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Homework 1: Summary AD SKEPTICISM
Three studies investigated the effects of consumer skepticism toward advertising on responses
to ads. There are many advertising response, including brand beliefs, ad attitudes, responses to
informational and emotional appeals, efforts to avoid advertising, attention to ads, and reliance
on ads versus other information sources.
Study 1: Skepticism And Study 2: the relation STUDY 3: the effects of skepticism
Immediate Responses To Ads between SKEP and these on responses to emotional and
IV: ad skepticism consequences of advertising informational ad appeals
DV: Ad Response IV: ad skepticism IV: the nine SKEP items
Moderators: Product Category DV: preference for other DV: The set of _G items are the
Involvement (PCI) + Ad sources of information “good–bad” and the _D items are the
Informativeness “desirable–undesirable”
Hypothesis H1: advertising skepticism has H2: high skepticism toward H3: higher skepticism would be
negative impact on immediate advertising would be related associated with less positive
consumer responses to ads to avoiding advertising responses to informational ads
Sampling 140 students (65 M.B.A.s, 75 Participants were 104 adult 54 M.B.A. students
method undergraduates) professionals aged 26 to 53
who responded to an initial
questionnaire (longitudiual
design)
Variable a nine-item SKEP scale to Correlations between SKEP Information and Transformation
measurement measure ad skepticism (after each and the 12 dependent Scale
ad, participants rated the ad on measures
several five-point scales
Statistical SEM model. (SMART PLS SEM model (SMART PLS AMOS 4. 0
model Software) Software)
Finding Looked at the moderating effect skeptics reported no high skeptics are not only less
summary of skepticism for ads that were preference for or against persuaded by informational ads than
perceived to differ in noninformational appeals are low skeptics; they are also less
informational content and showed persuaded by informational ads than
no evidence that participants they are by emotional ads.
favored ads that were perceived
to contain more information
Discussion Skeptics were shown to be generally less positive in response to advertising; they like it less, believe it
and less, and believe it is less influential. Sskeptics indicated more reliance on friends and trial
conclusions
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Journal of Advertising
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AD SKEPTICISM: The Consequences of Disbelief

a b c
Carl Obermiller , Eric Spangenberg & Douglas L. MacLachlan
a
Seattle University
b
Washington State University
c
University of Washington
Published online: 04 Mar 2013.

To cite this article: Carl Obermiller , Eric Spangenberg & Douglas L. MacLachlan (2005) AD SKEPTICISM: The Consequences of
Disbelief, Journal of Advertising, 34:3, 7-17, DOI: 10.1080/00913367.2005.10639199

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00913367.2005.10639199

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 AD SKEPTICISM
The Consequences of Disbelief
Carl Obermiller, Eric Spangenberg, and Douglas L. MacLachlan

ABSTRACT: Three studies investigated the effects of consumer skepticism toward advertising on responses to ads. Consumer
skepticism, defined as the tendency toward disbelief of advertising claims (Obermiller and Spangenberg 1998), is measured
in each study and then related to various measures of advertising response, including brand beliefs, ad attitudes, responses
to informational and emotional appeals, efforts to avoid advertising, attention to ads, and reliance on ads versus other
information sources. The results generally support the hypotheses that more skeptical consumers like advertising less, rely
on it less, attend to it less, and respond more positively to emotional appeals than to informational appeals.
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Advertising is an industry that involves billions of dollars per
year (nearly $250 billion for 2003 [McCann-Erickson 2003]),
employing bright minds with access to state-of-the-art theory
in human behavior. Despite its sophistication, subtlety, vast
resources, and ubiquity, advertising faces enormous challenges
to the objective of influencing sales, not least of which is that
many consumers simply do not believe advertising claims.
Our aim is to examine the consequences of disbelief—to
discover what happens when people don’t believe the ads
they see.
Sorting through ad claims, many of which are difficult to
substantiate, requires effort, and consumers are generally not
highly motivated to process advertising information
(MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991). It is, therefore,
reasonable that simple disbelief may be one way that con-
sumers cope with the persuasive attempts of advertising.
Friestad and Wright (1994) describe how a person’s knowl-
edge of persuasion strategies influences his or her responses to
persuasion attempts. Both consumers and marketing agents
have access to three categories of knowledge: The consumer
has knowledge of the topic (or product), knowledge of per-
suasion (beliefs about how persuasion occurs and what tactics
Carl Obermiller (Ph.D., Ohio State University) is a professor of
marketing and Marketing Department chair at the Albers School of
Business, Seattle University.
Eric Spangenberg (Ph.D., University of Washington) is dean and
Maughmer Chair at the College of Business, Washington State Uni-
versity.
Douglas L. MacLachlan (Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley)
is a professor in the Department of Marketing and International
Business, University of Washington.
are used or are effective), and knowledge of the agent (adver-
tiser or manufacturer). The marketing agent, in turn, has
knowledge of the topic, knowledge of persuasion, and knowl-
edge of the target (the consumer segment). The marketing
agent relies on knowledge bases to develop a persuasion at-
tempt. The consumer, relying on a set of knowledge, counters
with a persuasion-coping response. Although the relationship
between marketer and consumer is not always adversarial, we
suspect that the most frequent coping response may be to discount
messages recognized as ads.
Empirical evidence suggests that advertising claims (in ads
that are processed) are frequently not accepted. Calfee and
Ringold (1994) reported the consistent observation in public
opinion polls that roughly two-thirds of consumers claim they
doubt the truthfulness of ads. Previous research (Obermiller
and Spangenberg 1998, 2000) supports the proposition that
consumers are socialized to be skeptical toward advertising,
and the extent of their skepticism is a determinant of their
responses to advertising.
Obermiller and Spangenberg (1998) defined skepticism
toward advertising (ad skepticism) as the tendency to dis-
believe the informational claims of advertising. They devel-
oped and validated a scale to measure the construct (SKEP),
and demonstrated empirical support for a hypothesized no-
mological network. Their work proposed that ad skepticism
is a marketplace belief; demonstrated its relation to atti-
tude toward advertising and attitude toward marketing; and
identified its consequence to certain personality characteris-
tics, marketplace experiences, consumer socialization, and
education (Obermiller and Spangenberg 2000). Ad skepti-
cism was also shown to relate to global measures of evalua-
tive responses to advertising.1 We extend that work in the
present study, focusing on the consequences of ad skepti-
cism on advertising.

