G.R. No.

L-15434            October 31, 1960

DIONISIO NAGRAMPA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
JULIA MARGATE NAGRAMPA, defendant-appellee.

Ricardo B. Caayao for appellants.

Gregorio S. Turiano for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

This is a suit to revoke a donation. The court of first instance of Camarines Sur dismissed it on the
ground of prescription.

Way back in 1937, the plaintiffs executed a notarial instrument entitled "Onerous donation inter
vivos" the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

That we, Dionisio Nagrampa, Filipino, 69 years of age, and Tecla Collada, Filipino, 68 years
old, husband and wife, respectively, residents and with postal address in Iriga, Camarines
Sur, Philippines, hereafter called the DONORS, and Julia Margate Nagrampa, Filipino, of
legal age, and Pablo Sadang, Filipino, of legal age, wife and husband respectively, all
residenta and with postal address in Iriga, Camarines Sur, Philippines, hereinafter called the
DONEES, have agreed as they do hereby agree to the following;

That the said DONORS, Dionisio Nagrampa and Tecla Collada, for and in consideration of
their love and affection for the said DONEES, Julia Margate Nagrampa and Pablo Sadang,
and also for the services rendered and to be rendered to the DONORS by the donees, do by
these presents, voluntarily give, grant, and donate to the DONEES, their heirs, executors,
administrators, and assigns forever the following described real properties and the
improvements thereon, free from all liens, charges and incumbrances: . . .

These parcels described above are not registered under Act 496 not under the Spanish
Mortgage Law, hence, the parties herein have agreed to register this instrument under the
terms of Act 3344.

That the said donees, Julia Margate Nagrampa and Pablo Sadang, hereby receive and
accept this donation and gift and further express their gratitude for the generosity of the said
DONORS who hereby acknowledge the notification of such acceptance by the Donees. . . . .

Donors and donees signed and acknowledged the instrument.

On July 21, 1958, this complaint was filed, the plaintiffs alleging that defendant, in violation of the
conditions of the donation, had failed to render them "financial, physical and all kinds of services";
and that "five years ago" plaintiffs demanded such services, which defendant Julia Margate
Nagrampa (her husband had died) "refused and until now refuses" to render. Copy of the deed of
donation was attached to the complaint.

Defendant moved to dismiss, because Art. 764 of the Civil Code of the Philippines has fixed a four-
year period within which actions to revoke donations may be filed, such period to be counted from
the non-compliance with the conditions allegedly violated. The court sustained the motion, and
ordered the dismissal of the case.
Plaintiffs have appealed. The period of prescription, they contend, is ten years because this being an
onerous donation, it is governed by the law on contracts — Art. 733, Civil Code of the Philippines-
and according to Art. 1144 of the same Code, actions upon written contracts must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues.

Appellee replies that Art. 764 is a special provision about revocation that must control general
provisions. At any rate, she says, even if the rules of contracts be applied, plaintiffs' action is in effect
one for rescission. which actin "must be commenced within four years." (Art. 1389.)

The deed of donation was undoubtedly inter vivos. It was captioned "onerous donation inter vivos." It
contemplated immediate transfer of ownership. There was no mention of death, the donees "hereby
received" the donation, and it provided for registration of the instrument (which donated real
property) in the land records. It was not in the form of a will, since there were no three witnesses and
no attestation clause.1

Such donations (inter vivos) "shall be governed by the general provisions concerning contracts and
obligations in all matters not determined by this title." Art. 621, Civil Code (Art. 732, Civil Code of the
Philippines). And under Art. 647 of the same title (as amended by Art. 764 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines), actions for the revocation of such donation by reason of non-compliance with its
conditions prescribe "after four years counted from such non-compliance." Now, therefore, as the
complaint described refusal of donees to render services — which refusal constituted the alleged
non-compliance — more than five years before the presentation thereof, it is clear that the court a
quo committed no error in dismissing it on the ground of prescription.2

In this connection, it may be explained that although no special period of prescription was fixed in
"this title" at the time of the donation in 1937, the provisions of Art. 764 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines operate, to preclude this action, because the entire period of four years fixed by its has
elapsed since the time such Code took effect in 1950: suit in July, 1958, violation in 1953.

Art. 1116. — Prescription already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be
governed by laws previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire
period herein required for prescription should elapse. the present Code shall be applicable,
even though by the former laws a longer period might be required. (1939)

Consequently, the appealed order is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, and
Paredes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

 See Cuevas vs. Cuevas 98 Phil., 68; 51 Off. Gaz., 6163; Concepcion vs. Concepcion, 91
1

Phil., 823; Zapanta vs. Posadas, 52 Phil., 557; Tuason vs. Tuason, 54 Phil., 289; Tagala vs.
Ybeas, 49 Off. Gaz., 200.

In fact, appellants do not claim, in this Court, that it was mortis causa.

 2
 This view makes it unnecessary to go into the other points raised by appellee: (a) no
violation of the indefinite condition of "future services to be rendered"; (b) the violation, if any,
was ground for rescission of a contract which must be filed within four years.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 247429, September 08, 2020 ]

JAIME ARAZA Y JARUPAY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, C.J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Jaime Araza y Jarupay (Araza), praying for
the reversal of the December 17, 2018 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
40718 and its May 10, 2019 Resolution,2 which affirmed the October 30, 2017 Decision3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, Branch 199 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 15-1287, finding
petitioner guilty of violating Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004.

Antecedents

The Information filed against Araza reads:

That on or about the month of September 2007, prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Las
Pinas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to humiliate and degrade his lawful wife AAA,4 did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of psychological abuse upon his wife by then and there committing acts of
marital infidelity by having an affair with his paramour Tessie Luy Fabillar and begetting three
illegitimate children with his paramour thus causing [his] wife emotional anguish and mental
suffering.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

When arraigned, Araza pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: 1) private complainant AAA; 2) Armando Que (Que);
and 3) Dr. Kristina Ruth Lindain (Dr. Lindain).

As culled from the records of the RTC, the prosecution elicited the following:

[AAA] testified that she and [Araza] were married on October 5, 1989 at Malate Catholic Church.
Initially and at the onset of their marriage[,] her husband [Araza] was hardworking, loving and
faithful. She had no marital issues with [Araza] until x x x [he] went to Zamboanga City in February
2007[,] for their networking business. [Araza] was formerly working as an Overseas Filipino Worker
but decided to stop in 1993 to join [AAA] in her business.
It was at this point that she began to notice [Araza's] change in behavior. Allegedly, he would act x x
x depressed and would cry. He always appeared absent[-]minded. She was concerned and would
ask [him about it] but [he] would just stay quiet, [and] x x x stare at her[,] full of anxiety.

One day, she received a text message from a certain Edna and Mary Ann who told her that her
husband x x x is having an affair with their best friend. At first, she did not believe them. However,
that information brought [AAA] to Zamboanga to see for her herself whether [it] is true. Indeed[,] on
September 3, 2007[,] she was able to confirm that her husband was living with another woman[,] a
certain Tessie Luy Fabillar [Fabillar].

She instituted a complaint against [her husband Araza] x x x and his alleged mistress, [for
Concubinage,] at the Philippine National Police. The case was subsequently amicably settled after
the parties executed an Agreement whereby [Araza] and [Fabillar] committed themselves never to
see each other again.

After the case was settled x x x, [Araza again] lived with [AAA] x x x. However, [it] x x x was only for
a short time. Without saying a word, [Araza] left [AAA] on November 22, 2007. She was looking for
[Araza] and out of desperation[,] she sought the help of the NBI to search for [him]. To her surprise,
[Araza] had returned to live with his mistress again.

In the days to come, she would receive text messages from her husband's supposed mistress using
various numbers. The messages would tell her that [Araza] is sick and needed money for medicines.
There was also another text message threatening her that she will kill [AAA's] husband. Because of
this, sometime in 2013, she sought a law firm who issued a letter addressed to [Fabillar,] demanding
for the release of [Araza].

[AAA] was emotionally depressed and anxious of her husband's condition. She believed that
[Araza's] liberty was being restrained by [Fabillar]. She was determined to bring her husband home.
Thus, [i]n May 2014[,] she went to Zamboanga to search for [Araza]. She looked for him from one
[b]arangay to another; she would ask help from [p]olice [stations giving out pictures of her husband.
She would promise a reward to those who are able to locate [Araza]. She was desperate looking for
[him] and she fell ill and [was] confined in a hospital.

