Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability

Author(s): Kenneth N. Waltz

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4 (JULY/AUGUST 2012), pp. 2-5
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23218033
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 Why Iran Should Get the Bomb
Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability

Kenneth Ν. Wàltz

The past several months have witnessed of a nuclear weapon. But this outcome is
a heated debate over the best way for the unlikely: the historical record indicates
United States and Israel to respond to that a country bent on acquiring nuclear
Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument weapons can rarely be dissuaded from
has raged, the United States has tight doing so. Punishing a state through
ened its already robust sanctions regime economic sanctions does not inexorably
against the Islamic Republic, and the derail its nuclear program. Take North
European Union announced in January Korea, which succeeded in building
that it will begin an embargo on Iranian its weapons despite countless rounds
oil on July 1. Although the United States, of sanctions and un Security Council
the eu, and Iran have recently returned resolutions. If Tehran determines that its
to the negotiating table, a palpable sense security depends on possessing nuclear
of crisis still looms. weapons, sanctions are unlikely to change
It should not. Most U.S., European, and its mind. In fact, adding still more
Israeli commentators and policymakers sanctions now could make Iran feel
warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be even more vulnerable, giving it still
the worst possible outcome of the current more reason to seek the protection of
standoff. In fact, it would probably be the the ultimate deterrent.
best possible result: the one most likely The second possible outcome is that
to restore stability to the Middle East. Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon
but develops a breakout capability, the
POWER BEGS TO BE BALANCED
capacity to build and test one quite quickly.
1 he crisis over Irans nuclear Iran would not be the first country to
program
acquire First,
could end in three different ways. a sophisticated nuclear program
diplomacy coupled with seriouswithout building an actual bomb. Japan,
sanctions
could convince Iran to abandonfor instance,
its pursuit maintains a vast civilian

Kenneth Ν. Waltz is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute

of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at
Columbia University.

[2]

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 Why Iran Should Get the Bomb
nuclear infrastructure. Experts believe begun to develop a nuclear weapon of
that it could produce a nuclear weapon its own. Yet so far, every time another
on short notice. country has managed to shoulder its way
Such a breakout capability might satisfy into the nuclear club, the other members
the domestic political needs of Iran's have always changed tack and decided to
rulers by assuring hard-liners that they live with it. In fact, by reducing imbalances
can enjoy all the benefits of having a in military power, new nuclear states
bomb (such as greater security) without generally produce more regional and
the downsides (such as international international stability, not less.
isolation and condemnation). The prob Israels regional nuclear monopoly,
lem is that a breakout capability might which has proved remarkably durable
not work as intended. for the past four decades, has long fueled
1 he United otates and its European instability in the Middle East. In no
allies are primarily concerned with other region of the world does a lone,
weaponization, so they might accept a unchecked nuclear state exist. It is Israel's
scenario in which Iran stops short of nuclear arsenal, not Iran's desire for one,
a nuclear weapon. Israel, however, has that has contributed most to the current
made it clear that it views a significant crisis. Power, after all, begs to be balanced.
Iranian enrichment capacity alone as an What is surprising about the Israeli case
unacceptable threat. It is possible, then, is that it has taken so long for a potential
that a verifiable commitment from Iran balancer to emerge.
to stop short of a weapon could appease Or course, it is easy to understand why
major Western powers but leave the Israelis Israel wants to remain the sole nuclear
unsatisfied. Israel would be less intimi power in the region and why it is willing
dated by a virtual nuclear weapon than to use force to secure that status. In 1981,
it would be by an actual one and thereforeIsrael bombed Iraq to prevent a challenge
would likely continue its risky efforts at to its nuclear monopoly It did the same
to Syria in 2007 and is now considering
subverting Iran's nuclear program through
sabotage and assassination—which couldsimilar action against Iran. But the very
lead Iran to conclude that a breakout acts that have allowed Israel to maintain

its nuclear edge in the short term have

capability is an insufficient deterrent, after
all, and that only weaponization can prolonged an imbalance that is unsustain
provide it with the security it seeks. able in the long term. Israel's proven ability
The third possible outcome of the to strike potential nuclear rivals with
standoff is that Iran continues its current
impunity has inevitably made its enemies
anxious to develop the means to prevent
course and publicly goes nuclear by testing
a weapon. U.S. and Israeli officials have
Israel from doing so again. In this way,
declared that outcome unacceptable, current tensions are best viewed not
the
as the early stages of a relatively recent
arguing that a nuclear Iran is a uniquely
Iranian nuclear crisis but rather as the final
terrifying prospect, even an existential
stages of a decades-long Middle East
threat. Such language is typical of major
powers, which have historically gottennuclear crisis that will end only when a
balance of military power is restored.
riled up whenever another country has