Journal of Advertising, vol. 34, no. 3 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–17.

© 2005 American Academy of Advertising. All rights reserved.
ISSN 0091-3367 / 2005 $9.50 + 0.00.
 8 The Journal of Advertising
AD SKEPTICISM AND
RESPONSES TO ADVERTISING
We propose that ad skepticism influences a set of responses to
advertising, one of which is to bypass advertising and gather
product information from other sources. Other moderated
responses include processing of the ads, formation of brand
beliefs, attitude toward the ad, responsiveness to certain ad-
vertising tactics, and purchase intention. We expect that con-
sumers who are high in ad skepticism would show weaker
brand beliefs consistent with advertising claims, more nega-
tive attitudes toward ads, different responses to emotional
versus informational appeals, and lower intentions to purchase
the advertised products. Furthermore, higher skepticism
should be related to less attention to advertising and greater
attention to nonadvertising sources of information. We jus-
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tify these hypothesized consequences as follows: Because ad
skepticism reflects a tendency not to believe advertising,
the disbelief in specific ad claims follows directly. Because
virtually all ad claims are positive, less belief in those claims
should lead to less positive attitudes and purchase inten-
tions. Because high ad skepticism is reflective of a general
distrust in the validity of advertising, consumers with high
skepticism should be inclined to ignore ads and seek prod-
uct information from other sources. Finally, because ad skep-
ticism reflects a disbelief in the information content of ads,
consumers with high skepticism should be less responsive
to information-based appeals (as compared to consumers with
low skepticism).
Our investigation of the influences of ad skepticism is in
accord with other research on individual differences as mod-
erators of responses to advertising. Many studies have exam-
ined immediate or temporary antecedent variables, some of
which may be influenced by the ad itself, such as mood or ad-
induced feelings (see Meuhling and McCann 1993). Other
studies have also examined effects of more stable consumer
dispositions, similar to ad skepticism, including attitude to-
ward the ad/advertiser/advertising (Homer 1990; Miniard,
Bhatla, and Rose 1990), beliefs about specific ad elements
(Moore, Harris, and Chen 1995), prior brand attitudes
(Chattopadhyay and Basu 1990), brand-related beliefs (Mittal
1990), demographics and lifestyles (Green 1999; Grier and
Brumbaugh 1999), product involvement (Rose, Miniard, and
Bhatla 1990), and various personality traits (e.g., Schoen-
bachler and Whittler 1996; Zhang 1996). Generally, these
studies have found predictable relations: In relative senses,
responses to ads are less positive when ad or advertiser atti-
tudes or beliefs are negative, when prior brand attitudes or
beliefs are negative, when consumers are older or better edu-
cated (possibly a consequence of increased ad skepticism), and
when product involvement is lower (though the latter effect
has been shown to be moderated by a number of ad factors).
Consistent with these findings, we expect that consumers with
relatively higher skepticism toward advertising should ex-
hibit less positive responses to ads.
Skepticism about advertising has both social and individual
antecedents. Earlier researchers (among others, Darby and
Karni 1973; Ford, Smith, and Swasy 1988; Nelson 1970)
developed the notion of information economics in advertis-
ing, arguing that consumers tend to value information that is
perceived to be useful and valid. Because advertising is asso-
ciated with selling and tends toward exaggerating, especially
as claims are more difficult to substantiate, consumers are
socialized to be skeptical. That social antecedent is entirely
consistent with our consideration of skepticism as an indi-
vidual difference. While acknowledging the general, social
effects on skepticism, we focus on differences in individuals’
willingness to believe advertising claims. Finally, our hypoth-
eses are based largely on the discussion in Obermiller and
Spangenberg (1998) of the nomological relation between ad
skepticism and these other factors. In the current research,
moreover, we examine a greater range of consequences than
in previous studies.
STUDY 1: SKEPTICISM AND
IMMEDIATE RESPONSES TO ADS
Ad skepticism should influence specific, immediate responses
to ads. In particular, we expect more skeptical consumers to
like ads less and find their claims less believable, less influen-
tial, and less informative. To test these hypotheses, we as-
sessed the ad skepticism of 140 students (65 M.B.A.s, 75
undergraduates), and four weeks later, presented them with a
series of 13 print ads. Ad skepticism was measured with the
SKEP scale, a nine-item scale that rates advertising on the
following dimensions: getting the truth, aim is to inform, is
informative, is generally truthful, is a reliable source of infor-
mation, is truth well told, presents a true picture, provides
essential information, and leaves one feeling accurately in-
formed (see Obermiller and Spangenberg 1998 for exact word-
ing). After each ad, the participants rated the ad on several
five-point scales: “In general, I like the ad very much,” “In
general, I find the ad very believable,” “I think other people
would be very likely to be influenced favorably by this ad,”
and “I found the ad informative.” Participants also indicated
their interest in the product category (very interesting to me/
not at all interesting to me) and the relevance of the product
category for them (very important to me personally/not at all
important to me personally). Finally, participants identified
any specific claims they believed were untrue.
The ads were full-color, one-page print ads taken from
popular magazines. The products were Whirlpool appliances,
gold jewelry, Kenmore dryer, Pony athletic shoes, Amoco
Ultimate gasoline, Land O’Lakes butter, Colt automobile,