Thereupon, thinking that [Fabillar] was restraining the liberty of [Araza], she filed a Petition for
Habeas Corpus before the [CA,] Manila[,] on June 20, 2014. The [CA] deputized a [National Bureau
of Investigation] NBI agent to conduct a thorough investigation on [Araza] and [Fabillar].

[Based on the investigation, Araza] left their conjugal abode on his own volition and he has been
living with his mistress[,] as husband and wife. As a matter of fact, three children were born out of
their cohabitation. Hence, the petition for habeas corpus was dismissed.

The truth cause[d] AAA emotional and psychological suffering. She was suffering from insomnia and
asthma. Allegedly, she is still hurting and crying[.] [S]he could not believe x x x what had happened
in their marriage as they were living harmoniously as husband and wife.

At present[,] she is [taking] x x x anti-depressant and sleeping pills to cope with her severe emotional
and psychological turmoil brought about by [Araza's] marital infidelity and having children with his
mistress.

She claimed she had spent a large amount of money to search for her husband[,] [which] includes
the filing of several cases.
Armando Que, a friend of AAA and x x x [Araza], x x x testified that he is a member of Boardwalk, a
direct selling and networking business. Allegedly, he met AAA and [Araza] for the first time in 2001 in
this Boardwalk business. He alleged that while he was recruiting and selling items of Boardwalk in
Zamboanga, he frequently saw [Araza] and [Fabillar] togetherf,] [and] holding hands.

Allegedly, he kept that information to himself because he knew once AAA would know about it[,]
there would be trouble in their relationship.

After the reception of prosecution evidence, they formally offered their exhibits, which were all
admitted by the court[,] but only as part of the

testimonies of witnesses who testified thereon.6

xxx

On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Dr. Lindain as expert witness, who testified:

[S]he met xxx AAA for the first time on September 9, 2016 when she was referred to her by the
Women's Desk of the PGH[,] in relation to her filing of a VAWC complaint against her husband[,]
[Araza].

Allegedly, she saw AAA on September 9, x x x 22, and xxx 29, 2016[,] on an hour per session.
Based on her assessment and expert opinion, the symptoms AAA was having was like the
depressed mood; her occasional difficulty in sleeping are secondary to the relational distress with
[Araza]. It was [her] wanting to be with [her] husband that was causing those symptoms. However,
[Dr. Lindain] clarified that the manifestations exhibited by [AAA] are not sufficient to be considered as
a psychiatric disorder. She advised AAA to undergo consel[l]ing or psychotherapy[,] in order to help
her accept [her] situation x x x.7

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Araza as it sole witness. According to Araza:

[H]e and AAA were married in 1989. He averred that he was a former taxi driver and an [Overseas
Filipino Worker] OFW for [two] years. When he stopped being an OFW, he went back to being a taxi
driver. [O]n the other hand[,] [AAA] was into buy and sell of Boardwalk. In order to extend help to his
wife AAA, he helped in the recruitment of Boardwalk dealers to the extent of even going to various
provinces.

He recalls that initially, their marriage was going smoothly[,] but when AAA started earning money,
her behavior changed. He revealed that he did not earn anything from recruiting agents who worked
under AAA. All the commissions went to AAA['s] account.

Fie disclosed that when he was in Cagayan de Oro to recruit agents for their business, AAA had told
him that his sister had a stroke. He was allegedly dismayed when his wife did not even offer any
help as she claimed she has nothing to spare. He felt hurt about it and sadly, his sister died.

He testified that since 2007[,] his relationship with his wife has gone sour. Oftentimes, she would
believe rumors and accuse him of being a womanizer.
He denied having an affair with x x x Fabillar[,] who was acting as his guide in his recruiting activities
in Zamboanga.  He revealed that when AAA went to Zamboanga, she filed a complaint against him
Ꮮαwρhi ৷

at the Women's Desk. He was arrested as a consequence and was forced to sign an agreement. He
returned to Manila with his wife hoping that she would change her ways towards him[,] but she [did
not].

About a month, he sought a friend ['s] help [for him to secure] a plane ticket [bound] to Zamboanga.
He left his wife because he could no longer stand [her] attitude towards him. He also denied
fathering children with xxx Fabillar.9

Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision dated October 30, 2017, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime of violence
against women under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 were satisfied. Araza and AAA were married, as
required by the first element. The prosecution was able to establish through testimonial and
documentary evidence that Araza was the perpetrator of the mental and emotional anguish suffered
by AAA.10 Araza left their conjugal abode and chose to live with his mistress; and he reneged his
promise to stop seeing his mistress, contrary to the written agreement between him and his
mistress. AAA's psychological and emotional sufferings due to the said ordeals can also be gleaned
from Dr. Lindain's testimony, who was presented as an expert witness.11

With regard to AAA's testimony, the RTC is convinced by her sincerity and candor.12 Her testimony
was able to show that due to Araza's acts of infidelity, she suffered emotional and psychological
harm.13 Since there are no facts and/or circumstances from which it could be reasonably inferred
that AAA falsely testified or was actuated by improper motives, her testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit.14

On the other hand, Araza only offered the defense of denial, which cannot be given greater weight
than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this court finds accused JAIME ARAZA y
JARUPAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act 9262 and
hereby imposes an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
PRISION CORRECIONAL as its minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION
MAYOR as its maximum.

In addition to imprisonment[,] accused shall pay a FINE in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS [P100,000.00 and to indemnify the private complainant moral damages in the
amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS [P25,000.00.

The period during which accused has remained under detention shall be credited to him in full[,]
provided that[,] he complies with the terms and conditions of the City Jail.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the prosecution, the private complainant, the accused[,] as
well as his counsel for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.15

Aggrieved, Araza appealed to the CA.

 Ruling of the CA

The CA denied Araza's appeal, and motion for reconsideration, in toto. The appellate court echoed
the RTC's factual findings and conclusions. The CA found that the prosecution sufficiently
established the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, and as alleged in
the Information filed against Araza. Psychological violence as an element of the crime, and the
mental and emotional anguish she suffered, were proven through the testimonies of AAA and Dr.
Lindain. The defense of denial of Araza, which were not supported by clear and convincing
evidence, cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the victim.16

The CA concluded that R.A. No. 9262 does not criminalize acts such as the marital infidelity per
se, but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.17

Araza filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its May 10, 2019 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming Araza's conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of R.A.
No. 9262 although his conviction was based on facts not alleged in the Information.

2. Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Araza's conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262 on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the acts allegedly committed by Araza.

3. Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Araza's conviction for violation of Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262, considering that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
AAA suffered mental and emotional anguish and Araza's act was the proximate cause
thereof.

Our Ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The elements of violation of
Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 were
sufficiently alleged in the
Information.

Araza argued that nothing in the Information mentioned his alleged abandonment of the conjugal
home, and his pretenses that he was forcefully detained, specifically caused AAA's emotional
anguish and mental suffering. For this reason, he cannot be convicted based on these acts, which
were not part of the charge against him.18

In Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan,19 an Information is sufficient if it accurately and clearly alleges all
the elements of the crime charged, to wit:

The issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should be made in order to meet the
standard of sufficiency has long been settled. It is fundamental that every element of which the
offense is composed must be alleged in the information. No information for a crime will be sufficient
if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court requires, inter alia, that the information must state
the acts or omissions so complained of as constitutive of the offense. Recently, this Court
emphasized that the test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense is
whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not
considered. The law essentially requires this to enable the accused suitably to prepare his defense,
as he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

This is in consonance with the fundamental right of an accused to be informed of the "nature and
cause of accusation."21

In order to determine the sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information, Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262 must be referred to, being the law defining the offense charged in this case.

Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 9262, in relation to Section 5(i), provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:

xxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions, causing or likely to cause mental or

emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or
visitation of common children.

On the other hand, Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 penalizes some forms of psychological violence
that are inflicted on victims who are women and children through the following acts:

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children. (Emphasis supplied)

In Dimamling v. People22 the elements of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 are enumerated:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar acts or omissions.
To determine whether the elements of violation of Section 5(i) were sufficiently alleged, the
accusatory portion of the Information is reproduced below:

That on or about the month of September 2007, prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Las
Pihas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with intent to humiliate and degrade his lawful wife AAA, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit acts of psychological abuse upon his wife by then and there committing acts of
marital infidelity by having an affair with his paramour Tessie Luy Fabillar and begetting three
illegitimate children with his paramour thus causing [his] wife emotional anguish and mental
suffering.

