TEMPLATE: DO NOT ALTER!

#1 Case Title: KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
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FACTS:
GR No. [Insert Here]
ISSUE:
Date Promulgated:
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Topic Discussed:
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Student Assigned:

#2 Case Title: KEY POINTS :

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GR No.
FACTS:
Date Promulgated:

Topic Discussed: ISSUE:

Student Assigned: RULING:

TOPIC: SEPARATION OF POWERS
#1 Angara v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Electoral Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific
Commission, G.R. purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
No. L-45081, July 15, National Assembly.
1936
That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to
Topic Discussed: contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission.
Implied powers: the
doctrine of necessary (i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and
implication carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and
manner of filing protests.
Student Assigned:
Aguilar The doctrine of implications means that “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed”.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this
power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives
in the executive and legislative departments of the governments of the government.

FACTS:

· There was an election and the following people were the candidates: Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor for the position of the member of the National Assembly for the 1st district
of the Province of Tayabas.

· Angara won and took his oath.

· Thereafter, the National Assembly passed the resolution no. 8 (December 3, 1935)

“Confirming the minutes of those deputies against whom no protest has been presented. It is resolved: That the acts of
election of the Deputies against whom a protest has not been duly presented before the adoption of this resolution be,
as hereby, approved and confirmed. “

· December 8, 1935: The respondent filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest".

· December 9, 1935: The electoral commission adopted a resolution, p6 of which provides “ The commission will
not consider any protest that has not been presented on or before this day.”

· December 20, 1935: Angara, filed a motion to dismiss the Protest alleging the following:

a) that resolution Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b)
that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that
the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period;

· Then respondent filed a reply

· Then, the electoral commission denying the petitioner’s to “motion to dismiss the protest”

ISSUE:

Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

RULING:
No, the Electoral Commission acted within its jurisdiction in assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

In this case at bar, the Electoral Commission,, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. The
Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then
the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.The
doctrine of implications means that “that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed”.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature.

From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal.

It must be stressed that, in the Angara controversy, no legislative body or person was a litigant before the
court, and that no directive was issued against a branch of the Legislature or any member thereof. 2 This
Court, in that case, did not require the National Assembly or any assemblyman to do any particular act. It
only found it "has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission." (Supra, 63 Phil., 161.)

However, there was an allegation that in 1936, Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), modified
the aforesaid ruling. But we do not agree. There is no pronouncement in the latter decision, making
specific reference to the Alejandrino incident regarding our power — or lack of it — to interfere
with the functions of the Senate. And three years later, in 1939, the same Justice Laurel, who had
penned it, cited Alejandrino vs. Quezon as a binding authority of the separation of powers. (Planas
vs. Gil, 67 Phil., 62.)

*** It must be stressed that, in the Angara controversy, no legislative body or person was a litigant before
the court, and that no directive was issued against a branch of the Legislature or any member thereof. 2
This Court, in that case, did not require the National Assembly or any assemblyman to do any
particular act. It only found it "has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission." (Supra, 63 Phil., 161.)
That this court in the Angara litigation made declarations, nullifying a resolution of the National Assembly,
is not decisive. In proper cases this court may annul any Legislative enactment that fails to observe the
constitutional limitations. That is a power conceded to the judiciary. (Basis: If Congressional statute, which
is the act of an agency of the sovereign authority, conflicts with the Constitution, that congressional statute
must fail – doctrine of constitutional supremacy. To hold it invalid is a Court’s power, vested upon it by the
constitution – judicial power—to administer justice according to law.)

We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3,
1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the
Electoral Commission might prescribe
#2 Arnault v. KEY POINTS :
Nazareno, G.R. No.
L-3820, July 18, ● The Philippine Constitution is patterned after the US Constitution. But despite similarities in the basic structure
1950 of government, one essential difference is that the Philippine legislative department is more powerful than its
Topic Discussed: US counterpart, in the sense that the latter shares power with the congresses of individual states.
Implied powers: the ● The power of inquiry -- with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
doctrine of necessary function of the Philippine congress. Although there are no express provisions in the constitution that invest
implication
either the House or the Senate with the power to conduct investigations and exact testimony, such power is
Student Assigned: implied.
Alferez
FACTS:

The Rural Progress Administration of the government bought Buenavista and Tambobong Estates for 4.5M AND 500,
000 Php. The initial payment of 1M PHP was paid to Ernest Burt through his representative Jean Arnault. The second
sum amounted 500,000 PHP was paid through the same Burt, still represented by Arnault. A total of 1.5M PHP was
collected. Arnault encashed 400,000PHP from the total sum and gave it to an undisclosed person. There was an
alleged anomaly in the procurement of the said estates because the estates mentioned were already owned by the
Philippine Government therefore, there was no need to repurchase the estates for 5M PHP.

Because of this, the senate created a special committee to investigate. The purpose of the investigation is to
determine who were responsible and who benefited from the anomalous transaction. Arnault testified before the
senate. One question asked was to whom did he give the 400,00 PHP. Renault insisted that the transaction was legal
but refused to give the name of the undisclosed person and invoke his right against self-incrimination.

Due to his refusal, he was cited for contempt and was held prisoner until he names the undisclosed person whom he
gave the 400,000PHP. Arnault petitioned for habeas corpus and argued that the senate has no power to punish him.

Major Premise

Doctrine of necessary implication – the exercise of the power may be justified in the absence of an express
conferment, because the grant of express power carried with it all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from
it.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt.

2. Whether or not the Senate can impose punishment beyond the legislative session.

3. Whether or not Arnault can invoke the right against self-incrimination as an excuse in not answering the question he
is being asked in the Senate.

RULING:

1. Yes, the court ruled that such power is necessary especially those that fall within the senate’s jurisdiction.

Analysis

The senate holds the power of inquiry with the process to enforce it. It is not a requirement that each questions asked
necessarily be material. Because the necessity and the lack of necessity for legislative action and the form of character
of the action are determined by the sum total amount of information to be gathered from the investigation.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must
be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees
charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation.  To deny
to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which
that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative
function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body
and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress  . . . There is no limit as to time to
the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case.

2. The court ruled that the senate is a continuing body and does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of
the congress.

Analysis

Arnault was detained for 13 days which is beyond the legislative session of congress however, there is no time limit to
the senate’s power to contempt in cases as it is a continuing body.

3. No, the court ruled that the invocation of right against self-incrimination has no basis.
Analysis

Arnault failed in his duty to provide truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact
fulfillment of a citizen’s obligation. When a specific right and obligation is in conflict, and one is doubtful and the other is
clear, the former must give way to the latter.

Petition dismissed
-#3 In re Dick, G.R. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
No. L-13862, April
15, 1918 FACTS:
R.McCulloch Dick, is the editor and proprietor of the Philippines Free press, a periodical published weekly in
Topic Discussed: the city of Manila. There was a publication of certain articles in that paper which tends to obstruct the Government of
inherent power of the Philippines Islands in policies inaugurated for the prosecution of the war between the United States and the
states to deport German Empire, and other articles which have tended to create a feeling of unrest and uneasiness in the community.
undesirable aliens
He is being detained because the Governor-General of the Philippines ordered his deportation but before the
Student Assigned: Governor General gave his order, there was an investigation in the manner and form prescribed in Sec. 69 of the
Amac Administrative Code.

Petitioner, filed for a writ of habeas corpus so that he may be discharged from detention by the acting chief of
police of the City of Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor –general could exercise the deportation power in the absence of statutory
authority

RULING:

Yes, the Governor-General has the power to institute and maintain deportation proceedings.

The discretionary power to deport” undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the Philippine Islands is a
menace to the peace and safety of the community,’ as an act of state, having been conferred upon the Governor-
General, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion as to whether the facts disclosed by an investigation had in
accord with Sec. 69 of the administrative code justify of necessitate deportation in a particular case, he is the sole and
exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal is at liberty to re- examine or controvert the
sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.

SECTION 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. – A subject of a foreign power residing in the (Philippine
Islands) Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by
the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or
his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such a case the person concerned
shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than three days for the
preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses on his
own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing witnesses.
#4 In Re Sotto, KEY POINTS :
January 21, 1949
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior statue is a doctrine or principle uniformly
Topic Discussed: accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our
(Read also the Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence
concurrence of J.
Perfecto) – inherent **This is accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction
power of courts to cite since our Constitution and courts of Justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence.
a person in contempt
CANON 10- A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Student Assigned:
Aniñon Vicente Sotto-is the author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No 53) interpreted by the Supreme Court in
the case of Angel Parazo.

Angel Parazo- is the reporter of a local daily, who had suffered 30 days imprisonment for refusal to divulge the source
of news published in his paper.

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel
Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a
news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but
that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its members, In the
wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that
one of the first measures, which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may
hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times
of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary.

FACTS:

● This is a proceeding for contempt of the court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto, who was required by
the Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court for
having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of the Court In re Angel Parazo for contempt
of court.

● Respondent appears to belong to the class of individuals who have no compunction to resort to falsehood of
falsehoods. The record of this case indicates that the practice of falsehoods seems to be habitual in
respondent, and this is proved when he reiterated in his answer one of his allegations in a previous petition
 which were pronounced by this Court to be false in its resolution of December 3, 1948.

● It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys
as being guilty of flagrant misconduct.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not Sotto is guilty of contempt.

Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to punish contempt of court
RULING:

Yes

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of the superior statute. It is a doctrine or principle uniformly
accepted and applied by the court of last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our
Constitution and courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence.

I. The Court finds that the respondent Sotto knowingly published false imputations against its members.

● He accused them of such depravity as to have committed "blunders and injustices deliberately."
● He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent, narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril
to liberty and democracy," to be the opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines
judiciary, to be needing a lesson in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by
better qualified justices.

SEC. 232. of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended What Other Acts are Contempts of Court .
— A person guilty of any of the following act any be punished as for contempt:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment of command of a court, or injunction
granted by a court or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties, or in his official transactions;
3. A failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
4. The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process
of the court held by him.
5. The persons defeated in a civil action concerning the ownership or possession of real estate who, after being
evicted by the sheriff from the realty under litigation in compliance with judgment rendered, shall enter or attempt to
enter upon the same for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession or who shall in any manner disturb
possession by the person who the sheriff placed in possession of said reality.
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION:

●The respondent has not been punished to curtail his freedom of the press, but because of his wanton
interference in the independence of the Supreme Court his overt attempt to deprive us of our freedom of
judgment in a pending case, his swashbuckling bravado to intimidate the members of the Court to sway their
decision in favor of a litigant.
CONCLUSION:
● The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of justice. It springs from the very nature of their
functions. Without such power, courts of justice would be unable to perform their functions effectively. They
function by orders. Every decision is a command. The power to punish disobedience to command is essential
to make the commands effective.

The Court concurred in imposing upon Atty. Sotto a fine of P 1000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment an
ordering him to show cause why he should not be completely deprived of the privilege of practicing the
● profession of a lawyer.
#5 In re Integration KEY POINTS :
of the Philippine Bar "Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines.
This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non
Topic Discussed: to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Inherent power of the
Supreme Court to "The term ‘Bar’ refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An
integrate and regulate Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
the Philippine Bar
"Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the State. Bar
Student Assigned:
integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national organization of the legal
Arcenal
profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

"Designed to improve the Position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum
Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT; COURT OF THE VIEW
THAT IT MAY INTEGRATE THE PHILIPPINE BAR IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS POWER UNDER ARTICLE
VIII, SEC. 13 OF THE CONSTITUTION TO PROMULGATE RULES CONCERNING THE ADMISSION TO
THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise
of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that" the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397
neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court’s inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration
that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

FACTS:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30,
1972, with the "earnest recommendation"…. that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the
Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “ An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds
Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to affect the integration of the Philippine Bar. The Supreme Court formed a Commission
on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The
Court accepted all comments on the proposed integration.

ISSUE:

1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

2. Whether or not the integration of the bar be constitutional?

3. Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

1. The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article
VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the
Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts
the Court’s inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote
public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to “ Integration” of the
Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines.

