Respondent Memo Final Team J

Team Code: J
24TH M.C. CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE NATIONAL

MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017
IN THE
HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF HIND
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 1304 of 2017

FOOD PRODUCE OF HIND … PETITIONER
V.
GOVERNMENT OF HIND AND ORS. … RESPONDENTS
ALONG WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 1970 OF 2017

ASSOCIATION OF BEEF HANDLERS & EXPORTERS … PETITIONER
V.
GOVERNMENT OF HIND … RESPONDENTS
AND
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 511 OF 2017

FOOD PRODUCE OF HIND … PETITIONER
V.
GOVERNMENT OF HIND AND ORS … RESPONDENTS
MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT(S)
In the Petitions concerning the Constitutional Validity of the Rattlesnake Gau-Mai Scheme
and Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Market) Rules, 2017.
24TH M. C. CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE
NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Abbreviations................................................................................................................III
Index of Authorities.................................................................................................................IV
Synopsis of Facts...................................................................................................................VIII
Issues Raised............................................................................................................................XI
Summary of Arguments..........................................................................................................XII
Pleadings....................................................................................................................................1
Contention A: The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Market)
Rules, 2017 do not violate the fundamental rights of the petitioners.....................................1
[A.1] The Impugned Rules do not violate the right to equality guaranteed under Article
14........................................................................................................................................2
[A.2] The Impugned Rules do not violate the fundamental right to Freedom of Trade and
Profession under 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution of Hind......................................................4
[A.3] The Impugned Rules do not violate the fundamental right to Life guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution of Hind................................................................................8
[A.4] The Impugned Rules do not violate the right to religious freedom guaranteed by
Article 25 of the Constitution...........................................................................................10
Contention B: The Impugned Rules do not suffer from the vice of lack of legislative
competence...........................................................................................................................11
Contention C: The Impugned Rules do not contravene the prevention of cruelty to animals
act,1960................................................................................................................................14
[C.1] The Rules have been passed in a manner prescribed by the Act.............................14
[C.2] The Rules have been passed within the powers delegated by the Act and do no
contravene any provisions of the parent act......................................................................15
Contention D: The Rattlesnake Gau-Mai Scheme is not arbitrary and is not liable to be
declared unconstitutional......................................................................................................17
Prayer for relief.....................................................................................................................XIV
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& AND
§ SECTION
¶/¶¶ PARAGRAPH/PARAGRAPHS
ADDL. ADDITIONAL
AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
ANR. ANOTHER
ART. ARTICLE
ED. EDITION
HON'BLE HONORABLE
ID . IBIDEM
I.E. THAT IS
ORS. OTHERS
P. PAGE NUMBER
SC SUPREME COURT
SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTS
SLP SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
SUPP SUPPLEMENTARY
UOI UNION OF INDIA
U/S UNDER SECTION
V. VERSUS
VOL. VOLUME
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTION
 THE CONSTITUTION OF HIND.
STATUTES
 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897.

 PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGULATION OF LIVESTOCK MARKET)
RULES, 2017.
 PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1960.
DICTIONARIES USED
 BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ED. 2009).
BOOKS REFERRED
 ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, LEXIS NEXIS

BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA, NAGPUR (2ND ED., 2007).
 C.K. THAKKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, EASTERN BOOK COMPANY, LUCKNOW (2ND
ED, 2012).
 DR. D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, LEXIS NEXIS
BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA, NAGPUR (8TH ED., 2008).
 DR. L.M. SINGHVI, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, THOMSON REUTERS (3RD ED., 2013).
 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING CO.,
NEW DELHI (4TH ED., 2011).
 I.P. MASSEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, EASTERN BOOK COMPANY, LUCKNOW (7TH ED.,
2008).
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | IV

 M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA,

NAGPUR (7TH ED., 2015).
 M.P. JAIN & S.N. JAIN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LEXIS NEXIS
BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA, NAGPUR (6TH ED, 2013)
INDIAN CASES
A.C. Aggarwal, Sub Divisional Magistrate v. Ram Kali, AIR 1968 SC 1.................................1
Air India v. Nergesh Meerza and others, (1981) 4 SCC 335.....................................................2
Ajit Singh Singhvi v. State of Rajasthan, 1991 Supp (1) 343...................................................16
All-India Bank Employees' Assn. v. National Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1962 SC 171..............4
Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy & Ors.
(2011) 9 SCC 286...................................................................................................................3
Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1.......................................................19
Asgar Ibrahim Amin v. Union of India, (2016) 13 SCC 797...................................................16
Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422.................................................14
Bajaj Hindustan v. Shadi Lal Enterprises (2011) 1 SCC 640.................................................19
Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board AIR 1967 SC 295.................................................4
Bharat Hydro Power Corpn. Ltd v. State of Assam, (2004) 2 SCC 553..................................13
Bhim Singh v. Union of India & ors. (2010) 5 SCC 538.........................................................18
Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Asson v Central Valuation Board and Others (2007) 6 SCC
668..........................................................................................................................................2
Board of Control for Cricket v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2016) 8 SCC 535..............................4
CCE v. Venus Castings (P) Ltd., (2000) 4 SCC 206................................................................16
Commr., H.R.E. v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 282.10
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712...............................................................3, 5
Diamond Sugar Mills v. State of A.P., AIR 1961 SC 652.......................................................11
DM Wayanad Institute of Medical Sciences v. Union of India, (2016) 2 SCC 315.................14
Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC
293........................................................................................................................................19
E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 394.................................................................12
Essar Steel Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 11 SCC 1...............................................................19
Express Newspapers v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 578........................................................9
G.P. Ceramics v. CIT, 2009 2 SCC 90....................................................................................16
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | V

Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643...................................................................6

Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781..................................................12
Grand Kakatiya Sheraton Hotel and Towers Employees and Workers Union v Srinivasa
Resorts Limited and Others (2009) 5 SCC 342......................................................................2
Greater Bombay Municipal Corp v. Nagpal Printing Mills (1988) 2 SCC 466......................15
Heena Kausar v. Competent Authority (2008) 14 SCC 724......................................................1
Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1140.............................4
J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2007) 13 SCC 673.....................................................15
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225....................................................6
Krishna Kumar v. Municipal committee (2005) 8 SCC 612......................................................5
M.B. Cotton Assn. Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1954 SC 634.....................................................5
Mohd. Subrati v. State of West Bengal (1973) 3 SCC 250........................................................8
Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Anil Shantaram Khoje, (2016) 15 SCC 726...........14
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430.............................................................5
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664.........................................18
Navinchandra v. Mafatlal, AIR 1955 SC 58...........................................................................11
Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2011) 3 SCC 139...........13
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545...........................................8
P. Raghava Kurup v. Ananthakumari (2007) 9 SCC 179........................................................16
P.M.Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka,1989 Supp (1) SCC 696.........................1
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2 SCC 1..........................................................................6
Prafull Goradia v. Union of India, (2011) 2 SCC 568............................................................18
Pratap Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 87.....................................................5
Progressive education society v. Rajendra (2008) 3 SCC 310................................................16
PUCL v. Union of India (2004) 2 SCC 476...............................................................................1
R.K. Garg v. Union of India and ors. (1981) 4 SCC 675..........................................................2
Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (2000) 2 SCC 46.................................................................8
Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 603..........................................................1
Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India and Ors, (2006) 10 SCC
1..............................................................................................................................................3
Roop Chand Adlakha v. D.D.A., (1989) 1 Supp. SCC 116........................................................3
S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of T.N., (2013) 9 SCC 659.....................................................18
Sanchit Bansal v. Joint Admission Board (2012) 1 SCC 15....................................................18
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | VI

Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 85.........................10

Second CTO v. Nazareth, AIR 1970 SC 999...........................................................................12
Seshammal v. State of T.N. (1972) 2 SCC 11..........................................................................10
Sewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1958 SC 845..............................4
Shree Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 SCC 193..................................................4
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1............8
Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1989) 4 SCC 155.......................................8
Soosai v. Union of India 1985 Supp SCC 590...........................................................................1
St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 559...............................................3
State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318................................................................19
State of Gujarat v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal, (2004) 5 SCC 155...................11
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi kassab Jamat and Ors., (2005) 8 SCC 534.5, 7, 10
State of Karnataka v. Drive-In Enterprises, (2001) 4 SCC 60................................................13
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310..............................................................2, 6
State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312.....................................................................2
State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram Rao, AIR 1970 SC 1157.............................5
State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries (2004) 11 SCC 26...........................................15
State of Rajasthan v. Vatan Medical & General Store, AIR 2001 SC 1937...........................12
State of T.N. v. L. Abu Kavur Bai, (1984) 1 SCC 515..............................................................17
State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517.......................................................15, 16
State of Tamil Nadu & ors. v K. Shyam Sunder & ors. (2011) 8 SCC 737................................3
State of W.B. v. Ashutosh Lahiri (1995) 1 SCC 189................................................................10
State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201................................................12
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR 1952 SC 75......................................................1
State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd. v. CTO, AIR 1963 SC 1811...............................................4
Subhash Photographics v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 323.......................................18
Sushila Saw Mill v. State of Orissa (1995) 5 SCC 615..............................................................5
TELCO Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 40..........................................................................4
Union of India v. Alok Kumar, (2010) 5 SCC 349...................................................................16
Union of india v. J.D. Suryavanshi (2011) 13 SCC 167..........................................................18
Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645...........................................................6
Venkatamma v. City Improvement Trust Board, (1973) 1 SCC 188.......................................17
Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University, (2003) 8 SCC 440...........................................................2
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | VII

Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561........................18
SYNOPSIS OF FACTS
I. Hind is a rapidly developing secular constitutional republic. Hind is also a
religiously diverse country, with a majority population following the ‘Rumi’
religion and other religions such as Hindu, Islam, Christianity, Sikhism, etc.,
being religious minorities. In terms of cattle, as per 2008 estimates Hind has the
largest cattle population in the world, with 98.7 million buffaloes and 176 million
cows.
II. The cow is also considered a sacred animal in the Rumi religion, which majority
of the population follow, and cows were afforded varied degrees of statutory
protection from slaughter. But at the same time, beef is a popular food, with a few
states having no restrictions on sale and consumption of beef, and amongst the
minorities, and weaker economic sections, beef is considered a primary and
affordable source of protein.
III. In March 2015, the incumbent Freedom And Motherland (hereinafter referred to
as “FAM") Party was voted out with a thumping victory to the Brotherhood
Against Religion Party (hereinafter referred to as “BARP"). The new Prime
Minister, Mr. P. R. Magna (hereinafter referred to as “PR") of BARP won several
state assembly elections forming governments in 80% of the states in Hind.
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | VIII

IV. In December 2015, PR announced a new scheme to protect cows as a holy animal
called the ‘Rattlesnake GauMai Scheme’. Under the Scheme, ‘Any person or
association providing shelters to cows’ would be issued land and capital grants to
build ‘Gau Shelters’ as ‘shelters for cows’ and a recurring annual maintenance
grant of Rs.15 lakh was to be issued to every such ‘registered Gau Shelter per
cattle’. Further, the ‘Owner of the Gau Shelter was empowered to undertake any
reasonable actions to protect cows in the area and prevent slaughter or cruelty to
cattle’.
V. The Food Produce of Hind (hereinafter referred to as “FPH") is a representative
Association of food and dairy producers, majority of who were transnational
corporations. Many members of FPH are companies incorporated in Trumpberg.
FPH filed a writ in the High Court of Sarai, a State in Hind, in May 2017,
claiming that the Rattlesnake GauMai Scheme was unconstitutional as it was
arbitrary and unfair. The Hon’ble High Court rejected the submissions made by
FPH. Special Leave Petition against the Order of the Hon’ble High Court was
filled.
VI. In January 2017, the Central Govt. notified the ‘Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(Regulation of Livestock Market) Rules, 2017’ (2017 Rules), which inter alia,
prohibited the sale of cattle for slaughter in the animal markets.
VII. Association of Beef Handlers & Exporters (hereinafter referred to as “ABHE") is
an association of meat packers, processors and slaughter house owners, majority
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | IX