CONTRARY TO LAW.23

Araza is correct that he cannot be convicted based on acts of abandonment of the conjugal home,
and pretenses that he was forcefully detained. These were not alleged in the Information. However,
there were other acts alleged in the Information that caused emotional anguish and mental suffering
on AAA.

In this case, the Court finds that the Information contains the recital of facts necessary to constitute
the crime charged. It clearly stated that: (1) The offended party AAA, is the wife of offender Araza;
(2) AAA sustained emotional anguish and mental suffering; and (3) such anguish and suffering is
inflicted by Araza when he had an extramarital affair with Fabillar and had three illegitimate children
with her.

The CA was correct in ruling that

Araza committed psychological
violence upon his wife AAA by
committing marital infidelity,
which caused AAA to suffer
emotional anguish and mental
suffering.

Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No.

9262.24 Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are
personal to the complainant.25 Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by
the offended party.26 The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due
to the psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish
and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence
only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such experiences are
personal to this party.27

In order to establish psychological violence, proof of the commission of any of the acts enumerated
in Section 5(i) or similar of such acts, is necessary.

The prosecution has established Araza's guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that he
committed psychological violence upon his wife by committing marital infidelity. AAA's testimony was
strong and credible. She was able to confirm that Araza was living with another woman:

Q: You also mentioned in your complaint affidavit that in September 2007 there was some sort of an
agreement entered into by you[,] the complainant and your complainant's alleged mistress, do you
confirm that?
A: Yes, sir.

xxx

COURT

Q: What was the agreement all about?

WITNESS

A: I went to Zamboanga when I learned that my husband has a live[-]in relationship with one Tessie
Fabillar. I went to the police station to ask for assistance. I had them arrested and I had them sign a
document saying that they will stay apart from each other.

xxx

FISCAL MACASAET

Q: What happened to that agreement Madam Witness?

WITNESS

A: He stayed in my house for a short period only and then after November 22, 2007 he fled without
asking for my permission.

Q: Do you know where he went?

A: I'm aware that he went to his mistress.

Q: How did you know that he went to his mistress?

A: Because my colleagues in the office told me.

Q: Were you able to confirm that he went to his mistress?

A: Yes[,] sir, because I went to Zamboanga[,] I secured NBI assistance to investigate on my

husband and we discovered that he had a mistress.

Q: Who was that mistress as discovered by the National Bureau of Investigation?

A: Tessie Luy Fabillar, sir.28

xxx

Q: When did you discover that indeed your husband is living with another woman?

A: When I went back to Zamboanga last December and the police caught Jaime Araza and Tessie
Luy Fabillar living in one house.

Q: Were you able to see them living in that house?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: You were also saying that there was a policeman, what did the policeman do?

A: They just brought Tessie Luy Fabillar and Jaime Araza to the police and sign an agreement that
they be separated and no more relationship will be made.

Q: Were you able to confirm the relationship of your husband from himself?

A: Yes, Your Honor.29

On the part of Araza, he admitted that he deserted AAA in order to live with Fabillar:

Q: Was there a time that you lived with Tessie Fabillar?

A: Yes[,] sir.

xxx

Q: Nagsama kayo sa iisang bubong ni [Fabillar]?

A: Yes, I stayed in her place.

Q: In the house of [Fabillar]?

A: Yes[,] sir.

Q: You are in one room?

A: In one house, your [H]onor.

xxx

Q: For how long did you stay with [Fabillar] and in her house?

A: Now, I'm staying with her, your [H]onor.

COURT

Continue.

FISCAL MACASAET

Q: When did you start living in the same house with [Fabillar]?

xxx

WITNESS
A: For 1 year only.

Q: Are you sure Mr. Witness for one year only?

A: Yes[,] sir.

FISCAL MACASAET

I have to warn you Mr. Witness if you are lying you can be...

COURT

Naiintindihan po ba ninyo ang sabi ni Fiscal kung ikaw ay nagsisinungaling mananagot ka sa batas.

Q: I'm giving you a chance, how long have you been living with [Fabillar] under one roof. A: Since
2008, sir.30

Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA's
emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was adversely
affected.

The RTC ruled:

Logic and experience dictate that any woman who goes through that kind of ordeal would suffer
psychologically and emotionally as a consequence. The prosecution was able to prove this in the
case of AAA as can be gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Kristina Ruth B. Lindain who was
presented as an expert witness.31

On the other hand, the CA held:

In addition to [Araza's] marital infidelity[,] [i]t was the thought that her husband was being detained,
sick and ailing, and in the danger of being killed if she will not send money that caused [AAA's]
emotional and psychological turmoil that drove her to the brink of despair. [AAA] became so
depressed that she had to be hospitalized.32

In the RTC Decision, and as affirmed by the CA, these acts were in accord with the Information to
have caused emotional and mental anguish on AAA:

No doubt that the prosecution has successfully established that [Araza] left his wife AAA and
decided to stay in Zamboanga City where he maintained an illicit affair with x x x Fabillar during the
subsistence of their marriage. The record is brimming with evidence that [Araza] intentionally left
AAA groping in the dark. Without any explanation or mature conversation with his wife, x x x [Araza]
simply left his wife causing the latter emotional and psychological distress.33

First, the prosecution was able to prove the case of AAA, as can be gleaned from the testimony of
Dr. Lindain, who was presented as an expert witness:

A: Well, separation po, even that they have been together from 1989 to 2007[,] it's been a marriage
wherein there's a commitment, the fact that he was not there ncrwala siya counted as a loss so, the
actual loss can actually perpetrate symptoms of depression, anxiety so na-test yung reaction it's a
contegration but the actual loss of him not being there anymore can trigger the symptom.34
xxx

Q: Just the sole act of leaving a spouse, can you already qualify that as psychological or emotional
abuse?

A: In my opinion, yes.

Q: Why so?

A: During the separation there was no understanding of what had actually happened and from her
story that per 2007 until 2013[,] she was making an effort to actually find the husband and she was
worried what was happening to the husband, it is enough to be the cause of emotional and
psychological abuse.35

Second, AAA narrated how she received several information about Araza's affair with Fabillar; how
she was able to confirm the affair herself which led to the filing of the complaint for concubinage; and
despite the complaint being settled and that both Araza and Fabillar agreed to stop living together,
Araza repeated his affair with Fabillar.36

AAA's testimony that she suffered mental and emotional anguish due to Araza's acts, was
categorical and straightforward, to wit:

Q: In this letter Madam Witness, [Fabillar] was asked to release your husband from her custody and
to send your husband to you, what was the result of this letter, if you know?

A: The case was not given due course because the truth is, my husband was living with xxx Fabillar.

Q: Was your husband returned to you by x x x Fabillar?

A: No, sir.

xxx

Q: What was the effect of your husband's unfaithfulness to you?

A: I became so depressed until now, I was always hospitalized.

Q: What was your proof that you were hospitalized?

A: I have a medical certificate from Perpetual Help.

xxx

Q: And if you see those medical records, will you be able to identify them?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: I'm showing you [these] documents marked as Exhibits "E" up to "E-6", will you please look at
them and tell us if those are the medical records that you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.

FISCAL MACASAET

Your Honor, just for the record the witness identified Exhibits "E" up to "E-6".

Q: Now in filing this complaint against your husband, what do you wish to attain?

WITNESS

A: He must be put in jail so that he knows that he is really, he had done something wrong to me
because I love him so much but then he has different attitudes and he has a different answer against
me. I want to put him in jail that's all.

FISCAL MACASAET

We want to make it on record Your Honor, that the witness is crying.

Q: What if he...

A: The main purpose of mine today is to put him in jail.

Q: That's all?

A: After the case I will also present the case against Tessie Luy Fabillar so that both of them will be
put in jail.37

xxx

Q: And you said that your husband came back and live with you again as husband and wife?

A: Only for two (2) months.

Q: And then after two (2) months?

A: He went back to x x x Fabillar.

xxx

Q: And this time when your husband left you to live with her mistress once more, how did you feel
about this?

A: Until now I am depressed, I can't forget my husband.

Q: So, you want to impress upon this court that you still love your husband? A: Yes of course, but
then a punishment should be made.

Q: Flave you forgiven your husband about this? A: I'm still hurt.38

xxx
Q: You said in your affidavit in no. 28 of that document Madam Witness, Jaime is engaging in
conduct that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to you, can you please tell us
what do you mean by that?