Mont Blanc pen, Murray lawn mower, Mazda Miata automo-
bile, Isuzu Truck service division, Dewar’s Scotch whiskey,
and Invisible Fencing. The ads were displayed as color slides
for about one minute each; participants were instructed to
view them carefully and were given one minute to respond to
the first three scales (like, believe, and influential). The ads
were then presented again while participants completed the
remaining scales (informative ad; interesting, important prod-
uct; untrue claims). Two orders of exposure were used to con-
trol for order effects.
Study 1 Results
Average responses to the series of ads were computed. SKEP
scores were a sum of the items, corrected for direction. Al-
though the reliability and validity of the scale have been dem-
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onstrated elsewhere (Obermiller and Spangenberg 1998,
2000), we assessed and found adequate internal reliability with
Cronbach’s α (.825) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
(CFI [comparative fit index] = .906, GFI [goodness-of-fit in-
dex] = .908, RMSEA [root mean square error of approxima-
tion] = .092, RMR [root mean squared residual] = .047,
χ2(27) = 59.00, p < .01).2
Correlations between SKEP and the three ad response mea-
sures were significant and negative (higher scale values indi-
cated greater skepticism and more positive responses to the
ads), as predicted. The pair-wise correlations were SKEP–Like,
r = –.23; SKEP–Believable, r = –.37; and SKEP–Influential,
r = –.27 (all p’s < .01). Participants who were more skeptical
toward advertising in general found the 13 ads, on average,
less likable, less believable, and less likely to be influential.
The total number of claims identified as untruthful was
summed for each participant across the 13 ads as an indica-
tion of the extent of perceived falseness of the collection of
ads. This total ranged from zero (for 67 participants) to 15.
The total number of perceived false claims was correlated with
SKEP at r = .50 ( p < .01), indicating that more skeptical
participants identified more ad claims as false than did less
skeptical participants.
Ad skepticism is a general characteristic, and these results
support its relation with responses to ads in general (at least,
across 13 ads). We should expect, however, that individual
respondent or ad variables, such as product involvement and
perceived information content, might moderate the responses.
Skeptical consumers might be more receptive to messages
about products they were interested in and more receptive to
ads with less information (since the information is disbelieved).
We investigated these hypothesized moderating effects by
contrasting products identified as high and low in involve-
ment and information content.
Our measures of “interest in the product” and “perceived
personal relevance of the product” were highly correlated
Fall 2005 9
(across the 13 ads, average r = .72, p < .01). Based on this
close association, the two were combined into a measure we
called “product category involvement” (PCI), with an aver-
age rating across product categories of 4.03 (on a scale rang-
ing from 2 to 10 points). We identified the ads with the highest
and lowest average PCI. The ads for gold jewelry, Isuzu truck
service, Dewar’s Scotch, and Invisible Fencing were all rated
below 3.50. Ads for Pony athletic shoes, Colt automobile,
and Mazda Miata automobile all rated above 4.80. The rela-
tions between SKEP and ad responses for these two sets of ads
are compared in Table 1.
We conducted a similar breakdown of the ads according to
the ratings of informativeness (very informative/not at all in-
formative). The 13 ads had an average informativeness rating
of 3.24. Three ads had distinctly higher ratings (all above
4.00)—Kenmore dryer, Colt automobile, and Isuzu truck ser-
vice—and four ads had distinctly lower ratings (all below
2.40)—gold jewelry, Land O’Lakes butter, Mont Blanc pen,
and Dewar’s Scotch. The relations between SKEP and ad re-
sponses were examined for these two sets of ads, with the re-
sults also presented in Table 1.
Product category involvement appeared to have had some
effect on the relation between ad skepticism and responses to
ads. Skepticism had slightly more explanatory power for liking
of the ad and perceived influence of the ad when PCI was higher.
On the other hand, perceived informativeness did not ap-
pear to moderate the effect of ad skepticism on responses to
the ads. It is noteworthy that perceived presence of informa-
tion in the ads did not result in more positive responses by
highly skeptical participants—even for high-information ads,
SKEP was negatively correlated with positive responses. To
the extent that skepticism measures a tendency to disbelieve
the information claims in ads, we might expect that SKEP
would be a better predictor of responses to ads for the most
informative ads. However, we observed a significant differ-
ence only on perceived influence, where participants with high
skepticism rated the more informative ads as less influential.
We further investigated the moderating effects of PCI and
perceived informativeness by analyzing responses for indi-
vidual ads. For each ad, we examined the following equation:
ARi = α(PCIi) + β(SKEP) + δ(PCIi × SKEP),
where ARi was a measure of ad response for ad i, PCIi was the
measure of the participant’s product category involvement,
and SKEP was the participant’s ad skepticism score. A statis-
tically significant contribution of the interaction term (δ)
would indicate a moderating effect of PCI on the influence of
ad skepticism.
Across the 13 ads, the liking, believable, and influential
measures were highly intercorrelated; the 39 bivariate r’s were
all between .50 and .79. For efficiency, we created a single
 10 The Journal of Advertising

TABLE 1
Relationship Between SKEP and Advertising Responses for Low and High Product
Category Involvement (PCI) and Ad Informativeness

Correlations Low PCI High PCI Low ad information High ad information

SKEP–Likable –.09a –.18 a –.11 –.14

SKEP–Believable –.27 –.29 –.26 –.29
SKEP–Influential –.17 a –.26 a –.14 b –.30 b
SKEP–False claims .47 .42 .44 .44
a
Z = 2.00, p < .05.
b
Z = 2.68, p < .01.