of whom were from religious minorities. Both ABHE individually and FPH made
several representations to the Central Government to recall the 2017 Rules.
VIII. ABHE and FPH both filed two separate Writ Petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution of Hind in February, 2017 in the Supreme Court of Hind challenging
the 2017 Rules, including Rule 22.
IX. The Supreme Court ordered that it would hear all the matters together for the sake
of brevity and to better serve the ends of justice.
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | X

ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE A: WHETHER THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGULATION OF
LIVESTOCK MARKETS) RULES, 2017 IS CONTRARY TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
ΩΩΩ
ISSUE B: WHETHER THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGULATION OF
LIVESTOCK MARKETS) RULES, 2017 IS WITHIN THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT?
ΩΩΩ
ISSUE C: WHETHER THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGULATION OF
LIVESTOCK MARKETS) RULES, 2017 IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF
PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1960?
ΩΩΩ
ISSUE D: WHETHER THE RATTLESNAKE GAU-MAI SCHEME IS ARBITRARY AND UNFAIR?
ΩΩΩ
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | XI

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
CONTENTION A. THE 2017 RULES ARE NOT CONTRARY TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
The petitioners do not possess a right under Article 19(1)(g) as they are not citizens of Hind.
Further more any restriction on any right is a reasonable restriction as it is in consonance with
the principle and mandate of Article 48. Furthermore, the Impugned Rules cannot be set aside
as violative of Article 25 as no practice integral to any religion is being adversely affected.
ΩΩΩ
CONTENTION B. THE 2017 RULES DO NOT SUFFER FROM THE VICE OF LACK OF
LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE
It is contended that the Impugned Rules have been passed by the Government in exercise of
the powers granted under §38(1) & (2) read with Entry 17 of List III of the Seventh Schedule
of the Constitution. Any incidental encroachment cannot be relied upon to strike down any
provision of the Impugned Rules for want of Legislative competence.
ΩΩΩ
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | XII

CONTENTION C. THE RULES ARE WITHIN THE POWERS GRANTED BY THE PARENT
LEGISLATION
The Rules are in consonance with the provisions and the scheme and policy of the act under
which they are made. The two Enactments can be interpreted harmoniously and there exists
no defect in the Rules.
ΩΩΩ
CONTENTION D. THE GAU MAI SCHEME NOT ARBITRARY AND IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is the case of the petitioners that the Impugned Scheme in the present case is not violative
of the fundamental rights of the petitioners. The action of the government in this regard is for
a public purpose as given under Article 282 of the Constitution.
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | XIII

PLEADINGS
¶1. The counsel for the respondents herein have a four-fold contention in the present case.
The counsel for the respondents seek liberty from the Hon’ble Supreme Court to present their
arguments. The counsel most respectfully showeth the following:
CONTENTION A: THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGULATION OF
LIVESTOCK MARKET) RULES, 2017 DO NOT VIOLATE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF
THE PETITIONERS.
¶2. The respondents contend that the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of
Livestock Market) Rules, 2017 [hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Rules’] does not
contravene any fundamental right provided in Part III of the constitution of Hind. It is
submitted that each statute/enactment carries with it the presumption of constitutionality 1 and
the burden of proof lies on the petitioner which it has clearly fair.2
¶3. The respondents further submit that the classification made by the Rules is reasonable and
the provisions of the Rules enforce the duty on the state contemplated under Part IV of the
Constitution.3
1
PUCL v. Union of India (2004) 2 SCC 476 at p. 494 [at ¶ 42-43]; P.M.Ashwathanarayana Setty v. State of
Karnataka,1989 Supp (1) SCC 696; A.C. Aggarwal, Sub Divisional Magistrate v. Ram Kali, AIR 1968 SC 1.
2
Heena Kausar v. Competent Authority (2008) 14 SCC 724 [at ¶ 20]; Soosai v. Union of India 1985 Supp SCC
590; Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 603; State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar AIR
1952 SC 75.
3
Article 48, Constitution of Hind.
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | 1

[A.1] THE IMPUGNED RULES DO NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO EQUALITY
GUARANTEED UNDER ARTICLE 14.
¶4. It is important to note that Article 14 permits discrimination with reasons. 4 Discrimination
with reasons means rational classification for differential treatment having nexus to the
constitutionally permissible object.5 It is the case of the respondents that discrimination is the
essence of classification and does violence to the Constitutional guarantee of equality only if
it rests on an unreasonable basis and it is for the petitioners to establish that classification was
unreasonable and bears no rational nexus with its purported object. 6 In the present case the
classification of animals as cattle and the subsequent rules formed have a clear nexus.
¶5. It is further submitted that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with
greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. 7 No
enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable or irrational
but some constitutional infirmity has to be found.8 A law can be declared ultra vires on the
ground of done of total unreasonableness but not on the ground of hardship. 9 Thus, merely
because it is less economical to procure beef and other related products and raw materials for
the same, it is not open for the petitioners to rely on Article 14 to further their case.
¶6. It is a settled legal proposition that Art. 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness
10
because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. However,
4
Vijay Lakshmi v. Punjab University, (2003) 8 SCC 440 (¶4).
5
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310 quoted with approval in The Major Law Lexicon, P
Ramanatha Aiyar, (4th Edn., 2010).
6
Air India v. Nergesh Meerza and others, (1981) 4 SCC 335.
7
R.K. Garg v. Union of India and ors. (1981) 4 SCC 675
8
State of M.P. v. Rakesh Kohli, (2012) 6 SCC 312 at p. 327 [at ¶ 32].
9
Grand Kakatiya Sheraton Hotel and Towers Employees and Workers Union v Srinivasa Resorts Limited and
Others (2009) 5 SCC 342; Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Asson v Central Valuation Board and Others
(2007) 6 SCC 668.
10
Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation v. B. Narasimha Reddy & Ors. (2011) 9 SCC
286.