A: First of all[,] when my husband left me[,] I didn't eat, I didn't sleep until 2013 when I found out that
he's still alive[,] then that's the time I changed my mind so I tried my health to be better so that I can
move to another case.

Q: Isn't it that the matter that you told us is just an effect of love being unreturned and not because of
what Jaime intentionally did to you?

A: No, it's not, ma'am.

Q: You considered those things as the effect of actions of Jaime, not loving you back?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And what you wanted now to do is that you filed this case so that he will love you back?

A: I think no more because until now I know he doesn't love me anymore because he wants to stay
with another woman so, I want him to be punished so that he will know how it feels to be hurt, both
of them.39

Third, while Araza denied that he committed marital infidelity against AAA, he w© would later on
admit that that he left his wife AAA to live with Fabillar, and that he was fully aware that AAA suffered
emotionally and psychologically because of his decision:

[ATTY. SOMERA]

Q: After a month more or less[,] where did you go?

A: When I couldn't take her behavior anymore, I called my friend who's in Zamboanga, ma'am.

Q: And what did you ask this friend[,] if there be any?

A: I asked the help of my friend for him to secure a plane ticket for me because I was intending to go
back and work in Zamboanga.40

xxx

Q: You decided to finally leave your wife in 2007 because you cannot stand her character anymore,
is that correct?

A: Yes[,] sir.

Q: And you know very well that your separation from her is affecting her emotionally and
psychologically, is that correct? You know that?

COURT
Please answer the question.

A: Yes[,] sir.

Q: And despite knowing that your wife is suffering emotionally and psychologically because of your
decision to leave [her] you still choose to stay [away] from her, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

xxx

Q: Was there a time that you lived with Tessie Fabillar?

A: Yes[,] sir.

xxx

COURT

Q: I'm giving you a chance, how long have you been living with [Fabillar] under one roof.

A: Since 2008, sir.41

xxx

Q: And it is correct to say based on this document that you and [Fabillar] agreed not to live [together]
anymore, is that correct?

COURT

Please don't nod.

Q: What's the answer?

A: Yes, sir[.]

Q: And yet after signing that agreement you and [Fabillar] lived together under one roof, is that
correct?

A: Yes[,] sir[.]42

The RTC was convinced by the sincerity and truthfulness of AAA's testimony. AAA, who only
intended to bring justice to what happened to her, was able to testify and to show through her
testimony that due to Araza's act of infidelity and failure to stay true to his promise, she suffered
emotional and psychological harm.

This Court will not disturb the findings of the RTC and as affirmed by the CA, as regards AAA's
credibility as a witness. The RTC is in a better position to observe her candor and behavior on the
witness stand. Its assessment is respected unless certain facts of substance and value were
overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.43
Araza can only offer the defense of denial. The defense of denial is inherently weak and cannot
prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the accused
committed the crime.44 Denial, being a self-serving negative defense, cannot be given greater
weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.45

The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that Araza committed the crime of
psychological violence, through his acts of marital infidelity, which caused mental or emotional
suffering on the part of AAA.

Having ascertained the guilt of Araza for violation of Section 5(i), We shall now proceed to determine
the appropriate penalty.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 9262 provides:

SECTION 6. Penalties- The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5
hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

If the acts are committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her
child, the penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in the section.

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred thousand pesos
(300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall
report compliance to the court.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correcional, in any of its period which is
from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, while the maximum term shall be which could
be properly imposed under the law, which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
the crime.46 This Court deems it proper to impose on petitioner Araza, the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correcional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.

Also, petitioner Araza is DIRECTED TO PAY a fine in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P100,000.00), and moral damages in the amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P25,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for failure of the petitioner to show any
reversible error in the assailed CA Decision. The assailed Decision dated December 17, 2018 and
the Resolution dated May 10, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40718 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:

1. Petitioner Jaime Araza y Jarupay is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation

of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correcional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum;
 2. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY a fine equivalent to One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PI
00,000.00), and moral damages in the amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00); and

3. Further, petitioner is DIRECTED to UNDERGO a mandatory psychological counselling or

psychiatric treatment, and to REPORT his compliance therewith to the court of origin within
fifteen (15) days after the completion of such counselling or treatment.

SO ORDERED.

Caguioa, Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, with Associate Justices Miraflor P.

Punzalan Castillo and Rafael Antonio M. Santos, concurring; rollo, pp. 34-45.

2 Id. at 47-48.

3 Penned by Presiding Judge Joselito dj. Vibandor; id. at 69-83.

4 The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well
as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to
Republic Act No. 7610, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes"; Republic Act
No. 9262, "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes";
Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, known as the "Rule on Violence Against Women and
Their Children," effective November 5, 2004; People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703, 709
(2006); and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017,
Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the
Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal
Circumstances.

5 Rollo, p. 69.

6 Id. at 70-72. (Citations omitted)

7 Id. at 74.

9 Id. at 13.

10 Id. at 75-76.

11 Id. at 79.

12 Id. at 82.
13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id. at 82-83.

16 Id. at 42.

17 Id. at 44.

18 Id. at 19.

19 462 Phil. 712, 719(2003). (Emphases ours)

21 Sen. De Lima v. Judge Guerrero, et al, 819 Phil. 616 (2017).

22 761 Phil. 356, 373(2015).

23 Rollo, p. 69.

24 Esteban Donato Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 232678, July 3, 2019.

25 Id.

26 Id

27 Dinamling v. People, supra note 22, at 376.

28 TSN, Testimony of AAA, April 26, 2016, pp. 7-8. (Emphases ours)

29 Id. at 12-13. (Emphases ours)

30 TSN, Testimony of Jaime Araza y Jarupay, January 18, 2017, pp. 21-22. (Emphases
ours)

31 Rollo, p. 79.

32 Id. at 44.

32 Id. at 76. (Emphasis ours)

34 TSN, Testimony of Dr. Kristina Ruth B. Lindain, August 22, 2017, pp. 12-14.

35 Id. at 18.

36 Rollo, p. 36.

37 TSN, Testimony of AAA, April 26, 2016, pp. 8-10.

 38 Id. at 12-13.

39 Id. at 22.

40 TSN, Testimony of Jaime Araza y Jarupay, January 18, 2017, p. 14.

41 Id. at 20-22. (Emphases ours)

42 Id. at 24-25. it

43 People v. Dizon, 453 Phil. 858, 881 (2003). (/

44 People v. Leonardo, 638 Phil. 161, 195 (2010).

45 People v. Peteluna, et al, 702 Phil. 128, 142 (2013).

46 Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. - In cases in
which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, x x x the courts shall observe for
the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are not
mitigating or aggravating circumstances: 1. When there are neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its medium
period.

FIRST DIVISION

January 11, 2018

G.R. No. 212448

AAA, Petitioner
vs.
BBB, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting psychological violence under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,  otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
1

Children Act of 2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit relationship
occurred or is occurring outside the country?

The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition  for the issuance of a writ
2

of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the Resolutions dated February 24,
2014  and May 2, 2014  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal
3 4

Case No. 146468. The assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the Information  which
5

charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, committed as follows:

On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [BBB],
being then legally married to [AAA], caused herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having
an illicit relationship with a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with his purported
paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter by his mother mentioning about the said
relationship, to the damage and prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the aforecited law.

Contrary to law.

We briefly recount the antecedents.

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City. Their union produced two
children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and DDD on October 1, 2009. 6

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent resident
status in September of 2008. This petition nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City
where his parents reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until March of
2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City. 7

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to no financial support, and
only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to
augment her income as a flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse,
BBB supposedly started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA and BBB
had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her visit with their kids.  As can be
8

gathered from the earlier cited Information, despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the
investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity. 9

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. AAA was also able to
secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who continued to evade the warrant of arrest.
Consequently, the case was archived. 10

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused With Omnibus Motion to
Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest  was filed on
11

behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby
dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:

Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in this case
and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear
showing that the acts complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper
since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

xxxx

The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that since [AAA] has been suffering from
mental and emotional anguish "wherever she goes'', jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this
Court notwithstanding that the acts resulting in said suffering had happened outside of the
Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it noting that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this
score considering that Republic Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act itself which had caused a
woman to suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred within the territorial limits of the
Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense. This amply explains the use of the emphatic word
"causing" in the provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes the bringing about or into existence
of something. Hence, the mental or emotional anguish suffered by a woman must have been
brought about or into existence by a criminal act which must logically have occurred within the
territorial limits of the Court for jurisdiction over the offense to attach to it. To rule otherwise would
violate or render nugatory one of the basic characteristics of our criminal laws - territoriality.

