Matthew Stand - Modular Motorsports, Inc., Marcus Luton, Et Al.

1 CASE SYNOPSIS
2 1. MMI manufactures parts for, and tunes, competition Ford Mustang engines, and
3 holds itself out as building engines for “the world’s fastest Mustangs.”
4 2. MMI, owned by Defendant LUTON, conducts approximately $600,000 per month

in sales of Mustang engine parts, however many of these parts are fraudulently misrepresented and
5
are not custom made, resulting in millions of dollars in losses to consumers around the world. Many
6
of the parts are merely re-labeled factory parts, sold to unsuspecting victims for huge markups based
7
upon the fraudulent misrepresentation that the parts are custom-made by MMI. Defendant LUTON
8
has realized millions of dollars in fraudulent income as a result of this artifice.
9
3. Defendants LUTON and HUNTER are avowed white supremacists, who openly
10
engaged in racial abuse of employees, including Plaintiff, who is of Mexican extraction.
11
4. MMI operated as a glorified chop shop selling fake parts on the name of being “the
12
world’s fastest Mustangs.” MMI sold thousands of “custom CNC” crank gears for Mustang 4.6 liter
13 engines, which were merely regular crank gears purchased directly from Ford, that MMI lasered
14 their name and logo onto. Cylinder wall reinforcement sleeves were purchased from Darton, and
15 MMI would merely laser an oversized MMI logo over the Darton logo so that consumers could not
16 determine that they were being defrauded by being sold rebranded Darton parts. Further, CNC
17 ported heads were represented to customers as being custom made in-house, when they were in fact
18 manufactured by an outside vendor, and were of a very low quality. Engine failures resulting from
19 these fraudulent parts were covered up by having the customer ship the entire engine back so that
20 no third party could tear the engine down and discover the use of low-quality, fraudulent, and
21 rebranded parts by MMI.

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
22
Jurisdiction and Venue
23
5. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of Plaintiff’s claims. Jurisdiction is
24
proper in this Court because the damages and claims alleged and demanded herein by Plaintiff
25
exceeds $25,000, and Plaintiff herein does make a demand and prayer for damages, in excess, of the
26
jurisdictional limit of this Court.
27
6. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant MMI in that it was, at all relevant
28
periods of time covered by this complaint, a California corporation with its principal place of
2
UNLIMITED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
1 business located at 816 Calle Plano, Camarillo, CA 93012.
2 7. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges that this Court has personal
3 jurisdiction over Defendant LUTON in that he was, at all relevant periods of time covered by this
4 complaint, a resident of the County of Ventura.

8. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges that this Court has personal
5
jurisdiction over Defendant HUNTER in that he was, at all relevant periods of time covered by this
6
complaint, a resident of the County of Ventura.
7
9. Venue in this Court is proper in that, upon information and belief, Defendants reside
8
in the County of Ventura.
9
10. All the harm suffered by Plaintiff took place within this judicial district.
10
The Plaintiff
11
11. Plaintiff was, at all relevant periods of time covered by this complaint, a resident of
12
the City of Ventura, County of Ventura.
13 The Defendants
14 12. Defendant COLA is a public entity who maintains a place of business, where it
15 injured Plaintiff at 816 Calle Plano, Camarillo, CA 93012.
16 13. Defendant LUTON is an individual who, upon information and belief, maintains his
17 principal residence in the County of Ventura.
18 14. Defendant HUNTER is an individual who, upon information and belief, maintains
19 his principal residence in the County of Ventura.
20 Relationship Between the Defendants
21 15. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that Defendants, and each
of them, were at all times mentioned herein the agents, servants, and employees of each other, or
22
otherwise were acting with the full knowledge and consent of each other. Plaintiff is further
23
informed and believes, and upon such basis and belief alleges, that in doing all the things alleged in
24
this complaint, Defendants, and each of them, were acting within the scope and authority of their
25
agency, servitude, or employment, and were acting with the express and/or implied knowledge,
26
permission, and consent of one another. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and upon such
27
basis and belief alleges, that Defendants learned of, ratified, and/or approved the wrongful conduct
28
of its agents and/or employees identified in this Complaint as having engaged in wrongful conduct.
3
1 16. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that at all relevant times,
2 Defendants, and each of them, were business entities or individuals who owned, controlled, or
3 managed the business which has damaged Plaintiff, and are each therefore jointly, severally, and
4 individually liable to Plaintiff.

17. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that at all relevant times,
5
Defendants, and each of them, were in some fashion, by contract or otherwise, the successor,
6
assignor, indemnitor, guarantor, or third-party beneficiary of one or more of the remaining
7
Defendants, and at all relevant times to Plaintiff’s claims alleged herein, were acting within that
8
capacity. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants, and each of them, assumed the liabilities of the
9
other Defendants, by virtue of the fact that each to some degree, wrongfully received and/or
10
wrongfully benefited from the flow of assets from the other Defendants, to the detriment of Plaintiff.
11
Plaintiff further alleges that by wrongfully receiving and/or benefiting from Defendants’ assets, and
12
in the consummation of such transactions, a de facto merger of the Defendants, and each of them,
13 resulted, such that Defendants, and each of them, may be treated as one for purposes of this
14 Complaint.
15 18. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges, that at all relevant times
16 mentioned herein, Defendants, and each of them, were the partners, agents, servants, employees,
17 joint venturors, or co-conspirators of each other defendant, and that each defendant was acting
18 within the course, scope, and authority of such partnership, agency, employment, joint venture, or
19 conspiracy, and that each defendant, directly or indirectly, authorized, ratified, and approved the
20 acts of the remaining Defendants, and each of them.
21 Factual Allegations
19. Plaintiff was hired by MMI on or about March 1, 2019 as a Salesperson, Shipping
22
Coordinator, and Engine Technician. Plaintiff is of Mexican/Latino extraction.
23
20. Plaintiff regularly worked seven (7) days per week, from 8:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M.
24
Plaintiff was only paid for 40 hours per week, no matter how many hours he worked that week.
25
Plaintiff was not paid overtime and was not given uninterrupted meal and rest periods. Plaintiff
26
would sometimes have to work overnight.
27
21. Defendant LUTON is the owner of MMI, and Defendant HUNTER was the General
28
Manager of MMI.
4
1 22. MMI is in the business of building Ford Mustang racecars, and touts itself as building
2 “the world’s fastest Mustangs.” MMI also sells CNC machined custom parts over the internet to
3 Mustang owners around the world. MMI has approximately monthly sales of $600,000.
4 23. MMI engaged in criminal fraud on its customers by buying factory Mustang engine
parts directly from Ford, then laser engraving “Modular Motorsports” onto the parts and
5
fraudulently passing on these parts to unsuspecting buyers as custom CNC-machined parts custom
6
made by MMI (e.g. ported head products).
7
24. MMI has a no-return policy on its sold parts, including the fraudulent parts it sold to
8
victims.
9
25. LUTON and HUNTER are avowed white supremacists, and another manager, Taylor
10
Fenstermacher, has “White Power” prominently tattooed on his shins, which he would openly
11
display in the workplace.
12
26. HUNTER told Plaintiff that all Mexican babies should be drowned at birth, and that
13 he believed that Mexicans were “the stupidest race ever.” Both HUNTER and LUTON agreed in
14 conversation in front of Plaintiff that “Mexicans are the most stupid people in world.” LUTON,
15 HUNTER, and other employees would, in the presence of Plaintiff and others, regularly refer to
16 Hispanics as “beaners.” LUTON informed Plaintiff that “[he] only got an interview because [his]
17 last name is as white as can be.” LUTON once accosted Plaintiff and told him, “you’re a stupid
18 beaner who can’t do their job,” in addition to referring to Plaintiff as a “retard” on a daily basis.
19 27. Plaintiff opposed this racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.
20 28. The racial abuse of Plaintiff was continuous, ongoing, and happened on a near-daily
21 basis. LUTON and HUNTER would openly congratulate MMI’s cleaning personnel and
mailpersons for “making it across the border.” LUTON once informed an MMI client that he was
22
“the stupidest beaner.”
23
29. HUNTER would also openly refer to African-Americans as “niggers.”
24
30. LUTON would interview prospective employees based upon their surnames, and
25
informed Plaintiff that he would never interview any prospective employee with a Hispanic
26
surname.
27
28
5
1 31. Plaintiff is a CNC expert, gunsmith, with decades of experience working in a tool &
2 die environment. However, a zero-experience Caucasian technician was hired and immediately
3 promoted over Plaintiff.
4 32. Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiff sales commissions due and owing to him.
33. Plaintiff eventually grew tired of the nonstop racial abuse, non-payment of wages,
5
non-payment of commissions, and complained about the criminal fraud being perpetrated by
6
Defendants upon unsuspecting “mom and pop racers.”
7
34. Plaintiff, an expert machinist, knew that Defendants were selling low-quality CNC
8
ported heads to customers that had a high propensity to fail, and were not of the quality that they
9
were represented to be. This fraud was facilitated by the fact that MMI had a “no return” policy.
10
Plaintiff complained about this criminal fraud to Defendants.
11
35. MMI operated as a glorified chop shop selling fake parts on the name of being “the
12
world’s fastest Mustangs.” MMI sold thousands of “custom CNC” crank gears for Mustang 4.6 liter
13 engines, which were merely regular crank gears purchased directly from Ford, that MMI lasered
14 their name and logo onto. Cylinder wall reinforcement sleeves were purchased from Darton, and
15 MMI would merely laser an oversized MMI logo over the Darton logo so that consumers could not
16 determine that they were being defrauded by being sold rebranded Darton parts. Further, CNC
17 ported heads were represented to customers as being custom made in-house, when they were in fact
18 manufactured by an outside vendor, and were of a very low quality. Engine failures resulting from
19 these fraudulent parts were covered up by having the customer ship the entire engine back so that
20 no third party could tear the engine down and discover the use of low-quality, fraudulent, and
21 rebranded parts by MMI.