FIGURE 1
The Moderating Effect of Product Category Involvement (PCI) on the
Skepticism–Ad Response Relationship
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Land O’Lakes Butter Pony Athletic Shoes

10 9

8.5

9
Ad Response

8
Ad Response

Low PCI Low PCI

7.5
High PCI High PCI

8 7

6.5

7 6
Low SKEP High SKEP Low SKEP High SKEP

Notes: ANOVA (analysis of variance) results: Overall model, F = 2.93, p Notes: ANOVA (analysis of variance) results: Overall model, F = 6.74, p
< .04; SKEP effect, ns; PCI effect, F = 4.03, p < .05; SKEP, × PCI, F = < .01; SKEP effect, F = 3.11, p < .08; PCI effect, F = 12.72, p < .01;
3.77, p < .05. SKEP × PCI, F = 5.00, p < .03.

measure of ad response (sum of like, believable, and influen-
tial items; analyses of separate measures yielded essentially
the same results). Regression analysis of the equation resulted
in statistically significant models for 12 of the 13 ads. The
interaction term was statistically significant for two ads, as
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows ad response as a function
of ad skepticism and product category involvement, split at
their mean values. In both cases, PCI had little effect for
participants with low skepticism. For participants with high
skepticism, however, ad response was relatively negative if
PCI was low, but relatively positive when PCI was high.
Thus, for some products, participants with high skepticism
had as positive responses to ads as participants with low skep-
ticism, provided the products were important or interest-
ing to them.
We repeated the regression analysis, using perceived infor-
mation content in the ad as the moderating variable, testing
for an interaction between SKEP and perceived information.
The interaction term was statistically significant for three of
the ads at p < .05, and another at p < .06; these interactions
were not consistent, however. For two of the products, par-
ticipants with low skepticism responded better to high infor-
mation, and for the other two, participants with high
skepticism responded better to high information.
Study 1 Conclusions
Skepticism toward advertising related as expected to impor-
tant responses to advertising—attitude toward the ad, be-
lievability of ad claims, perceived influence of the ads, and
perceived untruths in the ads. Evidence of a moderating ef-
fect of product category involvement or perceived informa-

tion level was mixed. The influence of skepticism on ad re-
sponses was slightly stronger for more involving products.
For some of those ads, involvement with the product tended
to mitigate against the negative effects of higher skepticism.
The effect of perceived information content was less clear:
Although the moderating effect of skepticism on the perceived
influence of ads, as a group, was stronger when more informa-
tion was perceived, perceived informativeness had inconsis-
tent effects on individual ads.
The moderating effect of PCI and perceived informative-
ness were investigated with two types of analysis. Both meth-
ods had shortcomings. One was to contrast the strengths of
the correlation of SKEP with response measures for the ads
that, over the sample, were regarded as high and low in PCI
and informativeness. This method averaged responses over
groups of three or four ads. Not all participants agreed on the
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involvement or informativeness of all ads, however. The second
method eliminated the potential problems associated with
averaging by focusing on individual ads, but at the cost of
statistical power and the combination of dependent mea-
sures into a composite. In general, analysis of the relations
was limited by the quasi-experimental design; product in-
volvement and perceived informativeness were measured, not
manipulated.
STUDY 2: SKEPTICISM AND BEHAVIORAL
RESPONSES TO ADVERTISING
The first study indicated that ad skepticism influenced
thoughts and feelings about ads and advertised products. Study
2 extended the investigation to more distant and behavioral
responses. To clarify the ambiguous evidence from Study 1
regarding the role of skepticism in response to perceived in-
formation content of ads, we included direct measures of re-
sponses to ad appeals based on information and entertainment.
We expected that because participants with high skepticism
expect less information value from advertising, they would
pay less attention to ads, rely less on ads in decision making,
make more efforts to confirm ad claims when they did pro-
cess them, and buy fewer products in response to ads. Study 2
tested the relation between SKEP and these consequences of
advertising.
Participants were 104 adult professionals aged 26 to 53
who responded to an initial questionnaire containing the SKEP
scale and demographic information. Three to six weeks later,
the same participants were contacted with a second question-
naire containing the items shown in Table 2. We hypoth-
esized that high skepticism toward advertising would be
related to avoiding advertising (more “zipping and zapping”
[items 1 and 2] and less attention [item 6], less reliance on
ads in decision making [item 3], more reliance on Consumer
Reports and specialty magazines [items 4 and 5], more reliance
Fall 2005 11
on friends for confirmation of ad claims [item 7], and less pur-
chasing prompted by advertising [items 11 and 12]). Despite
Study 1 results, which showed no systematic effects of perceived
information content of ads, we expected participants with high
skepticism to prefer more informative and more straightforward
ad executions (items 8–10). Given our findings above, this
expectation was more tentative than the others. If highly skep-
tical consumers are disposed toward processing the informa-
tion content of ads, we should expect that even though they
may not believe the claims of ads, they prefer ads with informa-
tion appeals (perhaps they feel they are best equipped to deal
with this type of ad). Such a preference was suggested by Kanter
and Wortzel (1985), who proposed that “cynical” consumers
prefer straightforward informative appeals.
Study 2 Results
The reliability of the SKEP scale was again assessed by
Cronbach’s α (.923) and CFA (CFI = .946, GFI = .887,
RMSEA = .108, RMR = .094, χ2(27) = 59.80, p < .01).3
Correlations between SKEP and the 12 dependent mea-
sures are shown in Table 2. The results support the hypoth-
esis that ad skepticism is associated with avoiding advertising;
higher skepticism was related to zipping, zapping, and ig-
noring ads (items 1–3). The results also supported the hy-
pothesis that skeptics were less likely to make purchases solely
on the basis of advertising information (items 4, 8, and 9).
On the other hand, the results were mixed regarding skep-
tics’ uses of nonadvertising information. No significant asso-
ciations were found for use of Consumer Reports or other specialty
magazines (items 5 and 6), but skeptics did report they were
more likely to check out the truth of ad claims by asking
friends or trying the product (item 7). Finally, there were no
significant associations between SKEP and trust in or prefer-
ence for celebrity spokespeople, infomercial structure, or
noninformation appeals (items 10–12).
Study 2 Conclusions
Study 2 related SKEP scores to self-report measures of re-
sponses to advertising. The results generally conformed to
the hypothesis that skepticism leads to less attention to and
reliance on advertising. Evidence of an association between
skepticism and preference for other sources of information,
however, was mixed, which may reflect different levels of
measurement specificity. The two items that showed nonsig-
nificant correlations (items 5 and 6) referred to specific sources,
relative to the more general measure in item 7—checking
out the truth through friends or trial. Since previous evidence
has shown no relation between trust in advertising and trust
in Consumer Reports (Obermiller and Spangenberg 2000), it is
unlikely that consumers with high ad skepticism are auto-
 12 The Journal of Advertising