In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of (sic) access to the woman's child/children" - it becomes clear
that there must be an act which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation", and it is such act which partakes of a criminal nature. Here, such act was the alleged
maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a certain Liesel Mok" - which has been conceded to have
been committed in Singapore.

Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written, quashal of the Information
must still be ordered following the underlying fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved
in favor of [BBB]. At best, the Court draws the attention of Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction
spawned by the law.  (Emphasis in the original)
12

Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case,
AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA
posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and
worthless law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women have been
given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without fear of any consequence, as long as they are
carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential
element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her wherever she goes, and
not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where
she resides can take cognizance of the case.

In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis ours)

As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed order, AAA directs us to:

Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children.

In his Comment  filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of the motion to quash is in
13

effect an acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a criminal case may be appealed by the private
offended party; and. that this petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought before
this Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as counsel for the People in
appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers that the petition was belatedly filed.

We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should entertain the petition.

It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that the instant petition was
belatedly filed. The date erroneously perceived by BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for
Extension  was filed - June 2, 2014 - refers to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court and
14

not the date when the said motion was lodged before this Comi. The motion was in fact filed on May
27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the Rules of Court to file the intended petition.
Thus, considering the timeliness of the motion, this Comi in a Resolution  dated June 9, 2014,
15

granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014 to file a petition for review.

In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was awaiting the OSG's response
to her Letter  dated May 26, 2014 requesting for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive
16

to her plea for assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in her own
name before the lapse of the extension given her by this Court or on June 25, 2014.

We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be better served by
entertaining the petition if only to resolve the question of law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v.
People of the Philippines, et al.,   where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a
17

question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the OSG's participation, we
recalled the instances when the Court permitted an offended party to file an appeal without the
intervention of the OSG. One such instance is when the interest of substantial justice so requires. 18

Morillo,   also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

19

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide
the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either
because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the
offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is
not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word dismissal is
commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term acquittal, is when, after the prosecution
has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the
case on the ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the
merits. If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it
were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the court of competent jurisdiction; and
it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense
before a court of competent jurisdiction.  (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
20

The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an acquittal, which in limited
instances may only be repudiated by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave
abuse of discretion lest the accused would be twice placed in jeopardy. 21

Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court,
in case only questions of law are raised or involved."  "There is a question of law when the issue
22

does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or
falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the c01Tect application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter." 23

Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of the peculiar provisions of
R.A. No. 9262 is a question of law. Thus, in Morillo,  the Court reiterated that:
24

[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the complaint or Information, in
relation to the law prevailing at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty
provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves a
proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the jurisdiction of courts to
entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a question of law that can be properly brought to
this Court under Rule 45.  (Citations omitted)
25

We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the charge against BBB, much
less weigh the evidence, especially as the case had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the
merits. The issue for resolution concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given
set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are deprived of territorial jurisdiction over
a criminal charge of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital
infidelity and the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.

The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined that there is still as yet no
jurisprudence on this score, prompting it to quash the Information even as it maintained its earlier
October 28, 2011 ruling that probable cause exists in the case.  Calling the attention of Congress to
26

the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law,  the RTC furnished copies of the assailed order
27

to the House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate through the Committee on Youth,
Women and Public Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and Human Rights. 28

The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present economic reality that a
great number of Filipino families have at least one parent working overseas. In. April to September
2016, the number of overseas Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2 million,
97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas contract workers or those with existing work
contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas without contract.  It is thus necessary to clarify how R.A.
29

No. 9262 should be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case of psychological abuse
brought against the husband when such is allegedly caused by marital infidelity carried on abroad.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced
social and economic isolation of women, is also common."  In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No.
30

9262 made it a point to encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that may
be committed against women and their children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and their
children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:

xxxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or .unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information, threshing out the essential elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is
crucial. In Dinamling v. People,  this Court already had occasion to enumerate the elements of
31

psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.] No. 9262, the elements of
the crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with
whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they
may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children
or access to the children or similar· such acts or omissions.

xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological violence that are inflicted
on victims who are women and children. Other forms of psychological violence, as well as physical,
sexual and economic violence, are addressed and penalized in other subparts of Section 5.

xxxx
Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional
anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof
of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish
mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party. x x x.  (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
32

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital
infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to
outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological
violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the spouses and for a
myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional
anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct
element in the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,  the Court explained that:
33

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction.  It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts
1âwphi1

in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal
cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense
allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should
dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.  (Emphasis in the original)
34

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction. As correctly pointed out by
AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means
employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential
also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. The
resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element of damage in a
prosecution for estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses employed by the accused, as
shown in the vouchers, might have been perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution
of the criminal action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated. Deceit and damage
are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in this case appears to be a transitory or
continuing offense. It could be filed either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person
charged with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in part
committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the
crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of
either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the case will exclude the others x x x[.] 35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning
that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the
crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it
being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. 36

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence
under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside
Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of
the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended
wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence,
the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the information relates to BBB's
marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for the purpose of formally charging the
husband, and to establish the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise
remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is simply
whether or not a complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the
Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged extra-marital
affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does
not place a prosecution under R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated February 24,

2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No.
146468 are SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is
ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

*
 Section 44 of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004) requires the confidentiality of all records pertaining to cases of violence against
women and their children. Per said section, all public officers and employees are prohibited
from publishing or causing to be published in any format the name and other identifying
information of a victim or an immediate family member. The penalty of one (I) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand pesos (₱500,000.00)
shall be imposed upon those who violate the provision. Pursuant thereto, in the courts'
promulgation of decisions, final resolutions and/or final orders, the names of women and
children victims shall be replaced by fictitious initials, and their personal circumstances or
any information, which tend to identify them, shall likewise not be disclosed.

 AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING
1

FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENAL TIES

THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on March 8, 2004.

2
 Rollo, pp. 19-45.

3
 Rendered by Presiding Judge Maria Rowena Modesto-San Pedro; id. at 49-52.

4
 Id. at 53.

5
 Id. at 4 and 26.

6
 Id. at 57.

7
 Id. at 57-58.

8
 Id. at 58-59.

9
 Id. at 26.

10
 Id. at 27.

11
 Id. at 49.

12
 Id. at 50-51.

13
 Id. at 154-160.

14
 Id. at 3-6.

15
 Id. at 17-A.
  Id. at 15-17.
16

 775 Phil. 192 (2015).

17

 ld. at 215-216.
18

 Morillo v. People, et al., supra.

19

 Id. at 212, citing People v. Salico, 84 Phi I. 722, 732-733 (1949).

20

 Id. at 211.
21

 Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, 749 Phil. 823, 832 (2014), citing Rep. of the Phils., et al. v.
22

Sunvar Realty Development Corp., 688 Phil. 616, 630(2012).

 Id. at 832.
23

 Morillo v. People, et al., supra.

24

Id. at 214.
25

 761 Phil. 356 (2015).

31

 Id. at 372-376.
32

 680 Phil. 368 (2012).

33

 id. at 380, citing Isip v. People, 552 Phil. 786, 801-802 (2007).

34

 Tuzon v. Judge Cruz, 160 Phil. 925, 929 (1975).

35

 Morillo v. People, supra note 17, at 206.