● This requires membership and financial support that is indispensable to the practice of law and the retention of
his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
● The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An
Integrated Bar or Unified Bar perforce must include all lawyers designed to improve the position of the Bar as
an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law integration fosters cohesion among lawyers , ensured through
their organized action and participation.
 ● The promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy
with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

Application

1. On the first issue,that the Court may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “ to promulgate rules
concerning, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Indeed
the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar.
2. The second hinges issue was the following constitutional rights freedom of association and of speech
a. Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become a
member of any group of which he is not already a member.
b. Integration is also not violative of freedom of speech because dues paid by the lawyer may be used
for projects or programs which the lawyer opposes.
c. The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of regulation.
3. As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration.

Conclusion

Therefore, the survey showed an overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration and the rule otherwise
would make every government action a free speech issue. And the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to
positions taken by the integrated bar.

2. Whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the effect of Bar integration on the
lawyer’s constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the
dues exacted from him.

Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.- The practice of law is not a
vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public interest, because a lawyer
owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of
justice, as an officer of the court.

"1. Freedom of Association.-

"To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate (or the corollary right not to associate)
#6 Santiago v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Vazquez, G.R. Nos.
99289, January 27, Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
1993 by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Topic Discussed:
Inherent power of Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be
courts to issue impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with
interlocutory orders to arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety,
protect, preserve and or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The
maintain its Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263).
jurisdiction
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the
Student Assigned: Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law
Aribas jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines
must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes

FACTS:

1. In 1991, a criminal case was filed against Santiago with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Subsequently, an order of arrest
was issued against her by Presiding Justice Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the
accused fixed at P15,000.00

2. An "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,"
was filed by petitioner and she prayed for dispensing of her personal appearance in the Court for now until such time
she will have recovered due to the result of the vehicular collision in which she suffered extensive physical injuries
which required surgical intervention. Such motion was granted and the Court authorized petitioner to post a cash bond
for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest, unless by that time
her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court.
3. In 1991, respondent Ombudsman Vasquez filed a manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared
in his office in Ermita, Manila in the afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented
himself to be Atty. Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying
for about fifteen minutes

4. The Sandiganbayan acted on the manifestation and setting the arraignment Miriam. The petitioners filed a motion
for her provisional liberty under a recognizance and averred that her continuance to remain under a b ail bond may
imply that she had intent to flee.

5. She also filed a petition for cetiorari with the SC for the suspension of the RTC proceedings against her. The SC
issued a TRO. It subsequently lifted the TRO and denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

6. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order as regards her announcement to leave for the U.S. to pursue a
fellowship in Harvard.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner is in violation of the
latter’s right to travel?

RULING:

No. The hold departure order is but an exercise of a respondent court's inherent power to preserve and maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and person of the accused. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines
must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law . The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes

. The petitioner raised that there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel and
under Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Article III, Sec. 6 should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such Court or officer. A court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect
its jurisdiction. It has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail an opportunity to leave the Philippines . This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Santiago does not deny and, as a matter of fact,
even made a public statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies
abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of
petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order.

To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an exercise of the respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to
maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused. Under the obligations
assumed by petitioner in her bail bond, she holds herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
court
#7 Echegaray v. KEY POINTS :
Secretary of Justice,
G.R. No. 132601, FOR ORIGINAL CASE:
January 19, 1999
RA 7659- AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT
Topic Discussed: PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER
Inherent, power of PURPOSES
courts to control and
supervise the RA 8177- AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
execution of their CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
decisions AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659

Student Assigned: Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177-promulgated by the Secretary of Justice
Aton Section 17- Suspension of the Execution of the Death Sentence
Section 19-Execution Procedure

FACTS:

ORIGINAL CASE:

June 25, 1996- SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray for RAPE of 10 years old daughter of his
common law spouse. he was sentenced with DEATH PENALTY. (G.R. No. 117472)

*Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration questioning the
constitutionality of RA 7659.

February 7, 1998- SC denied both motions. SC finds Congress duly compliant with the requirements for the
reimposition of death penalty and therefore, it is not unconstitutional.

*Congress passed RA 8177. It changed the mode of executing death penalty: from ELECTROCUTION to LETHAL
INJECTION.

*In line with the provisions of RA 8177, the Secretary of Justice promulgated RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
IMPLEMENT REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177

*Directed by the Secretary of Justice, The Director of the Bureau of Corrections prepared the LETHAL INJECTION
MANUAL
March 2, 1998- Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and the
Director of Bureau of Corrections from carrying out the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it
constituted:

1. cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment,

2. being violative of due process,
3. a violation of the Philippines’ obligations under international covenants,
4. an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by the respondent Secretary of the
power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice.

xxx

ISSUES RAISED BY THE RESPONDENTS

January 4, 1990- Public respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of SC. The
temporary restraint on the execution of petitioner and the filed Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, is requested.

The submission of the public respondents are the following:

1. The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of
executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an
end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may
now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this
Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the
past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or
modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty
involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator
Pimentel.

In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement
the death penalty law."

The Resolution was concurred in by ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (113) Congressmen..

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends:

(1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on
congressional prerogatives;

(2) the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable;

(3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition;

(4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and

(5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes
and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.

Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No.
117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court. The
instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection
Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution
of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and
Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case
at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:
1. WON RA 8177 is unconstitutional
2. WON there was undue delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections
3. WON SC loses its jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment.

RULING:
1. NO. R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional BUT Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement
 R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of
the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended.

Reasons:

(a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act
No. 7659

(b) Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of
Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel.

2. NO. A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from
the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice.
Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of the
correctional system." Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should
supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation
with the Department of Health.

THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.

The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system of government and each department has exclusive
cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the
doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule is : potestas
delegata non delegari potest.” (what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however exceptions to this
rule and one of the recognized exceptions is “ Delegation to Administrative Bodies “

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.

Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty,
the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries,
and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose
may be carried out.

3. The SC does not lose its jurisdiction over a case with a final judgment rendered upon it . What it cannot do is
modify or amend the final decision. The court held that by finality of judgment, the court loses its jurisdiction to
amend the decision but retains its power to execute or enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction
of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter a decision. The former
continues for the purpose of enforcing the judgment while the latter terminates after the final judgment is
rendered for after the judgment becomes final, facts and circumstances may transpire which may render the
execution unjust or impossible.

Public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the
principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to
begin litigation."

Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of
its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.

Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this issue as follows:

“The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of
the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference
between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. . . . For after the judgment has become final
facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.”

The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction
to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it
enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
TOPIC: CHECKS AND BALANCES
#1 Springer v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Government of the
Philippine Islands, § 3 of Art. IV of the Constitution, neither the President nor the heads of any of the executive departments have
277 U.S. 189 (1928) any powers in respect to the use or disposal of public property apart from those given them by Congress.

Topic Discussed: Organic Act contained in § 22, which provides that all executive functions must be under the Governor
(Read the oft-quoted General or within one of the executive departments under his supervision and control.
dissent of J. Holmes
regarding blending of J. Holmes’ Opinion:
powers) The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific
of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. Property must not be
Student Assigned: taken without compensation, but with the help of a phrase, (the police power) some property may be taken or
Ceniza destroyed for public use without paying for it, if you do not take too much. When we come to the fundamental
distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.

Blending of powers - instances under the Constitution when powers are not confined exclusively within one department
but are in fact assigned to or shared by several departments; there is some difficulty in classifying some of them as
definitely legislative, executive or judicial; the powers of the government may not at all times be contained with
mathematical precision in water-tight compartments because of their ambiguous nature.

FACTS:
The controversy is all about whether the present petitioners herein have the right to be directors in certain corporations
described in the opinion (National Coal Company & Philippine National Bank)
.


In each of the two cases (No. 564 and No. 573) an action for quo warranto was brought in the Supreme Court of the
Philippines challenging the right to hold office of directors of certain corporations organized under the legislative
authority of the Philippine Islands, involving directors of the National Coal Company and directors of the Philippine
National Bank.

• The National Coal Company was created by Act 2705. The act provides: “The voting power of all such stock owned
by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee, consisting of the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”

• The National Bank was created by Act 2612. By the original act the voting power of the government-owned stock was
vested exclusively in the Governor-General, but by the amended acts now in force that power was “vested exclusively
in a board, the short title of which shall be ‘Board of Control,’ composed of the Governor-General, the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The Governor-General was also divested of the power of
appointment of the President and Vice-President of the bank, originally vested in him, and their election was
authorized to be made by the directors from among their own number
.
• The petitioners in No. 564 were elected directors of the National Coal Company by a vote of the government-owned
shares cast by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House; and the petitioners in No. 573 were elected
directors of the National Bank in the same way. The Governor-General, challenging the validity of the legislation, did
not participate in either election.

• Respondent in both cases contend that the election of directors and managing agents by a vote of the government-
owned stock was an executive function entrusted by the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands to the Governor-General,
and that the acts of the Legislature divesting him of that power and vesting it in a “board” or a “committee” were invalid
as being in conflict with the Organic Act.

Petitioners’ Arguments (Mr. John W. Davis)

-Government ownership, this Court has repeatedly held, is insufficient to blur the corporate lines that separate such
corporations as that herein concerned from the government that has created them.

-Conceding, arguendo, that the corporate entity of the National Coal Company may be disregarded and that the power
of voting the government-owned stock may be regarded as a duty of caring for government property, that voting
power, as such a duty, is nevertheless properly confided to legislative officers.

-It is well settled under § 3 of Art. IV of the Constitution, neither the President nor the heads of any of the executive
departments have any powers in respect to the use or disposal of public property apart from those given them by
Congress.

-The powers of Congress in the care of government property are plenary. In that behalf the executive departments are
no more than the agents or instrumentalities of Congress. It is plain that the duty of caring for government property, far
from being "surely executive," is, in fact, legislative in character. The executive departments ordinarily perform the
detail of such care; but to Congress belongs the power of direction and such direction may be as specific as Congress
sees fit to make it.

-Officers of the National Coal Company are not officers of the Philippine Government, and the fact that the voting
power of the government-owned stock is to be exercised for the purpose, inter alia, of selecting such officers, does not
make that voting power a part of the Governor-General's asserted power of appointing persons to public office.

-The Governor-General of the Philippine Islands has no general power of appointing persons to public office and the
alleged "offices" herein involved would not be within the powers of appointment specifically given to him under the
Autonomy Act, even if they were properly regarded as "offices" within the meaning of that Act.
Respondents’ Arguments (Solicitor General Mitchell)
-The Acts of the Philippine Legislature, read in connection with other statutes relating to the Philippine National Bank,
the National Coal Company, and corporations in general, have the effect of stripping the Governor General of all
direction or control over the Bank or Coal Company and of vesting the direction of the management and operation of
those institutions in representatives of the two Houses of the Legislature selected by those Houses.

-The effect of these provisions is that the majority in the Legislature, acting through representatives doing their bidding,
from day to day direct and control the operations and management of these institutions.

-The selection and removal of the managing directors and officers of corporations, a majority of the stock of which is
owned by the Government, and the direction of the operations of those corporations through the exercise of that
power, are not legislative functions. They do not constitute the making or repealing of laws or anything incidental to
such legislative action. The voting of the Government's stock is itself not legislative, and depriving the Governor
General of all control of the operations of these corporations is in direct violation of that provision of the Organic Act
contained in § 22, which provides that all executive functions must be under the Governor General or within one of the
executive departments under his supervision and control.

-It is not material whether the relation of the Philippine Government to these corporations is proprietary or sovereign, or
whether the corporations are engaged in performing sovereign governmental functions or conducting private business.
The power of the Philippine Legislature over matters in which the Philippine Government acts in a proprietary capacity,
is legislative. It has no more power to exercise administrative or executive functions over proprietary interests of the
Government than it has over sovereign governmental functions, and the exclusion of the Legislature from participation
in administrative or executive functions, and the granting of those functions to the Governor General and his
subordinates, operate on all governmental matters whether proprietary or sovereign.

ISSUE:
-WON directors of certain corporations organized under the legislative authority of the Philippines have the right to hold
office.

RULING:
-NO. Directors of certain corporations organized under the legislative authority of the Philippines have no
right to hold office. The assigning of these directors are executive in character.

Whether the Philippine Legislature, in view of the alternative form of the provision vesting all executive functions
directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under his supervision and control,
might devolve the voting power upon the head of an executive department or an appointee of such head, we do not
now decide. The legislature has not undertaken to do so; and in the absence of such an attempt it necessarily results
that the power must be exercised directly by the Governor-General or by his appointee, since he is the only executive
now definitely authorized by law to act.

- Organic Act, following the rule established by the American constitutions, both state and federal, divides the
government into three separate departments-- the legislative, executive and judicial. Some of our state constitutions
expressly provide in -one form or another that the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the government shall be
forever separate and distinct from each other.

-It may be stated then, as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system, that, unless otherwise
expressly provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial
power; the executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power; the judiciary cannot exercise either executive
or legislative power. The existence in the various constitutions of occasional provisions expressly giving to one of the
departments powers which by their nature otherwise would fall within the general scope of the authority of another
department emphasizes, rather than casts doubt upon, the generally inviolate character of this basic rule.

-Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot
engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection;
though the case might be different if the additional duties were devolved upon an appointee of the executive.

-Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee," respectively, are not
charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of the
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties
devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not
legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the authority of
either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one of the
three among which the powers of government are divided.

-There is nothing in the Organic Act, or in the nature of the legislative power conferred by it, to suggest that the
legislature in acting in respect of the proprietary rights of the government may disregard the limitation that it must
exercise legislative and not executive functions. It must deal with the property of the government by making rules, and
not by executing them.

-Whether the members of the "board" or the "committee" are public officers in a strict sense we do not find it necessary
to determine. They are public agents at least, charged with the exercise of executive functions and, therefore, beyond
the appointing power of the legislature.

-The court held that it is unconstitutional for any of the 3 separate departments of the government to exercise powers
beyond their scope.
-Whether the Philippine Legislature, in view of the alternative form of the provision vesting all executive
functions directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under his
supervision and control, might devolve the voting power upon the head of an executive department or an
appointee of such head, we do not now decide. The legislature has not undertaken to do so; and in the
absence of such an attempt it necessarily results that the power must be exercised directly by the
Governor-General or by his appointee, since he is the only executive now definitely authorized by law to ac

It may be stated as a general rule inherent in the American constitutional system that, unless otherwise expressly
provided or incidental to the powers conferred, the legislature cannot exercise either executive or judicial power; the
executive cannot exercise either legislative or judicial power; and the judiciary cannot exercise either executive or
legislative power.

• Legislative power, as distinguished from executive power, is the authority to make laws, but not to enforce them or
appoint the agents charged with the duty of such enforcement. The latter are executive functions.

• Not having the power of appointment, unless expressly granted or incidental to its powers, the legislature cannot
engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection.

• The appointment of managers (in this instance corporate directors) of property or a business in which the government
is interested, is essentially an executive act which the legislature is without capacity to perform, directly or through its
members.

• The powers here asserted by the Philippine Legislature are vested in the Governor General by the Organic Act; by
the provision vesting in him the supreme executive power, with general supervision and control over all the
departments and bureaus of the government; the provision placing on him the responsibility for the faithful execution of
the laws; and the provision that all executive functions of the government must be directly under him or within one of
the executive departments under his supervision and control.

Holmes, dissenting:
• It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches
into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the
Constitution requires.
• It is said that the functions of the Board of Control are not legislative or judicial and therefore they must be executive.
I should say rather that they plainly are no part of the executive functions of the Government but rather fall into the
indiscriminate residue of matters within legislative control.

The only qualification of such latitude as otherwise would be consistent with the three-fold division of power is the
proviso in § 22 of the Organic Act "that all executive functions of the government must be directly under the Governor-
General or within one of the executive departments," etc. Act of August 29, 1916, c. 416, 39 Stat. 553, U.S.C. Tit. 48, §
1114.

That does not appear to me to govern the case. The corporations concerned were private corporations which the
legislature had power to incorporate. Whoever owned the stock, the corporation did not perform functions of the
government. This would be plain if the stock were in private hands, and if the government bought the stock
from private owners, the functions of the corporations would not be changed. If I am right in what I have
said, I think that ownership would not make voting upon the stock an executive function of the government
when the acts of the corporation were not. I cannot believe that the legislature might not have provided for
the holding of the stock by a board of private persons with no duty to the government other than to keep it
informed and to pay over such dividends as might accrue. It is said that the functions of the Board of Control
are not legislative or judicial, and therefore they must be executive. I should say, rather, that they plainly are
no part of the executive functions of the government, but rather fall into the indiscriminate residue of matters
within legislative control. I think it would be lamentable even to hint a doubt as to the legitimacy of the action
of Congress in establishing the Smithsonian as it did, and I see no sufficient reason for denying the
Philippine Legislature a similar power.
#2 Ocampo v. KEY POINTS :
Secretary of Justice, Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution provides that "the judicial power shall be vested in the Supreme Court
G.R. No. L-7910, and in such inferior courts as may be established by law," and
January 18, 1955 Section 9 of the same Article provides that "the Members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall
hold office during good behavior, until they reached the age of 70 years, or become incapacitated to discharge the
Topic Discussed: duties of their office."
Congress may also
pass a law
reorganizing the FACTS: (CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 3 RA NO 1186)
judiciary, but it should OCAMPO, ET AL. , petitioner, questioned the validity of Section 3 of Republic Act 1186 which took effect on June
not undermine the 19, 1954, several provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 were amended. Now, the judicial function in
security of tenure of Court of First Instance is vested in District Judges; and although the number of Judicial Districts is maintained, the
the members of the number of District Judges has been increased to 114 . Section 3 of Republic Act No. 1186 provides that "all the
judiciary (Article VI, existing positions of Judges-at-Large and Cadastral Judges are abolished, and section (53)fifty-three of Republic Act
§2) Numbered Two Hundred and Ninety-six is hereby repealed."

Student Assigned: Shortly after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 1186, the Secretary of Justice informed the petitioners that they had
Cruz ceased as Judges-at-Large and Cadastral Judges.
The petitioners have filed the present petition for declaratory relief and/or mandamus, for a judicial declaration that
section 3 of Republic Act No. 1186 is unconstitutional and void, that the respective positions and offices of the
petitioners under the Judiciary Act of 1948 still exists, and that they are entitled to exercise the powers and functions of
said offices; and for adirective against the Secretary of Justice to permit the petitioners to continue in the exercise of
said powers and functions, and against the Chief Accounting Officer and Judicial Officer of the Department of Justice
to pay the petitioners their corresponding compensation beginning June 20, 1954

ISSUE: WON the petition that Section 3 of Republic Act 1186 is invalid and unconstitutional?

RULING:
Yes, valid and constitutional. Petition was denied without costs, due to insufficient votes to invalidate Section 3 of RA
1186.

CONCURRING:

Chief Justice Parás, and Justices Padilla, Reyes (A.) and Labrador voted to
uphold that particular section;

The power of Congress under section 1 to organize, reorganize and even abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court,
is conceded; and the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners is merely that such power is restricted by and
may be reconciled with section 9 in the sense that they should be allowed to continue holding their o ces during good
behavior, until they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated, notwithstanding the reorganization
effected under Republic Act No. 1186 and the express abolition of their positions by section 3 thereof
*The legislature has the power to abolish as well as to create, to diminish as well as to increase, the number of judicial
districts.

The judge's right to his full term and his full salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the
contingency that the legislature may for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, from time to time
consider his office unnecessary and abolish it. Properly and logically speaking, the petitioners were not removed from
o ce, because a removal implies that the o ce exists after the ouster.

"To dispense with an unnecessary court is not to change his term of judgeship, nor is it to affect the guarantees of the
Constitution as to his salary, nor does it remove the judge from o ce. The office no longer exists, and, of course, a
removal from an o ce that has no existence is not a conceivable proposition."
To allow the legislature, while making one new district, to legislate the judge of an old district out of office, and provide
for appointment or election of two new judges, would clearly be vicious in principle, and this is the class of legislation
which falls within the constitutional inhibition. But to prohibit the legislature from abolishing a district which has been
improvidently established, and thereby vacating the office of a judge, is another and altogether different thing, which
the constitution does not, in express terms, prohibit."

DISSENTING
Justices Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Concepcion and Reyes, J.
B. L., believe it is unconstitutional.
#3 De La Llana v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Alba, G.R. No. L-
57883 March 12, FACTS:
1982
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled, “An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Topic Discussed: Purposes” was passed, providing for the separation of Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals
Congress may also to municipal circuit courts (except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax appeals). The honorable
pass a law petitioner sought to prohibit the respondents from implementing BP 129, alleging that the security of tenure provision of
reorganizing the the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Furthermore, they assert that the reorganization was done in a
judiciary, but it should lack of good faith. However, the Solicitor General denies his claim and maintains that the allegation of lack of good
not undermine the faith is unwarranted and devoid of any support in law and that BP 129 was a legitimate exercise of the power vested in
security of tenure of the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary.
the members of the
judiciary (Article VI, ISSUE:
§2) Whether or not BO 129 disregarded the “Security of Tenure” Provision of the Constitution disregarded thereby
impairing the independence of the Judiciary?
Student Assigned:
Dacuyan RULING:

No. The Court held that there was good faith in reorganizing the judiciary. It held that the enactment thereof was in
answer to a pressing and urgent need for a major reorganization of the judiciary. Citing the separate opinion of Justice
Laurel in the case of Zandueta v. De La Costa, the Court similarly maintains that the passage of BP 129 was in good
faith seeing as its purpose was for the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative
department, not intended to adversely affect the tenure of judges or any particular judge. While it is possible that the
legislature could deliberately abuse the power to reorganize the judiciary, thus lacking good faith, the Court is
unconvinced that such was the case in this situation. Thus, where the Court holds that the reorganization of the
judiciary under BP 129 was done in good faith, the “separation” of the petitioner due to the abolition of his office is valid
and constitutional.

A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact, the entire judicial
system can be changed. To hold that tenure of judges is superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render
impotent the exercise of that power. Under Section 7, Article X, Judges are entailed to their count, from which they
cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts
are not entailed to their judges, because the power of the legislative to establish inferior court presupposes the power
to abolish those courts. If an inferior court is abolished, the judge presiding that court will necessarily have to lose his
position because the abolished court is not entailed to him.

Moreover, this Court is em powered "to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members,
order their dismissal." Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the
President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination under the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position

Section 1, Article X refers to the "Judiciary" as a fundamental department of Government, Section 7 of the same Article
refers to the tenure of office of "individual" Judges (inclusive of Justices of inferior Courts); that is to say, tenure of
office is a matter concerning the individual Judge. This "individuality" character of Section 7 is supported by the clause
that the Supreme Court has the power to discipline individual judges of inferior courts..
TOPIC: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
#1 Angara v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Electoral
Commission, supra The Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law ,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
Topic Discussed:
Supreme Court – the In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
constitutional organ allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
mandated to allocate
constitution The judiciary has the authority to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers provided in the Constitution. And when
boundaries
the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does
Student Assigned: not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Dizon Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

Judicial supremacy - is the power of judicial review under the Constitution

FACTS: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking
further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of Jose Angara as member of the National Assembly
for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.

1. In the election of Sept. 17, 1935, Angara (petitioner) and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, Dionision Mayor (Respondents)
were candidates voted to be members of the national assembly (NA) for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.

2. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took
his oath of office.

3. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of the members of the
National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed.

4. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the election of Angara. On
Dec 9, 1935, the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA.

5. Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no longer protest (the
prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the respondent was late in filing his protest
because he filed the protest after December 3.).

