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  Const it ut ion St a t ut es Exec ut ive Issua nc es Judic ia l Issua nc es Ot her Issua nc es Jurisprudenc e Int erna t iona l Lega l Resourc es
AUSL Exc lusive

Republic of t he Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

THE HOLY SEE, pet it ioner,

vs.
THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61
and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondent s.

Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

T his is a pet it ion for certiorari under Rule 65 of t he Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside t he Orders
dat ed June 20, 1991 and Sept ember 19, 1991 of t he Regional Trial Court , Branch 61, Makat i, Met ro Manila in Civil
Case No. 90-183.

T he Order dat ed June 20, 1991 denied t he mot ion of pet it ioner to dismiss t he complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183,
while t he Order dat ed Sept ember 19, 1991 denied t he mot ion for reconsiderat ion of t he June 20,1991 Order.

Pet it ioner is t he Holy See who exercises sovereignt y over t he Vat ican Cit y in Rome, It aly, and is represent ed in
t he Philippines by t he Papal Nuncio.

Privat e respondent , St arbright Sales Ent erprises, Inc., is a domest ic corporat ion engaged in t he real est at e
business.

T his pet it ion arose from a cont roversy over a parcel of land consist ing of 6,000 square met ers (Lot 5-A,
Transfer Cert ificat e of T it le No. 390440) locat ed in t he Municipalit y of Parañaque, Met ro Manila and regist ered in
t he name of pet it ioner.

Said Lot 5-A is cont iguous to Lot s 5-B and 5-D which are covered by Transfer Cert ificat es of T it le Nos. 271108
and 265388 respect ively and regist ered in t he name of t he Philippine Realt y Corporat ion (PRC).

T he t hree lot s were sold to Ramon Licup, t hrough Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., act ing as agent to t he sellers.
Lat er, Licup assigned his right s to t he sale to privat e respondent .

In view of t he refusal of t he squat t ers to vacat e t he lot s sold to privat e respondent , a disput e arose as to who
of t he part ies has t he responsibilit y of evict ing and clearing t he land of squat t ers. Complicat ing t he relat ions of
t he part ies was t he sale by pet it ioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Propert ies and Development Corporat ion
(Tropicana).

On January 23, 1990, privat e respondent filed a complaint wit h t he Regional Trial Court , Branch 61, Makat i, Met ro
Manila for annulment of t he sale of t he t hree parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
pet it ioner, represent ed by t he Papal Nuncio, and t hree ot her defendant s: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr.,
t he PRC and Tropicana (Civil Case No.
90-183).
T he complaint alleged t hat : (1) on April 17, 1988, Msgr. Cirilos, Jr., on behalf of pet it ioner and t he PRC, agreed to
sell to Ramon Licup Lot s 5-A, 5-B and 5-D at t he price of P1,240.00 per square met ers; (2) t he agreement to sell
was made on t he condit ion t hat earnest money of P100,000.00 be paid by Licup to t he sellers, and t hat t he
sellers clear t he said lot s of squat t ers who were t hen occupying t he same; (3) Licup paid t he earnest money to
Msgr. Cirilos; (4) in t he same mont h, Licup assigned his right s over t he propert y to privat e respondent and
informed t he sellers of t he said assignment ; (5) t hereaft er, privat e respondent demanded from Msgr. Cirilos
t hat t he sellers fulfill t heir undert aking and clear t he propert y of squat t ers; however, Msgr. Cirilos informed
privat e respondent of t he squat t ers' refusal to vacat e t he lot s, proposing inst ead eit her t hat privat e
respondent undert ake t he evict ion or t hat t he earnest money be ret urned to t he lat t er; (6) privat e respondent
count erproposed t hat if it would undert ake t he evict ion of t he squat t ers, t he purchase price of t he lot s should
be reduced from P1,240.00 to P1,150.00 per square met er; (7) Msgr. Cirilos ret urned t he earnest money of
P100,000.00 and wrot e privat e respondent giving it seven days from receipt of t he let t er to pay t he original
purchase price in cash; (8) privat e respondent sent t he earnest money back to t he sellers, but lat er discovered
t hat on March 30, 1989, pet it ioner and t he PRC, wit hout not ice to privat e respondent , sold t he lot s to Tropicana,
as evidenced by t wo separat e Deeds of Sale, one over Lot 5-A, and anot her over Lot s 5-B and 5-D; and t hat t he
sellers' t ransfer cert ificat e of t it le over t he lot s were cancelled, t ransferred and regist ered in t he name of
Tropicana; (9) Tropicana induced pet it ioner and t he PRC to sell t he lot s to it and t hus enriched it self at t he
expense of privat e respondent ; (10) privat e respondent demanded t he rescission of t he sale to Tropicana and
t he reconveyance of t he lot s, to no avail; and (11) privat e respondent is willing and able to comply wit h t he t erms
of t he cont ract to sell and has act ually made plans to develop t he lot s into a townhouse project , but in view of
t he sellers' breach, it lost profit s of not less t han P30,000.000.00.

