MANILA STUDIES

Ma.Faye D. Romulo October 25, 2021

BSPT-12 Prof. Priscila Doctolero

1. Manila as an open city

The Japanese violations of General Douglas MacArthur's proclamation of

Manila as an open city on December 26, 1941, have received a lot of

attention. The Japanese bombings on December 27-28 were viewed by

Americans as premeditated attacks on a vulnerable city. The attacks were

particularly vexing because they occurred shortly after MacArthur

declared the city defenseless. In fact, there is some debate as to whether

party breached Manila's open city status. Some others believe it was the

Americans who did it. On December 24, 1944, Manila was designated an

open city in order to protect the Metropolitan area from air and ground

attacks. At the same time, his two corps-equivalent fighting units were

withdrawn from the beaches and attempted to reach the Bataan Peninsula

in a double retrograde manoeuvre. The American high commissioner, the

Commonwealth administration, and all combatant military sites were all

quickly evacuated from Manila. Throughout the day, Manila's newspapers

and radio stations broadcast news of the open city proclamation. "Open

City" and "No Shooting" were written on two enormous banners in front of

city hall. On the day after the announcement, Japanese twin-engine naval

aircraft performed raids against vessels in Manila Bay and the Pasig

River, putting the open city proclamation to the test. The ships were

docked near densely populated regions, particularly those along the Pasig

River. The Pasig River passed through the center of Manila, barely yards

from some of the city's most significant shrines, while Manila's ports

abutted the city (Withman, 1998).

2. The Japanese Slogan-Greatest
Asia Prosperity Sphere
Konoe's cabinet advocated for the construction of a "Greater East Asia

Coprosperity Sphere" in 1940, on the 2,600th anniversary of Japan's

founding, a notion based on Konoe's 1938 proposal for a "New Order in

Greater East Asia," including Japan, Manchukuo, China, and Southeast

Asia. With its proposed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan

wanted to replace the Western "open-door" strategy of retaining China as

an open market for all. The Greater East Asia Ministry was founded in

1942, and the Greater East Asia Conference was conducted in Tokyo in 1943.

In the late 1930s, Japan declared a "Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity

Sphere" [Dai-to-a Kyoeiken, Dai Tôa Kyôeiken, Kyujitai Shinjitai] or "New

Order for East Asia." The creators of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere received very little benefit from it. Japan announced the Greater

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept on July 27, 1940, in order to

maintain its control in Asia and the Pacific, as well as its capacity to

obtain raw materials from its neighbors. The Greater East Asia

Coprosperity Sphere was created in response to the changing geopolitical

environment that emerged in 1940. Its goal was to unite Asia politically

and economically under Japanese leadership in order to counter Western

dominance. What would replace Japan's imperial plan of a "Greater East

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" was the final question. Since World War II,

Japan has been creeping gently and subtly toward a larger leadership

role, painfully aware that if she pushed too hard or too eagerly,

unpleasant memories of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere would

return to haunt her. In Asia, European powers had empires.

3. World War II Orange Plan I
Between 1921 and 1924, the first postwar Pacific war plan assessed America's

disadvantageous strategic position and identified Japan as a likely

adversary. A war with Japan would mostly be a Pacific-based naval conflict.

There would be no need for big ground forces, as far as anyone could see. Of

fact, Japan could attack the Panama Canal, Hawaii, or even the west coast,

but there was no serious threat of Japan seizing and occupying any of these

locations. In the event of hostilities, the planners' strategy was to conduct

"an offensive campaign, especially naval," with the goal of creating "at the

earliest date American sea power in the western Pacific in strength superior

to Japan." To accomplish this, the US would need a base in the area that

could serve the whole US fleet. Because Manila Bay was the only big base

west of Pearl Harbor large enough for this purpose, the planners thought it

was critical to hold the bay in case of war and be able to send reinforcements

to the Philippines in time to avoid their capture. The Army was tasked with

maintaining the base in Manila Bay until the Fleet arrived, but the Navy

would play the most important part in any conflict with Japan, as success in

the end hinged on sea power. There was no provision in War Plan ORANGE

for a landing on the Japanese home islands. "Isolation and harassment," the

interruption of crucial maritime lines, and "offensive sea and air operations

against her naval forces and economic life" were to be used to defeat Japan. It

is unlikely that an invasion of Japan would be necessary. However, the

strategists acknowledged that if these methods failed to bring Japan to its

knees, they would have to take "such additional action as may be required."

It is unlikely that an invasion of Japan would be necessary. However, if these

methods failed to bring Japan to its knees, the planners realized they would

have to take "such additional action as may be required to win the war."
4. World War II Orange Plan II
·The most recent iteration of these plans, known as War Plan ORANGE-3 (WPO-

3), was completed in April 1941 and was based on the combined Army-Navy

ORANGE plan of 1938, one of many "color" plans prepared during the prewar

years. Each color scheme dealt with a different issue, with ORANGE addressing

an emergency involving only the US and Japan. In this respect, by 1941, the plan

had become tactically impractical and obsolete. Tactically, however, the strategy

was brilliant, and its defense provisions could be used in any local context. It

was believed under War Plan ORANGE that the Japanese attack would occur

without a declaration of war and with less than 48 hours' notice, making it

impossible for the US to supply reinforcements for some time. As a result, the

defense would have to be carried out exclusively by the military and naval troops

already stationed in the Philippines, with backup from local forces. Any

organized elements of the Philippine Army that might be conscripted into the US

service under the Tydings-McDuffie Act were included in the last category.

5. Death March
The Bataan Death March was a 66-mile (106-kilometer) march in the Philippines

that the Japanese forces forced 76,000 prisoners of war (66,000 Filipinos, 10,000

Americans) to endure in April 1942, during World War II's early phases. Starting on

April 9, 1942, near Mariveles, on the southern point of the Bataan Peninsula, the

captives were force-marched north to San Fernando and then transported by train

to Capas in tight and unclean boxcars. They then trekked another 7 miles (11 km) to

Camp O'Donnell, a former Philippine army training center that the Japanese forces

used to hold Filipino and American prisoners. The captives were tortured, shot,

bayoneted, and, in many cases, beheaded during the main march, which lasted 5 to

10 days depending on where a prisoner joined it; a huge number of those who made

it to the camp eventually perished of malnutrition and disease. Only 54,000

captives made it to the camp; though exact figures are unknown, the march may

have claimed the lives of 2,500 Filipinos and 500 Americans, with another 26,000

Filipinos and 1,500 Americans dying at Camp O'Donnell.

References:
Whitman, J. W. (1998, August 19). Manila: How Open Was This Open

City? - January '98 World War II Feature. HistoryNet.

https://www.historynet.com/manila-how-open-was-this-open-city-

january-98-world-war-ii-feature.htm.

Pike, J. (n.d.). Greater East Asia Coprosperity Sphere. Greater East Asia

Coprosperity Sphere.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/greater-east-

asia-coprosperity-sphere.htm.

Pike, J. (n.d.). War Plan Orange. War Plan Orange.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-orange.htm.

Norman, M. (1998, July 20). Bataan Death March | Definition, Date,

Pictures, Facts, Survivors, & Significance. Encyclopedia Britannica.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Bataan-Death-March.