6. Ynsua claims that there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the NA cannot be contested
 after confirmation of the NA. EC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Petitioner then files a protest to the Supreme Court
(SC) questioning EC’s jurisdiction over the case. ( Petitioner argues that, EC could only regulate proceedings, that SC has
jurisdiction to pass upon fundamental questions in the issue since it is an interpretation of the constitution)

The Solicitor General (SolGen) argues that EC is a constitutional body which has jurisdiction to try all contested cases
re:elections and said acts are beyond SC. Further, Res #8 did not deprive EC of its jurisdiction. Since EC acquired jurisdiction
over the election protest, the Motion to dismiss filed in EC is not reviewable by the SC.

ISSUE: WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy?

RULING: Yes, the SC has the jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy.

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. The Constitution has provided for an
elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. In
cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.

In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of the herein
petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed
said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid.

The Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the
resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.

In this case at bar, the Electoral Commission,, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly . The Electoral Commission
has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of December 9,
1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last day for filing protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should be upheld.The doctrine of implications means that “that which is
plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed”.
-#2 SPCMB Law KEY POINTS :
Offices v. CA, G.R.
No. 216914,  All cases questioning the constitutionality of a law does not require that Congress be impleaded for their
December 6, 2016 resolution. The requisites of a judicial inquiry are elementary:
Topic Discussed:
Congress need not be 1. There must be an actual case or controversy; party;
impleaded in cases
assailing 2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
constitutionality of
statutes 3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
Student Assigned:
Ganzan 4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself

As presently worded, Section 11 of the AMLA has three elements: (1) ex-parte application by the AMLC; (2) determination of
probable cause by the CA; and (3) exception of court order in cases involving unlawful activities defined in Sections 3(i)(1), (2),
and (12).

Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and
investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage. It is the
preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question which brings these within reach of the judicial
process, specifically a determination that the seizure violated due process.

a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account holder.

FACTS:
FACTS:

SPCMB file the petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court the constitutionality of Section 11 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council's
authority to file with the Court of Appeals (CA), an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments,
including related accounts based on probable cause.

Before the 2016 Election media reports, burst out the issue of Vice President Binay’s and the rest of his family’s disproportionate
wealth. The office of the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigation and inquiry based on their power in the
Constitution.
    Anti-MoneyLaundering Council (AMLC) asked permission of the CA’s to check the bank accounts of the Binay’s, their
corporations, and the law firm (SPCMB) in which his daughter was once a former partner.

In behalf of SPCMB, Atty. Castro inquire the veracity of the reports with the Court of Appeals. He demanded to received the
response of his letter not later than 24-hours. Failure to do so, SPCMB will assume that cases are exist and they will act
accordingly.

    CA’sreplied that the Office of the Presiding Justice is strictly mandated not to disclose, divulge, or communicate to anyone
directly or indirectly, in any manner or by any means, the fact of the filing of any petition brought before the Court by the Anti-
Money Laundering Council.

·        The Court of Appeals (CA) has officially issued an order for examination of Vice President Binay's bank accounts. Granting
the petition of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the CA also ordered the inspection of the bank deposits of Binay's
wife, children, and law office (SPCMB) connected to him.

 Before the 2016 presidential elections, reports regarding disproportionate wealth of then
VP Binay and the rest of his family abounded

 The Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon

 various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank
accounts, including accounts of members of his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza
Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with the article published in
the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which read,
in pertinent part:

o xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA)
to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into the bank accounts of the Binays, their
corporations, and a law office where a family member was once a partner.
xx xx

o Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente
Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm, where the Vice President's daughter Abigail
was a former partner.

 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of
Binay 's assets" reporting that the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the
ex-parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB.

 Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported ongoing unconstitutional
examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct resort to Supreme Court via this petition for certiorari
and prohibition on the following grounds that the Anti-Money Laundering Act is
unconstitutional insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice
to the affected party: (1) It violates the person's right to due process; and (2) It violates
the person's right to privacy.

 SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's exparte application for a bank inquiry
order and all subsequent pleadings, documents and
orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion where
the purported blanket authority under Section 11:
o partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing expedition;
o violates the attorney-client privilege
o is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money laundering offense
o is a form of political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele

ISSUE:

Whether or not Congress needs to implead the cases assailing the Constitutionality of the statutes

Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution.

RULING:

No.
On the issue of whether SPCMB should implead the Congress, the contention of the OSG though unusual is untenable. All cases
questioning the constitutionality of a law does not required the Congress to implead for their resolution. Under the Constitution the
requisites of a judicial inquiry are the following:
a. There must be an actual case or controversy;
b. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
c. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
d. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself

CONCLUSION:
Thus, Congress need not to implead the cases assailing to Constitutionality. Considering also that the Supreme Court affirms the
constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the AMLC for authority to inquire and check, certain bank deposits and
investments

 No 

AMLC provides safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of
preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:
o The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order;

o The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that
the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under
Section 4 of the AMLA;

o A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the
principal account which court order ex-parte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such
related account is materially linked to the principal account inquired into; and

o The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts shall comply with the
requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution.

The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically
and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of demonstration by the
AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We will
revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA' s denial of SPCMB' s letter request for
information concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.
 we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority
to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments.
 Section 11 of RA 9160 is valid and constitutional
In this case, at the investigation stage by the AMLC into possible money laundering offenses, SPCMB demands that it have
notice and hearing of AMLC's investigation into its bank accounts.

the grant of jurisdiction over cases involving money laundering offences is bestowed on the Regional Trial Courts and the
Sandiganbayan as the case may be.

Textually, the AMLA is the first line of defense against money laundering in compliance with our international obligation. There are
three (3) stages of determination, two (2) levels of investigation, falling under three (3) jurisdictions:

The AMLC investigates possible money laundering offences and initially determines whether there is probable cause to charge
any person with a money laundering offence under Section 4 of the AMLA, resulting in the filing of a complaint with the
Department of Justice or the Office of the Ombudsman;[21] 2. The DOJ or the Ombudsman conducts the preliminary investigation
proceeding and if after due notice and hearing finds probable cause for money laundering offences, shall file the necessary
information before the Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan;[22] 3. The RTCs or the Sandiganbayan shall try all cases on
money laundering, as may be applicable.
Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules and Regulations can we glean that the AMLC exercises quasi-
judicial functions

That the AMLC does not exercise quasi-judicial powers and is simply an investigatory body finds support in our ruling in Shu v.
Dee.

the AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.[26] Thereafter, the next step is for the
AMLC to file a Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6.b.

Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses,
specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising
quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's
constitutional right to procedural due process.

The warning in Eugenio that an ex-parte proceeding authorizing the government to inspect certain bank accounts or investments
without notice to the depositor would have significant implications on the right to privacy still does not preclude such a bank
inquiry order to be allowed by specific legislation as an exception to the general rule of absolute confidentiality of bank deposits.
#3 Endencia v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
David, G.R. No. L-
6355-56, August 31, The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law
1953 was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a
statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial
Topic Discussed: function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
Supreme Court ruling
on constitutional The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an
issues cannot be attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
undone, or in effect (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)
reversed, by
Congress section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

Student Assigned: SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good
Gloria behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.

section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered
as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be diminution of his compensation
fixed by the Constitution or by law.

Annotations of Cruz:

Page 152- The Supreme Court held that the interpretation of the provisions in question was the exclusive function of the
judiciary.

Page 585- Salaries of Judges

Section 10, Article VIII

“The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of the lower courts
shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.”

As previously observed, the prohibition against diminution of the salaries of judges during their continuance in
office in one of the guarantees to their independence. Without this provision, it would be possible for Congress to exert
pressure on the members of the judiciary by threatening their financial security through reduction of their salaries.

The Supreme Court declared that the imposition of income taxes on the salaries of judges was unconstitutional
because it would result in the reduction of their compensation.

FACTS: This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic
Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to
Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income
tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and
from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement
as to costs.

This constitutional issue was decided on Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phils., 552 which laid down the doctrine on the collection
of income taxes from the salaries of justices and judges. According to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not
did favourably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated RA No. 590, if not to counteract the
ruling in that decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress may reverse a ruling by the Supreme Court on a Constitutional issue. In this case
the ruling on Perfecto v. Meer on the taxability of the salaries of Justices and Judges.

RULING: No. The Congress may not reverse a ruling by the Supreme Court on a Constitutional issue. The act of
interpreting the Constitution is vested upon the Judiciary. The legislature under our form of government is assigned the
power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them.

Application: In section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase
"which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature
is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

Conclusion: The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.

-#4 Sameer
Overseas Placement Sameer Overseas Placement Agency v. Cabiles
v. Cabiles, supra G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014

Topic Discussed: Key:

Supreme Court ruling
on constitutional Why/What: Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
issues cannot be Ruling: Respondent Wins
undone, or in effect Supreme Court ruling on Constitutional issues cannot be undone, or in effect reversed, by Congress : Nullity of
reversed, by RA 8042 and its reinstatement in RA 10022: When a law or a provision of law is null because it was inconsistent with
Congress the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or similar law or
provision. Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic
Student Assigned: hardships that our reading of the Constitution intended to avoid. A law or provision of law that was already declared
Lanzaderas unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

Thesis Statement

1. Who Filed the Case: Sameer OVerseas Placement Agency, Inc

2. Against Whom: Joy C. Cabiles; herein described as an overseas worker with shattered dreams
3. What is the Action Filed: Petition for Certiorari;
4. What reliefs are sought:
- To declare respondent’s Dismissal as illegal, and to direct the petitioner to pay respondent’s three month salary
equivalent to 46,080.00 NTD, and ordering to reimburse the 3,000 NTD withheld from respondent, and pay her
300.00 NTD attorney’s fees.

Facts

● Petitioner is a recruitment and placement agency

● Respondent, responding to an ad published by the petitioner, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan.
● After being accepted, Joy was asked to sign a one year employment contract for a monthly salary of 15,360 NTD
● The Respondent allegedly asked her to pay a placement fee of 70,000 NTD when she signed the contract.
● After being deployed, she was asked to work as a cutter instead of what was stated in the contract as a quality control
officer for one year.
● Respondent subsequently claims that Mr Huang from Wacoal informed Joy without prior notice a termination of
employment and that she should report to the office to get her salary and passport, and was asked to prepare for an
immediate repatriation.
● Respondent was told that she only earned a total of 9,000 NTD from her period of service as Wacoal deducted 3,000
NTD to cover her plane ticket.
 NLRC: First Complaint Filed

● Respondent filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commissions that she was illegally dismissed by the
petitioner and wacoal - asking as well to return her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of
her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages.
● Petitioner responded to the complaint that allegedly the termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties,
and her failure to comply with the work requirements of her foreign employer, denying as well the claim of asking a
placement fee, showing receipt only amounting to 20,360 P, added as well that the foreign employers accreditation was
transferred to pacific Manpower and Management Services, Inc.
● However, PMMSI denied that it assumed liability for the petitioner's illegal acts.
● Labor Arbiter: Dismissed the complaint of Joy, the respondent. Stating that her complaint was based on mere
allegations, found that there was no excess payment of placement fees, and found unnecessary the discussion on
petitioner’s transfer of obligations.
● On Appeal - NLRC Decision: Subsequently declared, Joy was illegally dismissed. Reiterating the Doctrine of Burden
of Proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer, found that the petitioner
failed to prove that there were just causes for the termination. Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in
terminating the respondent.
● Aggrieved of the above ruling, Petitioner filed for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
● Court of Appeals Decision: Affirmed the Decision of the NLRC in finding the dismissal illegally made.
● Petitioner was dissatisfied, hence this petition in Court.

Issue

I.

Whether or Not Cabiles is entitled to receive the equivalent salary of the unexpired term of her contract?

II.

Whether or not a new law (RA 10022) may reinstate a previously declared provision/clause Unconstitutional?

III.

Whether or Not the Constitution Guarantees rights and security of tenure for Labor?

Ruling of the Supreme Court

I.
YES. Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to receive the equivalent salary of the unexpired term of her Contract.

Having been illegally dismissed, she is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was
violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.

Section 10, Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and OVerseas Filipinos Act, states that
overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause “shall be entitled to the full reimbursement
of his placement fee with interest of 12 percent per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

The award of the three-month equivalent of her salary, should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired
term of the employment contract.