36

G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated

August 28, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated September 10,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-
87386 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,5 otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004."
 The Facts

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation Section 5 of RA
9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
having the means and capacity to give financial support, with deliberate intent, did then
and there commit acts of economic abuse against one [AAA,6] and her minor son, [BBB]
(12 years old), by depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7
After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, he and
AAA entered into a compromise agreement8 on the civil aspect of the case. After the
RTC's approval of the compromise agreement on June 24, 2010, the criminal aspect of
the case was provisionally dismissed with Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year
later, or on June 24, 2011, the prosecution moved to set aside the compromise
agreement and to revive the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the
property, which was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of
his son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement.
Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed the
prosecution to present its evidence.9

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship with Melgar,
which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child. Melgar freely acknowledged the
paternity of BBB as evidenced by the latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as
numerous photographs showing Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with
Melgar turned sour as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was
just about one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a
case for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding, Melgar still
refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was constrained to file the
instant criminal case against Melgar.10

To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to provide support of
P8,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle with his family. He owns a
Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled in. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a
scholar at and she spends the amount of P20,000.00 a month for his needs, of which
she asked Melgar for P8,000.00 as support.11

For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce evidence due to his
repeated failure to appear during trial.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment13 dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and, accordingly, sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.14
The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA and their son,
BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the property which was
supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from 2001 to 2010.15

Melgar moved for reconsideration,16 which was, however, denied in an Order17 dated

May 9, 2013 of the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed18 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction. It held that
Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB.20 As such, when he deliberately and with
evident bad faith deprived BBB of support, he committed economic abuse under Section
5 (e) of RA 9262. In this regard, the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal
case was prompted by Melgar's evident refusal to comply with the judgment based on
compromise agreement, particularly, in providing support to his son; and worse, in
conveying to another person the parcel of land which was supposed to, among others,
answer for the support-in-arrears of his son from 2001 to 2010.21 Lastly, the CA ruled
that Melgar's acts "has clearly caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to [AAA] and her child[, BBB]."22

Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,23 which was, however, denied in a

Resolution24 dated February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Melgar's
conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of
violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or any person who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or
is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse.25 The said law defines economic abuse
as follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - x x x.

xxxx

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article
73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.

xxxx
As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the deprivation
of support of a common child of the man-accused and the woman-victim, whether such
common child is legitimate or not.26 This specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA
9262, pertinent portions of which read:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to desist from conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other hann, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the
woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
xxxx
Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.27 Notably, case law instructs
that the act of denying support to a child is a continuing offense.28

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA
had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his
paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter
was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent
when he sold to a third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among
others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no reason to deviate from
the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication
that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and
detennine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due
deference should be accorded to the same.29

In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar argues, inter alia, that
he was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262 as the Information alleged that
the acts complained of "caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to [AAA] and her son[, BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.30

Melgar's contention is untenable.

Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,31 punishes the act of

"causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access to the
woman's child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of violation of
Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to
show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts.
And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony
of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party."32 Thus, in cases of
support, it must be first shown that the accused's denial thereof - which is, by itself,
already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the
woman-victim and/or to their common child.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA
and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused
either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into
consideration the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a
crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged33 -
the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as
the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element
of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that

violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia, prision correccional. Notably,
while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided therein is
taken from the technical nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v.
People,34 the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties
found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,35 otherwise known as the
Indetenninate Sentence Law, viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the
minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond
what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the
landmark mling of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)]
that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the
penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such
circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would
also necessarily apply to the speciallaw.36
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties
under the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the
rules applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.37

Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on Melgar the
penalty of imprisonment for an indetenninate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, Melgar is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of
P300,000.00, to undergo a mandatory psycholo ical counselling or psychiatric
treatment, and report compliance to the court.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 28,
2015 and the Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR No. 02211 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar:
(a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum; (b) to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to
undergo a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report
compliance to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Caguioa, J., on official business.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 12-43.

2
 Id. at 50-61. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos with Associate
Justices Renato C. Francisco and Edward B. Contreras concurring.

3
 Id. at 64-65. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos with Associate
Justices Edward B. Contreras and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi concurring.

4
 Id. at 88-93. Penned by Presiding Judge Ester M. Veloso.

5
 Entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004.

6
 The identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members, shall be
withheld pursuant to RA 7610, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER
DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND
DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June 17, 1992; RA 9262,
entitled "AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,
PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on March 8, 2004; and Section 40
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, otherwise known as the "Rule on Violence against Women
and Their Children" (November 15, 2004). (See footnote 4 in People v. Cadano, Jr., 729
Phil. 576, 578 [2014], citing People v. Lomaque, 710 Phil. 338, 342 [2013]. See also
Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015, entitled "PROTOCOLS AND
PROCEDURES IN THE PROMULGATION, PUBLICATION, AND POSTING ON THE
WEBSITES OF DECISIONS, FINAL RESOLUTIONS, AND FINAL ORDERS USINU
FICTITIOUS NAMES/PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES," dated September 5, 2017.)

7
Rollo, pp. 50-51 and 88.

8
 Dated June 23, 2010. Id. at 85-87.

9
 See id. at 51-52.

10
 See id. at 89-90.

11
 See id. at 90-91.

12
 Id. at 52. See also id. at 92.

13
 Id. at 88-93.

14
 Id. at 93.

15
 See id. at 92-93.

16
 See motion for reconsideration dated February 4, 2013; id. at 94-98.

17
 Id. at 99-101.

18
 Not attached to the rollo.

19
Rollo, pp. 50-61.

20
 Id. at 60.

21
 See id. at 55-60.

22
 Id. at 60.

23
 See motion for reconsideration dated October 7, 2015; id. at 66-78.

24
 Id. at 64-65.
25
 See Section 3 (a) ofRA 9262. See also Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 66 (2013).

26
 Under the Family Code, parents are obliged to provide for their children, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, support which comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family. This obligation to give support is
demandable from the time the person who is entitled thereto needs it, and such
obligation may be enforced through a civil action for this purpose. (See Articles 194,
195, and 203 of the Family Code.)

27
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, 749 Phil. 823, 839 (2014).

28
 Id. at 840.

29
 See Peralta v. People, G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017, citing People v. Matibag,
757 Phil. 286, 293 (2015).

30
 See rollo, pp. 21-34.

31
 Under Section 3 (a) (C) of RA 9262, "'[p]sychological violence' refers to acts or
omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as
but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public
ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any
form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the
right to custody and/or visitation of common children."

32
Dinamling v. People, 761 Phil. 356, 376 (2015).

33
 See People v. Caoili, G.R. Nos. 196342 and 196848, August 8, 2017. See also
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
read:
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. - When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.
34
 See G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017.

35
 Entitled "AN ACT TO PROVIDE AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR ALL
PERSONS CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE
FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on December 5, 1933.

36
 See Quimvel v. People, supra note 34.

37
 See Peralta v. People, supra note 29, citing Mabunot v. People, G.R. No. 204659,
September 19, 2016, 803 SCRA 349, 364.

38
 Pertinent portions of Section 6 of RA 9262 read:
Section 6. Penalties. - The crime of violence against women and their children, under
Section 5 hereof shall be punished according to the following rules:

xxxx

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not
less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological
counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court.

Jesus C. Garcia vs. The Hon. Ray Alan T.

Drilon, Pres. Judge, RTC, Br. 41, Bacolod
City, et al.
G.R. No. 179267

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

- versus -

THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-
Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of
minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million
Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million - adhering to the teachings
of Jesus Christ.
 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ
loved the church and gave himself up for her
 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women.
The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for
the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse
and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the
women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups,
Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27,
2004.

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e,
husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom the woman has a common child.

 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of
barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers,
health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to complaints
of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition

 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the
part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the
former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent
adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years
old.
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved
around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent,
is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children.
He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends.
When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office,
petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was
often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one
point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner
admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He
even boasted to the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager.
Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of
their accounts with the bank.

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically
and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private
respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and
hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that
caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann,
who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for
squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for
fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware
of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he
would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of
despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her
wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house
instead of taking her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about
seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or
showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost
every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she
intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent
that he was leaving her for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives
with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his
extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child
with her.

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he
would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had
previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a
single centavo.
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep
wells. He is the President of three corporations - 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation - of which he and private
respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over
said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00
from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses
amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation
together with the bills for utilities.

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations.

 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold
office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are
conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said businesses.
Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of
pesos.
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO

 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family
home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he
refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this
order is enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty
Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow
the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any
danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner
shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.

The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March
2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from
her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help
and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the
Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or
indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters
and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the
future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK
and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the
Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should
also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a
house for them, and educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and
as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later
than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the
court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month,
under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the
Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a
BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient
sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion

 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO,

 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque,
the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be
finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO
 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply
with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that
the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and
returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2)
cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more
manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved

 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the
following modifications prayed for by private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings
of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be
declared in Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the

conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48
hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her
representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the
household furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be
submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
indirect contempt of Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk
of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to
faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and
their children, private respondent filed another application

 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of
which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering
the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of
replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with
long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.

While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to
go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-
Ann, by the arm and threatened her.

