fl*"i/ r"-^-ii, lhit_.4,-¡_&+*-gtà [orç"J, û.Ç,.
-,1 Counterfactøal Dependence and Time's
[/*ir.n,í{7 lrcsr, f1$? ).
SEVENTEEN
Ptilr- ç¡o
Counterfactual Dependence and
Time's Arrow
THE ASYMMETRY OF COUNTERFACTUAL DEPENDENCE
Today I am ryping words on e page. Suppose today were different.
Suppose I were typing different words. Then plainly tomorrow would
be differenr also; for instance, different words would appear on rhe
page. NlÃonl*Testerday also be different? If so, how? Invited to answer,
you will perhaps come up with something. But I do not think there is
anything you can say about how yesterday would be thet will seem
clearly and uncontroversially true.
The way the future is depends countelactually on the way the pres-
ent is. If the present were different, the future q/ould be different; and
there are counterfactual conditionals, many of them as unquestionably
true as counterfactuals ever get, that tell us a good deal about how the
future would be different if the present were different in various ways.
Likewise the present depends counterfactually on the past, and in
general the way things are later depends on the way things were
earlier.
Not so in reverse. Seldom, if ever, can we find a clearly rrue counter-
factual about hoq/ the past would be different if the present were some-
how different. Such a counterfacrual, unless clearly false, normally is
not clear one way or the other. It is at best doubtful whether the past
depends counterfactually on the present, whether the present depends
32
Anoø, 33
on the future, and in general whether the way things are earlier
depends on the way things will be later.
Often, indeed, n¡e seem to reason in a way that takes it for granted
that the past is counterfactually independent of the present: that is, that
even if the present were different, the past would be just as it actually
is. In reasoning from a counterfacmal supposition, we use auxiliary
premises drawn from (what we take to be) our factual knowledge. But
not iust anything we know may be used, since some truths would not
be true under the given supposition. If the supposition concerns the
present, we do not feel free to use all v¡e know about the future. If the
supposirion v/ere true, the future v¡ould be different and some thìngs
q/e know about the actual future might not hold in this different coun-
terfactual future. But we do feel free, ordinarily, to use whatever q'e
know about the past. We evidently assume that even if our supposition
about the present were true, the past would be no different. If I were
acting otherwise just now, I would revenge a wrong done me last
year-it is absurd even to raise the question whether that past wrong
would have taken place if I were acting otherwise now! More gener-
ally, in reasoning from a counterfactual supposition about any time,
we ordinarily assume that facts about earlier times are counterfactually
independent of the supposition and so may freely be used as auxiliary
premlses.
I would like to present â neat contrast between counterfactual
dependence in one direction of dme and counterfactual independence
in the other direction. But until a distinction is made, the situation is
nor as neat as that, There are some special contexts that complicate
matte¡s, \íe know that present conditions have their past causes. e \
can persuade ourselves, and sometimes do, that if the present were dif-
ferent then these past causes would have to be different, else they
would have caused the present to be as it acmally is. Given such an
argument----{all it a bach-tracÞing argument-we willingly grant that if
the present were different, the past would be different too. I borroq/ an
example from Downing (tS]). Jim and Jack quarreled yesterday, and
Jack is still hopping mad. \fle conclude that if Jim asked Jack for help
today, Jack would not help him. But wait: Jim is a prideful fellow. He
never would ask for help after such a quarrel; if Jim were to ask Jack
for help today, there would have to have been no quarrel yesterday. In
that case Jack would be his usual gene¡ous self. So ifJim asked Jack for
help today, Jack would help him after all.
At this stage we may be persuaded (and rightly so, I think) that if
Jim asked Jack for help today, there s'ould have been no quarrel yes-
34 Coønærfaaøals and Time
terday. But the persuasion does not last, \Øe very easily slip back into
our usual sort of counterfactual reasoning, and implicitly assume once
again that facts about earlier times are counterfactually independent of
facts about later times. Consider v/hethcr pride is cosdy. In this case, at
least, it costs Jim nothing, It would be useless for Jim to ask Jack for
help, sinceJack would not help him. lüle rely once more on the premise
we recently doubted: if Jim asked Jack for help today, the quarrel
would nevertheless have taken place yesterday.
]ù(/hat is going on, I suggest, can best be explained as follos's.
(l) Counterfactuals are infected with vagueness, as everyone agrees.
Different ways of (panly) resolving the vagueness are appropriate in
different contexts. Remember the case of Cacsar in Korea: had he been
in command, would he have used the atom bomb? Or would he have
used catapults? It is right to say either, though not to say both
together. Each is true under a resolution of vagueness appropriate to
some contexß. (2) !/e ordinarily resolve the vagueness of counterfac-
tuals in such a way that counterfactual dependence is asymmetric
(except perhaps in cases of time travel or the like). Under this standard
resolution, back-tracking arguments are mistaken: if the present were
different the past would be the same, but the same past causes would
fail somehoq¡ ro cause the same present effects. If Jim asked Jack for
help today, somehow Jim s'ould have overcome his pride and asked
despite yesterday's quarrel. (3) Some special contexts favor a different
resolution of vagueness, one under which the past depends counterfac-
tually on the present and some back-tracking arguments are correct. If
someone propounds a back-tracking argument, for instance, his co-
operative partners in conversation will switch to a resolution that gives
him a chance to be right. (This son of accommodating shift in abstract
features of context is common; see Lewis ([14]).) But when the need
for a special resolution of vagueness comes to an end, the standard
resolution returns. (4) A counterfactud saying that the past would be
different if the present were somehow different may come out true
under the special resolution of its vagueness, but false under the stan-
dard resolution. lÍ so, cell ir e bdcþ-tracking counterfaaual.Taken out
of context, it s,ill not be clearly true or clearly false. Although we tend
to favor the standard resoludon, we also charitably tend to favor a
resolution which gives the sentence under consideration a chance of
trurh.
(Back-tracking counterfactuals, used in a context that favors their
tn'th, are marked by a syntactic peculiarity. They are the ones in
v¡hich the usual subjunctive conditional constmctions are readily
Coøntert'actuøl Dependence and Time's Anozp 35
replaced by more complicated constructions: "If it q/ere that . . . then
it would have to be that. . . " or the like. A suitable context may
make it acceptable to say "If Jim asked Jack for help today, there
would have been no quarrel yesterday", but it would be more natural
to say " . . . there would have to have been no quarrel yesterday."
Three paragraphs ago, I used such const¡uctions to lure you into a
context thet favors back-tracking.)
I have distinguished the standard resolution of vagueness from the
sort that permiti back-tracking only so that I can ask you to ignore the
latter. Only under the standard resolution do we have the clear-cut
asymmetry of counterfactual dependence that interests me.
I do not claim that the asymmetry holds in all possible, or even all
actual, cases. It holds for the sorts of familiar cases that arise in every-
day life. But it well might break down in the different conditions that
might obtain in a time machine, or at the edge of a black hole, or bcfore
the Big Bang, or after the Heat Death, or at a Possible world consisting
of one solitiry atom in the void. It may also break down with respect
to the immediate past. \X/e shall return to these matters later.
Subject to these needed qualifications, what I claim is as follows.
Consider those counterfactuals of the form "If it were that,4, then it
would be that C" in which the supposition ,4 is indeed false, and in
s¡hich,4 and C are entirely about the states of affairs at tr¡o dmes t4
and t6 respectively. Many such counterfachals ere true in which C
also is falsi, and in which t6 is later than l¿. These are counterfactuals
that say how the way things are later depends on the way thinBs were
earlier. But if 16 is earlier than t¡, then such counterfactuals are true if
and only if C is true. These are the counterfactuals that tell us how the
way things are earlier does not depend on the way things q/ill be later.
ASYMMETRIES OF CAUSATION AND OPENNESS
The asymmetry of counterfactual dependence has been little discussed'
(Howéver, see Downing [5], Bennett [2], and Slote [19] ) Some of its
are better known. It is instructive to see how the
"onr"or,"r,a"a counterfâctual dependence serves to explain these
of
"rya-",ry
more familiar asymmetries.
Consider the temporal asymmetry of causation. Effects do not pre-
cede their
""ur"r,
* at least not ordinarily. Elsewhere ([12]) I have
advocated a counterfectual analysis of causation: (1) the relation of
36 CounterfactaaLs andTime
cause to effect consists in their being linked by a causal chain; (2) a
causal chain is a certain kind of chain of counterfactual dependences;
and (3) the counterfactuals involved are to be taken under the srandard
resolution of vagueness. If anything of the sort is right, there can be no
backward causation s/ithout counterfactual dependence of past on
future. Only where the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence
breaks down can there possibly be exceptions to the predominânr
futu¡ev¡ard direction of causation.
Consider also what I shall call che asymmetry of openness: the
obscure concrast we drav¡ betv¡een the "open future" and the "fixed
past". We tend to regard the future as a multitude of alternative possi-
bilities, a "garden of forking paths" in Borges'phrase, whereas we
regard the past as a unique, settled, immutable actuality. These descrip-
tions scarcely wear their meaning on their sleeves, yet do seem to cap-
ture some genuine and important difference between past and future,
Vhat can it be? Several hypotheses do not seem quite satisfactory.
Hypothesis 1: Asymmetry of Epistemic Possibility. Is it just that we
know more âbout the past than about the future, so that the future is
richer in epistemic possibilities? I think that's not it. The epistemic
contrâst is a matter of degree, not a difference in kind, and sometimes
is not very pronounced. There is a great deal we know âbout the
future, and a great deel we don't know about the past. Ignorance of
history has not the least tendency to make (most of) us think of the
past as somewhat future-like, multiple, open, or unfixed.
Hypotbesis 2: Aslmmetry of Muhrple Aauølity. Is it that all our
possible futures are equally actual? It is possible, I think, to make sense
of multiple actuality. Eisewhere I have argued for two theses (in [9]
and [8]): (1) any inhabitant of any possible world may truly call his
own world actual; (2) we ourselves inhabit this one world only, and are
not identical with our other-worldly counterpa¡ts. Both theses are
controversial, so perhaps I am right about one and wrong about the
other. If (1) is true and (2) is false, here we are inhabiting several v¡orlds
at once and truly calling all of them actual. (Adams argues contra-
positively in [1], arguing from the denial of multiple actualiry and the
denial of (2) to the denial of (1).) That makes sense, I think, but it gives
us no asymmetry. For in some sufficiently broad sense of possibìlity,
we have alternative possible pasts as well as alternative possible futures.
But if (l ) is true and (2) is false, thât meâns thât ¿ll our possibilities are
equally actual, past as well as furure.
CounterfactøaL Dependence andTime's Arrou 37
Hypotbesis 3:Asymmetry of Indeterminism. Is it that we think of
our world as governed by indeterministic laws of nature, so that the
actual pâst and present are nomically compossible with various alterna-
tive future continuations? I think this hypothesis also fails.
For one thing, it is less certain that our wo¡ld is indeterministic than
that there is an asymmetry betv¡een open future and fixed Past-what-
ever that may turn out to be, Our best reason to believe in indeter-
minism is the success of quantum mechanics, but that reason is none
too good until quântum mechanics succeeds ih giving a satisfactory
account of processes of measurement.
For another thing, such reâson as we have to believe in indeter-
minism is reâson to believe that the laq¡s of nature are indeterministic
in both directions, so that the actual future and present are nomically
compossible with various alternative pasts. If there is a process of
reduction of the wave packec in which a given suPerPosition may be
followed by any of many eigenstates, equally this is a process in which
a given eigenstate may have been preceded by any of mâny suPerPosi-
tions. Again we have no asymmetry.
I believe that indeterminism is neither necessary nor sufficient for
the asymmetries I am discussing. Therefore I shall ignore the possi-
bility of indeterminism in the rest of this paper, and see how the asym-
metries might arise even under strict determinism. A' deterministic
system of làws is one such that, whenever two possible worlds both
obey the laws pernecúy, then either they are exactly alike throughout
all of time, or else they are not exactly alike through any stretch of
time. They are alike always or never. They do not diverge, matching
perfectly in their initial segments but not thereafter; neither do they
ion,retge. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the laws of
nature of our actual world are in this sense deterministic.
(My definition of determinism derives from Montague ([15]), but
with modifications. (1) I prefer to avoid his use of mathematical con-
structions as ersatz possi5le worlds. But should you prefer ersatz
worlds to the real thing, that will not matter for the purposes of this
paper. (2) I take exact likeness of s,orlds at dmes as a primitive rela-
iion; Montague instead uses the relation of having the same complete
description in a certain language, which he leaves unspecified.
My definition presupposes that v¡e can identify stretches of time
from one world to another. That presupposition is questionable, but it
could be avoided at the cost of some complication).
Hypotbesis 4: Asymmetry of M utability. Is it that we can change
the future, but not the past? Not so, if "change" has its literal meaning'
 Counterfaauals andTime CounterfaaøaL Dependence and Time's Arrow 39
38
ft is true enough that if, is any Past time' then we cannot bring about
a It might work by fiat. It is an easy matter to build the asymmetry
.,"," oi t at time tl and the (supposedlv into an analysis of counterfactuals, for instance as follows
åÏf.ä;;,;;,ú. "tt"itt "t t is
r,"," of affairs at f at a later time t2' But the pastness of
"i".rn"d) ti-. -o"t¿ be true if t were Present or future' Pest' ANALYSIS 1. Consider a cot4nterf*ctunl "If it uete that A, tben it
#;i;i;t;h; ìmpossibil- woald be that C" ubere A is entireþ aboøt afføirs in a stretcb of time
;;;;;;;:';;Ji",".e are alike immutable' \fhatixplains the"the state of
i* ì .iläJ;*t.t ",rt. state of affairs at t at 4" or t¡. Consider aII those possible worlds vt such tbdt:
;i;;;;;;,;i t¡,h.v ",,n."n iust mean: the state of affairs at (1) A is trae at 7r);
"nv'hing,
d-ifference between that and itself'
;. öi .;;;. :;;í b.i.tg
"bo"t "
(2) to is exaaþ liþe oør øctuøl zaorld at øll times before ø trønsi-
tion peiod beginning shortly before t¡;
Dependence' Our
Final H'vÞothesis: Asymmetry of Colnterfadual (3) tu conforms to the øawal huts of nøtøre øt all times aftet t7,;
fo,rrrh hvóáthesis was closer to the truth than the others' wnÑ we can
and
to bring it about
il;;;:;;i;;;;"nsine th. future" (so to speak) is
anv of the
(4) daring ta and tbe preceding transition period, w differs no
ir'", ír. ä,** ;;';hi;'"v it actuallv will bi'-rather than
more from oør øct&al u,orld thøn it møst to Permit A to hold.
if s¡e acted differently in the Present'
other ways it would have been
liter- Tbe counterfaaual is true if and onþ if C bolds at eaery such utorld u'.
i'r,"i rt rirn.ir,¡gik. "hrng.. Ve make a di{ference' But it is not and
is actualitv
;ù;-;;;;., ;t"å the diffãrence we make between
In short, take the counterfactual present (if r¡ is now), avoiding gratui-
Iti*" "ï!¡t;rj,t* ,,åi u.,o,."n successive actualities' The literal truthIt
fu,u." d.p"nd' counterfactually on the present' tous difference from the actual present; graft it smoothly onto the
il'i;t,';;;; actual past; let the situation evolve according to the actual laqts; and see
deáends. oanlv, on what we do noq'
-"ili..*1i.,
tãå.ili.g *e o'din"rily cdnnot do by way of "changing what happens. An analysis close to Analysis t has been put forward by
the oast" is to bring it about that the past ís the-wây rt actually was' Jackson ([7]). Bennett ([2]), Bowie ([3]), and\ùfeiner ([21]) have con-
*ould been if we acted differendv sidered, but not endorsed, similar treatments.
;;ã;;t;;;t'her wav it have
Analysis 1 guarantees the asymmetry of counterfactual dependence,
;....ñ. ;;;;; The past wo"ld be the same' however we acted now'
'il;":;;;.i depend on what we do now' It is counterfac- with an exception for the immediate Past' Let C be entirely about a
";; "Jall
independent of the present' stretch of timi 16. If t6.is later than r,a, then C may very v¡ell be false at
''ì."'i.tiì
t,.,"llv
our world, yet ffue at the worlds that meet the conditions listed in
ttãeest thaì the mysterious asymmetry between open
is nothing else than the-asymmetry of counterfac- Analysis 1. \ùíe have the counte¡factuals whereby the affairs of later
fr;;;Jh;JËtt actual one and times depend on those of earlier times. But if 16 is before ú,{' and also
.""iì.""ti.*.lrhe forking faths into the furure-the would come. abour before the transition period, then C holds at worlds that meet con-
;äil;i;;;;;,1* {utures that
-"nv "Ït"n"tiue dition (2) if and only if C is true at our actual world' Since C is entirely
;i;;;;;;t;;""nte.f"ctu"l suppositions abou¡ the Present' Tre one
actual under this about something that does not differ at all from one of these q¡orlds to
;tJ, 6;J past is the o,t" p"'iìh"t would remain
another, its truth vâlue cannot vary. Therefore, excePt for câses in
same range of suPPositions'
which ¿c falls in the transition period, we have the counterfactuals
whereby the affairs of earlier times are independent of those of later
times,
TWO ANALYSES OF COUNTERFACTUALS any temPtation to
'ùle need the transition period, and should resist
of counterfactual replace (2) by the simpler and stronger
I hooe I have now convinced you that an asymmetry
and therefore
à"'ñ;;;;;ì;;';-,t ", i n"J i'npottânt consequences;
semantic a'alysis of
(2'r) za is exactly like our actual world at all times before r¡.
äïi ilñ;;il. .-pr"ittà by'anv satisfactory
I shall consider (2*) makes for abrupt discontinuities. Right up to t, the match_ was
."""t".f**¡ condiciånah. I.' ih" i"st of this paper'
stationary and a foot away from the striking surface. If it had been
how that explanation ought to work'
 Coønætfaauals and Time
Counterfactaal Dependence a¡dTime's Arrow 41
40
of counterfactual dependence. It will not do to declare them impossible
have travelled a foot in no time at all? Noi
we
struck at t, would it priori.
independence of the immediate past- to provide an ø
ri"rià r""irn* and The asymmetry-by-fiat strategy of Analysis 1 is an instructive error,
;ä;;it";;;;;;- "e iro- past to counterfactual present
,
"",u"1 dePends on not a dead loss. Often we do have the right sort of supposition, the
future, That is not to say, however, that the immediâte Past standard resolution of vagueness, and no extraordinary circumstances.
There may be a vanety ot ways
the present in any very definite way' Then Analysis 1 works as v¡ell as we could ask. The right analysis of
;il; i;;;il *ier',-ó, henc' th'ie mav be no true co.unterfactuals
it the Present counterfactuals needs to be both more general and more flexible. But
ih", r"" in anv de-tail how the immediate past would be also it needs to agree with Analysis 1 over the q/ide range of cases for
iî"p" "",, ti"*
iÏ*"ä1ri"."ti' if there were a definite and detailed
which Analysis 1 succeeds.
some of this depen-
ä;"d.;.;:l; ;.uli
-C" b. h"'d for
me to sav whv 'coors'-as
The right general analysis of counterfactuals, in my opinion, is one
ä:íääiíi'";; i'i.'p*"¿-*'onglv' of backward
based on comparative similarity of possible worlds. Roughly, a coun-
in cases that are not at âll extta-
causation over sho¡t intervals of time
terfactual is true if every world that makes the antecedent t¡ue ¡vithout
ordinarv.
"'iÏ"iít¡ 1 seems to fit a wide range of counterfactuals;.and it gratuitous departure from actuality is a v.,orld that also makes the con-
with sequent rrue. Such an analysis is given in my [10] and [11];here is one
;ì"iii ï"'";;;".rv of tot'nt"tf"ttial dependence'I though
fear not' for formulation.
.*Lp,i"t' Should we be iontent?
"äi","lt*^tu"1iti"
two
"'iitti.
reâsons.
ANALYSIS 2. A counterfactual "lf it utere thøt A, then it u.,oøld be
Ái"r".it I is built for a special case' we necd a suppositron
ii,n", the
t" nttd ' counte¡factual taken under tltdt C" is (non-aacuouslT) trøe if and only if some (dccesible) øorld
"blu; ;;"ht ""¿
,.*ã"ra'..rottr¡n of vagueness' rJØhat shall we do with suppositions robere both A ønd. C are trøe is tnore similar to oør actøal zaorld, otter-
øll, tban is any uorld ubere A is true but C is fake.
such as

If kangaroos had no tails ' ' ' This analysis is fully general:.Á can be a supposition of any sort. It is
also extremely vague. Overall similarity among worlds is some so¡t of
If graviry went by the inverse cube of distance ' ' ' resultant of similarities and dif{erences of many different kinds, and I
If Collett had ever designed a Pacific '' ' have not said what system of weights or priorities should be used to
1 cannot cope as it squeeze these down into a single relation of overall similarity. I count
ç,hich are not about particular timesl Analysis that a virtue. Counte¡factuals are both vague and various. Different
most we could
*""är.î"tìl tr,*. any obvious way to generálize on At
it'
the cases.handled resolutions of the vagueness of overall similarity are appropriate in dif-
:ìi:ä";il;;";;t, ãf ott'"'
""s"id'"-ing Analvsis t is ferent contexts,
EiIiÍ*" tlü;;r.'åi Cfzll does this to some extent')
of counterfactuals in Analysis 2(plus some simple observations about the formal
lår',ni.í' ï ;;i;;à'; uniform treatment
character of comparative similarity) is about all that can be said in
general.
"
gtves us more of an asymmetry than we ought
to full generality about counterfactuals. \íhile not devoid of testable
Second' Analysis I
may be' no conrent-it settles some questions of logic-it does little to predict
*ant. No matter how special the circumstances ol the case the the t¡uth values of particular counterfactuals in particular contexts,
;;i"i;;;i;;;";' is m"de for actual or possible exceptions-to
period)' rhat The rest of the study of counterfactuals is not fully general. Analysis
Ï:;;ä;'ä;;;i in ln. is-too.inflexible'
""n'i'i"n stones oÌ t'.: 2 is only a skeleton. It must be fleshed out g¡ith an account of the
ðlr"ful t""dàt. hãve thought they could make sens€.ol appropriate similarity relation, and this will differ from context to
t.avel (see my [1]l for further discussion); hard-headed. Psycnrcat
have context. Our present task is to see what sort of similarity relation can
;.r.;;.Ë'rti.'ù.ir"*¿
-""ritt, in precognition; speculativc phvsicists
and be combined with Analysis 2 to yield what I have called the standard
consideration to tihyont, "dutnttd potentials'
"ì""" timËlik' cu*e'' Most or all of these resolution of vagueness: one that invalidates back-tracking arguments,
:;;"bñ;i;.-å;i;"'iih '1""'d one that yields an âsymme[ry of counterfactual dependence except
pät"*Ë".-*;U involve special excePtions to the normal asymmetry
42 Counterfaaøals andTime
perhaps under special circumstances' one that agrees with Analysis 1,
ãur arymmetry-by-fiat analysis, whenever it ought to.
But-first, a word of warning! Do not assume that iust any respect of
similarity you can think of must enter into the balance of overall simi-
larity with positive weight. The point is obvious for some respects of
simiiarity, iï such they be. It contributes nothing to the similarity of
two gemstones that both are grue. (To be grøe is to be green-and first
.*"--ined before 2000 A.D. or blue and not 6rst examined before 2000
A.D.) But even some similarities in less gruesome resPects may count
for nothing. They may have zero weight, at least under some reason-
able resolutions of vagueness' To what extent are the philosophical
writings of llittgenstein similar, overall, to those of Heidegger? I don't
know. But here is one respect of comparison that does not enter into it
at all, not even with negligible weight: the ratio of vowels to conso-
nants.
(Bowie ([3]) has argued that if some respects of compârison counted
foi nothing, my assumption of "centering" in [10] and [11] would be
violated: worlds differing from ours only in the respects that don't
count would be as similar to our world as our world is to itself. I reply
that there may not be any worlds that differ from ours only in the
respects thât àon't count, even if there are some resPects that d-ont
Respect, of comparison may not be entirely separable. If the
"orr.rt.
writings of-two philosophers were alike in every respect that mattered,
they would be word-fòr-word the same; then they would have the
same ratio of vos¡els to consonants,)
And next, another word of warning! It is all too easy to make offhand
similarity judgments and then assume that they will do for all purposes.
But if we respect the extreme shiftiness and context-dependence of
\ùíe will
similarity, ç'e^will not set much store by offhand judgments-
be prepared to distinguish between the similariry relations that guide
oui ofih"nd explicit iudgments and those that govern our counterfac-
tuals in various contexts.
Indeed, unless we are prepared so to distinguish, Analysis 2 faces
immediate refutation. Sometimes a pair of countelactuals of the fol-
lowing form seem true: "If,4, the world would be very different; but if
.4 and B, the world would not be very different"' Only if the similarity
relation governing counterfactuals disagrees with that governing expli-
cit judgrients of what is "very different" can such a Pâir be true-under
AnalyJis 2. (I owe this argument to Pavel Tichf and, in a slightly diË
f"."r,i forrn, ro Richard J. Hall.) It seems to me no surprise, given the
instability even of explicit judgments of similarity, that ts'o different
Coønterfactual Dependence and Ti¡ne's Anoø 43
comparative similarity relations should enter into the interPretation of
a single sentence.
The thing to do is not to start by deciding, once and for all, what we
think about similarity of worlds, so thât $'e can afterwards use these
decisions to test Analysis 2. V/hat that would test would be the combi-
nation of Analysis 2 s'ith a foolish denial of the shiftiness of similarity.
Rather, we must use what we knov¡ about the truth and falsity of
counterfactuals to see if we can find some sort of similarity relation-
not necessarily the first one that springs to mind-that combines s/ith
Analysis 2 to yield the proper truth conditions. It is this combination
that can be tested against our knowledge of counterfactuals, not
Analysis 2 by itself. In looking for a combination that s'iil stand up to
the test, we must use what v¡e know about counterfactuals to find out
about the appropriate similarity relation-not the other way around.
THE FUTURE SIMILARITY OBJECTION
Several people have raised what they take to be a serious objection
against Ànalysis 2. (It was first brought to my attention by Michael
Slote; it occurs, in various forms, in [2], t3l, t4l, t6l' [7]' [17]' [18]' and
[19]. Kit Fine ([6]: 452) shtes it as follows.
The counterfactual "If Nixon had pressed the button there vould have
been ¿ nuclea¡ holocaust" is rue or can be imagined to be so. Now sup-
pose that there never will be a nuclea¡ holocaust. Then that counterfactual
ls, on Lewis's analysis, very likely false For given any wo¡ld in which
antecedent and consequent are both true it will be easy to imagine a closer
s'orld in vhich the antecedent is true and the consequent false. For ¡ve
need only imagine a change that prevents the holocaust but that does not
require such a great divergence from rcality.
The presence or absence of a nuclear holocaust surely does contribute
with- overwhelming weight to some Prominent similarity relations.
(For instance, to one that governs the explicit judgment of similarity in
the consequent of "If Nixon had pressed the button, the v¡orld would
be very different.") But the relation that governs the counterfactual
may not be one of these. It may nevertheless be a relation of overall
similarity-not because it is likely to guide our explicit judgments of
similarity, but rather because it is a resultant, under some system of
weights or priorities, of a multitude of relations of similarity in par-
ticular respects,
44 Coanterfactøals atdTime
Let us take the supposition that Nixon pressed the button as
implicitly referring to a particular time t-let it be the darkesr
moment of the tnal days. Consider øe, a world that may or may not
be ours. At øe, Nixon does not press the button at , and no nucleâr
holocaust ever occurs. Let zrs also be a world with deterministic
laws, since we have confined our attention here to counterfactual
dependence under determinism. Let u.re also be a world that 6ts our
worst fantasies about the bufton: there is such a button, it is connected
to a fully automatic command and control system, the wired-in s¡ar
plan consists of one big salvo, everything is in fauldess working order,
there is no way for anyone to stop the attack, and so on. Then I agree
that Fine's counterfactual is true at øe: if Nixon had pressed the
button, there would have been a nuclear holooaust.
There e¡e all sorts of s/orlds where Nixon (or rather, a counterpart
of Nixon) presses the button ar ¡. \ù(/e must consider which of these dif-
fer leasr, under the appropriate similarity relation, from rro. Some are
non-starrers. Those where the payload of the rockets consists entirely
of confeni depart gratuitously from we by any reasonable standards.
The more serious candidates fall into several classes.
One class is typified by the world tø1. Until shortly before r, u.r1 is
exactly like zae. The two match perfectly in every detail of particular
facc, however minute. Shortly before ú, however, the spatio-temporal
region of perfect match comes to an end as ar1 and @q begin to diverge.
The deterministic laws of zls are violated at æ'1 in some simple,localized,
inconspicuous way. A dny miracle takes place. Perhaps a few extra
neurons fire in some corner of Nixon's brain. As a result of this, Nixon
presses the button. rùlith no further miracles events take their lawful
course and the two q¡orlds w1 anð, ws go their separate ways. The
holocaust takes place. From that point on, at least so far as the surface
of this planet is concerned, the two worlds a¡e not even approximately
similar in matters of panicular fact. In short, the worlds typified by ø1
are the worlds that meet the conditions listed in Analysis 1, our
asymmetry-by-fiat analysis. lVhat is the case throughout these worlds is
just what we think u¡ould have been the case if Nixon had pressed the
button (assuming that we are at,rgs¡ ar\d operating under the standard
resolution of vagueness). Therefore, the worlds typified by rø¡ should
turn out to be more similar to zre, under the similarity relation we seek,
than any of the other worlds where Nixon pressed the button.
(ufhen I say that a miracle takes place ar ø1, I n.ean that there is a
violation of the laws of nature. But note that the violated laws are nor
las's of the same world where they are violated. That is impossible;
Couñterfactødl DePende¡ce and Time's A¡¡out 45
whatever else a law may be, it is at least an exceptionless regularity. I
am using "miracle" to express a relation between different s/orlds. A
miracle at ub relzrtive to tos, is a violation at tø1 of the laws of øe,
which are ât best the almost-laws of u¡The laws of ø1 itself, if such
there be, do not enter into it.)
A second class of candidates is typified by u2. This is a v¡orld com-
pletely free of miracles: the deterministic laws of løq are obeyed per-
fectly. However, rø2 differs from zøe in that Nixon Pressed the button.
By definition of determinism, 'Io2 @o are alike always or alike
^iò
never, and they are not alike always,Therefore, they are not exactly
alike through any stretch of time. They differ even in the remote Past.
lØhat is worse, there is no guarantee whatever lhat v2 can be chosen so
that the differences diminish and eventually become negligible in the
more and more remote past. Indeed, it is hard to imagine hos¡ two
deterministic worlds anything like ou¡s could possibly remain just a
little bit different for very long. There are altogether too many oPPor-
tunities for little differences to give rise to bigger differences.
Certainly such worlds as zø2 should not turn out to be the most simi-
lar worlds to ule where Nixon pressed the button. Thac v¡ould lead to
back-tracking unlimited. (And as Bennett observes in [2], it would
make counterfactuals useless; we know far too little to figure out
which of them are true under a resolution of vagueness chat validates
very much back-tracking.) The lesson we learn by comparing ø'1 and
ro2 is that under the similarity relation s,e seek, a lot of perfect match
of particular fact is worth a little miracle.
à third class of candidates is typified by ø3. This world begins like
æ,r. Undl shortly before t, w3 is exactly like zre. Then a tiny miracle
takes place, permitting divergence. Nixon presses the bu¡ron at ¿. But
there is no holocaust, because soon after ¡ a second dny miracle takes
place, just as simple and localized and inconspicuous as the first' The
Íatal signal vanishes on its way from the button to the rockets. There-
after events ut take their lawful course. At least for a while, worlds
^t
zas aîd u3 remain very closely similar in matters of particular fact But
they are no longer exactly alike. The holocaust has been prevented, but
Nixon's deed has left its mark on the world ø3' There are his 6nger-
prints on che button. Nixon is still trembling, wondering what went
wrong-or right. His gin bottle is depleted. The click of the button has
been preserved on tape. Light waves that flew out the s'indow, bearing
the image of Nixon's finger on the button, are still on their way into
outer space. The wire is ever so slightly warmed q/he¡e the signal cur-
rent passed through it. And so on, and on, and on. The differences
 Counterfactual Dependence dnd Time's Anop 47
46 Counterfaaaals and Time
wa and zue reconverge. They are exacdy alike again soon aÍter t, eîð
between tu3 and zoç are many and varied, although no one of them
exactly alike forevermo¡e. All it takes is enough of a reconvergence
-amounts to much. the close similarity between u''3 end trlo could not miracle: one involving enough different sorts of violations of the laws
i rl.rf¿ think that
of uo, in enough different places. Because there are many different
last. Some of the little differences would give rise to bigger diflerences
at f¿¡l sorts of traces to be removed, and because the t¡aces spread out
sooner or leter. Maybe Nixon's memoirs are more sanctrmonrous
character rapidly, the cover-upjob divides into very many parts. Each part
;il;;;". Conseqlently they have a different impact on the
requires a miracle at least on a par with the small miracle required to
of a -hìr¿t.¿
feo. hu.rdred ãrrt of the millions s'ho read them' A tew ot these
prevent the holocaust, or the one required to get the button pressed in
i.- make different decisions at crucial moments of their
the first place. Differenc sorts of unlawful processes are needed to
ii*r-*¿ we're off ! But if you are not convinced that the differences
remove different so¡ts of traces: the miraculous vanishing of a pulse of
need increase, no matter. My case will not depend on that'
^'-iiÀt"l"t¡'z current in a wire is not like the mi¡aculous rearrangement of mag-
it ,o succeed, such worlds as rø3 must not turn out to be
nedzed grains on a recording tape. The big miracle required for perfect
,t worlds to zøe where Nixon pressed the button' The
"--ori"irnit"t reconvergence consists of a multitude of little miracles, spread out and
i;r"; -" leam by comparin g zo1 and zl¡ is that.und-er the similariry
relation q/e seek, close but approximate match ot Partrcular -tect
diverse.
Such worlds as zaa had better not turn out to be the most similar
i"rr..i"fb if it is iemporary) is nàt *otth even a little miracle' Taking
ìrr"i i"rroí of -, ,ogether' we learn that pcrfect match worlds to @q where Nixon pressed the button. The lesson we learn by
"rJü-t. "*ti",r,
counts for -uà ttiott than imperfect match' even if comparing ul and tøa is that under the similarity relation we seek, per-
"iï"r,i""1*Ì*,
th"'imoerfect match is good enough to give us similariry in respects fect match of particular fact even through the entire future is not wo¡th
a big, widespread, diverse miracle. Taking that and the lesson of zø2
;;;, ;:.*t very much tä us. I do iot "1"ì- that this pre-eminence o{
it is a feature of
i"*ft ii i"tuitivelv obvious. I do not claim that judgments together, we learn that avoidance of big miracles counts for much more
"".i.*
ii,. ,i*;t".ity ..t",ions måst likely to guide our explicit k is than avoidance of little miracles. Miracles are not all equal. The all-or-
put nothiDg distincrion between worlds that do and thai do not ever violate
,rot; .lt. ,há objection we are considering never would have been
the laws of tøe is not sensitive enough to meet our needs.
ioá"rd. (S." also the opinion survey reported by Bennett in [2]') But
,tr" pr"-.ìrrin."." of p..fect match-is a feature of some relations of This completes our survey of the leading candidates. There are other
it must be a feature of any similarity relation that candidates, but they teach us nothing new. There are some worlds
"""åiit;-il".it",
*ill "nd where approximate reconvergence to ø,e is secured by a second small
' meet our piesent needs. miracle before t, rather than afterq/ard as at ur3i Haig has seen fit to dis-
À i.iii "fitt .f candidates is typified by zøa' This world begins-like
12' and zr3. There is perfect match with z'e until shortly
before t' there connect the button, Likewise there are worlds where a diverse and
i " ¡r- ait"t*"n". mi."cl., the button is pressed' But there is a wide- widespread miracle to permit perfect reconvergence takes place mostly
.".."J'".¿ cåplicated and diverse second miracle after It not only before and during r: Nixon's fingers leave no prints, the tape recorder
,f,. hoio"rurt
'' button-
but also removes all traces of Nixon's malfunctions, and so on.
"'."".., fn"."".r-up
ir.rtit*. job is miraculously perfect' Of course the fatal Under the similariry relation we seek, tø1 must count as closer to taq
itgn"i ånith.t, iurt á, -r, but there is much more' The fingerprint than any o1 u.'2, 14, and wa. That means that a similarity relation that
',råirh.r, "i returns to Nixon's fingertip' Nixon's. nerves
tú. s*""t combines with Analysis 2 to give the cor¡ect truth conditions for coun-
"nd
tå.iú.d, his memories are falsified, and so he feels no need of the terfactuals such as the one we have considered, taken under the stan-
"* -"nini. Th" click on the tape is replaced by innocent noìses' The dard resolution of vagueness, must be governed by the following
"*i."
."i.aing tigttt *""es cease ro beai their incriminating images' The wire system of weights or priorities.
.ool, då*i, and not by heating its surroundings in the ordinary way' (1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse
And so on, and on, and on. Not only are there no traces that âny violations of law.
human detective could read; in every detail of particular fact' however
(2) It is of the second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal
;i;uæ,l, is just as if the button-prãssing had never been' The worlds
 Coønterfaauøl Dependence andTime's Arrota 49
48 Coønterfaauals and Time
match o{ Particular fact how could one small, localized, simple miracle possibly do all that
region throughout which perfect needs doing? How could it deal with the fatal signal, the fingerprints,
orevails. localized' the memoriis, the tape, the light waves, and all the rest? I put it to you
ol Tjirîî,r'" third importance rc avoid even small' that it can't be doneiDivergence from a world such as z''e is easier than
simPle violations o{ lav¡' similar- perfect convergence to it. Either takes a miracle, since tøe is determinis-
to tecure approximate
t'' ì:'iti iñä;nor"o'i-po""n"t
å"" i" *""ers that iõncern us greatlv' ìic, brrt conu"igence takes very much more of a miracle. The asym-
") il:;;;;"l;' metry of counierfactual dependence arises because the appropriate
(rt is a good question whether stand".d, of similarity, themselves symmetric, respond to this asym-
ìr"t ,hoild h"ue little weight or Ii:il:äiå:'i',ï?J::'.#mït"ll: metry o{ miracles.
ä:ïäd i;;"H'jirc 'å t'"*liu' ri't'i 1¡zo¡ and Jackson ([7])if It might be otherwise if øe were a different sort of q/orld' I do not
z- o-nly
meân t; suggest that the asymmetry of divergence and convergence
sive cases which appear 'o "o-"'oi''ijttt'uÀàei'en"lytis
but Morgenbesser has
i.ro.o"i-"t. simila¡ities toun' io'ìoif,ing; to,'-l"Tt"
miracles holds necessary or universally. For instance, consider a simple
i#Jî'ä, n sl'* tiiill' *r'i't' aPPears to word inhabited by just one atom. Consider the worlds that differ from
'.påi,.J first b'ought to my attention by brnest it in a certain way at a certain time. You will doubtless conclude that
il;. Th*;t'iù. was
convergence to this world takes no more of a varied and widespread
Loevinsohn.) efte¡ we
of course' even
Plenry of unresolved vagueness -remains' comparison' and ranked miraclJ than divergence from it. That means, if I am right, that no
have distinguished the foursorts
of respect of asymmetry of counte¡factual dependence prevails at this- -q/o¡ld'
ota"' ot n""nougit has been said to Aiymmetry-by-fiat analyses go wrong for such simple worlds. The
them in decreasing '-po-i"n"i'
o¡her versions of the future simt- asymmetry of miracles, and hence of counterfactual dependence, rests
Lt**'rìtììiîtii"ti'on; "nd I ihink way'
be answered in the same on a feature of v¡orlds like urq which very simple worlds cannot share.
i".ity åu;""tøn -ay