In Serrano versus Gallant Maritime Services, this court ruled that the clause “or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords
no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.

II.

NO.

RA 10022 incorporates the exact clause already declared as unconstitutional. When cases become moot and
academic, we do not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations
are capable of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases where there are millions of Filipinos
working abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection because of the restoration of an identical
clause in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional.

CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY: In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the
government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any
law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of
the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

When a law or a provision of law is null because it was inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
The new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior to the Serrano Case. Failure to
reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic hardships that our reading of the
Constitution intended to avoid.

We observe that the reinstated clause this time as provided in RA 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal
protection and due process. There is a failure to show any compelling change in the Circumstances that would warrant
us to revisit the precedent.

III.

Yes, Security of Tenure for Labor is guaranteed by our Constitution, expressly stated in Section 3, Article XIII. Employees are
not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas
Filipino Workers, we follow the principle of Lex Loci Contractus; As such case is governed by the law of the place where the
contract is made.

● The court is possessed with the Constitutional duty to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
Constitutional rights.
● In the Hierarchy of Laws, the Constitution shall reign supreme. No Branch or office of the government may exercise
its powers in any manner inconsistent with the constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such
exercise.
● The Court Upheld the findings of the Court of Appeals, entitled to all her claims, however , increasing the equivalent
salary to the unexpired terms of the contract.
● The government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all filipinos. We default by limiting the contractual
wages that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are breached by the foreign employers. The court will
ensure that our laws will reward our overseas workers with what they deserve: their dignity.
● Further, Petitioner also failed to comply with the due process requirement for dismissal: The dismissal within less
than a year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not only failure on the part of the petitioner to comply
with the due process requirements, a valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of
dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification.Petitioner Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the
unexpired portion of her employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also
ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an
interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.

The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 7 of RepublicAct No.
10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Doctrine of the Case

1. Constitutional issues resolved by the Courts cannot be undone or reversed even by the Congress: When a law or
a provision of law is null because it was inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or similar law or provision. Failure to reiterate the very ratio
decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic hardships that our reading of the Constitution
intended to avoid. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

1. Lex Loci Contractus: (the law of the place where the contract is made) There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and
regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum
will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Herein the Philippines, employment agreements
are more than contractual in nature.
#5 Baker v. Carr, 369 SUBJECT FOR REVISION
U.S. 186
KEY POINTS : Baker v. Carr (1962) was a landmark case concerning re-apportionment and redistricting. The United States
Topic Discussed: Supreme Court ruled that federal courts could hear and rule on cases in which plaintiffs allege that re-apportionment plans violate
The six the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .
characteristics of a
political question Six factors to help in determining which questions were "political" in nature. Cases that are political in nature are marked by:

Student Assigned: 1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;" as an example of
Lim this, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers, arguing that cases involving such matters would
be "political questions"

2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;"

3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;"

4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government;"

5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;"

6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

FACTS: In 1901, the Tennessee General Assembly passed an apportionment act. The statute required Tennessee to update its
apportionment of senators and representatives every ten years, based on population recorded by the federal census. The statute
offered a way for Tennessee to handle apportionment of senators and representatives as its population shifted and grew.

Between 1901 and 1960, the population of Tennessee grew significantly. In 1901, Tennessee's population totaled just 2,020,616
and only 487,380 residents were eligible to vote. In 1960, the federal census revealed that the state's population had grown by
more than a million, totaling 3,567,089, and its voting population had swelled to 2,092,891.

Despite population growth, the Tennessee General Assembly failed to enact a re-apportionment plan. Each time redistricting
plans were drawn up in accordance with the federal census and put to a vote, they failed to get enough votes to pass.

In 1961, Charles W. Baker and a number of Tennessee voters sued the state of Tennessee for failing to update the
apportionment plan to reflect the state's growth in population. The failure gave significant power to voters in rural areas, and took
away power from voters in suburban and urban parts of the state. Baker's vote counted for less than the vote of someone living in
a rural area, he alleged, a violation the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Tennessee had acted "arbitrarily"
and "capriciously" in not following redistricting standards, he claimed.

A district court panel declined to hear the case, finding that it could not rule on "political" matters like redistricting and
apportionment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the federal courts had jurisdiction of legislative apportionment?

RULING: Yes, the federal courts had jurisdiction of legislative apportionment.

Majority Opinion

Justice William Brennan delivered the 6-2 decision. Justice Whittaker recused himself.

Justice Brennan focused the decision on whether redistricting could be a "justiciable" question, meaning whether federal courts
could hear a case regarding apportionment of state representatives.

Justice Brennan wrote that the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction in relation to apportionment. This means that federal
courts have the authority to hear apportionment cases when plaintiffs allege deprivation of fundamental liberties. Next , Justice
Brennan found that Baker and his fellow plaintiffs had standing to sue because, the voters were alleging "facts showing
disadvantage to themselves as individuals."

Justice Brennan drew a line between "political questions" and "justiciable questions" by defining the former. He developed a six
prong test to guide the Court in future decisions regarding whether or not a question is "political." A question is "political" if:

The Constitution has already given decision making power to a specific political department. there is no apparent judicial
remedy or set of judicial standards for resolving the issue a decision cannot be made without first making a policy determination
that is not judicial in nature the Court cannot undertake an "independent resolution" without "expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government"

there is an unusual need for not questioning a political decision that has already been made
"the potentiality of embarrassment" from multiple decisions being issued by various departments regarding one question

Following these six prongs, Justice Warren concluded that alleged voting inequalities could not be characterized as "political
questions" simply because they asserted wrongdoing in the political process. Federal courts could create “discoverable and
manageable standards” for granting relief in equal protection cases.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Felix Frankfurter dissented, joined by Justice John Marshall Harlan. The Court's decision represented a clear deviation
from a long history of judicial restraint, he argued. The decision allowed the Supreme Court and other federal district courts to
enter the political realm, violating the intent of separation of powers, Justice Frankfurter wrote.

Justice Frankfurter added:

The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic spread of population is so universally accepted as a necessary
element of equality between man and man that it must be taken to be the standard of a political equality preserved by the
Fourteenth Amendment... is, to put it bluntly, not true.

Impact

Chief Justice Earl Warren called Baker v. Carr the most important case of his tenure on the Supreme Court. It opened the door to
numerous historic cases in which the Supreme Court tackled questions of voting equality and representation in government.
Within seven weeks of the decision, lawsuits had been filed in 22 states asking for relief in terms of unequal apportionment
standards. It took only two years for 26 states to ratify new apportionment plans with respect to population counts. Some of those
new plans were guided by federal court decisions.
#6 Alejandrino v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Quezon, G.R. No.
22041, September Alejandrino (Petitioner) v. Quezon (Respondent)
11, 1924 G.R. No. 22041
September 11, 1924
Topic Discussed: Ponente: MALCOLM, J.
Political Questions -
NOTE: ruling no Topic: Political questions
longer supported by
the 1987 Constitution FACTS:

Student Assigned: On 5 February 1924, the Philippine Senate composed of respondent Senators, including Senate President Manuel L. Quezon,
Lungay issued a resolution (The Casus Belli) depriving petitioner, Senator Jose Alejandrino Senator for the Twelfth District, of all the
prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of his office for a period of one year from the first of January 1924, having found the
petitioner guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted
Vince de Vera, Senator for the Sixth District, on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the
debate regarding the credentials of Senator Alejandrino.

Alejandrino contested the resolution, claiming the same to be unconstitutional, praying to the Supreme Court:
(1) to issue a preliminary injunction against the respondents enjoining them from executing the resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and
(3) as a consequence of the foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction against the respondents ordering them to
recognize the rights of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he enjoys all of his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments, and prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising the rights of his office, and from carrying the
order of suspension into effect.

Respondents, through the Attorney General, objected by claiming the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction therein.

ISSUE:

WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to annul the Resolution made by the Philippine Senate against Senator Alejandrino.

RULING:

No, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to annul the Resolution made by the Philippine Senate against Senator Alejandrino.

The Philippine Government has three (3) distinct departments such as Executive, Legislative and Judicial with each having
equally independent powers and functions. Section 18 of the Philippine Organic Act provides that the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of
two-thirds, expel an elective member."

In the case at bar, the resolution made by the Senate is the exercise of its powers and function as provided by the Constitution
(Philippine Organic Act at that time), purely legislative in character and over which they have exclusive control.

Thus, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to annul the Resolution made by the Philippine Senate against Senator Alejandrino.

Verbatim decision made by the Supreme Court:

We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process. The court accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the demurrer
must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be dismissed
without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So ordered.
#7 Vera v. Avelino, KEY POINTS (By the Principle of Separation of Powers, each branch of the government may not interfere on its exclusive
G.R. No. L-543, prerogative; In cases involving political questions, the Court has no business of interfering the same):
August 31, 1946
FACTS: Pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, the COMELEC submitted to the President and Congress its report on the
Topic Discussed: conduct of the national elections wherein it stated that due to violence and terrorism, the results of the voting did not
Political Questions - reflect the true will of the people. Petitioners got one of the highest number of votes during such elections and thus
NOTE: ruling no proclaimed by the COMELEC. Some members of Congress, however, petitioned against the sworning in and assumption
longer supported by of office of the Petitioners. During the Senate session, a resolution was passed suspending the sworning in of the
the 1987 Constitution petitioners and thus disallowing them to assume their respective seats in the senate pending the resolution of their
disqualification case. Petitioners instituted the instant action to annul the resolution. Respondents interposed the
Student Assigned: defense of lack of jurisdiction and justiciability, alleging that the case is a political question in which the Court had no
Mahilum business to decide.

ISSUE: WON the case is a political question.

RULING: YES. The Case is a political question.

Major Premise: By the principle of separation of powers, each branch of the government may not interfere into the
prerogatives of the other branches unless the act of one branch encroaches on the prerogatives of the other branch.

When the Commonwealth Constitution was approved in 1935, the existence of three coordinate, co-equal and co-
important branches of the government was ratified and confirmed. That Organic Act contained some innovations
which established additional exceptions to the well-known separation of powers; [e.g, the creation of the Electoral
Tribunal wherein Justices of the Supreme Court participate in the decision of congressional election protests, the
grant of rule-making power to the Supreme Court, etc.;] but in the main, the independence of one power from the
other was maintained.

In the case at bar, postponing or suspending the sworning in of Petitioners due to causes which Congress considered
valid is no doubt a prerogative of the latter which the Court has no business to pass on.

THE SUPREME COURT REFUSED TO INTERVENE, APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF

POWERS. THUS, RESPECTING THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DETERMINE WHO SHALL
BE ADMITTED IN THEIR MEMBERSHIP

As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member
thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and
balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.

Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case, may this petition be entertained? The answer must naturally
be in the negative. Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to suspension of the
petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in
effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should be denied. As
was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To
do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven
into our institutional setup.

*Hands-off Policy*** . . . Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the
performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
power. So it has been held that where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power,
irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement. . . . Under
our form of government the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that
department by the constitution. (Supra, p. 93) x x x x the Supreme Court does not possess the power of coercion to
make the Philippine Senate take any particular action. . . . (Supra, p. 97.)

t must be stressed that, in the Angara controversy, no legislative body or person was a litigant before the court, and
that no directive was issued against a branch of the Legislature or any member thereof. 2 This Court, in that case, did
not require the National Assembly or any assemblyman to do any particular act. It only found it "has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commission." (Supra, 63 Phil., 161.)

That this court in the Angara litigation made declarations, nullifying a resolution of the National Assembly, is not
decisive. In proper cases this court may annul any Legislative enactment that fails to observe the constitutional
limitations. That is a power conceded to the judiciary. (Basis: If Congressional statute, which is the act of an agency of
the sovereign authority, conflicts with the Constitution, that congressional statute must fail – doctrine of constitutional
supremacy. To hold it invalid is a Court’s power, vested upon it by the constitution – judicial power—to administer
justice according to law.)

