platform to increase its
state-making capabilities as well, and through a tax of 7 to 10 percent
per kilo of coca paste the group had an estimated annual income of $60
million to $100 million by the early 1990s.243 This additional income
not only assisted in the expansion of the FARC militarily but also in
terms of commerce, providing means of transportation, adjudicating and
arbitrating social and personal conflicts, constructing landing strips, and
providing health, education, and essential public services.244 As of 2000,
of the 61 FARC fronts, 32 are linked to the drug trade through income or
protection.245 Some analysts believe that it would be prudent to assume a
substantial part of their income is in a reserve for combat escalation, but
even without that, the development of these incomes have “broadened the
range of strategic options available to the guerrillas.”246 Analysts look to
the strategic objective of the FARC to consolidate its coca growing regions
in order to build up their military capabilities and push into other regions,
such as its establishment of seven new fronts near Bogotá which provide a
new source of income from the cultivation of poppy fields on the eastern
side of the Andes.247 As early as the mid-1990s the FARC could take on
the military in a pitched battle and prevail.248 It is important to note that
in 1999 the FARC cooperated in a $6 million UN project to convert coca
plantations to legal alternatives.249 While it is true that fronts of the FARC
are involved in taxation of the illicit drug trade, the organization has
minimal connections to the cultivation, refinement, and transshipment to
the US250
According to the data, the conclusion can be drawn that the organi-
zational behavior and culture were changed with the involvement of the
FARC in illicit crop production. With increased funding, the operational
military functions were better supplied and became more expansive, giving
the FARC access to areas they were unable to infiltrate before. The FARC
was also able to present more of a challenge to the military than previously,
thus changing their behavior as an organization. Along with the increased
military capacity, the data shows that with the income from the drugs trade
the FARC began to run their own state more effectively and provide more
services to their base. Perhaps the greatest organizational change emerged
within the culture of the FARC where originally the view was that working
with drugs was not consistent with the group’s political goals. However, the
organization was forced to adapt to the threat of losing their marginalized
masses to competing groups. The data provided indicates that the organiza-
tional changes to the FARC are linked to their entrance into the protection
and taxation of illicit crops.
With the completion of the matrix diagram the evidence for each
hypothesis is demonstrated. This supplements the above discussion of each
hypothesis and the data collected. For the sake of brevity, the major points
of evidence are broken into four major themes and the conclusions drawn
on their consistency or inconsistency when compared to the hypothesis.
The first hypothesis citing the end of the Cold War as the main factor in
Table 7.1 Matrix diagram and analysis (FARC)

Evidence Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
Corruption in the government N/A I N/A
Broad government suppression N/A C N/A
People supporting the government N/A I N/A
Weak government N/A C N/A
Loss of international support I N/A N/A
Breaking from communist C N/A N/A

ideologies
Losing support from the public I N/A N/A

base
Changing leadership I N/A N/A
Increased income I N/A C
Increased ability to build and I N/A C

support a parallel state
Increased size and capabilities of I N/A C

military
Movement into international I N/A C

criminal activity
C = consistent
I = inconsistent
N/A = not applicable
the FARC change of structure and culture was proved inconsistent. While
the end of the Cold War did help push the change in ideology in different
directions, none of the evidence complied in the rest of the data supported
the hypothesis. The second hypothesis looking at government actions as
the main factor in FARC change produced similar results. While there was
some correlation between a weak government and the behavioral changes
of the FARC, there was a lack of examples to securely link the data to the
hypothesis. For the other factors there was inconsistent data on whether
the corruption of the government or public support would change FARC
behavior. The final hypothesis looks at the involvement of the FARC

in the illicit drugs trade. This change in the organizational culture and
behavior of the group was conclusively supported by all of the categories
looked at in this research. According to the data, with increased income
the group was able to change its military tactics due to greater numbers
and better, more abundant equipment. The data also supported the thesis
that the FARC was able to provide better services on a greater scale in
their function as a parallel state. Their change in organizational culture
was also supported by the data since the founding of the FARC’s interest
in the illicit drug trade was a result of the changing economic situation
with their marginalized base. That coupled with the FARC desire to ensure
the loyalty of their base in competition with their political enemies was all
supported by the data.
Conclusion
The survival of the FARC in Colombia has depended on the organiza-
tion’s ability to adapt to its surroundings through cultural, behavioral,
and structural changes. In this research the attempt was made to compile
data for three possible contributing factors to this development, namely
the end of the Cold War, the role of the state, and the impact of the
illicit drugs trade. While there are inconclusive results in relation to the
end of the Cold War and the role of the state, the research supports the
attempt to explain the organizational changes of the FARC arising from
involvement in the illicit drugs trade. This part of the chapter analyzed
the FARC as the dependent variable with the end of the Cold War, the
role of the state, and involvement in the illicit drugs trade as independent
variables. For each of the factors, it would be beneficial to look at each
of the independent variables as major themes for the purpose of a more
in-depth study. Increasing US involvement and the role of paramilitaries
could also be looked at as variables in the attempt to explain the FARC
organizational changes.
The next part of this chapter will focus on the ELN, analyzing that
organization’s ability to adapt. The ELN will be analyzed using the same
techniques and theoretical guidelines to support the comparison of the two
groups in following parts of this chapter. This leads to the LAMP analysis
(Part Four) to predict the future behaviors of the FARC and ELN. In
addition to the LAMP study, Part Four will update the current situation of
the FARC thanks to the publication of a new document. This will demon-
strate the continual adaptability of the FARC in more recent situations. The
next part of this chapter will illuminate both the similarities and differences
in the adaptation of the ELN with the intention of exploring these factors
in the LAMP study (Part Four).
1985 1990 2000
FIGURES 7.1–7.3 Evolution of FARC actions

(Sanchez and Palau 2006, 8)
Part Four: The ELN’s adaptability

Introduction
From independence until the present day, Colombia has been characterized
by constant warfare and a fragmented political climate due to unequal
land distribution, poverty, and oppression. Many revolutionary arms of
rural and urban Latin America have used the Cuban Revolution and the
ideology of Che Guevara and Castro as their example to follow; the ELN
(Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) was one of these organizations. The ELN
has remained as a small but persistent guerrilla group in Colombia since
the 1960s. Based on the Cuban Revolution, a workers’, students’, and
peasants’ movement, Movimiento Obrero Estudiantil Campesino (MOEC)
was started in 1961 in rural Colombia.251 By 1964 the MOEC had divided
into factions, and one group in particular, led by Fabio Vasquez, went to
Havana for training and returned to Colombia to establish the ELN.252
Due to their Havana ties, the ELN tried to adhere to the “foquista ideology
as propounded in the works of Che Guevara.”253 Along with the “Che”
ideology, the group took on a Robin Hood persona by “stealing from
the rich to give to the poor” and followed a Christian moral ideology.254
One of the ELN’s most influential members, the priest Camilo Torres,
committed the group to implement a moral component in its revolutionary
actions.255 This style of conflicting ideology has caused a quandary between
the teachings of “Clausewitz and Guevara, on one hand, and the Christian
view of murder as the ultimate sin, on the other.”256 Through their mix
of Christianity and political realism the ELN focused on gaining support
from the campesinos with their argument that the state is an enemy to
the people.257 The ELN mixture of moral and intellectual ideology gained
support from the “middle-class students and professionals alienated by
the exclusionary politics of the National Front” since even moderate
leftist behavior was not tolerated.258 This unique set of ideologies created
an identity for the ELN and its members but also caused many internal
problems in the organization. The ELN has been considered a marginal
player in the Colombian conflict; however, it has been the organization’s
ability to adapt and change its culture, ideology, and behavior that has
made the ELN a persistent guerrilla organization.
The ELN as a guerrilla organization has had to adapt to the changing
social and political climate but their refusal to change in other areas has
been the reason the organization has limited membership and success. The
ELN was faced with a difficult start as its leaders were killed or exiled
on more than one occasion causing their near demise at the hands of the
Colombian army in the 1970s. Re-emergence after these hardships required
major changes in the leadership, ideology, and actions of the revolutionary
group. This also included the ELN’s financial expansion into new criminal
enterprises. Thus changes were imperative not only for the survival of
the remaining members, but also in terms of increasinf the organization’s
strength and effectiveness in the 1980s up to the present. Among these
changes, the ELN was forced to expand their economic opportunities and
their modes of operation in order to survive. While in some cases the organ-
ization benefited from increased income and expanded territorial control,
they were forced to stray from their core ideology, reducing their appeal to
the people. As one of the longest-running revolutionary organizations, the
ELN has proven their ability to adapt and increase their effectiveness even
after the assistance from Cuba had dwindled after the end of the Cold War.
It has only been in the last decade that the ELN has proven itself a strong
adversary for the Colombian government.
As the ELN has strengthened it has become a more effective federation
of fighters, improving their bargaining position with the government. With
other organizations having taken precedence at the negotiation table, the
ELN has a renewed sense of purpose and some new forms of income to
help their negotiating positions. In spite of the difficulties within the organi-
zation, the ELN has been able to adapt its behavior, structure, and ideology
to make it one of the only surviving revolutionary groups in Colombia. Since
their re-emergence as a strong fighting force, the Colombian government
can no longer afford to ignore the ELN. It is important to understand
how this force was able to return from almost complete annihilation to
become an effective guerrilla organization. Analysis of these changes and
capabilities will shed light on government mistakes in stopping the organi-

zation and give insight to future negotiations. Due to the implications for
US and Colombian relations, studying the ELN is imperative if there is ever
to be peace in the region.
Literature review
The main research for this chapter has been focused on revolutionary
groups in Latin America and Colombia. The literature provides infor-
mation on the creation of the ELN and their long history. These works will
demonstrate the mistakes the ELN made in their early years as well as their
ability to adapt and return as an effective force a decade later. This research
also provides insight on the structure, organization, and behavior of the
ELN and how these have changed over time. Each author adds information
on the origins, ideology, economic changes, and actions of the ELN.
In Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America, James F Rochlin discusses
the revolutionary groups of Peru, Colombia, and Mexico. Rochlin begins
with the four most powerful guerrilla movements, one of which is the
ELN.259 The work gives a brief history of Colombia from independence
to the era of La Violencia when the ELN began.260 Rochlin then focuses
on the ELN and their origins as a unique mix of Christianity and political
realism.261 The work gives a timeline for the organization and their actions
from their creation in the 1960s and their decimation in the 1970s to their
re-emergence in the 1980s.262 Rochlin points out the areas of operation for
the ELN and the strategy behind their choices for areas of operation and
recruitment.263 This work is thorough in its explanation of the ELN’s birth
and transformation into their modern version.
In the following two works, the focus is on the history of Colombia
and its wars. In Colombia: A Brutal History, by Geoff Simons focuses
on the social and political history of Colombia from the pre-colonial era
to post-9/11. The work touches briefly on the formation of the ELN,
but the focus is on the actions of the ELN and their interaction with the
government.264 Simons explains the terrorist actions, kidnappings, and
negotiations with the Colombian government over the course of multiple
administrations.265 While this work provides little in the way of a thorough
study of the ELN, it does provide a timeline throughout the life of the
organization, accounting for their actions during these periods. In The
Colombian Civil War, Bert Ruiz focuses on both the actions of the ELN
and their combatants. The ELN portion of the book begins with the US
and Colombian government working toward peace agreements.266 The
work explains the force the ELN has at its disposal and the mentality of the
leadership at the time.267 Ruiz covers a series of talks between the Pastrana
administration and the ELN and explains the ideological make-up of the
ELN and its leaders.268 The work goes back in time to the era of the Cuban
Revolution and the beginnings of what would become the ELN.269 Camilo
Torres is discussed in depth since this Catholic priest was considered one
of the “best and brightest minds in Colombia” and went on to join the
ELN.270 Ruiz then looks at the ties between the ELN and Cuba and explains
the founding Marxist ideology of the organization.271 The end of the work
returns to the failure of the talks between the ELN and Pastrana admin-
istration where Pablo Beltran, an ELN leader, proclaimed “our fight will
grow, and we will not disarm.”272 This work gives a better insight into the
leadership of the ELN and how its organization operates.
The following two works focus exclusively on the ELN. “Colombia:
Moving Forward with the ELN?”—an International Crisis Group paper—
focuses on the modern ELN and their capabilities. This paper begins with the
military capabilities of the organization and their interaction with other armed
groups.273 The political and social bases are discussed as the ELN has a very
diverse membership.274 Economics and finances are the last topic of the section
focusing on the ELN, which gives a look at the evolution of their money-
making activities since the 1980s.275 The next section of the paper considers
the recent talks with the government and their interaction with organizations
in Cuba and Mexico.276 This section also looks at the negotiations between
the ELN and the Uribe administration, as well as the involvement of the
international community.277 The paper ends with the participation of peace
organizations in the negotiating process and these highlight the difficulties
facing the government and populace in ending ELN hostilities.278 The paper
offers some insight into governmental and non-governmental roles in the
negotiations, but the focus is too narrow in time and scope.
In “Colombia: Prospects for Peace with the ELN,” the International
Crisis Group offers a much broader and in-depth study of the ELN and
their actions. The report begins with an overview of the successes and
failures of negotiations with the ELN and “evaluates the prospects for
the constructive advancement and conclusion of peace negotiations.”279
The history of the ELN is discussed in detail as the report moves from
the founding of the organization through the decline of the 1970s.280 The
report then briefly looks at the re-emergence of the organization in the
1980s and the changes within the organization and in negotiations with the
government.281 The next section of the report is a detailed timeline of the
interactions of the ELN with the government during the Pastrana adminis-
tration.282 The details of the Pastrana administration transitions the paper
into the Uribe administration and how negotiations can commence based
on the lessons learned from the past.283 The report concludes with a detailed
set of negotiating actions which the government needs to follow in order to
get the ELN into peace talks because “without peace, the fight against drugs
will never be won and the fight against poverty will never succeed.”284 This
paper is thorough in its discussion of negotiations between the ELN and the
government but barely considers the changes in behavior and ideology that
have made the ELN of today so durable.
Moving into the economics side of the ELN conflict, the next three works
consider the actions of the ELN and their economic strategies. In Systems
of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, Nazih
Richani offers a quantitative study on the ELN. After a brief history of
the ELN, Richani studies the class and gender composition of the organi-
zation.285 The author then focuses on the extortion portion of the ELN
income and their capabilities as fighters within their areas of geographic
control.286 Even though the work is limited to economic, geographic,
and statistical data, it is very thorough in these aspects of the ELN. In
“Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war and criminality from the Colombian
experience,” Francisco Gutierrez Sanin focuses on quantitative data on the
FARC and ELN actions in Colombia. Sanin tests the research on economic
causes of civil war as stated by Paul Collier,287 and specifically tests Collier’s
“criminal rebels” thesis against his own data for the ELN, at the same time
analyzing organizational behavior.288 The author explains his points of
critique when comparing the ELN to Collier’s ideas and gives a thorough
accounting of the ELN actions and their income from those actions.289 After
analyzing the data, Sanin refutes the assumptions made by Collier in his
“criminal rebels” thesis and states his conclusions on the opportunities and
motivations of the organization.290 Sanin does a good job in using data to
explain the actions of the ELN, but he treats the ELN like a secondary player
since the FARC has more data to its credit for the purpose of this study.
The final work, “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection
Economy of Colombia” by Alfredo Rangel Suarez, looks at “Colombia’s
guerrilla groups [and] places them among the most outstanding examples
… of successfully self-financed insurgent groups.”291 Suarez begins with an
overview of the insurgent groups in Colombia and gives a general picture
of their behavior.292 The work describes the guerrilla economy as it exists
by “how it relates to the territory and the people it controls, as well as
by the state’s governing capability.”293 Suarez breaks this into income,
extortion, kidnapping, drugs trade, and cattle theft, and gives incomes and
percentages that the ELN derives from these activities.294 The expenses and
investments of the guerrillas are also discussed before Suarez completes
his study with a look at the overall microeconomic effect of the guerrilla
economies in Colombia.295
Two papers focus on the Colombian conflict orientation. In “Colombia
– Thinking Clearly about the Conflict,” Philip McLean studies the type
of conflict in Colombia between all of the major players.296 The author
breaks down the individual groups and considers the ELN conflict as the
only one that could be described as “a classic guerrilla war.”297 McLean
looks at the actions of the guerrillas and compares them to their stated
purpose and summarizes peace talks between the guerrillas and the
government.298 In “Conflict, Decentralization, and Local Governance in

Colombia, 1974–2004,” Fabio Sanchez and Maria del Mar Palau discuss
the contributing factors to the geographical expansion of the armed
factions in Colombia.299 After a brief overview of the Colombian conflict,
the work focuses on each of the individual groups including the ELN.300
The look at the ELN provides factors that have contributed to the organi-
zation’s survival and geographic expansion.301 Sanchez and Palau show
the role that government decentralization reforms played in the expansion
of the armed groups in Colombia through testing the variables in econo-
metric models and a contiguous matrix.302 This means that the work can
“analyze the contagious effects of illegal armed activity in one municipality
or another … [and] the influence of independent variables … on local
dependant variables.”303 The study breaks the data into time periods and
groups which gives data sets for illegal actions and graphs representing the
change in probability of the actions for each group.304 Finally, Sanchez and
Palau provide similar data sets and graphs for the effect of the conflict on
the local governments.305 This work is very specific to the actions of the
organizations in relation to the independent variables tested and their effect
on their geographical region. This work is well planned but is limited to
decentralization factors and political implications.
The final work, “War and Drugs in Colombia” by the International
Crisis Group, rounds out the literature as it focuses on the drugs trade in
Colombia. Since the ELN had a rigid ideology, the organization resisted
the drugs trade for a long time.306 However, it is particularly interesting to
note the organizational/ideological change within the ELN on this matter.307
Even though their role in the drugs trade is marginal, the ELN is still an
important actor within the region.308 The work discusses the unexpected
partnership and expected conflict that has risen between the ELN and the
FARC and the changes that have given the ELN strength in drug-producing
regions.309 The paper concludes with the current attempts to curtail the
drugs trade in Colombia and the future options available to the country to
control and possibly end the drugs war.310
This literature helps in understanding how the ELN has changed and
adapted over the years to be the second-largest and important revolutionary
group in Colombia. None of the authors give a clear overview of the ELN
exclusively and many cover all of the illegal armed groups in Colombia.
While many works look at single factors for change, the purpose of this
part of the chapter is to apply the individual factors to the ELN.
Methodology
To explain the multiple factors involved and their effect on the ELN,
this research will use liberalism as the theoretical approach. The ELN is
a non-state actor that has proven to have both military and economic
strengths that make it a formidable opponent to the state. It is also
important to understand that the actions of the state directly affect the ELN
as an organization and its culture. Taking that into account, the focus on
the state, the populace, the military, and the other organizations competing
for power all play into the liberal cobweb approach to social science theory.
This will be a more effective approach for explaining how the independent
variables, such as the international drugs trade, the actions of the state, and
the near annihilation in the 1970s, affect the organization. In the above
literature, the focus is on the ELN as in independent variable and how it
affects the state. Through the liberalist approach, the ELN will be the focus
of the study as the dependent variable, and the state will be considered
one of the independent variables. Since the changes within the ELN as an
organization is the focus of the study, all of the surrounding factors of
the government, military, populace, and competing organizations will be
treated as independent variables.
Through rational choice models the study will propose competing
hypotheses which will individually be major contributing variables to the
organizational and structural changes to the ELN.
Hypothesis 1: The changes to the organizational culture

and structure of the ELN are a direct result of their near
annihilation in the 1970s
The ELN was ideologically strong during their creation but their military,
organization, and leadership were weak, which, combined with attacks
from the government and competing organizations, led to the near demise
of the ELN. A Catholic-Marxist mix of ideologies could be the main
deterrent for popular support, due to the contradiction of murder being an
unforgivable sin in Catholicism, in the rural communities the ELN controls.
It stands to reason that the ELN has purposely changed their ideology and
behavior in order to garner support within the regions they control. It is
possible that this single era of rebuilding between the 1970s and 1980s is
responsible for the strong leadership, military, and structure that the ELN
seems to have today.
Hypothesis 2: Through organizational changes the ELN

was more successful at procuring funding and expanding
influence
It is understood that the conflicting ideology of Marxism and Catholicism
has dictated some of the actions of the ELN. In order to survive, and
obtain greater financial rewards and geographic expansion, the ELN has
de-emphasized their ideology.
Hypothesis 3: The ELN is reactive to the government and

populace and changes the frequency, severity, and type of
attacks accordingly
The second largest guerrilla group in Colombia is not happy with the
government treating the ELN as second-place or unimportant. The behavior
of the government and populace toward the ELN could directly change
the behavior and actions of the organization. The government’s relative
strength or weakness in an area could explain the severity, frequency, and
type of actions carried out by the ELN.
Through the analysis of these hypotheses using liberalism as the
theoretical approach the goal will be to understand the importance of
the variables on the ELN. By treating the ELN as the dependent variable,
the study will look at the near destruction of the organization and their
ideology, their economic capabilities, the populace and the state. The
aim is to show what affect these variables have on the ELN individually
and then show the links between the independent variables. This analysis
will show the most definitive variables contributing to the organization’s
structural, cultural, and behavioral changes over time and how effective
these changes were in the survival of the organization. As a result of the
readings, it is realistic to say that the organizational behavior, structure,
and culture of the ELN changed over time. The variables will be looked
at to determine the time and severity of the changes. Some of the organi-
zational changes outlined in the hypotheses were gradual and took place
over periods of time, whereas other changes were dramatic and fast.
In looking at the literature, part of the research will be conducted to
determine why some instances or variables caused immediate change
whereas the impact of other variables caused a more gradual change over
time. Since the focus of this chapter is on one organization, the changes
will be measured by the independent variables in the research and how
their increase or decrease of influence on the ELN caused or did not cause
change to the organization.
The significance of this study lies is its focus on the organizational
changes to the ELN created by internal and external factors. Whether the
goal is to eradicate the group or to provide for an advantage in negotiations,
understanding the effects these variables have on the ELN is important. By
understanding how independent variables affect the organization, these
independent variables could be manipulated to direct or control the organi-
zational changes of the ELN in the future. This study will also show just
how strong the organization is and where its greatest weaknesses lie.
There will be two secondary sources to support the data side of

the hypothesis-testing. These studies focus on statistical, geographical,
and operational data. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and
Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability, by Angel Rabasa and
Peter Chalk, gives a detailed account of the ELN, its geographic expansion,
and involvement in the drug trade.311 The work also covers the political,
economic, and social complications by organizations like the ELN in
Colombia.312 In Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia by Jennifer S.
Holmes, Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin, the focus
is on illicit activities. The main portions of the book to be used are the
sections on guerrilla violence hypothesis-testing and the resulting data.313
The section on illicit crops and their effect on the Colombian economy will
also be used.314
For the analysis portion of the study, the data and competing hypotheses
are constructed into a matrix diagram to analyze the “diagnosticity” of the
data and its effect on the hypotheses. The study will be completed with an
analysis of the sensitivity of the data to each hypothesis. The analysis will
consist of an explanation of each hypothesis and all of the factors that are
consistent and inconsistent with each hypothesis. Through a systematic
approach, each of the factors will be described in detail and the effect of each
factor will be explained. The end of each section will include a summation
of whether the hypothesis is consistent with the data or if the data produced
inconclusive results. The section will finish with a matrix diagram focusing
on the major themes of evidence as compared to each hypothesis. The data
will be coded as consistent (C), inconsistent (I), and not applicable (N/A).
The diagram will be discussed as the evidence is weighed for diagnosticity,
which will lead to the conclusions. Aside from limitations, the biases
involved in the study arise in looking at the competing hypotheses where
the subject (ELN) is discussed based on the presumed actions the organi-
zation will take in each hypothetical scenario. While this is counteracted by
the data and actions known and documented about the group, there is still
some question of certainty when estimating how the organization reacted to
specific variables. For the purpose of the study it will be assumed that the
organizational actions are true to the studies used in the analysis.
The limitations of the study result from missing first-hand information
from the guerrillas and the civilians involved or directly affected by the
guerrillas. Most of the works used in this particular study were compiled
by military sources, government, and non-governmental organizations.
While some of the works incorporate data collected from former guerrillas
and civilians in the region, this data is very limited. There is also a lack of
information due to the relative size of the organization compared to other
illegal groups in the region. There are new works coming out of the region
from “inside” sources, but they have yet to be translated and are beyond
the limitations of this chapter.
First hypothesis and analysis: The changes to the

organizational culture and structure of the ELN are a
direct result of their near annihilation in the 1970s
In 1962 a group of 16 Colombian students visited Cuba on scholarships
at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis.315 Around 60 students would travel
to Cuba by the end of 1962.316 The students asked for military training to
transplant the Che Guevara “foquista” to Colombia to target “militant
petroleum workers and peasant land colonizers.”317 The Santander area was
chosen for the ELN camp because the region had experienced a communist
uprising in 1929 and the formation of a liberal guerrilla force during La
Violencia: the area had a history of armed opposition.318 The area was also
known for the Industrial University and the Port of Barrancabermeja on
the Magdalena River; the former provided left-wing student agitators and
the latter provided radicalized trade unionists.319 These target groups were
successful in operating among angry petroleum workers and peasants.320
As a result of these ties, the leaders of the ELN trace their origins to the
1929 uprising and unions of Barrancabermeja.321 In spite of initial success,
the ELN soon encountered a string of problems that lasted through the
1970s.322 Considerable infighting began in the group.323 This infighting
resulted from the diversity of the members with no strong leadership, and
purges under the accusation of treason.
The ELN ideology supported nationalism and “popular democracy”
with aversion to foreign investment.324 The ELN’s declared aim was to
“take power and establish a democratic and popular movement capable
of liberating Colombia from the international monopolies and the crillo
oligarchy.”325 The ELN proposed equality, “full democratic liberties to
the popular sectors,” giving women their legitimate rights, and “assuring
respect for human dignity and the free development of all Colombians.”326
By focusing on the energy sector of Colombia, the ELN distinguished itself
from the other organizations in the region.327 During the period of tension
between Moscow and Cuba over revolutionary ideology, the ELN became
favored by Havana and adopted the Castroite revolutionary ideology.328
While this ideology worked for the ELN at the time, they were on a path to
great difficulty.
After their first actions in Simacota, the ELN gained attention from
clergymen, most notably Camilo Torres.329 Torres tried to organize his
own movement called the United Front and failed.330 His decision to
join the ELN changed the organization and Colombia forever by uniting
Marxist ideology and Christian morality.331 Torres was able to bring new
membership to the ELN with his call for “popular unity.”332 After the
death of Torres, his charisma and commitment turned him into a martyr
for the organization.333 By the 1970s the first generation of ELN leaders
had died in combat, were exiled, or were executed by their own men for
treason.334 Information provided by deserters of the organization “enabled
the army to kill and capture most of the ELN leadership” during this
time.335 The ELN had a habit of purging their ranks and making the
organization naturally weak as a result.336 This purging weakened the
organization to the point that the remaining leaders focused on military
action and the application of the foquista doctrine.337 However, this focus
would only last for a few years before more threats to the ELN’s survival
arose. By the 1970s the ELN was further weakened by continued desertion
and infighting that caused an abandonment of the foquista philosophy and
retraction from political work to focus all of their attention on the milita-
ristic side of the ELN.338 In 1977–8 the ELN suffered more losses at the
hands of the military and through desertion to the point where the organi-
zation had no more than 30 people.339 This near-demise ignited a serious
rethinking of the ELN’s goals and strategy, marking an era of reorientation
and soul-searching for the organization.340 This marked the end of the old
ELN and its ideology and made way for the rebirth of the organization in
culture and structure.
By the 1980s the ELN began its resurgence due to three main factors: 1)
“[t]he ELN was able to strengthen its links with existing social movements
and trade unions”;341 2) “alongside its increasingly decentralized individual
guerrilla fronts a more complex organizational structure was put into place,
composed of the National Congress, the High Command, the National
Directorate, and the National General Staff”;342 and 3) “the development
of the oilfields in areas where the ELN enjoyed relative strength, provided
unexpected financial windfalls through extortion of domestic and inter-
national oil companies.”343 The first national conference held by the ELN
dictated the division and expansion of its two fronts.344 Their strategy
included a multi-class recruitment directive that would bring unity to the
Catholics, students, and middle-class professionals.345 The addition of
Manuel Perez saw the implementation of key military strategies and ideol-
ogies by the ELN.346 Perez brought the various factions of the ELN together
and developed new forms of income for the organization, especially through
extortion of oil companies.347 The ELN works through a federation of units
and in some cases pays their men as professional revolutionaries.348 These
changes in their structure were but a portion of the organizational change
coming to the ELN.
During this time of structural change, the ideology and goals of the
ELN went through gradual transformation as well. In practice, the ELN
“original aim of ‘national liberation’ was replaced by an ‘emphasis on
the control and exercise of power at the regional level … which has been
denominated by some as a kind of armed local co-government.’”349 These
developments have earned the ELN the reputation of being the most politi-
cally developed guerrilla movement in Colombia.350 The ELN moved to
maximize its power through its Christian-Marxist ideology and refrained

from politics, stating that it would “ultimately mean the corruption and
ideological sellout of the group.”351 In its second international conference
in 1989 the ELN still supported the movement toward a socialist Colombia,
a commitment which has not changed since the 1970s.352 The ELN leader
Nicholas Rodriguez Bautista (“Gabino”) called the “socialist system … an
extremely young project” and called on the ELN to become a successful
“pioneer” of the revolution.353 Another point that has not changed in the
life of the ELN is their continued support from Havana even though it has
become minimal recently.354 However, it has been the ability of the ELN
to remain financially independent from external sources that has left them
unhurt by the end of the Cold War.355 These ideological consistencies and
changes were the backbone of the renewed ELN.
These facts definitively support the hypothesis that the ELN changed its
culture and structure in response to their near-demise. The organization
could not have survived without changing their ideology, structure, and
behavior. The end of the old leadership and the changing environment
for the ELN forced the group to restructure and broaden their appeal. In
many ways the data that supports this hypothesis appears to be the only
reason the organization survived. Without these drastic changes the ELN
would have died out in the late 1970s. As much as these factors support the
hypothesis, it is important to note other factors that created change within
the ELN.
In the 1990s, changes to the international community forced the ELN
to alter its culture and structure for survival again. “The capitalist restruc-
turing demanded by neoliberalism through global institutions such as the
World Bank and the IMF” became points of threat to the ideology of
the ELN.356 For Perez the onset of this global reality would bring human
rights’ violations, and a concentration of wealth that would further embed
economic misery in the region.357 The ELN rose as “moral and ethical
combatants poised against the threat of creeping neoliberalism” and
pledged their fight against this emerging economic order imposed on the
world via the “North American ‘monocultural parameter.”358 This brought
the ELN view of economic redistribution back to the forefront since they
see the revolutionary actions in Colombia to be a result of economic
“misery and exploitation.”359 The 1990s also brought a change in the ELN
view on foreign investment, stating that they simply want a better deal
for Colombia from transnational corporations (TNCs).360 This improved
deal has to include a larger profit share and the “human, material, scien-
tific, and technological infrastructure” support Colombia needs to end its
dependence.361 These changes to their organization are a direct result of the
changes in global economics and politics. While these points do not support
the hypothesis, they do outline other shifts in environment that have forced
the organization to change and adapt.
Second hypothesis and analysis: Through organizational

changes the ELN was more successful at procuring
funding and expanding influence
An insurgencies support base is directly related to the support of the regions
and people they control.362 During their rise in the 1960s the ELN survived
from contributions from the peasants, theft of local payrolls, and bank
raids.363 The major income breakdown for the ELN is 60 percent extortion,
28 percent from kidnapping, 6 percent from the drugs trade, and 4 percent
from cattle theft.364 Since the 1970s, confrontations between the ELN and
the Colombian army produced such disastrous results that the ELN has
avoided military confrontations and has pursued an “economic strategy.”365
The ELN “developed an organizational structure capable of collecting and
investing the enormous economic resources that would allow the movement
to recover and expand.”366 A major reason for the growth of the ELN came
in the 1980s with the building of the Cano–Limon–Covenas oil pipeline,
which became a nationalist issue and source of funding for the ELN.367 Oil
production in Arauca has provided the ELN with an exceptional source of
rent from petroleum companies.368 The north-east front covers an area that
the center of the country needs for transit and communication via railroads
and roads, and the corporations pay the ELN for protection of mining and
transit.369 Along with the Barrancabermeja region, the ELN moved into the
Carmen and San Vicente coal regions, northern Antioquia, and southern
Cauca which has strategic highways and agricultural production.370 This
expansion of the 1980s also included the Norte de Santander region
and Uraba, a banana-producing area.371 The ELN controls a number of
corporations and invests both domestically and in foreign markets.372 This
Gabino extortion expansion plan of in the 1980s was the linchpin for the
growth and sustainability of the ELN. This expansion of extortion—with
the emergence of both international and national companies in the region
seeking to exploit its natural resources—has given the ELN a unique form of
income. During the early years of the organization, it fought the movement
of foreign companies into the region—but now such companies provide the
ELN with its largest source of income. The processes of globalization and
foreign direct investment now add more opportunities for income than any
other avenue outside of kidnapping.
The ELN has greatly expanded its income through the use of kidnapping.
In Colombia, the ELN is responsible for more than twice the number of
kidnappings of any other armed group.373 The technological advances in
kidnapping developed by the ELN have caused the socio-economic status
of the victims to drop and have resulted in a near-perfect, automated
operation that is highly profitable.374 The ELN has specialists who select
the victim, study their financial situation for the purpose of ransom
amount and ability to pay, study their security, study their routines, plan
the capture and captivity, and negotiate the ransom.375 This operation has
become technologically advanced due to the increasing financial stability of
the ELN.376 Through the use of computer technology, the process has been
greatly streamlined and while this is not the newest form of income for the
ELN it has definitely expanded since the 1980s.
The final change to the financial status of the ELN came in the form
of the drugs trade. For a time the ELN refused to participate in the drugs
trade since the Catholic and Christian members and leaders objected to the
trade on moral grounds.377 With the death of Perez in 1998, his successor,
Gabino, has allowed more participation in the drugs trade.378 While ELN
participation in the drugs trade is less than other armed organizations, their
fronts are active in almost every opium/poppy region.379 The relationship
between the ELN and drug-producing areas is complex.380 The ELN is
active in almost ten regions, five of which are coca-producing areas.381 In
some areas the ELN would not tax the farmers for illicit crop production
but would allow chosen drug dealers into the area to buy.382 In other areas,
such as the Magdalena River, Bolivar, and Serrania de San Lucas, the ELN
taxed the cultivation of coca.383 Some areas, which the ELN was contesting
with the FARC, witnessed an order to peasants to eliminate crops being
promoted by the FARC.384 The increased pressure of a paramilitary presence
in areas shared with the FARC has hindered the ability of the ELN to gain
substantial amounts of drugs revenue.385 There is more recent evidence that
shows that ELN income from drug trafficking has increased, and in some
regions the organization is involved in the whole chain of production.386
The evidence supports the hypothesis that changes in the procurement of
funds for the organization have enabled their survival. Economic diversity and
expansion have been important to the ELN and its ability to survive. While
the major component of ELN finances is extortion and increased kidnap-
pings, it is not possible to discount their involvement in the drugs trade. The
decision in the 1980s by Gabino to extort natural resource companies and
their transit was and is the most significant economic change in the ELN’s
organization. While the drugs trade income is still relatively small, it has been
an important addition to the ELN since it allows them to control regions that
would otherwise be taken over by the FARC or paramilitaries.
Final hypothesis and analysis: The ELN is reactive to