the action of legislature, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, should ordinarily be
manifestly arbitrary.11 There must be a case of substantive unreasonableness in the statute
itself for declaring the Act ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution.12 The legislation can
be questioned as arbitrary and ultra vires under Art. 14. However, to declare an Act ultra
vires under Article 14, the Court must be satisfied in respect of substantive unreasonableness
in the statute itself.13 No such case has however been made out in the present case by the
petitioners.
¶7. It is also pertinent to note that the laying out of intelligible differentia does not have to be
scientifically perfect or logically complete. 14 Classification having regard to microscopic
differences is not good and to overdo classification is to undo equality. 15 Treating unequal
differently according to their inequality is not only permitted but required.16 Such protection
of cattle is necessary owing to their utility in the primary sector. Hence the animals utilised in
the primary sector have been protected by virtue of the Rules.
¶8. The counsel for the respondents concludes that there exists no manifest arbitrariness that
could serve as a ground to declare the Impugned Rules as unconstitutional.
[A.2] THE IMPUGNED RULES DO NOT VIOLATE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF TRADE AND PROFESSION UNDER 19 (1)(G) OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF HIND
11
Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. v. Airports Authority of India and Ors, (2006) 10 SCC 1.
12
State of Tamil Nadu & ors. v K. Shyam Sunder & ors. (2011) 8 SCC 737.
13
Ibid
14
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712 at p. 747 (¶ 56).
15
Roop Chand Adlakha v. D.D.A., (1989) 1 Supp. SCC 116.
16
St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 559.

[A.2.a] FPH, not being a citizen of Hind does not have a right under
Article 19(1)(g).
¶9. It is important to bear in mind that the petitioners FPH are an association of companies. 17
It is however, fairly settled that a company not being a citizen has no fundamental right under
Article 19.18 It is well settled that a company cannot maintain a petition under Article 32 of
the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the
Constitution. A company, being not a citizen, has no fundamental rights under Article 19 of
the Constitution.19
[A.2.b] The restriction in question is partial and not a total
prohibition.
¶10. The question whether a restriction in effect amounts to a total prohibition is a question of
fact which shall have to be determined with regard to the facts and circumstances of each
17
See Moot Proposition at ¶ 10.
18
Board of Control for Cricket v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2016) 8 SCC 535 at p. 584 [at p. 59-60]; Shree
Sidhbali Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2011) 3 SCC 193 at p. 205 [at ¶ 25]; Barium Chemicals v. Company Law
Board AIR 1967 SC 295; TELCO Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 40; Indo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd.
v. Jasjit Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1140; State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd. v. CTO, AIR 1963 SC 1811; All-India
Bank Employees' Assn. v. National Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1962 SC 171; Sewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v.
Collector of Customs, AIR 1958 SC 845.
19
Ibid

case, the ambit of the right and the effect of the restriction upon the exercise of that right 20.
But when the prohibition is only with respect to the exercise of the right referable only in a
particular area of activity or relating to a particular matter, there was no total prohibition.21
¶11. In the present case, the rules only prohibit slaughter and sale of cattle for slaughter
within the animal markets.22 The restriction in question is not a total prohibition. The right
under Article 19(1)(g) is subject to Article 19(6) which permits reasonable restrictions to be
imposed on it in the interests of the general public.
[A.2.c] The restriction placed is in furtherance of Article 48 and hence
in public interest
¶12. Any enactment is made for advancement of Directive Principles and it runs counter to
the Fundamental Rights an attempt should be made to harmonise the same if it promotes
larger public interest.23 It cannot be overstressed that the DPSPs are fundamental in
governance of the country. What is fundamental in the governance of the country cannot be
less significant than what is fundamental in the life of an individual. 24 It is well settled that
fundamental rights are but a means to achieve the goals indicated in the directive principles
and that the fundamental rights must be constructed in the light of Directive principles.25
¶13. The court should guard zealously Fundamental Rights guaranteed to the citizens of the
society, but at the same time strike a balance between the Fundamental Rights and the larger
20
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India (2004) 1 SCC 712; Sushila Saw Mill v. State of Orissa (1995) 5 SCC 615;
Pratap Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1997) 5 SCC 87; State of Maharashtra v. Himmatbhai Narbheram
Rao, AIR 1970 SC 1157; Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430; M.B. Cotton Assn. Ltd. v.
Union of India AIR 1954 SC 634.
21
Krishna Kumar v. Municipal committee (2005) 8 SCC 612.
22
Rule 2 (b), Prevention of Cruelty (Regulation of Livestock markets) Rules, 2017.
23
State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi kassab Jamat and Ors., (2005) 8 SCC 534.
24
D.D. Basu, Comparative Constitutional Law at p. 4020, (2nd ed., 2008).
25
Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645.

