The Baltics: Between Russia and the West

Author(s): James Kurth

Source: Current History, Vol. 98, No. 630, Russia (OCTOBER 1999), pp. 334-339
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/45318367
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 "For 800 years, the distinctive character of the Baltic countries has been shaped
by their peculiar and precarious position between the East and the West. That
position has generated for these countries both great creativity and great
tragedy. It is also a position that will not soon change."

The Baltics: Between Russia and the West

James Kurth

The principle reason Peter the Great became

three small nations whose cultures are very great was that he understood this reality and acted
different from that of Russia and very simi-
On different three the small northwestern from nations that of whose frontier Russia cultures and of Russia very are simi- very lie
on it. He did so through his military victories over
lar to those of the West. These are Estonia, Latvia, Sweden in the decisive Great Northern War of
and Lithuania, which collectively are known as the 1700-1721, which saw him conquer the Baltic lands
Baltic states. Seen by the Russians, the Baltic coun- and extend Russian power to the Baltic Sea. Peter
tries are a natural extension of Russia. Seen by the culminated his and Russia's drive to the Baltic by
Baltic nations themselves, they have all too often building a new city and new capital, St. Petersburg,
been in Russia, but they have never been of it. which he envisioned would become Russia's gate-
The Baltic countries were the westernmost exten- way to the West. For more than two centuries there-
sion of the Russian Empire of the czars and the after, the Baltic countries were under the political
Soviet Union of the Communists. Earlier they had authority of the Russian czars, and they guarded the
been for several centuries the easternmost extension military approaches to the Russian capital.
of German rule and culture. The German presence Peter had intended that St. Petersburg would be
in the Baltic countries was so pronounced that it Russia's window on the West, serving as a conduit
made the Baltics permanently a part of the civiliza- of Western ideas and ways that would enter, and
tion of the West. This Western character, so differ- progressively modernize, the vast Russian hinter-
ent from the Russian, would survive two centuries land. To a degree, his new city did come to serve
of czarist rule and a half-century of Soviet repres- this role. However, it was Peter's other acquisition,
sion, and it still distinguishes the Baltic states today. the Baltic countries, that performed the Westerniz-
The Baltic countries can properly be seen as both ing role even more clearly and consistently. This
the East of the West, and the West of the East. The was especially the case with the old city of Riga,
Baltics were first, in the thirteenth and fourteenth which became a busier and more successful port for
centuries, the object of the Germans' drive to the the Russian Empire than did St. Petersburg.
East and later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen- The Baltic countries performed this Westerniz-
turies, the object of the Russians' drive to the West. ing role so well because they were already a part of
Then, in the First and Second World Wars, they had the West, not just a window on it. Although they
the great misfortune to be the object of both. might be geographically the westernmost extension
of Russia, that is, the West of the East, the Baltic
The view from Russia countries were culturally the easternmost extension
From the Russian perspective, the Baltic coun- of Germany, or the East of the West.
tries are obviously a part of Russian geography. Rus- Five centuries before Peter the Great conquered
sia reaches its natural western frontier with the the Baltic countries from the east, the Teutonic
distinct geographical feature of the Baltic Sea. Con- Knights had invaded them from the west. Hence-
versely, no pronounced geographical features on the forth, the Germans held the economic and social
eastern borders of the Baltic countries establish a power in the Baltic countries. Most of the Baltic
natural frontier between themselves and Russia. countryside was owned by German nobles, and
most of the Baltic towns were dominated by Ger-
James Kurth is a professor of political science at Swarthmore man merchants, especially the cities of Riga and
College. Tallinn. Although the successive military victories

334

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of the Poles, the Swedes, and finally the Russians
enabled these peoples to succeed the Teutonic
Knights as the political authorities in the Baltic
countries, the economic achievements of the Baltic
Germans continued to give them the social power.
THE 'BALTIC SPECIAL ORDER'. . .
The Russian political authorities found it in their
interest to preserve and protect the economic posi-
tion of the Baltic Germans because they provided
educated officials, tax revenues, and Western con-
nections for the czar's regime. This preservation of
an economic and social part of Germany within the
political and military realm of Russia was known as
the "Baltic Special Order" (Baltisches Sonderrecht ).
Beneath the political power of the Russians and
the economic power of the Germans could be
found the original Baltic peoples, most of whom
were peasants. When, in the nineteenth century,
these peoples began to develop their own distinct
national identities - as Estonians, Latvians, and
Lithuanians - they followed the German models of
national development at the time.
One dimension of national development was the
recovery of national culture, or more accurately, the
invention of national tradition. The Baltic national
movements placed great emphasis on the establish-
ment of a distinctive national language, literature,
music, and artistic style. The other dimension of
national development was the construction of a
modern society. The Baltic national movements
emphasized the creation of a society that adhered
to and operated under Western, especially German,
standards in such areas as education, public health,
civic associations, and economic enterprise. By the
beginning of the twentieth century, the national
movements had largely succeeded in achieving the
cultural goals, and they were well advanced toward
achieving the social goals.
. . .AND ITS DEMISE
The Russian Empire and the Baltic Special Order
within it collapsed in the course of World War 1 and
the Russian Revolution. The Baltic peoples, through
their military achievements against both the Rus-
sian and German armies in 1918 and 1919, over-
threw the Russian authorities, expropriated the
German landed estates, and established themselves
as independent national states. From the Estonian,
Latvian, and Lithuanian perspectives, it was the nat-
ural fulfillment of their decades-long period of
national development.
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The Baltics: Between Russia and the West • 335
Russia saw the political and military indepen-
dence of the Baltic countries as the unnatural con-
sequence of temporary Russian weakness, brought
about by the world war, the Russian Revolution,
and the ensuing Russian civil war. With time, Rus-
sia would regain its natural and rightful power and
status. Then, the two-century norm established by
Peter the Great would resume, replacing the two-
decade anomaly of Baltic independence.
This resumption occurred in 1939 and 1940 with
the beginning of the next world war and the Soviet
annexation of the three Baltic states, which were
forced to become Soviet republics within the Soviet
Union. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin clearly saw him-
self as restoring or realizing anew a large aspect of
the understanding of Peter the Great and the suc-
ceeding czars: that the Baltic countries were the nat-
ural, westernmost extension of Russia.
Stalin did not see himself as restoring the other
aspect of that understanding: the idea that the Baltic
countries were a window on the West, which had
underlain the Baltic Special Order. Quite the con-
trary. Stalin's methods in the Baltic countries were
exceptionally brutal and destructive. His secret
police murdered or deported to Siberia more than
5 percent of the general population and more than
50 percent of the professional classes in each of the
three countries. Anything and anyone connected
with the West was liquidated.
Stalin's successors followed this line during the
1950s and 1960s. Thus, in the first three decades of
their rule in the Baltics, the Soviet authorities
repressed every expression of Western ideas and
ways. There seemed to be nothing left of a Baltic
Special Order.
The soviet window of vulnerability
In the last two decades of Soviet rule, the Baltic
countries once again became Russia's window on
the West. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet
Union began to allow local Baltic initiatives in some
cultural, social, and economic areas, and these ini-
tiatives quickly emulated Western models. Western
cultural innovations and economic practices often
first entered into the Soviet Union through experi-
ments within the Baltic republics, from which they
then spread to Russia and beyond. Although this
was hardly a robust version of a Baltic Special
Order, a common view in the Soviet Union was that
the Baltic republics were clearly the most European
of the Soviet republics, and they were known as the
"Soviet West."
336 • CURRENT HISTORY • October 1999
In August 1989, on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the Nazi-Soviet Pact that had con-
signed them to Soviet rule, the three Baltic republics
took the lead among the Soviet republics in demand-
ing freedom from Soviet rule. Their demand for
autonomy soon became one for full independence.
In August 1991 the three Baltic countries succeeded
in gaining this independence, and in December
1991, when the other republics also broke away, the
Soviet Union disintegrated entirely. The window on
the West had let in a political hurricane.
A decade later the Baltic nations are still, in sev-
eral senses, a window on the West for Russia. First,
a large part of the Russian underground economy
connects and operates with Western economies
through the Baltic countries, especially through the
port cities of Riga and Tallinn (the capitals of Latvia
and Estonia, respectively). Second, large Russian
minorities reside in Latvia (33 percent of the pop-
ulation) and Estonia (28 percent); Russians also
form a majority of the population in Riga and in
Tallinn. Russian demography, as well as Russian
geography, still reaches to the Baltic Sea. Third, the
Baltic countries form a military and strategic buffer
between Russia and the recently expanded nato
(especially its easternmost member, Poland).
Most Russians see the political and military inde-
pendence of the Baltic states as the regrettable con-
sequence of an abnormal Russian weakness,
brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the confusion and disorder of succeeding Rus-
sian governments. They view this kind of full inde-
pendence for the Baltic countries as unnatural and
unhistorical. And the efforts of the Baltic states to
become political and military allies of the West -
that is, to become members of nato - are seen as
threatening and insulting.
For Russia, reasonable and acceptable indepen-
dence for the Baltic states should follow the model
of Finnish independence: to be economically and
culturally part of the West, politically independent
of the West and Russia, and militarily neutral and
unthreatening to Russia. When Russia regains its
natural and rightful power and status, some version
of the norm established by Peter the Great should
once again resume, replacing the recent anomaly of
Baltic full independence. With this resumption,
however, and unlike that of Stalin, some new ver-
sion of Russia's window on the West and the Baltic
Special Order may arise.
Russia sees several possible models for this new
Baltic Special Order. First is the Finland-like status,
with economic, cultural, and political - but not mil-
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itary - independence. Next would be a status like
that of the Baltic Germans under the czars, with eco-
nomic and cultural independence, but not political
and military independence. Next would be a status
like that of the Baltic republics in the later Soviet
Union: no real independence but still a conduit of
selected Western ways, a window on the West.
Finally, there would be the low status and dreary
specter represented by what is another Baltic terri-
tory, although its population is now completely
Russian. This is the geographical anomaly that is
the Kaliningrad region of Russia, which, before
World War II, was the East Prussian region of Ger-
many. Here the Russians have demolished virtually
everything Western. Kaliningrad, to the immediate
south of the Baltic states, is the total opposite of
Finland, to the immediate north.
THE BALTIC PERSPECTIVE
The Baltic peoples view themselves as distinct
from other nations, and from each other. But their
conceptions of what a proper nation should be have
always been defined by the conceptions of the
nations to the West. Although this has been espe-
cially the case with Germany, the Baits have also
been attentive to the ideas of other nations, espe-
cially if they were the leading Western powers of
the time (Britain after World War I and the United
States since World War II).
During their first period of national indepen-
dence in the 1920s and 1930s, the Baltic states were
among the smallest nations in Europe. Their popu-
lations at that time (Estonia, 1.1 million; Latvia, 1.9
million; Lithuania, 2.9 million) were even less than
that of Denmark. But these new and miniature
nation-states adhered to and operated under the
cultural and economic standards of those that were
the largest and most advanced (Estonia, for exam-
ple, had one of the highest literacy rates in the
world, and Latvia was not far behind).
The Baltic nations have always believed, there-
fore, that they should and could learn from the
West. Conversely, they have almost always believed
that the Russians have nothing to teach them. (An
exception was some elements of the Latvian indus-
trial workers at the time of the Russian Revolution.)
The Baltic nations fear and loath the Russians, even
more after the Soviet period than after the czarist.
They also fear and loath the very thought of sink-
ing to Russian standards. Even when the Germans
oppressed and exploited the Baltic peoples, they
provided the Baits with many of their models. In
contrast, the Russians under both the czarist and
 The Baltics: Between Russia and the West • 337

Soviet regimes oppressed and exploited the Baits ulation of Estonia, 27 percent of Latvia, and 9 per-
and provided no models. In contrast again, the cent of Lithuania. The Sovietization and Russifica-
British and the Americans, who have been too dis- tion continued, especially in Estonia and Latvia. In
tant from the Baltic countries to pose a threat to 1989, on the eve of Baltic independence, the Rus-
them, have provided only models. From the Baltic sians comprised 30 percent of the population of
perspective, the United States - both Western and Estonia and 34 percent of that of Latvia (and it
remote - is the perfect great power. remained at 9 percent of Lithuania).
After almost a decade of independence, the Rus-
The Russian question sian minority is only slightly smaller: 28 percent in
In this Baltic conception of the region as the East Estonia, 33 percent in Latvia, and 8 percent in
of the West, the Russian minority in the Baltic states Lithuania. Despite being the objects of Baltic polit-
has a special, and unstable, place. It is seen as an ical discrimination, the Russians are often the ben-
alien body, a eficiaries of
form of East in RUSSIANS IN Baltic eco-
the West. THE BALTIC STATES nomic growth.
The Russian They have con-
minority in the cluded that it
Baltic countries is better to be a
is largely a second-class
product of the citizen in a
Soviet occupa- Baltic country
tion. In the than a first-
interwar class citizen in
period, Rus- Russia.
sians com- The Rus-
prised only 8 sians largely
percent of the live in vast and
population of ugly working-
Estonia, 9 per- class suburbs.
cent of Latvia, Most are not
and 3 percent citizens of the
of Lithuania. new states. The
During the granting of
Soviet period, citizenship is
authorities closely tied to
brought in vast knowledge of
numbers of © Current History, Inc.
the national
Russians (and language, and
also Belarusians and Ukrainians) to work in the most Russians are unwilling or unable to learn
new factories in heavy indus-tries (known as "black these obscure and difficult tongues.
work"), which the re-gime built acc-ording to The Russians in the Baltics have the same social
Soviet concepts of industrialization. They also attitudes and behavior as the Russians in Russia:
brought in large numbers of Russians and other many are conspicuously sullen, surly, and self-pity-
Soviet nationalities to serve as soldiers and sailors ing. The Russians young men are especially antiso-
in the great network of military bases that the cial. Their behavior in public places typically is
regime built. Many officers in the military and secu- crude, mean-spirited, and drunken. And then there
rity services found the Baltic republics so congenial are the wannabes of the Russian Mafia, dressed in
that they retired there. These included officers of black. The Russian minority is in the Baltic coun-
the KGB, the Soviet secret police. tries, but not of them.
By 1959 these two processes of industrialization From the perspective of the Baltic nations, the
and militarization, Soviet style, had greatly altered Russian minority is a legacy of Soviet colonial occu-
the ethnic structure of the Baltic countries. In that pation, a collaborator with the Soviet totalitarian
year the Russians comprised 20 percent of the pop- regime, and a product of the worst excesses of

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338 • CURRENT HISTORY • October 1999

Soviet industrialization and militarization. Like the
abandoned industrial factories and military bases,
the Russian minority is thought of as something
like a toxic waste dump. It represents the nightmare
of the past rather than the promise of the future,
Eurasia rather than Europe, the East rather than the
West, and, in the minds of many Baits, even bar-
barism rather than civilization. As the Baltic nations
see it, the more Russian their countries remain, the
less Western they will become.
The characteristics of the Russian minority and
the attitudes of the Baltic nations toward it create a
serious problem for democracy in the Baltic states.
For the Baltic nations, to grant full citizenship and
equal rights to the Russians would be to reverse their
epic journey toward the West and to stumble back
toward the East. This problem for Baltic democracy
is compounded by differences in politi-
cal culture. The political culture of the
Baltic nations, especially the Estonians
and Latvians, is like that of the Scandi-
[Stalin's] secret
navians: democratic, rationalist, and police murdered or
legalist. The political culture of the Rus- deported to Siberia
sian minority is like that of Russia itself:
more than 5
authoritarian, ethnocentric, and populist.
percent of the
If democracy is defined by adherence
to democratic values, a substantive defi- general population.
nition, then Baltic democracy will best
operate if it is limited to the Baltic peo-
ples themselves; it will be in danger of
ceasing to operate if it is extended to large numbers
of Russians. This substantive conception of democ-
racy is the one held by the Baltic nations. Yet if
democracy is defined by adherence to democratic
procedures, a formal definition, then Baltic democ-
racy must be extended to include all or most Rus-
sians. This formal conception appears superficial and
frivolous to the Baltic nations.
It is this formal conception, however, that is
advanced by political and intellectual elites in West-
ern Europe and especially in the United States.
These elites are now largely believers in the ideolo-
gies of multicultural diversity and universal human
rights. To them, the idea that the Baltic countries
might better be seen as cases of bipolar division
rather than multicultural diversity, and of historic
communal identities rather than universal human
rights, is politically incorrect.
The governments of Western Europe and the
United States, along with the European Union (eu)
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (osce), have pressured the Baltic states
to loosen their citizenship requirements and open
their political processes to the Russian minority.
From the perspective of the Baltic nations, this
would have the paradoxical result that, in order for
them to become more Western in form, and as
members of Western international organizations
(the EU, osce, and perhaps nato), they must become
less Western in substance.
In response to this pressure from Western gov-
ernments and international organizations, Estonia
and Latvia in 1998 liberalized their citizenship
requirements; Russian children born in these coun-
tries after 1991 (the date of independence) will
become citizens almost automatically, and the num-
ber of Russians who can be certified for the national
language requirement has been increased. But this
year the Latvian parliament has moved to have gov-
ernment business conducted only in the Latvian lan-
guage, setting off another round of
criticisms from Russia and the West. The
conjoined issues of the citizenship rights
and the language rights of the Russian
minority will continue to trouble both
the national identity and the interna-
tional relations of the Baltic states.
From the balkans to the Baltics
The nato air war against Serbia in
the spring of 1999 could establish an
ominous precedent for future Russian
actions against the Baltic states. The
United States and nato argued that the Serbs were
engaging in gross violations of the human rights of
the Albanian majority in Kosovo, a region of Serbia.
This justified nato military operations, including
the bombing of Belgrade and other Serbian cities
outside Kosovo. The bombing continued until the
Serbs accepted nato's demands for the autonomy
(and de facto independence) of the Albanians in
Kosovo, backed up by the occupation of the region
by nato military forces.
During the Kosovo campaign Russia saw itself as
the historical ally of Serbia. Although in its current
weakness it could do nothing substantial in military
terms to help the Serbs, it did engage in many sym-
bolic actions, including the preemptive occupation
of Kosovo's Pristina airport by a small contingent of
Russian soldiers. In any event, Russia never consid-
ered the nato arguments and actions to be legitimate.
Russia may now consider these arguments to be
a precedent, for it can see potential parallels
between recent nato interpretations of the situation
in the Balkans and its own interpretations of the sit-
uation in the Baltics. From the Russian perspective,

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the Estonians and the Latvians are engaged in the
extensive denial of the human rights of the Rus-
sians. Although the Russians are a minority of the
total population of Estonia and Latvia, they consti-
tute a majority in the eastern districts, which bor-
der on Russia. They are also a majority in the
capital cities of Tallinn and Riga. And although the
extensive denial of human rights is not the same as
their gross violation through murder and expulsion,
as in Kosovo, the Russian security agencies have
long experience in inflating incidents (or even pro-
voking them) for purposes of propaganda within
Russia itself.
Further, although the nato intervention in Ser-
bia was legitimated by the approval of two major
international organizations (the eu as well as nato),
and a Russian intervention would have no chance
of gaining the approval of any international organi-
zation, in Russian eyes this lack of international
legitimacy could be compensated by demographic
affinity and geographic proximity. Russians would
be coming to the aid of Russians, a far more com-
pelling calling than Americans coming to the aid of
Albanians. And they would be doing so in territo-
ries that, for most of the past three centuries, Rus-
sians have ruled and have seen as a natural
extension of Russia itself. (In 1998 the Russian mil-
itary conducted maneuvers on the border of Esto-
nia, which were code-named "Operation Return.")
NATO'S NEWEST MEMBERS?
The potential Russian threat to the Baltic states
poses the question of NATO's further expansion to
the east. Should nato's recent admission of Poland,
the Czech Republic, and Hungary be followed by a
"second round of enlargement," which would
include the Baltic states? The Baltic nations cer-
tainly think so. For them, nato membership would
be a full and formal recognition by Western Europe
and the United States that they are indeed the East
of the West, and also a full and formal deterrent
against Russia, making them once again the West
of the East. Further, the Clinton administration has
made statements that have encouraged the Baltic
nations to think they will be included in the next
round of nato expansion.
It is not clear, however, that a political base
within Western Europe and the United States is
sufficient to support a full nato commitment to the
Baltic states. In particular, are the United States
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The Baltics: Between Russia and the West • 339
Senate (which must ratify a treaty) and the United
States Army (which must compose a strategy)
likely to assume an obligation to guarantee the mil-
itary security of these three small countries that
border Russia, are within 150 kilometers of Rus-
sia's second-largest city, St. Petersburg, and contain
large and alienated Russian minority populations?
What would be nato's military strategy? If it were
conventional defense, how would this be possible?
If it were nuclear deterrence, how would this be
credible? Finally, even if American congressional
and military leaders should agree to a guarantee
given the current weakness of Russia and its mili-
tary, what would this guarantee look like if Russian
strength should revive a decade or two from now?
The Baltics see membership in nato as desirable,
even essential. For the United States it may seem
impractical, even impossible. This contradiction
suggests the need to search for a new version of a
Baltic Special Order.
Creating a new baltic special order
The old Baltic Special Order was designed by
Russia and saw the Baltics as the West of the East.
While giving primacy to Russian security interests,
it also preserved Baltic economic and cultural
autonomy. The new Baltic Special Order could be
designed by the United States, along with Western
Europe, and would see the Baltics as the East of the
West. While giving primacy to Baltic economic, cul-
tural, and political independence, it would also pre-
serve Russian security interests. One possible model
for this combination, as was noted earlier, is Fin-
land. Before the Soviet period, Finland often fol-
lowed a path similar to that of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, and it was often defined as a Baltic coun-
try. Perhaps in the future the four countries can be
similar again, all in a special Baltic way.
For 800 years, the distinctive character of the
Baltic countries has been shaped by their peculiar
and precarious position between the East and the
West. That position has generated for these coun-
tries both great creativity and great tragedy. It is also
a position that will not soon change. The task of the
West, and especially the United States, is to bring its
strategic vision and diplomatic skills to support
Baltic independence and security, while maintaining
and strengthening peaceful and productive relations
with Russia. It will take the best of the West to pre-
serve and protect this easternmost part of itself. ■