ASYMMETRY OF OVERDETERMINATION
THE ASYMMETRY OF MIRACLES
Any panicular fact about a deterministic world is predetermined
Enough-has been said' "*:l':.;Ï1":HlJ-'5::'1, :';;'UX. :l
counterfactual dePendence tn st
throughout the past and postdetermined throughout the future. Á't any
-past
have been oJ the sort time, or future, it hìs at least one determinant: a minimal set of
ffiåîffi;;;;å the button-' the future s¡ould
of particular fact, {rom conditìons jointly sufficient, given the laws of nature, for the fact in
{ound at tu r: a future very drtter"n,lln -"".tr at tø¡: a question. (Members of such a set may be causes of the fact, or traces o{
il;ï";;.'ïi;;"it *ould have been of the sort tound
"l'o before ¡' \lhence came this ii, or neither,) The fact may have only one determinant at a given time,
oast exactlv like that of to unlit'îtto'ity into the stan- disregarding inessential differences in a way I shall not try to make pre-
It is not built
TlJitî.,"i, ä1, not built into Analvsisto2'combine u¡ith Analvsis 2' cise. Or it may have tq¡o or more essentially different determinants at a
äiäläìiilliJr;:,i"t -t t'"u' t"n nt
in the range of.candidates.
\trü'e
given time, each sufficient by itself. If so, it is oaerdeteflnined at thet
It i,o* "n ",y.,n.i|
came instead divergence from iime. Orrerdetermination is a matter of degree; there might be two
considered worlds s/here ,*"ii'-ilt""t" permit--ted
"
worlds where a small miracle. permitted 'approxt-
determinants, or there might be very many more than tY¡o.
i,il'ü.;.;td;; permitted per- I suggest that whac makes convergence take so much more of a mir-
;:;.:;.*;ä;;io t" *¿ *o'iã' *here a bis miracle worlds where a acle than divergence, in the case of a world such as øe, is an âsymmetry
fect convergence to Ír''o' But
*-" Ji¿ no' consiãet any
to ri'o' If we had' our svm- of overdetermination at such a wo¡ld. How much overdetermination
.ï;ù;ì;;;ï; o**itteà p"rfect conutrgencer"uot"á such s¡orlds no less of later affairs by earlier ones is there at our world, or at a deterministic
metric standards of itil"ity ïJuìJ-ttiu" world which might be ours for all we know? Ve have our stock
th"fr.ffåi. could they be likc: examples-the victim ''fi/hose heart is simultaneously pierced by rwo
an.r.,ny such worlds to consider?'vhat
 Cot4ntefdcttøl DePendence andTime's Anou 51

to Counterfaauls and Time

matter, holding near here but not in remote parts of time and space' If
bullets, and the. like' But those-:::åÏ"#"ï"ïXHi:,#:î::::,'å: so, then th"irests on it-the asymmetries of miracles, of counterfac-
extreme' *t "o"' ':::.*r:.;t".t' "ll
overdetermination is not very ,u"l d"p"rrd.n"", of causation and openness-may likewise be local
äàî* t-"*,il.''ot a very and subject to exceptions.
of earlier affairs by later ones' on """ lilI"o,ï:,r#åïïï:ifiil:ïiT
got' o" it"tts widesPread I regret that I do not know how to connect the several asymmetries I
q¡orld like outs'Vh-at-*"'
less universal at a are so mrnute or herre d"iscussed and the famous asymmetry of entropy'r
;å;;iä;;;"t future times-' Most of these traces
iï;:ää;;;;;;*g'ïiili'åïili:::Ë',',f"iml:"i
them: but no matt€r' so long a
of t'"""t-of present fact
manv simultaneou, di';oint "ornlin"tíon' for the
"ny
combinatíon to
REFERENCES
; there is no lawful
wav
:äT:;;ffiînä,hereof trace could some-
il;;;ä; t" the alsence of the fact' (Even if a tf f1l Robert M. Adams, "Theorics of Actualiry," Nods 8(1974):2Il-31'
of
hos, have been faked, t'"""' "t itt"'"útitè
of the requisite
T:::t
jointly suf- izi ¡o.r"th"n Bennett, re"ie* of Lewis ([to]), Tbe C¿nadizn Journal
i¡"Lîrï"r îi'n"l;ã"¿ -i'tt 'r'"'tt""t i"trr to form a set P bilo soPhy 4(197 4): 381402
in quesuon ) If so' the abundan-ce of future traces [f] G. Lee Bowie, "The Similarity Approach to Counterfactuals: Some
ficient for the fact
makes for a like abund-"t ot
tutu'" àettr-ina"t'' Ve mry reasonably Problems," Nois 13(1979): 477-98.
([10]), Philosopby of
the past on an altogether ditterent [4] Lewis Creary and Christopher Hill, review of Lewis
exoect overdetermination tos'ard 14'
::íË;,oï';;;"'ion"l "" ài'ii¿'o'"'¿""'mination to*ard the Scic nce 42(197 5) : 34
Order, and Causa-
[5] P. B. Downing, "subjunctive Conditionals, Time
t"äl:; It takes a miracle to rion," Prcceedings of the Atistotelian Societf 59(1959)t 12540
*ot,o explain the asymmetry o{ miracles' which it determines' 16l Kit Fine, review oÍ Lewis (l1o))' Mind 84(1975):451-8'
br."k ;h.it.k ;ä;;" "ny áttt'*i'i"nt
and that
zao' a u/orld where Nixon izj frank ¡ackson, "A Causal ih"ory of Coun¡erfactuals," Atttrahtian
äiiil; äü .."-prt' rt ¿itttg"thefrom wherebv certain past con- Joamal of Pbilosophy 55(1977)t 3-21.
;;;..;'h.'üt;;nå.d onlv breaË p'esslinks
it' To converge' to'us' a world [8] bavid Lewis, "Counterpart Theory
and Quaotificd ModalLogic," Joør-
àitions determine that h" do"s "ot varied nal of Pbilosopby 65(1968): 113-26'
where Nixon pres"'utt*on"títt útttt 'tt" tinttt -hereby a not ¡91 "Anselm and Actuality," Noris 4(1970): 175-88.
'ht that he does
äiluj;;i filte conditions vastly overdetermine'
tttt more links necd breaking
liol çounrrrfaauak (ox[or& Rlackwell, 1973)'
overdetermin"äãn' 'co""terfactuali and comparative Possibility," Joømal of Pbil'
oress it. The more be i{ it is to break i11j -,
........--.."._,
'and iiitttt'åtti" -itacle
the more widespread and -,
osoPbical Logic 2(1973): 41846.
"C;sation," Joumal of Philosophy 7.0(1973)t 556-67; rePrinted
them all.
"'ïîî,r-.o.vnotedbvt"-P#:gi:rl,':å:l;""iffi ' ' -=-.._,
U2l
Ernest Sosa (ed.), C¿øsation and Conditionals (London: Oxford
in
oí overdetermination'
'I ;ti5:lä University Press, 1975).
-.trv point sou'c' to infiniry' The oppostte "1¡" pa¡adoxes of Time Tr ate\," Aøerican Philosopbicøl Quar-
î;J;;J;;;ard from
" contrects inward from infiniry
[13]
terþ 13(1976)t 145-52'
#.":tt.:,'i;;ht"h " 'pt";"tí*"i" u-' of nature equallv well' But ther -,
ffiï;:J"i;-;;utd åb'v
'-ù sort exhibits t*¡¡sms 6vg¡dgtermtna-
:ïJ;;;;. ;;;t;"" of "itht' the wave each- deter-
I I ¡m erateful to manv friends for discussion of these matters, and especially to
d ì";;;i;.:;ion' cou*ltt' iinv '"tpl"t.of
ptltit *tt"t" the wave is emitted
Tonathin Bennett, RoLerr Goble, Philip Kitcher, Ernest Loevinsohn' John Perry'
mine what happen' "t'tt" tp'"T-ii'oít in which this i¡fi"hael Slote, and Robert Stalnaker. I am grateful ¡o seminar eudiences ¡t seve¡¡l 'ni-
or absorbed' The processes ;h"; ;;Jttth" p"tt' not those in which it
are the ones versities in New Zealand for comments on an early version of this paper, rnd to
the
Founderion for making those seminars pos-
extreme overdeter-in"tion
got;-to*t'ã New Zealånd-United St¡tes Educarional

