Rabadilla v CA, supra

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of
the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the
original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to
inherit, as in a simple substitution, 12 or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.13 The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir
by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation. 14 In the case under consideration,
the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default
due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs
not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized
and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is

correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve
the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is
lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve
clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary
substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not
fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here.

Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property
is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary.
A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first
degree to the second heir. 17 In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at
all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the
New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property
left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a
condition unless it appears that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator
and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and
interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding
article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied
with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the
law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator
upon the heir.18 A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not
affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. 19 On the other hand, in a conditional
testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to
be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and
the mode obligates but does not suspend. 20 To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory
condition.21

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned
over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
 CRISOLOGO vs SINGSON
G.R. No. L-13876
February 28, 1962

FACTS:
This involves a lot and improvements thereon. Complaint alleged that Singson owned
half pro indiviso of said property and that Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the
duly probated last will of Singson (original owner). Defendant's defense was that
ConsolacionFlorentino was a mere usufructuary of and not owner of one-half pro-
indiviso of the property in question, and that therefore, she was not entitled to demand
partition thereof.
Lower court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Singson appealed. At the time of the
execution of the will, the nearest living relatives of the original owner were her brothers
Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and
her grandniece Consolation, all surnamed Florentino.

ISSUE:
Whether the testamentary disposition provided for sustitucion vulgar or for sustitucion
fideicomisaria?

HELD:
The old Civil Code governs this case. Testator may not only designate heirs who’ll
succeed him, but also substitutes in the event that said heirs don’t accept or are in no
position to accept inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of him.

Testator may also bequeath his properties to particular person with obligation, on part of
latter, to deliver the same to another, totally or partially, upon occurrence of particular
event. The particular testamentary clause provides for substitution of heir in this
manner: upon death of ConsolacionFlorentino, whether before or after that of testatrix,
property bequeathed to her shall be delivered or shall belong in equal parts to testatrix's
three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel, Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them
die ahead of ConsolacionFlorentino. If this created sustitucion vulgar, necessary result
would be that ConsolacionFlorentino, upon death of testatrix, became owner of one
undivided half of the property,but if it provided for sustitutionfideicomisaria, she would
have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over same half. In the former, she
would be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.
As Manresa says, a careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration
shows that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the
fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the effect that appellee,
during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to
her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already
stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death whether this happens before or
after that of the testatrix. Her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix. In the
light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased Dña.
Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution
ConsolacionFlorentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place
upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.
 Ramirez vs. Ramirez
G.R. No. L-27952. February 15, 1982 111 scra 704
Ponente: ABAD SANTOS, J.
FACTS:

Jose Ramirez, a Filipino, died in Spain, with only his widow, Marcelle Ramirez, French, as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI. In the project partition, the property was
divided into two parts: one to the widow in satisfaction of her legitime; the other free portion to his
grandnephews, Jorge and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, 1/3 of the usufruct of the free portion was
given to the widow and the 2/3 to Wanda Wrobleski, an Austrian.

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition. One of their contentions is that the
provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the substitution is valid.

RULING:

The vulgar substitution is valid. Dying before the testator is not the only case where a vulgar
substitution can be made for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided
in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra.

As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their
claim that it is void for the following reasons:

(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda,
the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution
"provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."

(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes
as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject
of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked owners."
 PCIB V. ESCOLIN

Short Summary:
Mr. and Mrs Hodges both made in their wills provisions that upon their deaths, their
whole estates should be inherited by the surviving spouse and that spouse could
manage and alienate the said lands, with the exception of the Texas property. Upon
death of the latter spouse, the residue of the estate inherited by the later spouse from
the spouse who predeceased him would redound to the brothers and sisters. Mrs.
Hodges died first then Mr. Hodges, but since there was no liquidation of Mrs. Hodges’
estate, the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges wanted to determine the extent of her
estate that they could inherit. (believe me, this is a short summary…case is long…)

Facts
-Charles & Linnie Hodges, both TEXAN nationals, provided in their respective wills that
 bequeath remainder of estate to spouse…during lifetime
 remainder goes to brothers and sis of surviving spouse
-Mrs. Hodges died first. Mr. Hodges appointed as EXECUTOR
 in Financial Statements submitted before the court, he made statements that the
estate of Mrs. Hodges is 1/2 of conjugal estate
 that he allegedly renounced his inheritance in a tax declaration in US
 for 5 years before his death, he failed to make accounting, failed to acquire final
adjudication of wife's estate

-Charles died. Magno, initially administratrix of both spouse's estate, later replaced by
PCIB for Charles' estate

WON Action is prescribed?

NO. 33 appeals were timely made
-Court did not pass upon its timeliness

WON Certiorari and Prohibition is proper?

YES. Appeal insufficient remedy
-many appeals, same facts, same issues = multiplicity of suits

WON THERE IS STILL A RESIDUE FOR MRS. HODGES' HEIRS?

YES.

