Pointers for the Legal Ethics Midterm Examination

Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except:
A. Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to
persons specified in the agreement; or
B. Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer; or
C. Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan even
if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon v. Atty. Mariano Pefianco, Administrative Case No. 6116,
August 1, 2012
In this case respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the CPR which prohibits
lawyers from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR for having abandoned his
legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregards
of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed
our affirmed laws.
RESPONDENT WAS SUSPENDED FROM THE PRACTIVE OF LAW FOR ONE
YEAR FOR VIOLATION OF RULE 1.01, CANON 1, RULE 9.02 OF CANON 9 OF THE CPR.
Rule 12.08 – A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a. On formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument, and the like; or
b. On substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case
to another counsel.

The Elements of forum-shopping are:

a. Identity of parties or at least such parties as represent the same interest in both
actions;
b. Identity of the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for the relief being founded on
the same facts; and
c. The identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgement rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration.

Res judicata (RJ) or res iudicata, also known as claim preclusion, is the Latin term for "a
matter [already] judged" and refers to either of two concepts: in both civil law and common
law legal systems, a case in which there has been a final judgment and is no longer subject
to appeal; and the legal doctrine meant to bar (or preclude) relitigation of a claim between
the same parties.

Angelo Gambiglioni, De re iudicata, 1579

In the case of res judicata, the matter cannot be raised again, either in the same court or in a
different court. A court will use res judicata to deny reconsideration of a matter.[1]
The doctrine of res judicata is a method of preventing injustice to the parties of a case
supposedly finished but perhaps also or mostly a way of avoiding unnecessary waste of
resources in the court system. Res judicata does not merely prevent future judgments from
contradicting earlier ones, but also prevents litigants from multiplying judgments, and
confusion.

Crimes Categorized as Crimes Not Involving Moral Turpitude

1. Minor Transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding)
2. Illegal recruitment
3. Slight physical injuries and carrying of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of firearms)
4. Indirect Contempt

sub judice, Latin for "under a judge", means that a particular case or matter is under trial or
being considered by a judge or court. The term may be used synonymously with "the
present case" or "the case at bar" by some lawyers.
In England and Wales, Ireland,[1] New Zealand,[2][3][4] Australia, South
[5]
Africa, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Canada,  Sri Lanka, and Israel it is generally
considered inappropriate to comment publicly on cases sub judice, which can be an offence
in itself, leading to contempt of court proceedings. This is particularly true in criminal cases,
where publicly discussing cases sub judice may constitute interference with due process.
Prior to 1981 in English law the term was correctly used to describe material which would
prejudice court proceedings by publication. Sub judice is now irrelevant to journalists
because of the introduction of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. Under Section 2 of the Act, a
substantial risk of serious prejudice can only be created by a media report when proceedings
are active. Proceedings become active when there is an arrest, oral charge, issue of a
warrant, or a summons.
In the United States, there are First Amendment concerns about stifling the right of free
speech which prevent such tight restrictions on comments sub judice. However, State Rules
of Professional Conduct governing attorneys often place restrictions on the out-of-court
statements an attorney may make regarding an ongoing case. Furthermore, there are still
protections for criminal defendants, and those convicted in an atmosphere of a media
circus have had their convictions overturned for a fairer trial. One example is the murder
conviction of Sam Sheppard.
 EN BANC

May 31, 2016

A.C. No. 5179

DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment  against respondent Atty. Rene 0.
1

Medina on December 10, 1999. 2

Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped
respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City.  Respondent alighted from his car and
3

confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila

sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and then left. 4

Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's
car.  Complainant later learned that the driver of the car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial
5

board member of Surigao del Norte. 6

According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated."  Respondent's act

7

showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this
act constituted gross misconduct.  8

Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit,  Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit,   and a
9 10

letter  dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of
11

Mayors President of Surigao del Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that
respondent slapped complainant and caused him great humiliation.   Thus, respondent should
12

be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority:

Dear Mr. Chief Justice:

This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao City,
committed by Provincial Board Member Rene O. Medina.

The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a tricycle driver,
causing great humiliation on the person. We believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an
elected official. Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully submitted
that appropriate action be taken on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross
misconduct and abuse of authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the Municipal Mayors
League of Surigao del Norte.

