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DAILY BRIEF
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THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR,-,Frg,nge; Pravda's first editorial comment
on the French_€i-tuation on fl June suggests that the
USSR is still being careful not to prejudice its future
\\ 72W diplomatic relations with De Gaulle. Pravda focused
its attacks on the French Committees oi‘ Public Safety.

3
-

\\ The Soviet press continues to publicize and implicitly

\ endorse the increasingly sharp French Communist par-
\ ty line, however, and has printed Jacques Duclos' state-
\\
ment calling for Communist leadership of a united cam-
\5 ai n a' ainst a De Gaulle-led fascist movement.
Ru
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(Page 1>
\
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I I. ASIA -AFRICA \
\ \
\\

Lebanon: UN Secretary General Hammarskjold en-

23%
visages that the UN observation group will establish watch
;;:&\\
posts inside Lebanon along roads to the troubled areas; it
will not be a "police force" in the sense of the UNEF which
.-:-;+;1*

patrols the Egyptian-Israeli borders. It is doubtful that

\
\
Such a group can effectively check on the flow of materiel
and infiltrators into Lebanon from Syria. There have been
no major changes in the internal military or political situa-
\ tion since 11 June. \
‘(Page 2) (Map)
\\ §\
\i\\\

\
\ Cyprus: Initial reactions of the Greek and Turkish gov-
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ernmen s o the new British proposals on Cyprus, presented
to them on 10 June, have been negative. Both regard the plan
121121

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proposals is likely to set off a new wave of terrorism. A

battalion of British paratroops is being sent to the island
to bolster the security forces, and the injection of Turkish
"volunteers" is becoming increasingly possible.
W6 4) \

Watch Committee conclusion;-~- Middle East: A delib- j

7€0 erate initiation ofhostifities in the Middle East is con- \ \
sidered unlikely in the near future. However, serious in-
cidents are likely to recur. In Lebanon the continuing crisis
\ represents a grave threat to the nation as presently consti-
tuted. There is evidence of continuing intervention by UAR
irregulars and of the infiltration of considerable quantities
of UAR arms. There is, however, no evidence of UAR.
\ intention to interfere with regular military forces, a step
which may not be required for UAR purposes. Although \
there have been instances of more forceful action by the
Lebanese armed forces, the latter have not been employed
I

\
to the extent of their capabilities. Available evidence does
not indicate an intention by the Soviet bloc or by Israel to
"

become militarily involved. _

2
_
\

\ \
a
Indonesia: The encirclement of the dissident capital
310 of Menad A

ernment forces is progressing.

(See map on adjoining page)

Afghanistan‘: A jet light bomber,

identified as an IL-28,

My
M _

,1‘ g
was observed over Kabul on June with Afghan Air Force
8
\\l
“-

3"
markings. Afghanistan has already received some 40 MIG-15
and MIG-17 fighters Pakistan will be con c e rne d o er the -
.
h
quisition of bombers by the Afghan Air Force.
(Page 5)
\
France-Tunisia: French-Tunisian negotiations are ap-
“5
parently headed for new difficulties‘ despite the conciliatory
J -

tone of Bourguiba's public utterances. The French are balk- Yéiilil-ll

ing at the "provisional regime" proposed by the Tunisians for

\
\
\\
\\\
\
DAILY BRIEF
pg
§‘§>_~:~§.~>"§.~

is 13 June 58 11
-§:_;:::§:: :2?
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\ V (it

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3\\\_.
the Bizerte base and provided for in the 15 March good of-
;§\ _..
‘E
-

fices proposals. Bourguiba is under continuing domestic

:\\\ ~_\> §\$§‘*‘§

pressure to demand evacuat' s from

1}‘ .\\;;<<§\’%

Tunisia, including Bizerte. Page 6) -

\ \>

Watch Committee conclusion--North Africa: The \\\\\\\\

French-Tunisian situationiremains tea's‘é;ana"a serious

Era t\-

incident could lead to open hostilities between the two

E-:\
t

countries No evidence is aVail able of S

. tblo ef -
'

forts to exploit the current crisis in Nort)lYi:frica(fj

'

:\ ,/

III. THE WEST 1

De Caulle-French Communism: The general‘s offer

ww of a cabinet P ost to a Ge n eral L ab or C on f e d era t 1‘on 1 e ad er,
“.1;
T‘

who is regarded byimany as.a crypto-Communist, alarmed

'
1: 1:-\.‘.,;

leaders of the non-Communist unions. They fear De Gaulle

-

.
.
lacks a basic understanding of Communism. De Gaul1e's
record indicates a wariness as to C ommunist objectives,
‘

but he considers himself a symbol of national reconci1ia-

' _

tion and probably will continue such gestures.

he

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE

REPORTS AND ESTIMATES &\\\\\\\
'

\\
(Available during the preceding week) L
'§
‘E
§\\‘\

Y National Intelligence Estimate - 8. The

;\ ~ Outlook for Spain. 20 May 1958. \

:~\~

.\\
,;\\\
:>l\\ I

///

is
i -\‘

¥?;;\
‘
.\\_\§

.13 June 58 DAILY BRIEF 111

 Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194456

L. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Attitude Toward De Gaulle: Still Cautious ~

Moscow continues to be cautious in its public statements

on De Gaulle in order to avoidprejudicingt the possibilities of
good relations with his government. A Pravda editorial on
11 June warned that the Committees of fiublic Safety present
_

a serious danger to France but criticized De Gaulle's govern-

ment only for "tolerating or encouraging" these organizations
While this line of criticism may persist, the editorial was
probably written before the increase in friction between De
Gaulle and the Algerian Committee of Public Safetyt

Pravda also published its most extensive criticism of

De Gaulle to iiate on 10 June, but in the form of an interview,
originally in an East German paper-, with French Communist
leader Jacques Duclos. By this technique, Moscow is publi-
cizing the Communist party's claim to be the most effective
opponent of De Gaulle and is endorsing Duclos’ instructions
to the party without compromising its own tactici of cautious
waiting with regard to De Gaulle.

Duclos charged the Pflimlin government and Soc.ialist

leaders Mollet and Auriol with capitulation to De Gaulle in
the face of Communist willingness to defend the republic.
He claimed that De Gaulle intends to use the Committee of
Public Safety as the nuclei of a mass fascist movement since
he lacks broad public support. He alleged that De Gaulle in-
tends to follow an "ultracolonialist" policy and pursue the
war in Algeria. Duclos called for unity among all working-
class and re p ublican forc e s un de r C ommuni‘st 1 eader shi to
prevent fascism and achieve peace in Algeria.

13 June 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1

Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194456

-
Approved for Release: 2019/08/20 C03194456 .

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\Jl.4%l \l-J 1

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Lebanese Situation

UN Secretary General Hammarskjold's quick action in

sending an advance group of observe rs to Lebanon may have
caught the anti-Chamoun opposition unprepared. However,
opposition leaders are putting up a bold front and have said
that they will debunk charges of intervention by the UAR and
"prove" that Western intervention has "internationalized"
the Lebanese situation. Meanwhile, the controlled Damas-
cus press has charged that the UN Security Council is a
"docile instrument in the hands of the imperialist powers."
Cairo radio accuses the United States of sending "arms to
murder the Lebanese people," while at the same time charg-
ing the UAR with interference.

Hammarskjold envisages the establishment of observa-

tion posts along roads to the troubled areas and hopes that
the group will set to work in the immediate future. The ad-
vance group, composed of five officers borrowed from the
UNTSO in Palestine, is in Beirut and will be augmented by
additional observers. A
Norwegian general has been asked
to chair a three-man directorate, consisting also of an Ec-
uadorean and an Indian. The group will work only from the
Lebanese side of the border. General Burns, UNEF com-
mander in Gaza, has said he believes that about 5,000 men
would be required for adequate surveillance of the Lebanese
border. It is doubtful that the observation group will be able
to operate effectively in the mountainous countryside, much
of which is held by rebel forces, Hammarskjold has requested
helicopters from US forces in Europe.

The center of fighting remains

in the city of Tripoli and
the rugged mountains behind Beirut. The forces of pro-
Chamoun leader Mughabghab, which have been instrumental.

-SEGR-E-T-

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in holdingup the Druze advance, are reported to have suf-

fered heavy casualties and to have withdrawn from the struggle

Reports persist that General Shihab is employing half:-~

hearted measures designed to convey the impression of en-
ergetic action without really being effective. In the Moslem
quarter of Beirut, opposition fighters are confident that the
army will never make a major effort to take over their sec-
tion of the city. They claim that the army permits them to
receive arms shipments unmolested, and that army men even
have advised them how to construct their defenses. They ex-
press distaste for all Lebanese political leaders and say their
real leader is President Nasir.

\"some" Syrians are voll-

unteering for action in Lebanon and that while not helping in-
filtrators, the UAR is "doing nothing to prevent" them from
assisting their Lebanese brothers. Meanwhile, the Danish
consul general in Damascus has stated that on 9 June Syrian
authorities commandeered a Danish mission hospital near
for the treatment of "Lebanese wounded."
/ %,-C2’ 5;-5 “Q5”

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‘\-r

Cyprus
Long-awaited.British proposals for Cyprus, presented
in Athens and Ankara on 10 June, have met with tmofficial
Greek rejection and probably also face rejection in Ankara.
Greek objections appear centered on the claim that the new
plan contravenes the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne by formally
recognizing Turkish interest in Cyprus. Turkish objection
appears to be based on fear that Turkish Cypriots will even-
tually be placed under "the oppression of the Greek commu-
nity" through its dominance of the proposed government.

A
definite rejection of the British plan by any of those
concerned could lead to new acts of terrorism on Cyprus
and possibly a political crisis for the Greek Government.
Premier Karamanlis predicts a violent reaction against his
government when the proposals become known even if it re-
jects them outright. While Greek Foreign Minister Averoff
indicates willingness to delay announcing his government's.
reaction to the proposals, it is less likely that Archbishop
Makarios, alsoinformed, will remain silent.- Public de-
nunciation of the plan by Makarios would probably unleash
an all-out attack by EOKA against British, and possibly Tur-
kish, targets on Cyprus.

Announcement- Turkish rejection of the plan could

of
stimulate Turkish Cypriots to new acts of terrorism. Efln
Turkey, where widespread mass demonstrations of students
are planned during the next few days, nationalist speakers
could inflame the crowds against the Greek minorities in
Istanbul and Izmir. It is possible that "spontaneous" demon-
strations will soon be held throughout Turkey calling for
"volunteers" to come to the assistance of the Turkish Cypriots.

Meanwhile, communal clashes are continuing on Cyprus,

and the British have announced that a battalion of paratroo ers
bolster the 24.000 troops on the island.
' '

—SEGR-E-“F

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yr’ ‘f

Afghan Air Force Acquires Soviet Twin-jet

Bomber
'

Light
A '

A twin-jet light bomber with Afghan markings, identi-

fied as a BEAGLE (IL-28), observed over Kabul on 8 June
is the first firm evidence that Afghanistan has obtained one
or more bombers from the USSR. It is not clear whether
Afghanistan is receiving the BEAGLE under the Soviet arms
loan of 1956 or under a new agreement. About 40 FAGOTS
and FRESCOES (MIG!-15's and MIG-17's), some of which
are being used for training Afghan jet fighter pilots, have
been delivered to Afghanistan since 1956.

The BEAGLE could be used for reconnaissance and

ground support against possible tribal uprisings within
Afghanistan. Its presence indicates that the Afghan Air
Force is beginning a new stage in its program of moderni-
zation and expansion. The military airfield at Mazar-i-
Sharif, in northern Afghanistan, has a runway suitable for
BEAGLE operations and another is being built at Bagram,
30 miles north of Kabul.

Pakistan will be concerned over the acquisition of a

bomber by the Afghan Air Force, and may request earlier
delivery and greater numbers of American jet light bombers
1?-p1‘0l’IllS€d for late 1959 and 1960.

-SEER-E-‘F

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French-Tunisian Negotiations

French-Tunisian negotiations apparently are headed

for further difficulties. France insists that Tunisia agree
to a more permanent arrangement for the Bizerte base
than the "provisional regime" provided for in the Anglo-
American good offices proposals of 15 March, while Tu-
nisia wants the provisional regime and, \

holds that only those French troops neces-

\

sary to the functioning of the Bizerte base can remain

at the base, and those only temporarily. France condi-
tioned its 8 June offer to withdraw within four months
the 9,000 French troops outside Bizerte on Tunis’ -com;
mitment "in principle" to negotiate permanent French re-
tention of the base. \ \

The Tunisian defense secretary told Ambassador Jones

on 10 June that the only obstacle to French-Tunisian agree-
ment is Paris’ insistence on "something we cannot give?!
and that the Tunisian Government--which remains under
constant pressure for total evacuation--could not now go
beyond the substance of the 15 March proposals. He indi-
cated, however, that is France would accept the Tunisian
counterproposal of 8 June, "many things will be possib1e"
once the climate has been improved by the withdrawal of
French forces. Ascending,-to,»,F,re-1@csh‘C_hargé -Benard,
Paris views as ’”"too vague"_';thé ":]_‘u;-iiigigm ;sug~'g§_$tiqn_t,11a_t_
neg0tiatioT5 for aJirovisional:regime-be-held before 1- .4

October. 1'

Q/Q
A

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50/ if

III. THE WEST

De Gaulle's Attitude Toward the Communists

Non-Communist trade union leaders have expressed
alarm at De Gaulle's statements to them that he had of-
fered a cabinet post to Pierre Le Brun, a secretary of
the Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation
(CGT), and he regretted that Le Brun had not accepted
because of CGT opposition. The non-Communist trade
union leaders regard Le Brun as a secret member of the
Communist party. They have the impression that De Gaulle
lacks a basic understanding of Communism and views Com-
munists from the ',_'lofty‘3he"ights of national unity," taking the
attitude that "all are Frenchmen."

De Gaulle is to consider himself a symbol of

known
national reconciliation, but his anti-Communist record
and wariness of Communist objectives, have been long
established. A notable example was his rejection of Com-
munist demands in 1945 for the key posts of foreign affairs,
defense, and the interior ministry. The general is probably
anxious" to obtain the general support or at least the acquies-
cence of labor for his program, and thus can be expected to
continue conciliatory gestures toward the CGT, which rep-
resents by far the largest part of all organized workers.

-SEGRE-‘F

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