1. WON SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR SETTLEMENT OF MRS. HODGES ESTATE

SHOULD ALREADY BE CLOSED, BASED ON THE DECEMBER 1957 COURT
ORDER ALLEGEDLY ADJUDICATING MR. HODGES AS SOLE HEIR? NO
….no final distribution to all parties concerned of the estate

2. R90.1 (on RESIDUE):

…after residue assigned to parties entitled to it, S.P. deemed ready for FINAL
CLOSURE:
1. Order issued for distribution/assignment of estate among those entitled
2. Debts
 Funeral expenses
 Expenses of administration
 Widow allowance
 Taxes
 Etc.
…should be paid already

3. Motion of party requesting the same (not motu proprio) Would include distribution of
residue of estate
-Here:
a. No final distribution of residue of Linney's estate
b. No special application made by charles/PCIB
c. Merely allowed advance or partial payments/implementation of will before final
liquidation
d. If charles already deemed sole heir, why PCIB needed to file a motion to declare
that Charles is indeed the sole heir?

3. ON ALLEGED INTENTION OF MR. HODGES

PCIB: He intended to adjudicate whole estate to himself (Thus, no residue left, thus ulit,
tapos na special
proceeding)

BUT SC:
1. Whatever was intended, he can't deprive those who have rights over the estate
2. Order - motion filed merely for exercise of ownership pending proceeding
3. Mr. Hodges was aware that wife's siblings had rights:
 In FS, stated that 1/2 of conjugal estate belonged to Estate of Linney
 In Petition for will's probate, he listed the bros and sis as heirs
 Lawyer of Magno was initially lawyer of Charles when latter was still
executor of Linney's estate – so may know what Charles' intended
 Charles admitted omitting a bro of Linney
 He even allegedly renounced his share of the estate (but was not proven)
 Charles had duty, as Surviving spouse, of trustee of wife's estate so had
to act in GF

4. ON PROPERTIES FOR SIBLINGS: since there's still a residue, can't close SP yet
>PCIB: NO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTIES YET, PCIB SHOULD
SOLELY ADMINISTER EVERYTHING TO DETERMINE THE SEPARATE ESTATE OF
LINNEY, OVER W/C MAGNO COULD ADMINISTER H:

NO. both PCIB and Magno should administer

a. It was Charles' fault why no administration of estate yet
 b. Admin should both be
 impartial
 extent of interest
c. Executor (PCIB) of Executor (Charles, over Linney's) Can't administer estate of
decedent (Linney) _ R78.6
d. Liquidation of conjugal partnership may be done in either spouse's probate
proceedings - R73.2

SUCCESSION: WON THERE'S SUBSTITUTION? None

1. No simple or vulgar substitution (A859, NCC)
 no provision for:
i. Predecease of T for designated heir
ii. Refusal
iii. Incapacity of designated heir to accept inheritance
2. No fideicomissary substitution
 no obligation on Charles to preserve the estate
3. There's simultaneous institution of heirs subject to resolutory condition of
Charles' death
 Charles was to enjoy the whole estate
 but he can't dispose of property mortis causa (because it's already subject
to the will made by his wife, which he agreed in the provision of his will)
4. Charles didn't get mere usufruct: he exercises full ownership

PRIL: WON RP LAW GOVERNS LEGITIME OF CHARLES?

No answer yet. Remanded

Art 16, NCC > applies: law of nationality

If we apply Texas PRIL law:

 Personal property: law of domicile
 Real property: law of situs (both in RP)

IF Art16 applies, then Texas law should govern; Texas law provides no legitime

So renvoi to RP: RP Law provides that the Surviving Spouse, being the sole heir,
gets 1/2 o the conjugal property, then 1/2 goes to the estate of the spouse. If 1/2 of the
estate of the spouse goes to the surviving spouse which is the sole heir, then Charles
gets 1/4 of the whole conjugal property.

Court said that Texas law may apply, but since not proven as…
 Courts can't take JN
 should show foreign law:
o As certified by person holding/having custody of such law
o Certificate that such officer does have custody over said law
 o Aznar can't be used to show what Texas law may contain, as there's a
time difference between this case and that case, thus the Texas law might
have changed in between the rulings

BUT WHATEVER HAPPENS, PCIB can't claim that the estate of Linney is not entitled
to at least 1/4 of conjugal property, they having argued that it is so.

NOTES:
1. will executed in Texas - Oklahoma
2. Charles made executor by Linney, but Charles had no executor - so
administrator dapat
3. as regards foreign laws:
 Should be proved as a fact
 R132 on Public documents
 SIR: Dapat use an expert witness
 Prove in accordance w/RP law

PCI Bank vs. Escolin

If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first heir to preserve the property
and transmit it to a second heir, there is no fideicomisaria. The institution is not
necessarily void; it may be valid as some other disposition, but it is not a fideicomisaria.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

56 SCRA 266

FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her husband. At the time
of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines.
To see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to
know what law should be applied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.

RULING:
It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a
renvoi will happen or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In
line with Texas law, that which should be proven is the law enforced during the death of
Hodges and not in any other time.