FOREIGN AFFAIRS · July /August 2012

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 Kenneth Ν. Waltz

do so after the eu announced its plan

UNFOUNDED FEARS
oil embargo in January. The Iranian r
One reason the danger of a nuclear
clearlyIran
concluded that it did not wan
has been grossly exaggerated provoke
is that the
what would surely have been
debate surrounding it has been
swift
distorted
and devastating American resp
to such
by misplaced worries and fundamental a move.
Nevertheless,
misunderstandings of how states generally even some observers and
behave in the international system.
policymakers
The who accept that the Iranian
first prominent concern, which undergirds
regime is rational still worry that a nuclear
weapon
many others, is that the Iranian would embolden
regime is it, providing
Tehran with
innately irrational. Despite a widespread a shield that would allow
it to
belief to the contrary, Iranian act more
policy is aggressively and increase
made not by "mad mullahs" butits
bysupport for terrorism. Some analysts
perfectly
sane ayatollahs who want to survive just
even fear that Iran would directly provide
like any other leaders. Although Iran's
terrorists with nuclear arms. The problem
leaders indulge in inflammatory and
with these concerns is that they contradict
hateful rhetoric, they show no
the propensity
record of every other nuclear weapons
for self-destruction. It would begoing
state a grave
back to 1945. History shows
error for policymakers in the United
that when countries acquire the bomb, they
States and Israel to assume otherwise. feel increasingly vulnerable and become
Yet that is precisely what many U.S. acutely aware that their nuclear weapons
and Israeli officials and analysts have make them a potential target in the eyes of
done. Portraying Iran as irrational has major powers. This awareness discourages
allowed them to argue that the logic of nuclear states from bold and aggressive
nuclear deterrence does not apply to action. Maoist China, for example, became
the Islamic Republic. If Iran acquired a much less bellicose after acquiring nuclear
nuclear weapon, they warn, it would not weapons in 1964, and India and Pakistan
hesitate to use it in a first strike against have both become more cautious since
Israel, even though doing so would invite going nuclear. There is little reason to
massive retaliation and risk destroying believe Iran would break this mold.
everything the Iranian regime holds dear. As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists,
Although it is impossible to be certain no country could transfer nuclear weapons
of Iranian intentions, it is far more likely without running a high risk of being found
that if Iran desires nuclear weapons, it out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would
is for the purpose of providing for its pose a serious obstacle, as would the United
own security, not to improve its offensive States' impressive and growing ability
capabilities (or destroy itself). Iran may to identify the source of fissile material.
be intransigent at the negotiating table Moreover, countries can never entirely
and defiant in the face of sanctions, but control or even predict the behavior of
it still acts to secure its own preservation. the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once
Iran's leaders did not, for example, attempt a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear
to close the Strait of Hormuz despite capability, it will have every reason to
issuing blustery warnings that they might maintain full control over its arsenal.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS · Volume gì No. 4

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 Why Iran Should. Get the Bomb
After all, building a bomb is costly and states. Once Iran crosses the nuclear
dangerous. It would make little sense to threshold, deterrence will apply, even if
transfer the product of that investment to the Iranian arsenal is relatively small.
parties that cannot be trusted or managed. No other country in the region will have
Another oft-touted worry is that if an incentive to acquire its own nuclear
Iran obtains the bomb, other states in the capability, and the current crisis will
region will follow suit, leading to a nuclear finally dissipate, leading to a Middle
arms race in the Middle East. But the East that is more stable than it is today.
nuclear age is now almost 70 years old, and For that reason, the United State
so far, fears of proliferation have proved and its allies need not take such pa
to be unfounded. Properly defined, the to prevent the Iranians from develop
term "proliferation" means a rapid and a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy betwe
uncontrolled spread. Nothing like that Iran and the major powers should con
has occurred; in fact, since 1970, there has because open lines of communicatio
been a marked slowdown in the emergence will make the Western countries fee
of nuclear states. There is no reason to better able to live with a nuclear Ira
expect that this pattern will change now. But the current sanctions on Iran can
Should Iran become the second Middle be dropped: they primarily harm ordi
Eastern nuclear power since 1945, it would nary Iranians, with little purpose.
hardly signal the start of a landslide. When Most important, policymakers and
Israel acquired the bomb in the 1960s, it citizens in the Arab world, Europe,
was at war with many of its neighbors. Israel, and the United States should
Its nuclear arms were a much bigger threat take comfort from the fact that history
to the Arab world than Iran's program is has shown that where nuclear capabilities
today. If an atomic Israel did not trigger emerge, so, too, does stability. When it
an arms race then, there is no reason a comes to nuclear weapons, now as ever,
nuclear Iran should now. more may be better.©

REST ASSURED

In 1991, the historical rivals India and

Pakistan signed a treaty agreeing not
to target each other's nuclear facilities.
They realized that far more worrisome
than their adversary's nuclear deterrent
was the instability produced by challenges
to it. Since then, even in the face of high
tensions and risky provocations, the two
countries have kept the peace. Israel and
Iran would do well to consider this
precedent. If Iran goes nuclear, Israel and
Iran will deter each other, as nuclear powers
always have. There has never been a
full-scale war between two nuclear-armed

FOREIGN AFFAIRS · July /August 2012

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