Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2-Earnings Management and Audit Quality
2-Earnings Management and Audit Quality
Bureau P609
Earnings management
Room P609
Earnings management: Definition and Motivations
The arbitrary nature of accounting figures
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What is earnings management?
“… a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the
intent of obtaining some private gain”
Schipper – Commentary on earnings management – Accounting Horizon (1989)
“Given that managers can choose accounting policies from a set of policies, it is
natural to expect that they will choose policies so as to maximize their own
utility and/or the market value of the firm. This is called earnings management.”
Scott – Financial accounting theory – Pearson ed. (6th edition, 2012)
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Earnings management is not fraudulent financial
reporting
Earnings management becomes fraud only when a company
intentionally provides materially misstated information, when there is
violation of GAAPs.
Examples of conservative earnings management: recognition of inflated
provision, overstated asset impairments, etc.
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Motivations for earnings management
Contracting motivations
EM aims to monitor and regulate contracts based on accounting numbers (such as
lending contracts, management compensation contracts, etc…)
Regulatory motivations
EM aims to circumvent industry regulation (capital requirements in the banking
industry, regulated prices in the utility sector, etc…)
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Motivations for earnings management
Behavioral motivations
Corporate managers suffer from behavioral biases that lead them to manage
accounting figures to report smoothed earnings and to meet or exceed specific
thresholds (small losses, last year earnings, analysts’ forecasts).
Storage motivations
Firms report strong losses aimed at storing earnings in case of inescapable poor
performance (big bath accounting), change in the management team, etc.
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Do firms manage earnings and how do they do it?
Do firms really manage earnings?
Abnormal breakdown
Degeorge, Patel, Zeckhauser « Earnings management to exceed thresholds », Journal of Business - 1999 10
Do firms really manage earnings?
Abnormal breakdown
Degeorge, Patel, Zeckhauser « Earnings management to exceed thresholds », Journal of Business - 1999 11
Accrual-based vs. real activity-based EM
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Accrual-based vs. real activity-based EM
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How to detect accrual-based EM?
Yes,
Because discretionary accruals are positive (negative), when managers
have an interest in reporting high (low) earnings.
Positive (negative) accruals = Net income increasing (decreasing) accruals
Hong, Teoh, Welch, Wong « Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings », J.F.E - 1998
L’intuition de l’étude
•Pour émettre des actions nouvelles à des prix élevés, les émetteurs
manipulent leurs résultats à la hausse avant l’émission.
•Les investisseurs surestiment les prix et les résultats post-émission.
•Les résultats post-émission étant moins élevés que ceux de pré-émission, les
investisseurs sanctionnent le cours de bourse.
Les hypothèses
H1- La relation entre le niveau des accruals discrétionnaires pré-émission et
les résultats post-émission de la firme est négative
H2- La relation entre le niveau des accruals discrétionnaire pré-émission et la
rentabilité boursière des actions post-émission est négative
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Do firms manage their accruals opportunistically?
Hong, Teoh, Welch, Wong « Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings », J.F.E - 1998
L’échantillon
•1248 firmes américaines
•1976-1989
•Firmes suivies 3 ans avant et 3 ans après l’augmentation de capital
Hong, Teoh, Welch, Wong « Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings », J.F.E - 1998
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Do firms manage their accruals opportunistically?
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Do firms manage their accruals opportunistically?
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Do firms manage their accruals opportunistically?
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Do firms manage their accruals opportunistically?
Hong, Teoh, Welch, Wong « Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings », J.F.E - 1998
Qu’a-t-on appris?
• Les performances boursières après l’opération sont d’autant plus négatives que les
manipulations ont été fortes.
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Do firms manage their activities opportunistically?
Bartov « The timing of asset sales and earnings manipulation », The Accounting Review - 1993
The research aims to determine whether managers time the sales of assets
«so that the recognized incomes from these sales smooth earnings changes
and mitigate accounting-based restrictions in bond covenants»
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Do firms manage their activities opportunistically?
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Should we worry about earnings management?
Should we worry about accrual–based EM?
No,
• Because it only consists in accelerating or delaying the recognition
of revenues and expenses.
• Because investors can see through earnings management. Or at
least, they are aware of this practice.
Yes,
• Because stock market does not see properly through earnings
management, which can cause wealth transfers.
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Should we worry about activity–based EM?
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Should we worry about activity–based EM?
Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal « Economic implications of financial reporting », J.F.E - 2005
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Should we worry about activity–based EM?
Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal « Economic implications of financial reporting », J.F.E - 2005
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Should we worry about activity–based EM?
Graham, Harvey, Rajgopal « Economic implications of financial reporting », J.F.E - 2005
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Should we worry about activity–based EM?
How do companies meet earnings benchmarks?
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•
•
•
• Manipulation of transactions
• Manipulation of figures 32
Should we worry about activity–based EM?
Value sacrifice to meet earnings benchmarks?
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Audit et qualité du reporting
Nature du questionnement
La nature de l’auditeur
Tous les auditeurs ne fournissent pas des audits de qualité identique. La
qualité de l’audit dépend de caractéristiques propres à l’auditeur.
Le contexte de sa mission
Deux auditeurs présentant les mêmes caractéristiques pourront fournir
des audits de qualité différente si le contexte juridique ou les relations
qu’ils entretiennent avec l’entreprise auditée diffèrent.
L’auditeur et la qualité de l’audit
• Son indépendance
Son incitation à révéler (ou ne pas révéler) les anomalies découvertes
Les Big sont censés offrir les audits les meilleurs parce que
• ils sont plus compétents du fait de plus grandes ressources
• leurs revenus sont moins dépendants d’un client particulier
• ils ont plus à perdre en cas de défaillance car leur capital réputationnel
est plus important
Parmi les Big, les auditeurs spécialistes d’un secteur sont censés être les
plus compétents (et indépendants)
La répartition des Big en Europe
Oligopoles ?
Le contexte de la mission et la qualité de l’audit
• La durée du mandat
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La réglementation affecte-t-elle la qualité de l’audit ?
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La réglementation affecte-t-elle la qualité de l’audit ?
La réglementation affecte-t-elle la qualité de l’audit ?
Qu’apprend-on ?
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