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War, Peace, and The Ideologies of The Twentieth Century
War, Peace, and The Ideologies of The Twentieth Century
War, Peace, and The Ideologies of The Twentieth Century
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CURRENT HISTORY
January 1 999
Born in war and shaped by competing ideologies, the " short twentieth
century " that Current History has chronicled will stand as one of the
bloodiest in history. James Kurth surveys the complex interplay between
war and ideology that has marked the last 85 years.
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4 • CURRENT HISTORY • January 1999
century as responses, first to the French Revolution quickly fell apart after Kaiser Wilhelm II dismissed
and then to the Industrial Revolution. Each had its him in 1890.
main base in an industrializing economy. Industry Once the "Great War" started, however, it had
and finance formed the base of liberalism (and cap- profound consequences for the existing ideologies.
italism). Conservatism's base was in agriculture, In the course of the four years of bloodletting, each
most obviously landlords but also on occasion (in ideology became a starker, harsher, more extreme
regions of France, Germany, and Austria) indepen- version of itself. Conservatism became nationalism
dent farmers. Industrial workers comprised radi- (especially in Germany and France), liberalism
calism's base. became democracy (especially in the United States,
This tripartite division was not wholly in equi- with President Woodrow Wilson's portrayal of
librium, with the relationship between the three World War I as a great struggle between democracy
parts shifting. The progress of industrialization saw and autocracy), and part of socialism became com-
a concomitant increase in the power of industry and munism (especially in Russia, with Lenin portray-
finance and decrease in the power of agriculture. At ing the war as a major struggle between competing
the same time, however, the growth of industry imperialisms).
induced growth in the number and power of indus- Had the Great War remained European, it would
trial workers, which steadily increased the natural have ended in a German victory, brought about by
base for socialism. This produced some rather odd Germany's defeat of Russia in the east in 1917 and
conjunctions and coalitions, such as the the German offensive in the west in the
Lib-Lab (Liberal and Labour) coalition in spring of 1918. The development of
Britain, the Radical-Socialist Party in In the summer of European history would have issued in
France, and conservative-initiated social German hegemony over the European
1940. . .national
welfare programs in Germany and Aus- continent. Only because of the United
socialism seemed
tria-Hungary. States entry into the war, and the mil-
Within an international context of the path to the lions of fresh American troops arriving
peace and progress, the natural, logical future. on the Western front in 1918, was the
development of this ideological system German offensive in the spring turned
might have led, in a mature industrial back and then reversed with the Allied
society, to a pattern defined by one ideology and offensive in the fall.
political party based on pro-capital positions, and The victory of the Western nations appeared to
another ideology and political party based on pro- validate their ideology of liberalism, including
labor views. But since labor had more voters than democracy and capitalism. This was the case not
capitalists, the pro-capital party had to add an ide- only in nations of the West, but initially also those
ological element to attract other voters. This ele- in the East, where discredited monarchies were at
ment could be variously pro-religion (Catholicism first replaced by apparent democracies. But
in France), pro-nation (nationalism in Germany), although defeated by the Western allies, Germany
pro-empire (imperialism in Britain), or against and Austria-Hungary were not conquered by them.