Privat e respondent t hus prayed for: (1) t he annulment of t he Deeds of Sale bet ween pet it ioner and t he PRC on
t he one hand, and Tropicana on t he ot her; (2) t he reconveyance of t he lot s in quest ion; (3) specific performance
of t he agreement to sell bet ween it and t he owners of t he lot s; and (4) damages.

On June 8, 1990, pet it ioner and Msgr. Cirilos separat ely moved to dismiss t he complaint — pet it ioner for lack of
jurisdict ion based on sovereign immunit y from suit , and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper part y. An opposit ion
to t he mot ion was filed by privat e respondent .

On June 20, 1991, t he t rial court issued an order denying, among ot hers, pet it ioner's mot ion to dismiss aft er
finding t hat pet it ioner "shed off [it s] sovereign immunit y by ent ering into t he business cont ract in quest ion"
(Rollo, pp. 20-21).

On July 12, 1991, pet it ioner moved for reconsiderat ion of t he order. On August 30, 1991, pet it ioner filed a "Mot ion
for a Hearing for t he Sole Purpose of Est ablishing Fact ual Allegat ion for claim of Immunit y as a Jurisdict ional
Defense." So as to facilit at e t he det erminat ion of it s defense of sovereign immunit y, pet it ioner prayed t hat a
hearing be conduct ed to allow it to est ablish cert ain fact s upon which t he said defense is based. Privat e
respondent opposed t his mot ion as well as t he mot ion for reconsiderat ion.

On October 1, 1991, t he t rial court issued an order deferring t he resolut ion on t he mot ion for reconsiderat ion
unt il aft er t rial on t he merit s and direct ing pet it ioner to file it s answer (Rollo, p. 22).

Pet it ioner fort hwit h elevat ed t he mat t er to us. In it s pet it ion, pet it ioner invokes t he privilege of sovereign
immunit y only on it s own behalf and on behalf of it s official represent at ive, t he Papal Nuncio.

On December 9, 1991, a Mot ion for Int ervent ion was filed before us by t he Depart ment of Foreign Affairs,
claiming t hat it has a legal int erest in t he out come of t he case as regards t he diplomat ic immunit y of pet it ioner,
and t hat it "adopt s by reference, t he allegat ions cont ained in t he pet it ion of t he Holy See insofar as t hey refer to
argument s relat ive to it s claim of sovereign immunit y from suit " (Rollo, p. 87).

Privat e respondent opposed t he int ervent ion of t he Depart ment of Foreign Affairs. In compliance wit h t he
resolut ion of t his Court , bot h part ies and t he Depart ment of Foreign Affairs submit t ed t heir respect ive
memoranda.

II

A preliminary mat t er to be t hreshed out is t he procedural issue of whet her t he pet it ion for certiorari under Rule
65 of t he Revised Rules of Court can be availed of to quest ion t he order denying pet it ioner's mot ion to dismiss.
T he general rule is t hat an order denying a mot ion to dismiss is not reviewable by t he appellat e court s, t he
remedy of t he movant being to file his answer and to proceed wit h t he hearing before t he t rial court . But t he
general rule admit s of except ions, and one of t hese is when it is very clear in t he records t hat t he t rial court has
no alt ernat ive but to dismiss t he complaint (Philippine Nat ional Bank v. Florendo, 206 SCRA 582 [1992]; Zagada v.
Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114 [1992]. In such a case, it would be a sheer wast e of t ime and energy to
require t he part ies to undergo t he rigors of a t rial.
T he ot her procedural quest ion raised by privat e respondent is t he personalit y or legal int erest of t he
Depart ment of Foreign Affairs to int ervene in t he case in behalf of t he Holy See (Rollo, pp. 186-190).

In Public Int ernat ional Law, when a st at e or int ernat ional agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomat ic
immunit y in a foreign court , it request s t he Foreign Office of t he st at e where it is sued to convey to t he court
t hat said defendant is ent it led to immunit y.

In t he Unit ed St at es, t he procedure followed is t he process of "suggest ion," where t he foreign st at e or t he

int ernat ional organizat ion sued in an American court request s t he Secret ary of St at e to make a det erminat ion
as to whet her it is ent it led to immunit y. If t he Secret ary of St at e finds t hat t he defendant is immune from suit ,
he, in t urn, asks t he At torney General to submit to t he court a "suggest ion" t hat t he defendant is ent it led to
immunit y. In England, a similar procedure is followed, only t he Foreign Office issues a cert ificat ion to t hat effect
inst ead of submit t ing a "suggest ion" (O'Connell, I Int ernat ional Law 130 [1965]; Not e: Immunit y from Suit of
Foreign Sovereign Inst rument alit ies and Obligat ions, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]).

In t he Philippines, t he pract ice is for t he foreign government or t he int ernat ional organizat ion to first secure an
execut ive endorsement of it s claim of sovereign or diplomat ic immunit y. But how t he Philippine Foreign Office
conveys it s endorsement to t he court s varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA
130 (1990), t he Secret ary of Foreign Affairs just sent a let t er direct ly to t he Secret ary of Labor and
Employment , informing t he lat t er t hat t he respondent -employer could not be sued because it enjoyed
diplomat ic immunit y. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), t he Secret ary of Foreign Affairs
sent t he t rial court a t elegram to t hat effect . In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), t he U.S. Embassy asked t he
Secret ary of Foreign Affairs to request t he Solicitor General to make, in behalf of t he Commander of t he Unit ed
St at es Naval Base at Olongapo Cit y, Zambales, a "suggest ion" to respondent Judge. T he Solicitor General
embodied t he "suggest ion" in a Manifest at ion and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

In t he case at bench, t he Depart ment of Foreign Affairs, t hrough t he Office of Legal Affairs moved wit h t his
Court to be allowed to int ervene on t he side of pet it ioner. T he Court allowed t he said Depart ment to file it s
memorandum in support of pet it ioner's claim of sovereign immunit y.

In some cases, t he defense of sovereign immunit y was submit t ed direct ly to t he local court s by t he
respondent s t hrough t heir privat e counsels (Raquiza v. Bradford, 75 Phil. 50 [1945]; Miquiabas v. Philippine-
Ryukyus Command, 80 Phil. 262 [1948]; Unit ed St at es of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990] and companion
cases). In cases where t he foreign st at es bypass t he Foreign Office, t he court s can inquire into t he fact s and
make t heir own det erminat ion as to t he nat ure of t he act s and t ransact ions involved.

III

T he burden of t he pet it ion is t hat respondent t rial court has no jurisdict ion over pet it ioner, being a foreign st at e
enjoying sovereign immunit y. On t he ot her hand, privat e respondent insist s t hat t he doct rine of non-suabilit y is
not anymore absolut e and t hat pet it ioner has divest ed it self of such a cloak when, of it s own free will, it ent ered
into a commercial t ransact ion for t he sale of a parcel of land locat ed in t he Philippines.

A. The Holy See

Before we det ermine t he issue of pet it ioner's non-suabilit y, a brief look into it s st at us as a sovereign st at e is in
order.

Before t he annexat ion of t he Papal St at es by It aly in 1870, t he Pope was t he monarch and he, as t he Holy See,
was considered a subject of Int ernat ional Law. Wit h t he loss of t he Papal St at es and t he limit at ion of t he
t erritory under t he Holy See to an area of 108.7 acres, t he posit ion of t he Holy See in Int ernat ional Law became
cont roversial (Salonga and Yap, Public Int ernat ional Law 36-37 [1992]).

In 1929, It aly and t he Holy See ent ered into t he Lat eran Treat y, where It aly recognized t he exclusive dominion
and sovereign jurisdict ion of t he Holy See over t he Vat ican Cit y. It also recognized t he right of t he Holy See to
receive foreign diplomat s, to send it s own diplomat s to foreign count ries, and to ent er into t reat ies according to
Int ernat ional Law (Garcia, Quest ions and Problems In Int ernat ional Law, Public and Privat e 81 [1948]).

T he Lat eran Treat y est ablished t he st at ehood of t he Vat ican Cit y "for t he purpose of assuring to t he Holy See
absolut e and visible independence and of guarant eeing to it indisput able sovereignt y also in t he field of
int ernat ional relat ions" (O'Connell, I Int ernat ional Law 311 [1965]).

In view of t he wordings of t he Lat eran Treat y, it is difficult to det ermine whet her t he st at ehood is vest ed in t he
Holy See or in t he Vat ican Cit y. Some writ ers even suggest ed t hat t he t reat y creat ed t wo int ernat ional persons
— t he Holy See and Vat ican Cit y (Salonga and Yap, supra, 37).
T he Vat ican Cit y fit s into none of t he est ablished cat egories of st at es, and t he at t ribut ion to it of "sovereignt y"
must be made in a sense different from t hat in which it is applied to ot her st at es (Fenwick, Int ernat ional Law
124-125 [1948]; Cruz, Int ernat ional Law 37 [1991]). In a communit y of nat ional st at es, t he Vat ican Cit y
represent s an ent it y organized not for polit ical but for ecclesiast ical purposes and int ernat ional object s.
Despit e it s size and object , t he Vat ican Cit y has an independent government of it s own, wit h t he Pope, who is
also head of t he Roman Cat holic Church, as t he Holy See or Head of St at e, in conformit y wit h it s t radit ions, and
t he demands of it s mission in t he world. Indeed, t he world-wide int erest s and act ivit ies of t he Vat ican Cit y are
such as to make it in a sense an "int ernat ional st at e" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of Int ernat ional
Law 160 [1956]).

One aut horit y wrot e t hat t he recognit ion of t he Vat ican Cit y as a st at e has significant implicat ion — t hat it is
possible for any ent it y pursuing object s essent ially different from t hose pursued by st at es to be invest ed wit h
int ernat ional personalit y (Kunz, T he St at us of t he Holy See in Int ernat ional Law, 46 T he American Journal of
Int ernat ional Law 308 [1952]).

Inasmuch as t he Pope prefers to conduct foreign relat ions and ent er into t ransact ions as t he Holy See and not
in t he name of t he Vat ican Cit y, one can conclude t hat in t he Pope's own view, it is t he Holy See t hat is t he
int ernat ional person.

T he Republic of t he Philippines has accorded t he Holy See t he st at us of a foreign sovereign. T he Holy See,
t hrough it s Ambassador, t he Papal Nuncio, has had diplomat ic represent at ions wit h t he Philippine government
since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). T his appears to be t he universal pract ice in int ernat ional relat ions.

B. Sovereign Immunity

As expressed in Sect ion 2 of Art icle II of t he 1987 Const it ut ion, we have adopt ed t he generally accept ed
principles of Int ernat ional Law. Even wit hout t his affirmat ion, such principles of Int ernat ional Law are deemed
incorporat ed as part of t he law of t he land as a condit ion and consequence of our admission in t he societ y of
nat ions (Unit ed St at es of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]).

T here are t wo conflict ing concept s of sovereign immunit y, each widely held and firmly est ablished. According to
t he classical or absolut e t heory, a sovereign cannot , wit hout it s consent , be made a respondent in t he court s of
anot her sovereign. According to t he newer or rest rict ive t heory, t he immunit y of t he sovereign is recognized only
wit h regard to public act s or act s jure imperii of a st at e, but not wit h regard to privat e act s or act s jure gestionis
(Unit ed St at es of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Sant iago, Public Int ernat ional Law
194 [1984]).

Some st at es passed legislat ion to serve as guidelines for t he execut ive or judicial det erminat ion when an act
may be considered as jure gestionis. T he Unit ed St at es passed t he Foreign Sovereign Immunit ies Act of 1976,
which defines a commercial act ivit y as "eit her a regular course of commercial conduct or a part icular
commercial t ransact ion or act ." Furt hermore, t he law declared t hat t he "commercial charact er of t he act ivit y
shall be det ermined by reference to t he nat ure of t he course of conduct or part icular t ransact ion or act , rat her
t han by reference to it s purpose." T he Canadian Parliament enact ed in 1982 an Act to Provide For St at e
Immunit y in Canadian Court s. T he Act defines a "commercial act ivit y" as any part icular t ransact ion, act or
conduct or any regular course of conduct t hat by reason of it s nat ure, is of a "commercial charact er."

