Dialectic of Logos

Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 69(1-4), 249-280. doi: 10.2143/JECS.69.1.
3214959
© 2017 by Journal of Eastern Christian Studies. All rights reserved.
St. Maximus the Confessor’s dialectic

of logos, mode and end
in a postmodern context
Its Importance to a Theological

Evaluation of Race and Nationalism
Dionysios Skliris *
The demand for a contextual theology coincides with a multiple crisis, when
we experience a crisis of our self-understanding and of our traditional views
in many Orthodox countries (such as Greece, to take one characteristic
example), but also a crisis of global capitalism as it has evolved in late post-
modernity. But it is exactly this dual character of the recent crisis that could
prove theologically fertile if we achieve a dialogue from inside our impasses.
In such a dialogue, theology would no longer propose ready-made answers
with a lofty attitude, but it would share the common puzzlement.
We shall therefore examine the question of race and nationalism in their
contemporary fluidity in an encounter with the Orthodox patristic tradition.
We will focus on two points of the latter. On the one hand, on the Chalce-
donian theology of distinction and division.1 And, on the other, on a dialec-
tic between logos, mode and end that is inspired by the theology of Maximus
the Confessor (c. 580-662).2 Our choice is based mainly on two factors:
i) Maximus incorporated elements of the previous tradition in his thought –
for example, Cappadocian Trinitarian theology, Gregory of Nyssa’s anthropol-
ogy, an Antiochian emphasis on historicity, and Alexandrian contemplative
* Université Paris-Sorbonne.
1
For the theological significance of the terms diaphora or diakrisis (distinction) and diaire-
sis (division), see John Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood
and the Church (London and New York, 2006), pp. 40f.
2
We have presented this dialectic in a general way in Dionysios Skliris, ‘To aitēma tēs
istorikotētas kai ē dialektikē logu, tropu kai telus stē skepsē tu agiu Maximu tu Omologētē’
(The demand for historicity and the dialectic of logos, tropos and end in the thought of
Saint Maximus the Confessor), Synaxi, 126 (2013), pp. 21-30. We are trying here to
extend this problematic and apply it to the question of race and nationalism.
250 Dionysios Skliris
philosophy, and ii) Maximus thematizes a crisis – namely, the collapse of

Byzantine ecumene under Persian and finally Arab invasions. The concern
for historicity takes the form of a peculiar dialectical thought on History and
anthropology. We therefore think that Maximus’s thematization of crisis
might be fertile in the context of the postmodern crisis of our times.3
This dialectic has three poles: logos, mode and end. Logos or reason is a
will of God for the creature.4 It could therefore be considered as uncreated
and as distinguished from the being itself of which it constitutes the reason.5
Inside time, natural beings in themselves have a nature that is not perfectly
completed from the outset, but is quite fluid.6 The created nature in itself is
3
The importance of Maximus to a Theology of History is also highlighted by J. Kameron
Carter, who considers him as an “anticolonialist intellectual” avant la lettre, see J. Kameron
Carter, Race: A Theological Account (Oxford, 2008).
4
Maximus draws the identification of the divine logoi with the divine will from ps.-
Dionysius the Areopagite. See Questions to Thalassius, Corpus Christianorum Series Graeca
(from now on: Thal. and CCSG respectively) 7,95,8 and Ambigua to John (from now on:
Amb.) 7,24; Nicholas Constas, ed., Maximos the Confessor, On Difficulties in the Church
Fathers: The Ambigua Volume I, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library, 28 (Cambridge/MA,
and London, 2014), pp. 106-108, where he is also referring to the cycle of Pantaenus.
Logos therefore constitutes the divine will for a created being. This also means that it is
the reason for the latter’s existence, its raison d’être. But there is a clear distinction between
a being itself and its logos. The logos is divine and can therefore be considered as uncreated.
The being is created and in itself mutable.
5
For an interpretation of logoi as uncreated, see Vasilios Karayiannis, Maxime le Confesseur:
Essence et Energies de Dieu, Théologie historique, 93 (Paris, 1993), pp. 113-114, 219-222.
This interpretation is based mostly on Amb. 7,15-24, see Constas, Maximos the Confessor
I, pp. 94-108.
6
We could have here a very interesting encounter between Maximus’s thought and some
tendencies of postmodern thought on nature. There is a certain ‘antiessentialism’ in Maxi-
mus, in the sense that nature is not completed in its origin, see Nikolaos Loudovikos, Ē
Kleistē Pneymatikotēta kai to Noēma tu Eautu: O mystikismos tēs ischyos kai ē alētheia fyseōs
kai prosōpu (Closed Spirituality and the Meaning of Self: The mysticism of power and the
truth of person and nature) (Athens, 1999), pp. 191, 281. This reminds us more of a
postmodern or post-structuralist type of antiessentialism than a modernist or existentialist
one. We would define the two types (with a certain danger of oversimplifying) thus: in an
existentialist or modernist type of antiessentialism, nature is considered as something given
(either in a biological or a cultural way), which is then opposed or transcended by man
(as a person or a consciousness or an ecstatic existence, etc). In contrast, in a postmodern
or post-structuralist type of antiessentialism, there is no such given nature in the first place.
Nature is considered as a linguistic, social or cultural construction. Therefore, there is no
need for transcendence but simply for denunciation. Of course, this distinction is not as
simple as that. The existentialist notion of facticity might include social and linguistic
St. Maximus the Confessor’s Dialectic of Logos, Mode and End 251
therefore distinguished from its divine logos. Logos has a triple character:
i) protological, because it exists ‘before’ or rather ‘outside’ creation in time
as a divine will for one being. ii) teleological, because it constitutes the goal
of its nature, and iii) eschatological, because this goal has a radical disconti-
nuity in relation to nature and its potentialities, contrary to Aristotelian or
other teleologies. Among the three, there is a contrast that is nonetheless
sublated for the sake of eminent syntheses.7 The mode (tropos)8 consists in
the historical activations of nature due to human personal hypostases. There
constructions. Nonetheless, there is a shift of emphasis from transcendence of nature to

its denunciation. We can observe this in feminism. In previous contexts, the emphasis was
that a ‘woman’ should transcend her condition as ‘woman’, either biological or cultural.
In a postmodern context, the emphasis is on the denunciation of linguistic and cultural
constructions of ‘womanhood’ at the level of signifiers. Therefore, a subject that is defined
as ‘woman’ could either engage in a deconstruction of the phallogocentric dualism of
‘manhood’ and ‘womanhood’, or negotiate ‘her’ identity inside a gender continuum, where
arbitrary boundaries are no longer considered as definite. In such a postmodern context,
it would be very fertile to engage in a new reading of Maximus’s antiessentialism, especially
the distinction between nature and its logos. Created nature is not given in the beginning.
It is very fluid and in itself is perishable and mortal. Only the logos is given and only as a
‘sign-post’ to the eschatological perspective. Besides, the logos is very cryptic inside His-
tory, stirring man to find it through the chaos and the ambivalence of empirical data.
Consequently, Maximus’s antiessentialism would no longer mean the transcendence of a
given protological nature, but a dialectical relation with its logos. What is more, man has
his own created logos as an image of God. But, inside History, it is possible that human-
created logoi become independent in an idolatrous way. Then, antiessentialism would
mean tropoi (novel modes) that would undermine the self-sufficiency of idolatrous created
logoi or even of exeis (‘fallen’ modes that have turned into sinful habits of nature). This
sort of antiessentialism is inspired by the dynamic divine logoi and their eschatological
perspective. In such a sense, we consider that an actualization of Maximus in the context
of postmodern antiessentialism is possible and indeed very fertile.
7
For the theological importance of the distinction between the logoi and the creatures
that they determine see Nikolaos Loudovikos, Theopoiia: Ē metaneōterikē theologikē aporia,
Theopoiia: The Postmodern Theological Quest (Athens, 2007), pp. 20-21.
8
In Trinitarian theology, the duality logos- tropos means a distinction between the logos
of nature and the modes of existence. That is, logos refers to catholicity (which is nonethe-
less ‘situated’ in the Son as the Logos par excellence) and tropos to a hypostatic mode of
existence that is determined by the Inascibility of the Father, the Filiality of the Son, and
the Ekporeusis of the Spirit. Nevertheless, when the concept of tropos is transferred to
christology and anthropology, it acquires a broader meaning and can denote historical
modalities that differ from the hypostatic mode of existence, but are usually its conse-
quences, see Jean-Claude Larchet, La Divinisation de l’homme selon saint Maxime le Confes-
seur, Cogitatio fidei, 194 (Paris, 1996), pp. 141-151. Maximus explains how he under-
stands the notion of tropos mainly in Amb. 42, 26-29, see Nicholas Constas, ed., Maximos
is a dialogue between God and man, where God proposes a logos for nature,9
man responds with his own created logos resulting in a mode of nature, and
God can respond again with new miraculous modes.10
Maximus is using the duality logos-tropos as a conceptual tool to achieve a
synthesis between a Hellenic and a Judaistic demand. The former is the
existence of stability, as a permanent object of the sage’s contemplation. The
latter is the possibility of contingence inside History, of a dialogue between
God and man, and of miraculous divine interventions. Tropos is precisely a
modality that can coexist with logos. The permanence of logos is thereby
guaranteed, but it takes diverse modifications inside History. It is to be noted
that tropos differs from tropē (trope). The latter means an omnivorous flux
that threatens the permanence of logos, even though it fails in this threat. In
contrast, tropos is a modality that can coexist with logos without annulling
it.11 This dialogue between God and man does not take place in a void, but
in view of a goal of nature, which consists in the hypostatic union of the
created with the uncreated in Christ.12 This union begins with the Incarna-
tion but it will be completed in all its ontological vigor in the common resur-
rection of all in the eschaton. Nevertheless, during History, the human mode
of being is infiltrated by evil due to the Fall and to death, which were a tragic
human response in the dialogue with God. Christ constitutes the hypostatic
dialogue between God and man, because in His Person Ηe condenses the
three poles of the dialectic: He is the Logos, the Verb in Whom are situ-
ated the protological reasons of beings.13 He is the Mode of Filiation that
the Confessor, On Difficulties in the Church Fathers: The Ambigua Volume II, Dumbarton
Oaks Medieval Library, 29 (Cambridge/MA and London, 2014), pp. 172-178.
9
For a “Theology of dialogue” where God offers logoi as divine propositions to man, see
Loudovikos, Ē Kleistē Pneymatikotēta, p. 191.
10
See Amb. 7,37-38 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, pp. 130-132).
11
For the distinction between tropos and tropē, see Opuscula Theologica et Polemica PG
91:48CD.
12
For the telos or skopos (hypostatic union as a goal), see Amb. 7,37-38 (Constas, Maximos
the Confessor I, pp. 130-132), and Amb. 7,7-10 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor I,
pp. 80-88).
13
See Mystagogy CCSG 69,30,474-485 and Amb. 7,15 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor I,
p. 94). According to Maximus, we have a meeting between the created human logos (or
reason) and the uncreated logos. This meeting has a Trinitarian character. The “logical”
character of God is centered on the Person of Son the Logos, Who constitutes a formed
expression of the Father-Nous in the Spirit. (See Thal. CCSG 7,161,46-50; 163,72-74;
modifies nature in a ‘filial’ way. And He is the eschatological goal of the