the government and populace, and changes the
frequency, severity, and type of attacks accordingly
The military capabilities of the ELN have waned due to many factors.387
Some analysts see the reduction as a conscious movement into a political
strategy, while others contend that the increased mobility of government

forces is a key factor.388 There is the expected correlation between “state
presence and political development, [and] both judicial efficiency and
electoral participation have a negative effect on ELN activity.”389 As stated,
this is expected since the stronger and better the government presence, the
less likely there are to be ELN attacks. With the death of Manuel Perez
Martinez, the ELN leader Nicholas Rodriguez declared: “On Father Perez’s
grave, the ELN swears it will never abandon the oppressed and exploited.
It will never give up the revolution.”390 Five days before the death of Perez,
the ELN agreed to peace talks with the government but withdrew, calling
the government “opportunistic” due to upcoming elections.391 By July 1998
the government met the ELN for peace talks in Germany, and Pastrana
offered a withdrawal of troops and a prisoner exchange program.392 The
ELN agreed to free congressmen and mayors and called for a unilateral halt
of hostilities while negotiating “a national convention to introduce wide-
ranging political reforms, [and] the creation of a constituent assembly.”393
Subsequent talks with the government included Francisco Galan and Felipe
Torres, two ELN leaders, who were temporarily released from jail to partic-
ipate, and coupled with upcoming negotiations between the government
and FARC, the incentive existed to “agree a favorable accommodation with
the government.”394
The ELN was annoyed with the government’s hard line in their negotia-
tions while giving concessions to the FARC.395 As a result of this insult,
the ELN intended to begin a “bold new guerrilla campaign designed to
enhance the bargaining power” of the organization.396 This new campaign
was designed to prove that the ELN was a worthy military force, including
hijacking an Avianca plane and taking 41 passengers as hostages.397
Pastrana immediately called the action a “blatant terrorist act” and refused
any political demands of the ELN; essentially the plan backfired.398 By
1999 the political tide turned against Pastrana, as “14 of the country’s 30
generals and 200 officers [were] all opposed to the government’s moves
to negotiate peace with the rebel groups.”399 Within four days the ELN
kidnapped some 100 people at a Cali church.400 Negative public outcry
and an immediate military response prompted the ELN to release 30
hostages in return for a 48-hour moratorium on troop movements from
the government.401 Upon public outcry, the ELN begged for forgiveness
from the Catholic community while secretly soliciting ransoms for the
wealthy church-goers, but made it clear they “had to finance a war.”402
The ELN ended the debacle by giving 33 hostages over to an international
commission in mid-June 1999.403
By April of 2000 the government was finally willing to cede a zone to
the ELN; however, negative public sentiment and a paralyzing wave of
roadblocks throughout the country caused the government to rescind the
offer.404 This retraction caused the ELN to unleash a wave of “sensational
sabotage and kidnappings.”405 In December of 2000 the ELN released

45 captive officers as a show of goodwill for both Christmas and for
prospective peace talks.406 These actions all follow the ELN “broad strategy
of attracting the attention of the government and the global media through
non-murderous extravaganzas.”407 This characteristic of avoiding carnage
has been effective in getting the attention of the state and increases the
government’s willingness to engage the ELN in peace talks.408 This example
also presented itself when the ELN protested the Pastrana admninstra-
tion’s sale of the ISAGEN (a state power generator), ISA (a power grid
company), and Carbocol (the region’s coal producer) as mandated by
the IMF.409 The ELN wanted to gain Pastrana’s attention and blew up
22 electricity producing sites.410 ELN leader Gabino stated that the “the
popular revolution has the responsibility of protesting how the government
is managing policy-making” and that the “Pastrana clan has always
benefited with privatizations, as well as Colombia’s oligarchy. We want
that to stop.”411 However, in 2001 the ELN was losing its negotiation for a
cease-fire zone and in a fit of frustration unleashed attacks that summer in
which civilians were slaughtered.412 This ended the ELN talks for their own
zone.
By 2001 the effectiveness of the paramilitaries caused the ELN
bargaining position to become increasingly weaker.413 Even with their
diminished position, the ELN scheduled peace talks in 2002 and
observers did not foresee an agreeable outcome nor did they believe
the ELN would honor a holiday truce.414 With only 22 active fronts in
2006, the ELN has reduced its military actions from an average of 195
a year to just 19 a year.415 Army offensives resulting in demobilizations
and captures have hindered the effectiveness of the ELN. The ELN has
survived in many regions due to their mobility, but the importance of
their presence has been reduced.416 While the ELN and the Uribe admin-
istration have tried peace talks both in Mexico and Cuba, there seems to
be no end in sight.417 The ELN has noted three issues in particular that
have led to the failure of negotiations: 1) “the government’s persistent
denial that an internal conflict existed”; 2) “its bias in favor of the
paramilitaries”; and 3) “it’s reluctance to resolve the humanitarian
crisis.”418 The ceasefire bottleneck remains the principal problem as the
ELN sees their mobility as their only defense against the other armed
groups.419 This also causes issues of concentrating fighters which would
not only expose the ELN’s strengths and weaknesses to the government
(thus losing negotiating power) but would also mean “military suicide”
if negotiations ended.420
The data supports the assertion that the government’s actions directly
affect the frequency and severity of ELN actions. Where the data
deviate is when looking at the actions themselves. The ELN has always
supported minimal or no innocent deaths as a result of their actions.
While this is not true in all cases, the few outliers containing civilian
deaths are the exception, not the rule of the ELN. The data are not
supportive of the ELN rhetoric of minimal fatalities because this has
not always been the case, but compared to the other armed groups in
the country, the ELN is the least murderous. In conclusion, the data do
not support the hypothesis that the ELN changes the type of military
based on the government’s actions. Their actions follow the same lines
regardless of the specific motivations, although there are exceptions. But
in many cases of ELN and government negotiations, the ELN has used
their small number of innocent killings as a point of leverage against
the government, and each time this is violated the ELN loses negoti-
ating power. The ELN does not change its actions or their severity in
response to public sentiment. While the leadership has asked the public
for forgiveness in certain cases, ELN operations have not been changed
or deterred.
The matrix diagram presents the evidence for each hypothesis, supple-
menting the discussion of hypotheses and the data collected. The major
points of evidence are broken into four major themes of change, new inter-
national orders, government, and public, and the conclusions drawn on
their consistency or inconsistency when compared to the hypothesis. These
themes emerge in the hypothesis analysis portion of the work. In the first
hypothesis the change in ideology overlapped multiple areas. Their change
in ideology ensured their survival and opened new forms of economic
gain throughout the life of the organization. It never changed its tactics in
attacking the government or negotiating peace. The change in leadership of
the organization played a large role in changing the organization’s structure
and the geographic utilization of their areas of control for economic gain.
Diversity in membership seemed to be the cause of many changes within
the organization, as it expanded and created a hybrid force that was truly
unique to revolutionary movements in many ways. The rise of neoliberal
capitalism and the IMF was originally an area the ELN refused to accom-
modate, but as its inevitability became apparent the ELN used it to their
economic advantage and changed their culture to fit the new economic
order.
In the second hypothesis the economic expansion of the ELN in the
1980s is supported as one of the most important points of organizational
change. Involvement in the drugs trade is a direct result of economic
factors in that some areas of control require the ELN to fight other armed
groups, and a change in later ideology also supported this economic
venture. Acceptance of foreign investment opened new opportunities for
the ELN financially through extortion but it also changed the interaction
between the ELN and the government. The data shows that during the
time of privatization and foreign sale of resources the ELN was most
active in terrorist attacks in these areas. Technological advancements made
Table 7.2 Matrix diagram and analysis (ELN)

Evidence Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
Change in ideology C C I
Change in leadership C C N/A
Diversity in membership C N/A N/A
Rise of new international political C C N/A

and economic policies
Economic expansion N/A C N/A
Involvement in drugs trade N/A C N/A
Acceptance of foreign investment N/A C C
Technological advancements N/A C N/A
Government actions dictate N/A N/A C

frequency and severity of
attacks
Government actions dictate type of N/A N/A I

attacks
Popular sentiment dictates N/A N/A I

frequency and severity of
attacks
Popular sentiment dictates type of N/A N/A I

attacks
C = consistent
I = inconsistent
N/A = not applicable
the ELN proficient kidnappers in Colombia. The data shows that these
advancements made the kidnapping processes systematic and much more
profitable.
In the third hypothesis, the data did support the assertion that government
actions dictated the severity and frequency of attacks perpetrated by the
ELN, but that their actions followed the same minimal casualty or no
casualty type of action. In view of these findings, the data did not support
the hypothesis considering the change in the type of actions pursued.
In relation to public sentiment, the data shows that while apologetic on

occasion, the ELN does not change the frequency, severity, or type of
attacks.
Conclusion
The ELN has depended on their ability to change their organizational
culture, structure, and behavior in order to survive. This part of the
chapter has highlighted the major factors contributing to these changes
through the near demise, expansion of funding, and influence in a new
economic order, and through the actions of the government and populace.
The data supported the hypothesis of annihilation, funding, and influence.
This showed that the near-decimation of the ELN changed their ideology,
structure, and leadership. The data also demonstrated that the expansion
of funding opportunities and influence played integral roles in the survival
and in the changes in the organizational behavior and structure. When
considering the final hypothesis, the data supports the change in frequency
and severity of ELN attacks based on the actions of the government, but the
types of actions were not changed, and the popular view changed nothing.
Having studied the FARC and ELN changes, the next part of the chapter
is a LAMP (Lockwood Analytical Method of Prediction) analysis of the
FARC and the ELN. Part Four pulls together the individual studies of the
FARC and the ELN for the purpose of predicting their futures in Colombia.
1985 1990 2000
FIGURES 7.4–7.6 Evolution of ELN actions

(Sanchez and Palau 2006, 11)
Part Four: The future of the FARC and ELN

Introduction
For a nation with abundant natural resources and extensive area, Colombia
is the second oldest democracy in Latin America, yet remains one of the
most unstable democracies, with a long legacy of violence. The violence has
stemmed from political divisions which are a result of economic structural
inequalities, giving rise to such guerrilla groups as the FARC and the ELN,
which offer redress of social ills. Although the international community has
tried to help the government of Colombia, its socio-economic problems are
considered of their own making and thus must be handled by the Colombian
government via the military, the police, or diplomacy. These problems have
become international issues as globalization has made Colombia a major
trading partner of the US and other countries, and has also opened up
the country to direct foreign investment. Unfortunately, this international
assistance will all be brought to an end if the government cannot regain and
maintain control of the insurgent forces within the country.
This part of the chapter will begin with a brief history of Colombia and
its democratically elected government for context. Next, we will discuss
each actor and their roots and ideologies, and how these groups interact
with each other and with the Colombian government. Research earlier in
this chapter focused on the ELN and FARC individually. With the addition
of the government, this part will show the likely futures of these actors.
This will be followed by the “pair-wise comparison” and an explanation of
the findings.421 The research will then explain focal events and indicators
that will present themselves in the event tat the futures predicted become
reality.
Predictive issue: Within the range of adaptations

probable, what are the most likely predictions for
future FARC and ELN behavior?
Actors
The purpose of this part of the chapter is to fill some of the gaps in the
prediction theories surrounding the future of Colombia in its battle against
insurgencies. This question involves an evaluation of the three major actors
in the battle between the insurgencies and the state. This study focuses on
the FARC and the ELN with the state as a constant, and all of the choices
and interactions therein. These two actors and their options are considered
under the scenarios of Colombian state involvement. Colombia’s state
options include taking a neutral stance, a containment stance, or a

“victory” stance in its battle with the FARC and the ELN.
Colombia
When looking at the history of the Colombian state it is important to
focus on the political divisions within the country. As noted in previous
chapters, the FARC and the ELN are militant, radical wings of political
movements. Since independence in the 1830s from Gran Colombia,422
the Liberal and Conservative parties would determine or influence
every aspect of politics, nation building, and Colombian society.423
With their roots in the Wars of Independence, the two parties were
comprised of land owners and merchants who had a “considerable
degree of autonomy” and could mobilize their supporters for elections
and civil conflicts.424 This bipartisan system was used by the elites as a
framework “to channel, promote, and protect their interests.”425 Elite
interests became indistinguishable from party ideology and this, coupled
with the hereditary nature of the political factions, led to a polarized
Colombia where party affiliation became the main social cleavage in the
country.426 Violence occurred as a result of competition for state power
and distribution of resources.427 In the early Colombian republic one of
the most important and often only sources of wealth was the “ability to
award contracts, control political and public service appointments, and
make policy decisions related to the economy.”428 This was because the
“state budget was the only industry in a country without industries,” and
this lack of a private sector meant that the government offered the only
opportunities for advancement.429

The political parties were “subcultures” and operated on an “attack
and revenge” basis since the membership was passed on from generation
to generation.430 However, the minority party was never excluded from
participation in the government and a system of elite pacts was used as a
“mechanism for accommodation, power sharing, mediation, and resolving
conflict.”431 Elite pacts were ways of sharing power and making sure that
no significant political faction was left out so that a “political truce” or
gradual exchange of power between parties could happen without insti-
gating violence.432 This was the basis for the clientelismo, or clientelist,
form of government that came to define Colombian politics.
Clientelist politics was discussed earlier with regard to the FARC and
the ELN, but in this part of the chapter to the focus is on the modern
state of Colombian politics. Clientelismo is a reward system “in the
form of patronage, in exchange for support.”433 This reward could mean
government contracts, licences, positions in local or regional government,
or even the giving of a title of public land to private interest.434 This
clientelism occurred between the Liberals and Conservatives (state repre-
sentatives) and elite groups, and between the elites of the parties and their
supporters.435 For peasants, this form of patronage could mean “relief from
military conscription for a son to effective police protection from belligerent
neighbors to a favorable resolution of legal disputes.”436 For landowners,
this could mean “access to government jobs, advanced education for
children, a favorable decision on the location of a road or any of a hundred
other political or legal favors.”437 This system unified parties from the top
elites through the bottom of society and “replaced the state as a source
of identity.”438 Clientelism was critical in the polarization of the country
and the polarization of the two parties.439 Now that the foundations of
Colombian political polarization are clear, it is important to recap on the
era of La Violencia.
The next major event in the history of Colombia was an era known as
La Violencia. This era is important due to the changes in Colombia during
and after the period between 1940 and 1960. Two distinct levels of conflict
started in this era and at first look, this was the same type conflict as in the
past between the Liberal and Conservative parties.440 During this period the
“old bipartisan hegemony” conflicted with the new political ideologies that
fell “outside of the traditional political order.”441 These new political groups
formed as a result of the political and social changes that spread throughout
Latin America in the twentieth century, as discussed in Part One of this
chapter. These groups were categorized as “silent revolutions,” and while
their political and social divisions were previously discussed, it is helpful to
recall the changes that resulted from this period.
First came the influx of foreign investment, economic growth due to
exports, industrial and manufacturing growth, and the state becoming a
supporting rather than driving force.442 Rapid growth in the population
included massive migration from agricultural lands to industrial urban
centers.443 The expansion and growth of this era created almost no
downward distribution of wealth and the “majority of Colombians experi-
enced either a stagnation or relative decline in their standard of living.”444
This created a period where government income increased some 400
percent yet the social expenditures in the country were stagnant.445 These
conditions, coupled with the general increase in education of the public and
relative loss of influence of the Catholic Church, set the stage for te “silent
revolutions.”446 The formation of new political groups added new powers
and opportunities and new “loads to the political system.”447 The expansion
of these groups allowed them to channel and satisfy the demands of their
constituents thus eclipsing the traditional parties and eroding the clien-
telist system.448 This led to immediate attempts by both the Conservatives
and Liberals to integrate these new parties into their bipartisan system;
for example, the Liberals integrating the labor unions and interest groups
arising from the urbanization of the work force.449 These issues of political
and social divisions led to the rise of a new political leader that would
change the face of Colombian politics.
Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was the face of the “reformist wing of the Liberal party,”
focusing his efforts on uniting the politically marginalized people against the
“oligarchy, the real country against the political country, ceaselessly attacking
the corruption and bankruptcy of the old system.”450 Gaitan mobilized the
populace by Gaitanismo where the traditional Liberal–Conservative divisions
were realigned to transform the traditional system into “a new class oriented
axis of political confrontation.”451 For the oligarchy, “Gaitanismo equaled a
revolution which threatened the foundation of their interests” and so these
traditional parties tried to continue their previous path of integrating the new
political forces into their pre-existing vertical party divisions.452 It was this
attempt to change the face of Colombian politics that appealed to so many
and brought the full weight of the hard-line Conservatives to bear on Gaitan.
This would mark the beginning of La Violencia.
La Violencia can be broken into four periods. The first was the galva-
nizing moment of political tension, the assassination of Gaitan on April
9, 1948.453 This led to the Bogotazo which was a spontaneous riot that
began the “multifaceted insurrection” reflecting “the demands of the new
challengers.”454 The traditional party leaders acted quickly to stop the
violence but as Conservative violence increased, the Liberals withdrew from
the political alignments and the killing escalated.455
The second period of La Violencia was marked by the quick spread
of guerrilla warfare throughout the country, as guerrilla groups armed
themselves against partisan attack.456 To make matters worse, the
Conservative-controlled government used the National Police and the army
for partisan ends that further mobilized the Liberal peasantry.457 This use
of police and military in “scorched-earth” tactics and terror would mark
itself in the minds of Colombian society.458 In 1952 the guerrillas met with
the Liberal leadership and gave them the ultimatum of either leading the
revolt or the guerrillas would.459 The Liberal response was a public parting
from the guerrilla organizations and the people they represented.460This
growing independence of the guerrilla groups and the inability of the
Liberal elite to control them led to “an irreversible social and political
crisis.”461 The final break between the Liberals and the guerrillas came with
the increasing radicalism of the guerrillas and their announcement that the
Llanos region of Colombia was to be an autonomous area under a popular
democracy.462 Land reform would entail “land for the people who work it,”
which directly challenged the Liberal land owners.463 It was at this point
that General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew the government in a military
coup at the behest of the political parties.464 The Conservative and Liberal
moderates “essentially thrust” Pinilla into power while the two parties
“worked out a new governing pact.”465 The General preferred a civilian
solution to the problem and preferred the past military stance of not getting
politically involved since he believed that “we the military do not have suffi-
cient capacity to govern the country.”466
In the third period of La Violencia, progress stalled, corruption increased,