goes toward the futu'"' r tl'i th" '"r,.t i"ru" t9tt gtl"li[' sible.I also thank Princeton Univershy and the American Council ofLeârned Societies
foi r.r."r.h .uppor, "t earlier stages. An eerlier version of this papcr was presented et
"'gg;
Let me emphasize, once more' that
the- asymmetry of o-verdetermt-
the 1976 AnnuaiConference of the Australasian Association of Philosophy'
#ä'iî ;';'åffi si^'i a' f ii ^ tt'r' Moieov'r' it mav be
a local
 Countedactual Depetdence andTime's Anow tJ
52 Counerfaauals and Time
of Philosophical Then I focus attention on some contexts in particular, and on the range
f t4t "scorekeeping in a Lenguage Gtme"' Jotmal of similarity relations that apply in such contexts' Thereby I add to my
Lo1ic, I (1979): 3!9-59 '
i¡ Decisions' Vahtes dnd .irti.r àirJutri"n, bt t do nãi at all subtract from ir' Yet not a few
t'"' Richa¡d Montague, "I)etermmrstic Theories"'
tl51 -, think I have taken something back. Vhy?
lî"".,irìi".i p.r*"rnon pr"rr,lie2); reprinted in Monøgue' Formal readers
Press' 197-4)' The trouble seems to be that a comparative ¡elation of the sort thar I
iäí"iå)iy 1N..* naien: Yale Universiry --^ now put forward----one that turns to some extent on the size of regions
tft+íimi:t,Ï;rffi ijxffi ;#'íåi!!t'])!)-!)!;"¡'.-a"r of o.'.f"", match, and to some extent on the scarcity in one v¡orld of
' l0r-118
Pbilosoohv 5J(1975): . t Ð ,..-t ,trr, violaie the laws of another-is not at all what my earlier
and countcrfactu¡ts"' Anaþsis "ue'n,. led these readers to exPect. But why not? I think the trouble
tttr ;ïïi'#i::íu"íg"i-';dl'il"'t'v writings
38(1978)1 80-2' .' ,t-:--t D--.' has three sources.
Pbilosophkal Retnew
tlrf iliri;í',i. í1o,", "Tltt in Counterfactuels"' One source, I think, is entrenched doubt about the very idea of simi-
87(1978): !-27 ' Analysis of laritv. It is widelv thought that eaery shared property, in the most
Counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis
t'"' Pavel Tichi, "A
t20l
l-7 inclisive possible sense ol that "rord, is prinø føcie a respect of similar-
å"ït,"*""11,4 r," üilo'oph;,.ot'st"tlie s 29(1976\ 27 irr,, ,h", ,i,in*, be similar in respect of satisfying the same miscella-
conundrum"' Noris 13(r e7e)z 4ee-5os' ""n
frtf iJ;ü;;;;ïë.u""Jiåtu"t .,áouslv disirinctive formula, or in respecr of belonging to the same
,,tt"rlr/ misáellaneous class. If so, then there's little to be said about
similarity. Any two things, be they two peas in a pod or
"o-oát",iu.
be thev a raven and a writing-desk, are alike in infinitely many
resPec$

PostsctiPts to - uá[ke in equ"lly

arrd many.
^scepticism,
I observed that we undeniably do make
Àg"int, this
i,rdpîents of comparatiue overall similarity. And readers took the
'""iñ,-U", in far ioo limited a way. "Yes," I think they thought'
"' Counterfactual DePendence i'there is indeed a comPerative relation that is special in the way it gov-
and Time's Arrow" .in, ou, tr,ap judgments. Ve can scarcely doubt that-q/e have
"tpli.itt"rt' ^But
r. op.*,io"A ground, and. ¡'e're as much at
i."u. that firm
.." i, Apart from that one special case, we- do no.t understand
"u"..
io* on" rhrråd prop".ty can be more or less of a similarity-maker
A. NE\íTHEORY AND OLD?
,-tr* -o,t tto* i, be that some orderings are comparisons of
"t; ".oth".s aren't."
""n And so I speak of similarity, and these
Fromtimetotimelhavebeentold'muchtomysurprise'thatthisbppoied to the "old "i-il".i,t, ".rá
scepti"s índerstand me in the only wây they can: they seize on
the one
oaoer Dresents a "n"* ,h.oty" oitàlterfactuals'
Jisärirnin"tion they regard as unproblematic, since they can under-
ir,ãr*l; iÏ"J¿"anced in eárlier writings'r
"'""¿tld'ü;l;"'etn, t"tt*,itt'i'he"truth of the matter was as fol- .t"nã noo',o pi.t ãut ðne similarity relation operationally i: IiTt tf
loq¡s. ln the earlier writings t "lJ
thtt counterf¿ctuals r¡'-e*-Þ"-lï*d rnro i"¿ern.nit. Then they observe, quite rightly, that the- "similarity
lIii.i.'äh ;ïäiiio"' s"v toto*"tive of
overall similaritv 'worlds' r-.litiån'ir now put for*ard as governing counterfactuals isn'¡ that
pt"t"tly.fi*ed relation of simil"ttty
but that there was no on" Ct1-
:lit srmr- one.
ãirJ riL alw"ys' To the contrary' the governtng
l""."t""tuals Th. right lesson would have been more far-reaching Our ability to
Djlferent .rk" *rJ snap judgment is one reason, among others, to reject the
ia",a"
i".i*- was both vagut "nd co¡text-dePendent'
probablv
:ïiJ;oiil r"i.., ¿iät'"nit^nges of similariry relations' allthat' ."epti"tl, egaliariai otthodoxy. It iust isnt so that a'll propenies (in
*"iiîäìî *..-t"Jing fuu d"t";in""tv' In this paier I reiterate th"'-oriinãlusiue ,ense) are equally respects of similarity' Then it is by
no means empty to say as I doìhat a relation of overall similarity is any
1973); ¡lso "Countcrf¡ctu¡ls ¡nd and dissimilarity' (To
IPrincio¡llv Countel4ctxdlt (Oxford: Blackwell' *"i!n"a."*i,"n, of respects of similarity
l"ip"tiitr't¿ i" le73 rnd rcprintcd in this volume'
ä:ÏåJffi;';,ïíritv'
 Coønterfactual Depcndence and Time's Arrow 5t

54 Couterfactuals dnd Time

sticking in
down the lav¡s of the first world, then to mutilate them by
nonarchimedean; that is' s'e fashion' Yet
which I add that the weighting might be ;il"r-;" fe.mit 'rarious exceptions in an unprincipled
;äih"* ";ñ;. of påo'iti" r"ih"rcan th"" trade-offs') Here we have almost evervthing that ever happens in the second world conlo¡ms
that go far bevond the one that li.fä; ;ih. i"is of the 6rst."ihe third world does have a nice' ele-
l':i;ï;;p;;;;ì". yei falls far shon.of.the class
qoverns the snap iudgments; and that the Ê¡st world except
""l"tion' l-ì, ìíif*t" system; its laws resemble those ofsquare
Í"Iin.",.d iust by the iormal character of comparatrve slmllarlty' - An i.r I here, a switch from inverse to inverse cube
"'äi"""ii..¡"i,'.*¡i"ti",,itt, what shall we put in its
'place? are
"fiisn
"ft".g. f"o'ith.. ich mino' changes' consequentlv' the third
;;;,;;d";
,.il::r,;;;ñ;, åt'.it" ¿int"ntt uetween those properti€s that *o.lá .on.t"ntly uiolates the laws of the first; any little thing that goes
distinction? A
llJ,iålliJi'ì'ì'i;;rÇ "nà 'no'" 't'"' aren't? A primiiive of.the very
.i i. ,tt" third íould be prohibited by the laws of the.first' Focus on
in the forÁ of denial
i::ilJo; t;ìì;ì;;á;;"*'logv'ir'at aren't respects of similaritv? A
a
tn"'ii.*itii. "t¿i6cation o[ the laws, and it may well seem that the