interests of the society. But when such right clashes with the larger interest of the country it
must yield to the latter.26 Therefore, wherever any enactment is made for advancement of
Directive Principles and it runs counter to the Fundamental Rights an attempt should be made
to harmonise the same if it promotes larger public interest.27
¶14. The Supreme Court departed from the rigid rule of subordinating directive principles
and entered the era of harmonious construction. The need for avoiding a conflict between
fundamental rights and directive principles was emphasised, appealing to the legislature and
the courts to strike a balance between the two as far as possible.28
¶15. It is also important to note that the Directive Principles of State policy are often used to
judge the reasonableness of the restriction imposed on fundamental rights.29 The interest of a
citizen or section of a community, howsoever important, is secondary to the interest of the
country or community as a whole.30
¶16. In other words, the restriction which can be placed on the rights listed in Article 19(1)
are not subject only to Articles 19(2) to 19(6); the provisions contained in the chapter on
directive principles of State policy can also be pressed into service and relied on for the
purpose of adjudging the reasonability of restrictions placed on the fundamental rights.31
¶17. In the present case, the Impugned Rules put a restriction on the slaughter of Cattle. The
provisions of the Impugned Rules have been introduced by keeping in mind Article 48 which
read: “The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern
and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the
26
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2 SCC 1.
27
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310.
28
Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
29
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
30
Ibid.
31
Case of Mirzapur Moti Kureshi kassab Jamat and Ors. Supra Note 23 at ¶ 47.

breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught
cattle.”32
¶18. It is important to make clear at this juncture that the expression “milch or draught cattle”
as employed in Article 48 of the Constitution is a description of a classification or species of
cattle as distinct from cattle which by their nature are not milch or draught and the said words
do not exclude milch or draught cattle, which on account of age or disability, cease to be
33
functional for those purposes either temporarily or permanently. The said words take
colour from the preceding words cows or calves. A species of cattle which is milch or
draught for a number of years during its span of life is to be included within the said
expression. On ceasing to be milch or draught it cannot be pulled out from the category of
other milch and draught cattle.34
¶19. Keeping the above in mind he animals which could be put in the category of Milch and
draught cattle have been included in the definition of cattle in the Impugned Rules.35 Hence, it
can be safely concluded that the Rules impose a restriction to further the mandate provided in
Article 48. Thus, it is clear that the restrictions placed on the Fundamental Right under
Article 19(1)(g) are reasonable in terms of Article 19 (6).
[A.3] THE IMPUGNED RULES DO NOT VIOLATE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
LIFE GUARANTEED UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF HIND.
¶20. It is the case of the petitioners that the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 is not
an absolute right and is subject to reasonable restrictions. 36 These restrictions may be placed
32
Article 48, Constitution of Hind
33
Case of Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat Supra Note 23 at p. 571 [at ¶ 68].
34
Ibid
35
Rule 2(e), Prevention of Cruelty (Regulation of Livestock markets) Rules, 2017.
36
Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (2000) 2 SCC 465 [at ¶ 35] ;Mohd. Subrati v. State of West Bengal (1973)
3 SCC 250.

for the purpose of enforcing Directive Principles of State of Policy in Part IV of the
Constitution.37 It is submitted that the restrictions placed on the said right in the present case
supplements the efforts of government to implement Article 48.38
¶21. The petitioners submit that Article 21 is not attracted in a case of trade or business —
either big or small. The right to carry on any trade or business and the concept of life and
personal liberty within Article 21 are too remote to be connected together. The case of Olga
tellis is clearly distinguishable in this respect.39
¶22. It is further submitted that the word “Profession” means an occupation carried on by a
person by virtue of his personal and specialised qualifications, training or skill. On the other
hand, the word “occupation” has a wide meaning such as any regular work, profession, job,
principal activity, employment, business or a calling in which an individual is engaged.40
¶23. Furthermore, the word “Trade” in its wider sense includes any bargain or sale, any
occupation or business carried on for subsistence or profit, it is an act of buying and selling of
goods and services. It may include any business carried on with a view to profit whether
manual or mercantile. Finally, the word “Business” is a very wide term and would include
anything which occupies the time, attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit. It
may include in its form trade, profession, industrial and commercial operations, purchase and
sale of goods, and would include anything which is an occupation as distinguished from
pleasure.41
¶24. The petitioners are in the present case engaged in a trade, profession or business as per
the above definition.42 Hence they cannot take the plea of erosion of Right to Livelihood
37
Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1 [at ¶ 24-25].
38
See Contention A.2.c.
39
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545.
40
Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1989) 4 SCC 155 at p.174 [ at ¶ 28]
41
Ibid
42
See Moot Proposition at ¶ 10 & 11.

when in reality the Right being asserted is the right under Article 19(1)(g). Hence the
Impugned Rules cannot be said to have an adverse impact on the Livelihood of the
petitioners.
¶25. Moreover, unless these were the direct and inevitable consequences of the measures
enacted in the impunged Act it would not be possible to strike down the legislation as having
that effect and operation.43 Thus other rights affected as an indirect consequence of the
Impugned Rules cannot be relied upon to render the Rules unconstitutional.
[A.4] THE IMPUGNED RULES DO NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE 25 OF THE CONSTITUTION.
¶26. It is submitted that Rule 22 does not contravene Article 25 of the Constitution. It is well
settled that cow sacrifice is not an obligatory overt-act for a Muslim to exhibit his religious
43
Express Newspapers v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 578 at p. 620.

belief. No fundamental right can be claimed to insist on slaughter of a cow on Bakr Id day. 44
It is further submitted that Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution contains a guarantee for
rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are essential or integral part of
religion.45
¶27. The counsel for the respondents would state that the test to determine whether a part or
practice is essential to a religion is to find out whether the nature of the religion will be
46
changed without that part or practice. In other words, if the taking away of that part or
practice could result in a fundamental change in the character of that religion or in its belief,
then such part could be treated as an essential or integral part. 47 There cannot be additions or
subtractions to such part because it is the very essence of that religion and alterations will
change its fundamental character. It is such permanent essential parts which are protected by
the Constitution.48
¶28. Thus, in the light of the above submissions it cannot be said that the rules abrogate, in
any manner the provisions of Article 25.
CONTENTION B: THE IMPUGNED RULES DO NOT SUFFER FROM THE VICE OF LACK OF
LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE
¶29. It is the contention of the Respondents that the Central Government has the Competence
to pass the Impugned Rules. It is further submitted that the Power of the Union is co-
44
Case of Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat, Supra Note 23 at p.555 [at ¶22]; Commr. of Police v. Acharya
Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770 at p. 806 [at ¶ 87]; State of W.B. v. Ashutosh Lahiri (1995) 1
SCC 189.
45
Seshammal v. State of T.N. (1972) 2 SCC 11.
46
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 85.
47
Commr., H.R.E. v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 282.
48
Ibid

extensive with that of the parliament.49 The Union can take steps with respect to matters
which are within the legislative domain of the parliament.50
¶30. It is submitted that in interpreting the scope of various entries in the legislative lists in
the Seventh Schedule, widest-possible amplitude must be given to the words used and each
general word must be held to extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly be
said to be comprehended in it.51 It is further submitted that in order to see whether a particular
legislative provision falls within the jurisdiction of the legislature which has passed it, the
Court must consider what constitutes in pith and substance the true subject-matter of the
legislation and whether such subject-matter is covered by the topics enumerated in the
legislative list pertaining to that legislature. 52
¶31. It is contended that when the vires of an enactment is challenged and there is any
difficulty in ascertaining the limits of its power, the difficulty 53 must be resolved, so far as
possible, in favour of legislative body, putting the most liberal construction upon the relevant
legislative entry so that it may have the widest amplitude. 54 The entries in the lists are merely
topics or fields and not powers of the legislation55 and they must receive a liberal construction
inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in a narrow and pedantic manner.56
¶32. It is further submitted that in the case of apparent overlapping between two Entries, the
doctrine of pith and substance has to be applied to find out the true nature of legislation and
entry within which it would fall.57 The doctrine of pith and substance saves the incidental
encroachment if the law in pith and substance falls within an entry within the legislative field
49
Article 73, Constitution of Hind
50
List I and III, Seventh Schedule, Constitution of Hind.
51
State of Gujarat v. Akhil Gujarat Pravasi V.S. Mahamandal, (2004) 5 SCC 155 at p. 165.
52
Ibid
53
Diamond Sugar Mills v. State of A.P., AIR 1961 SC 652 at p. 635.
54
Navinchandra v. Mafatlal, AIR 1955 SC 58 at p. 61.
55
Goodyear India Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1990 SC 781.
56
D. D. Basu, Commentary of Constitution of India (8th Edn.), 2008, p. 8713.
57
Second CTO v. Nazareth, AIR 1970 SC 999 at p.1001.

of the particular legislature which has enacted it. 58 Once it is found that in pith and substance
a law falls within the permitted field, any incidental encroachment by it on a forbidden field
does not affect the competence of the concerned legislature to enact the law.59
¶33. To put it differently, incidental encroachment is not altogether forbidden. 60 If an
enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon
the Legislature enacting it, it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally
encroaches on matters assigned to another legislation. 61
¶34. It is further submitted that the Rules in the present case should be taken in one piece and
then its true character determined. The name given to the Rules is immaterial 62 and it is not
apt to limit the scope of enquiry to the object of Impugned Rules. 63 In other words, if the rules
substantially fall within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the
legislature, it cannot be held to be ultra vires merely because its nomenclature shows that it
encroaches upon matters assigned to another heading of legislation. 64 To examine the “pith
and substance” of a legislation, one has to look at the legislative scheme, object and purpose
of the Act and practical effect of its provisions.65
¶35. It is contended that, the substance of the Rules falls under Entry 17, List III, namely
‘Prevention of cruelty to animals’. It is submitted that if the substance of the Impugned Rules
falls within the Concurrent list then the incidental encroachment by the enactment on the
State List, if any, would not make it invalid. 66 Thus, the Central government relied upon the
58
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7TH ED., 2016,at p. 564, LEXIS NEXIS
BUTTERWORTHS, NAGPUR.
59
Ibid
60
State of Rajasthan v. Vatan Medical & General Store, AIR 2001 SC 1937.
61
Ibid
62
State of W.B. v. Kesoram Industries Ltd., (2004) 10 SCC 201.
63
E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 394.
64
State of Karnataka v. Drive-In Enterprises, (2001) 4 SCC 60 at p. 63 [at ¶6].
65
Offshore Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Bangalore Development Authority, (2011) 3 SCC 139 at p 179, [at ¶93].
66
Bharat Hydro Power Corpn. Ltd v. State of Assam, (2004) 2 SCC 553.

power granted by the parliament under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1961 to
make the Impugned Rules.67
CONTENTION C: THE IMPUGNED RULES DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE PREVENTION OF
CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT,1960
¶36. The counsel for the respondents submits that the sole object of Article 32 is the
enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It follows that no
question other than relating to the fundamental rights will be determined in a proceeding
under Article 32 of the Constitution. If the validity of the provisions of the statute is
challenged on the ground other than the contravention of fundamental rights, this Court will
67
§38, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1961.

not entertain that challenge in a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution. 68 Thus,
owing to the fact the Impugned Rules have been challenged only under Article 32, the scope
of the enquiry must be restricted to whether any provision of the Rules violates the
Fundamental Right(s) of the petitioner.69
[C.1] THE RULES HAVE BEEN PASSED IN A MANNER PRESCRIBED BY
THE ACT.
¶36. The Act in the present case provides that the Central Government may, by notification in
the Official Gazette and subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules to carry
out the purposes of the Act. 70 It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of
doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or
not at all.71 It thus makes such publication in the official gazette of the rules mandatory.
Furthermore, the publication would be conclusive proof that the rule.72 Thus, in compliance
with the same, the Central Government published the Rules inviting objections/Suggestions
from the affected parties on the 16th day of January 2017.73
[C.2] THE RULES HAVE BEEN PASSED WITHIN THE POWERS DELEGATED
BY THE ACT AND DO NO CONTRAVENE ANY PROVISIONS OF THE
PARENT ACT.
68
DM Wayanad Institute of Medical Sciences v. Union of India, (2016) 2 SCC 315 at p. 321-2 [at ¶ 17-18].
69
See Moot Proposition at ¶ 12.
70
§ 38, Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1961.
71
Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Anil Shantaram Khoje, (2016) 15 SCC 726 at p.731 [ at ¶ 14]; Babu
Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 422 at p. 432 [at ¶ 31]; Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D
426.
72
§23, General Clauses Act, 1897.
73
G.S.R. 34(E), dated the 16th January, 2017, Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, Section 3, Sub-section (i).

¶37. It is humbly put forth that the enabling provision must be held broadly and not narrowly.
The approach must be to uphold the validity of the rules. 74 The court has to start with the
presumption that the Impugned Rule are intra vires and the burden lies on the person
challenging it.75 This approach means that the rule has to be read down only to save it from
being declared ultra vires if the court finds in a given case that the above presumption stands
rebutted. 76 It is equally well settled that rules made on matters permitted by the Act in order
to supplement the Act and not to supplant the Act, cannot be held to be in violation of the
Act. 77
¶38. It is humbly submitted that as the provisions of Rule conform to the provisions of the
Parent Act and comes within the scope and purview of the rule making authority then the
Rule would be held valid.78 In holding a relevant rule to be ultra vires it becomes necessary
to take into consideration the purpose of the enactment as a whole, starting from the preamble
to the last provision thereto. If the entire enactment read as a whole indicates the purpose and
that purpose is carried out by the rules, the same cannot be stated to be ultra vires of the
provisions of the enactment.79
¶39. In the present case, the Impugned Rules are made keeping in mind the object and scope
of the parent act.80 It is humbly contended that the Impugned Rules are within the four
corners of authority conferred by the parent act. The Impugned Rules supplement the
provisions of the Act and it is possible to interpret the two harmoniously.81
74
State of Punjab v. Devans Modern Breweries (2004) 11 SCC 26 [at ¶ 105,119 & 120].
75
State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517 at p. 528 [ at ¶ 15].
76
J.K. Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2007) 13 SCC 673 at p. 766-7 [at ¶ 129 & 133].
77
Ibid
78
Greater Bombay Municipal Corp v. Nagpal Printing Mills (1988) 2 SCC 466 [at ¶ 8 & 9].
79
CCE v. Venus Castings (P) Ltd., (2000) 4 SCC 206 at p. 212 [at ¶11].
80
G.P. Ceramics v. CIT, 2009 2 SCC 90 [at ¶ 27].
81
P. Raghava Kurup v. Ananthakumari (2007) 9 SCC 179 [at ¶ 5 & 7]; Ajit Singh Singhvi v. State of Rajasthan,
1991 Supp (1) 343.

¶40. Arguendo, when the valid part is severable from the invalid parts, it can be saved rather
than striking down the whole enactment. 82 The doctrine of severability can be relied upon to
achieve the same.83 In the present case the respondents pray that the Court make an attempt to
save the valid portions of the act; in case any provision is declared invalid for the reason of
being Ultra vires or in contravention of the Parent Act.
CONTENTION D: THE RATTLESNAKE GAU-MAI SCHEME IS NOT ARBITRARY AND IS
NOT LIABLE TO BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
¶41. FPH filed a writ in the High Court of Sarai, a State in Hind, in May 2017, claiming that
the Rattlesnake Gau- Mai Scheme [Hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Scheme”] was
unconstitutional as it was arbitrary and unfair.84 It is however, the case of the respondents
that the High Court was correct in upholding the constitutionality of the scheme.
82
Asgar Ibrahim Amin v. Union of India, (2016) 13 SCC 797 [at ¶ 16]; Union of India v. Alok Kumar, (2010) 5
SCC 349 [at ¶ 62]; Progressive education society v. Rajendra (2008) 3 SCC 310 [at ¶ 16-19]; State of T.N. v. P.
Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517 at p. 535 [ at ¶ 31].
83
Ibid
84
Moot Compromis at ¶ 10

¶42. It is humbly put forth that owing to the quasi-federal nature of the Constitution and the
specific wording of Article 282, both the Union and the State have the power to make grants
for a public purpose irrespective of whether the subject matter of the purpose falls in the
Seventh Schedule.85 It is pertinent to note that any purpose which directly benefits the public
or a section of the public is a public purpose.86
¶43. It is further contended that the words ‘public purpose’ have been defined thus: “The term
is synonymous with governmental purpose… A public purpose or public business has for its
objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security,
prosperity, and contentment of all the inhabitants or residents within a given political
division, as, for example, a State, the sovereign powers of which are exercised to promote
such public purpose or public business.”87
¶44. It is also the claim of the respondents that the scheme has a public purpose as it
supplements the efforts of the state in putting into practice a directive principle of state policy
which requires that the state endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on
modern and scientific lines and take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and
prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle. 88 It is
submitted that the Impugned Scheme challenged in this petition falls within the realm of
fulfilling the directive principles of State policy thereby falling within the scope of public
purpose in Article 282.89
¶45. It is a humble plea of the respondents that the Impugned Scheme does not suffer from
the vice of Arbitrariness. The petitioners have failed to make out a case that suggests Central
85
Ibid
86
Venkatamma v. City Improvement Trust Board, (1973) 1 SCC 188 at p. 191 [at ¶ 9].
87
State of T.N. v. L. Abu Kavur Bai, (1984) 1 SCC 515 at p. 543 [at ¶ 72].
88
Article 48, Constitution of Hind.
89
S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of T.N., (2013) 9 SCC 659 at p. 712 [at ¶ 84.2].

Government is averse to the idea of granting similar support to other religions. Thus, it
cannot be said that the scheme is discriminatory or arbitrary. 90 The court can strike down
scheme only on the basis of its vires or unconstitutionality but not on the basis of its
viability.91
¶46. It is fairly settled that under Article 136 the court would not interfere with the wisdom of
the Government policy in economic matters.92 The legality of policy and not the wisdom of
policy is the subject matter of review.93
¶47. It is further the case of the respondents that in respect of public policies which are
94
initiated by the Government the courts should not become an approval authority. It is
neither within the domain of the courts nor the scope of judicial review to embark upon an
enquiry as to whether a particular public policy is wise or whether better public policy can be
evolved.95 Wisdom and advisability of economic policy are ordinarily not amenable to
judicial review. In matters relating to economic issues the Government has, while taking a
decision, right to “trial and error” as long as both trial and error are bona fide and within the
limits of the authority. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is
Parliament and not the courts.96
¶48. It would not be appropriate for this Court to question the wisdom of the same, unless it
is demonstrated by the aggrieved persons that the said policy has been enacted in an arbitrary,
unreasonable or mala fide manner, or that it offends the provisions of the Constitution of
90
Prafull Goradia v. Union of India, (2011) 2 SCC 568 at p. 573 [at ¶ 11 & 14].
91
Bhim Singh v. Union of India & ors. (2010) 5 SCC 538.
92
Subhash Photographics v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 323.
93
Sanchit Bansal v. Joint Admission Board (2012) 1 SCC 157; Union of india v. J.D. Suryavanshi (2011) 13
SCC 167 [at ¶ 7-11]; Directorate of Film Festivals v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain (2007) 4 SCC 737.
94
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664 at p. 763 [at ¶ 234].
95
Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561 at p. 605 [at ¶ 169].
96
Ibid; See further State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318.

India.97 Article 14 cannot be construed as a charter for judicial review of State action, to call
upon the State to account for its actions in its manifold activities by stating reasons for such
actions.98
¶49. In present case, there being no evidence to suggest that the Impugned Scheme is illegal,
arbitrary, unreasonable or otherwise violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, there exist no
ground to warrant the interference of the Court. 99 Thus, the respondents submit that the
Scheme is not in contravention of any constitutional provision.
97
Essar Steel Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 11 SCC 1 at p. 24 [at ¶ 49]. Bajaj Hindustan v. Shadi Lal
Enterprises (2011) 1 SCC 640 [at ¶ 39].
98
Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 at p.304 [at ¶
22].
99
Arun Kumar Agrawal v. Union of India, (2013) 7 SCC 1.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, in the light of facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly prayed that the Honourable Supreme Court of Hind may be pleased to adjudge and
declare that:
I. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock Markets) Rules,
2017 does not violate the Fundamental Rights.
II. The central government has the legislative competence to pass the said rules.
III. The provisions of Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Regulation of Livestock
Markets) Rules, 2017 are not contrary to the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act
1960.
IV. The Gau Mai Scheme is not arbitrary and is constitutional.
The Court may also be pleased to pass any other order, in light of justice, equity and good
conscience.
All of which is most humbly submitted.
Place: Hind S/d-
Date: 2017 On Behalf of the Respondents
Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | XIV

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24TH M.C. CHAGLA MEMORIAL GOVERNMENT LAW COLLEGE NATIONAL

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 1304 of 2017

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 1970 OF 2017

WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 511 OF 2017

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT(S)

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | II

AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER

SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

SCR SUPREME COURT REPORTS

SLP SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

UOI UNION OF INDIA

U/S UNDER SECTION

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | III

 THE CONSTITUTION OF HIND.

 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897.

 BRYAN A. GARNER, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ED. 2009).

 ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, LEXIS NEXIS

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | IV

 M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, LEXIS NEXIS BUTTERWORTHS WADHWA,

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | V

Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643...................................................................6

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | VI

Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay AIR 1962 SC 85.........................10

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | VII

Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam v. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561........................18

I. Hind is a rapidly developing secular constitutional republic. Hind is also a

religiously diverse country, with a majority population following the ‘Rumi’

minorities, and weaker economic sections, beef is considered a primary and

affordable source of protein.

Against Religion Party (hereinafter referred to as “BARP"). The new Prime

Minister, Mr. P. R. Magna (hereinafter referred to as “PR") of BARP won several

state assembly elections forming governments in 80% of the states in Hind.

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | VIII

V. The Food Produce of Hind (hereinafter referred to as “FPH") is a representative

Association of food and dairy producers, majority of who were transnational

corporations. Many members of FPH are companies incorporated in Trumpberg.

claiming that the Rattlesnake GauMai Scheme was unconstitutional as it was

prohibited the sale of cattle for slaughter in the animal markets.

VII. Association of Beef Handlers & Exporters (hereinafter referred to as “ABHE") is

an association of meat packers, processors and slaughter house owners, majority

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | IX

several representations to the Central Government to recall the 2017 Rules.

Constitution of Hind in February, 2017 in the Supreme Court of Hind challenging

the 2017 Rules, including Rule 22.

of brevity and to better serve the ends of justice.

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | X

ISSUE A: WHETHER THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGULATION OF

LIVESTOCK MARKETS) RULES, 2017 IS CONTRARY TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?

ISSUE B: WHETHER THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGULATION OF

LIVESTOCK MARKETS) RULES, 2017 IS WITHIN THE LEGISLATIVE COMPETENCE OF THE

ISSUE C: WHETHER THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (REGULATION OF

LIVESTOCK MARKETS) RULES, 2017 IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF

PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS ACT, 1960?

ISSUE D: WHETHER THE RATTLESNAKE GAU-MAI SCHEME IS ARBITRARY AND UNFAIR?

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | XI

CONTENTION A. THE 2017 RULES ARE NOT CONTRARY TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

as violative of Article 25 as no practice integral to any religion is being adversely affected.

provision of the Impugned Rules for want of Legislative competence.

Memorandum on Behalf of the Respondents Page | XII

no defect in the Rules.

CONTENTION D. THE GAU MAI SCHEME NOT ARBITRARY AND IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

a public purpose as given under Article 282 of the Constitution.