 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal
complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids
working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention
against private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a
TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her
things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent
filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,

 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another,

acts of violence against the offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise

communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or

agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's
three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the
petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter
the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as
from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact
the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to
pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children
through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK to the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and

Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00
and Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said
vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the
one taken by J Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and
those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini
St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal
assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia
and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2,"
including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served
a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the
transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person,
entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who
shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of
petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or
sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order

 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another
ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause
why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation,
 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order
 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless,
an Order
 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August
23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the
Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended
for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after
each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be
ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it
would only be an "exercise in futility."
Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition

 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of
the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified
TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order

 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed[^36] the
petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before
the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
Secondly, the challenge to the validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders
issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution

 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that -

The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE
THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO
CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT
R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.

IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES
VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262
AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the
appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by
petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the
trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.

 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of
Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a

statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level
as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act
of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of
domestic violence against women and children.

 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches
of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.
 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of
its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed
of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.

 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,
 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."
 The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare the
constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all RTCs.
 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA
 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or

executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262
could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the
same, subject to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their
Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an
opposition to the petition and not an answer.

 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. - (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim,
cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue
of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any
claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing
party.

 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original
action or of a counterclaim therein.
 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of
court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.
 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a
statute is not a cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or
a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the
opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo
because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the
very statute the validity of which is being attacked

 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and
purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have
deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
evidence.

 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of
a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further
hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the
form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one
day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary
protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing
when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said
order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be
necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without
necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB -
SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds
succor in a superior court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section
22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court.
Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was
improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is
prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall
not stay its enforcement,

 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,
 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.

 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,

 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with
respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of
course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the
community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The
imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence,
unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers
only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears
fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To
issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We
have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional
issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment

 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal
and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife,
gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under
the law.

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,

 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-
Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called
a "synthesized measure"
 - an amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the
"Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"
 - providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the
same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,
 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same
measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's
groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to
include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the
household, including children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the
efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims
really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would like
to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves
"WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe
so I placed here members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law
wives, and those related with the family.

xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this
to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The
understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just
women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation
period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get
me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in
the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not
decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming
they can at all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the
already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I
am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world.
Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given
equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino
man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this
bill because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the
other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence.
While women are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the
measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also
stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is
inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to
men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women.
However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards
in our courts which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and
whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the
family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold
inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family
members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family
members as a critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with
various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda
would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically
on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the
rationale mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I
am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept
this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the
amendment, Mr. President.

xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the
distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung
may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake,
puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove
the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment -

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. - more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter
of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old
children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their
mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will
update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only
women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in
the bill but not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment, as amended, is approved.

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency
of a statute.

 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to
women and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in
this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant
this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy
against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy,
wisdom and expediency of any law.
 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was
sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union

 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man,
woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of
inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must
be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held
that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is
based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not
violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence
and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under
the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is
the essence of true equality."

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for
Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and
men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate
people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in
society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form
of men's expression of controlling women to retain power.

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of
historically unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to
domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the
full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with
men."

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-
based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks
delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last
October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The
patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under
his control. I quote the early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy - the

institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally
inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether
slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as
property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife
if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of
society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the
eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife
were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the
entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their
wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat
their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or
inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given
more importance than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the
English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate
court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair,
choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the
same protection of the law that the husband can invoke for himself.

As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The
temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the
evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and
picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's
agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then,
the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the
public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern.
No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are
the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported
that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year.
The [American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates,"
because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well,
and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true
incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million
severely assaulted women per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be
physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their
male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife
beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most
visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic
isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they
perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in
shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of
income... Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United
States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed
by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The
United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the
equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role and rights of
women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The
UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half - and full - steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the
State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence
against women and children show that -

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing
55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were
2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number
of women in especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD
cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence
comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of
these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their
husbands and live-in partners.

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on

violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with
violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its
implementation in 2004,

 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23

Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201

Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness

Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29

Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155

Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police - Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against
men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many
men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who
had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11%
of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women
constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.

 Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause
injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence
from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses,
and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a
woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional
abuse.
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the
Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.

In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their
vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance
was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is
limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not
utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-
vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible
and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community."

 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of
the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.
C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against
women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then
United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the
U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the
widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of
rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" - first at the hands of the
offender and then of the legal system.

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor,
the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of
response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in
partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship."
Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable
greed" and of absconding with the contested property.

 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.

 Petitioner's contention,
 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and
"hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines
bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority
of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."
 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic
violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct
mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,
as follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women
and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to
protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on
August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the
Philippines on October 6, 2003.

 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men before the
law
  and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and women.
 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.
 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or
her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object,
making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat
of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking,
damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of
a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to
witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody
and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse
removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate
contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and
need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.

 Yet, petitioner insists

 that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right,"
"solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and
"causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of
spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings
or detailed in its provisions.
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even
lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected
to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,

 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in
the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had
 community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support;
harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her
verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of
family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened."

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is
to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life
and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves
to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated
family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to
prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner

 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"
 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when
the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of
VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order.
The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her
witnesses' affidavits to the petition.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
abscond or dispose of his property,

 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests,
  among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied
by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection
order should not be issued.

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the
fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future
employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a
mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006.
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow
him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006,
gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or
extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an
"exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only
for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said
order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be
heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from
the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check"
issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest
that this is so. It states:

SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some
or all of the following reliefs:
 xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If
the respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there
until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;

xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's
residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are
violated. How then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate
it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of

encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy
of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution."

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any
issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows:

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a

proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue
at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In
addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic
because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against
whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which,
under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts
as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay
officials to issue protection orders.

 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. - Barangay
Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of
this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the
protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the
basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application
for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the
BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation
by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to
effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and
administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance."
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and
(2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public
order in the barangay."

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers."

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must
determine reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of
a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence
and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and
that the chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials
and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and
to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of,
or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.

 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were
presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262,
which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 
 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight
against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a
hindrance to the struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment."

 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion:

See: Concurring Opinion
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 On official leave
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See Separate Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
See separate concurring opinion
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
*
 On official leave.

[ G.R. No. 229762, November 28, 2018 ]

AAA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
GESMUNDO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by AAA[1] (petitioner),  praying for the reversal of the July 22, 2016
Decision[2]  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01170-MIN and its January 12, 2017 Resolution,[3] which
affirmed the January 22, 2013 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 2 (RTC),  in Criminal Case
No. II-14837, finding petitioner guilty of violating Republic Act (R.A.)  No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004.

Antecedents

The information filed against petitioner reads:

That on or about February 17, 2010 in the City of [XXX],[5] Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of violence against his
wife [BBB],[6] as follows: by taking their conjugal properties and bring[ing] them to the house of his mother without
regard to her feelings and against her will which caused mental, emotional anguish to his legal wife [BBB].
Contrary to and in violation of Section 5(i) of Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence against
women and their Children Act of 2004.[7]

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, BBB (private  complainant)  and CCC, private complainant's daughter.

Private complainant testified that she and petitioner are husband and wife, then being married for 19 years. They
have two children, one of whom was witness CCC. Petitioner worked abroad while private complainant was a full-
time housewife. Petitioner sent money to private complainant and the children. From this money, private complainant
was able to buy household items: television set, refrigerator, karaoke, washing machine, dining table, and "sleeprite"
bed. The family lived in a house owned by petitioner's mother, while petitioner's parents lived in a separate house in
the same city.

On February 17, 2010, petitioner and private complainant had a heated argument regarding private complainant's
supposed indebtedness, to which the family's television set and refrigerator were used as collateral. Private
complainant said she incurred the debt to pay her siblings the money she borrowed in relation to petitioner's
applications for work. Petitioner hauled the family's television set, refrigerator, divider, " sleeprite" bed, and dining
table to his parents' house. Private complainant tried to stop him but petitioner " mauled" her.

The couple's daughter, witness CCC, testified that she saw her parents arguing, but she did not know what the
argument was about. She later saw petitioner removing several appliances and furniture from their house.