:ä,Ï;;;i;;;ii.iJp,op'"iJJt" t"ke up' lest we put the.onus on the ;illJ;;;iJ;"t"-bles the 6rst with respect to laws far more than the
#:,,".ì;;;ilo,i" i,ì, 'lt'v r."..¿ ¿""t. But I s'ould insist that theie is anoiher way of comparing
::'^:;îä".'\íú -" lno* bást on thisiubject' Iìhink' to
is that.egali-
reiect it without .i-ii"riru s/ith respect to laws, equally deserving of that name' on
ä:tHîö; iir;t';""..aiu.,' we are entitled ;ì;h;í. i."ond ïotld resembles the first very well' and the third
linguistic
o*iig
" d"u"loP"d altemative'2 t.ri",ii.t ,ft. first very badly. That is the way that neglects outlawed
"ny is that some readers thinh of
ï:',;;J;."t; of trouble' I suspect'match' and neslect the case of "rl'iÀ"",¡"t, "tJ
IooÉ inrt"âd th"
"t
classes of lawful and of
h;;;;;iltñ; itot'i"ct events,
"'
;:i:ääüï;;;a "l*'"v' iimítea *siån' ro illustrate' consider three
4018 are alike in this
loco-
wav:
äääiä, ;óìã,-"nJ eolsl zars and and ñreboxes (to the extent
,'i"" r''"" á""ii""te Loilers, smokeboxes, B, BIG AND LITTLE MIRACLES
production line-eve¡ are
;ilí*;;i;iì;firo- "n t"tlv zoth century
are ãuplicated' But 2818 is a I should
ffiiJä,;;J;rioot t"tt"t É*ings also It has often been suggested, not often by well-wishers, that
:åi':"Ji'iüï*rJ, ;;;:;ví;¡;åd 2-&4 coar haurer-prentv or ¿i"i""ritft Si* "nd litil. mir""les thus: big miracles are other-worldly
to..a-*ú","", 4ôt8 is the opposite' a {astJargc-wheeled' ;;;il; urZtt ,n"ny of the laq/s that actually obtain, whereas linle
"îi,ìi,,i"
Î.,',r-.vlindered ,H express p"""ng"i io"ototive.' So is 6018; but this proposal is thoroughly mis-
-it""ì", Ut""t onty a few la*s. I thinkendorsed
duplicate.the correspondins
:iï.idlkT;;ì t' rt". r.*'ir ""v p""sandihatmodãrnized thing that I never it, and a bad thing that I
version of 4018') r"iJ"à.ìi it " s..á
äi;iïöì;. (öili' " "'r'i-"p eols is more similar to 4018 than
ãm sometimes said to have endorsed it'
-'¿;r;id;t two cases' (1) By "laws" we might mean t'undamental
iî;;";;J;h. *"v in whici¡
wav of comparing simi-
I'iÏJi. sTiìî""ü in.i,,,,i"'tht" i' tnother the duplicate standard
t*,,i"t. t.gttrtiti.s tÈ"t *ould "ome out as axioms in a system that
ffi;:;""ìlt;;;;ru'i.g of .h"t n"*t, on which qras ootimal
and
true systems in its combination of simplicity
.rrnrrntk" 2-8t8 the stronger candidate' ;;;;.;i;. ii,üi"p"., of púvri", .ote true, there mav be onlv a few of
"Lonq
""Ï;ä;;"i,t.tu'lt may be a hasty step from similarity with if t".."ft"J"..",.1'la*s aitogethet' Then zo miracle violates many fun-
-uiolatt'
,.ro..i ao l"-. of nature to similarity of the laws-or' I mrght even say' ä"-"",rili*tt -r miracle the Grand Unified Field equation'
consider three
:iäù"'i;; ;;','h"- lineuitti" todífi"ttio"t of laws'uniform hws' The
ü. sltttoaing"t
"iuation,
or another one of the very few' very sweep-
J"iiäÏäi nï,'r'"t't.iti-"ì"t, "t'santdov'¡n
svstem.of
would be to wrrte
ing fundamental laws.
-ö;'itt bt iil"*r" *.
..Iànì'do., ,ro,, ,he best way to writeits laws might rather mean fundamental or deriøed
¡Inthis¡tc¡l¡nindcbtcdtoMichaelSlotc;llongegodefcndcdthccgditarilnortho.
h*., Àát"'t"gultrities that iould come out as axioms or theorems in
io -v oirisnisfrction Morc rccendv'I havc oo,irn"Lt"ti"-. Then any miracle violates infinitely many laws; and
:::î:"fi ñ;;oä..n", not 'nti']iv
*i'th D. M. Armstrong, which havchclpcd mc to "î i; J.."t'. seem that iig miracles violate mo¡e laws than little
ii.ln,l;ï... .i.*¡vc discussions ¿nd ihc r¡dition¡l problcm of "eJ;
ãir,i-i¡i' -¿ t.r.. the qucstion oi-t"ttit"ti"n¡t,n --ìJt
ones.
ç- ru^r'* ,li."us'ion'
"cf -"v
"rtcw llork For a Thcorv of Univêrsels"' blind alley to count the "iolated laws''Ùfhat to do instead?
""î.1.ìi. 6l (1i83\t 14177 ' "
Arrlt,a/lriun loumal ol Pbilosophy
 Coønterfactual Dependencc and'l ime's A¡tow tl
t6 Counterfaauals and Time
"diversence from such a world as tze is easier than perfect converBence
Take the laws collectively; distinguish lawful events from.unlac'ful ,o it. EÏth"r r"k", miracle . ' . but convergence takes very much more
ones. (For example, lawiul pair-annihilations with radiation from àf fo "be sure, I said that it might be otherwise for a differ-
unlawfìl quiet diiappearings of single particles. without a -trâce') In ".it""1"."
.it ,on of *otld. But the Bennett o'orld seems to be a wo¡ld of the
whatever -"y .r,"nù-""n bã spread out or localized, unlawful events seme sort as t o. After all, it has the very same laws'
b. aor."á out or localized. In whatever way several events can be
""r, or varied, several unlac'ful events can be alike or veried' In whet- No. Same laws are not enough. If there ate de facto asymmetries of
alike
time, not written into the laq/s,ìhcy could be just what it takc-s to make
.".. we can distinguish one simple €vent from many simple
","y aonsisting of many simple pans, we
,h" áiff.r"n"" between a world to which the asymmetry of miracles
o, fro- ona
a world to which it does not; that is, between a world like
"r.n,r, "o-p-ia* "uarrt
can in oanicular distinguish one simple unlawful event from meny' or "nd
.rlJ("r out.) to which convergence is dif6cul¡ and a Bennett world to
"oolies
fro- on. co-ple* "uent consisting of many simple unlawful.parts' A *úi"h is easy. Consider, for instance, Poppet's asym-
Û;n *it".l" .ontit,s of manv little miracles together, preferably not all "onu.rg.n"e
-"ìrrr.o Th"t ii no, " *"*", of law, so it could
obtain in one and not
iliie. 'Vh"t m"kes the big miracle more of a miracle is not that it breaks the óther of two worlds with exactly the same las's' Likewise in
more laws; but that it is divisible into many and varied parts, any one
general for the asymmetry of overdetermination'
of which is on a par with the little miracle ' " A B"nn.,, *or-ld is deceptive' After the time of its convergence with
?rrr, it contains exâctly the same apparent traces of its. past
thât rtr.does;
th" tr"""r,o be found in u,¡ are such as to record a past exactly like
"nã q/orld is full of t¡aces that
C. \íORLDSTO VHICH COIWERGENCE IS EASY that of the base world re,6. So the Bennett
,""* * ,."o.d " past likeìhat of tl,e. But the past of the Bennett world
ir rlti .. the laws tLat are common to both
Beein with our base world øe, the deterministic world something like påst of øo: under the
that Nixon
oui o",n. Proceed to zr¡, the world which stans out just like ?¿'0, -orlds. the oait of the Bennett world predetermines
Ji".rg", frorn it by a small miracle, and thereefter evolves in accord- presses'the button, whereas the past of ø6 predetermines that he does
ii.h the lawi of zro. Now extrapolate the later pan of z,¡ back- not. Further, we cennot suPPose that the two Pasts ere eve¡ close' As I
"n""
q,ard in accordance u¡ith the laws of øe to obtain what I shall call a noted in discussing world à2, there is no reason to think that t¡'o laq'-
Bennett uorld.3 This Bennett world is free of miracles, relative to z'6' ful histories can, b-efore diverging, remain very closè throughout a long
That is, it conforms perfectly to the laws of zre; and ìt seems safe to initial segment of time. To cãnstrain a history to be lawful.in its,own
suppose that these arà the laws of the Bennett ç'orld also' From a cer- rieht, anã to constrain it also to stay very close to a given lawful his-
,"in'ti-. onward, the Bennett wo¡ld and world z''¡ match perfectly, to-* fo, a lone time and then swerve off, is to impose two very strong
c/hich is to sey thât u¿'r converges to the Bennett world' Further, this Tiere is not the slightest reâson to think the two con-
converpence i; accomplished bi.a small miracle: namely' the very same
"oírtr"int..
straints are compatible.
ii"Lñirt.l. t'h.teby zr¡ diveiges from zre' For we had already settled To be sure, any co-pl"t" cross section of the Bennett world, taken
ih"t thi, ,-"ll diuergenci mirac-le was the only violation by u1 of the in Írll d.t"il, truthful record of its past; because the Bennen s'o¡ld
;t
"
l"*, of r¿0, and thoie âre the same es the laws of the Bennett world' is lawful, and its laq's are ex hypotbesi deterministic (in both.-direc-
T'hus the Bennett -orld is ¿ world to which convergence is easy, since iion$, any complete cross sittion of such a world is lawfully suf-
"nd
ur¡ converges to it by only a small miracle' fi"i.íi fot "ny oth.i' But in a wo¡ld like r¿0, one that manifests the
\flhat tten becomes of my asymmetry of miracles? I said that .ordinary de fLao asymmetries, we also have plenty of very incomPlete
arorr rá.rioá. that postdetermine incomplete cross sections at eârlier
times. It is these inìomplete Postdeterminents that are missing from
t So-c¡lled to ¡ck¡owlcdgc my indebtcdncss toJonethrn Bcnncn, who 6rst brought the
oossibiliw of such *oild, iorny ¡ttention. Sec his "Countc¡f¡cruds rnd Tcmporal
'Dir.rætioi," et itosoptirot R.!ir@ gf $984)t 57-91, cspccirlly pp' 6144' I ¡m indebtcd
Karl Popper, "The A :r.ow oÍTime," Narure 177 (1956')t 538
¡l¡o to D¿vid S¡nford for hclpful corraspondcncc on thc subicct'
'
 t9
Cotaûterfactødll)ependenceøtd|'ime'sAnota
58 Co*nærfaatals ønd Time
process takes place when a person
idea that a unique microphysical
the Bennett world. Not throughout
its history;.butthe postdetermina- se"m''aboutì' credible as the idea that a unrque
;;il;;;*¿."r,t
'ffii;f"ä;;;ionr"k",
,i"" ,tt.,i-e of conterfen"e *ith zr¡ is deficicnt' - t-o people fall trulv in love' Instru-
fl""t "h"n
"ïopï;iï;äïi.öi""i" i"'
"*"tt same wav' Ripple:
1'-" 1:*d Ti:HffiitË;;ü phvtiti'tt doesn't help matters' though
rnwaro and 'r'e
get higher;-when they reach the tt'"o'f år measurement is such a disaster that it
"'áong
the edge; they contract ;ä;;,fü;;'iuí,,
q'aieåand"then the pond is perfecdy dismissed es a mere instrument' Vhich parts
of present
cenrer a stone flies out ol ttre \--'.).i')" ,^ ¡1"
::il:'üd;ï".ii;pp""J it tr" time-reversed mirròr imase of what irliåó'läri", i;ili.ï n.ii'"r
.rløt'" *ill remain when the dust settles?
It is no less lawful; but for
.räì"rrilrï"pp...'-h"n ' "ont iäl' into "ofpond' be no I can only guess; my guess rs not especially well informed;
,h. violeted asvmmetries are not â matter law' Theres'ould
no trace *t"ii; ;;'i""ä;"i';i;; "' follo*' Ïh' tÍreoretical foundation of
For thcre would be
;;tdË;; ;;;ä -i"i t'¿ t"""ened' the rock q'ould ;ä,il;;"h;;i., il p'ob"blv *'ong to sav that reduction is brought
on the water of its previous "gn'i'iJ"t and * {o'-tt' ::"ü:iï:*Ë';;Í;;;' the working quantum mechantcs of
the nearby light would þeer no and the like can
¡r *ã"fJ bear no iound of a splash'
radioactive decay, coherent sotrcs, chemical-bonding'
lil-ìJ.ì."*.,. . . . In shon, perfcct covet-up iob-and wrthoutåny
a
it, o*n' It does not need this unfortunate anthro-
äIi;;.""d;;
n'" *å'ra ur*Jt"' *d not in a s'orld like ours' Ioanv
be
ìü'."J"''ä"i'ä, govern our w-orld
d.t..*ini'tit, the event is postdetermined bv
:ä;;; ø"îi"¡ii rrt." th" lao's of naturtofthat
;i;h.-il;;"
J;;.
we lackihe usurl abundance of
äili,l;il;;";;;tri.. vh"tt"tt we make thJreduction of the
:H;iÏ'ä;,iäìii"'*"¿"s't ;;;; fr;",i"" supposedly brought on by measurement' at any.rete
tbe making
lesser postdeterminants. å:;:l.i it,î;;;å;Ji'"'r"Ë¿ in radíoactiuein decav'-in radiation of light
ï"jffiË;f ã;".i""1 uona', in ionization' the
so.much so that not
il h;;;:;;å ;. ".. These processes are pervasive' it can contain fev¡
D. THE INDETERMINISTIC CASE ä"1" tJä.;ìd;, *-tt"É in¿tt*tiniitic' but also
"
if deterministic enclaves.
" "n., In one wâv' the P-rob-
Iassumeddeterminismforthesakeoftheargument'Iconsidered.the ü|j-.lì;; ;i;;i."o*"' of 'v "'vmmetries? miracle' not rt there
Ë",,.il;';;ii odt' to oppose the view that the,aslmmetrtes m ¡ì"ri"t. O;t"rgence no long"r reouires ainsmall
;;î;ñå;;, op|;iunitit' fo''diu"tience the outcomes of
brencnmg' chance
,riã", arise out of one-way indetermimstrc
"HÏÏä;;;:;;'
"onridat"tion oi I determinism
:í!!li^:-*'r' ;;:,öi.:]î"iJq""T;ll':
Jn not- Acceoted phvsics,""u"', all' is"'ime
atter't'"' not deterministic'.It is hard to
-i'htstill be reouired somettmeXï:'.'ï",**";',.î'f,r'11î:ù "T:',"."r'::
in present-day quantum :ì::i.ìiiä.ffi li;i'.-i"áli.,ii"¡u" case it dàes not matter q/hether I
1".- -f,* to -"k" of the indeterminism tel"tiuelv cheap dissimilarities' our
ì..äJ"t: P;; ilnr,.in, ind"ttttinism process per se ii credible enough' But
in nature-reduc-
ä tJÏJ".r;; ilf mi'a"le'
"s
liälliiuì.'lt ìi". ,t. ãil-v i"¿"tttinisiic Schrödinger wol¡fon-is *diverfences come cheaPer still' remains'the same'
ä';ï;h. o'aue function, as opposed to of measurement'5 And the
Th: ,ht;g o s"y
"bóut
approximate convergence
even if .it is cheaper
:ö;:.ä';.;;;0""i"ì,ã'i'r'" pr'!å'menon Even if apÞroximate convergence is cheaP-and
"*iñïi*"i, äb;itJ*iir'i"t even a litìle miracle-still w-e cân sev
so it is not that if Nixon had
äï;åil1;;ìiJ. o' nott'ing' so
\i;gn" 1il"o^ington: Indiene lJ:rivcnigr
'Forrfonhrightlccountofthcprcdicrrncnt'sccEugcncP.Vign,lx's!,imetficsand
Rcflcction¡: Scientìfc Essays of Etg'n" i
¿ió,.'. ti-lu'' r¡' h"othcsis that mcasuiqnent rcduccs thc wlvc
;;:;.:ï;t by John von Ncumatn' Mathema-
6HerelfollowtheleadofNrncyCartwright'HøøtbeLauso|Pþ,rÈr.Lie,insuggcst.
function comcs from r,a"*tnt" o' t"l*totcnt
this case' thc "proiechon Pos'
*",ü.p,1.i.rn ;u.* alleged fundo-entrl laws-in
i,i-
,lchonihlBTlin:sþringcr'.1er2);andbvFritzLon- *"""""-"ntl"iuitt the ¡¡¡ve function-may pcrfectly well
åi;:"¿;",:;;t:;;;;{i,t,o (Paris: tui¡te." which s¡vs ¡ha, to
äî.i Ëåt.îJ s* eì, u th¿o'i' ic I'ib'cruation cimtøniquc quantþuc ääbtti.ì;t,';;""*h rc¡lism about the r¡nobsew¿ble obiects.and Proccsscs
in Abntr shimonv' with acieptance ofless fund¡mcntal
;"#;'ï'ði:.,;-"t n'o'pt"t' to' â w¡v ou! 'rG survcvcd ;ïlî'.i;;;J;"à i';ì' *pp*'¿ to
:"ilì;î'uf ö;;*"' Pþri"s 3l (1963): "nd I do noi follow Canwright in her
'fiá*'ever'
"pprv'
ín qu""tu¡¡ Th'ory"; Ameàcan Joumal of laws rbout these objeco p'ot""tt
¿n Ancf¡ct of
iuna'"t""oil"*t or phvsics l take,th'e proiection
postulate
tittti .ti; Ñ-.t ctà'¡gr", "n'"*-íit Mc¡suremlnt P¡oblcmjs
(orford: Press' ;;:*Ë"¡;* ;ñ "na
íi:ú'"#;i;; il ;;'H"; ':h"
iott's of Pþsìa Lie cl¿¡cndon
io be . sp.ii"l c"te, sick spot in the midst
"
of generâl tooo he¡rtn'

