Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Barangay Justice System
Barangay Justice System
Barangay Justice System
The barangays are the smallest political subdivisions in the Philippines. They are
the smallest units of government. Smallest in terms of area of jurisdiction but big in the
sense that they are nearest to our people.
The barangays are given mandate to help in the administration of justice. Their
first duty is to conduct conciliation proceedings in civil cases and in criminal cases
where the penalty does not exceed one year of imprisonment or a fine not exceeding
five thousand pesos, before the same can be filed in court. The second is that power
granted to Punong Barangays to issue Barangay Protection Order (BPO) under Section
14 of RA 9262. The third is the establishment of a Barangay Council for the Protection
of Children under RA 9344. The fourth is the creation of the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee under Section 46 of RA 6657 wherein this Committee is tasked to mediate
and conciliate parties involved in an agrarian dispute including matters related to
tenurial and financial arrangements.
History
The Datu (Barangay Chief) had both the responsibility and the right to govern his
people. With this, he was expected to act not only as a leader in battle and protector of
the chiefdom/barangay, but also to settle local disputes both as the judge and enforcer
of law.(WH Scott 1994:p128-130)
Based on an early Spanish treatise, historian William Henry Scott narrated the
early justice system of 16th century Pampanga.
In 16th century Pampanga, datus like any other datus in Luzon and Visayas
performed tasks of settling disputes among his constituents (people in the
chiefdom/barangay). His job included those of what a usual modern judge does:
summoning parties, judging and giving out sentence to lawbreakers. He also settle
disputes on appeal. In instances when a datu failed to take action against a criminal or a
lawbreaker, other datus intervened. These intervening datus are chosen by their peers/
among their ranks based on their status, reputation for impartiality and good judgment.
Decisions rendered by the chosen datus are enforced; datus even band together to
ensure enforcement of laws, even by arms if needed. Such intervention is needed
especially in cases when it is a conflict of interest between two datus (chiefly class).
(WH Scott 1994:p245-250).
Chiefs were compensated for their duties as judge and enforcer; they usually get
half the fine or half of the property/ies involved.
Lawsuits
Lawsuits could be brought for the following cases: Murder, witchcraft, insult, theft,
marriage/divorce, arson, inheritance etc. Timawa can brought up lawsuits against
another, while in cases involving chiefs, other chiefs/datus intervene.
The usual process for lawsuits during the 16 th century were as follows:
1. Parties were summoned by the chief/datu who would act as both the trier and the
judge.
2. The datu would first try to arrange an amicable settlement between parties.
3. Failure to enter into amicable settlement would ensue trial of case wherein the
parties were examined by judge (orally), and then witnesses are heard.
4. Decision would be handed down, the witnesses and the chief were paid off, the
former according to social rank, and the decision is enforced.
This system of amicably settling disputes continued during the Spanish regime,
although informally and in limited extent, with the Cabeza de Barangay acting as the
datu. However, the cabeza de barangay only plays minor magisterial authority as it was
the primary duty of gobernadorcillos (municipal magistrates) to settle civil cases arising
between and among Indios (as the natives were called), Chinese mestizos and
Chinese.(Bankoff 1996:p99-100)
The Barangay Justice System was put to an end during the American Regime with the
imposition of American justice system, which is adversarial in nature.
The idea of a barangay justice system was conceived in the early ‘70’s by no less than
then Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro. He proposed it to President Marcos. On January
27, 1978, then President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1293 creating a Katarungang
Pambarangay Commission to Study the Feasibility of Resolving Disputes at the
Barangay Level. The committee was composed of the Chief Justice as Chairman, and
the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of Local
Government and Community Development, the Secretary of Education and Culture, the
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Director of the UP Law Center
as members. (Rodriguez, The Local Government Code of 1991 Annotated 2003 Edition,
page 431)
In the spirit of reviving Filipino tradition of peaceably settling disputes within the
community, then President Marcos issued on June 11, 1978, Presidential Decree No.
1508-Establishing a System of Amicably Settling Disputes at the Barangay Level. The
barangay justice system is an extrajudicial system wherein disputes are settled within
the barangay for speedy disposition of justice and also to minimize referral of such
cases to the court.(Puno,p.3)
In the words of Chief Justice Reynaldo Puno, the “Barangay Justice System
plays a vital role in addressing the weaknesses of our adversarial system of dispute
resolution”. The conciliatory character of barangay justice system is much more attuned
to the Filipino culture of smoothing interpersonal and community relationship as against
the adversarial justice system which is more combative in nature, and which is more
“complicated” in nature.(Puno, p.4). Moreover, barangay justice system offers a more
affordable access to justice to our poor countrymen…
The provisions of PD 1508, except for a few changes, were incorporated into the
Local Government Code of 1991 as Sections 399-422.