36. Plaintiff made repeated complaints to Defendants about this ongoing, multi-million
22
dollar fraud by Defendants.
23
37. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereupon alleges that he was terminated,
24
constructively terminated, or was forced to quit on or about January 31, 2020.
25
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
26
38. Plaintiff timely obtained a Right-to-Sue letter from the California Department of Fair
27
Employment and Housing based upon the facts and transactions underlying this Complaint on July
28
19, 2021.
6
1 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
2 FEHA DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE IMPACT
3 Gov. Code § 12940(a)
4 (Against Defendants MMI and DOES 1-99)

39. Plaintiff realleges, and incorporates herein by their reference, each and every
5
allegation contained in the foregoing Paragraphs, inclusive, as though fully set forth herein. Further,
6
all allegations set forth in this cause of action are pled upon information and belief, unless otherwise
7
stated.
8
40. These Defendants were an employer.
9
41. Plaintiff was an employee of these Defendants.
10
42. These Defendants subjected Plaintiff to one or more of the following adverse
11
employment actions: (1) asked impermissible non-job-related questions; (2) demoted; (3) denied
12
any employment benefit or privilege; (4) denied equal pay; (5) denied hire or promotion; (6) denied
13 or forced to transfer; (7) denied work opportunities or assignments; (8) forced to quit; (9) laid off;
14 (10) reprimanded; (11) suspended; (12) terminated.
15 43. One or more of the following protected statuses was a substantial motivating reason
16 for these Defendants to have subjected Plaintiff to the adverse employment actions described herein:
17 (1) ancestry; (2) association with a member of a protected class; (3) color; (4) national origin
18 (includes language restrictions); (5) race.
19 44. Plaintiff was harmed.
20 45. These Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.
21 46. In doing the things herein alleged, the acts and conduct of these Defendants
constituted “malice,” “oppression” and/or “fraud” (as those terms are defined by Civ. Code
22
§3294(c)), in that these acts were intended by these Defendants to cause injury to Plaintiff and/or
23
constituted despicable conduct carried on by these Defendants with willful and conscious disregard
24
of the rights of Plaintiff, with the intention of these Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of property and
25
legal rights, and were authorized or approved by Defendants, justifying an award of exemplary and
26
punitive damages in an amount according to proof, in order to deter these Defendants from similar
27
conduct in the future, should be made.
28
7
1 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
2 FEHA WORK ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT
3 Gov. Code §§ 12923 & 12940(j)
4 (Against All Defendants)

5
6
7
stated.
8
48. Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants.
9
49. Plaintiff was subjected to harassing conduct based upon one or more of the following
10
protected statuses applicable to Plaintiff: (1) ancestry; (2) association with a member of a protected
11
class; (3) color; (4) national origin (includes language restrictions); (5) race.
12
50. The harassing conduct was severe or pervasive.
13 51. A reasonable person in Plaintiff’s circumstances, with Plaintiff’s same protected
14 characteristics, would have considered the work environment to be hostile, intimidating, offensive,
15 oppressive, or abusive.
16 52. Plaintiff considered the work environment to be hostile, intimidating, offensive,
17 oppressive, or abusive.
18 53. A supervisor engaged in the conduct, or Defendants supervisors or agents knew or
19 should have known of the conduct an d failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.
21 55. The conduct of Defendants was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.
56. In doing the things herein alleged, the acts and conduct of these Defendants
22
23
24
25
26
27
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8
1 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
2 FEHA RETALIATION
3 Gov. Code § 12940(h)