1983).
 d Time
60 Co unterfact ua ls an
pressed the button there ç'ould have been aPProximete convergence to
our world, and no holocaust.
But s'hat about perfect convergence? Here, indeterminism makes
my problem harder. It is not to be said that the simila¡ity achieved by
o"rl"., counts for little or nothing. For it is just like the
"on".rg.nce
past similarity ihat has decisive weight in the deterministic case-,-tilting
ih" brl"n"" ín fa'or of last-minute divergence instead of difference
throughout the past. I said that perfect convergenc€ would take. a big,
*idesóread, uari.d mit"cle-" miraculously perfect cover-up job' But
if chance processes are abundant, as I have guessed that they are, why
couldn't ihey accomplish the cover-up? \(ihy couldnì convergence
happen *ithãut any miracles at all, simply by the right pattern of law-
fuÍåutco-es of many different chance processes? Call such a pattern a
quøsi-miracle.lt is extraordinarily improbable, no doubt, but it does
not the laq's of nature that prevail at our world.
"iolate
\ùlhat must be said, I think, is that a guasi-miracle to accomplish per-
fect convergence, though it is entirely lawful, nevertheless detracts
from similarity in muchìhe sa-. *"y that a convergence miracle does'
That seems plausible enough' (Though the test of the hypothesis is not
in its offhanã plausibility, but its success in yielding the right counter-
-quasi-miracle
factuals.) The would be such a remarkable coincidence
that it would bá quite unlike the goings-on we take to be typical-of our
n'orld. Like a big genuine miracle, it makes a tremendous difference
from our world. Therefore it is not something that hePPens in the
closest worlds to ours where Nixon presses the button. These worlds
have no convergence miracles, and also no convergence quasi-miracles'
So the case turns out as it should: the closest worlds s'here Nixon
presses the button are s,orlds where a holocaust ensues'
My point is not that quasi-miracles detract from similarity because
theyire so t'ery imptobable. They ar.; but ever so many unremarkable
thiágs that actually happen, and ever so many other thin-gs that might
hapfen under various counterfactual suppositions, are likewise very
improbable. rùlhat makes a quasi-miracle is not improbability Per se'
bui ¡ather the remarkable way in which the chance outcomes seem to
conspire to produce a pattern. lf the monkey at the ty-pewriter pro-
duces a 950-þage dissertation on the Yarieties of anti-realism, that is at
least somewhat quasi-miraculous; the chance keystrokes happen to
simulate the tracei that would have been left by quite a different pro-
cess. If the monkey instead types 950 pages of jumbled letters, that is
not at all quasi-miraculous. But, given suitable assumptions about
q,hat sorr of chance device the monkey is, the one text is exactly as
Cornte{actudl l)ependencc an ¡1 Tíme's Anow
improbable as the other. (It is irrelevant to comPare the probability
thaì there will be soze dissertâtion with the ptobabilicy that there will
be sorze jumble-the monkey does not iust select one or the other kind
of te*t, 6ut also produces â particular text of the selected kind.) The
pattern of systematic falsification of traces required for perfect conver-
gence is quasi-miraculous in the same way.
('ùØhat if, cont¡ary to what we believe, our oq¡n world is full of
quasi-miracles? Then other-worldly quasi-miracles would not make
óther *orlds dissimilar to ours. But if so, we would be very badly
wrong about our world, so why should q/e not turn out to be wrong
also a-bout which counterfactuals it makes truè? I say that the case
needn't worry us. Let it fall where it may')
In the deterministic case, the asymmetry of counterfactuals derives
from an asymmecry of miracles: divergence takes less of a miracle than
(perfect) convergence. Likewise in the indeterministic case s¡e have an ìi
of quasi-miracles. Convergence to an indetcrministic i¡
"iy--etty
q,orld of tbe sort that ours might be takes a quasi-miracle; divergence
,l
:å
from such a q/orld does not. (l do not speak of small quasi-miracles;
what corresponds to a small miracle in the deterministic case is a per-
iH
fectly commonplace chance occurrence.) The asymmetry is made
plausible by the same thought-experiment as ùefore: think, in some ffi
ãetail and without neglecting imperceptible differences, of what would
be needed for a perfect cover-up. lË
The trouble with using quasi-miracles as a weighty respect of dis- iH
similarity is that it seems to prove too much, more than is true. For if
quasi-miracles make enough of a dissimilarity to outweigh perfect tfi
Åatch throughout the future, and if I am right that counterfactuals ili
work by similarity, then we can flatly say that if Nixon had pressed the rEl
button there would have been no quasi-miracle. But if chance pro- H
cesses are abundant' and would have been likewise abundant if Nixon r
had pressed the button, then in that case there would have been so¡ne ìij
chance of a quasi-miracle. To be sure, the probability would have been !.1
rÈr
very low indeed. But it would not haYe been zero'
úut if there would have been some minute probability of a quasi- ii
miracle, does it not follow that there might have been one? And if there ,l
might have been one, then is it not false to say that there would not
have been one? True, it would have been overwhelmingly probable
that there not be one. But may we say flady that this improbable thing 'i
would not have happened?
(Note that I am not talking about probabilities that certain counter-
factuals are true, Rather, the consequents of the counterfactuals have to
iì
tå
 6J
CoønterfactuøLl)epcndenceandTimc'sArroe
62 Cotnterfactuals and Time
in oart of temporal order. I still say that won't do' lt imposes a priori
do *ithprobabilities' In particular,. the-y have.to do with, objective
,nr..r, on questions that ought to be empirical No; the asymmetry
sinsle-case chances, as of tlie time right after the hypotheticel Prcsstn-g'
of counterfaitual dependence should come from a symmetrical analy-
;i.il ;;;;i;;;.
-'ilif,;t;, ih", -ould ö'prise a suita6le quasi-miracle'7)
sis and an asymmetrical q/orld.
o"r¡"ot, exact bâlancei Suppose that perfect match
"n the vhat is tó be done? Our trouble v'as caused by an apparent logical
,#";;;; Ih; i;i";. contributes to similaiiiv exâcdv- as much.as connection between counterfactuals about what would happen' coun-
quasi-äiracle needed to achieve that match detracts trom srmrlârlty'
*rf""ru"l, about q¡hat might happen, and counterfactuals -about what
ìi.I -"tìãt *ìir, a quasi-miraculous convergence have no net ad,van-
the chances would be. One et"ap" route is to reconsider that connec-
;;';;;; Then thev b" tott' but not all' of
,ion, lnd."d, the connection seemed intuitively right, and I. s'ould
""n be
".;di.åu"n,"g..
irtiìf"l*i *.rf¿r where Ni"xon pressed ihe button' That seems button to give
But it
reluctant to challenge it just as a cure for my Present trouble'
iüã tieúi1"t.,"*actuals: it is nåt so that if he had pressed
the
convergence' and.such needs challenging also for other reasons'
,iti" t'¡.t" toould have been quasi-miraculous
Recall the ptoLl"rn. By trcating quasi-miracles as a weighty respect
*itlJ but it is so that if
.äI"*".t.. not h"*'" teen at all probable;
of Jirri-il".iiy, I make i turn out ih", there are no quasi-miracles
of
Nixoniad oressed the button then there migbt have been- quast- at any
anv kind, and hence there is no quasi-miraculous convergence'
iiär"tt Jonu.tg"n"". So far, so good' But- ìhis-solution \)ühat about
(besides
other oi',h. tno.t similar worlds where Nixon pressed the button That
r."-ì.g "iiru¡l fiil, to ,olu. the *iole-problem' means that:
o,rasi-riiracles: Þatterns of outcomes of chance Processcs that ar€
l--"i'f,'t.-"tlåUle coincidences, just as improbable, iust as,dissimilar 'ust
(l) If Nixon had pressed thebutton, there s¡ould not have been a
typically goes on et our world-but do not yield conver-
fiom -h"t quasi-miracle.
O"','tt" Uát"î"" hypothesis, these non-conoergence quasi'
""r".¡
"^;*ãrr-dr;rt^r, greatly ftom similarity and bring.no compensating But cuasi-miracles are iust certain special patterns of outcomes of
io,tt.t, uå'lik. ih. conv€rgence quâsi-miracles, are not to be pro""rr"., and the chances -ould h"ut been much the same if
""1n. of the closest worlds where Nixon had Pressed the but- "h"n"'.
Nixon had pressed the button. That means that:
íound tt
"nf
iãn. Ãra *tå, ."..s wrong. It seems that we shouldsay the same
thing
or not it yields convergence: if (2) If Nixon had Pressed the button, there s'ould have been some
;;;;';;t-q,r"tt-miracle,"whether
it would have had some minute prob- minute chance of a quasi-miracle'
Ñ1""" ní¿ pìessed the button,
h'appening, hence if so it might have happened' hence we \le had better accept both (1) and (2)' But they seem to conflict Or do
"Uif* "i
rñ"ri¿.", t"Tn*ly"that it *ould not have happened.' So the hypothe-
in trouble' thev? Considered Lv themselues, there is no very clear impression of
sis of e*""t b"lan.e does not sat'e the day and I am still coíflict. Above, to áreate a sembl"nce of conflict, I went in two steps'
The line of retreat, of course, is asy-mmetry by.fi.at' Analysis 1'
by way of:
ç'hich drops the whole idea that counterlactuals work by slmtlarlty' ls