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented petitioner as its sole witness. Petitioner claimed that private complainant incurred debts from
a lending institution and from their neighbors without his knowledge or approval. The collateral for the loans were
their television set and refrigerator. Petitioner admitted that he brought the appliances and some furniture to his
parents' house for safety because the debt collector had told him that the sheriff would confiscate these the following
day. While petitioner was bringing out the items, private complainant blocked the door. Petitioner was enraged and he
pushed private complainant aside. He asserted that the household items were acquired through his hard work.
Further, he said that he did not know why private complainant incurred debts when he regularly sent her support.

Ruling of the RTC

In its decision, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime of violence against women under Sec. 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262 were satisfied. There was no question that petitioner and private complainant were married, as required by the
first element. The RTC viewed as constituting violence the petitioner's act of taking away all their properties over the
objection of his wife to the extent of physically harming and verbally abusing her. Petitioner's allegation that he only
wanted to protect their properties was not given credit for being uncorroborated and unjustified. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused [AAA] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5(i)
of R.A. No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, and the said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision  mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

The CA denied petitioner's appeal. The appellate court echoed the RTC's factual findings and conclusions. The CA
found that the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262 and as alleged in the information filed against petitioner. The CA highlighted that the element of mental or
emotional anguish was proved through the victim's testimony. The CA, however, found it proper to apply the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. Petitioner's outburst was triggered by the indebtedness incurred
by private complainant without his knowledge and consent. The CA remarked that petitioner's emotional response
was a natural reaction of a person who found that the fruits of his hard work had been squandered. Thus, the CA
reduced the penalty imposed by the RTC. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 22, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, [XXX], in Criminal Case
No. 11-14837, finding accused-appellant [AAA] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5(i), of
Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004"
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-Appellant [AAA] is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision  correccional,  as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor,  as maximum.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its January 12, 2017 resolution.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
I.

WHETHER THE PROSECUTION HAS OVERTHROWN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO
BE PRESUMED INNOCENT; and

II.

WHETHER THE ACT OF THE PETITIONER CONSTITUTES EMOTIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE.

Petitioner argues that: his act of moving their personal properties to his parents' house was not intended to inflict any
emotional pain on private complainant. He only did so to protect their properties from being taken away by the
creditors. He did not deprive his wife of the use of their properties and did not inflict any emotional violence upon her.
He reasoned that the act of protecting the family's properties against seizure cannot be considered as abuse or
violence under R.A. No. 9262. Private complainant's testimony is insufficient to prove psychological violence being
bereft of details as to her hurt feelings that can be directly attributed to petitioner. Lastly, the evidence proffered by
the prosecution failed to overcome petitioner's right to be presumed innocent.

In its August 11, 2017 Comment,[10] the Office of the Solicitor General maintained that: private complainant testified
candidly that petitioner's acts had caused her mental or emotional anguish and humiliation. Private complainant
averred that she was hurt, confused, and shamed when petitioner verbally abused her in the presence of their
children. In fine, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses in offenses punished under R.A. No.
9262, the latter being a special law.

OUR RULING

The petition lacks merit.

The information charges petitioner of violating Sec. 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, which states:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not
limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial
of access to the woman's child/children.
In Dinamling v. People of the Philippines,[11] the Court enumerated the elements that must be present for the
conviction of an accused, viz:

(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or
illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and

(4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.[12] (Citations omitted)

The Court will address the final two elements as the first two are undoubtedly present in this case.

The cited section has been ruled to penalize certain forms of psychological violence. As defined in law, psychological
violence refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering to the victim.
[13]
 Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect
caused upon or the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish this as an element, it is necessary to show
proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i). To establish mental or emotional anguish, the
testimony of the victim must be presented, as these experiences are personal to the party.[14]

The courts a quo found this element present as supported by private complainant's testimony:

Q: On February 17, 2010 at around 7:00 in the evening, could you still remember where were
you?
A: Yes, sir. I was at home.

Q: Was there anything unusual incident happened at that time?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that?

A: He mauled me.

Q: Do you know the reason why [the] accused mauled you?

A: Because I had incurred debts.

xxxx
Q: Before you were mauled by the accused, what happened prior to that incident?
A: He verbally abused me.

Q: What else, if any?

A: He put me into shamed.[sic]

xxxx

Q: What were those things that were taken away from the house?
A: Our conjugal things.

Q: What are those things taken from the house?

A: TV, Refrigerator, Divider, Sleep Rite, Dining Table.

xxxx

Q: What did you do, if any when the accused took these properties?
A: I tried to stop [him] and I was so hurt.

xxxx

Q: Who were with you at the time of the incident?

A: My children.

xxxx

Q: When your husband, the accused in this case, took those properties, what did you feel?
A: I was so hurt.

Q: What else?
A: I was confused what I want supposed to do.[15]

The trial court observed that private complainant was " so hurt and humiliated." Augmenting the pain brought about
by the situation was that petitioner "abandoned her and their children."[16]  The CA, for its part, remarked that
petitioner admitted to pushing private complainant. CCC also testified that the incident was not isolated, as similar
arguments and even physical abuse had already happened between them.[17] Evidently, the above portions of private
complainant's testimony, as well as the other statements made by private complainant mentioned in the CA and RTC
decisions, all prove petitioner had caused mental and emotional anguish upon private complainant.

Finally, private complainant's anguish was clearly caused by acts of petitioner parallel to those provided by the law.
Private complainant's suffering was due to petitioner's denying the use of the appliances and furniture commonly
owned by the family. Anguish causes distress to someone, or makes someone suffer intense pain or sorrow.[18] It is
doubtless that private complainant, by her own recount of the situation, was thoroughly distressed by petitioner's acts,
contrary to petitioner's averments.

In defense, petitioner insists that he was only preventing the appliances and furniture from being taken away and that
he did not intend to inflict emotional abuse on private complainant. His assertions deserve scant consideration. The
Court highlights that he not only gathered the appliances that were used as collateral for the loan, i.e.,  the television
set and refrigerator, but also took away the divider and even the "sleeprite" bed the family slept on. His very act of
depriving the entire family of such sleeping fixture does not justify his reasons. Moreover, his defense of lack of intent
to commit the crime is contradicted by what transpired. Private complainant tried to prevent petitioner from removing
the appliances and furniture from their house, but petitioner did it against her will and even hurt her. He could not
deny causing her harm, mental and emotional anguish, and humiliation when he also "mauled" her in front of their
children.

Petitioner claims that he has the right to be presumed innocent. Surely, Art. III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. To
overcome this presumption, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
mean such degree of proof as to exclude the possibility of error and produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty
is required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[19] All the elements of the crime
are deemed present; thus, the presumption of innocence is overcome.

The Court agrees with the RTC and the CA in finding the petitioner guilty of violating Sec. 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262.
However, the Court disagrees with the penalty imposed by the CA, most especially the application of the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation. It must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and allows the reviewing tribunal to correct errors, though unassigned, in the appealed
judgment. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision  of the penal
law.[20] This principle  has been applied by the Court even in petitions for review on certiorari.[21]

A number of cases state that an offense is defined and is ostensibly punished under a special law, when the penalty
therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature; necessarily, its duration,
correlation, and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code also apply. Modifying circumstances
may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even to reduce the penalty by
degrees.[22] However, in this case, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation should not mitigate the penalty
imposed on petitioner.

In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following elements should occur:
(1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which
produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time,
during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity.[23]  This circumstance is considered mitigating
because by reason of causes naturally producing powerful excitement in a person, he loses his reason and self-
control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.[24]
The elements for the consideration of the mitigating circumstance are missing. Private complainant did not commit
any unlawful act against petitioner that would cause such a reaction from him. Private complainant's acts also cannot
be considered as providing a legitimate stimulus justifying petitioner's reaction – where he lost reason and self-
control.

Further, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to include the imposition of a fine on petitioner and to
require him to undergo psychological counseling or treatment. These are additional penalties that are set by Sec. 6 of
R.A. No. 9262 in addition to imprisonment, thus:

SECTION 6. Penalties. – The crime of violence against women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall be
punished according to the following rules:

xxxx

(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.

xxxx

In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory
psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court. (Underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The July 22, 2016 Decision and the January 12, 2017
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01170-MIN are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
AAA is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision  mayor, as maximum. He is also
ordered to (a) pay a fine in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00); (b) to undergo mandatory
psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment; and (c) to report to the court his compliance with counseling or
treatment.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, (Acting Chairperson),** J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando, JJ., concur.

Peralta, (Chairperson) J., on official business.