pockets of violence were met with repression, and guerrilla warfare began
to spread again.467 Rojas Pinilla alienated the businessmen through his
economic policies, and in incidents where students were fired upon and
crowded churches were tear-gassed he alienated the Catholic Church.468
The Rojas Pinilla blend of populism with corporatism alienated the military
and “threatened the institutional unity,” and finally he was unable to
demobilize the guerrillas or bring alliances together with new movements
like the trade unions.469
The fourth period of La Violencia saw the creation of the National
Front government (a two-party, four-year alternating power system).470
Due to the threats to the traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives
created the National Front to combat the rise of new political challengers
and the attempt by Rojas Pinilla to unite the people in a Gaitanista
fashion.471 Through a series of constitutional amendments the Liberals and
Conservatives reached agreements to ensure neither party was excluded
or repressed by the other.472 This legitimized inter-elite arrangements and
along with a four-year alternating presidency, each party was given half
of the legislative seats regardless of their number of votes.473 All cabinet
positions, Supreme Court appointments, public service appointments,
governorships, and mayoralties “were made on the basis of parity between
the two parties,” and “ordinary legislation required a two-thirds majority
vote to be ratified.”474 The National Front also marked the first time the
military became involved in political negotiations. The removal of Pinilla
in 1957 began the transition of the government from military back to
civilian control.475 The military was given three concessions upon its return
to civilian control.476 First, the excesses and/or failings were placed at
the feet of Pinilla exclusively.477 Second, the “professionalization” of the
military in their national security role was redefined.478 They were given
modern equipment, professional training abroad, a large budget increase,
and complete autonomy over these resources.479 Third, the military was
given the role of advisor on public order and security decision-making.480
The final part of the National Front system dealt with the emergence of
new political participants and restrictions to be imposed on them.481 There
were four principal restrictions: 1) none of the new political entities were
involved in the National Front system; 2) all parties other than Liberals and
Conservatives were excluded from the electoral process; 3) there was no
provision for the expansion of political participation in the National Front
agreement; and 4) the agreement was purely political and addressed no
social or historical issues.482 This power-sharing program was the source of
diminishing party loyalty, which eroded the political relationship between
the state and the people even further.483
The National Front was effective as a power-sharing and control
mechanism for the Liberal and Conservative parties, but the system further
repressed new political entities in Colombia and strengthened the resolve

of the guerrillas. The Colombian crisis is a result of political violence that
goes almost completely uncontrolled by the state.484 There are four main
elements in the Colombian crisis.485 First, 40 years after the National
Front, the Liberals and Conservatives still run the political scene.486 The
system is closed to any other potential participants, and membership of
the traditional parties has become extremely narrow. Where the system is
fragmented beyond the control of any actor, the democratic institutions
have neither been a channel for concerns of the public nor a mechanism for
broad debate, and these institutions cannot mediate or resolve conflict.487
Second, the expanding poverty gap, despite economic growth, has increased
social protest and given rise to new organizations that “are creating politics
without the government or the guerrillas.”488 Third, all social conflict
resolution has been militarized due to the dependence of the elite on
military support to stop new political opposition.489 The military has gained
influence in “defining the ideological rationale and implementing policy
related to public order, social conflict, and the ongoing war with the various
guerrilla groups.”490 Fourth, the justice system is breaking down since the
system has been politicized through state repression, agents responsible for
human rights’ violations have absolute impunity, and the system cannot
effectively deal with escalating crime.491 These problems have permeated the
political climate in Colombia to the point where most of the social conflict
can be traced to these core issues.
Colombia has become a tangled web of groups that have evolved into
part of the culture where each fight for individual ideals rather than the
common good.492 The desire for power and easy wealth has tainted the
vision of these groups, and their self-serving behavior has produced the
“Loop Effect” that the country is currently entangled in.493 The social
condition of Colombia is dominated by the uneven distribution of wealth,
the inability to meet human needs, lack of free speech, weak ethics, poor
leadership, mishandling of the country and resources, and electorate indif-
ference.494 The political forces in Colombia obtain their profits and power
from the chaotic state of the country.495 This produced new ideological
leaders in Colombia that followed the tradition of Gaitan. Gaitan was
followed by Luis Carlos Galan Sarimento, the founder of the New
Liberalism political party, who supported the extradition of criminals to
the US and was killed for his efforts in 1989.496 Guillermo Cano Isaza was
a defender of free speech and human rights and his protest against violence,
rights violations, authoritarianism, and corruption led to his assassination
in 1986.497 Jamie Garzon was a journalist, comedian, and political satirist
but his human rights activism led to his assassination in 1999.498 During
the 1990s over 250,000 Colombians were killed in social conflict.499 In
2006 the National University of Colombia’s faculty was threatened due to
their scholarly approaches to the Colombian social and political situation
and their research into certain topics.500 Ideologues and their families are
often kidnapped or assassinated. Senator Ingrid Betancourt is an example
of this.501 She demanded a change in all aspects of the system, involving
society in general, the rebels, politics, and government, and was kidnapped
by the FARC because of her efforts to change the old ways.502 The efforts
of Uribe Velez, who is the president elect from 2006 to 2010, started the
improvement of Colombia.503 It will be the actions and improvements of the
Uribe administration that will support the scenario portion of this study.
While violence in Colombia has been endemic, it has not been until
recently that the conflict spillover into neighboring nations has created a
new set of problems for the Colombian government. These extenuating
circumstances beyond the state of Colombia warrant far more discussion
than can be included here. However, this part of the chapter focuses on the
Colombian state and its impact on the actions of the FARC and the ELN.
The short-term and long-term goals of each group are considered next,
followed by the goals of the government, which are discussed in relation to
the scenarios that will come later in the study.
The FARC
To date there have been numerous political guerrilla groups in Colombia
but the most commonly known which still presents a threat to the
Colombian government is the FARC (“Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia”). This group adopted a revolutionary doctrine based on
Marxist-Leninist ideology and a military strategy following other guerrilla
and terrorist activities.504 The ideological discourse these groups pursued
in the decision-making process “diminished their intellectual flexibility in
developing strategies and their ability to adapt to the political and social
environment.”505 This deeply imbedded doctrine forced the group to “adopt
political and military behavior that on many occasions was not suited to the
real conditions in which the struggle was to take place.”506 The evolution
of the FARC began with the shift from the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy to
a less rigid “Bolivarian” ideological path.507
This new ideological vision combines nationalist with left-wing ideas
and sidelines ultimate ideological goals for the establishment of a socialist
model.508 This has evolved into competition with the state through a
heightened critique of government incompetence when dealing with social
inequality, crime, and deficient public services.509 The FARC has presented
themselves as a credible alternative for “good government.”510 The FARC
has moved from “criticizing the legitimacy of the origin of the state to
questioning its functional legitimacy.”511 The group has since pushed to
gain a share of power within the state at the municipal level so as to be
visible in an administrative capacity.512 The guerrillas have also increased
their ability to provide public services such as health, education, and
public order.513 New governmental forms of the FARC were derived from
a narrow set of ideologies that clashed with the culture of the population
and as a result diminished the group’s operational flexibility as well as
their lobby for support from local social coalitions. What makes this group
unique is their pragmatic strategy for gaining power.514 This difference has
been crucial to the survival of the FARC where their support within the
rural areas remains strong from those who have been neglected by the
government.
In 2008 the FARC was dealt two serious blows to its leadership. Second-
in-command Raul Reyes died in a bombing raid in Ecuador in March, and
founder Pedro Marin died in May, after which the new leader Alfonso Cano
(Guillermo Saenz) rose to power.515 The Colombian military continued its
strategy of military neutralization through “deepening internal fissures and
splintering the organization,” leaving the FARC no choice but to surrender,
be captured, or die.516 But the government failed to recognize that the
organization is still a durable political-military force with an ideology that
contains remnants of Marxism-Leninism.517 The government estimates that
there are around 7,000 to 10,000 troops left and while the numbers vary
due to the replenishment capabilities of the FARC, the authorities have been
particularly effective in using FARC defectors to hunt down and infiltrate
remaining FARC units.518 This increase in fighting has decimated the FARC
ranks, with 10,806 killed and 26,648 captured between 2003 and 2009. To
make matters worse, individual demobilization has also been a problem,
with 11,615 fighters leaving the FARC ranks.519

The FARC has maintained its assertion that their struggle is legitimate
but there is a lack of education among its recruits.520 The fighters are simply
told that the state elites are responsible for their hardships which leave
the majority of fighters unaware of the political and military structures
and objectives of the FARC.521 This lack of political savvy and the waning
morale coupled with unrelenting military pressure has created a “culture
of distrust” leading the FARC to adopt a policy of child recruitment to
replenish its forces.522 These problems have added further strain to the rural
fronts where the FARC has retreated to the high ground border regions of
Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, and Brazil.523 These units have merged with
stronger “inter-fronts” and have reduced their unit size to avoid air attacks
and increase their ability to use hit-and-run methods of attack with “triads”
(three-man cells).524 This has hindered the ability of the FARC to launch
offensives but that has not reduced their capacity to take over new territory
in these deeper rural areas.525
On the urban fronts the FARC still could gain strength against the
government since the security policy of the government is not supported in
these areas and an increase in attacks would discredit this policy.526 A new
goal of the FARC is to gain attention through assassinations, sabotage, and
recruitment of students.527 Several attacks have already taken place in the
cities of Bogotá, Cali, Buenaventura, and Neiva.528 The FARC has shown
resolve in these areas.529 While kidnapping and extortion remain important

sources of income, the FARC has changed its methods by keeping
kidnapped victims in various places and by demanding smaller ransoms.530
Illicit activities remain at the top of the list for income, and the FARC has
responded to the government offensive by strengthening its units in coca-
producing areas.531
The FARC’s goals for the short term include property acquisition
in drug-cultivating regions and domination of communication across
Colombia. In 1999, the Colombian government conceded a piece of land
the size of Switzerland to as a demilitarized zone after which the military
and police withdrew from the area.532 For three years the FARC increased
their effective presence in the areas around the zone, thus expanding the
territory they controlled and ensuring southern lines of communication.533
They were able to use the area to hide and manage their inventory of
hostages, accelerate their terrorist training, and manufacture bombs and
mines.534 The FARC is trying to consolidate its control of coca-growing
regions in the south and east, thus allowing them to expand their opera-
tions and gain military capabilities.535 Subsequently, new goals included
extending their theatre of operations to envelope the entire country, to be
accomplished through the control of corridors to the coastal, border, and
mountain regions of Colombia.536 The FARC and the ELN in separate
actions both plan to isolate Bogotá and other major cities by cutting
communications between the cities and the rest of the country.537 Finally,
through networking in the urban areas, the FARC plan a large-scale attack
that will result in a general uprising.538 However, these goals have taken
a back seat to the more important goals of leadership replacement and
survival since 2008.
A pressing issue is the effect of the military on the ability of the FARC to
continue to support their base. FARC support has been reduced to almost
nothing in rural communities and their support nationally and interna-
tionally has been greatly diminished.539 The ability of the FARC to mobilize
populations against the government has diminished since they have been
unable to protect those involved from the reprisals of security forces
and new armed organizations.540 The rural communities have also taken
advantage of the weakened state of the FARC to combat the extortion and
recruitment tactics of the group.541 This all hinges on the upcoming 2010
elections in Colombia when the new FARC leader Cano hopes that the
organization will be able to restructure its political side.542 The FARC is
infiltrating the left wing and government opposition through universities
and protests which are strengthening links with urban militias.543 This has
led to a return to their Bolivarian interpretation and continuing their anti-
imperialist ideals with a focus on uniting Latin America.544 Since the 2002
shock of being placed on the European and Canadian terrorist lists, the
FARC has shifted some of its focus to regaining international support, and
while this has met with limited success, the organization has increased its
prisoners-for-hostages swaps with the government.545 This, coupled with the
FARC request to increase the involvement of the international community,
has not only improved their international image but has proven their ability
to act with political cohesion.546
The ELN
The Marxist-based ELN, by comparison, has never strayed from their
rigid communist ideology. A smaller group, numbering around 3,500, the
ELN believes in removing the current government and replacing it with a
socialist system.547 Heavily inspired by the Cuban Revolution, the group
evolved from urban radicals (MOEC—“Movement for Workers, Students,
and Peasants”) who were inspired by Castro and Che Guevara in their call
for the removal of all Latin American governments.548 At this time, another
group, the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), solicited Castro
for financial support, and the FUAR would eventually become part of the
ELN.549 Soon peasants and farmers supported the group for protection
from the right-wing paramilitaries, and even radical Roman Catholic
priests joined the movement due to its call for “popular unity” against a
government that neglects its poor.550 The ELN has also shown that for the
right reasons it will ally itself with other guerrilla groups like the FARC, as
they did in the 1990s for the “Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordination.”551
For most of their existence the ELN has followed a strict separation
from the drugs trade, freedom of religion, and a separation from Maoist
communist ideology.552 Foundational differences aside, the ELN and the
FARC have different goals for the short term, yet have similar long-term
goals.
The ELN avoids direct military confrontation and uses an “economic
strategy” consisting of attacks on the power grid and communications,
including “armed propaganda,” kidnappings, and airplane hijackings.553
This strategy has been a result of the smaller size of the ELN and their
lack of military strength. Currently, the FARC and the ELN have similar
long-term goals, which include but are not limited to complete destruction
of the state as it exists; the ELN still has the short-term goal of negotiating
its own demilitarized zone.554 Although the talks concerning this demilita-
rized zone ended with the Pastrana administration, the ELN remains an
effective force involved in kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and the drugs
trade.555 Under the Uribe administration the ELN changed their strategy
by presenting their political demands to parliament, giving the government
hope that the rebels might “reconcile their revolutionary demands with
Uribe’s mandate to strengthen the state, enhance citizen security and
combat poverty.”556 It is important to note that the ELN has the unique
“capacity for reflection and political assessment” that is more developed
than in the other armed groups.557 This is reflected in a more pragmatic
approach by the ELN leadership, recognizing that there might be more to