r,iiiløi.Ët". r, has no need of determinism' or we could complicate (3) If Nixon had pressed the button, there might have been a

ii. *.igh,ing
-heavilv
.f tespects of similarity so that Perfect match in the past quasi-miracle.
*'eishs but perfect match in the future counts tor nothrnS'
pt".i*Ç' perfect match before and after the time relevant to the
'$(,fhether
or not (1) and (2) conflict, it certainly seems that (1) and (3)
ii"rãr"
:;;;;;f;;"í.,jpposition in question-as it might be, the.time of confìict, and it alìo seemi that (2) implies (3)' But perhaps we are being
^pressing of ihe but-ton'¡ Either way' ç'e build an fooled by an ambiguitY in (3).
Ñi-"r{ ttpp.t"å -advocated
a "not-g¡ould-not" reading of "might"
âsymm€try bets'een the directions of time into our very analysrs: I havé hitherto
and hence on my view causal, dependence just con sists counterfactuals, on which (3) comes out as:
.ã"ri"tfré,u"t,
l3-nwn) It is not the case that; if Nixon had pressed the button'
Theory"' and
' Sce "ÂSubjcctivisfs Guide to Oblective Chance," "Crusal Decision there would not have been a quasi-miracle'
Postcript B to "Crusation," ¿ll in this volumc'
 Counterfactudl Dependence andTime's A¡tow 6t
64 Connterfactuals and Time
In fact, our problem is more far-reaching still' If we want any kind
But perhaps there is also a "would-be-possible" reading, on which (3) s¡ould
of tï.l"tit ,n'."ty of counterfactuals, -e ã"'e not tre^t "there
comes out as: "it s'ould not haPPen" in general as incom-
b" ro¡n" oíit" and
"h"n"" two kinds
(3-wbp) If Nixon had pressed the button, it would be that: a
or,iUi", Stppot. lor reductio thât counterfactuâls of these
quasi-miracle is Possible' i." i" incompatible. Let C be any proposition that might
"*1,äl
ol,^in J. no, of chance; let øandubeaC-worldandanot-
The readings differ as folloç's. (3-nwn) means that some of the most "t ".atàrbut let them both be worlds that have a chance
ð-*"rta, t"rp"o;tely,
q/here a
similar *oilds where Nixon pressed tbe button are s'orlds J be the proposition that holds at these two
noi.rn'either -av; let,{
ouasi-miracle haopens; whe.eas (3-wbp) means that all of them are *o?ldrind no oth"rs; and let u, be any third world lt is true at tr, that
*orlds *here it ii þossible for a quasi-miracle to happen' If all of them if 14, túere would be some chance that C; so by the supposed incom-
are s¡o¡lds -her. ihe.. is an unfulfilled possibility of a quasi-miracle, ;r,ttilt*. it is false at t¡, that if ,4, it would be that not-C; so ø must be
that makes (3-nwn) false and (3-wbp) true. And if we take possibility å, i."r, ái close to 2l as z is. Likewise, PuttinB not-C in place of C' ø
,o .."r, non-""ro chance (as of the time of the pressing), then that is must be at leâst as close to z¡., as ø is. Thãt is, worlds ø and z are tied in
exectly the situation that makes (l) and (2) both true together' Indeed, to eny third world. But u and were az7 two worlds.that
(l) conflicts with (3-nwn); indeed, (2) implies (3-wbp);but (1) and (2) '¿
"tor"n"tt
ãìiÍ* in r.tp""i of the outcome of a matter of chance-no matter how
are compatible.E well! This compleres rhe reduc-
same problem arises in consequence of my treatment
.r"tr ,tt"y iray differ in other ways as
I note that the üo.1o
of counterfacuals $'ith true antecedents. Suppose that our world is an can have a simpler reductio if we suppose that it is legìtimate to
'rü(,¡e

,4-world s'ith an unfu16lled non-zero chance of B. Then, since a coun-

mendon chances in tire antecedent of a counterfactual-and hoq/ can
terfactual with a true antecedent is true iff its consequent is,e we hâve a
i-i", ftii be legitimate' if chances are indeed an objectiv-e.feature of
.
pair of true counterfactuals that parallel (t) and (2)'
iit" *otld¡ 'tfhaíwould be the case if there were an unful6lled chance
(4) If it were that /, then it v¡ould be that not 8. oi C¡ to, then there would be some chance that C' But if so, then
f
i, *."í¿ not be that C. So here q'e have a counterexample to the
(5) If it were that,4, then there would be some chance that B' "fr.
r"ooor"¿ incompatibility, just on the principle that a counterfactual
Thus (4) and (5), on my account, are comPâtible' Yet they may appear holåt *h.tt the antecedent implies the consequent'
So the supposed incompatibility had better.be. rejected ' The
recon-
to conflict if we consider:
ciliation of (t) with (2), (ai with (5), and the like is by no means iust a
(6) If it were that A, then it might be that B. dodee to deiend my controversial vieç's about time's arrow and about
louri *iih true antecedents But it does sewe, inter alia' to
This counterfactual seems to confìict with (+) and to be implied by (5)' ".f""tu"lt
defend them. \fe can count quasi-miracles as weighty dissimilarities
I reply that on the "not-would-not" reading (6) conflicts- with (4) end *.
p"rrurd. ou¡selves by examples that pcrfect
is filse, *here"s on the "would-be-possible" reading it is implied by
iro- ""n
""turli,y;io e worli fike ours would require, if not a.big miracle'
,."onu.tg.n"!
(5) and is true.
we can conclude that if Nixon had pressed the
"il""r, "!u".i--iracle;
borton, th.r. *ould have been no perfect convergence; and still v¡e can
r Como¡re Roben Stalnaker's discussion of "might" countcrfectuels in his "A Dcfcnse minute chance of
r"y, should, that there s¡ouid have been some
oi cåndnion¡l Excluded Middle" in /r, ed. by villirm Harper, Robe¡t Stalnaker and "tï"
Glenn Pcarce (Dordrecht: Reidcl, l98o). He tecognizes â rangc of diffcrent senser for
perfect convergence.
"mighf' counter{rctuels. Some of these are epistemic stnscs irrelcvrnt !o our.P'esent
conåms. But he does ¡dmh my "not-would-not" reading, though as quasi-epistemic; ro Pavel of chance and future similarity in "A Counterexamplc
Tichf raises the problem
¡nd it seems that he s'ould aúo edmit my "would-be-possible" rceding, though as of Counterfactuals," Philosophkal Studiet 29 (1976):
ro th. St"li"ke.-l-c-i. Theory
doubly abnormal beclrse the "might" neither is epistcmic nor has wide scope . thrt
sec Scction I of "Cor¡n¡crf¡ct¡rals äitã. rr¡. "-".prc is ineffective, however. It can be met simply by denying
" ttis fâllo*s from my assumptioi of "centering"i i-pJ.., .",.h toward similarity, and thus it serves to support that denial'
¡nd Compar¡rive Possibility," in this volume. "áun,"
 66 Counterlaauals and Time

E. UBTQUTTOUSTR¡,CES AND COMMON KNOIùTLEDGE

My argument for an asymmetry of miracles (or of quæi-miracles)

relied on an empiricd premise: at a world like ours, everything rhat
happens leaves many and varied traces, so that it would take a big mira-
EI GHTEEN
cle----equivalently, many and varied small miracles working rogerher-
to eradicate those traces and achieve reconverg€nce. Bur I need more
than merely the truth of that premise. I need common knowledge of it.
For if the premise were tnre but generally disbelieved, and if our coun-
tefactuals work as I say they do, then we ought to ñnd people often
âccepting the counterfactu¿ls that would be true on my âccount if that The Paradoxes of Time Travel
premise were false, Ve ought to find them saying that if Nixon had
pressed the button, the future c,ould have been no different, there
would have been convergence and no holocaust. In illustrating the
multitude of traces that the pressing would have left, and the difficulty
of a perfect cover-up, I relied on ¿ certain amount of scientific knon l-
edge that many people do not sha¡e. I may have explained why the
right counterfactuals come out true according to my bcliefs. But I have
done nothing to explain why ignorant folk accept thosc sarne counter-
factuals. Time travcl, I maintain, is possible. The paradoxes of time travel are
I reply that €veryon€ believes in ubiquity of traces. Maybc not oddities, not impossibilities. They prove only this much, which few
everyone cân illustrate the point in the way I did (though I must say would have doubted: that a possible world where time travel took
place would be e most strange world, different in fundamental ways
that I did not use anything very esoteric) but they can still think that
somehow everything leaves many and varied traces, from the vvorld we think is ours.
Consider detective stories. Seldom are they written by, or for, expert I shall be concerned here s¡ith the sort of time travel that is
scientists. The background against which they are to be read is com- recounted in science fiction. Not all science ficdon s'¡iters are clear-
mon knowledge, not expert knowledge. And part o{ that background headed, to be sure, and inconsistent time travel stories have often been
is the assumption thât events leave many and varied traces. Else the written. But some writers have thought the problems through with
plots would not make sense. !íe are supposed to marvel at the skill of great care, and their stories are perfectly consistent.l
the detective in spotting and reading the traces. Ife are not supposed to If I can defend the consistency of some science ñction stories of time
marvel that the fieces are there at all. Ignorant or expert, anyone travel, then I suppose parallel defenses might be given of some cont¡o-
knows better than to read the tale as a hardJuck story: how rhe crimi- versial physical hypotheses, such as the hypothesis that time is circular
nal was caught because he was especially unfonunate in leaving traces. or the hypothesis that there ere particles that trevel faster than light.
And anyone knows bener then to read the tale ¿s science fiction: how But I shall not explore these parallels here.
'What is time travel? Inevitably, it involves a discrepancy between
things would be in a bizarre world where rhings leave far more traces
than they do in ours, No; it is supposed to be a tale of a world like time and time. Any traveler dePârts and then arrives at his destination;
ours, and the ubiquity of traces is part of the likeness.
IIhave particularly in mind two of the time tr"".l of Rob.r, Á Hcinlcin: "By
",ori..
His Boãatrrps," in R. A.Heinlein,The Menace from Eanb (Hicksvillc' N.Y.' 1959)'
¡¡d "-A,ll You Zombies-," in R. A' Heinlein, The lJnpleasant Profession of
Jonathan Hoag (Hicksville, N.Y., 1959).

67