How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith Butler

Author(s): Irene Costera Meijer and Baukje Prins

Source: Signs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Winter, 1998), pp. 275-286
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175091 .
Accessed: 15/01/2014 09:43

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Signs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Irene Costera Meijer
B au kj e Pr in s

How Bodies Come to Matter:

An Interview with JudithButler

Europe.It started
Butlermadea shorttourthrough
n May 1996Judith
offwitha lightning visitto theNetherlands, whereherworkis followed
withmuchinterest. Butlerwas theguestoftheDepartmentofWomen's
StudiesoftheFacultyofArtsat theUniversity ofUtrecht.To us, herpres-
ence in thefleshseemeda good opportunity to put beforeherour ques-
tions concerningsuch complexnotionsas the performativity of gender,
the construction of sex,and the abjectionof bodies, as set out in Gender
Trouble(1990) andBodiesThatMatter(1993). Butler'stextsmakeforfasci-
natingreadingsbut also leftus withsome intricate puzzles.So, just a few
hoursafterher arrival,Butlerfoundherselfassailedby two eagerDutch
interviewers. It was the startof a rewardingand inspiringexchangeof
views. The followingday, an intensiveresearchseminartook place in
whichDutchwomen'sstudiesscholarsseizedtheopportunity to pose their
mostpressingquestions.In theeveninghours,we listenedto a challenging
lectureon thelimitsof restraining instancesof hatespeechby law.It elic-
ited a livelydiscussionabout the differences between,and the pros and
cons of politicaland constitutional regulationsin, the United Statesand
theNetherlands.To us, theseeventsprovisionally concludedan extended
and fruitfulimmersionin Butler'sthoughts.
The followinginterviewis the resultof threeroundsof conversation.
To be well preparedforour confrontation withButler,we spentseveral
animatedafternoons and eveningsdiscussingherworkand itssignificance
forour own theorizingand research.The second roundwas in writing,
whereinButlergave elaborateresponsesto our firstset of questions.The
face-to-facetalkin Utrecht,finally, enabledboth partiesto explainthem-
selves,offerclarifications,
try to eliminate misunderstandings, and have a
fewgood laughsas well.
The interviewconcentrates on threeinterrelated issues.First,we won-
deraboutthestatusofButler'sworkand abouthow sheexpectsherreaders
to understandit. What are its feministand what are its philosophical

ofWomenin Cultureand Society

[Signs:Journal 1998, vol. 23, no. 2]
? 1998 byThe University
of Chicago.All rightsreserved.0097-9740/98/2302-0001$02.00

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
276 I Meijerand Prins

claims?Is it an exercisein carefulconceptualanalysis,or shouldwe readit

as politicalfiction?Is it a politicalcritiqueconcerningthe (un)repre-
sentabilityof (some) bodies,or is it a deconstruction of thenotionof rep-
resentabilityitself?Does itaddresstheepistemological questionofhow we
canpossiblyknowour (sexed) bodies,or is itan attemptto understand how
(sexed) bodies can be- which would be an ontologicalquestion? Butler's
responseis unequivocal:herprimeconcernsare not thoseof the"concep-
tuallypure" philosopherbut of a theoristin a much more politicaland
strategicvein.She agreesthatherclaimsconcerningtheexistenceof abject
bodiesaredownrightcontradictory. But,so shetellsus, theyarecontradic-
toryon purpose:pronouncedas performative formulas,theyaremeantto
enforceor invoke this "impossible" existence. We may see Butler'sworkas
politicalfiction- as long as we realizethat it offers thatwant to
fictions
bringabout "realities.'Second,we wentmoredeeplyintothemeaningof
thenotionof the"abject.?Whatkindof bodieswould countas abjectbod-
ies? Tramps,transvestites, madmen?The raggedbody,the disabledbody,
theveiledbody?It is clearthatButlerresistsgivingexamples.But she ex-
plainsin detailwhythatis thecase. Finally,theinterviewintroducesques-
tionsof sex and heterosexuality. Are therenot otheraxes thatgovernthe
exclusionof bodies nextto heterosexuality, and does one not runthe risk
of strengthening preciselythatwhich one wishes to weakenbypresenting
"theheterosexual matrix"as thesourceof all evil?Again,Butler'sresponse
refersto politicaland strategicratherthan to philosophicalor empirical
motives:I mayexaggerate, she admits,butI fearthatputtingothercatego-
riesof exclusionon a par withheterosexuality once againleads to the"ab-
jection"of the homosexual and especiallythe lesbianbody.