T he rest rict ive t heory, which is int ended to be a solut ion to t he host of problems involving t he issue of sovereign
immunit y, has creat ed problems of it s own. Legal t reat ises and t he decisions in count ries which follow t he
rest rict ive t heory have difficult y in charact erizing whet her a cont ract of a sovereign st at e wit h a privat e part y is
an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.

T he rest rict ive t heory came about because of t he ent ry of sovereign st at es into purely commercial act ivit ies
remot ely connect ed wit h t he discharge of government al funct ions. T his is part icularly t rue wit h respect to t he
Communist st at es which took cont rol of nat ionalized business act ivit ies and int ernat ional t rading.

T his Court has considered t he following t ransact ions by a foreign st at e wit h privat e part ies as act s jure imperii:
(1) t he lease by a foreign government of apart ment buildings for use of it s milit ary officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84
Phil. 312 [1949]; (2) t he conduct of public bidding for t he repair of a wharf at a Unit ed St at es Naval St at ion
(Unit ed St at es of America v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) t he change of employment st at us of base employees
(Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]).

On t he ot her hand, t his Court has considered t he following t ransact ions by a foreign st at e wit h privat e part ies
as act s jure gestionis: (1) t he hiring of a cook in t he recreat ion cent er, consist ing of t hree rest aurant s, a
cafet eria, a bakery, a store, and a coffee and past ry shop at t he John Hay Air St at ion in Baguio Cit y, to cat er to
American servicemen and t he general public (Unit ed St at es of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]); and (2)
t he bidding for t he operat ion of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles Cit y (Unit ed St at es of America v.
Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). T he operat ion of t he rest aurant s and ot her facilit ies open to t he general public is
undoubt edly for profit as a commercial and not a government al act ivit y. By ent ering into t he employment
cont ract wit h t he cook in t he discharge of it s propriet ary funct ion, t he Unit ed St at es government impliedly
divest ed it self of it s sovereign immunit y from suit .

In t he absence of legislat ion defining what act ivit ies and t ransact ions shall be considered "commercial" and as
const it ut ing act s jure gestionis, we have to come out wit h our own guidelines, t ent at ive t hey may be.

Cert ainly, t he mere ent ering into a cont ract by a foreign st at e wit h a privat e part y cannot be t he ult imat e t est .
Such an act can only be t he st art of t he inquiry. T he logical quest ion is whet her t he foreign st at e is engaged in
t he act ivit y in t he regular course of business. If t he foreign st at e is not engaged regularly in a business or t rade,
t he part icular act or t ransact ion must t hen be t est ed by it s nat ure. If t he act is in pursuit of a sovereign act ivit y,
or an incident t hereof, t hen it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undert aken for gain or profit .

As held in United States of America v. Guinto, (supra):

T here is no quest ion t hat t he Unit ed St at es of America, like any ot her st at e, will be deemed to have
impliedly waived it s non-suabilit y if it has ent ered into a cont ract in it s propriet ary or privat e
capacit y. It is only when t he cont ract involves it s sovereign or government al capacit y t hat no such
waiver may be implied.

In t he case at bench, if pet it ioner has bought and sold lands in t he ordinary course of a real est at e business,
surely t he said t ransact ion can be cat egorized as an act jure gestionis. However, pet it ioner has denied t hat t he
acquisit ion and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed t hat it acquired said propert y
for t he sit e of it s mission or t he Apostolic Nunciat ure in t he Philippines. Privat e respondent failed to disput e
said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by pet it ioner as a donat ion from t he Archdiocese of Manila. T he donat ion was made not
for commercial purpose, but for t he use of pet it ioner to const ruct t hereon t he official place of residence of t he
Papal Nuncio. T he right of a foreign sovereign to acquire propert y, real or personal, in a receiving st at e,
necessary for t he creat ion and maint enance of it s diplomat ic mission, is recognized in t he 1961 Vienna
Convent ion on Diplomat ic Relat ions (Art s. 20-22). T his t reat y was concurred in by t he Philippine Senat e and
ent ered into force in t he Philippines on November 15, 1965.