This is not the exercise of a substantive power to review and nullify acts of Congress, for no substantive power exists.
It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the
court, to the determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law.
#8 Mabanag v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Lopez Vito, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed:
Political Question: Three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission
NOTE: ruling no on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946.
longer supported by
the 1987 Constitution) The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the
→ IMP’T: Read also elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election.
the scathing dissent
of J. Perfecto The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of
the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended.
Student Assigned:
Manaig A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted
upon definitively by the House when the present petition was filed.

They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required ¾ vot e (of each house) in
order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution) – which had been considered as an enrolled bill by
then.

At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was
passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote.

If these members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.

Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that the
SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not the said resolution was duly enacted by
Congress.

2. Whether or not the enrolled bill (the amendment to the Constitution) falls within the meaning of political
question.
RULING:

1. As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of
the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section
313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule
of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the
latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies “shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

**Enrolled Bill – that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each,
approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: “Official documents may be
proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in
the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of conflict, the
contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those of the journals.

2. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full
harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the
political departments of the government. But there is one case approaching this in its circumstances: Coleman
vs. Miller, a relatively recent decision of the United States Supreme Court reported and annotated in 122 A.L.R.,
695. The case, by a majority decision delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, is authority for the conclusion that
the efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political
question and hence not justiciable.

If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a political question. The two
steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the amendatory process as
provided in section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification."
There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its
charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on
grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial
inquiry into the validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification.

It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. (16 C.J.S., 431.) This doctrine is predicated on the principle of the separation of
powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what
matters fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and
authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with
the actions of the political departments of the government.

No. Political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional
or statutory provisions. The difficulty lies in determining what matters fall within the meaning of
political question. However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of ratification by state legislature
of a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question and hence not
justiciable. If a ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. There is no logic in attaching political character to one
and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by Congress. If a political question conslusively binds the judges out
of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the “enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.

Important as the concept of political questions is for the proper understanding of this case, the Court does not define
it. In Justice Tuason's words: "The term is not susceptible of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not
always in full harmony as to the scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of
the political departments of the government."" This draws Justice Perfecto's dissenting rejoinder that "A doctrine in
which one of the elemental or nuclear terms is the subject of an endless debate is a misnomer and paradox.'"' But
Justice Concepcion, in a later case, comes to the rescue: ... the term 'political questions' connotes, in legal parlance,
what it means _jp ordinary parlance. namely, a auestion of policy. In other words, in the language of the Corpus ]uris
Secundum ( 16/413), it refers to 'those questions which, under thg. Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Exes:utive
branch of the GovemmenJ:.' It is concerned with issues dependent on the .owisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure

The bill theoryl:, •• which Justice Perfecto· promptly branded as an "uncourageous example which is given under the
intellectual tutelage of Wigmore.""
#9 Arnault v. KEY POINTS :
Balagtas, G.R. No.
L-6749, July 30, Petitioner----Arnault the Atty of Ernest H. Burt
1955
Respondent-- Eustaquio Balagtas as Director of Prisons
Topic Discussed:
SC cannot review the
findings of the FACTS:
Houses of Congress
in the exercise of their
legislative · The dispute started when the Government purchased 2 estates, the Buenavista and Tambobong.
prerogatives · The petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase which was effected. The price
paid for both estates was P5, 000,000.
Student Assigned: · On February 27, 1950 the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of the
Manguilimotan purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just.
· In the Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440, 000, was delivered.
· Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered
his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison
until such time he reveals to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440, 000
and to answer questions pertinent thereto.
· Petitioner filed a habeas corpus proceeding.
· The petitioner questioned the validity of the confinement so ordered a petition for certiorari filed in this Court. He contended
that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
delivered P440,000 and that the Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond the term of the legislative
session, and that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer is an incriminating question which the appellee is
not bound to answer.
· Court of First Instance of Rizal ruled that the continued detention and confinement of petitioner pursuant to a Senate
Resolution No. 114, is illegal, and that the Senate committed a clear abuse of discretion in not considering his answer
naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. Further, on the ground
that that petitioner, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is consequently entitled to be released and
discharged.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction on matters concerning the findings of the Houses of Congress in the exercise of
their legislative prerogatives.
 2. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed against it under the circumstances of the
case.

RULING:

1. No, the SC has no jurisdiction on matters concerning the findings of the Houses of Congress in the exercise of their
legislative prerogatives.

Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent
organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the government derives its authority from the
Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.

The judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in the same manner that the legislative
department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in
what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of
powers established by the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoked are when there has
been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion. All that the
courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to determine if the constitutional
guarantee of due process has been accorded him before his incarceration by legislative order, and this because of the mandate
of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be deprived life, liberty or property without due process of law.

In this case, such right has fully been extended to the petitioner, having been given the opportunity to be heard personally and by
counsel in all the proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering his continued confinement.

Consequently, the SC has no jurisdiction on matters concerning the findings of the Houses of Congress in the exercise of their
legislative prerogatives.

2. Yes, the Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed against it under the circumstances of the case.

American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to punish for contempt if the contempt has had the
effect of obstructing the exercise by the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from exercising, its legitimate functions. The
principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy.
Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.
In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al. it was admitted and the court ruled
that the Senate has the authority to commit a witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to
compel him to give the information, i.e., by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power.

In this case, the petitioner refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, regarding to whom a part of the purchase
price, or P440, 000, was delivered. This act had been conclusively labeled as contempt to the authority of the legislature.

Thus, the Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed against it under the circumstances of the case.
#10 Osmeña v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Pendatun, G.R. No.
L-17144, October 28, FACTS:
1960

Topic Discussed: Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the house, made the serious imputations of bribery
Political question: against the president.
whether a legislator’s
action constitutes · A special committee, composed of congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen, was created by virtue
“disorderly behavior” of house resolution no. 59, to investigate the truth of the charges against the president.

Student Assigned: · Osmeña failed to produce evidence in support of his remarks about the president. He was, by resolution no. 175, suspended
Monsanto from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behavior.

· Osmeña contests house resolution no. 175 and filed for declaratory relief, certiorari, and prohibition with preliminary injunction in
the supreme court. He contends that: (1) the constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in
the house, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for which he could be punished;
and (3) supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefore, the house had lost the power to do so because it had taken up
other business before approving house resolution no. 59 (4) that the house has no power under the constitution to suspend one
of its members.

ISSUE:

Whether a legislator’s action constitutes disorderly behavior.

RULING:

The house is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon
it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances.

In sec. 200. Judicial interference with legislature. The principle is well established that the courts will not assume a jurisdiction in
any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally independent
within the power conferred upon it by the constitution.

In this case, Congress is also empowered by the Constitution to adopt their own rules of procedure for the orderly conduct of
business, and as security against hasty action. Congress may also waive or disregard their own house rules without court
interference. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal
to interfere. The court refuses to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which is their special duty to maintain.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

-#11 De Castro v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Committee on To determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance.
Justice, G.R. No. L- To determine whether sufficient grounds for impeachment exist.
71688, September 3,
1985 FACTS:

Topic Discussed: ISSUE:

Political issue: validity
of the action of the RULING:
Committee on Justice
in dismissing the KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
impeachment To determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance.
complaint against To determine whether sufficient grounds for impeachment exist.
President Marcos
FACTS:
Student Assigned:
Pacienca ISSUE:

RULING:
 
FACTS:
In G.R. No. L-71688 filed on August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, claiming to be members of good
standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayers, filed a petition with this Court for certiorari to annul the resoltuion of
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, the very same resolution subject of the present petition, dismissing
the complaint for the impleachment of the President of the Philippines signed by the petitioners in the present case, and mandamus
to compel said Committee on Justice and the Batasan, represented by its Speaker, to give due course to said complaint
 
ISSUES:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction to order the Committe on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives
and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment?

2. Can this court, assuming said resolution and complain for impeachment are recalled from the archives, order the Batasan to
conduct a trial on the charges contained in said resolution and complain for impeachment?

RULING:
1. It is up to the Batasan to enact its own rules of procedure in said impeachment proceedings, which it had already done, The
interpretation and application of said rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review. The powers of the Batasan to dismiss a
petition for impeachment which in its judgment finds not meritorious of defective in form and substance are discretionary in nature
and, therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion.
2. Under the doctrine of Separation of Powers as interpreted by the decisions of the court, mandamus will not be from one branch of
the government to a coordinate branch to compel performance of duties within the later & apos sphere of responsibility. More
specifically, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan to compel it to give due course to the compaint for
impeachment
The provision fo the Rules of Procedure in imp

FACTS: In G.R. No. L-71688 filed on August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de Castro and Perfecto L. Cagampang, claiming to
be members of good standing of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayers, filed a petition with this Court for
certiorari to annul the resolution of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, the very same
resolution subject of the present petition, dismissing the complaint for the impeachment of the President of the
Philippines signed by the petitioners in the present case, and mandamus to compel said Committee on Justice and
the Batasan, represented by its Speaker, to give due course to said complaint for

ISSUES:
1. Has this Court jurisdiction to order the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from
the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment?

2. Can this court, assuming said resolution and complaint for impeachment are recalled from the Archives, order the
Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges contained in said resolution and complaint for impeachment?

RULING:
1. It is up to the Batasan to enact its own rules of procedure in said impeachment proceedings, which it had already
done, The interpretatioqn and application of said rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review. The powers of
the Batasan to dismiss a petition for impeachment which in its judgment it finds not meritorious or defective in form
and substance are discretionary in nature and, therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion.

2. Under the doctrine of separation of Powers as interpreted by the decisions of the Court, mandamus will not he from
one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to compel performance of duties within the latter atmosphere of
responsibility. More specifically, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan to compel it to give
due course to the complaint for impeachment.
3. the provisions of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, more specifically Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8
pursuant to which the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government had dismissed
Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for the impeachment attached thereto are unconstitutional, implying thereby
that the Batasan or the Committee thereof had, in the exercise of powers vested upon it by the Constitution,
transgressed or violated the Constitution, certainly a justiciable question.
#12 Philippine Bar KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Association v. While it is the judiciary which sees to it that the constitutional distribution of powers among the several departments of the
COMELEC, supra government is respected and observed, this does not mean that it is superior to the other departments. The correct view is that
when the Supreme Court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it is
Topic Discussed: upholding is not its own supremacy but the supremacy of the constitution.
Political issue:
whether the SC
should enjoin the FACTS:
“snap” presidential
elections Petitioners filed a complaint questioning the validity of BP 883; calling for a special election for President and Vice President on
February 7, 1986.
Student Assigned:
Padrigao The law was enacted following the letter of President Marcos to the BP that he was “irrevocably vacating the position of President
effective ONLY when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath of office
ten days after his proclamation.

Petitioners question the validity of Marcos’ resignation as it did not create the vacancy needed for a special election to be held
and pray for prohibition to acts in relation to BP Blg 883.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not BP 883 is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the Supreme Court should allow incumbent President Marcos to run on that said special election.

RULING:

Petitions dismissed. BP 883 is constitutional.

7 Justices voted to dismiss the case, while 5 justices voted to declare the statute unconstitutional.

It turned out that the issue has become a political question. It can be only decided by the people in their sovereign capacity at the
scheduled election, fair, clean, and honest election. The Court cannot stand in the way of letting the people decide through their
ballot, either to give the incumbent president a new mandate or elect a new president.