DepartmentofCommunication
University (Meijer)
ofAmsterdam

DepartmentofPhilosophy
ofMaastricht(Prins)
University

IRENE COSTERA MEIJER and BAUKJEPRINS: Preparingforthisinter-

view,we repeatedly cameto wonderaboutwhatkindofa workBodiesThat
Matteractuallyis: shouldwe see it as a philosophicalexercisein conceptual
projectofdeconstructivism?
analysis,as a politicalcritique,or as a strategic
CarolynHeilbrun, in an essay about thevalue of women'swriting,stated:
"What mattersis thatlivesdo not serveas models; only storiesdo that.
And it is a hardthingto makeup storiesto liveby.We can onlyretelland

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 S I G N S Winter 1998 I 277

live by the storieswe have read or heard. We live our lives through
texts.... Whatevertheirformor medium,thesestorieshave formedus
all; theyare what we must use to make new fictions,new narratives"
(1988, 37). To whatextentdoes yourworkfitintosucha viewofwomen's
writing?Can yourprojectbe understoodas a wayoftellingus new stories
to live by?Or would you rathersee it as an attemptto give us feminists
new analytical tools to criticizeour lives?In otherwords,how would you
want yourideal readerto read BodiesThatMatter: as a formof political
fictionor as a diagnosticphilosophicalinquiry?
JUDITH BUTLER: I am sympathetic withthedescriptionof myworkas
politicalfiction, but I think it is importantto stressthatnot all fiction
takestheformof a story.The interesting citationfromCarolynHeilbrun
emphasizes"stories"and suggeststhatit is throughnarrative thatsurvival
forwomenis to be found.That maybe true,but thatis not quitetheway
in whichI work. I thinkthata politicalimaginarycontainsall kindsof
waysof thinkingand writingthatarenot necessarily storiesbutwhichare
fictive,in thesensethattheydelineatemodes of possibility.
My workhas alwaysbeen undertaken withthe aim to expandand en-
hancea fieldof possibilities forbodilylife.My earlieremphasison denatu-
ralizationwas not so muchan oppositionto natureas itwas an opposition
to theinvocationofnatureas a wayofsettingnecessary limitson gendered
life.To conceiveof bodies differently seemsto me partof the conceptual
and philosophicalstrugglethatfeminism involves,and itcan relateto ques-
tions of survivalas well. The abjectionof certainkindsof bodies, their
inadmissibility to codes of intelligibility,
does makeitselfknownin policy
and politics,and to liveas sucha bodyin theworldis to livein theshadowy
regionsof ontology.I'm enragedby the ontologicalclaimsthatcodes of
legitimacy makeon bodies in theworld,and I try,whenI can,to imagine
against that.
So, it is not a diagnosis,and not merelya strategy, and not at all a story,
but some otherkindof workthathappensat the levelof a philosophical
imaginary, one thatis deployedbycodes oflegitimacy, butalso,one which
emerges from within those codes as the internal possibilityof theirown
dismantling.
ICM and BP: As we understandit, in BodiesThatMatteryou address
one of thethorniestproblemsfora radicalconstructivist,
namely,how to
conceiveof materiality
in constructivist
terms.Withthehelpof thenotion
of theperformativityof language,you manageto evokean imageof both
the solidityand contingencyof so-calledhard facts.You build a potent
argumentwithwhichwe thinkhard-boiledrealisticargumentsabout the
undeniabilityof "Death and Furniture"can be countered(see Edwards,

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
278 I Meijerand Prins

Ashmore,and Potter1995). In an attemptto capturetheargumentofyour

book, we would say thatit shows the constitutive characterof discursive
constructions. More it
particularly,shows that the conditions underwhich
material,sexedbodies come into beingsimultaneously concerntheirexis-
tence, theirknowability, and theirlegitimacy.
JB: I verymuchlikethislastsummaryof myclaims.However,I think
itmaybe a mistaketo claimthatBodiesThatMatteris a constructivist work
or thatit seeksto takeinto accountmateriality in constructivistterms.It
would be equallyright--orpossible--to say thatit seeksto understand
why the essentialism/constructivism debate founderson a paradox that
is not easilyor,indeed,not everovercome.Justas no priormateriality is
accessiblewithoutthemeansofdiscourse,so no discoursecan evercapture
thatpriormateriality; to claimthatthe body is an elusivereferent is not
In
thesame as claimingthatit is onlyand alwaysconstructed. some ways,
it is preciselyto claimthatthereis a limitto constructedness, a place,as it
were,whereconstruction necessarily meets itslimit.
ICM and BP: In theprefaceto BodiesThatMatteryou admitthatthere
is a certainnecessityand irrefutability to primary experiences,suchas bod-
ies living,eating,feelingpain, dying."But,"you continue,"theirirrefut-
abilityin no wayimplieswhatit mightmean to affirm themand through
whatdiscursivemeans"(xi). Here you suggestthatyou will addressques-
tions concerningknowability, thatis, concerningthe constitutive effects
of affirming primaryexperiencesapartfrom their"being" irrefutable and
primary. On theotherhand,you regularly emphasize thatBodies ThatMat-
teris morethan"just"an epistemological project.It appearsthatyou also
wish to addressquestionsof how theworldis,independently of how we
perceive/construct it. In this respect,we were puzzled by youruse of the
phrase"thereis."Most often,as in "thereis no doer behindthe deed,"it
is used in the negativemode. Withsuch phrasesyou intendto denythe
"originality" of theentityin question- not itsexistenceas such.But what
thenis thestatusof "thereis" in affirmative statements, such as "thereis a
matrixofgenderrelations"or "thereis a [constitutive] outside"(8)? Ifthey
do not suggesttheprediscursive characteroftheheterosexual matrixor the
constitutive outside, what do they referto?
JB:This is a good question,one thatI am pleasedto havetheopportu-
nityto respondto. For me, the questionof how one comes to know,or,
indeed,the conditionsof the possibilityof establishingthatone knows,
arebestansweredthroughturningto a priorquestion:Who are"we" such
thatthisquestionbecomesa questionforus. How has the"we" been con-
structedin relationto thisquestionof knowledge?In otherwords: How
does the epistemologicalquestionitselfbecome possible?Foucault pro-

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 S I G N S Winter 1998 I 279

vides anotherstep,made possibleby the kindof workthathe does. This

has to do with askinghow it is thatcertainkindsof discourseproduce
ontologicaleffects or operatethroughthecirculation ofontologicalmoves.
In part,I see myselfas workingwithindiscoursesthatoperatethrough
- -
ontologicalclaims "thereis no doerbehindthedeed" and recirculating
the "there is" in a
orderto produce counterimaginary to the dominant
metaphysics. Indeed, I thinkit is crucialto recirculateand resignify the
if to
ontologicaloperators, only produce ontology itselfas a contested
field.I think,forinstance,thatit is crucialto writesentencesthatbegin
with"I think"even thoughI standthe chanceof being misconstrued as
adding the subject to the deed. There is no way to counter thosekinds of
grammarsexceptthroughinhabitingthemin waysthatproducea terrible
dissonancein them,that"say"precisely whatthegrammaritselfwas sup-
posed to foreclose.The reasonwhy repetitionand resignification are so
important my to work has everything to do with how I see opposition
workingfromwithinthe verytermsby whichpower is reelaborated.The
pointis not to levela prohibitionagainstusingontologicaltermsbut,on
thecontrary, to use themmore,to exploitand restagethem,subjectthem
to abuse so thattheycan no longerdo theirusual work.
Thereis, however,anotherpointhereto be made,and it relatesbackto
the questionof constructivism. Phraseslike "thereis a matrixof gender
relations"do appearto refer, but theyalso referlaterally, withinlanguage,
to the conventionsof ontological ascription.They are philosophical
"mimes"in thesensethatIrigarayhasdescribed.Theyreferto certainkinds
of philosophicalconventions.But I also wantto claimthattheontological
claimcan neverfullycaptureitsobject,and thisviewmakesme somewhat
different fromFoucaultand alignsme temporarily withtheKantiantradi-
tion as it has been takenup by Derrida.The "thereis" gesturestowarda
referent it cannotcapture,becausethereferent is not fullybuiltup in lan-
guage, is not the same as thelinguisticeffect.There is no accessto it out-
side of thelinguisticeffect, but thelinguisticeffect is not the same as the
referent thatit failsto capture.This is whatallowsfora varietyof waysof
makingreference to something,none of which can claim to be thatto
whichreference is made.
ICM and BP: The pun of yourtitleis veryfelicitous:"bodies thatmat-
ter"simultaneously materialize,acquiremeaning,and obtaina legitimate
status.Bodies thatdo notmatterare "abject"bodies. Such bodies are not
intelligible(an epistemologicalclaim),nor do theyhave legitimateexis-
tence(a politicalor normativeclaim).Hence, theyfailto materialize. Nev-
ertheless, yourclaimis also thatabjectbodies "exist, thatis, as excluded,
as a disruptive power.At thispoint,we feela bitlost: Can bodies thatfail

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
280 I Meijerand Prins

to materializestill"be" bodies?If you intendthe conceptof the "abject"

to referto bodies that"exist,"would it not be moreadequateto saythat,
althoughabjectbodiesareconstructed, havematerialized, and gainedintel-
ligibility, they stillfail to as
qualify fully human? In other words,is it not
thecase thatabjectbodiesdo "matter"ontologicallyand epistemologically
but do not yet"matter"in a normative-political sense?
JB: Indeed, in a strictly philosophicalsense,at once to say that"there
are" abjectbodies and thattheydo nothave claimto ontologyappearsto
be whattheHabermassianswould calla performative contradiction. Well,
you could become kindof medievaland scholasticabout thisand say,oh
yes,certainkindsof beingshavemorefullyontologicalbeingthanothers,
etcetera,etcetera.Then you would remainwithina certainkindof philo-
sophicalframework thatcould be conceptually satisfying.But I would like
to ask a different kindof question,namely,How is it thatthe domain of
ontology is itselfcircumscribed by power?That is, How is it thatcertain
kindsof subjectslayclaimto ontology,how is it thattheycountor qualify
as real?In thatcase, we are talkingabout the distribution of ontological
effects, whichis an instrument of power,instrumentalized forpurposesof
hierarchy and subordination and also for purposes of exclusion and for
producing domains of unthinkability. This whole domain of ontologythat
the good, the conceptuallypure, philosophertakesfor granted,is pro-
foundlytaintedfromthestart.Now, we cannotlook at grammarand say,
ifI saythatthereare abjectbodies,thenI mustbe able to reasonbackfrom
theclaim"thereare"to a priorontology.Hardly,hardly.I could say"there
areabjectbodies,"and thatcould be a performative in whichI endowontol-
ogy. I endow to
ontology precisely that which has been systematically de-
prived of the of
privilege ontology. The domain of is a
ontology regulated
domain: what gets producedinsideof it, what gets excludedfromit in
orderforthedomainto be constituted is itselfan effectof power.And the
performative can be one of the ways in which discourse operationalizes
power.So, I am performing a performative contradiction, onpurpose. And
I am doingthatprecisely to confoundtheconceptually properphilosopher
and to pose a questionabout thesecondaryand derivative statusof ontol-
ogy.It is for me not a presupposition. Even ifI say,"there are abjectbodies
thatdo not enjoya certainkindof ontologicalstatus,"I perform thatcon-
tradictionon purpose.I am doing that to
precisely fly in the face of those
who would say,"but aren'tyou presupposing... ?" No! My speechdoes
notnecessarily haveto presuppose. ... Or,ifitdoes, fine!Perhapsit'spro-
ducing the effectof a presuppositionthroughits performance, OK? And
that'sfine! Get used to it! But it is to an
roundlyinaugurate ontological

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 S I G N S Winter 1998 I 281

domain,itis notto presuppose an already givenone.It is discursively to

instituteone.
ICM andBP: Still,itremains tograspthenotionofthe"abject"
difficult
in yourwork,whichmaybe due to thehighly abstract character ofmost
ofyourdefinitions anddescriptions. Youseemsomewhat reluctant to give
moreconcrete examples ofwhatcouldbe considered abjectbodies.
JB:Well,yes,I certainly am.For,youknow,typologies areusuallyex-
the
actly way in which abjection is conferred: consider the placeof ty-
pology within psychiatricpathologization. to
However, prevent anymis-
understanding beforehand: theabjectformeis inno wayrestricted to sex
andheteronormativity. It relatesto allkindsofbodieswhoselivesarenot
considered to be "lives"andwhosemateriality is understood notto "mat-
ter."To givesomething of an the
indication: U.S. pressregularly figures
non-Western livesinsuchterms. Impoverishment isanother commoncan-
didate,as is thedomainofthoseidentified as psychiatric "cases."
ICM andBP: Weagreethatbeingoutspoken onthissubject approaches
thelimits ofwhatcanbe spokenof.Still,couldyouelaborate on thisissue?
JB:OK, I'll do that,butI haveto do something elseatthesametime.
I couldenumerate manyexamples of what I take to be theabjection of
bodies.Wecannoticeit,forinstance, withthekilling ofLebaneserefugees:
thewaysthatthosebodies,thoselives,don'tgetfigured as lives.Theycan
getcounted, there's outragegenerally, but there is no I have
specificity.
seenit in theGermanpresswhenTurkish refugees are either killed or
maimed. Veryoftenwe cangetthenamesoftheGerman perpetrators and
theircomplexfamily andpsychological histories, butno Turkhasa com-
plexfamily or psychological history thatDie Zeiteverwritesabout,or at
leastnotthatI haveseeninmyreading ofthismaterial. So, we geta kind
ofdifferential production ofthehumanora differential materialization of
thehuman.Andwe alsoget,I think, aproduction oftheabject.So, itis not
as iftheunthinkable, theunlivable, theunintelligible hasno discursive life;
itdoeshaveone.Itjustliveswithin discourse as theradically uninterrogated
andas theshadowy contentless figure forsomething thatis notyetmade
real.Butitwouldbe a terrible mistake ifone thought thatthedefinition
oftheabjectcouldbe exhausted bytheexamples thatI give.I wanttohold
outfora conceptual apparatus thatallowsfortheoperation ofabjection
to havea kindof relative even
autonomy, emptiness, contentlessness--
preciselyso thatit is not captured byitsexamples, so thatitsexamples
don't then become normative of what we mean bytheabject.Whatvery
oftenhappensis thatpeoplegivetheirabstract theories ofsomething like
abjection,thentheygivetheexample, thentheexamplebecomesnorma-

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
282 I Meijerand Prins

tiveof everything else. It becomesparadigmatic and comesto produceits

own exclusions.It becomesfixedand normativein therigidsense.
ICM and BP: So, abjectionis a process?A discursiveprocess?
JB:I thinkso! I thinkit has to be, yes.
ICM and BP: So, it is not about bodiesthemselves, but about theways
bodies figurein discourse?We, forinstance,asked ourselveswhetherthe
oriental,theveiledbody,thefemalebodythatis veiledwhen she/itenters
publicspace,countsas an exampleof the abject.We hesitatedabout this,
because this body,this woman, acts accordingto an establishednorm.
Somehowwe could not combineabjectionand normativity.
JB:This questionopens up a couple of different issues.So, let me give
a
you couple of answers to that. One is that I think thatdiscoursesdo
actually livein bodies. in
Theylodge bodies; bodies in factcarrydiscourses
as partof theirown lifeblood.And nobodycan survivewithout,in some
sense,beingcarriedby discourse.So, I don'twantto saythatthereis dis-
cursiveconstruction on the one hand and a lived body on the other.But
the otherpoint,whichmaybe more importanthere,is thatwe also have
to worryabout certainways of describingorientalismand especiallyde-
scribingorientalismas it pertainsto women,women'sbodies,and wom-
en's self-representations. For instance,thereare manydebatesabout the
veil.And thereare some scholars,feminist scholars,who have arguedthat
theveilis actuallyverycomplexand thatveryoftena certainkindof power
thatwomen have withinIslamic countriesto expressthemselvesand to
exercisepoweris facilitated bytheveil,preciselybecausethatpoweris de-
flectedand made less easilyidentifiable. So, ifyou wereto sayto me, "the
veiledwoman,"do we mean in Iran?Do we mean a woman of a certain
class?In whatcontext,forwhatpurpose?What is the action,whatis the
practicethatwe are thinkingabout?In whatcontextare we tryingto de-
cide whetheror not theveiledwoman is an exampleof theabject?WhatI
worryabout is that,in certaincases,we would see thatas an abjection:in
the sense thatthiswoman is literallynot allowed to show her face and
hence enterinto the public domain of facedhumans.On anotherlevel,
however,we mightsaythatwe as Westerners aremisrecognizing a certain
culturalartifact, a certainculturaland religiousinstrument thathas been a
traditional wayforwomento exertpower.This particular debateoverthe
veilhas plaguedfeminist debates.The questionis: Arefeminists beingori-
entalistwhen they assume that the veiled woman is always an abject
woman?I wantto keepthatquestionopen; that'swhyI thinktheremust
be a relativeincommensurability betweenthetheoretical elaborationof ab-
jectionand the examples.And it maywell be that the exampleworksin
some contextsand not at all in others.

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 SI G N S Winter 1998 I 283

ICM and BP: Now thatyou mentioncontext,is thisnot theotherside

of the"thereis" question?As you said earlier,one of thefunctionsof the
"thereis" formulais thatyou engageyourself in a debateabout ontology,
of what is and what can be thought.In GenderTrouble, you intervenein
the debate on the construction of genderidentities.As you noticehere,
"theinternalcoherenceor unityof eithergender,man or woman,thereby
requiresboth a stableand oppositionalheterosexuality. That institutional
heterosexuality both requires and produces the univocityof each of the
gendered terms that constitute the limit of genderedpossibilitieswithin
an oppositional,binarygendersystem"(22). Our questionconcernsthe
assumednecessity of the heterosexual characterof practicesthat generate
stableidentities.Does the heterosexualmatrixnot also obscurethe per-
formative powersof thesexualdivisionsamongwomen?Feministhistori-
ans have shownthatthe stability of genderidentitiesdoes not automati-
cally depend on heterosexual negotiationsbut also on the differences
between "proper" women and other women, between"proper"men and
othermen (CosteraMeijer 1991).
To call the normativity of heterosexuality into questionis a powerful
gesture, but does it not obscure the fact that people constructnotionsof
difference not only throughgenderbut by sexual(izing)divisionswithin
gendersthroughcategoriesof race,class, or physicalabilities?Disabled
womensuffer frombeingstigmatized as lessfeminine thantheirmoreable-
bodied counterparts. On theotherhand,blackwomen aresometimesste-
reotypedas more female,whereasin othercontextstheyare considered
lessladylikethanwhitewomen.The construction of genderidentities,we
suggest, was made not only by repeating the difference between female
and male,femininity and masculinity but also by constantly affirming the
hierarchicalopposition between femininity and unfemininity, between
masculinity and unmasculinity. What are yourthoughtsabout the claim
thatthe oppositeof femininity is oftennot masculinity but unfemininity
and thatthesetwo notionsoftendo not coincide?
JB: I verymuch like the idea thatthe opposite of masculinity is not
necessarily femininity. I have no problem with that.But the relationship
betweensexualityand gender,theway thatyou frameit hereis based on
BodiesThatMatter. In fact,in GenderTrouble I wrotesomethingverysimilar
to whatyou suggesthere.AlthoughinBodiesThatMatterI emphasizethat
sexualityis regulatedthroughtheshamingof gender,thatof coursecould
not workifgenderwerenot itselfrenderedproperonlyin thecontextof
a certainregulationof sexuality.So, I see no problemthere.But I have
readmuchfeminist historythatassumesthatboththeproperand the"un-
proper"in women'ssexuality arekindsofheterosexuality (withinmarriage

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
284 I Meijerand Prins

and outsidemarriageor domesticand prostitution). The questionI want

to pose has to do withwhatis leftoutsidethesebinaries,whatis not even
speakableas partof the unproperor improper.I fearthatthe question
of femalehomosexuality becomesmutedpreciselythroughthosekindsof
feministhistoricalframeworks thatremainuncritically attachedto those
kindsof binarisms.
I suppose thatyou wantto suggestthatunpropersexualityis a larger
rubric,one thatmighttakeintoaccountall kindsof sexualpractices.But I
am worriedthatthe proper/unproper distinctionseeksto elide the ques-
tionof homosexuality. And I thinkthereI am probablywillingto commit
a sortof rhetoricalexcessin orderto keep the questionof homosexuality,
and lesbianismin particular, alive.Whichis not thesame as sayingthatall
scholarshipought to do that or thatit is the primaryoppression,or the
key,or whatever.It ratherindicateswhereI enterinto criticaldiscourse
thesedays.
ICM and BP: By puttingheteronormativity at the center,do you not
runthe riskof reproducingits importance? Is it not a relapse?When we
wantto studytheconceptofwomanin a certaintimeand place,whenwe
want to know who countedas a woman and who did not, would it not
be moreinformative to look "sideways"forinstance,at thenotionof the
unwomanlyor unfeminine?
JB: Well,you know,whatI worryabout is this.If lesbianismwere to
be understoodas one amongmanyformsofimpropriety, thentherelation-
shipbetweensexuality and genderremainsintactin thesensethatwe don't
get to ask underwhat conditionslesbianismactuallyunsettlesthe notion
of gender.Not simplythequestionof whatis a properwoman or an im-
properwoman,but whatis not thinkableas a woman at all! This is where
we come back to the notion of abjection.I thinkthatabjectiontriesto
signalwhatis leftoutsideof thosebinaryoppositions,such thatthosebi-
nariesare even possible. Who gets to count as an "improper"woman?
Who gets named as the improperin the textthatthe historianstudies?
What kindsof actsget classifiedor designatedor named?And whichare
so unnameableand unclassifiable thattheyare improperto theimproper,
thattheyareoutsideof theimproper?I am referring to actsthatconstitute
of
a domain unspeakability that conditions the distinction betweenim-
properand proper.
We arestillnot able to accountforthoseactsand practicesand waysof
livingthatwere wildlyexpelledfromthe verybinaryof the properand
the improper.They are not its benignprehistory but, rather,its violent
unspeakable underside. And that'swhat I want to continue to turnto.
ICM and BP: So, we come backto theabject.

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 S I G N S Winter 1998 I 285

JB: I thinkso. What'sgoing to be reallyinteresting

is how you do a
historyof that;thetracesofwhichhavebeen,or areforthemostpart,
erased.Thatis a veryinteresting
problem fora historian.
How to readthe
tracesofwhatdoesgetspoken.I don'tthink itis impossible
to do it,butI
thinkits a reallyinteresting
problem:how to do a ofthatwhich
history
wasneversupposedto be possible.
ICM andBP: In yourdesireto extendthedomainof"bodiesthatmat-
ter"youarenotalone.Thisambition is sharedbyintellectuals
whocome
fromquitedifferent backgrounds. especially ofsci-
philosophical We think
encestudies scholarssuchasDonnaHaraway andBrunoLatour.However,
theirproposalsto broadenour mindson thisissue are not exclusively
fo-
cusedon thedomainof(whatcouldqualify as) humanbodies.Theyalso
wishtotransform ourviewsof"Nature" and"Things," inordertodevelop
moreradicalaccountsof ecologyand technology. For thatreason,they
preferthenotionofthe"actor"to the(humanist) notionofthe"subject."
to
Contrary subjectivity, agencyis not the ofhumans.
prerogative Animals,
trees,machines,--for example,anything thathasan impacton or affects
something else- canbe perceived as an actor.BothHarawayandLatour
usethenotionofthe"hybrid" to refer to thisvastrealmofactorsthatare
not (seenas) human.How do youassesstherelationship betweenyour
owntheorizing ofabjectbodiesas disruptive challengesto what countsas
fullyhuman and the affirmation
of (nonhuman) hybrid actorsbyscience
studiesscholarssuchas HarawayandLatour?Forinstance, doesyourcon-
ceptof"abject"bodiesleaveroomtoincludethepossibility fornonhuman
bodiesto cometo "matter"? Or doesit remainrestricted to therealmof
whatis "livable"as fully
human?
JB: I thinkthatthe workofHarawayandLatourisveryimportant. And
I don'thavea problemwiththenotionof theactor.Still,I thinkthereare
reasonsto workwiththenotionofthesubject,reasonsthathaveevery-
thingto do withthewayin whichit is boundup withthelegaciesof
humanism. I wouldsuggestas wellthatthenotionofthesubjectcarries
withit a doubleness thatis crucialto emphasize: thesubjectis one who
is presumed to be thepresupposition ofagency, as yousuggest, butthe
subject is also one who is subjected to a setofrulesor lawsthatprecede
the subject.This secondsenseworksagainstthehumanist conception
of an autonomousselfor self-grounded humanactor.Indeed,"actor"
carriesa theatricalresonance thatwouldbe verydifficult formeto adopt
withinmyownwork,giventhepropensity to read"performativity"as a
Goffmanesque projectofputting on a maskor electing to playa role.I
preferto workthelegacyofhumanism against andI think
itself, thatsuch
a projectis not necessarily in tensionwiththosewho seekto displace

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
286 I Meijerand Prins

humanismthroughrecourseto vocabulariesthatdisperseagencyacross
theecologicalfield.Theyaretwo waysof undoingthesame problem,and
it seemsimportant who workat bothends of
to havescholarsand activists
theproblem.

References
and theSubversion
Butler,Judith.1990. GenderTrouble:Feminism New
ofIdentity.
YorkandLondon:Routledge.
Limitsof"Sex."New Yorkand
.1993. BodiesThatMatter:On theDiscursive
London:Routledge.
On the
MakestheDifference?
CosteraMeijer,Irene.1991. "WhichDifference
In SharingtheDifference:
Conceptualizationof Sexual Difference." De-
Feminist
batesinHolland,ed. JokeJ.HermsenandAlkelinevanLenning,32-46. New
YorkandLondon:Routledge.
Edwards, Derek,MalcolmAshmore, andJonathan 1995."DeathandFur-
Potter.
niture:TheRhetoric, Politics ofBottomLineArguments
andTheology against
Relativism." oftheHuman Sciences
History 8(2):25-49.
Heilbrun, G. 1988.Writing
Carolyn Press.
Life.London:Women's
a Womans

This content downloaded from 134.76.201.147 on Wed, 15 Jan 2014 09:43:23 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions