Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cases On Basic Legal Ethics
Cases On Basic Legal Ethics
Cases On Basic Legal Ethics
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
BENGZON, C.J.:
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred
to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed,
before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education
prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the
following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his
A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-
legal education".
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with
respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary
to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao
never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application
for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would
also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that
he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous
to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to
take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys,
the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his
lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
EN BANC
On 12 March 1962, this Court required the respondent to file "an answer
(not a motion to dismiss.) After interposing an unsuccessful motion for a
bill of particulars, he filed his answer on 29 May 1962 and this Court
accordingly referred the case to the Solicitor-General for investigation,
report and recommendation. In turn, the Solicitor General referred the
case to the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan. The fiscal conducted an
investigation. The petitioner adduced evidence, but not the respondent,
because on the date set for hearing, on 25 July 1964, following several
postponements, the respondent failed to attend, despite due notice, for
which reason the investigating fiscal considered the respondent as having
waived his right to present evidence. Thereafter, the fiscal forwarded
the record of the investigation to the Solicitor General. On the basis
thereof, the Solicitor General filed his report and a complaint with this
Court, recommending the disbarment of the respondent, for gross
misconduct.
Having accomplished the form, the respondent was appointed by the mayor
to the position applied for. However, on the day the respondent swore to
the information sheet, there was pending against him, and two (2) other
co-accused, a criminal case in the Court of First Instance of Bohol (No.
2646) for illegal possession of explosive powder.2
In his defense, the respondent claims that his answer "None" to the
aforequoted questionnaire was made in good faith, it being his honest
interpretation of the particular question (heretofore quoted) that it
referred to a final judgment or conviction and that Criminal Case No.
2646 was not a criminal or police record.1äwphï1.ñët
Nor is the pendency of Criminal Case No. 2194 (for perjury) a prejudicial
question, since the ground for disbarment in the present proceeding is
not for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude but for gross
misconduct. A violation of a criminal law is not a bar to disbarment (6
Moran 242, 1963 Ed., citing the case of In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3
Phil. 577), and an acquittal is no obstacle to cancellation of the
lawyer's license. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399).
The facts being clear and undisputed, respondent's insistence upon patent
technical excuses disentitle him to leniency from his Court.
Footnotes
*
The "Resolution of the Court on the " Motion for Reconsideration"
was promulgated on August 30, 1967 and is printed in this volume.
1
Admitted to the Bar on 7 February 1965.
2
The information bears data of 3 July 1958 (Exh. "B-1").
**
16 Supreme Court Reports Annotated 623.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
PARAS, C. J.:
G.R. No. L-9513 has a direct bearing on the present complaint. Said case
originated from a criminal action filed in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan by the complainant against the respondent for a violation of
Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code of which the respondent was found
guilty. The verdict, when appealed to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed.
The appeal by certiorari taken to this Court by the respondent was
dismissed for lack of merit.
Thus lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court, the
respondent is hereby declared disqualified from being admitted to the
bar. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
R E S O L U T I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met
respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to
finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the
meeting, respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time
they met. Along the way, complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so
sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along
Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco
Del Monte, Quezon City when she was almost restless respondent stopped
his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the
other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked
(sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately manage
(sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent
informing him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and
needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications
transpired was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:
CANON I – x x x
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
x x x x
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral
character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in the
Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is
a requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino
v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any
act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And
whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but
also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members
nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the
highest degree of morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that,
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to
maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity.
They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a
person really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four
ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4)
to protect errant lawyers from themselves.12
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you
goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left
hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on
the lips. We said goodnight and she got off the car.
x x x x
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left
cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her
right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There
was no force used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No
breast holding was done. Everything happened very spontaneously with no
reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building,
Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the
following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
x x x x
ATTY. MACABATA:
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and
then with the use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then
kissed her again softly on the lips and that’s it. x x x.14 (Emphases
supplied.)
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of
the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public
welfare.26
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage
of his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations
with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the
complainant, and she must establish the case against the respondent by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof,28 disclosing a case that is free
from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary
power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not he who denies, must
prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the
party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui
negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the
case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of
proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not
suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were
several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a
major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious
designs on complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a
more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not
grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or
suspension.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 1-2.
2
Id.
3
Id. at 13-20.
4
Id. at 149-155.
5
Id. at 148.
6
Mortel v. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586, 592 (1956); Cordova v.
Cordova, A.C. No. 3249, 29 November 1989, 179 SCRA 680, 683.
7
A.C. No. 5082, 17 February 2004, 423 SCRA 135, 140-141.
8
Ui v. Bonifacio, 388 Phil. 691, 708 (2000).
9
A.C. No. 1512, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 30, 40.
10
Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla, 403 Phil. 1, 9 (2001).
11
In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.
Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as
Member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar, B.M. No. 1154, 8 June 2004,
431 SCRA 146.
12
Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, 22 September 2004, 438 SCRA 582,
589.
13
Rollo, pp. 27, 35.
14
TSN, 26 July 2005, pp.18-24.
15
Ui v. Bonifacio, supra note 8.
16
446 Phil. 861, 867 (2003).
17
117 Phil. 768, 776 (1963).
18
213 Phil. 437, 440 (1984).
19
Supra note 12 at 588.
20
A.C. No. 1334, 28 November 1989, 179 SCRA 653, 659.
21
A.C. No. 2474, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 306, 315.
22
A.C. No. 6148, 27 February 2004, 424 SCRA 42, 54-55.
23
A.C. No. 5170, 17 November 1999, 318 SCRA 229, 231.
24
101 Phil. 313, 314 (1957).
25
106 Phil. 256, 259 (1960).
26
Madredijo v. Loyao, Jr., 375 Phil. 1, 17 (1999); Alfonso v.
Juanson, A.M. No. RTJ-92-904, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA 239, 255-
256, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990), p. 751.
27
Atty. Aquino v. Judge Acosta, 429 Phil. 498, 510 (2002).
28
Angeles v. Figueroa, A.C. No. 5050, 20 September 2005, 470 SCRA
186, 195.
29
Reyes v. Wong, Adm. Case No. 547, 29 January 1975, 63 SCRA 667,
673.
30
Angeles v. Figueroa, supra note 28.
31
Uytengsu III v. Baduel, Adm. Case No. 5134, 14 December 2005, 477
SCRA 621, 632.
32
Boyboy v. Yabut, Jr., A.C. No. 5225, 29 April 2003,401 SCRA 622,
627.
33
Agpalo, LEGAL ETHICS (4th Ed., 1989), p. 445.
34
In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of
Delaware Joel D. Tenenbaum, 6 February 2007.
35
Ting-Dumali v. Torres, A.C. No. 5161, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 108,
119.
36
Id. at 445-446.
37
Id.
38
428 N.E. 2 d 786 (Ind. 1981).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar
Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with
which request they complied.
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-
63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27,
1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to,
and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on
March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required
by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and
was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were
required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo
submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil
Law, affirmed:
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in
the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade
to 75%;
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations
in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner
in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit
of April 8, 1972 that:
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review
the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee
pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to
have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the representation of
the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not
strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of
the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing
irregular in that:
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I
accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the
slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up
to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I
derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the
contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo
stated:
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the
same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December,
1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law
examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of
the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily
high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring
back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change
of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4,
rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could
not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-
evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one
subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in
reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls,
however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but
this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as
the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p.
61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general
average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more
subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's
notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase
of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar
Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate
said notebook.
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent
Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this
was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that
occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent
Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because,
according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular
notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which
is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his
authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the
answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from
57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
B A I
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
B A I
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a
semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were
far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-
evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz
violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one
subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3)
subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number
given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent
Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as
to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration.
It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the
wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for
the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-
thought.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were
officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first
meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them
back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the
case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further
claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of
paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of
every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI,
p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees
and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave
after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It
appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court
in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such
sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp.
11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was
only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him
and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp.
34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is
1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile
Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the
initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code
number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in
Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by
the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-
Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII,
p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to
their admission in evidence.
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code
Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and
the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day
following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number
1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he
accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code
Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation
of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
B A
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was
referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of
47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was
removed are as follows:
B A
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should
likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5)
major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal
Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was
required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him,
and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal
resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not
be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early
as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his
pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such
omission.
IV
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-
evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned
the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration
or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are
of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners
made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any
consideration whatsoever.
Montecillo —
Pamatian —
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so
and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
Manalo —
Pardo —
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor
and integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on
October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when
Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge
against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before
the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent
or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not
impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or
revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971
Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went
to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking
his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an
examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release
of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such
information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official
release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected
of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations
and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar
examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact,
after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement
on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly
filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view
of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to
show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said
irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's
father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was
operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine
Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken
with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was
bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn
statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 46, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn
for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.
Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above
delineated.