In Art icle 31(a) of t he Convent ion, a diplomat ic envoy is grant ed immunit y from t he civil and administ rat ive
jurisdict ion of t he receiving st at e over any real act ion relat ing to privat e immovable propert y sit uat ed in t he
t erritory of t he receiving st at e which t he envoy holds on behalf of t he sending st at e for t he purposes of t he
mission. If t his immunit y is provided for a diplomat ic envoy, wit h all t he more reason should immunit y be
recognized as regards t he sovereign it self, which in t his case is t he Holy See.

T he decision to t ransfer t he propert y and t he subsequent disposal t hereof are likewise clot hed wit h a
government al charact er. Pet it ioner did not sell Lot
5-A for profit or gain. It merely want ed to dispose off t he same because t he squat t ers living t hereon made it
almost impossible for pet it ioner to use it for t he purpose of t he donat ion. T he fact t hat squat t ers have
occupied and are st ill occupying t he lot , and t hat t hey st ubbornly refuse to leave t he premises, has been
admit t ed by privat e respondent in it s complaint (Rollo, pp. 26, 27).

T he issue of pet it ioner's non-suabilit y can be det ermined by t he t rial court wit hout going to t rial in t he light of
t he pleadings, part icularly t he admission of privat e respondent . Besides, t he privilege of sovereign immunit y in
t his case was sufficient ly est ablished by t he Memorandum and Cert ificat ion of t he Depart ment of Foreign
Affairs. As t he depart ment t asked wit h t he conduct of t he Philippines' foreign relat ions (Administ rat ive Code of
1987, Book IV, T it le I, Sec. 3), t he Depart ment of Foreign Affairs has formally int ervened in t his case and officially
cert ified t hat t he Embassy of t he Holy See is a duly accredit ed diplomat ic mission to t he Republic of t he
Philippines exempt from local jurisdict ion and ent it led to all t he right s, privileges and immunit ies of a diplomat ic
mission or embassy in t his count ry (Rollo, pp. 156-157). T he det erminat ion of t he execut ive arm of government
t hat a st at e or inst rument alit y is ent it led to sovereign or diplomat ic immunit y is a polit ical quest ion t hat is
conclusive upon t he court s (Int ernat ional Cat holic Migrat ion Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where
t he plea of immunit y is recognized and affirmed by t he execut ive branch, it is t he dut y of t he court s to accept
t his claim so as not to embarrass t he execut ive arm of t he government in conduct ing t he count ry's foreign
relat ions (World Healt h Organizat ion v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration
Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by t he cert ificat ion of t he Depart ment of Foreign Affairs.

Ordinarily, t he procedure would be to remand t he case and order t he t rial court to conduct a hearing to est ablish
t he fact s alleged by pet it ioner in it s mot ion. In view of said cert ificat ion, such procedure would however be
point less and unduly circuitous (Ort igas & Co. Lt d. Part nership v. Judge T irso Velasco, G.R. No. 109645, July 25,
1994).

IV
Privat e respondent is not left wit hout any legal remedy for t he redress of it s grievances. Under bot h Public
Int ernat ional Law and Transnat ional Law, a person who feels aggrieved by t he act s of a foreign sovereign can
ask his own government to espouse his cause t hrough diplomat ic channels.

Privat e respondent can ask t he Philippine government , t hrough t he Foreign Office, to espouse it s claims against
t he Holy See. It s first t ask is to persuade t he Philippine government to t ake up wit h t he Holy See t he validit y of
it s claims. Of course, t he Foreign Office shall first make a det erminat ion of t he impact of it s espousal on t he
relat ions bet ween t he Philippine government and t he Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against
Foreign States, Select ed Readings on Prot ect ion by Law of Privat e Foreign Invest ment s 905, 919 [1964]). Once
t he Philippine government decides to espouse t he claim, t he lat t er ceases to be a privat e cause.

According to t he Permanent Court of Int ernat ional Just ice, t he forerunner of t he Int ernat ional Court of Just ice:

By t aking up t he case of one of it s subject s and by report ing to diplomat ic act ion or int ernat ional
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a St at e is in realit y assert ing it s own right s — it s right to ensure,
in t he person of it s subject s, respect for t he rules of int ernat ional law (T he Mavrommat is Palest ine
Concessions, 1 Hudson, World Court Report s 293, 302 [1924]).

WHEREFORE, t he pet it ion for certiorari is GRANT ED and t he complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against pet it ioner
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

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