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Missioner of Internal Revenue vs. COA
Missioner of Internal Revenue vs. COA
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G.R. No. 101976. January 29, 1993.
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* EN BANC.
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204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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that where the law does not distinguish, none must be made. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
NARVASA, C.J.:
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P11,397,924.75:
Atty. Jaime Maza, Chief, Legal Division
Ms. Potenciana Evangelista, Chief, Rev. Acctg.
Division
Mr. Jesus Parado, Chief, Personnel & Adm. Office
Atty. Vicente Y. Puno, Asst. Commissioner,
Personnel & Adm.
Mr. Marcelo N. Fernando, Undersecretary of Finance
Mr. Eufracio Santos, Deputy Commissioner, BIR
Mr. Jose A. Resurreccion, Asst. Commissioner,
Administrative
Ms. Marilyn Soledad, Researcher, Legal Division
Atty. Alicia P. Clemeno, Chief, Law Division
Mr. Melchor S. Ramos, Chief, Financial & Mgt.
Mrs. Elena C. Pineda, Special Disbursing Officer
These
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pleas were denied due course in COA Decision No.
1930, denying due course to the requests for
reconsideration. Hence, these separate petitions, which
were ordered consolidated in the Court's
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Resolution dated
March 10, 1992 in G.R. No. 102258.
In seeking nullification of COA Decisions Nos. 740 and
1930 in G.R. No. 101976, petitioner Commissioner of
Internal Revenue argues that: the approval by the
Department of Finance of the claim for informer's reward
of petitioner Savellano is conclusive upon the executive
agencies concerned, respondent COA included, as it
constitutes the final determination of the proper
administrative authority under Section 90 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; there were
actual cash collections of P 109,941,644.17 from NCA and
PNOC for nonpayment of withholding taxes on interest
earnings, which amount had accrued to the General Fund;
Section 316 (now 281) of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) entitling an informer to a reward for
information leading to the collection of internal revenue
taxes is clear and needs no interpretation; and assuming
that it does, it should be interpreted in G.R. No. 101976.
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from notice why his position was different from COA's, and
gave said respondent a period of ten (10) 16
days to file its
comment on the petition, if it so desired.
Briefly put, the Solicitor General's explanation is that he
found COA's disallowance of the informer's reward
erroneous because: government corporations are subject to
tax under the NIRC; having personalities distinct from the
government, if they evade payment of their taxes, the
amounts corresponding to such liabilities could be utilized
for purposes exclusive to them; contrarily, if they do pay
their taxes, the amounts so paid accrue to the General
Fund; Section 281 of the NIRC does not make any
distinction among taxpayers from whom taxes are
eventually recovered; it simply prescribes that for an
informer to be entitled to the reward, the information he
furnishes should result in the recovery of revenues;
statutes offering reward must be liberally construed in
favor of informers; the possibility of collusion is not
sufficient basis for disallowance, since collusion cannot be
assumed, while the official acts of the BIR and the
Department of Finance are entitled to a presumption of
regularity; even if the taxpayers referred to by an informer
are private entities, the possibility of collusion still
remains; such a consideration, moreover, goes into the
wisdom of the law a matter that concerns the legislature
and not the courts, much less, COA; and there being no
evidence of any irregularity, the determination made by
the BIR should be binding upon COA pursuant to the
Government Auditing Code.
Respondent COA questions the personality of petitioner
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to bring the instant
suit, arguing that the Commissioner is not an aggrieved
party adversely affected by the assailed decisions. In
justification of its actions, COA invokes its constitutionally
vested audit jurisdiction over all government agencies, to
which, it contends, the statutorily granted power of the
Secretary of Finance under Section 90, P.D. 1445 must
yield. It insists that petitioner Savellano is not entitled to
the informer's reward because there was no actual
collection of revenues under the benefittothegovernment
rule; and Savellano's alleged information did not
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212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Commissioner of lnternal Revenue vs. Commission on Audit
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distinguere debemos.
The Solicitor General correctly dismisses the mere
possibility of collusion to obtain the informer's reward as
sufficient ground for disallowance. Collusion cannot be
presumed. It must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. In the case at bar, there is no showing of
collusion between petitioner Savellano as informer and any
official or employee of the BIR or the Department of
Finance. Neither is there22 any evidence to overcome the
presumption of regularity enjoyed by the official acts of
the BIR and the Department of Finance in approving the
claim of petitioner Savellano for informer's reward.
Respondent COA considers the payment of informer's
reward in this case as placing a premium upon violations
committed by government agencies and therefore,
improper. At first blush, it would appear that by paying the
informer's reward, the government punishes itself for
violations committed by its own agencies. This, however, is
more apparent than real. The delinquencies of these
agencies are not condoned, much less rewarded. It is the
person whose information led to the discovery of their
transgressions who is being rewarded. Although this
results in a reduction in the amount of revenues actually
received, the net effect is that the government still gains
from the remaining amount paid, which otherwise would
have been lost to it.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby
GRANTED. The assailed decisions of respondent
Commission on Audit are set aside. No pronouncement as
to costs.
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21 Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520; citing
ColgatePalmolive Phil. Inc. vs. Gimenez, G.R. No. 14787, Jan. 28,1961,1
SCRA 267; Libudan vs. Gil, G.R. No. 21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17;
Dominador vs. Derahunan, 49 Phil. 452 (1926); Guevarra vs. Inocentes,
G.R. No. 25577, March 15, 1966, 16 SCRA 379; Director of Lands vs.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 32522, January 28, 1963; Alfato vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 52749, March 31, 1981, 103 SCRA 741; Statutory
Construction by Ruben E. Agpalo, 1986, pp. 143144.
22 Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court.
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SO ORDERED.
DISSENTING OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
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sanctions, would be, as the saying goes, "to fry one (the
government) in its own lard."
Moreover, the resulting loss (or reduction) of revenue to
the government referred to (in the tax informer's reward)
appears to be the result of the application of Section 316
(now 281) of the National Internal Revenue Code in
isolation, without considering the Constitution, to which all
laws are subordinate and to which every law must
harmonize.
The 1987 Constitution provides that:
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