hypostatic union. In the second pole, that of the mode which is infiltrated
by death, Christ assumes certain results of the fallen mode of being. Incarna-
tion therefore has two aspects: on one hand, the proslepsis (reception) of the
logoi of nature, and, on the other, the oikeiōsis (assumption) of historical
modes that may also be tragic.
For example, Christ’s Crucifixion is not formulated in terms of logos,
because death is not ‘logical’, death was not included in the initial divine
plan. However, the novel mode of Crucifixion does not annul, but rather
confirms in a miraculous way, the original logos that points to salvation and
divinization. This question is quite complex, because the objection could be
made that the sacrifice of the paschal lamb is not just one historical contin-
gency among others, but an event whose finitude is very deeply rooted in
History and soteriology. Nevertheless, Maximus’s dialectic is quite far from
an ontologization of death as we find, for example, in Hegel. In a very dif-
ficult passage in the Ambigua,14 Maximus uses the expressions paradoxoteros
(more paradoxal) and theoprepesteros (more divine) in order to qualify a mode
of salvation by which God answered to man’s Fall. What is meant by this
mode is a subject of debate among the specialists, but we could consider that
it included Incarnation and eventually Crucifixion.
167,158-159; and Amb. 24,4 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, pp. 12-14)). The Son is
the Logos par excellence. For this reason, He is the principal author, the “αὐτουργός”, of
both the Creation and the Incarnation, realizing the eydokia (good will) of the Father with
the synergeia (cooperation) of the Holy Spirit (see Thal. CCSG 22,79,94-81,130). The
created man also has nous (or intellect), logos (or reason) and spirit, as an image of God
(see Amb. 7,25 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, p. 110); Amb. 10,106 (Constas, Maxi-
mos the Confessor I, pp. 320-322)), and by his created logos he enters into dialogue with
the uncreated logos. There is thus in Maximus a certain “psychological” Triadology of
Nous, Logos and “vivifying” Spirit (see Expositio Orationis Dominicae CCSG 23,53,442-
445), which coexists harmoniously with the more “ontological” Triadology of the hypo-
static properties of Fatherhood, Filiality and Spiration or Ekporeusis, as well as with the
role of the Spirit as “teleiōtikon” (see the expression “eteleiōsen” in Amb. 61,2-3 (Constas,
Maximos the Confessor II, p. 266)). We should bear all this in mind in order to understand
the deeply Trinitarian character of Maximus’ Theology of dialogue. The created logos is
in dialogue principally with the hypostasis of the Logos Who brings this dialogue to the
Father in the Spirit.
14
Amb. 7,38 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, p. 132).
Christ does not assume sin and fall themselves, but He assumes freely
some of their results that constitute concrete historical modes. This assump-
tion is God’s counter-response to man’s Fall as an episode in their dialogue.
A certain dialectic is thereby also formulated by Maximus in the terms
proēgumenōs (previously) and ephepomenōs (consequently).15 The two terms
articulate a distinction between the initial plan and logos of God, and the
mode through which it was accomplished in relation to the human response.
This dialectic can take place infinitely – that is to say, man can continually
respond through concrete historical modes, and God can counter-respond
through novel wondrous modifications. The dialectic can therefore continue
to occur inside the adventure of History. God has a dialogue with man not
only at the natural level of the dialogue between the created and the uncre-
ated logos, but also at the historical level of continuous remodifications.16
This could mean that God finds man wherever he has fallen due to sin, as
the Good Shepherd seeks the lost sheep; or as the Good Samaritan abandons
the ‘schedule’ of his journey in order to save the injured. But this dialectic
has a dynamic that might even surpass one-dimensional qualifications of
good and evil which ossify historical experience. For example, God could
come to find man in a mode of technological novelty or of artistic or politi-
cal creation that did not preexist at the level of natural logos. Such modes
could be sinful as isolating the creature from its Creator; but they could also
be ‘beyond good and evil’ in the sense that their evolution is uncertain and
it is impossible to classify them a priori in moral terms. Such a dialectic is
valuable for contextual theology. Inside History, we might have original new
contexts that we cannot classify a priori as good or sinful, such as parliamen-
tary democracy, nationalism, and a technological novelty such as the air-
plane. In such cases, the notion of mode helps us formulate a meeting of
God with man at the extremes of human creativity and beyond, in the
assumption of its results by Christ in the Spirit. (We speak of an “assump-
tion of results”, because Christ does not assume sin nor the diablēta pathē
15
See Thal. CCSG 22,173,431-435. This difficult passage is analyzed in Marcel Doucet,
‘La volonté humaine du Christ, spécialement en son Agonie: Maxime le Confesseur, inter-
prète de l’Ecriture’, Science et Esprit, 37 (1985), pp. 123-159.
16
We have developed this line of thinking in Skliris, ‘To aitēma tēs istorikotētas’, pp. 26f,
with reference also to the dialectic between two different forms of freedom – namely, the
aytexusion (self-determined motion) and the eleytheron (liberation).
(sinful passions) in themselves, but only the results of historical modes in

order to save man through them).17
The Son’s miraculous modes assume man’s modes inside the historical
drama. What is more, the dialectic of proēgumenōs (previously) and
ephepomenōs (consequently) can also be valid for created logos. The human
logos that is not uncreated might become ossified and dominant to the detri-
ment of human freedom. Human logos sometimes turns into an idol that
isolates us from a living relation to God.18 The dialectic of logos, tropos and
telos can therefore also liberate us from the idolatry of human logos. When
the latter turns into a dominant discourse, we could have at the level of
mode a new Pneumatological incarnation of Christ that liberates us from
idolatrous monologue. Idolatrous self-sufficiency is undermined precisely by
the eschatological end that comes surreptitiously from the future. The dia-
logue is therefore dual: on the one hand, with God, and, on the other, with
ossified idolatrous human logos, which could be undermined by new modi-
fications. This dialectic is very important in the context of the linguistic turn
in philosophy to the signifiers as carriers of power. The dialectic of continu-
ous modifications could mean, for example, an undermining of dominant
nationalistic discourses, which could lead to a negotiation of national iden-
tity, or even to its transcendence.
In a postmodern context, it is very important to assume an attitude of
suspicion toward forms of power that exclude us from God. Tropos also
means a rupture in historical continuity, a break, a distantiation that is neces-
sary for dialogue. It would be interesting to compare the three poles of
Maximus’s dialectic with the three orders of Lacanian and post-Lacanian
psychoanalysis (i.e., the symbolic, the imaginary and the real). Logos consti-
tutes a symbolic order that introduces limitations. And, as the divine logos is
identified with divine will, we could say that it also entails a divine desire for
us. What is more, the divine logos constitutes the human logos as a possibility
of response to it. This reminds us of how, in Lacan, our desire is provoked
See Opuscula Theologica et Polemica 1, PG 91:236-241.