some particular group (anti-Semitism in Austria). And although convulsed for a few months in 1918
and 1919 by leftist revolutions, the peoples of Cen-
The radicalization of ideologies tral Europe were not transformed by them. The
The First World War was not caused by ideology absence of either conquest or revolution meant that
(although some simplistic analyses have blamed the pillars of the old social order and the old con-
nationalism or imperialism), but rather by the pecu- servative ideology - particularly the landlords -
liar form that the balance of power and the balance were, after being shaken up a bit, restored to their
of trade had taken by the beginning of the twenti- old place. Military defeat and the fall of the monar-
eth century. The real cause of World War I was the chies may have brought liberals and democrats to
inability of the old power and trade balances to formal power, but the deeper social realities were
absorb the great and rapid rise in the military and not liberal or democratic. These were now societies
economic power of Germany after its unification in traumatized by the vast, wasted sacrifices of the
1871. Bismarck had tried to use conservative ideol- Great War and by the grave threats from the com-
ogy (in the form of the Three Emperors League munist upsurge - a Red Scare or Great Fear that
between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia) to was especially compelling in the neighbors of Soviet
finesse Germany's rise in power, but this effort Russia. The Great War and the Great Fear served as
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War, Peace, and the Ideologies of lhe Twentieth Century • 5
the major ideological simplifiers in Central Europe: socialist political parties - born decades before in
liberals became more democratic and some even an era of international peace and led by older men
became radical; socialists became more Marxist and who had come of age long before the Great War -
some even became communist; and conservatives could not understand this yearning. But the new
became more nationalist and some even became fascist parties - with their glorification of the
fascist. nation, their rhetoric of combat, and their military-
style uniforms and routines - were perfecdy in tune
Fascism in fashion with it.
At the end of the twentieth century, the ideology For ordinary citizens the brief postwar period of
of fascism certainly appears to be unintelligent and communist upsurge had left a widespread fear of
unintelligible. This is especially the case with its revolution. This fear was especially intense, again,
most extreme version, national socialism. How in the defeated countries, Germany and Austria-
could these two ideologies have appealed to large Hungary (communist parties actually seized power
numbers of ordinary people in such advanced soci- for several months in 1919 in Hungary and the Ger-
eties as Germany and Italy? Today this phe- man states of Bavaria and Thuringia), and in Italy,
nomenon seems bizarre, even surreal. where for several years both industrial and agricul-
Sixty or seventy years ago, however, the percep- tural workers carried out disruptive strikes and
tion was quite different. During the 1920s, in the occupations of factories and farms. Middle-class cit-
aftermath of the First World War and the Bolshevik izens were haunted by the threats and insults that
Revolution, and especially during the 1930s in the they experienced during this period, and they
midst of the Great Depression, fascism and national sought assurance that the communists would never
socialism appeared to many to offer the best solu- again come to power.
tions to critical social problems. In particular, they Third, fascism combined popular elements of the
appeared to be better solutions than those offered two prewar nonliberal ideologies - conservatism
by liberalism or democracy and by socialism or (especially its nationalism) and socialism. Obvi-
communism. ously, this was most explicit with the National
The appeals of fascism and national socialism Socialist (Nazi) Party in Germany. From conser-
derived from three major sources: their relevance to vatism and nationalism, the new ideologies drew
the experience of frontline soldiers during the Great the idea that the state should control the society.
War; their relevance to the experience of ordinary From socialism they drew the idea that society
citizens during the Great Fear; and their creative should support the state. From both they drew the
combination of popular elements found in the ear- doctrine and practice that the state should and
lier ideologies of conservatism, including national- could impose constraints on free-market capitalism
ism, and socialism (but definitely not liberalism). and on particular political parties and, if conditions
First, the experience of frontline soldiers in required it, even impose direction on them.
World War I was unique in its unrelieved horror. The conservatives and nationalists had empha-
The uselessness and meaninglessness of the vast sized conditions of warlike economic struggle; the
expenditure in blood and treasure were especially socialists had emphasized conditions of depression-
painful in the defeated countries, Germany and induced economic stagnation. By the 1930s, both
Austria-Hungary, and in Italy, which, although for- conditions were clearly present. Operating within
mally a victor, actually gained very little in the the legacy of the Great War and the reality of the
peace settlement. For years, frontline veterans Great Depression, the fascists and national social-
would be haunted by their sacrifices and those of ists convincingly emphasized both conditions. The
their comrades, and they would seek recognition Great War had demonstrated the need for organi-
and redemption. The liberal, democratic, and zation, planning, discipline, and energy in running
the wartime economy. The Great Depression and its
attendant international economic struggles demon-
1 During the 1930s and 1940s, Americans often compared
strated the need for all these once again, i
Japanese militarism with German national socialism and
Italian fascism. The Japanese experience during the Great Within a few years after coming to power in
War, and with leftist threats, was completely different, how- 1933, national socialism eliminated unemployment
ever. Japanese militarism included elements of national
in Germany and appeared to have solved the prob-
socialism and fascism, but it actually had more in common
with the nationalism and militarism of Germany before the lem of the Great Depression better than any other
First World War. ideology - certainly better than the liberal govern-
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6 • CURRENT HISTORY • January 1999
ments of the United States, Britain, and France, The long duel
where unemployment hovered at 20 percent or The decisive defeat and conquest of Nazi Ger-
more. We now know that the astonishing success many and Fascist Italy in World War II served as a
of national socialism came at great costs: military great simplifier, removing fascism and national
rearmament and then military aggression. However,
socialism from serious contention and leaving the
this was not obvious in, say, 1936, the year of the
remaining two ideological families - liberalism/
Berlin Olympics, which provided another exhibi- democracy and socialism/communism - to confront
tion of the peacetime achievements of national each other in a long duel, which became the cold
socialism. war.
The coming of the Second World War brought a We have already noted that the experiences of
new demonstration of the superiority of national frondine soldiers during World War I in Europe led
socialism, with the extraordinary victory of the Ger- some of them to become fascists or national social-
man army over the French army in June 1940. This ists. Similarly, what partisan guerrillas experienced
brought Germany to where it would have been in during the Second World War in Asia led many of
the spring of 1918 had the United States not inter- them to become communists (in, for example,
vened in the First World War. At long last, after China, Korea, Vietnam, and Malaya). These
tremendous sacrifices but with ultimate redemp- wartime experiences would shape (and distort) the
tion, the natural development of European his- domestic policies of the communist regimes that
tory - German hegemony over the European came to power in China, North Korea, and North
continent - had been realized. The New Order of Vietnam; they would also guide the manner in
national socialism appeared to be the final solution which they would fight the United States in two hot
to the European problem of endemic wars in Asia, within what was the cold
international and social conflict. war more generally.
In the summer of 1940, this was the Liberalism now Among their other appeals, fascism and
reasonable conclusion to be drawn from national socialism had held that they
stands alone ,
the torturous path European history had could best protect and promote heavy
taken since 1914. Communism was of triumphant.
industry and capital goods (steel, chemi-
limited appeal everywhere, discredited by cals, machinery, and, of course, arma-
its 20-vear historv of brutalitv and terror. ments), especially with the collapse of
But liberalism was also of limited appeal on the international trade during the Great Depression.
continent, discredited by its failure to solve the Communism made the same claim, but it made
Great Depression and by its dramatic defeats in the heavy industry even more central to its ideology
new Second World War. National socialism seemed (Joseph Stalin's own name was a pseudonym that
the path to the future. meant "steel," and he seems to have considered
Of course, history soon took the opposite path. steel to be the solution for most problems). In this
Embedded within national socialism was its fatal respect, communism equaled national socialism
flaw: German racism. This racism derived more minus the capitalist organization of industry.
from the experience of the German minority within In the first two decades after the Second World
the Hapsburg Empire than from that of the over- War, communism proved to be very good at the
whelming German majority within Germany itself.2 rapid development of heavy industry and capital
It was this racist component that drove Hitler (who goods ("forced-draft industrialization"). These hap-
had grown up in Austria) to invade the Soviet pened to be the areas that had been so crucial to the
Union and that largely shaped Germany's occupa- Allied victories in the First and Second World Wars,
tion policies in the conquered territories in the East, and communists expected them to be crucial in
including, of course, the Holocaust. winning the cold war. This combination of war
communism and steel communism seemed to pro-
duce spectacular achievements for national inde-
pendence and national industrialization.
2To justify the privileged position of the German people (a
demographic minority) among the more numerous other By the 1970s, however, it became apparent that
peoples of the Hapsburg empire, the Germans were cast as this kind of communism was incapable of moving
an elite in the cultural (and also economic and political)
from a wartime environment to peacetime, from
sense. This ideology of cultural superiority, given the Social-
Darwinist fashions of the time, became an ideology of bio- capital goods to consumer goods, and from heavy
logical superiority, that is, racism. industry to high technology. Confronted with this
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War, Peace, and the Ideologies of the Twentieth Century • 7
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8 • CURRENT HISTORY • January 1999
tive way of reaching this stage of economic devel- Iraq, which is a non-Islamist state. For great-power
opment. But as the capitalist economies moved realists, the problem of Islamic fundamentalism can
beyond this level while communist economies did be readily handled by a policy of dual containment
not, it became clear that communism no longer and balance of power, that is, by using Iran and Iraq
produced national independence, but rather a new to contain each other.
form of international dependence. For political analysts who stress hostile great
National socialism's fatal flaw had been its ele- powers and military forces as the main threat,
ment of German racism. This meant that it could China - the leader of "Sinic civilization" - has clear
never serve as a stable ideology with which to gov- similarities to the pre- 1989 Soviet Union and with
ern multinational, multiethnic Europe. Commu- pre- 1945 Germany. Some Americans strongly
nism had an analogous fatal flaw. At its core was the believe that China will become the central threat to
idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which the United States, and that containment of China
might be seen as a form of proletarian classism. should be the organizing principle of American for-
Communism could never serve as a stable ideology eign policy.
with which to govern an economy that was moving It is possible, however, that not much will come
beyond heavy industry, a society composed of many of Islamic and Confucian resistance. Islam is not a
classes that together were more numerous than the monolithic force, but a religion variously inter-
industrial workers. Of course, the national socialist preted and practiced by many different peoples in
and communist regimes compensated for their lim- many different states, none of which has much
iting and unstable ideologies by developing brutal prospect of becoming a great power in international
and ruthless repression. politics. Furthermore, the current crisis in several
Asian economies has discredited Asian-style capi-
Resistance to liberalism talism based on the "Asian" or anti-liberal values of
Does liberalism confront any serious adversary authority and community, whether those values are
that could thwart its grand project of a global econ- rooted in Islam (Indonesia and Malaysia) or in Con-
omy and international peace? Samuel Huntington fucianism (Japan, South Korea, and the Chinese
has famously atgued that the central conflicts of the communities in Indonesia and Malaysia).
next century will not be between ideologies but Does liberalism have a fatal flaw, as did national
between cultures or civilizations. Already, the major socialism and communism? It is certainly difficult
resistance to the American-led liberal project has to discern one at this time. Liberalism was the prod-
been mounted by countries with either an Islamic uct of the international peace and economic growth
or a Confucian tradition and culture. They see lib- of what many historians call the long nineteenth
eralism as merely the distinctive product of West- century, the era between 1789 and 1914 that saw
em civilization. the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars, and
For Western political analysts who stress alien their lengthy aftermath. It then, astonishingly,
ideologies and terrorist actions as the main source turned out to be the ultimate victor in the world
of foreign threats, Islamic fundamentalism has clear wars - two hot and one cold - and economic
analogies with the previous enemies of liberalism, depression of what the historian Eric Hobsbawm
national socialism and communism. However, this has called the short twentieth century from 1914 to
analogy does not impress other political analysts - 1989. But wars and depression produced formidable
the "realists" - who see hostile great powers as the enemies of liberalism, which could only be van-
main source of foreign threats. They note that there quished at the cost of millions of lives and trillions
is no Islamic great power, certainly not in the cen- of dollars. As long as liberalism can deliver on its
ter of the Eurasian landmass and certainly not on promise to make the twenty-first century one of
the scale of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. The peace and prosperity, it will maintain its ideological
closest candidate is Iran, whose military threat was hegemony. But if that project should fail, the
contained by Iraq in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. twenty-first century is likely to be another century
The only other real potential threat in the region is of total war and ideological conflict. ■
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