TABLE 2
Measuresa of Behavioral and Distant Responses to Advertising and Simple Correlationsb with SKEP

Item Correlation with SKEP Interpretation

1. When I watch television that has been r = .61 Higher skepticism related to more zipping
recorded on VCR, if I am able, I fast-forward through through taped commercials.
the commercials.
2. When I watch television and I have a remote r = .48 Higher skepticism related to more zapping
control, I switch channels to avoid the commercials. commercials with a remote.
3. When I read a magazine, I look at the r = –.47 Higher skepticism related to lower tendency to
advertisements as well as the stories. note ads in magazines.
4. When I buy a new product or any product for the r = –.48 Higher skepticism related to less reliance on ads
first time, I rely on advertising as a source of information. for information.
5. When I buy a new product or any product for the first r=0 No relation between skepticism and reliance
time, I rely on Consumer Reports as a source of information. on Consumer Reports for information.
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6. When I buy a new product or any product for the r = .16 No relation between skepticism and reliance on
first time, I rely on reviews from specialty magazines specialty magazines for information.
(for example, PC Magazine, Runners’ World, Northwest
Gardener) as a source of information.
7. If a claim is made in an advertisement for a product r = .40 Higher skepticism related to greater tendency to
that I am considering buying, I check out the truth of the check the truth of ad claims.
claim either by asking friends who have used the product
or by trying out the product myself.
8. After seeing a commercial for a new product, I have r = –.58 Higher skepticism related to lower tendency to
buy immediately decided to buy the product. new product after prompting from advertising.
9. List below as many products as you can remember r = –.18 Weak relation between skepticism and recall of
buying for which the only source of information was (p < .10) fewer purchases based on advertising.
advertising.
10. I tend to distrust ads that use movie stars, famous r = .01 No relation between skepticism and distrust of
models, or sports celebrities as spokespeople. celebrity spokespeople.
11. I tend to distrust ads that look like stories r = .09 No relation between skepticism and distrust of
(in print) or programs (on television or radio) instead infomercial ad appeals.
of obviously looking like ads.
12. I prefer ads that have clear, simple information to those that r = –.09 No relation between skepticism and preference
try to entertain me with mostly pictures, music, or humor. for clear, simple informative ads.
a
Item 9 was coded as the number of products listed; all other items were Likert-type seven-point scales.
b
Correlations with absolute values above r = .28 were significant at p < .01.

matically distrustful of objective, nonadvertising information
sources. Perhaps reliance on magazine reviews is determined
less by skepticism and more by product interest and involve-
ment. On the other hand, across interest levels, asking a friend
or trying the product are trusted alternatives to seeking in-
formation from an ad.
The results did not support the hypothesis that skeptics
have a preference for or against any type of ad appeal (items
10–12). These results support the notion that SKEP is not a
measure of consumer cynicism. It has been suggested that
cynical consumers may be especially vigilant against overtly
manipulative attempts (Campbell 1995; Kanter and Wortzel
1985). Participants with high skepticism showed no disincli-
nation toward celebrity spokespeople, infomercial structure,
or “soft-sell” ads (emphasis on pictures, music, or humor).4
STUDY 3: SKEPTICISM AS A
MODERATOR OF AD APPEAL
Because Studies 1 and 2 provided only limited insight into
the relations between ad skepticism and ad appeals, Study 3
was designed as a test of the hypothesized relation between ad
skepticism and informational versus emotional appeal. We
characterized these two types of appeals according to Puto
and Wells (1984). Informational ads predominantly provide
relevant brand data, clearly and logically. Emotional (Puto
 Fall 2005 13

and Wells use the term “transformational”) ads predominantly FIGURE 2

provide an emotional experience that is relevant to the use of Effects of Skepticism on Responses to Emotional and
the brand. According to Puto and Wells, successful ads must Informational Ad Appeals
be effective on either the emotional or informational dimen-
sions (possibly both). X1 GD HD AD ED GG HG AG EG