The B.P. Blg 883 is not unconstitutional and elections are political and outside the scope of the courts. The petitioners
failed to demonstrate that B.P. Blg. 883 clearly contravenes any applicable constitutional provision. The issue posed by
these petitions are essentially political in character. And “when the issue is a political one which comes within the exclusive
sphere of Legislative and Executive Department of the government to decide, the Judicial Department or the Supreme Court
has no authority to determine whether or not the act of Legislature or Chief Executive is against the constitution. What
determines the jurisdiction of the courts in such case is the issue involved, and not the law or constitutional provision which
may be applied (Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al., L-1123, March 5, 1948, 78 Phil). After deliberating, the majority of
the Justices voted to dismissed the petition.
-#13 Romulo v. KEY POINTS
Yñiguez, G.R. No.
71908, February 4, SECTIONS OF THE BATASAN RULES OF PROCEDURES IN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS IN QUESTION
1986
Section. 4. Notice to Complainant and Respondent.— Upon due referral, the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Topic Discussed: Government shall determine whether the complaint is sufficient in form and substance. if it finds that the complaint is not sufficient
Political issue: in form and substance, it shall dismiss the complaint and shall submit its report as provided hereunder. If it finds the complaint
whether the Supreme sufficient in form and substance, it shall furnish the respondent with a copy of the resolution and verified complaint with advise
Court should order that he may answer the complaint within fifteen (15) days from notice. The answer may include affirmative defenses. With leave
the Committee on of the Committee, the complainant may file a reply and the respondent, a rejoinder.
Justice to recall the
impeachment Section 5. Submission of Evidence and Memoranda. —After receipt of pleadings provided for in Section 4, or the expiration of
resolution and the time within which they maybe filed, the Committee shall determine whether sufficient grounds for impeachment exist. If it finds
complaint against that sufficient grounds for impeachment do not exist, the Committee shall dismiss the complaint and submit the report requited
President Marcos and hereunder. If the Committee finds that sufficient grounds for impeachment exist, the Committee shall require the parties to
the Batasan to support their respective allegations by the submission of affidavits and counter- affidavits, including duly authenticated documents
conduct a trial on the as may appear relevant. The Committee may, however, require that instead of affidavits and counter-affidavits, oral testimony
charges contained shall be given. It may at all events examine and allow cross- examination of the parties and their witnesses.
therein
Section 6. Report and Recommendations. —The Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government shall submit it a
Student Assigned: report of the Batasan containing its findings and recommendations within thirty (30) session days from submission of the case for
Perez resolution.

Section 8. Vote Required for Trial.—A majority vote of all the members of the Batasan is necessary for the approval of the
resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the required vote, it shall then be set for trial
on the merits by the Batasan. On the other hand, should the resolution fail to secure approval by the required vote, the same shall
result in the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment.

FACTS:

1. Resolution No. 644 was filed by the Batasan which calls for the impeachment of President Marcos and is attached with a
verified complaint for impeachment.
2. Resolution No. 644 and the complaint was referred to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government.
3. It was found out by the Committee that Resolution No. 644 and the complaint were insufficient in form and substance, so
the Resolution was disapproved, and the complaint was dismissed.
4. The Committee then submitted Committee Report No. 154, reporting the dismissal of the resolution and complaint above.
5. One day after, Ramon Mitra filed a motion to recall Resolution and complaint from the archives. The motion was denied
 by the Batasan.

One-fifth of all members of the Batasan, filed Resolution No. 644, calling for the impeachment of
President Marcos together with a verified complaint by impeachment. said resolution and complaint
were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
(CJHRGG).

The committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and substances and thus sent to archives.

Petitioners prayed that dismissal by the CJHRGG of RN644 and the impeachment complaint attached
be declared null and void.

Petitioners, representing more than one-fifth of all members of the Batasan in 1985, filed with the Batasan Resolution No. 644
and complaint calling for the impeachment of President Marcos. Said resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to
the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not sufficient in form and
substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached.
It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the Batasan and sent to the archives.

On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra filed with the Batasan a motion praying for the recall from the archives of Resolution No.
644 and the verified complaint attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.

Hence, this petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of the Batasan Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government to recall from the archives and report out the resolution together with the verified complaint for the impeachment of
the President of the Philippines. Petitioner contend that said provisions are unconstitutional because they amend Sec. 3 of Article
XI I of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the mandatory amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the
Constitution, by empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach endorsed by the requisite 1/5 of all
the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various
stages by vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when such prerogative belongs solely
to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.

Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal
condition precedent in order that the complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a majority
vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules
impose a condition not required by the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at least one-
fifth of all The members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment proceedings or for the impeachment trial to proceed.

Respondents Speaker and the Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa contend that that the petition
should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises
questions which are political in nature; (3) the Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even
supposing without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify the dismissal of the complaint for
impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint
even without the benefit of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the Batasan to give due course to the
impeachment complaint.

ISSUE:

WON the court can interfere with the Batasan’s power of impeachment

WON the Court has jurisdiction to order CJHRGG to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and
complaint for impeachment

RULING:

1. The Supreme Court should not order the Committee on Justice to recall the impeachment resolution and complaint
against President Marcos and the Court also cannot order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges contained
therein.
2. In the case of de Castro and Cagampang (which was filed days after the Committee on Justice dismissed the
Resolution), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of separation of powers still exists under the 1973 Constitution
though in a modified form made necessary because of the parliamentary system amended in the 1973 Constitution. The
 doctrine of separation of powers was interpreted by the Court that a mandamus cannot be issued from one branch of the
government to another to compel performance of duties of the latter. 
3. In the case at bar, even though the petitioners merely asked for a preliminary mandatory injunction to command the
Batasan Committee on Justice to recall and report Resolution No. 644 and the attached complaint, their ultimate objective
is to have the Batasan proceed with the impeachment trial. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Supreme
Court cannot order the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial, so ordering the Committee on Justice to recall the
Resolution and complaint will be meaningless.
4. Therefore, the Supreme Court should not order the Committee on Justice to recall the impeachment resolution and
complaint against President Marcos, and the Court also cannot order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges
contained therein.

No. On all 3 accounts. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings
is an act of the Batasan as a body in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond
the power of this Court to review.

NO.

The dismissal by the majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body
in the exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of this Court to review. This Court
cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners. A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body
of the resolution and complaint for impeachment makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government had acted.

Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without
revoking or rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra’s motion for recall (which of course it had no authority to do
and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to comply with any order from the Court for said recall) such an order addressed
to the Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself.

The Court held that if it has no authority to control the Philippine Senate, then it does not have the authority to control the actions
of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing officer of the
Senate are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as requested,
there will be the spectacle presented of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the
Philippine Senate to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing.

The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute
power to execute it.
No, to all three counts. When the Batasan denied the motion of Mitra for the recall from the Archives of RN 644 and
the complaint for impeachment, it, in effect, confirmed the action of the CJHRGG dismissing said complaint and
resolution. The Constitution provides that no official shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least 2/3 votes
of its members. In this case, a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan confirming the action of the CHRGG
makes mathematically impossible the required vote for conviction of at least 2/3 of all the members. It would serve no
purpose to proceed any further when it is obvious that the require 2/3 vote for conviction cannot be obtained .
Dismissal of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order.

A dismissal by the Batasan itself (as a body) of the resolution and complaint for impeachment – as in the dismissal of
Mitra’s motion in the case – makes irrelevant under what authority the CJHRGG had acted. The dismissal by the
majority of the members of the Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the
exercise of the powers vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power of the court to review

. The court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the impeachment trial prayed for by the petitioners. To order the
CJHRGG to recall from the Archives the complaint and resolution would produce the effect of ordering the Batasan to
proceed with the impeachments proceedings. This, the court cannot do. The assailed provisions are constitutional.
The Batasan, pursuant to its powers to adopt rules of its proceeding, may adopt necessary rules of procedure to govern
impeachment proceedings. The Batasan Rules of Procedure in impeachment cases providing for the dismissal of an
impeachment complaint which is not sufficient in form and substance, or when sufficient grounds for impeachment
do not exist, or probable cause has not been established, or requiring majority vote of all members of the Batasan for
the approval of a resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not inconsistent with Sec. 3 of Art. XIII of
the 1973 Consti. Injunction cannot lie to restrain the enforcement of the particular provisions of the Rules (aside from
the fact that the question involved is a political one), because the acts of the committee sought to be restrained had
already been consummated. They are fait accompli.
-#14 Arroyo v. De KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Venecia, G.R. No.
127255, August 14, FACTS:
1997
ISSUE:
Topic Discussed:
Political: Whether a RULING:
law is void because
the House failed to Facts:
comply with its own
internal rules (read A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
also the concurring Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the
and dissenting
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
opinion of J. Puno)
violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
Student Assigned: amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House
Silorio and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations,
Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the
presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report.
The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the
same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to
a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person
other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character.

Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private
individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business
of the House.

Ratio:

To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of
our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either
to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners
can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire
into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would itself
be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately
be made here: petitioners can 3 seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In
the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment
of that body

In view of what is essential Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for
the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27 are VIOLATED.

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to
a particular measure
#15 Avelino v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-
2821, March 4, 1949 Jose Avelino submitted a petition for quo warranto to the Supreme Court after Mariano Cuenco replaced him as Senate
President after he abandoned his Chair and left the session hall on February 21, 1949. This petition was denied by the
Topic Discussed: Supreme Court in votation, 6-4.
Decision: SC has no
jurisdiction over the FACTS:
issue); March 14,
1949 (resolution: SC ● During the session on February 21, 1949, Senator Tanada had been granted the right to speak in session to talk about
has jurisdiction) → charges he drew up against Senate President Avelino.
(Read also ● Senate had reached quorum but the session did not start because Avelino had not yet opened the session. Before
concurrence of J. opening it, he read the written resolution of Tanada and Senator Sanidad on his charges . When he finally did, he used a
Perfecto, especially lot of dilatory tactics to postpone Tanada’s speech.
his critique of the ● Disorderly conduct happened so Senator David filed a motion for adjournment but it was opposed by Senator Sanidad.
judicial “hands-off” ● Avelino banged his gavel and immediately left the session hall followed by Senator David, Senator Tirona, Senator
policy) Francisco, Senator Torres, Senator Magalona, Senator Clarin.
● Session continued with Senator Arranz as Senate President Pro-tempore.
Student Assigned: ● Resolution 68 (ordering the investigation of charges filed against the Senate President, Jose Avelino) and 67 (declaring
Sta. Maria vacant the Senate President chair and designating Mariano Cuenco as acting Senate President) were approved by the
remaining senators present.
● Mariano Cuenco took an oath and was recognized by the president of the Philippines.
● Jose Avelino filed for a petition to declare himself the rightful Senate President and to oust Mariano Cuenco.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter?

RULING: NO. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to
elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. Senators have the liberty to
select their officers and/or reinstate them. If Avelino wants to be the presiding officer of the Senate, he should take it up there, not
the Supreme Court.

The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is political in nature and in doing so, the court will
be against the doctrine of separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77
Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take cognizance
of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators were alleged affected without any
immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only
the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if,
as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in
the Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court

Dispo: The Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the petition.

**Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of an official inferiority complex. Consequently like its parallel in the
psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an upshot of distorted past experience, warping
the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy appraisal of reality in its true form.

Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex. Consequently like its parallel in the
psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an upshot of distorted past
experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy appraisal of reality in its true form. It is futile
to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in the Alejandrino vs. Quezon,
46 Phil., 83, is absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a colonial Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic
policies of the masters. That explains its glaring inconsistencies.4 There is nothing so subversive as official abdication
or walkout by the highest organs and officers of government. If they should fail to perform their functions and duties,
what is the use for minor officials and

PERFECTO, J., dissenting
Concurrence of J. Perfecto on March 14, 1949 (Resolution) The problem of democracy must be faced not in the
abstract but as practical question, as part of the infinitely motley aspects of human life. They cannot be considered as
scientific propositions or hypothesis independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable flights of the spirit
which seen to elude the known laws of the external world. Experience appears to be the only reliable guide in judging
human conduct. Birth and death rates and incidence of illness are complied in statistics for the study and
determination of human behavior, and statistics are one of the means by which the teaching may render their quota of
contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual well-being and collective happiness. The way this case has
been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the evidence coming from many quarters and sectors, is provenly far
from being conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We intended to settle the controversy between petitioner and
respondent, but actually we left hanging in the air the important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed before us in
quest of enlightenment and reasonable and just in a quandary. We can take judicial notice that legislative work has
been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-attendance to
sessions of about one-half of the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and remained
unexecuted like mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent persons
with well-known addresses and residences and have been in daily contact with news reporters and photographers.
Farce and mockery have been interspersed with actions and movements provoking conflicts which invite bloodshed. It
is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that, notwithstanding the overflow of political passions and
the irreconcilable attitude of warring factions, enough self-restraint has been shown to avoid any clash of forces.
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as abstaining in the upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It
had echoed in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved in the House of the Representatives. It has
already involved the President of the Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is
apparent that solution cannot be expected from any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter
other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.
#16 Tañada v. KEY POINTS :
Cuenco, G.R. No. L-
10520, February 28,
1957
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: Petitioners Lorenzo Tanada, senator and only member of the opposition party Citizen’s Party and Diosdado Macapagal,
Justiciable: whether senatorial candidate who lost in the November 1955 General election but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal
the election of (SET) pray that respondents Cuenco and Delgado, both from Nacionalista Party (NP), be not allowed to hold/ exercise power in
Senators Cuenco and the Senate Electoral Tribunal that is currently being occupied by them and that respondent Fernando Hipólito be restrained from
Delgado as additional paying the salaries of respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Each Electoral Tribunal
members of the SET is composed of nine (9) members: three (3) justices of the Supreme Court, no more than three (3) senators from the majority
contravened the party, and no more than three (3) senators from the minority party. In this case, since Tanada is the only member of the minority,
constitutional the other two SET members that are supposed to be minority members, are filled in by two senators from the NP. Petitioner
mandate that Macapagal holds that the number of NP members within the SET may affect the decision(s) that SET is yet to make for Senate
additional members Electoral Case No. 4. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the
shall be chosen “upon remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public
nomination . . . of the opinion.
party having the
second largest ISSUE:
number of votes”
Whether or not the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is a political question.
Student Assigned:
Tariao RULING:

No. The term “political question” means a question of policy- “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government.” “Political question” issues are dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. In the present case, the Court is called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as
members of Senate Electoral Tribunal, by being nominated by Senator Cipriano Primicias, member and spokesman of the
majority party in the Senate, violates the constitutional mandate that (the supposed two other) members of the SET shall be
chosen upon nomination from the minority party in the Senate, and hence, is null and void, and is NOT a political question
thereof.

#17 Javellana v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Executive Secretary, ● Resolution no. 2 was implemented by Republic Act no. 6132, which was amended by Resolution no. 4.
supra
 FACTS:
Topic Discussed: ● Congress passed Resolution no. 4, calling for a constitutional convention to propose amendments to the 1935
Justiciable: validity of Constitution of the Philippines.
President Marcos’ ● During the session of the Convention, President FEM declared martial law in the entire Philippines through
proclamation that the Proclamation No. 1081.
people have already ● The Constitutional Convention approved the draft Constitution and submitted it to the President. The President
ratified the new issued Presidential Decree No. 73 which submits the draft Constitution to a ratification process from the
Constitution FILIPINO People.
● Charito Planas filed a writ of certiorari to the SC arguing that PD No. 73 has no full force of law and powers are
Student Assigned: exclusively given to Congress.
Tompong ● The President issued General Order 20 postponing the plebiscite to promote open debate for the Draft
Constitution. The Court deemed to refrain on the issue due to the said postponement.
● The President then issued Presidential Decree No. 86 creating Citizens’ Assemblies (Barangays) as an avenue
for the government to consult on certain public questions.
● The Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said three cases to comment on said urgent motion
and manifestation. However, while the case is being deliberated, the Secretary of Justice submitted to the Court
Proclamation No. 1012 announcing that more than 95% of the members of Citizens Assemblies approved the
1973 Constitution of the Philippines.
● Given the existence of Proclamation No. 1012, the Planas case was declared as moot and academic.
● Petitioner Josue Javellana filed a case against the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of National Defense,
Justice, and Finance, to restrain them from implementing the provisions of the 1973 Constitution that are not
found in the 1935 Constitution.
● Javellana argued that President FEM does not have power to create citizens’ assemblies, call for a plebiscite for
such purpose, and the election conducted should be deemed as null and void as it did not satisfy the
constitutional requirements prescribed by the 1935 Constitution.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a Justiciable or Political Question.
● Whether or not the proposed new or revised 1973 Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the
provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution.
RULING:
(1)
● The issue involving the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is Justiciable and non- political question.
● The six members, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Tehankee, and Conception, of the Supreme
Court held that the Proclamation No. 1102 is JUSTICIABLE and NON-POLITICAL question. Justices Makalintal
and Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second
question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by
the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval,
and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the
Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been
 complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is
political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
● Thus, the issue involving the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is justiciable and non- political question.
(2)
● NO, the proposed revised 1973 Constitution has not been properly ratified in accordance with the 1935
Constitution.
● As required in Section 1, Article XV of 1935 Constitution which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “ in an
election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated only by qualified and duly registered voters .”
Six members of the Supreme Court, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Tehankee, and Conception,
held that the 1973 Constitution was not properly ratified in accordance with the provision of Article XV of 1935
Constitution. It was stated in their explanation that the decision of the Citizens’ Assembly is inconsistent with
the constitutional requirement on the right to Suffrage. In the issue of citizens’ assemblies, it did not follow the
provision on the manner of voting, COMELEC supervision, and the age of legitimate voters.
● Hence, the proposed revised 1973 Constitution was not properly ratified in accordance with the 1935
Constitution.
#18 Sanidad v. FACTS:
COMELEC, supra
● September 2, 1976 – President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national referendum for the
G.R. No. L-44640 Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) to resolve various issues –among others, issues relating to Martial Law.

Date: ● September 22, 1976 – President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1031 which provided for the manner of voting
October 12, 1976 and canvass of votes in Citizens Assemblies (“barangays”) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite.

Ponente: MARTIN, ● September 22, 1976 (same day) – President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions to be
J,: submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite to be held on October 16, 1976.

Topic Discussed:
Justiciable: whether ❖ The questions asked were:
President Marcos 1. Do you want martial law to be continued; and
had the power to 2. Do you approve amendments to the following amendments to the Constitution?
propose
amendments to the
1973 Constitution ❖ The proposed amendments were:
[To whoever will be assigned to recite this case, you DO NOT have to read everything until #9.included
these lang just in case mag-ask si Atty. Thanks.]
Student Assigned:
Viarino
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa . Members of the
interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall
include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of
the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors,
and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional
representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be
determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their
election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.

2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.

3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the
members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall
 have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall
continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to
discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution.

4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President
(Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers
as he may deem necessary.

5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been
lifted.

6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat
or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate
action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of
instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.

7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and
composition may be altered by law.

Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may
be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any
important matter whether of national or local interest.

8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full
force and effect.

9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have
been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."

● Moreover, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the
October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.

● Herein petitioners contended, among others,:

 ○ That under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there is NO grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution;
○ That to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum, because the power to propose
amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is already expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under the Constitution; and
○ That allowing 15-year olds to vote would amount to an amendment to the Constitution.

● The Solicitor General, however, maintained that the issue raised was political in nature, which is beyond judicial
cognizance of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue of President Marcos, having the power to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution, is a justiciable
question.

RULING:
Yes, the issue of President Marcos, having the power to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution, is a justiciable
question.

The 1973 Constitution provided that the power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the Interim National
Assembly in the period of transition. After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to
propose amendment becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly.

Moreover, the Constitution provides that “All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or
law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may
be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members…”

In this case, the normal course of proposing amendments to the Constitution was not followed. Instead of calling the National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, President Marcos undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted
the proposed amendments to the people, through Presidential Decree No. 1033.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, BUT ALSO OF
THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF. When the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. Whether the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper
subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial, but by the Supreme
Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine
whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not.
Hence, the issue of President Marcos, having the power to propose amendments to the 1973 Constitution, is a justiciable
question.

Additional Note / Reference:

The following were of the view that the question of whether or not the constitutionality of PD Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 were
justiciable or political…..
JUSTICIABLE POLITICAL

1. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro 1. Associate Justice Felix V. Makasiar

2. Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando 2. Associate Justice Felix Q. Antonio
3. Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee 3. Associate Justice Ramon C. Aquino
4. Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo
5. Associate Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma
6. Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion Jr.
7. Associate Justice Ruperto G. Martin
#19 Daza v. KEY POINTS : Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution
Singson, G.R. No.
86344, December 21,
1989
DAZA VS SINGSON, GR. NO. 86344
Topic Discussed:
Justiciable issue: FACTS:
validity of petitioner’s
removal from the Rep. Daza represents the Liberal Party (LP) in the Commission on Appointments (CA). When Laban ng Demokratikong
Commission on Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized, the political realignment resulted in the swelling of the number of LDP members to 159
Appointments and diminishing of that of LP to 17. The House consequently revised its representation in the CA giving Daza’s seat to
Singson as additional member from the LDP. Daza now comes to this Court to challenge his removal, arguing that the
Student Assigned: LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution because it has not been registered. However,
Romaguera when LDP was subsequently registered, he then contended that it must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Daza’s removal from CA is a justiciable question.

RULING:

Yes, the court said that the issue is a justiciable question because it involves a question of legality and not the wisdom
of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the CA as prescribed by the Constitution. The court said that even if the
issue is a political question in nature,the court is still within the powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred by Art. VIII Sec.1 of the Constitution to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The court favors the authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in CA to reflect anytime the
changes that may transpire in the political alignment of its memberships as long as it is permanent and do not include
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another.

-#20 Tañada v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
Angara, supra
FACTS:
Topic Discussed: ● April 15, 1994- Respondent Secretary Navarro of Department of Trade and Industry, represented the Philippines
Justiciable: whether Government, and signed the Final act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations
the Senate violated in Marrakesh, Morocco.
the Constitution when ● By signing the Final Act, the Philippines, agreed (a) to submit, as appropriate, WTO Agreement for the
it concurred to the consideration of their respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
ratification of the accordance with their procedures. (b) To adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
WTO Agreement; ● The President submitted to the senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21 of Article VII of the
political: whether the Constitution.
decision of the ● Hence, the Petitioner assailed the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop
President and the a self-reliant and Independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos to give preference to qualified
Senate to ratify the Filipinos and promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials, and locally produced goods.”
WTO Agreement was
wise; whether trade ISSUE:
liberalization is
meritorious; whether  Whether or not the Petition presents a Justiciable Controversy.
the government’s  Whether or not the provisions of the “Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the Agreements and Associated legal
instruments included in Annexes 1,2,3 of that agreement cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, Spirit, and Intent of
economic policy of Section 9, Article II and Section 10-12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
reducing/removing  Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative power by congress.
tariffs, taxes,  Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of Judicial power of legislative power by Congress.
subsidies, quantitative  Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World
restrictions, and other trade organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the final act.
import/trade barriers
is appropriate
RULING:
Student Assigned:
 (1)YES, the petition is a Justiciable Controversy.
Tompong  The 1987 Constitution provides that Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of the government. If an action of the Legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the Judiciary to settle disputes. As explained by former CJ
Roberto Conception, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgement on matters of this nature.”
 Hence, the petition is a Justiciable Controversy.

 (2) The court ruled the petition in favor of the respondents.
 Article II of the Constitution is a “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” These principles are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the Judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. The provision of Sec. 10 and 12, Article XII of the Constitution, general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, is enforceable only in regards to the “grants or rights, privileges and concessions
 covering national economy and patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor
of our own goods, services, labor, and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipinos enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy.
 Hence, there is no basis for the contention that under WTO, local industries will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control
of the economy. In fact, the WTO recognizes the need to protect weak economies like the Philippines.

 (3) By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender
some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like
individuals, live with coequalities, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be
waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”
 (4) The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the
concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
 (5) The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final act required from its signatories, namely,
concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the
members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the republic
minutely dissected what the senate was concurring in.
#21 Francisco v. KEY POINTS (State important provisions mentioned in the case if any):
House of
Representatives, FACTS:
supra On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Topic Discussed: the Judiciary Development Fund
Justiciable: issues
arising from On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
impeachment Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
proceedings the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora
and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with
Student Assigned: Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution
Tariao The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but
voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by the above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
hus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that
"[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

ISSUE:
Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

RULING:
The issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly,
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is... a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an
intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.