The Legislative Department Cases:

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm

FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The said law originated from House Bill
No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao,
and San Fernando were combined with the second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second
legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the constitutional
standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand ( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative
district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.

HELD:

NO. The second sentence of  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of
a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned
about the population. Meanwhile, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to
be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Mariano v COMELEC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista,
Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante
Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned
sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there
must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many
contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this abstract
issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
 ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR.,
Petitioners, – versus – HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

Constitutional Law | Legislative Department | Composition of the House of Representatives | Legislative Districts

Art VI, Sec 5. Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by ordinary legislation. – Art VI, Sec
5 (1). 250k is the minimum required population of a city to have more than one legislative district. – Art VI, Sec 5 (3).

FACTS:

Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. RA 7675 was enacted which in effect
converted the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized City and divided the legislative district of
Mandaluyong and San Juan into 2 separate districts. Petitioners as taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong assail the
constitutionality of the RA contending it is contrary to Secs 5(1), 5(4), 26(1) and 26(2) of Art VI of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

(1) Is RA 7675 contrary to Art VI, Sec 5(1) of the Constitution?

(2) Is it contrary to Sec 5(4) of the same?

(3) Is it contrary to Sec 26(1)?

(4) Is it contrary to Sec 26(2)?

RULING:

(1) No. To the argument that the RA resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Reps beyond that
provided in Art VI, Sec 5(1) is thus contrary to the same, the court found no merit. The Constitution clearly provides that
the present composition of the House of Reps may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through legislative
enactment.

(2) No. To the argument that the RA in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant
to Art VI, Sec 5(4), it was held bordering on the absurd. It was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

(3) No. To the argument that the division of Mandaluyong and San Juan into 2 separate districts was not sufficiently
embraced in the title contrary to Art VI, Sec 26(1), the Court held in the negative. The creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city, but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion xxx. Thus, the title necessarily includes
the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. A liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule
has been invariably adopted so as not to cripple legislation. It should be given practical rather than technical
construction; it sufficiently complies with the rule if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are
germane to that general subject.

(4) No. To the argument that there is no mention in the RA of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had
each attained the minimum requirement of 250k inhabitants provided in Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution to justify
their separation, the Court held that the reason does not suffice. The Act enjoys the presumption of having passed
through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements of the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, It is not required that all laws emanating
from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. 177597 • July 16, 2008 • En Banc

Constitutional Law | Legislative Department | Apportionment of legislative districts

FACTS:

Congress enacted RA 9054, the Section 19, Article VI of which delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

Pursuant to such delegation, the ARMM Regional Assembly enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA
Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao.

ISSUES:

(1)

Whether or not Congress validly delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for
the House of Representatives;

(2)

Whether or not RA 9054 is constitutional;

(3)

Whether or not MMA Act 201 is void.

RULING:

(1) No. The power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create
a legislative district.

Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The
power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or
local legislative bodies enact.

(2)

RA 9054 is unconstitutional. (See above ruling.)

(3)

MMA Act 201 is void. (See above ruling.)

Romuldez-Marcos vs. COMELEC

GR 119976, 248 SCRA 300 [Sept 18, 1995]

QUALIFICATIONS of the Members of the House of Representatives Art. VI, Sec 6. For purposes of the Election law,
“residence” is the same as “domicile”. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment
of the old one.

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban, Leyte, ran for Congress representing the 1st
district of Leyte. Her adversary, Montejo, sought to disqualify her candidacy on the ground that, among others, she is
not a resident of at least 1 year of Tacloban and therefore she did not satisfy the residency requirement mandated by
Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution as she in fact wrote in her Certificate of Candidacy that she resided “in the constituency
where” she sought “to be elected” for only “seven months”. She later claimed it to be an honest mistake brought about
by confusion and asserted that it is in fact her domicile “since childhood”. However, COMELEC resolved in favor of
Montejo and contended that Imelda’s domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except
Tacloban. In its resolution, COMELEC cited San Juan, Metro Mla. and San Miguel, Mla. as places where she resided and
served certain positions. Mention was even made of her residence in Malacañang and Honolulu, Hawaii.

Issue:

Is Tacloban, Leyte the legal residence of Imelda thereby satisfying the residence requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6
of the Constitution?

Held:

Yes. The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of
residence if such fact is established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. It is settled that
when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.” It was held that Tacloban,
Leyte was in fact the domicile of origin of Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows the domicile of her parents
(which was the same). In its Resolution, COMELEC was obviously referring to Imelda’s various places of actual residence,
not her domicile (legal residence). An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment,* and
Imelda has clearly always chosen to return to her domicile of origin. Even at the height of the Marcos Regime’s powers,
she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating important personal
milestones there, instituting well-publicized projects for its benefit and establishing a political power base where her
siblings and close relatives held positions of power always with either her influence or consent.

* To successfully effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual removal or an actual change of domicile,
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which
correspond with the purpose (Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 331)

COQUILLA Vs. Comelec, GR No 151914, July 31, 2002

G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002
[Grounds for Loss on Citizenship]
Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. On 1965, petitioner joined
the United States Navy and was subsequently naturalized as a U. S. citizen. While on leave on the U. S. Navy, petitioner
visited the Philippines thrice from 1970 to 1973 and remained in the United States since 1985 upon retirement. On
October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, albeit continued making
several trips to the US. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines subsequently after his
application for repatriation was approved. On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga,
Oras, Eastern Samar. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two (2) years.”

On March 5, 2001, respondent incumbent mayor of Oras who was running for re-election, sought the cancellation of
petitioner’s COC on the ground that the latter had resided in Oras for only about 6 months since when he took his oath
as a citizen of the Philippines.

On May 14, 2001, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed mayor of Oras.

On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for
reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years
when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines.

The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner
was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private respondent’s 5,752 votes, or a margin of
379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. He
subsequently took his oath of office.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the petitioner may contend the defense that he was “compelled to adopt American citizenship”.

Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections that was held
on May 14, 2001.

Held:

No, the petitioner may not contend that he was “compelled to adopt American citizenship” only by reason of his
service in the U.S. armed forces. It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630, which applies
to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the
United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which provides for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who
lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been
naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.

No, the statement in petitioner’s certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
“two years” at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was. Petitioner made a false
representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation.
f) Atong Paglaum Inc. Vs. Comelec, GR No 203765, April 2, 2013
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other disqualified party list groups, petitioners
COMELEC, respondent

FACTS:

In line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013, approximately 280 groups and organizations manifested
their desire to participate in the party-list elections. However, 52 of these groups were subsequently disqualified by
COMELEC, including some that were duly registered and accredited as political parties. The reasons for their exclusion
were based on the contention that said groups failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and that their nominees were indeed members of the sectors they were seeking to represent.
ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from participating in the May 2013 elections.

HELD:

No, what COMELEC did was merely follow existing jurisprudence set forth by the SC in its earlier rulings. So for purposes
of setting uniform standards and understanding of the party-list system in the Philippines, the Court provides a lengthy
account of the history and dynamics of the party-list system as embodied in the 1987 Constitution and as envisioned by
the Framers, and institutes new guidelines to be used in resolving issues of similar nature in the future.

Q: Where can the party-list system be found in the 1987 Constitution?

A: Section 5, Art. VI; Sections 7 and 8, Art. IX-C

Q: What is the rationale behind the party-list system?

A: To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to
win seats in the House of Representatives.

Q: Is the party-list system synonymous with sectoral representation?

A: No. Under the party-list system, all voters get to have two votes: one for their choice of legislative district
representative, and another for their choice of party-list representative. But under sectoral representation, majority of
the electorate will only have one vote, which is for their choice of legislative district representative. In contrast,
members of sectoral communities (e.g. farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communitoes, etc.) will have two votes:
one for their district representative and another for their choice of sectoral representative. In other words, sectoral
representation is discriminatory.

Q: Is the party-list system exclusive to sectoral parties?

A: No. The party-list system is open to both sectoral and non-sectoral groups. The framers intended sectoral groups to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.

Q: Who can participate in party-list elections?

A: As per Section 5(1) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, any of the following can take part in party-list elections:
national parties and organizations, regional parties and organizations, and sectoral parties and organizations.

Q: What is the enabling law of the party-list system?

A: RA No. 7941, or the Party-List System Act.

Q: Do party-list groups need to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: No. Art. 6 of RA No. 7941 identifies six grounds for disqualification of a party-list group, and none of these grounds
touches on the failure of a party to represent the marginalized and underrepresented. For non-sectoral groups, it is
enough that its members are united in their cause or ideology. But for sectoral groups, a majority of their members
must come from marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Q: What are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: Section 5 of RA No. 7941 lists the following as marginalized and underrepresented sectors: labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 190582 • April 8, 2010 • En Banc Decision • Justice Del Castillo
Constitutional Law | Legislative Department | Registration | Party-List System

FACTS:
The COMELEC refused to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under R.A. 7941, otherwise known as
the Party-List System Act, on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and R.A. 7941,
nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).

In denying Ang Ladlad’s registration, the Comelec’s Second Division ruled: “Until the time comes when Ladlad is
able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application
for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that. x x x x Even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and
acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and
they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike. x x x x As a
society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral
precepts espoused by said religions have seeped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is legal basis for Comelec’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list group.

RULING:
There is none. Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system.

The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and R.A. 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that, “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.”

Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find
that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Comelec to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify
the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system.

The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
 Milagros Amores Vs. HRET, GR No 189600, June 29, 2010

Facts:

Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009 and
Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which
respectively dismissed... petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list organization Citizens' Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives,... In her Petition for Quo Warranto... petitioner alleged that, among
other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC); he was... disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his
certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section
9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to
represent the new sector under Section 15... of RA No. 7941.
As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009,[3] dismissed petitioner's Petition for Quo
Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as
entitled to at least... one seat in the House of Representatives through National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution
No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the
reglementary period being 10 days from private respondent's... proclamation.

Issues:
(1) whether petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed unseasonably; and (2)
whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent.

Ruling:
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in considering
petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its
Rules[8] from the... issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the May, 2007 elections,
along with other party-list organizations,[9] it was by no measure a proclamation of private respondent himself as
required by Section 13 of RA No.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private respondent's proclamation, the
Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the merits. Alternatively, since petitioner's challenge goes
into private respondent's... qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be... seasonably challenged.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed... to continue in office until the expiration of his term... a nominee who changes his sectoral
affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has
been effected at least six months before the elections.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007, it being
stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.[15] Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months
before May, 2007,... public respondent itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC's overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector only on March 17, 2007.[16]

Principles:

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed... to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
 BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN
POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIYAHENG PINOY, , Respondents.
G.R. No. 177271 • May 4, 2007 • En Banc Decision • Justice Garcia
Constitutional Law | Legislative Department | Party-List system | Manner of Voting | Disclosure

FACTS:
The Comelec denied petitioner’s request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner’s letter-request.

Argument of Comelec: The party list elections must not be personality oriented. The people are to vote for
sectoral parties, organizations, or coalitions, not for their nominees. There is nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the
Comelec to disclose the names of nominees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to reveal the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups.

RULING:
Yes. No national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reads: Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.

The Comelec’s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot
be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a weighty presumption of
invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. Respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
 Trillanes IV Vs. Pimentel, GR No 179817, June 27, 2008
ANTONIO TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL SR. (D)
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

FACTS:

July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation
of the President and key national officials.
On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in
the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general

HELD:

No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of
maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the
fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.

When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is
placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must
be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on
bail or on recognizance.

Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation
not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.
 Internal Discipline
Osmeña vs. Pendatun, Posted on 2020-11-01, G.R. No. L-17144 October 28, 1960

Parliamentary Doctrine of Separation of Powers; Power of the Legislature to discipline its Members for Disorderly Behavior

FACTS:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House, made the serious imputations of bribery
against the President.
A special committee, composed of Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen, was created by
virtue of House Resolution No. 59, to investigate the truth of the charges against the President.
Osmeña failed to produce evidence in support of his remarks about the President. He was, by Resolution No. 175,
suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.
Osmeña submitted to the SC a verified petition for “declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction” against the members of the special committee.
He asked for annulment of Resolution No. 59 on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity.
Several respondents challenged the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and defended the power of Congress
to discipline its members with suspension.

ISSUES:
What is parliamentary immunity?
Whether or not the delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct.

RULING:
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members of
the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.”
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly
of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty
may occasion offense.”
Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of
the United States. Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us.
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof.

2. On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced.

We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the
Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the
House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it
would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of
the Government.
The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
interfere.
Each department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the courts will not assume a
jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature since each department is equally
independent within the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are exclusively
legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power to example a member, the court will not review its action or
revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.)
 Liban Vs. Gordon, GR No 175352, January 18, 2011

FACTS: Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross
Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His
Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator. Gordon filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme
Court decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from
being a Senator, and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the
Congress is precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the
SEC as a private corporation. Gordon takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the
constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Gordon avers that the issue of
constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be
touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.

ISSUE: Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute? Whether
respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution

DECISION: No, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not
the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private corporation.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a
well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional
or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other
ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will
be left for consideration until such question will be unavoidable. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public
Functions the Philippine government does not own the PNRC. It does not have government assets and does not receive
any appropriation from the Philippine Congress. It is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and
private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors. The PNRC is not
government-owned but privately owned.