5
6
7
stated.
8
58. Plaintiff engaged in one or more of the following protected activities: (1) participated
9
as a witness in a discrimination or harassment complaint; (2) reported or resisted any form of
10
discrimination or harassment.
11
59. These Defendants subjected Plaintiff to one or more of the following adverse
12
employment actions: (1) asked impermissible non-job-related questions; (2) demoted; (3) denied
13 any employment benefit or privilege; (4) denied equal pay; (5) denied hire or promotion; (6) denied
14 or forced to transfer; (7) denied work opportunities or assignments; (8) forced to quit; (9) laid off;
15 (10) reprimanded; (11) suspended; (12) terminated.
16 60. Plaintiff’s aforementioned protected activities were a substantial motivating reason
17 for these Defendants’ decision to subject Plaintiff to one or more of the aforementioned adverse
18 employment actions.
20 62. These Defendants’ decision to subject Plaintiff to one or more of the aforementioned
21 adverse employment actions was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.

22
23
24
25
26
27
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9
1 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 FEHA FAILURE TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION,
3 HARASSMENT, OR RETALIATION
4 Gov. Code § 12940(k)

(Against Defendants MMI and DOES 1-99)
5
6
7
8
stated.
9
10
66. Plaintiff was subjected to harassment, discrimination, or retaliation in the course of
11
employment.
12
67. These Defendants failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the harassment,
13 discrimination, or retaliation.
15 69. These Defendants’ failure to take all reasonable steps to prevents harassment,
16 discrimination, or retaliation was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.
18 constituted “malice,” “oppression” and/or “fraud” (as those terms are defined by Civ. Code
19 §3294(c)), in that these acts were intended by these Defendants to cause injury to Plaintiff and/or
20 constituted despicable conduct carried on by these Defendants with willful and conscious disregard
21 of the rights of Plaintiff, with the intention of these Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of property and
22
23
24
//
25
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27
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10
1 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 RETALIATION
3 Lab. Code § 1102.5
4 (Against All Defendants)

5
6
7
stated.
8
72. Defendants were Plaintiff’s employer.
9
73. Plaintiff disclosed to a person with authority over Plaintiff, or an employee with
10
authority to investigate, discover, or correct legal violations, of one or more of the following: (1)
11
Gov. Code §§ 12900-12996; (2) Lab. Code §§ 203, 226, 226.7, 510, 1194, 1194.2; (3) Pen Code §
12
532; (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
13 74. Plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe that the information disclosed amounted to
14 a violation of state or federal law.
15 75. Defendants subjected Plaintiff to one or more of the following adverse employment
16 actions: (1) asked impermissible non-job-related questions; (2) demoted; (3) denied any
17 employment benefit or privilege; (4) denied equal pay; (5) denied hire or promotion; (6) denied or
18 forced to transfer; (7) denied work opportunities or assignments; (8) forced to quit; (9) laid off; (10)
19 reprimanded; (11) suspended; (12) terminated.
20 76. Plaintiff’s disclosure of information was a contributing factor in Defendants’
21 decision to subject Plaintiff to one or more of the aforementioned adverse employment actions.
77. Plaintiff was harmed.
22
78. Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.
23
24
25
26
27
28
11
1 punitive damages in an amount according to proof, in order to deter these Defendants from similar
2 conduct in the future, should be made.
3 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
4 WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

(“TAMENY” CLAIM)
5
(Against Defendants MMI and DOES 1-99, Inclusive)
6
7
8
9
stated.
10
81. Plaintiff was employed by Defendants.
11
82. Defendants discharged Plaintiff.
12
83. Plaintiff disclosed to a person with authority over Plaintiff, or an employee with
13 authority to investigate, discover, or correct legal violations, of one or more of the following: (1)
14 Gov. Code §§ 12900-12996; (2) Lab. Code §§ 203, 226, 226.7, 510, 1194, 1194.2; (3) Pen Code §
15 532; (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
16 84. The discharge caused Plaintiff’s harm.
18 constituted “malice,” “oppression” and/or “fraud” (as those terms are defined by Civ. Code
19 §3294(c)), in that these acts were intended by these Defendants to cause injury to Plaintiff and/or
20 constituted despicable conduct carried on by these Defendants with willful and conscious disregard
21 of the rights of Plaintiff, with the intention of these Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of property and
22
23
24
//
25
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27
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12
1 SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEAL AND REST PERIODS
3 Lab. Code § 226.7