We hypothesized that ad skepticism would more strongly X2

affect responses to informational (relative to emotional) ap-
peals. Since ad skepticism is defined in terms of believability X3
EMOT
and several of SKEP’s items refer specifically to the informa- X4
tion content of ads, we expected more skeptical consumers to SKEP
respond more negatively to and be less persuaded by informa- X5

tional ad appeals. Our expectation is consistent with Friestad X6

and Wright (1994), who proposed that emotional appeals are INFO
developed by marketers specifically to circumvent consum-
X7

ers’ skeptical resistance to informational arguments. Thus, X8

we hypothesized that ad skepticism would moderate the ef-

Downloaded by [University of Cambridge] at 04:32 05 September 2015

VD SD PD JD VG SG PG JG

fectiveness of ad appeals, such that higher skepticism would

X9

be associated with less positive responses to informational ads

(relative to emotional ones).
The stimuli were eight television commercials selected to
represent informational and emotional appeals. The adver-
tised products were Allstate life insurance, Ernest and Julio
Gallo wine, Goodyear tires, Hallmark cards, Joy dishwashing
liquid, Puffs tissues, Sudafed cold medicine, and Vaseline pe-
troleum jelly. The first four products were selected as emo-
tional appeals (death of father leads to loss of home, “family”
atmosphere at the winery, brothers reunited after many years,
and big brother returns home for Christmas, respectively).
The latter four represented informational appeals (how Joy
removes baked-on foods, most people prefer Puffs for colds,
Sudafed works faster, and Vaseline has many uses). As a check
on the face validity of the appeals, a pretest group of 27 par-
ticipants viewed the ads and rated them on the Puto and Wells
Information and Transformation Scale. The results supported
the categorization. All eight ads rated higher on the expected
dimension. Furthermore, all four of the “emotional” ads rated
lower in average information than all four “informational”
ads. (For the four “emotional” ads, the mean of the eight in-
formation dimension items was 2.75 versus 3.13 [on seven-
point scales] for the “informational” ads [p < .05].) Three of
the four “emotional” ads rated higher on the transformation
dimension than all four informational ads. (For the four “emo-
tional” ads, the mean of the 15 transformation dimension items
was 2.97 versus 2.83 [on seven-point scales] for the “informa-
tional” ads [ p < .05].) The Allstate ad, as the anomaly, was rated
near the midpoint of the range of transformation dimension
scores of the four informational ads. Thus, pretest results sup-
ported face validity of our categorization—four predominantly
informational and four predominantly emotional ads.
Participants were 54 M.B.A. students who responded to
the SKEP scale during class time. Four weeks later, the par-
ticipants were shown the eight ads. Two presentation orders
were used, each of which mixed the informational ads with
the emotional ads. After each ad, participants responded to
two, seven-point brand attitude items (very bad/very good
and very undesirable/very desirable) and to a thoughts-list-
ing question. (The number and valence of thoughts were coded
by two research assistants who were blind to the hypotheses,
with disagreements resolved by one of the authors.) Valence
for each thought was coded as negative, neutral, or positive.
Study 3 Results
After finding no statistically significant differences, the data
were pooled across presentation orders. The SKEP scale was
again assessed with Cronbach’s α and CFA. In this study, the
scale demonstrated relatively lower internal reliability
(α = .808; CFI = .771, GFI = .821, RMSEA = .148,
RMR = .079, χ2(27) = 58.36, p < .01).5 The low internal reli-
ability results in Study 3 were mitigated by evidence of good
reliability in the other studies and other published reports, as
well as the subsequent structural equations analysis results.
To test the hypothesis that skepticism would moderate ad
responses, we examined the structural model illustrated in
Figure 2. The X variables are the nine SKEP items. The set of
_G items are the “good–bad” dependent measures, and the
_D items are the “desirable–undesirable” dependent measures.
Study 3 allowed us to assess the effect of ad skepticism on
evaluation of ads with either informational or emotional ap-
peal. Ad evaluations were measured with the two attitude
measures (good–bad and desirable–undesirable). The struc-
tural equation model used to examine the relations is shown
in Figure 2. The model permitted correlation between the
two evaluation measures for given products. The results of
the analysis, using AMOS 4.0 (Arbuckle and Wothke 1999),
are presented in Table 3.
 14 The Journal of Advertising

TABLE 3
SKEP Influence on Response to Informational or Emotional Ads

Regression weight Standard error Critical ratio Standardized regression weight

Structural model
SKEP → EMOT .750 .278 2.693 .615
SKEP → INFO –.716 .267 –2.680 –.556
Measurement models
SKEP → X1 1.000 .675
SKEP → X2 1.329 .323 4.121 .652
SKEP → X3 .992 .241 4.114 .651
SKEP → X4 .781 .212 3.677 .574
SKEP → X5 1.042 .229 4.547 .734
SKEP → X6 .808 .217 3.722 .581
SKEP → X7 .580 .170 3.419 .529
SKEP → X8 .285 .181 1.570 .235
SKEP → X9 .675 .214 3.156 .486
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EMOT → GD 1.000
EMOT → HD .959 .347 2.768 .594
EMOT → AD .461 .319 1.442 .250
EMOT → ED .429 .362 1.187 .197
EMOT → GG 1.176 .242 4.865 .734
EMOT → HG .868 .315 2.754 .589
EMOT → AG .783 .299 2.618 .530
EMOT → EG .377 .339 1.113 .184
INFO → VD 1.000 .553
INFO → SD 1.427 .403 3.537 .698
INFO → PD .950 .303 3.132 .562
INFO → JD 1.160 .355 3.269 .603
INFO → VG 1.067 .170 6.270 .629
INFO → SG 1.548 .393 3.933 .839
INFO → PG 1.093 .299 3.654 .712
INFO → JG 1.255 .338 3.718 .739

Notes: CFI (comparative fit index) = .838; GFI (goodness-of-fit index) = .662; RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) = .097; RMR (root
mean square residual) = .186; χ2 (df = 265) = 398.291; χ2/df = 1.50; p value = <.001.

By the standard of measures of fit, this recursive model
does not fit the data well, which merely suggests that the
model is underspecified. It is clear that more than ad appeal
and ad skepticism are needed to provide complete predictions
of responses to ads. The crucial finding for our purpose was
the strong relations between SKEP and the attitude measures
for the two types of ad appeal. In response to informational
appeals, the higher the participant’s ad skepticism, the more
negative the attitude toward the advertised products (stan-
dardized regression weight = −.556). On the other hand, in
response to emotional appeals, the higher the participant’s ad
skepticism, the more positive the attitude toward the adver-
tised products (standardized regression weight = .615). Simple
correlational analysis of the valence of thoughts listed showed
a similar effect: r = −.52 for the average thought evaluation
of information appeal ads, and r = +.42 for the emotional
appeal ads (both the latter p’s < .01). (The number of thoughts
listed was unrelated to ad skepticism, either across all ads or
categorized by type of appeal.)
The nature of this interaction can be illustrated by consid-
eration of the mean attitude scores for the four conditions,
splitting at the SKEP median: For emotional ads, the high
and low skeptic groups had average attitudes, respectively, of
5.1 and 4.5. For informational ads, on the other hand, those
respective attitudes were 4.1 and 4.8. Contrast tests indicated
that informational ads evoked different responses from high
and low skeptics (4.1 versus 4.8; t(52) = 3.41, p < .01), and
high skeptics differed in response to informational versus
emotional ads (4.1 versus 5.1; t(52) = 3.68, p < .01). Other con-
trasts were not statistically significant. Thus, those partici-
pants who had lower ad skepticism did not differ significantly
across ad appeals. Highly skeptical participants, on the other
hand, were more positive in response to emotional appeals as
compared with informational appeals, and were more nega-
tive in response to informational ads compared with less skep-
tical participants. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis: Informational appeals were ineffective with par-
ticipants who were highly skeptical toward ads. This ineffec-

tiveness was apparent both as a contrast between informa-
tional and emotional appeals for highly skeptical participants
and as a contrast between the responses of high and low skep-
tics to informational appeals.
Study 3 Conclusions
Results supported the hypothesis that ad skepticism would
moderate responses to ad appeals, such that participants with
high skepticism would be less responsive to informational
appeals. In general, participants with low skepticism did
not differ across ad appeals. Furthermore, participants with
high skepticism did not differ from participants with low
skepticism in response to emotional appeals. The signifi-
cant interaction was driven by the poor response of partici-
pants with high skepticism to informational appeals. Our
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hypothesis was based on the expectation that consumers with
high skepticism would reject the informational claims, leav-
ing the informational appeals with little persuasive power.
The results also suggest that high skeptics are not only less
persuaded by informational ads than are low skeptics; they
are also less persuaded by informational ads than they are by
emotional ads.
Study 3 provides a test of the nomological validity of the
ad skepticism network of Obermiller and Spangenberg (1998).
The experimental manipulation of ad appeal provides a stron-
ger test of ad appeal than the correlational analyses of self-
report data in the previous studies. The results also support
the central premise of Friestad and Wright’s (1994) persua-
sion knowledge model, which is that advertisers and consum-
ers are engaged in a continuous interaction. Highly skeptical
consumers have likely become skeptical over time, in response
to numerous interactions in the marketplace that have led
them to disbelieve ad claims. Advertisers, in turn, have de-
veloped strategies for approaching these skeptical consumers,
including emotional appeals, whose success does not require
acceptance of informational claims.
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The hypotheses we tested were motivated in large part by the
nomological network proposed by Obermiller and
Spangenberg (1998) and their call for further investigation of
the relation between ad skepticism and advertising variables.
Our results are generally consistent with that work, provid-
ing further evidence of the construct validity of the SKEP
scale and extending the legitimacy of their nomological frame-
work. Skeptics were shown to be generally less positive in
response to advertising; they like it less, believe it less, and
believe it is less influential. They avoid advertising when they
can and report less connection between advertising and pur-
chasing. Although skeptics indicated more reliance on friends
Fall 2005 15
and trial, they showed no greater use of specific objective
sources of product information.
The major contribution of the present study is the observed
failure of informational appeals with highly skeptical partici-
pants. The advertising skeptic regards advertising as not cred-
ible and, therefore, not worth processing. The skeptic’s perspective
differs from the common sense of a consumer cynic. As more
commonly conceptualized, the cynical consumer is critical of
advertising because of its manipulative intent and indirect ap-
peals. Such consumers may prefer simple, direct, informative
advertising; skeptics, on the other hand, do not. Although it
may seem counterintuitive, advertisers are not apt to “win
over” skeptics by presenting them with simple informational
appeals. Study 1 looked at the moderating effect of skepti-
cism for ads that were perceived to differ in informational
content and showed no evidence that participants favored ads
that were perceived to contain more information. In Study 2,
skeptics reported no preference for or against noninformational
appeals. Study 3 manipulated informative versus emotional
appeals and found that informative appeals were less persua-
sive with skeptics. Thus, advertisers may be advised to avoid
direct informational approaches with skeptics in favor of emo-
tional appeals, which were shown to work equally well for
high and low skeptics, and no worse than informational ap-
peals for low skeptics.
Skeptics are not immune to advertising, however. In addi-
tion to an openness to emotional appeals (Study 3), Study 1
provided limited evidence that highly skeptical consumers
respond well to ads for products for which they are highly
involved. Future research with improved measures or manipu-
lations of product involvement may investigate this question
further. The implications for advertisers, however, may be lim-
ited, suggesting merely that marketers have a special need to
find ways to show how their products are important and rel-
evant to skeptical consumers. Furthermore, to the extent that
skeptics rely on friends for information, advertising may have
indirect effects by influencing their friends. In general, our
results reinforce the need for advertisers to employ a variety
of approaches to succeed with the broad spectrum of consumer
responses.
The evidence that skeptics were more persuaded by emo-
tional than informational ad appeals may appear inconsistent
with the observation that skeptics do not prefer emotional
appeals. On the one hand, this may simply mean that asking
people what they want is not a good way to predict what will
be effective. On the other hand, an additional possibility is
that ad skepticism, for the highly skeptical, is a salient aspect
of the consumer self. When people view themselves as “skepti-
cal,” perhaps they feel the need to respond in a manner consis-
tent with that personality characteristic, and correspondingly
manage external impressions (Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma
1971) or prefer to affirm a position that makes them feel best
 16 The Journal of Advertising

about themselves (Steele 1988). For skeptics, that may mean
that a general “No” to advertising is a common response to any
prompt, even though some ad appeals and ads for some prod-
ucts may, in fact, be effective.
We should acknowledge an important limitation of this
research, which is the time horizon. We examined reports or
behaviors immediately subsequent to the ad. Consumer re-
sponse to advertising may take place well after exposure to
the ad. Of particular relevance on this point is some evidence
that, over time, people may come to believe what they ini-
tially regarded as unbelievable (Gilbert, Krull, and Malone
1990). Moreover, Maloney (2000) has reported that disbelief,
per se, may represent a truly negative response to advertising,
but “curious disbelief ” may not. To the extent that consum-
ers do not believe ad claims but remain curious about them,
they may be positively inclined toward further investigation
Downloaded by [University of Cambridge] at 04:32 05 September 2015
may be influenced by basic psychological dispositions, but it is
also influenced by consumer socialization; thus, consumers may
become skeptical without regard for need for cognition. As we
found, highly skeptical consumers are apt to reject advertising.
On the other hand, high need for cognition is likely to lead to
processing of advertising, particularly in situations where an ad
is the only available stimulus.
2. A note on the reliability analyses for all three studies: Typi-
cally, for scale reliability, Cronbach’s α should exceed .80. The
benchmarks recommended for comparative fit index (CFI) and
goodness-of-fit index (GFI) are values in excess of .90 (Bagozzi
and Yi 1988). Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)
indices were mediocre to poor for all three studies. Standardized
root mean square residual (RMR) values were above the bench-
mark of .05, except in Study 1. Finally, all χ2 values were higher
than appropriate to indicate good fit. Because this statistic is
sensitive to sample size, some analysts recommend the ratio of χ2

to degrees of freedom. By this measure, there is adequate fit; the

or trial. The relation between ad skepticism and curious dis- ratio is below the benchmark of 3.0 (Carmines and McIver 1981,
belief should be investigated further. p. 80).
One final comment pertains to the social implication of
Reliability of the SKEP Scale
advertising skepticism. It has widely been presumed that some
level of consumer skepticism is “healthy” for the marketplace Study 1 Study 2 Study 3
because it encourages honesty from advertisers. The studies
Cronbach’s α .8250 .9226 .8080
reported here made no attempt to establish norms for skepti- Sample size 140 105 54
cism, so we cannot draw conclusions about whether the levels CFI .906 .946 .771
of skepticism we observed were “healthy.” We suggest, how- GFI .908 .887 .821
ever, that skepticism is both a cause that encourages advertis- RMSEA .092 .108 .148
ers to be honest and an effect of consumer experience of RMR .047 .094 .079
χ2 (df = 27) 59.004 59.798 58.357
dishonesty. In the latter case, too much skepticism is an im-
χ2/df 2.18 2.21 2.16
pediment to an efficient market. Useful information cannot p value <.001 <.001 <.001
succeed in the marketplace if consumers do not believe it and
act upon it. Future research might investigate the public policy 3. See note 2 above.
implications of skepticism by investigating its relation to 4. In an unpublished study (Obermiller and Spangenberg
negative market behaviors, such as shopping inefficiency (Are 2002) that also investigated the question of skepticism and ad
skeptics worse shoppers?); complaining (Do skeptics complain appeal, we tested source effects (expert, attractive, similar) and
more, with less justification?); late adoption (Are skeptics late argument type (case or base information) for moderating ef-
to switch to improved products?); ignoring credible claims fects of skepticism. As expected, participants with high skep-
(Do skeptics reject all informational claims, or just puffery?); ticism were generally less positive toward all sources and both
and rejection of public service information (Do skeptics ig- argument types, but we found no moderating effects of skepti-
nore product warnings, recall notices, etc.?). cism on either of those variables.
5. See note 2 above.

NOTES
1. An anonymous reviewer raised the question of the relation
of “need for cognition” (NFC) to ad skepticism. Measures of causes
of ad skepticism were not included in the present study, but
were investigated in earlier work (Obermiller and Spangenberg
1998). In that earlier work, we also expected that NFC should
correlate with ad skepticism. The evidence has been decidedly
mixed, however. In several unpublished studies, we found only a
weak positive correlation between need for cognition and ad skep-
ticism, with considerable variance. After some thought, we have
concluded that need for cognition is a more basic psychological
trait that reflects a need for mental stimulation. Ad skepticism
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