17
We are inspired in this by the thought of Jean-Luc Marion, see, for example, Jean-Luc
18
Marion, The Idol and Distance: Five Studies, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, 17
(New York, 2001).
by the desire of the Other, who establishes the symbolic order.19 On the
other hand, the mode presents some similarities with the imaginary order.
In the anthropology of will, Maximus presents thelēsis (natural will) as an
appetite that is prescribed by logos.20 Tropos does not emerge there, but at
the level of bulēsis.21 Bulēsis is defined as an “appetite of the imagination”
(orexis phantastikē),22 as it involves an act of imagination in posing a goal.
Tropos therefore emerges in the soul as a projection of the imagination that
is in dialectical relation to the phusikon thelēma (natural will), the latter being
a logikē orexis (appetite due to the logos). But the ontological foundation of
the logos-tropos dialectic is the end that is the hypostatic union. In Lacan, the
real is beyond the symbolic, but it is manifested rather as a hole in the sym-
bolic system, i.e., as an undermining or a rupture. In Maximus’s thought,
we find interesting correspondences but also differences. The equivalent of
the real is the hypostatic union. Creaturehood does not have an ontology of
its own. It is in itself mortal and perishable. Creaturehood gains ontology
only through the hypostatic union, as God is the only True Being.23 Con-
sequently, the ontological foundation of the creature in its dynamic evolu-
tion is the eschatological end of the Christological hypostatic union of the
created and the uncreated. Only on such an ontological foundation is it
possible to speak of a logos-tropos dialectic. The difference is therefore that,
in Lacan, the real is manifested mainly as an absence or as an undermining.
In Maximus, too, the hypostatic union retains an apophatic character, as it
is beyond the logoi and tropoi of the creature. But this apophaticism does not
hinder participation. On the contrary, it confirms it, and we therefore have
a Theology of divine presence instead of a Theology of the absence of God.
19
For a comparison between Maximus and Lacan, see Nikolaos Loudovikos, Psychanalysē
kai Orthodoxē Theologia: Peri epithymias katholikotētas kai eschatologias (Psychoanalysis and
Orthodox Theology: About Desire, Catholicity and Eschatology) (Athens, 2006),
pp. 15-42.
20
See Disputatio cum Pyrrho, Marcel Doucet, Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyr-
rhus: Introduction, texte critique et notes, PhD Thesis (Montreal, 1972), p. 549.
21
Opuscula Theologica et Polemica 1, PG 91:13B. This passage is analyzed in Doucet,
Dispute de Maxime, pp. 356-363.
22
See Opuscula Theologica et Polemica 1, PG 91:13B.
23
See Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, pp. 67, 109.
But they also have a Pneumatological character,24 since Christ is incarnated

in various ways in the Spirit according to the multiple charismas of the
Church. In Μaximian terms, we have multiple pachynseis (condensations)25
and formations of Christ in the faithful through the various ecclesial modes.26
Christ comes to find men in the Spirit by being formed in their ecclesial
virtues and by assuming the modes of our historical tragedies.
We would therefore like to propose a comprehension of race and nation
inside this dialectical view of History, which constitutes a peculiar Theology
of dialogue. Race could thereby be seen as a division that we are called to
transcend in the frame of a Chalcedonian Christology. Nation could be
thematized as a mode (tropos) precisely due to the ambivalence that this term
has in Maximus’s anthropology, between distinction and tragic division.
We will therefore observe ten points concerning race and mostly nation,
connecting them to a dialectical Theology of History.
Race as Division (Diairesis)
The particularity of race is that it is conceived mainly as a natural division.

Of course, it can be claimed that racial divisions are civilizational, linguistic
and social constructions. In reality (if there is such a thing as a ‘natural real-
ity’), there is a continuum, with the division of this continuum into a limited
number of races being quite arbitrary. Nevertheless, our point is that race is
usually construed as a natural division, whereas nation is construed as a divi-
sion that also has historical and civilizational connotations. For this reason,
a theological evaluation of race cannot but be very critical. Especially in
Maximus’s theology, the unity of the logos of human nature is exalted as well
as the synthetic work of Christ the Logos, who unites the divisions of crea-
turehood. More precisely, Maximus speaks of five divisions transcended by
Christ – namely, the division between the sexes, between paradise and the
oikoymenē (inhabited world), between earth and heaven, between sensible
24
For the synthesis between Christology and Pneumatology, see John Zizioulas, Being as
Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church, Contemporary Greek Theologians, 4
(London, 1985), pp. 123-142.
25
Amb. 33 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, pp. 62-64). See the analysis of the expres-
sion in Carter, Race, p. 358.
26
Mystagogy CCSG 69,14,207–17,257.
and intelligible being, and, finally, the great abysmal chasm between created
and uncreated being.27 From such a perspective of transcendence of natural
divisions in Christ, we could arguably also imagine a transcendence of the
supposedly ‘natural’ division of race. According to Maximus’s spirit, a divi-
sion inside human nature has no justification as it obscures the unity of the
logos of humanity. The latter cannot be broken up into races, but merely
comprises natural attributes and faculties that man shares with other created
beings. If any division of humanity occurs, the ecclesial vision is to bring it
to the Church in order to transcend it in a Eucharistic fashion, as is described
in Maximus’ Mystagogy.
We could make an exception, however. A racial construction might have
become a mode of historical coexistence that could have an eschatological
value. But what could be eschatologically meaningful is precisely the mar-
tyrdom of a race that is persecuted and oppressed, and that thereby ascends
to a historical mode of coexistence. For example, we could arguably speak of
a ‘black Christ’, not because the division of the ‘black’ race from the ‘white’
race or others is meaningful per se, but because, inside History, belonging to
the so-called ‘black race’ might have become a historical mode of sharing in
martyrdom, and also of rising to a historical collective consciousness.28
A ‘black Christ’ would therefore be a ‘Christ Recrucified’, to use the expres-
sion of the Greek novelist Nikos Kazantzakis – that is, a Christ recrucified
together with his fellow men sharing in a concrete historical mode. Such a
valorization of ‘race’ as a historical mode and not as a natural division could
arguably have some meaning in a Missiological context. In contrast, it would
be much more difficult to find any eschatological meaning in a ‘white’ Christ
or at the moment when ‘white race’ distinguishes itself from others. The
reason is that this distinction took place in the frame of a dominant ideology
that exalted its role in ‘civilizing’ other races, and eventually led to colonial-
ism and racism. We therefore have two sins: on the one hand, the creation
of a natural gap, where it is not certain that such a division exists, and, on
27
See Amb. 41. Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, pp. 102-120 and its analysis in Lars
Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confes-
sor, 2nd ed. (Chicago/IL, 1995), pp. 373-427.
28
See James H. Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation, The C. Eric Lincoln Series in Black
Religion (Philadelphia/PA, 1970), and Idem, God of the Oppressed (New York, 1975).
the other, its elevation to a historical mode of domination and exploitation.29

It is very difficult, or indeed impossible, to maintain such a mode into eccle-
sial being, because sinful division is inherent in it, and because it was used
as a pretext for annulling human freedom.
One last remark is that such a Christology of transcending divisions
should not lead us into Neo-gnostic Supersessionism.30 Christ’s human
nature has idiōmata (idioms), and it has a certain Jewishness. Jesus belonged
to a Jewish historical mode, even if we do not choose to name that mode a
‘race’ in the modern sense. In Maximus’s spirit, we could say that, precisely
in assuming His mode of Jewishness, the Christological hypostasis achieves
catholicity in His human nature. By being first a Jew, Christ assumes other
historical modes through the multiplicity of His incarnations.
The Theology of Incarnation and a Critique of Abstract Universalism
A Neo-Maximian theology would insist on the fact that there can be no

logos without a mode, and vice versa. Consequently, if such a theology is
placed in the context of postmodern globalization, it would have two oppo-
site aims in terms of what it criticizes: on the one hand, it would criticize an
abstract universality deprived of concrete historical modalities, and, on the
other, an essentialist nationalistic identarianism that provokes divisions
among humanity.31 We shall analyze the latter afterwards. Regarding the
29
We believe that this is the case much more for a race such as the ‘white’ race than for
the historical mode of a nation that had been linked to a colonial power, like, for example,
the English, French, Spanish or Belgian nation. National modes comprise much more than
a construction for the purpose of exploitation, and, for this reason, we think that an
ecclesial transformation of them would be possible. In contrast, the projection of one race
as normative is inherently racist. We therefore support the argument that the only races
that could possibly acquire an ecclesial meaning not as races per se but as historical modes
are the ‘crucified’ races.
30
The need to avoid Neo-gnostic Supersessionism is stressed in Carter, Race, pp. 29-36,
99-121.
31
An interesting correspondence could be observed in the question of sex and gender.
Maximus has a rather negative view of sexual reproduction as a mode of division which
does not belong to the logos of human nature and which is transcended by Christ (see
Amb. 41,1-7 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, pp. 102-110; 42,1-7; 122-134; 42,25;
170-172); Opuscula Theologica et Polemica PG 91:61B; 240C. Nonetheless, we believe
that this should not lead us to an abstract universalism that would exalt the universality
former, it is important to understand that the universality of logos can only

exist through concrete modes. This is related to a theology of Incarnation,
where Christ both integrates the multiple logoi of beings and assumes mul-
tiple historical modes. The former guarantees a certain biodiversity willed by
God at the level of natural difference.32 But it is equally important to main-
tain a ‘historico-diversity’ through preserving a multiplicity of historical
modes. In a traditional theological frame, this would mean that Christ
inhabits us when we acquire Christological virtues by imitating Him.33 This
dialogical reception of logoi and assumption of tropoi by the Logos is com-
pared by J. Kameron Carter to a “jazz ensemble that riffs upon and impro-
vises within the eternal Word”.34 But it could also mean that Christ comes
to assume the results of our historical adventure in sharing our suffering.35
Christ is buried along with the victims of earthquakes, He is present in the
boats carrying migrants and refugees, or among the victims of contemporary
of human nature by eradicating gender differences from our theology. The well-established
distinction between sex and gender could also be put in Maximus’s terms as follows: On
the one hand, sexual reproduction is, according to Maximus, a mode of division that does
not belong to the logos of human nature. On the other, we could argue that gender is a
historical mode and, as such, could claim eschatological value, even if the sexes are escha-
tologically superseded. We believe that the right theological solution is again not exalting
the universality of human nature to the detriment of gender, but considering the latter as
a concrete historical mode that claims an eschatological meaning alongside natural
catholicity.
32
The fact that the logoi of natures are God’s wills means that God wants diversity at the
natural level (alongside with otherness at the personal level). Our technological civilization
that leads entire species to extinction perpetrates a grave sin (see John Zizioulas, Ē Ktisē ōs
Eycharistia [Creation as Eucharist] [Athens, 1992]). In Maximus’s logic, this means a
rejection of dialogue with God, a dialogue which also takes place through the polyphony
of nature’s logoi. Humanity is not the only nature that is received by Christ. Through
humanity, Christ receives logoi that belong to the whole of creation. We can detect in
Maximus a certain ‘anthropic principle’. The particularity of man is that he gathers the
logoi of the whole of creation and therefore constitutes a sort of universal experiment.
And, when this experiment goes wrong with Adam, it is Christ Himself Who comes to
accomplish this mission (Amb. 41,1-3 [Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, pp. 102-106]).
Therefore, one crucial point in the Theology of dialogue is the importance of biodiversity
as an indispensable part of the dialogue between God and man.
33
See Mystagogy CCSG 69,14,199–17,257; 69,60,960–66,1075.
34
Carter, Race, p. 251.
35
We speak of an assumption of results of a historical itinerary, because Christ does not
assume either sin or a diablēton pathos (sinful passion).
slave-traders, among demonstrators that are attacked with chemicals, or

among a nation or ethnicity that suffers ethnic cleansing. He assumes tragic
historical modes without assuming either sin or diablēta pathē (unnatural
passions).
The Distinction Between Mode and Hypostasis-Person
We focus on mode as distinguished from hypostasis and person,36 because the

former term has some advantages for a dialogue with the postmodern context
in what concerns the relation between universality and particularity. The
concept of mode helps us transcend a rigid bipolar distinction between com-
mon natural attributes and incommunicable hypostatic idioms. We could
thereby achieve a deconstruction of dualisms such as between nature and
contingency, or between interiority and exteriority. Regarding the former,
tropos constitutes a historical modification and modality of natural proper-
ties. Regarding the latter, it is possible to interiorize modes that come from
the outside, whereas it is not possible to share hypostatic properties. For
these reasons, it is possible to thematize nation as a tropos (mode), while it
is not possible in terms of personal otherness. For example, when I have
the hypostatic idiom of sonship, I am relating to my father through my
36
In what concerns the relation of tropos with person or hypostasis, we should distinguish
between passages where tropos is linked to existence and means a mode of existence, and
other contexts where tropos determines other terms. The former refer mostly to the Holy
Trinity (see Mystagogy CCSG 69,53,847-863; Ambigua ad Thomam CCSG 48,7,32-38;
Ambigua ad Ioannem 10,39 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, p. 208); Ambigua ad Ioan-
nem 67,10 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, p. 296); Expositio Orationis Dominicae
CCSG 23, p. 54). In Triadology, Maximus speaks of the tropos yparxeōs (mode of exis-
tence) of the three divine persons, and tropos in this use is therefore more or less identified
with person and hypostasis. For this reason, theologians with personalistic tendencies often
identify tropos with person and they are justified in doing so, since the expression ‘mode
of existence’ is indeed very closely linked to personal hypostasis. Nonetheless, when tropos
determines other terms or is contrasted to logos in cosmology and anthropology, it is
not exactly identified with personal hypostasis, even though it usually has a hypostatic
foundation (see Larchet, La Divinisation de l’homme, pp. 141-151). For the needs of this
paper, we will focus on some semantic differences between tropos and person or hypostasis
in the fields of anthropology and Theology of History without denying the close relation
or even identification that these terms have in other contexts such as Triadology and
Christology.
difference from him.37 The communion of our nature will occur on the basis
of an absolute personal otherness, which in patristic terminology is formu-
lated by the term ‘incommunicable properties’. It is not the same regarding
mode. An ecclesial member might have the mode of an ascetic, whereas
another, the mode of a theologian. Those are distinct modes of charismas
through which they participate in the ecclesial event. Historical diversity of
modes is something desired by the Church. We do not wish all Christians
to be theologians or to be monks. However, there can be a perichoresis of the
modes of charismas,38 as long as it does not lead to confusion between the
distinct ecclesial institutions. The theologian is invited to be an ascetic, and
the ascetic is often a more profound theologian than the intellectual. What
is more, when we relate, we can interiorize the mode of a beloved person,
e.g., a theologian’s loving discipleship to a holy ascetic could lead to an
interiorization of his ethos. Likewise, at the anthropological level of a nation,
we can imagine a person that partakes in humanity through, for example, a
Greek mode, but this does not prevent her from interiorizing elements of,
for example, a French mode. The mode has a porous character.
In our age, we need such a transitional space between the individual and
humanity that would help us to connect them by avoiding both a withdrawal
into an isolated private life and an emaciation of concreteness into the com-
pletely general. In other words, we should avoid the very well-known reality
of our societies that is named ‘glocalization’. The importance of the nation
as a transitional object is also supported by psychoanalytic approaches, such
as the one of Julia Kristeva,39 and a relative dialogue between theology and
37
The criticism that transference of Trinitarian Theology (of a Post-Cappadocian type)
into anthropology leads to exteriority in human relations and to a consequent lack of
inwardness is formulated by the philosopher Stelios Ramphos, To Adianoēto Tipota. Filo-
kalika rizōmata tu neoellēniku mēdenismu: Dokimio filosofikēs anthrōpologias (The Incon-
ceivable Nothing. The Philocalical Roots of Modern Greek Nihilism: An Essay of Philo-
sophical Anthropology) (Athens, 2010).
38
See Nikolaos Loudovikos, Ē Apofatikē Ekklēsiologia toy Omoousioy: Ē archegonē Ekklēsia
sēmera (The Apophatic Ecclesiology of the Homoousion: The Ancient Church Today)
(Athens, 2002), pp. 78-79, 93.
39
See Julia Kristeva, Nations without Nationalism, European Perspectives (New York,
1993). Among many interesting intuitions, Kristeva compares national pride to the good
narcissistic image that a child owes to her mother and which is necessary for the formation
of an ideal ego.
psychology would be very interesting, especially with regard to Donald Win-

nicott’s theory of potential space. If we actualize Maximus’s principle that
there cannot be a logos without a mode, then I cannot participate in human-
ity without mediation by particular modes, national or other. This principle
is relevant to a theology of Incarnation. I have to begin from a mode – for
example, of Greekness – in order to partake in humanity. But this point of
departure is not irrevocable. A mode is a mode, precisely because it can be
modified. I can acquire another mode (that of Frenchness, say), or I can even
negotiate my initial mode and become Greek in a way that is different from
the mode prescribed by the dominant discourse.40 What is more, through
the Greek mode that I have from the beginning, or the French mode that I
might acquire in my personal itinerary, I can switch to, for example,
a Romanian mode. What is important is to avoid the illusion that I can be
a disincarnated subject, and to assume my concrete modality in order either
to affirm or to negotiate it. We could say that, by diving into my idiosyn-
cracy, I can better receive the tropic idiom of an alterity. By being Greek or
French, I can better receive elements of a Romanian mode when I enter into
a relation with it. Christology is always the example: Christ is a universal
man because He assumes in His humanity Jewish historical flesh. By being
incorporated as a man into the history of a people, by assuming a Jewish
tropic idiom, He can bear the universality of humanity in His hypostasis.
As J. Kameron Carter has remarked,41 we should avoid a Neo-gnostic
Supersessionism that would be indifferent to the historical flesh of Christ or
consider this historical aspect as superseded. As a man, Christ is born a Jew
and He has a determined genealogy that is historically charged. He enters
History at a special time of messianic anticipation and He belongs to the
tribe of Judah, being a son of David. This mode of Jewishness or ‘David-
ness’ is both natural and historical: it could be considered as a particular
idiom of Christ’s human nature, but, at the same time, it is a historical mode
as it is linked to the historical hopes of a ‘nation’. But it is exactly because
Christ assumes a tropic idiom and not only a universal logos of humanity
40
See Homi K. Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the
Modern Nation’, in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London, 1990),
pp. 291-322.
41
Carter, Race, pp. 168-181.
that He can later assume other historical modes in different civilizational

contexts – for example, a Roman, a Frankish, a Russian, an African mode.
It is the Holy Spirit that constitutes the catholicity of Christ through many
births and constitutions of the Christological identity, the foundation of
which is the Resurrection as the birth par excellence. Christ’s catholicity does
not entail Supersessionism. The fact that Christ entered History as a part of
Jewish history is not superseded. But He is not exhausted in this historical
identity. Thanks to the multitude of His Pneumatological incarnations,
Christ can assume other civilizational, historical, or even national modes. We
would say that, precisely because Christ is first of all a Jewish son of David,
he can then be incarnated in other contexts, such as the Roman, the Frank-
ish, the Slav, the Asian, the African, the Latin American etc.
A Comparison Between the National Mode and the Mode of Ecclesial

Charismas
The ecclesial foundation of the multiplicity of modes is the distinction

between the charismas, as we observe it in Pauline theology. The charismas
can be compared to the multiplicity of the organs of Christ’s body that
contribute to its harmonious function (1 Cor 12:12). In Maximus’s terms,
ecclesial charismas are different modes of the formation of Christ in us,42 or
of the “condensation” of the Logos.43 However, we should avoid an unquali-
fied integration of nation into ecclesiology. Charisma is an ecclesial mode,
whereas nation is a historical mode that is called to enter the Church through
a process of judgment and transformation. We could say that the nation is
placed in the offertory of the Eucharist as a historical material among other
such materials. Its integration into the Eucharist takes place through
“matapoiēsis” in Maximus’s terms – that is, through ecclesial transforma-
tion.44 And what should be rejected above all is its divisive character. Nation
42
See Amb. 47 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, p. 210) and its analysis in Loudovikos,
Ē Apofatikē Ekklēsiologia, p. 82.
43
See Amb. 33 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, pp. 62-64) and its analysis in Carter,
Race, p. 358.
44
For “metapoiēsis” see Amb. 48,7 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, p. 220); Amb. 50,3
(Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, p. 228); Amb. 63,4 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor
II, p. 272); Amb. 65,4 (Constas, Maximos the Confessor II, p. 280); Epistula 13, PG 91:
is a historical reality impregnated with division – that is, with sin. Its trans-
formation into an ecclesial mode would therefore entail a judgment (krisis)
in order to stop being divisive and to become merely distinctive according
to Chalcedonian terminology. For this reason, exeis (tropical habits) are like
‘passions’ that Christ assumes only if they are not liable to sin (adiablēta
pathē in Maximus’s terminology). What we intend to say is rather that Christ
is present next to every person who suffers in History. Consequently, for a
national mode to enter ecclesiology, there is need for a kenotic crucifixion
of it. Besides, national modes are not the only historical modes that are
conceivable; far from it. Ethno-diversity is not the only form of historico-
diversity, and a post-national historico-diversity might be conceivable in the
future, even if, in our opinion, it is not yet conceivable in the present. We
should therefore have an apophatic approach and abstain from blasphe-
mously dictating to God what the historical modes surviving in the eschaton
will be.
Nation and Language
At this point, we should examine two of the basic constituents of a nation

– namely, language and religion. Regarding language, the Church’s respect
(at least in the oriental tradition) for the various national languages is well
known, and the most prominent example is the translation of liturgical texts
into Slavonic by the saints Cyril and Methodius, and later by their disciples.
It is true that there is usually a certain conservatism and hesitation when it
comes to transferring liturgical texts into more contemporary forms of a
national language. Nonetheless, language is one of the aspects where an
assumption of national modes has indeed taken place. Linguistic modes were
employed to give historical flesh to the ecclesial event. In a postmodern
context, we could also support a loving perichoresis of languages. This could
mean a coexistence of linguistic forms of different ages of the same national
language, as is often the case in the Orthodox Church.45 It could also mean
509C; Thal. CCSG 7,37,338-349; 7,101,15-18; 7,143,114-116; 7,463,342; CCSG

22,285,553–287,560.
45
Fr. Nikolaos Loudovikos uses the term diaglōssikotēta (interlanguage) for the perichōrēsis
of linguistic types that is due to ecclesial communion, see Loudovikos, Ē Apofatikē
Ekklēsiologia, p. 344.
the coexistence of different languages in the cult, as is sometimes the case in

the so-called Diaspora. The latter could be a good example of how different
national modes can be affirmed without leading either to nationalistic exclu-
sivism or to idolization of ‘sacred’ languages.
Nation and Religion
The relation between nation and religion is much more difficult. In many
instances, religion is decisive for ethnogenesis. We observe this especially in
cases where neighbor nations are very close from a linguistic or another point
of view, and their main difference is in terms of religion; for example, in the
case of the former Yugoslavia or in the Indian peninsula. Besides, the rela-
tionship between nation and religion was very complex during the rise of
modern nationalism. Nation has come to offer a new type of social cohesion
that replaces the older forms offered mainly by religion (and loyalty to a
dynasty). In most cases, there was no direct, immediate or violent substitu-
tion of religion by nation. Nationalism was often and for a long period of
time parasitic on religion, draining its vitality.46 In Maximus’s terms, nation-
alism could be characterized as a tropos parhypostaseos – that is, a parasitical
mode owing its vigor to religion.47
From a theological point of view, the evaluation of religion as a constitu-
ent of nationalism is also very complex. During the 20th century, theology
was preoccupied with distinguishing religion from the ecclesial event. It was
sometimes even claimed that religiousness had a natural character as a sort
of drive, or at the least as a type of naturalistic discourse about the divine.48
Of course, this possibly naturalistic drive does not exist in a bare ‘natural’
state, but takes historical forms. Perhaps we could speak of modes of encoun-
tering the divine that are characteristic of some civilizations. In the frame of
contextual theology, we could search for ways to thematize religion as a
46
See Paul James, Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community, Politics
and Culture: A Theory, Culture & Society Series (London, 1996), pp. 86-87, where
he discusses the views of Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941). This issue is also analyzed in Elie
Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. (Oxford, 1993).
47
See Opuscula Theologica et Polemica PG 91:24-28.
48
See Christos Yannaras, Against Religion: The Alienation of the Ecclesial Event (Brookline/
MA, 2013).
historical mode and try to meet with the special ways in which each people
articulates its relation to the divine. This is especially relevant to Missiology.
But the question is much more complex when the Christianization of a
people has preceded its ethnogenesis. This is the case for most European
nationalisms. In the latter, nation was parasitic on religion for a long period
before substituting it as a form of social cohesion. In such cases, ecclesial
transformation, or rather ecclesial re-transformation, should be much more
critical of the divisive elements of the national mode.
Nation and Imagination. Nation as ‘Imaginary Community’ and as

‘False Consciousness’
When we come to the darker sides of nation, one of the most usual critiques
is that it constitutes an imaginary community, and that its formation requires
an imaginary construction or narration of History.49 Our comment is that
it is precisely for this reason that we have chosen to thematize it theologically
with the help of Maximus’s notion of tropos. In Maximus’s psychology, tropos
emerges at the level of bulēsis that is distinguished from thelēsis. Thelesis is an
appetite (orexis) prescribed by the logos of nature, and it is accompanied by
a mode of imagination (namely, the bulēsis) which determines a specific goal.
The concept of tropos in Maximus entails a projection that projects a goal in
the future and becomes involved in an ecstatic movement towards it.50
In other words, just as logos cannot exist in a bare state without a mode,
in the same sense aplōs thelein (volition) cannot exist without a pōs thelein
(modal determination of volition). This means that the natural will for being,
for life, receives a determination that is named bulēsis. Bulēsis is defined as
poia thelēsis,51 and it is a mode of thelēsis in relation to an object. Whereas
thelēsis is an appetite or an impetus for infinite being, bulēsis is a particulariza-
tion of this impetus in relation to a concrete object. Accordingly, bulēsis has
the following characteristics: i) it is beyond power (“hyper exousian”); we can
will objects that are beyond our natural or social potentialities (ouk eph’ ēmin)
49
See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London and New York, 1991).
50
For this analysis of volition, we are indebted mainly to Opuscula Theologica et Polemica
PG 91:12-20 and Disputatio cum Pyrrho; Doucet, Dispute de Maxime, pp. 547-549.
51
PG 91:13B.
– for example, to be immortal (athanatisthēnai);52 ii) consequently, bulēsis is

defined as “imagination” (phantasia), or rather as an appetite of imagination
(orexis phantastikē);53 iii) on the other hand, bulēsis differs from proairesis
(deliberation, decision) and gnomic will; deliberation involves choice between
the means to achieve a goal,54 but bulēsis means the posing of the goal itself;
iv) gnōmē (gnomic will) is also a mode like bulēsis, but it is a mode of our
disposition towards the object of our will,55 whereas bulēsis is a mode deter-
mined by the object itself. For example, by bulēsis, we can pose a general goal,
like conducting a spiritual life, and we modify our will in this way. By proairesis,
we choose particular means, like fasting. But gnomē as a mode of disposition
means how we are disposed to what we have chosen – for example, whether
we fast promptly or with difficulty.
Taking all this into account, we can now draw some conclusions concern-
ing an actualization of Maximus’s thought in new contexts: tropos emerges
when there is a projection of the imagination towards the future by posing
a goal. Logos prescribes the appetite of the will, but tropos emerges when this
will imagines its goals. Consequently, tropos can transcend power and liberate
us from its restrictions. It is not interested whether something is in the scope
of our possibilities or not. What is important, in our opinion, even if it is
not much discussed, is that Christ as a man has bulēsis. It could not be oth-
erwise, because logos cannot exist without tropos, and natural will (thelēsis)
must be determined in relation to an object. Consequently, in receiving a
logos of human will, Christ also assumes a mode of bulēsis. But this entails,
in our opinion, a valorization of imagination. Man needs imagination in
order to pose goals. And Christ as a man has imagination even though His
goal is achieved from the very beginning due to the hypostatic union that
takes place simultaneously with the Incarnation. In any case, imagination
functions as a bridge with a ‘concrete infinite’ (to use a paradoxical term),
whereas thelēsis urges us towards a simple infinite. But we also have, in our
opinion, a certain valorization of the undermining of power. By bulēsis, we
are encouraged to will beyond our possibilities, to seek for the impossible,
52
PG 91:13C.
53
PG 91:13B.
54
PG 91:16BC.
55
PG 91:17C.
and thus undermine the given. Christ as a man also has this appetite for
imagination beyond power, but in Him the supernatural goal is already
achieved due to the hypostatic union, and thus imagination is in harmony
with ontological reality.56
In this sense, in a Neo-Maximian theology, we could conceive of nations
as collective imaginary modes in view of goals specific to them that consti-
tute their particular narratives. Goals that remain elusive, we might add. For
example, being Greek means, in Maximus’s terms, a bulēsis that is a fantastikē
orexis (appetite of my imagination) to become Greek; in other words, put-
ting forward an end in the future.57 In any case, the ecclesial transformation
of a national mode will mean the removal of its false narratives in the per-
spective of eschatological truth. This might prove very traumatic for a nation.
Besides, Maximus’s theology would not affirm postmodern constructionism.
In Maximus’s context, we would rather speak of activations of nature thanks
to new modifications and not of constructions of nature. Therefore, it would
be legitimate to activate latent natural potentialities by posing concrete goals
in the future through imagination. But it would be illegitimate to use imagi-
nation in order to construct the past, as nationalisms often do. Likewise, we
might admit that nature is fluid and mutable and prone to being ‘con-
structed’. Nevertheless, an ecclesial activation of nature would take place in
dialogue with the logos of nature that accompanies it during its historical
journey, and not on a void of meaning that is waiting to be filled by means
of constructionist violence.
It is important to state, however, that imagination in itself could be
affirmed as a part of bulēsis that is included in the human nature of Christ
as a modality of His natural will. Another important characteristic of imagi-
nation is that it means an exusia (mode beyond power). During the dialogue
that takes place inside History, a mode of imagination could undermine an
already existent human logos. For example, inside a given national discourse
a novel imaginary mode might emerge that could modify a particular con-
ception of one nation in view of an alternative goal. This dialogue between
56
In contrast, Maximus severely condemns cases where imagination is divorced from
ontology, such as in Docetism, and his insistence that Christ’s economy was free from
imagination (see, for example, PG 91:32B, 48B) should be understood as a reaction
against Docetism. He also excludes gnomē and proairesis from Christology, as we shall see.
57
For example, the Great Idea until 1923, or the Hellenic particularity afterwards.
an already existing created logos and a new imaginary mode within a given
collectivity might take place at a national level or at a collective level of a
different type. In any case, we can conceive of subaltern groups as modifying
created logoi through modes of imagination. The latter can thus undermine
power.58
Church is by definition called to be a community that undermines power
and the idolatry of created logoi, also by employing imagination in view of
its proper goals. Imagination is not ‘post-lapsarian’ per se. On the contrary,
it can be valuable as something that leads to an ecstatic movement towards
an eschatological vision. Imagination has Christological foundation since it
is not excluded from Christ’s human nature. On the other hand, ecclesial
transformation entails a removal of falsehood.59 In a contemporary context,
it would be fertile to assume the Marxist and Post-Marxist critique of nation
as a “false consciousness”.60 According to the latter, the imaginary character
of a nation often has the mission of hiding the real historical dialectic as well
as of creating a false ideological superstructure for the benefit of a conserva-
tive ruling class. Theology could draw many elements from the Marxist and
Post-Marxist critique in the direction of a critique of national modes that let
imagination turn into false consciousness. For example, this subject is very
important for the actual state of nationalisms inside the European Union,
where there is a certain conflict between the so-called national interests and
the international interests of peoples, and where the former are used to
obscure the latter. This critique of nation is, however, related to a more
fundamental problem that it carries within it, a problem to which we shall
now turn.
58
See Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation’.
59
Nationalism is linked not only to posing goals in the future, but also to inventing the
past. See Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge,
1983).
60
For an evaluation of the complex relation between nation and class in Marxism, see,
for example, Gavin Kitching, ‘Nationalism: The Instrumental Passion’, Capital & Class,
25 (1985), pp. 98-116; Montserrat Guibernau, Nationalisms: The Nation-State and
Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 1996); Craig Calhoun, Nationalism,
Concepts in the Social Sciences (Buckingham, 1997).
Nation-State, Nationalism and Maximus’s Theory of Mode as Gnome

and Division
So far, we have sometimes celebrated some aspects of nation that fit with
Maximus’s notion of mode, in the effort to avoid abstract universalism. It
could be claimed, however, that by doing so we miss the entire point of what
modern nationalism is all about. Modern nationalism does not refer to the
mere existence of ethnicities. It entails a claim that every nation should have
its own nation-state. The specificity of modern nationalism therefore lies not
in the mere recognition of ethnic particularities, but in the claim that states
should be based on national sovereignty. Consequently, there is a distinction
between nation and ethnicity, with some specialists also using the term
“ethnie”.61 The ideology of nationalism has been the cause of enormous
bloodshed during the last three centuries, even if it was sometimes the carrier
of progressive ideas, such as democracy. Nonetheless, the problem for theol-
ogy is that nationalism is also a carrier of division, which, in Maximus’s
terms, is the opposite of love that is of the love that is God.
This is another reason why we have chosen to thematize nation as a mode.
Mode includes the darkness of division and secession in their most ontologi-
cal sense. In psychology, mode might bring about gnome (gnomic will),
which entails a division of nature and its natural will and a loss of catholici-
ty.62 This tropic fragmentation is the great historical drama of humanity –
61
See, for example, Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cam-
bridge, 1995), pp. 38-39.
62
The relation between gnomic will and the fragmentation of nature is also a complex
one. For sure, in the late works of Maximus, gnomic will is excluded from Christ (See
Opuscula Theologica et Polemica PG 91:81CD). But there is a certain debate among spe-
cialists concerning the reason why it is so excluded. For the needs of this paper, we shall
stick to the point that gnomic will seems to relate to a division of nature. Gnome is the-
matized as a mode by Maximus (Disputatio cum Pyrrho, see Doucet, Dispute de Maxime,
pp. 564-565). In contrast to bulēsis that is a mode of imagining or representing a goal,
gnome is a mode of disposition and of use of the object of will (Opuscula PG 91:17C
and Disputatio cum Pyrrho; Doucet, Dispute de Maxime, pp. 564-565). But it seems that
this mode of disposition presupposes a fragmentation of nature (see Epistula 2, PG 91:
392D-408B). In order to have one’s own individual disposition, one must bear a separate
part of nature and not its catholicity. Christ did not have a gnome, precisely because He
bore the catholicity of human nature. Man’s goal is therefore to bring his gnome to the
Church and to practice coordinating his gnomic will with that of other persons. This
namely, the fact that each person has his own fragmentary mode independ-
ent of the modes of others.63 This question of gnome and fragmentation is
also linked to the objection that nationalism functions as ‘false conscious-
ness’. Etymologically, gnome is linked to the root gno– and is thus related
to some sort of knowledge. Following Maximus’s analysis, we could say that
gnome is a disposition of will that is made possible by fragmentary knowl-
edge in a way that is related to sin. In other words, it is due to a spiritual
blindness of which we are somehow guilty, either directly or indirectly.64 We
think that it would be very interesting to link this aspect of gnome as sinful
ignorance (or rather partial knowledge) to the concept of ‘false conscious-
ness’ as developed by Marxists and to that of bad faith as developed by Jean-
Paul Sartre.65 That is, gnome could be a sort of ‘not wanting to know’ or a
person pretending to be ignorant in order to conceal his guilt and the fact
that he is exploiting other people. According to many theorists, nationalism
arises as this kind of partial ignorance. For example, Ernest Renan (1823-
1892) pointed out that, for a nation to be formed, there has to take place a
sort of collective oblivion or collective historical error. For instance, in order
to be French, one has to forget the night of Saint-Barthélemy.66 The gnomic
mode is therefore a Maximian concept that could thematize successfully the
character of modern nationalism as ‘sinful forgetfulness’.
process is completed in the eschaton when our gnomic will is finally surrendered to God
(ekchōrēsis gnōmikē, see Amb. 7,11 [Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, p. 88]). Gnome is
not identified with the dromos (historical journey) per se. The latter is absolutely necessary
as an activation of natural potentialities. But gnome is not equally indispensable for man.
We believe that, in Maximus’ view, if the Fall had not taken place, the dromos (historical
journey) would be conducted by the whole humanity together. Gnome means precisely
that, in a ‘post-lapsarian’ state, each person makes this journey for himself alone. Church
invites us to correct that. It calls us to make an effort to coordinate again our broken
individual movements so that we make this metaphysical journey together through love.
63
The relation of gnome to fragmentation is developed especially in Epistula 2, PG
91:392D-408B.
64
For the relation between gnome and ignorance, see Demetrios Bathrellos, The Byzantine
Christ: Person, Nature and Will in the Christology of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford Early
Christian Studies (Oxford, 2004), pp. 154f.
65
Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant: Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique (Paris, 1943).
66
Ernest Renan, ‘What is a Nation?’, in Nation and Narration, ed. Homi K. Bhabha
(London, 1990), pp. 8-22, here 11.
Maximus follows the Chalcedonian logic that it is possible to have a mode

of distinction without having a mode of division. This vision is ecclesiologi-
cal and Christological and is epitomized in the Mystagogy. Men are called to
bring their modes to the Eucharist, including the gnomic modes of their
wills. Through the Eucharist and its ontological consequences, men are
called to omognōmia that is to a coordination of their divided gnomic wills.
The latter are gradually united in order to manifest the catholicity of human
nature as a prolepsis of the eschaton, where the gnomic wills shall be fully
offered (ekchōrēsis gnōmikē).67 An ecclesial transformation of nation would
67
Τhe question of gnome is very important for a dialogue with the contemporary phe-
nomenological tradition and even with some forms of psychoanalytic thought. Generally
speaking, the phenomenological philosophical tradition involves a commitment to think-
ing from the perspective of a finite mortal being that is thrown into the world and assumes
its finitude and mortality. In Maximus’s terms, we could arguably articulate the same
problematic as a commitment to assuming one’s gnome, since the latter is related to the
fragmentation that is due to the introduction of death to nature. It is interesting that
sometimes gnome has a positive meaning in Maximus, which might confuse his reader
(for example, in Amb. 6,3 [Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, p. 70]; Amb. 7,10 [Constas,
Maximos the Confessor I, p. 86]; Amb. 7,21 [Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, p. 102];
Amb. 10,12 [Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, p. 168]). That is, on the one hand, we are
presented with the conclusion that Christ does not have a gnome, and that in the eschaton
we ourselves will also surrender it. But, on the other, we can observe a valorization of
gnome inside History, as for example in the case of a saint who has a gnomic will of
sanctity, love, obedience, etc. There is, however, no contradiction between the two.
Gnome is related to the Fall, but, given the fact that we live in a ‘post-lapsarian’ world,
man should assume it. Thus, in regard to gnome, a Neo-Maximian theology could enter
into dialogue with the notion of self-transcendence that has been a very crucial problematic
of phenomenology and existentialism at least since Friedrich Nietzsche. Inside History,
man is invited to assume his gnome in order to transcend it from within. Gnome is not
sin per se. On the contrary, not only is it insurmountable, but, what is more, man is called
to assume it inside History and then surrender it only at the end of the historical itinerary
(Amb. 7,11 [Constas, Maximos the Confessor I, p. 88]). There is a certain value in assuming
one’s gnome. Trying to avoid one’s gnome would be illusion or escapism. In this notion
of assuming and transcending from within, we can trace some affinity with phenomenol-
ogy. One possible way to relate Maximus to phenomenology would be to identify gnome
with the dromos of the historical journey. If we examine what is meant by Fall in Maximus’
thought, we will observe that, according to him, Fall happened somehow simultaneously
with the genesis of man (“ama tō genesthai”, see Amb. 42,7 [Constas, Maximos the Confes-
sor I, p. 134]). Fall is, according to Maximus, a historical event. But there was no such
thing as a pre-lapsarian state that was extended in time. In Maximus, the ‘pre-lapsarian’
state is mostly a hypothesis concerning what would have happened if Adam had not fallen
and not what was in fact the case in a countable period of time. Therefore, even though
therefore mean a metapoiēsis (transformation) of nation from gnomic mode

of division into mode of distinction, which is achieved in a Eucharistic way.
The survival of distinction is very desirable even though we do not know
which of the historical modes will survive in the eschaton, in order for the
logos of humanity not to be stripped of its historical diversity.
A Neo-Maximian thematization of nation as tropos could also lead to a
phenomenology of nation as a collective gnomic mode. Gnome as a break of
catholicity could be seen as a trauma in a psychoanalytic sense. This is valid
not only for each person, but also for entire nations, the ‘gnomes’ of which
arise through traumatic historical events, as for example the Asia Minor
Catastrophe in the case of the Greeks. From Maximus’s perspective, national
collectivities would be invited to self-transcend these ‘gnomic’ modes from
within.
There is therefore in the modern nation-state much to criticize from a
Neo-Chalcedonian point of view. However, the question is quite complex.
In many cases, nationalism was progressive and revolutionary. For example,
it was related to democracy,68 which, even though in its parliamentary and
bourgeois form might not be an ideal political regime, could be considered
as progress in comparison to absolutism or feudalism. According to Ernest
Gellner, the process of industrialization required social mobility and a new
type of cohesion that would be compatible with it. This social need was filled
by nationalism.69 In other cases, nationalism was linked to anti-colonialist
the assumption of dromos and the assumption of gnome could be distinguished in theory,
in our experience they more or less coincide. Since our historical journey takes place in a
fallen context, and since humanity did not actually have experience of another context
(except in Christ), then it is by a single movement that we assume both our dromos and
our gnome. In psychoanalytic language, this assumption of gnome would also mean an
assumption of our constitutive lack or of our primordial trauma. Therefore, an actualiza-
tion of Maximus’s thought in relation to phenomenology is possible, as long as we also
keep in mind the otherness of Maximus’s frame of thought, and mostly the fact that Christ
is the authentic man par excellence without having a gnomic will. (For a lecture on Maxi-
mus in dialogue with phenomenology, see Ilias Papagiannopoulos, Epekeina tēs Apusias
[Beyond Absence] [Athens, 2005]).
68
For example, nationalism is linked to democracy in the thought of the philosopher John
Stuart Mill (1806-1873), see, Stuart J. Woolf, ed., Nationalism in Europe, 1815 to the
Present: A Reader (London and New York, 1996), pp. 40-47.
69
See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, New Perspectives on the Past (New York,
1983); Idem, Nationalism (New York, 1997).
and anti-imperialist emancipatory movements in Africa and Asia. A theolo-

gian should not have a lofty attitude, judging the complexity of historical
reality from the vantage-point of eschatological visions of communion. We
could nonetheless claim that a Neo-Chalcedonian and Neo-Maximian theol-
ogy would be favorable for political orders where the ethnic mode functions
as a distinction and not as a division.70 Modern nationalism has led to frag-
mentation and to an exclusivism of the national mode as the uniquely
important mode. The coherence of our society was therefore made depend-
ent on a mode that was elevated to a status of exclusivity. Even if minorities
of other ethnicities are permitted inside a nation-state, its logic is that the
cohesion of society and the political regime is founded on a uniform national
mode imposed on other ethnic or alternative modes. In Maximus’s terms,
we would speak of a substitution of the logos of humanity by the national
mode. A mode must exist, but it should not substitute the logos thus leading
to an exclusivity of the particular.
An ecclesiological vision such as the one expressed in the Mystagogy could
be interesting in the political context of late postmodernity. The national
mode might be precious as a transitory space, preventing ‘glocalization’,
which is a split between abstract globalization and localism. But it can no
longer be divisive in a productive way: in the interior of nation-states, mass
migration creates new situations, and we are led to more civil comprehen-
sions of nationality. In the relations between different nation-states, we face
the problem of how we could supersede the nation-state and move toward
greater international unity, while at the same time preserving democracy. We
are used to the fact, at least in the West, that nation-state is the basic way
for a democracy to function, and we might be afraid that undermining the
nation-state could entail the dissolution of democracy. However, the two
realities are not as interdependent as one might think. The challenge of the
years to come will be to find ways to guarantee democracy even when
the nation-state is superseded. A related issue is the new form of financial
nationalism that we encounter inside the European Union. In the present
70
Besides, Maximus is writing in the context of a multinational Roman Empire. What is
more, he is thematizing its crisis in an age when it loses its ecumenicity. Maximus’s
thought could be seen as an effort to preserve one universal logos through the variety or
even the traumatic breaks of different modes. Or as an effort to save ecumenicity at the
ecclesial level when it is lost at the political one.
state of European integration, it is still possible for nation-states to be caught

between their proper national interests and what would be good for the
future of Europe as a whole. It is also possible to try to imagine if it would
be better to leave the EU. This can even lead to some games in the relations
between the different nation-states and even to indirect blackmails both by
the powerful nation-states to the weaker, and by the weak to the more pow-
erful. We would dare to say that, in such a context, theological virtues, such
as that of kenosis, might even have a political significance. “Whoever wants
to save his nation will lose it, but whoever loses his nation will find it” could
be a contemporary paraphrase of Matt 16:25. Sometimes national interest is
served when a nation-state is stripped of its nationalistic philautia, and
nationalistic egoism can prove extremely self-destructive, as was the case in
1914. This can also be the case for the exercise of power inside the European
Union, where the Pauline “when I am weak then I am strong” (2 Cor 12:10)
is also very timely.
Nation and Territory
Since we have observed nationalism as a ‘gnomic’ break, it is equally impor-

tant to examine it as a territorial one. It is often considered that nations are
linked to certain territories with which they are historically related. At this
point, there have been many constructions by modern nationalisms as well
as contestations, conflicts and wars. The fact remains that we often use the
term fatherland meaning the land of our fathers, the land where our ances-
tors spilled their blood and where they are buried. The connection between
nation and land is a type of nationalism that is very common among Ortho-
dox countries. It is arguably related to the Orthodox emphasis on the Eucha-
ristic worship of places of martyrdom. We should not forget that the Eucha-
ristic assemblies took place in such localities and that even today the holy
altars contain relics of martyrs and other saints. Orthodox tradition presents
a great incarnationism and an emphasis on the concrete locality, following a
quasi Aristotelian position that the local Church is the universal Church in
contrast to Roman Catholic universalism. Historically speaking, it could
therefore be argued that this Orthodox emphasis is related to a kind of local-
istic nationalism that is typical of Orthodox countries.
In the latter, modern nationalism has in many cases subordinated the

Church as a means to the fulfillment of its own ideals. Especially in the
modern History of the Balkans, we observe Churches that become auto-
cephalous or claim the status of a Patriarchate parallel to struggles for national
independence. Consequently, the structure of the Orthodox Church is often
based on that of modern nation-states. An even greater scandal occurs in the
so-called Diaspora, (a term that itself has nationalistic connotations), where
Church unity faces “co-territoriality” and “multi-jurisdiction”.71 The princi-
ple of territoriality72 is gravely threatened as we observe Orthodox dioceses
that are superimposed on each other. The result is that the great cities of the
Diaspora have many Orthodox bishops of different Orthodox Churches, and
the dioceses are structured according to nationalistic criteria and needs. Such
a situation brutally violates the ecclesiology of the Mystagogy, meaning a
substitution of the logos by national modes. Co-territoriality and multi-
jurisdiction should therefore end as soon as possible. Nevertheless, any solu-
tion to this problem should not mean the domination of one single nation,
language or civilization over the others, but a respect for all different national
modes in a perichōrēsis (loving of each other), so that, through a diversity of
modes, we can reach the unity of the logos. For the latter to emerge, it is
absolutely necessary that the canonical principle of territoriality be respected.
The principle of territoriality is indeed the most fundamentally ecclesiologi-
cal way to avoid ethnophyletism, which is nationalistic exclusivism. In Maxi-
mus’s terms, this principle helps to highlight the uniqueness of the logos of
communion. On the other hand, once this principle is respected, which is
an absolute priority, we should not be led into topomonism. In a postmod-
ern context, where localities are perpetually restructured, the relationship
between universality and personal otherness should be mediated not only by
place but also by other intermediaries. It is important to bring historical
diversity into the Church in the form of various languages, cultural features,
ethnic and even national modes.
71
Grigorios Papathomas, ‘The oppositional relationship between the locally established
Church and the ecclesiastical “Diaspora”: Ecclesiological unity faced against “co-territoriality”
and “multi-jurisdiction”’, L’Année Canonique, 46 (2004), pp. 77-99.
72
For the ecclesiological principle of territoriality, see John Zizioulas, Eucharist, Bishop,
Church: The Unity of the Church in the Divine Eucharist and the Bishop During the First
Three Centuries (Brookline/MA, 2001).
The Dialectic Between Logos and Tropos Inside One Nation.

The Danger of an Idolatry of Nation
Having expressed our objections to universalistic anthropology, we should

now examine the opposite danger – namely, the idolatry of nation. In its
dialogue with the divine logos, the created human logos might become inde-
pendent, pose itself outside the dialogue and turn into an idol. In such a
case, historical modes could undermine the self-sufficiency of the idol in
being inspired by the divine logos that points to the eschatological end. And,
as historical modes could have an ecclesial dimension as new incarnations of
Christ in the Spirit, then it is Christ Himself Who comes to shatter the idols.
Nation can begin as a rupture, as a break in a collectivity that claims a
common historical itinerary, and then become a dominant discourse that is
imposed on the posteriors and endeavors to integrate them into its uniform-
ity. We could then have a dialogue inside one nation, when signifiers that
originate from the dominant discourse are turned into objects of negotiation
and modification. For example, what it means to be Greek has been the
object of continuous negotiations since the 18th century.73 From a theologi-
cal perspective, an ossified human logos can be undermined by new incarna-
tions of the divine Logos happening secretly inside History. The multiple
incarnations of the logos shatter any essentialist identarianism that considers
identity as definitely accomplished and reduces it to essences, such as biologi-
cal or even civilizational essences. Mode is both a rupture and a projection:
it means a break in relation to the logos, but it also projects new goals that
modify the existent will. Maximus’s concept of tropos could meet here the
thought of Homi Bhabha. According to Bhabha, it is hybrid populations
that question the dominant nationalistic discourse in producing their own
counter-narrations.74 In Maximus’s terms, we could thematize this process
as a novel mode that modifies an ossified human logos from below. These
73
See Thanos Veremis, ed., Ethnikē taytotēta kai ethnikismos stē neoterē Ellada (National
Identity and Nationalism in Modern Greece) (Athens, 1997). What is interesting in Greek
History is that, for a long period of time, revolutionary voices that challenged the domi-
nant nationalistic discourse used religious and even national symbols, interpreting them
in an alternative way. We only have to think of the poet Yannis Ritsos or of Nikos Kazant-
zakis’ novel “Christ Recrucified”.
74
Bhabha, ‘DissemiNation’.
new modes can also have a Christological character, as Christ is the great
stranger inside History, the Good Samaritan Who comes to undermine the
order of the existent monolithic communities.
Modern nationalism itself has been a historical mode that provoked a
rupture in the dominant logos of multinational empires by posing new goals
such as democracy. But, as it evolved, it created essentialist identities and
was led to what is named “primordialism”,75 i.e., the view that a nation
always existed and was only waiting to be awoken, like Sleeping Beauty. In
Maximus’s terms, primordialism means a substitution of logos, when a his-
torical mode tries to achieve the status of universality and becomes an idol.
The Church itself was led to an ambivalent cooperation with nationalism.
As P. Kalaitzidis remarks,76 this cooperation was a form of contextual theol-
ogy avant la lettre. Contextual theology is not something new; it always
existed either consciously or unconsciously. Orthodox churches that were
very closely linked to their flocks at the concrete local level shared their suf-
fering in their historical adventures, and were often led to identifying with
national struggles. But, in doing so, they often lost the dialectical contrast
that is provoked by the eschatological vision inside History. In our age, it is
absolutely necessary to object to the primordialist essentialism of many idola-
trous forms of nationalism. For example, we cannot deprive migrants of a
national identity if they are willing to participate in a certain civilizational
coexistence on the basis of alleged biological factors.
The contestation of dominant idolatrous logoi occurs through modes from
below, through silent new incarnations of Christ in modest crèches as well
as new Crucifixions from the powers of this world. New kenotic incarnations
75
For a typology of theories on nation, including primordialism, see Umut Özkırımlı,
Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (Houndsmills, 2010).
76
Pantelis Kalaitzidis, ‘Orthodoxia kai Politikē Theologia’, in Biblikē Theologia tēs
Apeleytherōsis, Paterikē Theologia kai amfisēmies tēs neoterikotētas (“Orthodoxy and Political
Theology”, in Biblical Liberation Theology, Patristic Theology and the Ambiguity of Moder-
nity) (Athens, 2012), pp. 65f. In orthodox countries, an ethnocentric theological discourse
seems to have been a contextual Theology avant la lettre as well as a peculiar Orthodox
Theology of Liberation. The problem with the latter is, however, that it underestimated,
negated or even ignored the political and social factor at the profit of the national one (cf.
Kalaitzidis, ‘Orthodoxia kai Politikē Theologia’, p. 66). It was thus a one-sided contextual
theology not to be imitated in the future because of the danger of exclusivism that it
brought.
of the Logos might take place among peoples that are crucified for the sake
of the monologue of a globalized world order. But also among strangers that
are crucified as scapegoats by national groups that use nationalism to over-
compensate for their weakness. Images of Christ are crucified everywhere
today, in the boats carrying migrants and refugees, in the victims of human
trafficking, in the immigrants that are stabbed as scapegoats in the streets of
European capitals, in persons imprisoned in concentration camps. But also
in ethnic collectivities that are bombed, that suffer genocide, or lose their
dignity due to humiliating impoverishment. It is by kenotic incarnations in
crucified images of Christ that we can formulate again an eschatological hope
for globalized humanity, one that will only come from below and from the
inside through tropic transformation.
Abstract
This paper examines an important feature of the thought of Maximus the Con-
fessor (ca. 580-662), namely the dialectics between the terms logos (reason),
tropos (mode) and telos (end), which can be re-actualized as a peculiar theology
of dialogue.
The author suggests that this theology is likely to engage in a seminal dialogue
with postmodernity in general, and with post-Hegelian dialectical philosophy,
Lacanian and post-Lacanian psychoanalysis, and phenomenology in particular.
An application of this dialogical approach to the issue of race and nation is
ventured.

Dialectic of Logos

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Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 69(1-4), 249-280. doi: 10.2143/JECS.69.1.

St. Maximus the Confessor’s dialectic

Its Importance to a Theological

philosophy, and ii) Maximus thematizes a crisis – namely, the collapse of

constructions. Nonetheless, there is a shift of emphasis from transcendence of nature to

modifies nature in a ‘filial’ way. And He is the eschatological goal of the

(sinful passions) in themselves, but only the results of historical modes in

See Opuscula Theologica et Polemica 1, PG 91:236-241.

But they also have a Pneumatological character,24 since Christ is incarnated

Race as Division (Diairesis)

The particularity of race is that it is conceived mainly as a natural division.

the other, its elevation to a historical mode of domination and exploitation.29

The Theology of Incarnation and a Critique of Abstract Universalism

A Neo-Maximian theology would insist on the fact that there can be no

former, it is important to understand that the universality of logos can only

slave-traders, among demonstrators that are attacked with chemicals, or

The Distinction Between Mode and Hypostasis-Person

We focus on mode as distinguished from hypostasis and person,36 because the

psychology would be very interesting, especially with regard to Donald Win-

that He can later assume other historical modes in different civilizational

A Comparison Between the National Mode and the Mode of Ecclesial

The ecclesial foundation of the multiplicity of modes is the distinction

Nation and Language

At this point, we should examine two of the basic constituents of a nation

509C; Thal. CCSG 7,37,338-349; 7,101,15-18; 7,143,114-116; 7,463,342; CCSG

the coexistence of different languages in the cult, as is sometimes the case in

Nation and Religion

Nation and Imagination. Nation as ‘Imaginary Community’ and as

– for example, to be immortal (athanatisthēnai);52 ii) consequently, bulēsis is

Nation-State, Nationalism and Maximus’s Theory of Mode as Gnome

Maximus follows the Chalcedonian logic that it is possible to have a mode

therefore mean a metapoiēsis (transformation) of nation from gnomic mode

and anti-imperialist emancipatory movements in Africa and Asia. A theolo-

state of European integration, it is still possible for nation-states to be caught

Nation and Territory

Since we have observed nationalism as a ‘gnomic’ break, it is equally impor-

In the latter, modern nationalism has in many cases subordinated the

The Dialectic Between Logos and Tropos Inside One Nation.

Having expressed our objections to universalistic anthropology, we should

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