5
6
7
stated.
8
87. These Defendants are employers for purposes of California law.
9
10
89. Defendants did not make available meal and/or rest periods available to Plaintiff as
11
required by Lab. Code § 226.7 on a continuous, ongoing, and systematic basis.
12
90. Defendants required Plaintiff, and other employees, to work during meal and/or rest
13 periods mandated by an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission. Defendants failed
14 to provide Plaintiff, and other employees, with meal and/or rest periods in accordance with an
15 applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, and therefore Defendants are legally
16 compelled to pay Plaintiff one additional hour of pay at Plaintiff’s regular rate of compensation, no
17 less than the legal minimum wage, for each work day that the meal or rest period is not provided.
18 Plaintiff did not waive, nor did Plaintiff agree to waive, these meal and/or rest periods.
19 91. Defendants employed Plaintiff with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes.
20 Plaintiff did not waive, nor did Plaintiff agree to waive, these meal and/or rest periods.
21 92. As a proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has been deprived
of their rightfully earned compensation for meal and rest periods. Defendants are therefore pursuant
22
to Civ. Code § 226.7(c), entitled to pay Plaintiff “one additional hour of pay at the employer’s
23
regular rate of compensation for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery period is not
24
provided”, plus interest and costs.
25
//
26
27
28
13
1 EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES DUE, INCLUDING OVERTIME
3 (Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2)

5
6
7
stated.
8
94. These Defendants are employers for purposes of California law.
9
95. Plaintiff was employed by these Defendants.
10
96. The applicable IWC Order and Lab. Code §§ 510 and 1194 requires employers to
11
pay their non-exempt employees overtime pay for work in excess of eight hours in one workday or
12
any work in excess of 40 hours in any one workweek, and double-time pay for work in excess of 12
13 hours in one workday. In any action under Lab. Code § 1194 to recover overtime and double-time
14 wages, an aggrieved employee is entitled to interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs
15 of suit.
16 97. Throughout Plaintiff’s employment with these Defendants, these Defendants
17 engaged in a practice of failing to pay overtime wages. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a full-
18 time, non-exempt employee of these Defendants entitled to overtime pay.
19 98. These Defendants did not pay sales commissions due and owing to Plaintiff.
20 99. In addition to that, sums due and owing to Plaintiff, and by virtue of these
21 Defendants’ violation of Lab. Code § 1194, Plaintiff is entitled for this period to liquidated damages,
with interest thereon, pursuant to Lab. Code § 1194.2.
22
100. As a proximate result of these Defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff has been
23
deprived of his rightfully earned compensation. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the total
24
unpaid balance of wages and liquidated damages, plus interest, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs
25
of suit.
26
101. Plaintiff claims such amounts as damages in addition to pre-judgement interest
27
thereon pursuant to Civ. Code §§ 3287, 3288 and/or any other applicable provision of law providing
28
for prejudgment interest.
14
1 NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
2 WAITING TIME PENALTY
3 (Lab. Code § 203)

5
6
7
stated.
8
103. These Defendants were employers for purposes of California law.
9
104. Plaintiff was an employee of these Defendants. The employment relationship
10
between Plaintiff and Defendants ended on or about January 31, 2020.
11
105. Wages were due and owing to Plaintiff from these Defendants as the result of labor
12
performed by Plaintiff, as an employee of these Defendants, in amounts that were calculated by
13 time, task, piece, commission, or some other method.
14 106. These Defendants willfully failed to pay all wages due and owing to its employee,
15 the Plaintiff, as of the date of the filing of this complaint. These Defendants have not yet paid to
16 Plaintiff all the wages due and owing to Plaintiff as a result of Plaintiff’s employment with these
17 Defendants.
18 107. These Defendants willfully failed to pay these wages to Plaintiff, knowing that these
19 wages were due and owing to Plaintiff as of the date of this Complaint. This failure by these
20 Defendants to pay all wages due and owing to Plaintiff was willful in that these Defendants
21 intentionally failed and/or refused to pay the wages to Plaintiff.

108. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to a civil penalty pursuant to Lab. Code § 203 in an
22
amount equal to 30 days of his regular pay while in the employ of these Defendants.
23
109. Plaintiff claims such amounts as damages in addition to pre-judgment interest
24
thereon pursuant to Civil Code §§ 3287, 3288 and/or any other applicable provision of law providing
25
for prejudgment interest.
26
//
27
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15
1 PRAYER FOR RELIEF
2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as against Defendants as follows, for:
3 1) Compensatory damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial.
4 2) Attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to all applicable statutes or legal principles, including,
but not limited to Gov. Code §§ 12900-12996, Lab. Code § 1102.5, Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.5.
5
3) Costs of suit incurred.
6
4) Prejudgment interest on all amounts claimed as permitted by law.
7
5) Damages for unpaid minimum wages in violation of Lab. Code § 1197.
8
6) Damages for unpaid overtime in violation of Lab. Code §§ 1198, et seq..
9
7) Damages for failure to compensate for all hours worked in violation of Lab. Code §§ 1198,
10
et seq..
11
8) Wages for missed meal and rest breaks pursuant to Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512 in an amount
12
according to proof at the time of trial, with interest thereon.
13 9) Waiting time penalties pursuant to Lab. Code § 203.
14 10) Civil penalties as permitted by statute.
15 11) Punitive damages or other penalties recoverable by law pursuant to Civ. Code § 3294, or any
16 other applicable basis under the law.
17 12) Prejudgment interest on all amounts claimed pursuant to Civ. Code §§ 3287 and/or 3288.
18 13) All other general, specific, direct, indirect, consequential, and incidental damages, in an
19 amount according to proof at time of trial.
20 14) Such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper.
21
22
ROMERO LAW, APC
23
24 /s/
By:
25 DATED: July 26, 2021 ALAN ROMERO (SBN 249000)
ROBERT S. MYONG (SBN 262097)
26 Attorneys for Plaintiff
MATTHEW STAND
27
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1 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
2 Plaintiff hereby makes demand for Jury Trial, and has concurrently posted the jury fee
3 deposit.
4
ROMERO LAW, APC
5
6
By: /s/
7 DATED: July 26, 2021 ALAN ROMERO (SBN 249000)
ROBERT S. MYONG (SBN 262097)
8 Attorneys for Plaintiff
MATTHEW STAND
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17

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1 CASE SYNOPSIS

4 2. MMI, owned by Defendant LUTON, conducts approximately $600,000 per month

21 rebranded parts by MMI.

4 complaint, a resident of the County of Ventura.

19 his principal residence in the County of Ventura.

20 Relationship Between the Defendants

4 individually liable to Plaintiff.

20 acts of the remaining Defendants, and each of them.

19 27. Plaintiff opposed this racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.

3 promoted over Plaintiff.

21 rebranded parts by MMI.

2 FEHA DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE IMPACT

3 Gov. Code § 12940(a)

4 (Against Defendants MMI and DOES 1-99)

19 44. Plaintiff was harmed.

2 FEHA WORK ENVIRONMENT HARASSMENT

3 Gov. Code §§ 12923 & 12940(j)

4 (Against All Defendants)

20 54. Plaintiff was harmed.

3 Gov. Code § 12940(h)

4 (Against Defendants MMI and DOES 1-99)

19 61. Plaintiff was harmed.

21 adverse employment actions was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.

2 FEHA FAILURE TO PREVENT DISCRIMINATION,

4 Gov. Code § 12940(k)

3 Lab. Code § 1102.5

4 (Against All Defendants)

19 reprimanded; (11) suspended; (12) terminated.

20 76. Plaintiff’s disclosure of information was a contributing factor in Defendants’

2 conduct in the future, should be made.

3 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

4 WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

2 FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEAL AND REST PERIODS

3 Lab. Code § 226.7

4 (Against Defendants MMI and DOES 1-99)

2 FAILURE TO PAY ALL WAGES DUE, INCLUDING OVERTIME

3 (Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2)

4 (Against Defendants MMI and DOES 1-99)

2 WAITING TIME PENALTY

3 (Lab. Code § 203)

4 (Against Defendants MMI and DOES 1-99)

21 intentionally failed and/or refused to pay the wages to Plaintiff.

2 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as against Defendants as follows, for:

3 1) Compensatory damages in an amount according to proof at time of trial.

19 amount according to proof at time of trial.

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