Thank you very much for your attention and more power.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter 13

(Emphasis in the original)

Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of
different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte.  In his Comment,   respondent denied slapping
14 15

complainant. He alleged that the incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-old son to
school.   He further alleged that complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's tricycle to
16

bump the fender of respondent's car.  When respondent alighted from his car to check the
17

damage, complainant approached him in an unfriendly manner.   Respondent pushed 18

complainant on the chest to defend himself.   Sensing, however, that complainant was not
19

making a move against his son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle suffered
any damage and if they should wait for a traffic officer.  Both parties agreed that they were both
20

too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch.   No traffic officer was present
21

during the incident.22

Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio
programs by the Provincial Governor's allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver.  He 23

alleged that complainant's Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor as it
was prepared in the English language, which was unknown to complainant.  Respondent was 24

identified with those who politically opposed the Provincial Governor. 25

According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out of
the incident during the conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of
Barangay Washington, Surigao City.   During the proceedings, respondent explained that he
26

pushed complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a weapon, as he assumed
tricycle drivers did.  On the other hand, complainant explained that he went near respondent to
27

check if there was damage to respondent's car.  As part of the settlement, respondent agreed to
28

no longer demand any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car. 29

Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification  dated October 27, 2006 of the Officer-
30

in-Charge Punong Barangay stating that the case had already been mediated by Punong
Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably settled by the parties. 31

On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report, and recommendation. 32

Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted the Certification from Barangay Washington,
Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already been settled.  34

Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason why the
complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]"  The Mandatory Conference was reset to
35

September 21, 2007. 36

In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent
appeared.  Hence, the Commission proceeded with the case exparte.
37 38

In his Report  dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of
39

suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of
Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the suspension
of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the practice of law for a period of sixty ( 60) days from notice
hereof due to misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to discredit the legal profession.   (Emphasis in
40

the original)

Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a
slapping incident.  The slapping incident was witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1)
41

the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit attached to complainant's complaint;  and (2) the
42

signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao Mayors who
believed that respondent was guilty of gross misconduct and abuse of authority and should be
held administratively liable. 43

On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the
Resolution   adopting and approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's
44

recommendation, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A ";
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering Respondent's misconduct and violation of Canon 7. 03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O. Medina
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty (30) days.  (Emphasis in the original)
45

Respondent moved for reconsideration   of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008 Resolution.
46

The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution  dated 47

March 22, 2014.

We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively liable.

There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened.  He stresses
48

complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack of participation throughout the case and hints that
this administrative case is politically motivated.49

It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to
harass its officers with baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against
its officers only if allegations of misconduct are established.  A lawyer is presumed to be
50

innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption that his or her acts
are consistent with his or her oath.  Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to
51

prove his or her claim. 52

In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of

evidence,   or evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."
53 54

In this case, complainant discharged this burden.

During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors also adoptedfound that the slapping incident actually occurred.  55

The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized
Affidavit;  complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit  of a
56 57

traffic aide present during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of
respondent's plate number. 58

In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent,  Commissioner De La Rama gave

59

weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal
profession eroded"  because of respondent's act of slapping complainant.  The Integrated Bar of
60 61

the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.

The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's
allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case, the
letter reinforced complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only
reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects the public's reaction to
respondent's display of arrogance.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers
who are no longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance
of and harassment committed by its officers.

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a
character that disregards the human dignity of another.  Respondent's question to
1awp++i1

complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?"

("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a
tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination.

This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that
is unreflective of the nobility of the profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are
granted the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to submission.

Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers.   This Court has the power to impose
62

disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private
capacity if the acts show them unworthy to remain officers of the court.  63

This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis.   They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the parties'
64

rights. Rather, they are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a means to determine a
lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:65

Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can
thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.  66

As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses.
They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of
administrative liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings. 
67

Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are ADOPTED and
APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months.

Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as attorney, and
be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Official business
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO *
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DISODADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Official business On Official leave

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE **
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ***

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9604               March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony
J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie
L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of
Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and
Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from
the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed
against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar
Regulatory Administration. The Complaint 1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf
of Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo
denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When
Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his
name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an
affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his
supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit and other
documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of
falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaint’s validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for
Falsification of Public Document 2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and
Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified
the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit
dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. Divinagracia
asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document
and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint
for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal
case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and
other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.

SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The
complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that
the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged.
Complainants attached a Report 6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other
clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned
signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were
not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were
respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to

Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that
the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office
of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned
to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the cases,
he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However,
due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be
signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed
the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and documentary evidence.
Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law
office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were
directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5
May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for
the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of
law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law
firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in
the complaint filed against complainants’ Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9,
for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned
Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer.
The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the
act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by
undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines’
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility
as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of
his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility".
x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995
and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated
as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary
diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to
provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law
firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty.
Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case
for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate
Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed
by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation
of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively
liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 9 where we held:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law
is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited
to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed
to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer
to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not
to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the preparation and signing of a
pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may
not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as
a certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by affixing
one’s signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these
matters and give legal effect to the document. 1âwphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe
that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust
and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any
steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to the
Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer,
Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he
was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed
the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary,
albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an
act of falsehood which IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this
Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10303               April 22, 2015

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review Resolution No. XX-2011-264  of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
1

Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide (Atty.
Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public,
for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (Notarial Practice Rules). 2

The Case

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint  with the IBP's 3

Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's
office; (2) falsification;

(3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust.

In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission  to the Bar and
4

receipt  of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of
5

absolute sale on March 29, 2002.  She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular
6

entries in his notarial registers.

7

Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the services of
his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an annulment of title case that
involved her husband and her parents-in-law.

Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the
complaint for estafa and violation of RA 3019  that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed
8

against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by appearing against a former client, Atty.
Zaide violated the prohibition against the representation of conflicting clients' interests.  Lastly,
9

Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the same
administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.  In another civil case where she was
10

not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his opposing counsel as someone
suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one of his pleadings.  According to Gimeno,
11

these statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is
proscribed from using in his dealings.
In his answer  dated September 13, 2007,Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March
12

29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his
notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty.
Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document.  Atty. Zaide claimed that
13

Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his admission to the
Bar.

On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to
simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better
cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their growing number.  This explains the
14

irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers.

Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire
him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an
associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty.
Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners.  On this basis, the respondent should not be
15

held liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.

Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his
pleadings.16

The IBP Proceedings

On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory
conference.  After this, both parties were required to submit their position papers.
17

In his report and recommendation  dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr.
18

(Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial
Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and insulting language in his
pleadings.

He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
when he maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions
respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection,
a chronological official register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered papers" and to "keep only one active notarial register at any given time."  However,
19

Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held administratively liable for
usurping a notary public's office. The investigating commissioner noted that the evidence
presented on this issue is not enough to prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March
29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his
notarial commission. 20

Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno was indeed
Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that Gimeno only hired ZMZ
but did not personally hire him to defend them in their annulment of title case. The retainer of a
law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all its lawyers.  But despite this previous attorney-client
21

relationship, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
representing conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the
Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.

Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and
abusive language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings.  For22

violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that Atty. Zaide be
suspended for three months, and for another six months for employing abusive and insulting
language. 23
The IBP Board of Governors' Findings

In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that the
evidence on record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. However, the
Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years
suspension from being commissioned as a notary public. 24

Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration  of the Board's November 19, 2011 resolution but this
25

was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution. 26

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and
accordingly confirms them.

For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that the parties
identified.

Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules

a. Usurpation of a notarial office

As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete evidence to show
that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition prior to his admission
to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission.

It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, as notary
public.  Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his name, roll number, PTR
1âwphi1

number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial commission, were merely
superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name.

Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true information.
However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the document. In fact, this
document never appeared in his notarial register and was never included in his notarial
report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno falsified his signature and used his notarial
stamp to make it appear that he was the one who notarized it.

This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details
as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on
May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his
roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial commission,
prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002.

This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's claim such as
a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the conclusion that Atty. Zaide could
not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial
commission.

We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after his Bar
admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this happened is not clear from
the evidence before us.

b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices

We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial
registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized documents had been
irregularly numbered and entered:

Document 27
Date Doc. No. Page Book Year
Special Power of Attorney 6/20/05 273 55 18 2005
Secretary's Certificate 10/28/05 226 46 18 2005
Affidavit of Quitclaim 10/31/05 272 55 18 2005
Affidavit of Loss 4/17/06 54 11 25 2006
Affidavit of Two Disinterested 4/17/06 310 61 25 2006

Persons
Petition for Issuance of Owner's 4/17/06 72 15 25 2006

Duplicate copy
Affidavit of Parental Consent 4/19/06 461 93 23 2006
Confirmation of Sale 4/21/06 283 56 25 2006
Deed of Absolute Sale 4/27/06 304 60 25 2006

Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep,
maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological
official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered
pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active
notarial register at any given time."  On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping
28

several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI.