be gained from negotiations than armed conflict.558
The Uribe administration’s rounds of peace negotiations shared a similar
fate to those of the Pastrana administration. One of the focus points of
the ELN negotiations has been the humanitarian crisis, and while the
government refused to focus on this issue they demanded that the ELN
cease all hostilities and criminal acts as a precondition to participating
in negotiations.559 With the advent of the Cuban rounds in 2007 the
ELN and government could not even agree on whether to discuss the
ceasefire or agenda first.560 Upon the agreement of the government to
release ELN prisoners, the ELN was prepared to release all hostages and
stop kidnapping.561 However, when talks resumed in June the government
demanded that the ELN identify its combatants and move them to a
“special zone.”562 The government then accused the ELN of changing its
requests every time the negotiations seemed to be nearing a conclusion.563
The main points of argument for the ELN are legitimate in that they fear
the government will use the identification and concentration of their troops
to wipe out the organization. On the other hand, the government feels that
the ELN will continue their illegal acts if the government cannot identify
and locate ELN combatants.
There is a level of uncertainty when looking at the preferred outcome
and goals of the ELN in the current negotiations. As an armed group, the
goals of the ELN are relatively unchanged from the goals the group set out
to achieve at its foundation. With the new negotiations it is unclear whether
the ELN has the desire to become a legitimate political party and build on its
base and represent its goals through legal channels.564 The most challenging
aspect of this transition is the ELN’s desire to retain its structure.565 Two
points of difficulty seem to be that those close to ELN leadership are of the
opinion that the group does not want to create a political party, and the
FARC seems to be thwarting the efforts of the ELN and the government
to reach peace agreements.566 The ELN and FARC goals and recent actions
against the backdrop of the political climate in Colombia and the actions of
the government are the subjects of the following methodology and analyses.
Methodology
To explain the factors involved and their effect on the FARC and ELN
future actions, this research uses liberalism as the theoretical approach
which allows for the actions of non-state actors. The FARC and ELN are
non-state actors and in this work have proven to have both military and
economic strengths that make them formidable opponents to the state. It
is also important to understand that the actions of the state directly affect
the FARC and ELN future actions and adaptations. The focus on the state
competing for power and control of the country plays into the liberal
cobweb approach to social science theory. This is an effective approach
for explaining how the independent variables such as the actions of the
state affect the organizations, while in the literature review the focus is on
the FARC and the ELN as independent variables and how they affect the
state. Through the liberalist approach the FARC and the ELN is the focus
of the study as the dependent variables, and the state will be considered the
independent variable. Since the future actions and changes within the FARC
and the ELN are the focus of this study, the government and its actions will
be treated as the independent variable within each scenario.
This study will be using the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction
(LAMP) as its methodology. The LAMP technique is the sum of the possible
interactions between the FARC, the ELN, and the state.567 This technique
looks at the probability of an alternate future in relation to all possible
futures.568 Using this method will improve the organization of available
information based on the perceptions of the actors and make predictions
on which alternate future is likely at a given point in time.569 The LAMP
method is broken into twelve steps: 1) “Determine the issue for which
you are trying to predict the most likely future”; 2) “Specify the national
‘actors’ involved”; 3) “Perform an in-depth study of how each national
actor perceives the issue in question”; 4) “Specify all possible courses of
action for each actor”; 5) “Determine the major scenarios within which
you will compare the alternate futures”; 6) “Calculate the total number of
permutations of possible “alternate futures” for each scenario”; 7) “Perform
a ‘pairwise comparison’ of all alternate futures to determine their relative
probability”; 8) “Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from highest
relative probability to the lowest based on the number of votes received:”
9) “Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each alternate future in terms
of its consequences for the issue in question”; 10) “State the potential of
a given alternate future to ‘transpose’ into another alternate future”; 11)
“Determine the ‘focal events’ that must occur in our present in order to bring
about a given alternate future”; and 12) “Develop indicators for the focal
events.”570 Since only the past is fixed and since the analyst cannot know
how the future focal events of the study will change, the LAMP method is a
qualitative method of study where the outcomes can always be revoted and
all of the possibilities are analyzed, not just the probable ones.571
Courses of action
These are the four courses of action that are available to the FARC and the
ELN based on past and current behaviors.
Continue Fighting (CONT): The option remains for each of the actors
to continue the violence both against each other and against the state. This
means that the FARC can continue fighting the government and/or other
illegal armed groups (ELN). The ELN can continue fighting against the
government or other illegal armed groups (FARC).
Negotiate Peace (NEGO): Each of the armed groups has the chance to
negotiate peace with the government or with each other.
Withdrawal (WITH): It is possible for each of the actors to disarm and/
or withdraw from the fighting altogether.
Form Alliances (ALLI): The FARC and the ELN have worked together
in the past and if faced with destruction, they may join forces.
Both the FARC and the ELN have shown their desire to continue fighting
against the government. Even with the recent offensives by the government,
the FARC and the ELN have moved toward more remote areas and
strengthened their forces in areas from which they derive income, such as
drug-producing areas. Another similarity is the international legitimacy
desired by both organizations. Since the FARC and the ELN were placed
on international terrorist lists there has been pressure within both groups
to return to their political ideological roots and expand their recruitment
to bring in students and ideologues. Neither the FARC nor the ELN
have shown any desire to become legitimate political parties and while it
could happen, there are no indications that these groups will change their
positions.
The government continues to look to negotiations to end the violence of
the FARC and the ELN. In both cases the history of adaptation and survival
has shown that they are not going away by themselves and that government
eradication is unlikely. The only way the Colombian government will end
the violence is through negotiations. The FARC has shown their desire
for international legitimacy and control of territory as important goals
in the negotiations. The ELN’s goals are more political, seeking an inter-
national platform for their political movement to bring their issues with
the government to international attention. The ELN has been trying to
get the government to take them seriously since it has ignored them in
discussions with the FARC. The FARC’s actions seem to be interfering
with government negotiations with the ELN, and the state has accused the
FARC of tampering with the ELN–government negotiations. In the current
situation it appears that the government or the FARC or ELN can initiate
negotiations. Under the scenario of government withdrawal, the FARC
and the ELN can negotiate with each other. In the face of fighting until a
winner emerges, the two organizations have the option of negotiating a
truce among themselves.
The only way the FARC or the ELN would withdraw from the conflict
is if it was the only option left to them. The recent loss of support by the
FARC and ELN has not changed this position. The FARC and the ELN have
only attained limited support from the general populations and since much
of the support is forced it is easy to see why the organizations have not been
swayed by public opinion. Much like the discussion of the Marxist-Leninist

ideology before, the FARC and the ELN feel they are the best option for the
people and their best hope for prosperity, even if the people themselves do
not agree. The public appears to be siding with the government, and with
the government’s recent advances the FARC and the ELN have lost most
of their ability to provide for their base, which has directly affected their
support from local communities. However, the groups are still intent on
fighting for the cause even if the general public is no longer interested.
As this support dwindles, it is possible for the FARC and the ELN to
join forces to increase their effectiveness against the government. In the past
these alliances have been very short lived and have only occurred between
one or two fronts of both the FARC and the ELN. Differences over ideology
and economic activities were the major points of disagreement. In addition
to these differences, the current fighting between the organizations for
control over common drug-producing areas has further soured relations
between them. But the FARC and the ELN have also shown no limitations
to their adaptability in the face of annihilation. Because of this resolve, if
either force is facing destruction in a region there is a good chance that the
two will join forces for the sake of survival.
Scenarios
1 The Colombian government adopts a stance of neutrality in
Colombia. They withdraw from the conflict.
2 Colombia follows a containment strategy in Colombia. They
commit enough forces to contain the conflict to Colombia and
restrict the spread of violence within the country and outside.
3 Colombia employs a “victory” strategy in Colombia. They commit
significant military forces and funding in an all-out offensive against
the FARC and the ELN to achieve a permanent end to the conflict.
The government has gained public support with the Uribe administration.
The hard line against the FARC and the ELN has produced success in
fighting the groups and when coupled with the economic improvements
in Colombia in the last few years, the government has a better standing
with the people. It is this support that will keep the government from
withdrawing from the conflict. The advances made against the FARC
and the ELN have been significant and the government does not want to
lose the favor of its people. This leads to the issue of containment, since
2008 saw serious international problems as the FARC and the ELN have
shown their ability to move across borders into neighboring countries. The
Colombian government cannot continue a program that follows guerrillas
into neighboring countries without those countries’ support since this will
cause an international incident. The government has to contain the violence
to Colombia. While the role of the international community is beyond the
scope of this work, the assumption is that the Colombian government could
take on this containment strategy by itself. If the Colombian government
continues its current strategy it would follow a complete victory method
of dealing with the FARC and the ELN. The government has imposed few
limitations on itself in recent years in its attempts to eradicate the FARC
and ELN by force. While the methods have produced positive results, the
reality is that total eradication has been and will be impossible without
negotiations and the support of the international community.
In moving on to the scenarios this research will use a pair-wise
comparison to determine the most likely alternate futures for each scenario.
Since the discussion of the adaptations of the FARC and the ELN were
analyzed in Parts Two and Three, the focus will now be on prediction of
the futures of these groups, with the top five outcomes for each scenario
discussed.
Alternate futures calculations

y
X=Z
X= courses of action (4) y= national actors (2) Z= 16 alternate futures
Scenario 1: 120 votes
Table 7.3 Possible futures

Possible future # FARC ELN Remarks
1 CONT CONT This is the FARC and ELN desired

position
2 CONT NEGO Recently this is a common occurrence
3 CONT WITH
4 CONT ALLI
5 NEGO CONT
6 NEGO NEGO This has been a common scenario

historically
Possible future # FARC ELN Remarks
7 NEGO WITH
8 NEGO ALLI
9 WITH CONT
10 WITH NEGO
11 WITH WITH
12 WITH ALLI
13 ALLI CONT
14 ALLI NEGO
15 ALLI WITH
16 ALLI ALLI This has happened and failed in the past
CONT: Each group continues fighting.

NEGO: Each group negotiates with the government or each other.
WITH: Each group withdraws.
ALLI: ELN and FARC try to form alliance.
Table 7.4 Scenario 1 – The Colombian government withdraws from

fighting
Possible future # FARC ELN Votes
1 CONT CONT 15
2 CONT NEGO 14
4 CONT ALLI 13
3 CONT WITH 12
6 NEGO NEGO 10
5 NEGO CONT 9
13 ALLI CONT 9
8 NEGO ALLI 8
14 ALLI NEGO 8
7 NEGO WITH 6
16 ALLI ALLI 6
9 WITH CONT 4
15 ALLI WITH 3
10 WITH NEGO 2
12 WITH ALLI 1
11 WITH WITH 0
Total: 120
Alternate futures: Scenario 1 – Colombian government

withdraws
Alternate Future #1: The FARC and ELN continue fighting (15 votes)
This is the most likely outcome in this scenario due to the fact that
government withdrawal will remove all restraint from the guerrillas.
History has proven that when the government is on the offensive, the
guerrillas have larger losses inflicted on them than they can inflict on
the government.572 There are also the points discussed in earlier in the
chapter to consider: where the FARC and the ELN are focused on the
fight with or without the support of the masses, and these groups have
continually expressed their refusal to become legitimate political parties
and disarm. Under President Pastrana’s administration the government
essentially withdrew from the zona de despeje, an area conceded to
the FARC during peace talks, in return for their promise to disarm.573
The FARC used this area to traffic arms, money, supplies, troops, and
drugs to their other fronts.574 They also launched attacks against the
government from this region and held prisoners and hostages there.575
Since this is the outcome of government withdrawal on a small scale
there is no evidence to suggest that this will not happen on a large
scale. It is because of this track record that the first four of the top five
alternate futures indicate that the FARC will follow the same lines. The
ELN’s attempts to retain a zone of encounter (ZOE) during peace talks
proved less successful than the FARC since the government was soured
by the FARC exploitation of the agreement.576 Based on history it is hard

to see how the ELN will react upon government withdrawal but their
historical tenacity and desire to continue fighting makes the case for this
alternate future.
Alternate Future #2: The ELN will try to negotiate with the powers left in
the conflict (14 votes)
While negotiating with the government will no longer be necessary in this
scenario, the ELN will have to work out deals with the FARC over contested
regions. Since the FARC is a larger and stronger military force, the ELN will
try to negotiate its survival and control of their portions of the country. In
the last few years the ELN have shown their resistance to the expansion of
the FARC into their territory in areas like Arauca and Norte de Santander,
where the two groups have engaged in armed conflict.577 Based on occur-
rences like these it would be the ELN who would initiate negotiations with
their competitors since they are the smaller force. Without pressure from
other sources the FARC could focus its efforts on taking ELN territory,
and in doing so the ELN would not be able to sustain a prolonged conflict,
leading them to negotiate.
Alternate Future #4: The ELN would align itself with the FARC (13 votes)
While this is unlikely due to the core differences in ideology, the two
groups are fighting for the same general goals. With the government no
longer in the picture, the ELN may look to align itself with the FARC
rather than risk fighting and losing the battle. The ELN has shown
in the past their willingness to join other revolutionary movements
including the FARC. For a time, the two partnered up with other smaller
revolutionary groups in the late 1980s creating the National Guerrilla
Coordinating Instance (CNG).578 Later the ELN formed the Simon
Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Group, but the ideological differences
were too great and the organization fell apart.579 The FARC and the ELN
do have similarities in terms of their interests and goals but historically
seem to only tolerate each other.580 The FARC recognizes the ELN as a
revolutionary force, but the relationship is complex since in some areas
the ELN inhabit some higher regions with the FARC and even work
together in regions where the ELN has the weaker position.581 It has
only been the movement of the FARC into the Venezuelan border regions
that has caused armed conflict between the groups.582 The withdrawal
of the government could relieve some of the tension that exists between
these groups since they would no longer fight over peace negotiations in
which one group is participating while the other is not. There have been
instances of ELN frustration during government and FARC talks, and
FARC frustration during ELN and government talks, but this point of
friction would be removed.
Alternate Future #3: The ELN would withdraw from the conflict based on
the withdrawal of the government (12 votes)
This is a relatively remote option, since the ELN has proven to be very
resilient. The ELN has shown its desire to establish a socialist government
both in its ideology and in its attempts to join revolutionary groups
together. This alternate future would suggest that the ELN would see the
FARC as the leading force and, with the government gone, realize that its
ability to compete for control is nonexistent. Based on the superior strength
and size of the FARC, the ELN would have no choice but to be annihilated
by the FARC or disarm and withdraw.
Alternate Future #6: The FARC and ELN would negotiate for control of the
country (10 votes)
This is a remote possibility due to the power vacuum left with the withdrawal
of the government. Neither organization is prepared to, or has the capability
to, take over the country. There is a possibility that the two organiza-
tions would come to an agreement eventually, but their focus would be on
expanding as fast as possible to gain the upper hand and ultimately power.
Both would expand rapidly and since their concentrations of military
strength are in different regions there would be bursts of armed conflict
throughout important economic regions. Since the ideologies of the FARC
and the ELN differ so much, there would never be a consensus but probably
a division of land and control. This is assuming that the two organizations
will not decide to declare all-out war in a winner-takes-all conflict. This leads
into the second scenario where the government focuses on containment.
Focal events
Scenario 1: Colombian government withdraws
Alternate Future #1: The FARC and ELN continue fighting (15 votes)
Focal event: Colombian government loss of popular support from the
populace.
Focal event: Government would lose territory to the FARC and ELN on a
large scale.
Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to continue fighting.
Focal event: The FARC and ELN begin major offensives in urban areas
and government strongholds.
Alternate Future #2: The ELN will try to negotiate with the powers left in
the conflict (14 votes)
populace.
large scale.
Focal event: ELN forces lose the battle for the support of the populace to
the FARC.
Alternate Future #4: The ELN would align itself with the FARC (13 votes)
populace.
large scale.
Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to continue
fighting.
Focal event: ELN forces are too weak to fight the FARC.
Alternate Future #3: The ELN would withdraw from the conflict based on
the withdrawal of the government (12 votes)
populace.
large scale.
Focal event: Left to the FARC and the ELN, the ELN forces are too weak
and fail to gain public support.
Alternate Future #6: The FARC and ELN would negotiate for control of the
country (10 votes)
populace.
large scale.
Focal event: FARC and ELN gain sufficient support and strength and
divide the country rather than continue fighting.
Indicators
Focal event: Colombian government loss of popular
support from the populace
Key indicator: Refusal to enter into elections, protesting and rioting by
the public at large.
Key indicator: The humanitarian status of government actions would
worsen since in the past as people are killed by the government their
support moves to the revolutionaries.
Key indicator: Overall repression of the populace by the government
socially and politically.
Key indicator: Increase in jailed or “disappeared” opponents of the
government.
Key indicator: Number of refugees and displaced people increases greatly.
Focal event: Government would lose territory to the

FARC and ELN on a large scale
Key indicator: Government negotiations lead to large demilitarized zones
for the FARC and the ELN.
Key indicator: Military and police forces are forced out of regions when
faced with large columns of FARC and ELN combatants.
Key indicator: Government supply and communication lines are cut by
the FARC and the ELN, isolating government forces and cities.
Focal event: Government loss of personnel too great to

continue fighting
Key indicator: Assassinations of government officials increase sharply.
Key indicator: Government forces suffer major defeats on fronts
controlled by the FARC and the ELN.
Focal event: The FARC and ELN begin major offensives in

urban areas and government strongholds
Key indicator: College campuses begin forming radical political groups
that carry out terrorist actions.
Key indicator: FARC and ELN fronts begin isolating cities from
government communications, supplies, and control.
Key indicator: Strikes and protests against the government by unions and
students increase in frequency and violence.
Key indicator: The government is no longer able to protect the citizens
and declares martial law.
Focal event: ELN forces lose the battle for the support of
the populace to the FARC
Key indicator: Public support favors the FARC and their fronts through
taxes and recruitment.
Key indicator: The ELN continues to push a socialist/communist ideology

in the areas it controls, alienating the peasantry.
Key indicator: The ELN is unable to provide public works and support to
local populations.
Focal event: ELN forces are too weak to fight the FARC
Key indicator: The ELN will withdraw from areas where control is
contested with the FARC.
Key indicator: The ELN will not be able to recruit new combatants.
Key indicator: The FARC is able to take over vast drug-producing areas
and increase their size and strength faster than the ELN.
Focal event: FARC and ELN gain sufficient support and

strength and divide the country rather than continue
fighting
Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN will have successes in gaining
public support after the government withdraws.
Key indicator: Both groups will move to take over major income-
producing areas, increasing their ability to support their ranks
financially.
Key indicator: The FARC and ELN will begin working together in
contested areas or divide the fronts among each other.
Key indicator: Hostilities between the groups will cease.
Transposition
Scenario 1: Colombian government withdraws
When looking at Alternate Future #1 in which the FARC and the ELN
continue to fight, this future could easily transpose into Alternate
Futures #2, 3, 4, and 6. It seems impossible for Alternate Future #1
not to take place to some degree. It would be this initial fighting that
would determine transposition into other futures. If the groups expand
militarily and economically at similar rates then the conflict could be
sustained by both sides. If the FARC grew larger and stronger than
the ELN, which has been the case historically, then the ELN would be
faced with negotiation or withdrawal which would transpose Alternate
Future #1 into Alternate Futures #2, 3, or 4. It would be the FARC and
ELN adherence to political and ideological goals on top of the FARC’s
larger and stronger force that would mean the military end of the ELN.
If the ELN is pushed into a corner, it could be flexible on goals and
ideology, as in the past, prepared to align themselves with the FARC
in order to survive . Finally, Alternate Future #1 could transpose into
Alternate Future #6 since the build-up of forces and territory could
lead to negotiations by both groups who see each other as legitimate
and no longer need to continue the conflict with a government out of
the picture.
Table 7.5 Scenario 2 – The Colombian government imposes a

containment strategy
1 CONT CONT 14
16 ALLI ALLI 14
2 CONT NEGO 13
4 CONT ALLI 11
5 NEGO CONT 11
6 NEGO NEGO 10
13 ALLI CONT 10
8 NEGO ALLI 8
14 ALLI NEGO 8
7 NEGO WITH 6
3 CONT WITH 5
9 WITH CONT 4
15 ALLI WITH 3
10 WITH NEGO 2
12 WITH ALLI 1
11 WITH WITH 0
Total: 120
Alternate futures
Scenario 2: The Colombian government imposes a
Alternate Future #1: The FARC and ELN continue fighting the government
(14 votes)
With the government following a containment strategy, the FARC and
the ELN would not be deterred from fighting. As the FARC and the
ELN are conscious of their abilities to retreat, resupply, and train across
the Colombian border in the remote areas of neighboring countries, the
hostilities will increase. The FARC and the ELN will attempt to take over
all the areas and supplies of opposing groups, including the government,
to continue their fight. The FARC and the ELN are dependent on their use
of the borders and international corridors for many reasons. Drugs and
guns routinely cross the borders of Colombia and neighboring countries
as a result of the ineffective Colombian border patrols and the corrupt
and compliant local officials in neighboring countries.583 While the extent
of FARC and ELN trafficking in narcotics is not clear, it is understood
that the corridors most involved in the shipment of drugs and guns in and
out of Colombia are controlled by the FARC and the ELN. The FARC
in particular found a sympathetic ear in Hugo Chavez, the president of
neighboring Venezuela.584 This is problematic due to the need for interna-
tional support for Colombia to have an effective containment strategy. The
main point of the containment strategy will keep the domestic fight from
becoming an international one. Without the ability to resupply or cross
borders freely, the abilities of the FARC and the ELN will be reduced.
Alternate Future #16: The containment of the country would lead the FARC
and ELN to positions of ineffectiveness and they will group together (14 votes)
With the supply lines for drugs and weapons cut off, the FARC will have
some difficulty drawing new income but still have significant stores of
weapons and money. The ELN’s primary forms of income from kidnapping
and extortion will be untouched by the containment strategy, but their
resources of weapons and men are small. The two organizations will
find that their ideological differences will fall secondary to their desire to
continue the fight. By this point the increased manpower and supplies of the
FARC coupled with the local income opportunities of the ELN will make
the two organizations far more effective as a singular force.
Alternate Future #2: The FARC will continue to fight while the ELN
negotiates (13 votes)
Alternate Future #4 is similar in that the FARC will continue to fight while
the ELN will form an alliance with the FARC. These two alternatives fit
well together since they both hinge on the position of the ELN if their
corridors to other countries are cut off. It is understood that the ELN
is a smaller and weaker force, and due to the containment policy of the
government the ELN will be limited in its economic and supply options.
In regions where the FARC is stronger, the ELN uses the FARC forces as
a shield for protection, as in the Cesar and Magdalena highlands.585 While
both groups have established bases in the Venezuelan states of Apure and
Bolivar, the ELN presence is stronger and more vital to their operations.586
The ELN’s struggle has been more political than military and their organi-
zation both avoids direct military confrontations and has asked its militants
at conferences to focus their efforts on a broader social movement, more “in
tune” with other Latin American movements.587 Based on their flexibility
in working with other revolutionary movements and their need for the
border regions, the ELN will have to negotiate to be able to survive. As the
weaker force, if the ELN is cut off from their greatest areas of strength in
the Venezuelan corridor, the organization will be forced to seek protection
from the FARC through government negotiations or by forming an alliance
with the FARC.
Alternate Future #4: The FARC continues to fight while the ELN aligns
with the FARC (11 votes)
In this future the ELN is the smaller and weaker force, and due to
the containment strategy of the government it cannot survive alone.
Negotiations may not be an option if the ELN has no strength or income
left with which to negotiate. This future sees the ELN as too weak to resist
advancement of the FARC into their territory and is faced with the choice
of military defeat or cooperation with the FARC and concession of their
fighting forces and fronts to FARC control. In some of the higher regions
of the country and the areas where drug production has expanded into
ELN territory, this problem already exists. This reduced ability to fight and
collect income coupled with their aversion to direct confrontation would
lead the ELN to form an alliance.
Alternate Future #5: The FARC will negotiate and the ELN will continue
fighting (11 votes)
This is the most remote possibility when looking at the outcomes of the
top five alternate futures. This future assumes that since the majority of
the FARC’s income is drug-related, the organization will face force and
supply payments they can no longer afford, thus diminishing their size and
strength. Unlike the ELN, the FARC has been known for direct confron-
tations with the military, which actions require funding and supplies.588
FARC support is also at a serious low in recent times and with the people
refusing to pay extortion or “taxes” to the FARC, the organization may
have trouble finding enough income.589 With the FARC losing sources of
support and income, the fighters will defect to the government, further
weakening the FARC position. Perhaps the FARC may see the negoti-
ating table as a way to minimize defection while maximizing what little
bargaining power they have left. This scenario would be different for the
ELN since the containment policy has not affected their ability to derive
income from local companies and resources and from kidnapping. This
will be an opportunity for the ELN to expand their territory and absorb
deserting FARC militants to increase their military capabilities.
Focal events
Alternate Future #1: The FARC and ELN continue fighting the government
(14 votes)
Focal event: Colombia gains the help of Panama, Venezuela, Peru, Brazil,
and Ecuador to contain the guerrillas.
Focal event: Neighboring countries are too weak and corrupt to help the
Colombian government.
Focal event: The FARC and ELN appeal to the international community
for support against the government.
Focal event: The FARC and the ELN launch offensives against the
government in border regions.
Alternate Future #16: The containment of the country would lead the
FARC and the ELN to positions of ineffectiveness and will group together
(14 votes)
Focal event: Neighboring countries strengthen their border security and
remove the corrupt officials from the area.
Focal event: Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce the legitimacy of
the FARC and the ELN.
Focal event: Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas with the
Alternate Future #2: The FARC will continue to fight while the ELN
negotiates (13 votes)
Colombian government
Focal event: The ELN is unable to gain public support or funding and is
forced into a corner.
Alternate Future #4: The FARC continues to fight while the ELN aligns
with the FARC (11 votes)
Focal event: The ELN is unable to gain public support or funding and is
forced into a corner.
Alternate Future #5: The FARC will negotiate and the ELN will continue
fighting (11 votes)
Focal event: The FARC is unable to gain funding and supplies and their
larger force weakens quickly.
Indicators
Focal event: Colombia gains the help of Panama, Venezuela,
Peru, Brazil, and Ecuador to contain the guerrillas
Key indicator: Organization of American States (OAS) work to make
agreements between Colombia and its neighbors to combat the
guerrillas.
Key indicator: International states and organizations publicly support the
cooperation between the nations.
Key indicator: Colombia begins working to support neighboring
countries’ militaries.
Focal event: Neighboring countries are too weak and

corrupt to help the Colombian government
Key indicator: Borders are controlled on the Colombian side but not on
neighboring nations’ sides.
Key indicator: Guerrilla support and camps in bordering countries are

able to stage offensives against government forces from inside and
outside Colombia.
Key indicator: The movement of drugs, guns, and chemicals in the border
regions of neighboring countries increases as Colombia’s borders are
closed tighter.
Key indicator: Guerrilla forces are uncontested or easily defeat
government forces in the border regions of Colombia’s neighbors.
Focal event: The FARC and ELN appeal to the

international community for support against the
government
Key indicator: FARC and ELN forces try to make deals with governments
not heavily aligned with Colombia.
Key indicator: Kidnap victims will all be released unconditionally.
Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN will work with humanitarian
organizations.
Focal event: The FARC and the ELN form offensives

against the government in border regions
Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN will move out of the urban areas
and into the border areas with difficult terrain.
Key indicator: Indigenous people of border regions will move out of the
region and/or report increases in attacks.
Key indicator: Reports of fighting spilling over into neighboring countries
will increase.
Focal event: Neighboring countries strengthen their

border security and remove the corrupt officials from the
area
Key indicator: Neighboring countries will build up their military presence
at the Colombian border.
Key indicator: Officials will be increasingly jailed and tried on corruption
charges.
Key indicator: Drug, weapons, and chemical seizures along the border will
increase.
Key indicator: Reporting on displaced persons and refugees will increase
in border regions.
Focal event: Leaders in Latin America publicly denounce

the legitimacy of the FARC and the ELN
Key indicator: Leaders will denounce the human rights violations of the
FARC and the ELN and their refusal to allow humanitarian groups to
work in regions under their control.
Key indicator: This has already begun as of 2008, with President Hugo
Chavez of Venezuela, President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, and
Fidel Castro of Cuba calling for the FARC to release all hostages
unconditionally.590
Focal event: Neighboring countries engage the guerrillas

with the Colombian government
Key indicator: FARC and ELN actions will slow or become nonexistent in
the border areas.
Key indicator: FARC and ELN actions will increase frequency and
severity in urban areas.
Key indicator: Neighboring countries to Colombia will face an increase in
jailed guerrillas and trials.
Focal event: The ELN is unable to gain public support or

funding and is forced into a corner
Key indicator: FARC combatant ranks will grow quickly.
Key indicator: The local populations will fight the ELN and refuse to give
them money or support.
Key indicator: The ELN and the FARC will stop fighting each other and
the ELN will attempt to hold a conference with FARC leaders.
Key indicator: The ELN proposes peace negotiations to the government
before their negotiating position is too weak.
Focal event: The FARC is unable to gain funding and

supplies and their larger force weakens quickly
Key indicator: Combatants dissert their fronts or defect to the
government.
Key indicator: FARC units retreat from government controlled areas.
Key indicator: Local populations report more activity relating to taxes
and theft of supplies from towns by the FARC.
Transposition
When looking at Alternate Futures #1 and #16, the FARC and the ELN
will continue fighting and while that has been a historical guarantee there
remains uncertainty about how these organizations supply themselves. If
the FARC loses its main source of income and the ELN is faced with waning
supplies and troops, then they should easily move into the realm of alliances
envisaged in Alternate Future #16. In many regions the two organizations
have a symbiotic relationship and there is nothing to suggest that if the
advantages of one group complement the other they will not join forces.
When considering Alternate Futures #2 and #4, the FARC continuing to
fight remains a constant but the position of the ELN will change based on
the actions of the FARC. If the FARC sees this as an opportunity to go to
war with the ELN to take their territory, supplies, and forms of income,
the ELN may not be able to stop this incursion and thus negotiate with
the government, as in Alternate Future #2. It is also possible that they will
make the move to align themselves with the FARC, Alternate Future #4,
since the relations of the two groups have soured when the ELN tried to
negotiate with the government alone. Alternate Future #5 would transpose
from Alternate Future #1 as a result of the FARC being economically
decimated by the loss of the drugs and trafficking income and their ability
to fight gone. Thus they would negotiate, but only as a last option when
fighting and surviving are no longer possible.
Alternate futures
Scenario 3: The Colombian government employs a “victory”
strategy
Alternate Future #6: The FARC and the ELN both negotiate with the
government (14 votes)
With the government employing a constant barrage of troops and munitions
on the guerrillas and their fronts, the ability of the guerrillas to fight will
be eroded. This scenario has similarities with the current tactics of the
Uribe administration. Looking at how the past few years have changed the
dynamic between the government and the guerrillas provides a valuable
insight to this scenario and its alternate futures. In Alternate Future #6,
the FARC and ELN will negotiate with the government. The current
Uribe administration’s offensive against the FARC presents a challenge the
like of which the organization has never faced. Several FARC units have
Table 7.6 Scenario 3 – The Colombian government employs a

“victory” strategy
6 NEGO NEGO 14
16 ALLI ALLI 14
8 NEGO ALLI 13
14 ALLI NEGO 11
7 NEGO WITH 11
4 CONT ALLI 10
5 NEGO CONT 9
15 ALLI WITH 8
2 CONT NEGO 7
13 ALLI CONT 7
3 CONT WITH 5
10 WITH NEGO 4
9 WITH CONT 3
12 WITH ALLI 3
11 WITH WITH 1
1 CONT CONT 0
Total: 120
been wiped out, morale is falling and soldiers are deserting their units,
commanders have been killed or deserted, and three of the top FARC leaders
have died or were killed.591 This all came at a time when public support for
the government was at a high, while support for the FARC was at a low.592
This has effectively left the FARC fragmented. While the organization has
adapted to the new situation, the objective for Uribe’s administration was
to force the FARC into peace talks. This future looks to the administration
to continue its onslaught and drive the FARC to the point where they have
no option but to negotiate, by which time the organization will be so weak

that it will have little to offer beyond disarming.
Meanwhile, the Uribe administration saw the ELN as a low priority
in peace negotiations.593 After multiple rounds of peace talks, the absence
of mutual trust and the harder-line nature of the government demands
produced little in the way of progress.594 With this rigid attitude, the ELN
cannot afford to take on the government as directly as the FARC has
done. Once the government shifts its focus off the FARC and toward a
more complete strategy for fighting both groups, the ELN will be in grave
danger. Since the organization is smaller and less militant than the FARC,
their ability to recover from direct armed actions with the government is
also smaller. With the government following this system of eradication, the
FARC and the ELN they will have no choice but to negotiate or die fighting.
Alternate Future #16: The FARC and ELN form alliances with each other
(14 votes)
As noted before in the history of these groups, alliances have formed when
needed. Due to the recent offensive of the Uribe administration, the ELN
and the FARC are cooperating more than ever. After the death of one of
the FARC’s founding leaders, the ELN called for an alliance between the
two groups, but divisions in regions where the groups have traditionally
fought resisted this measure.595 In most other regions the FARC has helped
weaker ELN units, while stronger ELN units have helped the FARC.596 The
main differences—the ELN establishing a social base and having limited
involvement in the drugs trade while the FARC’s focus is on imposing its
presence locally and heavy reliance on the drugs trade—have hindered
alliances between the two.597 The FARC and the ELN will have no choice
but to form alliances as the government continues to press the groups closer
together. Since the regions traditionally controlled by the FARC and the
ELN have been geographically close, the movement of the government to
drive these forces closer together will force a bond of survival. This will give
the organizations better defenses against government attacks and better
positioning in future negotiations.
Alternate Future #8: The FARC negotiates with the government while the
ELN tries to form alliances with the FARC (13 votes)
The FARC will negotiate while the ELN form alliances, and in Alternate
Future #14 the ELN will negotiate while the FARC form alliances. This
future outcome is close due to the nature of these organizations when
one tries to negotiate with the government and the other is left out of the
process. The FARC negotiating is higher in probability due to the track
record of the groups. The FARC has shown repeatedly that they are willing
to negotiate with the government without the ELN. At the same time it
has always been the ELN that has instigated talks and attempts at alliances
between the organizations. Based on historical patterns, the FARC will

enter negotiations to stall or gain a respite from government attacks while
the ELN, feeling ignored, will try to bolster its ranks with the help of the
FARC.
Alternate Future #14: The FARC calls for an alliance while the ELN
negotiates with the government (11 votes)
While it is less likely that the FARC would call for an alliance as the ELN
negotiated with the government, the change in FARC abilities due to the
government offensives could alter their thinking. In this future the FARC
have no power left for peace talks and through aligning themselves with
the ELN they gain some of the political legitimacy they have lost, adding
new combatants to their ranks. The ELN’s preferred forum has always been
political and if there is something to be gained they will negotiate with the
government without the FARC.
ELN withdraws from the conflict (11 votes)
The ELN has avoided direct confrontation with the government and since
that has been their mode of operation they are a militarily weaker force
than the FARC. This future assumes that the ELN will be faced with
destruction from both sides, the government on one and the FARC on the
other. With the pressing of these two offensively capable groups, the ELN
will be forced to withdraw from the conflict. That withdrawal, coupled
with government offensives on FARC fronts, forces the FARC into negotia-
tions with the government but gives them more power at the negotiating
table since they are the only revolutionary group left to deal with. Looking
for a resolution, the government and the FARC have a good chance of
ending the conflict in this scenario.
Focal events
strategy
Alternate Future #6: The FARC and ELN both negotiate with the
government (14 votes)
Focal event: Government approval is at an all-time high while guerrilla
support is falling rapidly.
Focal event: The general populace fights the FARC and the ELN with the
government and refuses to allow the guerrillas sanctuary.
Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are forced from their territories and
suffer heavy losses in fighting with the government.
Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are listed as terrorist organizations
by the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the
fight.
Focal event: The FARC and the ELN reach out to the international
community to make their fight legitimate and force the government
into negotiations through international pressure.
Alternate Future #16: The FARC and ELN form alliances with each other
(14 votes)
Focal event: Peace negotiations fail between the government and the
FARC and the ELN.
fight.
ELN tries to form alliances with the FARC (13 votes)
FARC and the ELN.
fight.
Focal event: The FARC tries to negotiate while they have some power left
in the negotiations, and the ELN will be excluded making them push
for an alliance with the FARC.
Alternate Future #14: The FARC calls for an alliance while the ELN
negotiates with the government (11 votes)
FARC and the ELN.
Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by
the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight.
Focal event: The government starts negotiations with the ELN while
excluding the FARC and the FARC calls for an alliance against the
government.
ELN withdraws from the conflict (11 votes)
FARC and the ELN.
Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are listed as terrorist organizations by
the international community thus removing the legitimacy of the fight.
Focal event: The government offensive is too great and the ELN troops
are decimated or desert their fronts.
Indicators
Focal event: Peace negotiations fail between the
government and the FARC and the ELN
Key indicator: Talks stall for days and months at a time, with calls for the
addition of international arbitrators to get the talks out of a stalemate.
Key indicator: Benchmark agreements throughout negotiations are not
honored by the government or the guerrillas.
Key indicator: The hostilities by the guerrillas and government do not
stop for the negotiations.
Focal event: Government approval is at an all-time high

while guerrilla support is falling rapidly
Key indicator: Public demonstrations show support for the government.
Key indicator: Public demonstrations are against the guerrillas.
Key indicator: The general public turns out in large numbers for
government events, such as voting.
Key indicator: The free media supports the government.
Key indicator: Humanitarian issues are positive, and government
suppression or disappearances are no longer key factors.
Focal event: The general populace fights the FARC and

the ELN with the government and refuses to allow the
guerrillas sanctuary
Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN are refused taxes and supplies
from the fronts they control.
Key indicator: The public informs on the guerrillas to the government.
Key indicator: The public refuses to join the guerrilla groups and resists
forced recruitment.
Focal event: The FARC and the ELN are forced from their
territories and suffer heavy losses in fighting with the
government
Key indicator: Forced recruitment of peasantry into combat ranks.
Key indicator: Actions against the guerrillas move into higher and more
remote parts of the country as the guerrillas retreat.
Key indicator: The government has more and more combatants from the
FARC and the ELN defect and inform on the organizations.
Focal event: The FARC and ELN are listed as terrorist

organizations by the international community thus
removing the legitimacy of the fight
Key indicator: International terrorist organization lists are formed in each
country and international organization containing the FARC and the
ELN.
Key indicator: The Colombian government outlines the actions
of the FARC and the ELN as terrorist actions to international
organizations.
Key indicator: The international community denounces the actions of
the FARC and the ELN as no longer in the interests of the people and
therefore terrorist, not revolutionary.
Focal event: The FARC and ELN reach out to the

international community to make their fight legitimate
and force the government into negotiations through
international pressure
Key indicator: The FARC and the ELN will request the involvement of
humanitarian and non-government organizations in negotiations.
Key indicator: Both groups will offer to release all hostages
unconditionally.
Key indicator: Both organizations will stress their political goals on the
international stage.
Key indicator: Both organizations will try to improve their human rights
records.
Focal event: The FARC tries to negotiate while they have

some power left in the negotiations and the ELN will
be excluded, making them push for an alliance with the
FARC
Key indicator: The FARC will try to negotiate with the government
quickly using everything they have as leverage.
Key indicator: The ELN will realize their weak position and lack of
government attention in negotiations through increased actions and
attacks.
Key indicator: The ELN will call for a conference with the FARC
leadership.
Key indicator: The ELN will stop fighting FARC fronts in contested areas.
Focal event: The government starts negotiations with the

ELN while excluding the FARC and the FARC calls for an
alliance against the government
Key indicator: The government will convince the ELN to enter
negotiations without the FARC.
Key indicator: The FARC will attempt to interfere with the negotiations
between the government and the ELN.
Key indicator: The FARC will contact the ELN leadership for a
conference.
Key indicator: The FARC will stop fighting ELN fronts in contested
areas.
Transposition
strategy
Alternate Future #6 would be very similar to past patterns of government
negotiations with the guerrillas, with the failure of talks with both the
FARC and the ELN transposing into the two forming alliances, as in
Alternate Future #16. Trying to negotiate with the government and failing
to come to an agreement would be consistent with the history of the
guerrilla groups’ talks with the government, as in Alternate Future #6. With
the government resuming an offensive after talks, the FARC and the ELN
would begin to form alliances for survival. When considering Alternate
Futures #8 and #14, the transposition would be the government negoti-
ating with only the FARC or the ELN. While the government negotiates
with the FARC, the ELN will see forming an alliance with the FARC as
a necessity both for a better position in negotiations and for a stronger
united front against a government offensive. The transposition into the
future where the ELN negotiates while the FARC moves to form an alliance
(Alternate Future #14) will be a result of the FARC trying to end ELN talks
with the government and strengthen their position in vital regions where
the ELN is strong. In Alternate Future #7, the ELN negotiations fail and
the organization is forced to withdraw or be annihilated, or the negotia-
tions are a success and the ELN withdraws as part of the agreement. Any
of these future scenarios can transpose into each other since it has been
shown in the past that when the guerrillas face continuous armed action
from the government they will eventually begin to negotiate. Knowing this,
it is simply a matter of how the negotiations go with each group that will
determine the transposition into alternate futures.
Conclusion
This LAMP study set out to predict the future actions of the FARC and the
ELN based on the actions of the Colombian government. The study was
able to identify the most likely future actions for both the FARC and the
ELN through the scenarios; the most likely government actions were also
analyzed. Through the discussion of the transpositions, focal points, and
indicators, this work will help mark the progression and future actions of
these groups.
The LAMP study indicates that the third scenario—the negotiation
between the government and guerrillas—is the most likely. If this path is
continued after the 2010 elections, this is the most likely future. In this
research the Marxist-Leninist ideology takes a back seat to survival for

the FARC and the ELN. The more these organizations adapt to survive,
the more their ideology changes. On the one hand, if the two groups had
followed their ideologies closer to the letter, they may have developed a
much stronger social base. On the other hand, rigid ideologies would have
led to the defeat of the FARC and the ELN long ago.
Afterthought
This research focused on the Colombian revolutionary armed groups of the
FARC and the ELN, tracing the emergence of Marxism and the communist
movement through history, its applications in Russia and China, and its
profound effect on the revolutionary movements in Latin America, particu-
larly the FARC and the ELN in Colombia. In studying the formation of
these revolutionary groups, their origins and adaptability are as important
as their futures. As this research provides the histories, structures, and
adaptations of these groups, the end result is a better understanding of the
actors in the Colombian conflict and a consideration of the best possible
resolutions to this conflict. The matrices relevant to the FARC and the ELN
demonstrate that their Marxist ideologies are subordinated to the economic
realities of survival. Further, based on this LAMP study, and based on the
current status of the FARC and the ELN, I have argued that the most likely
outcomes are a negotiated end to the conflict, where the FARC and the ELN
are compelled to the bargaining table.
Looking at the evolution of the FARC and the ELN, the irony of their
actions has become evident. Marx’s utopian project united the workers
of the world under a revolutionary strategy and hope that social equality
was attainable. Unfortunately, this ideal fell far short in application.
Lenin and Stalin found the dark reality of absolute power that comes with
the communist ideology, and eventually the systems became a victim of
global isolation and internal destruction. While the revolutionary path
nevertheless seemed plausible to Third World revolutionaries, adaptation
necessarily kept the movements alive. The FARC and the ELN ultimately
became players in the global capitalist system their movements sought to
critique and wanted to destroy. Now their economic livelihoods depend on
the capitalist system, and their ideologies take a back seat to the material
conditions of survival.
The FARC and the ELN continually maintain and promote their position
as the resistance in Colombia against elite exploitation and structural
inequalities. While the Colombian government and the elite have tried
to improve their image with the public, there are still those who believe
that the guerrillas have their best interests at heart. The only constant in
all of these scenarios and conflicts over the years in Colombia is that the
peasantry and agrarian areas of the country are faced with the violent
realities of the conflict between the government and the guerrillas. The
tragic reality is that the people philosophically motivated to join the FARC
and the ELN in support of the revolutionary cause now see these groups as
mere parallel versions of a corrupt government that delivers the rhetoric of
equality but not the social remedies. In this way, the FARC and the ELN
are seen as poor alternatives to the state and have lost significant popular
support. Finally, the necessity of survival has altered the ideologies of the
FARC and the ELN to the point where the world sees them as little more
than terrorist organizations who exploit the people they claim to be fighting
for. But that does not seem to deter the revolutionary fighters that believe in
their cause.
This research seeks to discern the path to resolution of the conflict
through understanding the FARC and the ELN. The only way to strengthen
the relationship between the Colombian government and its people is
through control of the state and social redress of inequalities for the impov-
erished masses. That can never happen with two armed revolutionary
groups within Colombia’s borders. The basic goal is to end the conflict,
which will also enrich the scholarship on revolutionary groups for the
purpose of better understanding how to prevent and or deal with them. As
seen in this research, the reality of a resolution can be attained if the parties
involved in the negotiations hold up their end of the agreement. By looking
at the adaptations of the FARC and the ELN, this research was able to
provide possible alternatives to the futures of the FARC and the ELN, in the
hopes of working toward a viable resolution to the Colombian conflict. This
research also helps advance the understanding of Marxist revolutionary
movements in general and how the ideas of an important nineteenth-century
philosopher continues to impact the contemporary world.
Notes
1 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism: The Founders – The
Golden Age – The Breakdown (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 8.
2 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion to Major Social
Theorists. Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 107.
3 Ibid.
4 Kolakowski, Leszek (2005), Main Currents of Marxism, 9.
5 Ibid., 80.
6 Ritzer, George (ed.) (2000), The Blackwell Companion, 107.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 107.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 108.
14 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 130.
19 Ibid., 131.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 132.
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 117.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Frederick Engels was part of the young Hegelian movement of the 1840s and,
after critically addressing the political economy, became a communist. Marx
followed this path and Engels became a lifelong collaborator with Marx and
contributed substantially to Marx’s thought (Ritzer, 109).
33 Ibid., 187.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., 188.
38 Ibid., 189.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 341.
41 Ibid., 342.
42 Ibid.

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 130–1.
48 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 640.
51 Ibid., 641.
52 Ibid., 661.
53 Ibid., 662.
54 Ibid., 663.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 664.
60 Ibid., 667.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 668.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 669.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 673.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 732.
71 Ibid., 737–8.
72 Ibid., 738.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., 739.
75 Ibid., 741.
76 Ibid., 789.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 791.
79 Ibid., 792.
80 Ibid., 806.

81 Ibid., 867.
82 Ibid., 871–2.
83 Ibid., 872.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid., 873.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 881.
93 Ibid., 1178.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., 1179.
96 Ibid.
97 Alexander, Robert J. (1991), International Maoism in the Developing World
(Westport: Praeger), 41.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., 42.
100 Ibid., 1180.
101 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. (1991), Exploring Revolution: Essays on
Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory (Armonk: M. E.
Sharpe, Inc.), 5.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., 6.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 43.
109 Wright, Thomas C. (2000), “Latin America in the Era of the Cuban
Revolution.” Praeger Security International. Internet. Available from: http://
psi.praeger.com.ezproxy.apus.edu/doc.aspx?d=/books/questia/b78112/
b78112-sect24.xml [accessed March 2009], 1.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., 2.
112 Ibid.
113 Brittain, James J. (2005), “The FARC-EP in Colombia A Revolutionary

Exception in an Age of Imperialist Expansion.” Monthly Review
(September). Internet. Available from: http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.
apus.edu/ehost/pdf?vid=4&hid=108&sid=de2d9d2d-80a6-4b2b-bb78-
0e26c4201452%40sessionmgr103 [accessed 27 April 2009], 21.
114 Osterling, George P. (1989), Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and
Guerrilla Warfare (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers), 185.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid., 186.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., 187.
120 Ibid.
121 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. (1992), Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin
America: A Comparative Study of Insurgencies and Regimes Since 1956
(Princeton: Princeton University Press), 17.
122 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia: The Past as a
Prologue? A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia 1958–66
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 3.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., 4.
128 Palacios, Marco (2002), “Understanding Colombia: History and
Background.” Aspen Institute. Internet. Available from: http://www.ciaonet.
org.ezproxy.apus.edu/wps/pam04/index.html [accessed March 2009], 19.
129 Ibid.
130 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. 1992. Guerrillas and Revolution, 40.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid., 31.
133 Ibid.
134 Palacios, Marco (2002), “Understanding Colombia,” 19.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America
(Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers), 96.
141 Ibid., 97.

142 Ibid., 98.
143 Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. (1991), Exploring Revolution, 135.
144 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The
Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.” Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism 01 (April), 137.
145 Ibid., 130–1.
146 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History (London: SAQI), 35–43.
147 Ibid., 46–52.
148 Ibid., 75–89.
149 Ibid., 91–113.
150 Ibid., 114.
151 Ibid., 169–81.
152 Ibid., 182.
153 Ibid., 282.
154 Ortiz, Ramon D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 127.
155 Ibid., 128.
156 Ibid., 129–31.
157 Ibid., 134.
158 Ibid., 136–8.
159 Ibid., 140.
160 Stokes, Doug (2003), “Why the end of the Cold War doesn’t matter: The US
war of terror in Colombia.” Review of International Studies 29, 569–71.
161 Ibid., 578.
162 Ibid., 581.
163 Feldmann, Andreas (2005), “A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence:
Non-Governmental Terrorism in Latin America since the end of the Cold
War.” Revista de Ciencia Politica 25, 11.
164 Ibid., 28.
165 Ibid., 29–30.
166 Vargas, Ricardo (1999), “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade.” Transnational Insitute (June). Internet.
Available from: http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?page=archives_vargas_
farc [accessed 14 November, 2009], 4.
167 Ibid., 5–7.
168 Walker, Julius (2002), “The role of the state in the international illicit drugs
trade: the case of Colombia and external intervention.” Global Politics
Network. Internet. Available from: http://www.globalpolitics.net [accessed
14 November, 2008], 10.
169 Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez. 2003. “Criminal Rebels? A discussion of war
and criminality from the Colombian experience.” Crisis States Programme

(April), 7–10.
170 Ibid., 10.
171 Ibid., 11.
172 Marks, Thomas. 2002. Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 1–9.
173 Ibid., 9–21.
174 Manwaring, Max G. (2002), “Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to
the State and to the Hemisphere.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 01 (August),
71–73.
175 Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin
(2007), “A Subnational Study of Insurgency: FARC Violence in the 1990s.”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (March), 1.
176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 2–12.
178 Ibid., 12.
179 Ibid., 17.
180 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War
and Peace In Colombia (Albany: State University of New York), 60–81.
181 Ibid., 60.
182 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict, Decentralization
and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974–2004.” CEDE (May), 7–9.
183 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy
of Drugs and Insurgency and its Implications for Regional Stability (Santa
Monica: RAND), 23–51.
185 Sanin, Francisco Gutierrez (2003), “Criminal Rebels?” 5.
186 Ibid.
188 Manwaring, Max G. (2002), “Non-State Actors in Colombia,” 71.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid., 131.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid., 132.
195 Ibid.
196 Ibid.
197 Ibid., 133.
198 Ibid., 134.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid., 135.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence, 65.
204 Begerquist, Charles., Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzaol Sanchez G. (2001),
Violence in Colombia 1990–2000 Waging War and Negotiating Peace
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc.), 31–2.
205 Feldmann, Andreas (2005), “A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence,” 13.
206 Ibid., 15.
207 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 43.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid., 44.
210 Feldmann, Andreas (2005), “A Shift in the Paradigm of Violence,” 24.
211 Holmes, Pineres, Curtin (2007), “A Subnational Study of Insurgency,” 7.
212 Ibid., 16.
213 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 75–6.
214 Ibid., 76.
215 Ibid., 90–1.
216 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict,” 22.
217 Ibid.
219 Ibid., 110–13.
220 Ibid., 115.
221 Ibid., 130.
222 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid., 248.
228 Ibid.
229 Ibid., 305.
230 Ibid., 314–15.
231 Vargas, Ricardo (1999), “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” 1.
232 Walker, Julius (2002), “The role of the state,” 11.
233 Marks, Thomas (2002), Colombian Army Adaptation, 3.
234 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 26.
235 Walker, Julius (2002), “The role of the state,” 7.

236 Sanchez, Fabio and Maria del Mar Palau (2006), “Conflict,” 7–8.
238 Ibid.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibid., 71.
242 Ibid., 72.
243 Ibid., 75.
244 Ibid., 78.
246 Ibid., 33.
247 Ibid., 40.
248 Green, John W. (2005), “Guerrillas, Soldiers, Paramilitaries, Assassins,
Narcos, and Gringos: The Unhappy Prospects for Peace and Democracy in
Colombia.” Latin American Research Review (June), 40. 145.
249 Stokes, Doug (2003), “Why the end of the Cold War doesn’t matter,” 579.
250 Ibid.
251 Pearce, Jenny (1990), Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth (New York: Monthly
Review Press), 165.
252 Ibid.
253 Rochlin, James F. (2003), Vanguard Revolutionaries, 102.
254 Ibid., 103.
255 Ibid.
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid.
258 Ibid.
259 Ibid., 1.
260 Ibid., 87–102.
261 Ibid., 102–3.
262 Ibid., 103–4.
263 Ibid., 104–6.
264 Simons, Geoff (2004), Colombia: A Brutal History, 144–5.
265 Ibid., 156–267.
266 Ruiz, Bert (2001), The Colombian Civil War (Jefferson: McFarland &
Company Inc. Publishers), 86.
267 Ibid., 87.
268 Ibid., 89–91.
269 Ibid., 109–12.

270 Ibid., 112–16.
271 Ibid., 119–29.
272 Ibid., 245–8.
273 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward with the
ELN?” Latin America Briefing No. 16 (October). Internet. Available from:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/b16_colombia_
eln.pdf [accessed 18 March 2009], 2–6.
274 Ibid., 6–7.
275 Ibid., 7–8.
276 Ibid., 8–12.
277 Ibid., 12.
278 Ibid., 13–17.
279 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace with
the ELN.” ICG Latin America Report No. 2 (October). Internet. Available
from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/
A400790_04102002.pdf [accessed 18 March 2009], 1–4.
280 Ibid., 5–6.
281 Ibid., 7–8.
282 Ibid., 11–20.
283 Ibid., 20–3.
284 Ibid., 23–6.
285 Richani, Nazih (2002), Systems of Violence, 81–5.
286 Ibid., 85–91.
288 Ibid., 2–5.
289 Ibid., 6–13.
290 Ibid., 14–22.
291 Suarez, Alfredo Rangel (2000), “Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and
the Insurrection Economy of Colombia.” Journal of International Affairs
(Spring), Vol. 53, no. 2, 577–8.
292 Ibid., 580–1.
293 Ibid., 582–5.
294 Ibid., 585–95.
295 Ibid., 596–601.
296 McLean, Phillip (2002), “Colombia – Thinking Clearly about the
Conflict.” Center for Strategic and International Studies (October).
Internet. Available from: http://www.csis.org/index.php?option=com_csis_
pubs&task=view&id=729 [accessed 21 November 2008], 1.
297 Ibid., 3.
298 Ibid., 7–10.

300 Ibid., 9.
301 Ibid., 10–11.
302 Ibid., 12–18.
303 Ibid., 18–20.
304 Ibid., 21–6.
305 Ibid., 26–32.
306 International Crisis Group (2005), “War and Drugs in Colombia.” Latin
America Report No. 11 (January). Internet. Available from: http://www.
crisisgroup.org/library/documents/latin_america/11_war_and_drugs_in_
colombia.pdf [accessed 29 January 2009], 17–18.
307 Ibid., 18.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid., 19–20.
310 Ibid., 21–34.
311 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk (2001), Colombian Labyrinth, 23–52.
312 Ibid., 61–84.
313 Holmes, Jennifer S., Shiela Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin
(2008), Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia (Austin: University of
Texas Press), 73–101.
314 Ibid., 103–60.
315 Holmes, Jennifer S. (2008), Guns, Drugs, and Development, 50.
316 International Crisis Group (2002), “Colombia: Prospects for Peace,” 5.
319 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
330 Ibid.
331 Ibid.
332 Harper, Liz (2002), “Colombia’s Civil War: National Liberation Army
(ELN).” Online News Hour. Internet. Available from: http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/bb/latin_america/colombia/players_eln [accessed April 2009], 2.
334 Ibid.
339 Ibid.
340 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
346 Ruiz, Bert (2001), The Colombian Civil War, 116.
351 Ibid.
354 McLean, Phillip (2002), “Colombia – Thinking Clearly,” 3.
356 Ibid., 123.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid.
362 Suarez, Alfredo Rangel (2000), “Parasites and Predators,” 582.
367 McLean, Phillip (2002), “Colombia – Thinking Clearly,” 3.

369 Ibid.
371 Ibid.
374 Ibid.
375 Ibid.
376 Ibid.
377 Harper, Liz (2002), “Colombia’s Civil War,” 2.
378 Ibid., 3.
379 International Crisis Group (2005), “War and Drugs in Colombia,” 18.
380 Ibid.
381 Ibid.
382 Ibid.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
386 Ibid.
387 International Crisis Group (2007), “Colombia: Moving Forward,” 2.
388 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
392 Ibid., 188–89.
393 Ibid., 189.
394 Ibid.
396 Ibid.
397 Ibid., 88.
398 Ibid., 89.
400 Ibid.
401 Ibid.
405 Ibid.
408 Ibid.
410 Ibid.
411 Ibid., 246.
414 Ibid., 295.
416 Ibid.
417 Ibid., 10.
418 Ibid.
419 Ibid., 12.
420 Ibid.
421 Lockwood Johnathan S. and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood (1994), The
Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) (MBS: American
Military University), 28–9.
422 CIA (2009), World Factbook. “Colombia.” Central Intelligence Agency
(April). Internet. Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/co.html [accessed April 2009], 1.
423 Tuft, Eva Irene (1997), “Democracy and Violence: The Colombian
Paradox.” Chr.Michelsen Institute Report Series. Internet. Available from:
http://bora.cmi.no/dspace/bitstream/10202/307/1/R%201997.%201.%20
Eva%20I.%20Tuft-07092007_1.pdf [accessed 18 March 2009], 29.
424 Ibid.
425 Ibid., 30.
426 Ibid.
427 Ibid., 31.
428 Ibid.
429 Ibid.
430 Ibid., 32.
431 Ibid., 33–4.
432 Ibid., 33.
433 Ibid., 34.
434 Ibid.
435 Ibid., 35.
436 Ibid.
437 Ibid.
438 Ibid., 36.
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid., 38.
441 Ibid.
442 Ibid., 40.
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid.
445 Ibid.
446 Ibid., 41.
447 Ibid.
448 Ibid.
449 Ibid.
450 Ibid., 44.
451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia. 3.
454 Tuft, Eva Irene (1997), “Democracy and Violence,” 45.
455 Ibid., 46.
456 Rempe, Dennis (2002), Implementing Plan Colombia, 3.
457 Ibid.
459 Ibid., 48.
460 Ibid.
461 Ibid., 49.
462 Ibid.
463 Ibid.
466 Ibid., 50.
469 Ibid.
472 Ibid.
473 Ibid., 54.
474 Ibid.
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid., 55.
477 Ibid.
478 Ibid.
479 Ibid.
480 Ibid.
481 Ibid., 56.
482 Ibid.
483 Ibid.
484 Ibid., 58.
485 Ibid., 59.
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
490 Ibid.
491 Ibid.
492 Zambrano, Jair Cortazar and Lynn L. Adams (2008), “Colombia: Indications
of a Never-Ending Conflict in Relation to the Adams Revolutionary Model.”
Utah Valley University. Internet. Available from: http://law.creighton.edu/
wernerInstitute/complexityconference/speaker_materials/Table%20Topic%20
Paper%20Presentations/Colombia%20-%20Lynn%20Adams%20&%20
Jair%20Cortazar.pdf [accessed 18 March 2009], 13.
493 Ibid.
494 Ibid.
495 Ibid., 14.
496 Ibid., 12.
497 Ibid.
498 Ibid., 13.
499 Ibid., 12.
500 Ibid.
501 Ibid.
502 Ibid.
503 Ibid., 14.
504 Ortiz, Roman D. (2002), “Insurgent Strategies,” 128.
505 Ibid.
506 Ibid.
507 Ibid., 130.
508 Ibid.
509 Ibid.
510 Ibid.
511 Ibid.
512 Ibid., 131.
513 Ibid.
514 Ibid.
515 International Crisis Group (2009), “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict:
Dealing the Right Card.” Latin America Report No. 30 (March). Internet.
Available from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6016
[accessed 27 April 2009], 1. This work is the most current publication on
the FARC and was published while this chapter was being written.
516 Ibid.
517 Ibid., 1–2.
518 Ibid., 7.
519 Ibid.
520 Ibid., 9.
521 Ibid.
522 Ibid.
523 Ibid., 10.
524 Ibid.
525 Ibid.
526 Ibid., 11.
527 Ibid.
528 Ibid., 12.
529 Ibid.
530 Ibid.
531 Ibid.
532 Demarest, Geoffrey (2003), Mapping Colombia: The Correlation Between
Land Data and Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 16.
533 Ibid.
534 Ibid.
536 Ibid., 40.
537 Ibid.
538 Ibid.
539 International Crisis Group (2009), “Ending Colombia’s FARC Conflict,” 15.
540 Ibid.
541 Ibid., 17.
542 Ibid.
543 Ibid.
544 Ibid.
545 Ibid., 18–19.
546 Ibid., 19.
547 Harper, Liz (2002), “Colombia’s Civil War,” 1.
548 Ibid.
549 Ibid., 2.
550 Ibid.
551 Ibid.
552 Ibid., 3.
554 Ibid., 46.
556 Ibid., 21.
557 Ibid., 23.
558 Ibid.
560 Ibid., 11.
561 Ibid.
562 Ibid.
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid., 16.
565 Ibid.
566 Ibid.
567 Lockwood, Johnathan S. and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood. The Lockwood
Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), 25.
568 Ibid., 26.
569 Ibid., 27.
570 Ibid., 27–8.
571 Ibid., 91–3.
572 Restrepo, Jorge, Michael Spagat and Juan F. Vargas. 2003. “The Dynamics
of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data Set.” Center for Economic
Policy Research No. 4108 (November). Internet: Available from: www.cepr.
org/pubs/dps/DP4108.asp [accessed 17 March 2009], 19.
573 Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth, 43.
574 Ibid.
575 Ibid.
577 Ibid.
578 Ibid., 7.
579 Ibid.
581 Ibid., 5.
582 Ibid.
583 International Crisis Group (2003), “Colombia and its Neighbors: The
Tentacles of Instability.” Latin America No. 3 (April). Internet. Available
from: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1534&l=1 [accessed
18 March 2009], 3.
584 Ibid., 5.
586 Ibid.
587 Ibid., 6.
589 Ibid., 5.
590 Ibid., 18.
591 Ibid., 5.
592 Ibid.
594 Ibid., 12.
596 Ibid.
597 Ibid.
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322 Select Bibliography
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INDEX
ACH see Analyses of Competing courses of action 9, 22–6, 29, 51, 73,
Hypotheses 76–7, 105, 106, 174, 175, 178–9,
actors 8, 9, 21, 22, 23, 25–7, 29, 42, 199, 216, 218, 223, 228, 294, 297
45–7, 51, 73, 76, 77, 79, 80, 90,
91, 93, 104, 105, 106, 122, 126, Defense Intelligence College 14, 16
127, 129, 132, 143, 157–8, 174, Defense Intelligence Journal 16, 39, 81,
175, 178, 179, 199, 204, 209, 345
210, 216, 228, 235, 249, 260, Delphi 43, 44, 45, 46, 55
283, 293, 294, 295, 297, 321 doctoral dissertation 13, 16, 81
alternate future 11, 13, 16, 20, 21, Drew Lasater 10, 15, 233
22–7, 29, 32, 36, 38, 42, 43, 45,
51, 54, 56, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, focal event 29, 32, 34, 78, 132, 210
66, 68, 69, 71, 73, 76–9, 105, focal issue 47
106, 107, 109, 111, 113, 114, free will 19, 21, 27, 36, 42, 51, 77, 104
116, 118, 120, 123, 124, 128,
130, 132, 143, 144, 145, 175, hypothesized scenarios 14
179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 191,
192, 194, 199, 200, 210, 216, indicators 9, 32, 38, 43, 47, 48, 51,
219, 227, 294, 297, 299, 307, 53, 66, 132, 170, 175, 210, 216,
312, 320 283, 294, 320
Alternative Futures 14, 46, 47, 48, 49, intelligence training 79
51, 55, 79
American Military University (AMU) key indicator 33, 34, 35
14
Analyses of Competing Hypotheses LAMP’s practicality at the tactical 80
(ACH) 16, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, limitations 9, 15, 76, 78, 255, 256,
233 272, 296, 297
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 40
Mary Boyle 10, 15, 88
Bayesian analysis 77 mirror-imaging 23
MSSI degree 14
chaos theory 77
competitive business intelligence 80 Nicholas Lusas 10, 15, 151
consequences 13, 22, 29, 36, 43, 47,
48, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, pair-wise comparison 11, 26–7, 38, 40,
72, 73, 78, 120, 124, 125, 126, 41, 45, 51, 77–8, 107, 113, 120,
131, 156, 157, 192, 294 125, 143, 179, 181, 183, 185,
corporation 22 187, 197, 209, 283, 297
324 Index
Paul Croom 80, 81 scenario 9, 10, 13, 22, 25, 26–7, 38, 46,
perceptions 13, 14, 21, 24, 45, 56–7, 47–9, 50–1, 55–9, 62, 63, 65, 66,
73, 79, 93, 104, 143, 144, 155, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 90, 104,
157, 162, 163, 164, 167, 169, 105, 106, 107, 113, 124, 128, 130,
171, 175, 194, 216, 225, 294 143–5, 147, 175, 178, 179, 181,
perceptual study 22, 23, 24, 45 187, 195, 199, 200–10, 216, 217,
permutations 10, 11, 23, 25, 26, 27, 219, 223, 225, 235, 255, 272, 283,
51, 77, 81, 106, 113, 179, 180, 289, 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, 301,
294 308, 312, 315, 320, 322
policymaker 35, 36, 46, 79 sources of error 35, 39, 345
probability theory 21, 77
transposition 36, 39, 43, 62, 63, 64,
qualitative methods 20 65, 69, 71, 72, 73, 78, 143, 144,
quantitative methods 20, 41, 49 145, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220–7,
304, 320
Russian View of US Strategy 13, 14,
16, 38, 56, 74, 345 Wallman 30, 32, 38, 346

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The Lockwood

Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World

Sociocultural Intelligence: A New Discipline in Intelligence Studies

1385 Broadway 50 Bedford Square

Bloomsbury is a registered trademark of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

First published 2013

© Jonathan S. Lockwood, 2013

No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

ISBN: ePDF: 978-1-6235-6782-8

Typeset by Fakenham Prepress Solutions, Fakenham, Norfolk NR21 8NN

Foreword by Dr Mark M. Lowenthal vi

PART ONE The LAMP in theory 1

PART TWO The LAMP in practice 67

Select bibliography 321

Few professions are beset by as many “flavors of the month” as is intel-

One of the other appealing aspects of the LAMP is that it is not, as Dr

7.3 Possible futures 273

When I initially proposed in the Fall of 1991 to undertake a study of the

Alternative Futures or Hypothesized Scenarios, and is currently used within

as a graduate professor in their online Intelligence Studies degree program.

the LAMP can be integrated successfully with the Analyses of Competing

The LAMP in theory

The philosophy and steps

The 12 steps of the LAMP

of action to consider, thus causing the number of alternate futures to

1 How will North Korea’s emergence as a nuclear power affect

Specify the national “actors” involved

Perform an in-depth study of how each

The primary hypothesis of this paper is that the perceptions of the

1 What is the Russian perception of the political utility of nuclear

Specify all possible courses

Determine the major scenarios within which

1 Continue ambiguous policy. Israel continues neither to confirm or

FIGURE 1.1 Relationships between the analytic steps of the LAMP

Calculate the total number of permutations of possible

Perform a “pair-wise comparison” of all

it to future number 1, you will only be comparing it to futures 3 through

Rank the alternate futures for each scenario from

Table 1.1 Scenario 1 – Yeltsin stays in power (status quo)7

Possible future # Ukraine Belarus Kazakhstan # Votes

CD = Continue Disarmament; do not try to retain nuclear weapons

Because of the dynamic, constantly changing nature of the universe of

Assuming that each future occurs, analyze each

Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our

comparison in step 7. A good illustration of the use of “focal events” is

SCENARIO 1: Cuban Style Autocracy

Future #15 Cuba maintains a friendly diplomatic relationship with

Future #9 Cuba maintains friendly diplomatic relationship with

Future #31 Cuba maintains a neutral stance towards Venezuela, the

Future #25 Cuba maintains a neutral stance towards Venezuela, the

FOCAL EVENT – Autocratic Control of Venezuela Achieved, viable

Future #12 Cuba maintains a friendly diplomatic relationship with

SCENARIO 2: Functioning Multiparty System

Future #33 Cuba is openly hostile to developments of a functioning

Future #34 Cuba is openly hostile to developments of a functioning

Future #17 Cuba is hostile to developments of a functioning “U.S. style”

FOCAL EVENT – Viable democracy established in Venezuela