§5 Admittedly, the Rules of Court provides that a motion to intervene can be filed

at any time before rendition of judgment of the trial court. However, the
suppletory role of the Rules of Court in this case must be dispensed with if its
application would frustrate the electoral will. Further, as the Solicitor General
points out in his Comment filed in behalf of the COMELEC, the Court has, in
exceptional cases, allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of judgment
by the trial court, or even after the case had become final and executory. The
Court is not ordinarily predisposed, on account of broad claims of equity, to
disregard infractions of procedural rules. Yet election cases are of such an
exceptional character that the supervening State interest is to ensure that the
true results of its elections are given efficacy. We find that the COMELEC's grant
of the Bollozos Intervention is in accord with this superior principle which is
grounded on the imperative to seek and make the sovereign will of the people
prevail. (Idulza vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160130, Resolution, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA
701.)
§6 In Baltazar vs. Commission of Elections, 350 SCRA 518 (2001), we held: "By their
very nature and given the public interest involved in the determination of the
results of an election, the controversies arising from the canvass must be resolved
speedily, otherwise the will of the electorate would be frustrated. And the delay
brought about by the tactics resorted to by petitioner is precisely the very evil
sought to be prevented by election statutes and controlling case law on the
matter." We thus find that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioner's election protest. If at all, she has only herself to blame
for the predicament. (Hofer vs. HRET, G.R. No. 158833, May 12, 2004, 428 SCRA 383.)
§7 In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within
its command who the real candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns
upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not
only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the
correct ascertainment of the results. x x x Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that such rules may be "liberally
construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec has the discretion to
liberally construe its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any
portion thereof in the interest of justice. Disputes in the outcome of elections
involve public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not
be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true
will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing
such disputes must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in
the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.
(Suliguin vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166046, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 219.)