To attain this goal, PD 1508, now Sections 399-422 of the Local Government
Code, requires the parties to undergo a conciliation proceedings before the Barangay
Chairman or the Pangkat as a condition before filing a case in court. As a rule, this
requirement shall be satisfied in all civil actions. In criminal cases, all those cases
whose prescribed penalty exceed one year of imprisonment or a fine exceeding
P5,000.00, shall be brought first for barangay conciliation before filing the cases to the
Prosecutor’s Office or to the Courts. Non compliance with this requirement is a
ground to dismiss the case for pre-maturity. Thus, the Local Government Code
provides:
As stated, those matters within the authority of the lupon shall pass first the
barangay justice system before any party may go to court. What are these cases then
within the competence of the lupon?
As a rule all cases where the parties are actually residing in the same city or
municipality are within the competence of the lupon of each barangay. Thus the law
says:
“Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. - The lupon
of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in
the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding
Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
Justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
In Civil Cases:
It appears from the provision of the law, all civil cases involving individuals who
are residing in the same city or municipality, regardless of the amount involved must be
brought first with the barangay justice system before any court action may be filed. The
only instances where a direct action to the court is allowed are:
1. Under letter (a), if one of the parties is the national government, direct filing is
allowed. If one of the parties is a province, city or municipality or the barangay itself,
direct filing is allowed. Or if one of the parties is an instrumentality of the national
government, direct filing is allowed. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
Charter. (MIAA vs. CA, 495 SCRA 591, 617). Examples of a government instrumentality
are the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA vs. CA, i.d.) and the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS vs. City Treasurer of Manila, 609 SCRA 330, 346)
4. An example of letter (f) would be an action for damages, but one party is
residing in Barangay A of Municipality B, while the other party is residing in Barangay C
of Municipality D. However, if barangays A and C adjoin each other, then the parties
may agree to submit their differences to the lupon of either Barangay A or Barangay C.
But the parties are not compulsorily required to agree. It is merely an option given by
law for them to agree to refer their problem for conciliation.
In Criminal Cases
Not all criminal cases require conciliation proceedings. Only minor offenses are
brought within the coverage of the barangay justice system. This is because of the
fundamental principle in criminal law that crimes are committed against the State and
the State is the real offended party. As such, crime cannot be the subject of
compromise by private offended parties. (Kapunan, Criminal Law, 1990 Edition page
192; Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I, 2006 Edition page 600)
Thus under Section 408, letter ( c ) offenses punishable by imprisonment
exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) are
exempt from the coverage of the katarungan pambarangay law. Therefore, only cases
which penalties do not exceed one year imprisonment or a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos are covered by the law. Also even if the penalties are within the
coverage if there is no private offended party, then the law shall not be made to apply
under letter (d) of Section 408.
When one of the parties is a corporation or a partnership, the case may be directly filed
in court. Section
(1) Alarms and Scandals (Art. 155, Revised Penal Code (RPC);
(2) False medical certificates; false certificates of merit of service if committed by private
person (Article 174, last par., RPC);
(3) Using false certificates (Article 175, RPC);
(4) Using fictitious and concealing true name (Article 178, RPC);
(5) False testimony against a defendant in criminal cases (Article 180, No. 4, RPC);
(6) Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray when injuries inflicted are of a less
serious nature (Article 252, 2nd par., RPC);
(7) Less Serious Physical Injuries (Article 265, RPC);
(8) Slight Physical Injuries (Article 266, RPC);
(9) Kidnapping and failure to return a minor committed by a parent (Article 270 in
relation to the last par. of Article 271, RPC);
(10) Inducing a minor to abandon his home (Article 271, 2 nd par. RPC);
(11) Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of one’s own victim (Article
275, RPC)
(12) Abandoning a minor (Article 276, RPC);
(13) Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody; indifference of
parents (Article 277, RPC);
(14) Qualified Tresspass To Dwelling (Article 280, RPC);
(15) Other forms of Tresspass (Article 281, RPC);
(16) Grave Threat if the threat was not subject to condition (Article 282, No. 2, RPC);
(17) Light threats (Article 283, RPC);
(18) Other Light threats (Article 285, RPC)
(19) Grave Coercions (Article 286, RPC)
(20) Light Coercions (Article 287, RPC)
(21) Unjust Vexation (Article 287, last paragraph, RPC)
(22) Other similar coercions or compulsory purchase of merchandise and payment of
wages by means of tokens (Article 288, RPC)
(23) Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through
violence or threats (Article 289, RPC)
(24) Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence without revealing such
secrets (Article 290, 2nd paragraph, RPC)
(25) Revealing secrets with abuse of office (Article 291, RPC)
(26) Theft if value of stolen goods does not exceed P50.00 (Article 309, nos. 5, 6, 7 and
8, RPC)
(27) Altering boundaries or landmarks (Article 313, RPC)
(28) Swindling or estafa if the amount of the fraud does not exceed P200.00 (Article
315, 4th paragraph, RPC)
(29) Other forms of swindling (Article 316, RPC)
(30) Swindling a minor (Article 317, RPC)
(31) Other deceits (Article 318, RPC)
(32) Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property (Article 319, RPC)
(33) Special cases of malicious mischief where the value of the damaged property does
not exceed one thousand pesos (Article 328, Nos. 2 and 3, RPC)
(34) Other mischief (Article 329, RPC)
(35) Destroying or damaging useful or ornamental painting of a public nature (Article
331, 2nd paragraph, RPC)
(36) Simple seduction (Article 338, RPC)
(37) Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party
(38) Premature marriage (Article 351, RPC)
(39) Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a compensation or
blackmail (Article 356, RPC)
(40) Publication of facts connected with the private life of a person (Article 357, RPC)
(41) Slight Oral Defamation (Article 358, RPC)
(42) Slight Slander by Deed (Article 359, RPC)
(43) Incriminating Innocent Person (Article 363, RPC)
(44) Intriguing against person (Article 364, RPC)
(45) Reckless imprudence had it been intentional would constitute a less grave felony or
a light felony (Article 365, RPC)
(46) Simple Imprudence (Article 365, RPC)
(47) Violation of BP 22
Reference:
Willliam Henry Scott - Barangay: 16 th Century Philippine Culture and Society- © 1994 ADMU Press and William
Henry Scott
Greg Bankoff- Crime, society and the state in the 19 th Century Philippines. © 1996 Ateneo de Manila University
Press
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno -Peace through Justice. Keynote address delivered on the first day of the 2nd
Barangay Justice Advocates Congress on December 3, 2007, at the Grand Men Seng Hotel, Davao City,
2. Suppose the barangay chairman did not refer the matter to the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo but rather issue the Certification To File Action,
can the complaint in court be challenged for non compliance with the
barangay justice law?
Juridical persons
“ Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee, any individual who has a
cause of action against another individual involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon may complain, orally or in writing, to the lupon
chairman of the barangay. (underlining mine for emphasis)
It appears from the language of the law that only individual persons
may file a complaint against individual persons in the barangay Lupon. What
is then the meaning of the word “individual.”?
This rule was enunciated in the case of Vda. de Borromeo vs. Pogoy,
126 SCRA 217. In this case, the intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo
was the owner of a building located at F, Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building
has been leased by Petra Vda. De Borromeo (“Petra” for short) at a monthly
rental of P500.00. On August 28, 1982, the administrator of the estate,
served upon Petra a demand letter to pay the overdue rentals and thereafter
to vacate the premises. As Petra failed to do so, the Administrator instituted
an ejectment case against Petra in the MTC of Cebu City.
Petra sought to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the MTC of Cebu
City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to
refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
The Supreme Court ruled that referral of dispute to the Barangay Lupon is
required only where the parties thereto are “individuals.” An “individual”
means “single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution.”
Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons, and not
where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation,
partnership, corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc. It is
indisputable that the real party in interest is the intestate estate under
administration. “Since the said estate is a juridical person, plaintiff
administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same
being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.”
Section 410(b) of the Local Government Code states that the Barangay
Chairman shall constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation effort.
Suppose he did not constitute a pangkat but immediately issue a
Certification To File Action, can the Court still dismiss the case for
prematurity? This is the question resolved in the case of Lumbuan vs.
Ronquillo, 489, SCRA 650 (May 5, 2006)
Lumbuan is the registered owner of a lot. She leased it to Ronquillo for a
period of three years with a monthly rental of P5,000.00 with an escalation
clause of 10% increase annually and the leased premises will be used
exclusively for the respondent’s fastfood business. Ronquillo, however, used
the premises as his residence without Lumbuan’s prior written consent. He
/also failed to pay the 10% annual increase in rent.. Despite repeated verbal
and written demands, Ronquillo refused to pay the arrears and vacate the
leased premises.
Lumbuan filed a complaint with the Barangay Chairman’s office but the
parties failed to arrive at a settlement. Without referring the complaint with
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo, the Barangay Chairman immediately issued
a Certificate to File Action.
With this certificate to file action, Lumbuan filed against Ronquillo an action
for Unlawful Detainer. Lumban won the case in the Metropolitan Trial Court.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court set aside the METC decision and directed
the parties to go back to the Lupon Chairman or Punong Barangay for further
proceedings. This is because the case was not referred to the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo for mediation.
Lumbuan went to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ordered the
dismissal of the ejectment case by holding that when a complaint is
prematurely instituted, as when the mandatory mediation and conciliation in
the barangay level had not been complied with, the court should dismiss the
case and not just remand the records to the court of origin so that the parties
may go through the prerequisite proceedings. So the issue now is whether or
not the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation before the Pangkat, after
the Barangay Captain failed to settle the parties is fatal to the case.
The Supreme Court ruled that “while admittedly no pangkat was constituted,
it was not denied that the parties met at the office of the Barangay Chairman
for possible settlement. The efforts of the Barangay Chairman, however,
proved futile as no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was
formed, there was substantial compliance with the law. It is
noteworthy that under the aforequoted provision, the confrontation before
the Lupon Chairman or the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the
precondition for filing the case in court. This is true notwithstanding the
mandate of Section 410(b) of the same law that the Barangay Chairman shall
constitute a pangkat if he fails in his mediation efforts. Section 410(b) should
be construed together with Section 412, as well as the circumstances
obtaining in and peculiar to the case. On this score, it is significant that the
Barangay Chairman or Punong Barangay is herself the Chairman of the
Lupon under the Local Government Code and he issued a Certificate to File
Action stating that no settlement was reached by the parties.
The other case on this matter is that of Diu, et al vs. CA, decided on
December 19, 1995, a case decided under the regime of PD 1508. It appears
that on several occasions, private respondent Patricia Pagba purchased on
credit various articles of merchandise from petitioners' store at Naval, Biliran,
all valued at P7,862.55, as evidenced by receipts of goods. Private
respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioners brought the
matter before the Barangay Chairman of Naval and the latter set the case for
hearing, but private respondents failed to appear. When the case was again
set for hearing, the parties appeared but they failed to reach an amicable
settlement. Accordingly, the barangay chairman issued a Certification to File
Action. Petitioners then filed their complaint for a sum of money before the
Municipal Trial Court of Naval.
Having lost in the RTC, private respondents then went to the Court of Appeals
and they won in the Court of Appeals by technicality. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the complaint on the ground that there was no confrontation
before the pangkat. Petitioners Diu went to the Supreme Court.
Shall we consider the confrontations before the Barangay Chairman sufficient
compliance with the requirement in Presidential Decree No. 1508?
The Supreme Court ruled: “It must be noted that Presidential Decree No.
1508 has been repealed by codification in the Local Government Code of
1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992. The basic complaint was filed by
petitioners before the trial court on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the
Local Government Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former law
have been substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412,
respectively, of the latter law. The pertinent provisions read as follows:
While no pangkat was constituted, it is not denied that the parties met
at the office of the barangay chairman for possible settlement. The efforts of
the barangay chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was
reached. Although no pangkat was formed, we believe that there was
substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under Section 412
of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before
the luponchairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the pre-
condition for filing the case in court.
Compromise Agreement
With patience, the Barangay Chairman or the Pangkat may be able to forge a
settlement between the parties.
The amicable settlement shall have the force and effect of a final judgment
of a court after the expiration of ten (10) days period from the date thereof.
(Section 416, LGC)
Procedure of Execution
During the hearing, the Barangay Chairman shall ascertain the fact of
non compliance with the terms of the settlement. Upon such determination
of non-compliance, the Punong Barangay shall strongly urge the party
obliged to voluntarily comply with the settlement or award.(Section 4,
second paragraph, IRR)
The Punong Barangay shall within five [5] days from the day of
hearing, determine whether or not voluntary compliance can be secured.