The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial
register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial
register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to
different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf.

Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also personally
administer the notarial acts  that the law authorizes him to execute. This important duty is vested
29

with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than the notary public, should perform it.

On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological sequence in order to
address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank spaces in the notarial register to allow
the antedating of notarizations.

In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to maintain several
active notarial registers in separate offices so he could accommodate the increasing number of
his clients requiring his notarial services.

This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his powers and
duties are impressed with public interest.  A notary public's office is not merely an income-
30

generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who has been privileged to receive a
notarial commission must faithfully and conscientiously perform.
Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial commission. His
flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and
excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes."

Representing conflicting interests

The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for
representing conflicting clients' interests.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.1âwphi1

In Aniñon v. Sabitsana,  the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is guilty of
31

representing conflicting interests between and among his clients.

One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge
of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness
or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. 32

Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. 33

Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno,
his former law firm's client.

The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left
ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject
matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with
the Ombudsman.

The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her family pertained
to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this case since this only involved
Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno
involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the
funds that Somontan entrusted to her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the
Register of Deeds of Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case
are totally unrelated.

There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time Somontan
engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing in the record shows
that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential information which he acquired while he
was still their counsel in the annulment of title case.

Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the prohibition
against the representation of conflicting interests.

Use of intemperate, offensive and

abusive language in professional
dealings
The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a lawyer's
professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on the
following canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)

As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called
Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."  And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used
34

the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against his
opposing counsel:

Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole
Justice System, and the Department of Justice in particular, where the taxpayers paid for her
salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a prosecutor...This is a clear
manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her
mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.  (emphasis supplied)
35

This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court.

While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not
offensive.36

On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from any
offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or
a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in his
pleadings, must be dignified. 37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended penalty of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul Centillas Zaide is
found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate,
offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. His notarial commission, if existing, is hereby
REVOKED, and he is declared DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 9116               March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS and BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19,
2009 Resolution  of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
1

suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule
12.03,  Canon 12,  Canon 17,  Rule 18.03,  and Canon 18  of the Code of Professional
2 3 4 5 6

Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution  of the IBP Board of Governors
7

denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the
homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses
Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely
Mabanag  before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a
8

concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of way. The spouses
Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City
Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise
refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or
community street.  The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal
9

counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer. After
trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision  on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses
10

Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution  in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing
11

the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days
even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated
that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension
of time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr.,
as members of the Association, filed a Complaint  for Disbarment against respondent before the
12

IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his
negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,  respondent denied administrative liability. He
13

claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association in CA-G.R. CV No.
55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in
charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the
pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling
lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally
took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at
no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for
President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant
Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other
delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued
by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation,
complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him
and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy
of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association.
Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that
complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients;
hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of
merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of
the baseless complaint for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon
17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same
or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. 14

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-
14  adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows:
15

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03 and
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months. The Warning imposed against
respondent is hereby deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution
No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.  The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondent’s
16

motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial
grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly
found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03,
and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality to file
a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely
instituted to harass him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-
interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person who called
the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct "is in no sense a party, and generally has no
interest in the outcome."17

In Heck v. Judge Santos,  the Court held that "[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio
18

may initiate disciplinary proceedings." The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not
confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties
as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records show that
respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days after the
expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of
the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable negligence, respondent alleges that he
was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention,
however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent
Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous
motion had been filed but "due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not
able to finish said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by
him."  Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.
19

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s
interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client,
respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,  Canon 12 of
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the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly
delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos  the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief for his
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client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:

An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence.  (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client
1âwphi1

certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The
respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as
to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21
and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada,
43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely
suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion.  The penalties for a
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lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand,  warning with
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fine,  suspension  and, in grave cases, disbarment.  In the present case, we find too harsh the
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recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of six months. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension
for one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the extent of respondent’s
violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable
for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality
of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent
lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice