hazard analysis is used as the first step in a process used to assess risk. The result of a hazard
analysis is the identification of different type of hazards. A hazard is a potential condition and
exists or not (probability is 1 or 0). It may in single existence or in combination with other hazards
(sometimes called events) and conditions become an actual Functional Failure or Accident
(Mishap). The way this exactly happens in one particular sequence is called a scenario. This
scenario has a probability (between 1 and 0) of occurrence. Often a system has many potential
failure scenarios. It also is assigned a classification, based on the worst case severity of the end
condition. Risk is the combination of probability and severity. Preliminary risk levels can be
provided in the hazard analysis. The validation, more precise prediction (verification) and
acceptance of risk is determined in the Risk assessment (analysis). The main goal of both is to
provide the best selection of means of controlling or eliminating the risk. The term is used in
several engineering specialties, including avionics, chemical process safety, safety
engineering, reliability engineering and food safety.[1]

Contents

 1Hazards and risk

 2Severity definitions - Safety Related examples
 3Likelihood of occurrence examples
 4See also
 5Further reading
 6References
 7External links

Hazards and risk[edit]

A hazard is defined as a "Condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or contribute to an
unplanned or undesirable event." Seldom does a single hazard cause an accident or a functional
failure. More often an accident or operational failure occurs as the result of a sequence of
causes. A hazard analysis will consider system state, for example operating environment, as well
as failures or malfunctions.
While in some cases, safety or reliability risk can be eliminated, in most cases a certain degree of
risk must be accepted. In order to quantify expected costs before the fact, the potential
consequences and the probability of occurrence must be considered. Assessment of risk is made
by combining the severity of consequence with the likelihood of occurrence in a matrix. Risks that
fall into the "unacceptable" category (e.g., high severity and high probability) must be mitigated
by some means to reduce the level of safety risk.
IEEE STD-1228-1994 Software Safety Plans prescribes industry best practices for conducting
software safety hazard analyses to help ensure safety requirements and attributes are defined
and specified for inclusion in software that commands, controls or monitors critical functions.
When software is involved in a system, the development and design assurance of that software
is often governed by DO-178C. The severity of consequence identified by the hazard analysis
establishes the criticality level of the software. Software criticality levels range from A to E,
corresponding to the severity of Catastrophic to No Safety Effect. Higher levels of rigor are
required for level A and B software and corresponding functional tasks and work products is the
system safety domain are used as objective evidence of meeting safety criteria and
requirements.
In 2009[1] a leading edge commercial standard was promulgated based on decades of proven
system safety processes in DoD and NASA. ANSI/GEIA-STD-0010-2009 (Standard Best
Practices for System Safety Program Development and Execution) is a demilitarized commercial
best practice that uses proven holistic, comprehensive and tailored approaches for hazard
prevention, elimination and control. It is centered around the hazard analysis and functional
based safety process.

Severity definitions - Safety Related examples[edit]

(aviation)

Severity Definition

Catastrophic Results in multiple fatalities and/or loss of the system

Reduces the capability of the system or the operator ability to cope with adverse
conditions to the extent that there would be:

 Large reduction in safety margin or functional capability

Hazardous
 Crew physical distress/excessive workload such that operators cannot
be relied upon to perform required tasks accurately or completely
 Serious or fatal injury to small number of occupants of aircraft (except
operators)
 Fatal injury to ground personnel and/or general public
Reduces the capability of the system or the operators to cope with adverse
operating conditions to the extent that there would be:

 Significant reduction in safety margin or functional capability

 Significant increase in operator workload
Major
 Conditions impairing operator efficiency or creating significant discomfort
 Physical distress to occupants of aircraft (except operator) including
injuries
 Major occupational illness and/or major environmental damage, and/or
major property damage
Does not significantly reduce system safety. Actions required by operators are
well within their capabilities. Include:

 Slight reduction in safety margin or functional capabilities

Minor
 Slight increase in workload such as routine flight plan changes
 Some physical discomfort to occupants or aircraft (except operators)
 Minor occupational illness and/or minor environmental damage, and/or
minor property damage
No Safety
Has no effect on safety
Effect

(medical devices)

Severity Definition

Catastrophi Results in death

c

Critical Results in permanent impairment or life-threatening injury

Serious Results in injury or impairment requiring professional medical intervention

Results in temporary injury or impairment not requiring professional medical

Minor
intervention

Neglible Results in temporary discomfort or inconvenience

Likelihood of occurrence examples[edit]

(aviation)

Likelihood Definition

 Qualitative: Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire

system/operational life of an item.
Probable
 Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is greater
than 
 Qualitative: Unlikely to occur to each item during its total life. May
occur several times in the life of an entire system or fleet.
Remote
 Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less
than , but greater than 
 Qualitative: Not anticipated to occur to each item during its total life.
Extremely May occur a few times in the life of an entire system or fleet.
Remote  Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less
than  but greater than 
 Qualitative: So unlikely that it is not anticipated to occur during the
Extremely entire operational life of an entire system or fleet.
Improbable  Quantitative: Probability of occurrence per operational hour is less
than 

(medical devices)

Likelihoo
Definition
d

Frequent ≥ 10−3
Probable < 10−3 and ≥ 10−4

Occasional < 10−4 and ≥ 10−5

Remote < 10−5 and ≥ 10−6

Improbabl
< 10−6
e

See also[edit]
 Environmental hazard
 Medical Device Risk Management - ISO 14971
 Failure mode and effects analysis – Systematic technique for identification of potential
failure modes in a system and their causes and effects
 Fault tree analysis – Failure analysis system used in safety engineering and reliability
engineering
 Hazard and operability study, also known as HAZOP
 Hazard Potential Case
 SWIFT
 Safety engineering – Engineering discipline which assures that engineered systems
provide acceptable levels of safety
 Reliability engineering – Sub-discipline of systems engineering that emphasizes
dependability in the lifecycle management of a product or a system
 Occupational safety and health – Field concerned with the safety, health and welfare of
people at work
 RTCA DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment
Certification)
 RTCA DO-178C
 RTCA DO-254 (similar to DO-178B, but for hardware)
 SAE ARP4761 (System safety assessment process)
 SAE ARP4754 (System development process)
 MIL-STD-882 (Standard practice for system safety)
 ANSI/GEIA-STD-0010-2009 (Standard Best Practices for System Safety Program
Development and Execution)
 IEEE STD 1228-1994 Software Safety Plans
 IEEE STD 1584-2002 IEEE Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard Calculations

Further reading[edit]
 Center for Chemical Process Safety (1992). Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation
Procedures, with Worked Examples (2nd ed.). Wiley-American Institute Of Chemical
Engineers. ISBN 0-8169-0491-X.
 Bahr, Nicholas J. (1997). System Safety Engineering and Risk Assessment: A Practical
Approach (Chemical Engineering) (1st ed.). Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN 1-56032-416-3.
 Kletz, Trevor (1999). Hazop and Hazan (4th ed.). Taylor & Francis. ISBN 0-85295-421-
2.

References[edit]
1. ^ "Joint Software Systems Safety Engineering Handbook"  (PDF). Naval Ordnance Safety
and Security Activity. Retrieved  25 August 2021.

External links[edit]
 CFR, Title 29-Labor, Part 1910--Occupational Safety and Health Standards, § 1910.119
U.S. OSHA regulations regarding "Process safety management of highly hazardous
chemicals" (especially Appendix C).
 FAA Order 8040.4 establishes FAA safety risk management policy.
 The FAA publishes a System Safety Handbook that provides a good overview of the
system safety process used by the agency.
 IEEE 1584-2002 Standard which provides guidelines for doing arc flash hazard
assessment.

show

Occupational safety and health