The Supreme Court held that the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and
sisters could be more than just stated, but this would depend on (1) whether upon the
proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code and
the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by
Magno, and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively
renounced his inheritance from his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining
and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now, the Court is not in a position to
make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and We,
therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance
by the court o quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such
further proceedings, as matters stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is
beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs. Hodges, her husband could
not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her whole
share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof
during his lifetime, the resulting estate of Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the
uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-fourth of the conjugal partnership
properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have been
gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for
even if it were assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code
and applying renvoi the laws of the Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such
one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion, taking into account already the
legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code.
 G.R. No. L-56249. May 29, 1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED REV. FATHER
TEODORO ARANAS, RAMONA B. VDA. DE ARANAS, ADELIA B. ARANAS-
FERNANDEZ, HEIRS OF THE LATE RODULFO B. ARANAS, ETC., ET AL.,
Petitioners, vs
VICENTE B. ARANAS AND HON. LUIS B. MANTA, Respondents.
PONENTE: PARAS, J.
Facts:
The testator left a will which was admitted to probate in 1956.
The will provides that:
(1) the remainder of the estate will be under the the special administration of Vicente
Aranas, his faithful and serviceable nephew, until his death or until he resigns;
(2) that the sons of testator’s brother [Carmelo] can hold said office of special
administrator, and none other than they, if Vicente dies or resigns;
(3) the special administration is perpetual; and
(4) that Vicente will receive 1/2 of the produce of said properties, and the other 1/2 of
the produce to be given to the Catholic Church.
In 1977, respondent Judge in SP:303 [Motion for Declaration of Heirs and Partition and
for Removal of the Administrator] ruled in petitioners’ favor that the ‘perpetual
inalienability and administration by Vicente is null and void after 20 years from 1954.
Vicente moved to reconsider alleging that said order was violative of due process
because only the issue for the removal of administrator was heard. Thus, the court set
aside its earlier order. Petitioners moved to reconsider, but was denied.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the testamentary dispositions [right of usufructuary and right to hold as
special administrator] is null and void for being perpetual, that is, more than 20 years.
[NO]
Ruling:
Petition is Dismissed.
The court ruled in its questioned order that this particular group of properties (Group
"C") is subject to the following:
"1. Remunerative legacy by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of 1/2 of the estate
after deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas, during his
lifetime and shall continue an administrator of the estate, and, who, upon his death or
refusal to continue such usufruct, may be succeeded by any of the brothers of the
administrator as selected by their father, Carmelo Aranas, if still alive or one selected by
his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead; Pursuant to the Will. (Article 562, 563, 564 and 603 of
the New Civil Code).
"2. Legacy in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, particularly the Archbishop diocese
of Cagayan de Oro City Represented by the Reverend Archbishop Patrick H. Cronin
over one-half of the proceeds of the properties under Group "C." (Article 603, New Civil
Code) and to last for a period of Fifty years from the effective date of the legacy, Article
605, New Civil Code)."
Assailing the aforementioned ruling, petitioners rely heavily on the doctrine laid down in
Art. 870 of the New Civil Code
"Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate
inalienable for more than twenty years are void."
A cursory reading of the English translation of the Last Will and Testament
shows that it was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward his nephew
Vicente Aranas for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half
of the fruits of the testator’s third group of properties until Vicente’s death and/or refusal
to act as administrator in which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by
Carmelo Aranas among his sons and upon Carmelo’s death, his sons will have the
power to select one among themselves.
Vicente Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of
his uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of
another’s property, with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either the same
thing, or in special cases its equivalent.
This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and
therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal.
 Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his
refusal and/or death and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code
relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to
dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the usufruct. Neither are the naked
owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has been given to
Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice of
course to Vicente’s continuing usufruct.
To void the designation of Vicente Aranas as usufructuary and/or administrator is
to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and
unselfish services rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-
ridden. The proviso must be respected and be given effect until the death or until the
refusal to act as such of the instituted usufructuary/administrator, after which period, the
property can be properly disposed of, subject to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of
the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary substitution,
said Article "A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first
heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second
heir the whole or part of the inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided
such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at the time
of the death of the testator.”
It is contended by petitioners that the ruling made by respondent court dated
November 17, 1977 was already final and not subject to correction as what was set
aside and to be reheard was only regarding the determination of additional heirs. Such
contention is not worthy of credence.
Respondents in their Memorandum allege and it is not disputed by petitioners
that the order of November 17, 1977 has not yet become final because it was received
only on January 12, 1978 by the counsel for respondent Vicente Aranas and the Motion
for Reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs dated January 17,
1978 was filed by the said respondent within the reglementary period.
Besides the validity or invalidity of the usufructuary dispositions would affect the
determination of heirs. As to petitioners’ allegation that the order of July 16, 1980 is
without basis, the record shows that during the hearing of the urgent motion for
reconsideration and to declare testamentary and intestate heirs, it was proven
conclusively by the said respondent Vicente B. Aranas that he was instituted as a
remunerative legatee per mandate of the Last Will and Testament by way of
usufructuary. Likewise the right of the Roman Catholic Church as the other usufructuary
legatee for the duration of the statutory lifetime of a corporation, that is, 50 years from
the date of the effectivity of said legacy, was also established. 7 - Digested 30
September 2017, 21:59 * * *