Upon the lapse of said five-day period, there being no voluntary compliance,
he shall issue a notice of execution in the name of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The said notice must intelligently refer to the settlement and
the amount actually due thereunder if it be for money, or the terms thereof
which must be complied with. (Section 5, IRR)
If the execution be for the payment of money, the party obliged is
allowed a period of five [5] days to make a voluntary payment, failing which,
the Punong Barangay shall take possession of sufficient personal property
located in the barangay of the party obliged to satisfy the settlement from
the proceeds of the sale thereof with legal interest such sale to be conducted
in accordance with the procedure herein provided. If sufficient personal
property exists, the party obliged is allowed to point out which of them shall
be taken possession of ahead of the others. If personal property is not
sufficient to satisfy the settlement or award, the deficiency shall be satisfied
in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court. (Section 6.
a. , IRR)
If it be for the delivery or restitution of property located in
the barangay, the Punong Barangay shall oust therefrom the person against
whom the settlement is rendered and place the party entitled thereto in
possession of such property. (Section 6. b, IRR)
If it be for the delivery or restitution of property located in
another barangay of the same city or municipality, the Punong Barangay
issuing the notice shall authorize the Punong Barangay of the barangay
where the property is situated to take possession of the property and to act
in accordance with paragraph [b] hereof. (Section 6.c., IRR)
If a settlement directs a party to execute a conveyance of land, or to
deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform any other specific act, and
the party fails to comply within the time specified, the Punong Barangay may
direct the Lupon Secretary to perform the act at the cost of the
disobedient party and the act when so done shall have like effects as if done
by the party. (Section 6.d., IRR)
Six months to execute
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides:
“SEC. 417. Execution. – The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be
enforced by execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of
the settlement. x x x”
Clearly, the disputant has only six months from date of settlement to
enforce the amicable settlement by the Barangay Chairman. What is the
meaning of this if the obligor has to perform the obligations, not on the date
of settlement but at some other date or dates?
The case of Vidal vs. Escueta, 417 SCRA 617, gives us the answer. It
appears that when Abelardo Escueta died intestate on December 3, 1994, he
was survived by his widow Remedios Escueta and their six children, including
Ma. Teresa O. Escueta and her brother Herman O. Escueta. Part of his estate
was a parcel of land located at No. 14 Sierra Madre corner Kanlaon Streets,
Barangay Highway Hills, Mandaluyong City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. (77083) - 27568, and the house thereon. The property was
leased to Rainier Llanera, who sublet the same to 25 persons. The heirs
executed an extra-judicial settlement of estate over the property. They also
executed a special power of attorney authorizing Ma. Teresa Escueta to sell
the said property.
Sometime in 1999, Ma. Teresa Escueta, as a co-owner of the property,
filed an ejectment case against Llanera and the sub-lessees before
the Lupon of Barangay Highway Hills, docketed as Barangay Case No. 99-09.
On May 5, 1999, Escueta and Llanera, and the sub-lessees, executed
an “Amicable Settlement,” where they agreed that (a) the owners of the
property would no longer collect the rentals due from the respondents
therein (lessee and sub-lessees) starting May 1999, with the concomitant
obligation of the respondents to vacate the property on or before
December 1999; (b) time was the essence of the agreement, and that
consequently, if the lessee and sub-lessees fail or refuse to vacate the
property on or before December 1999, the barangay chairman was
authorized without any court order to cause the eviction and removal of all
the respondents on the property. The amicable settlement was attested
by Pangkat Chairman Jose Acong. The parties did not repudiate the amicable
settlement within ten days from the execution thereof. Neither did any of the
parties file any petition to repudiate the settlement.
Llanera vacated the leased premises. Later, twenty of the sub-lessees
also vacated the property.
By January 2000, five sub-lessees, namely, Ma. Teresa Vidal, Lulu
Marquez, Marcelo Trinidad, Carlos Sobremonte and Jingkee Ang remained in
the property, and requested Escueta for extensions to vacate the
property. Escueta agreed, but despite the lapse of the extensions granted
them, the five sub-lessees refused to vacate the property.
Escueta opted not to have the sub-lessees evicted through the Punong
Barangay as provided for in the amicable settlement. Neither did she file a
motion with thePunong Barangay for the enforcement of the settlement.
Instead, she filed on May 12, 2000, a verified “Motion for Execution”
against the recalcitrant sub-lessees with the MTC for the enforcement
of the amicable settlement and the issuance of a writ of execution. The
pleading was docketed as Civil Case No. 17520, with Teresa Escueta as
plaintiff, and the sub-lessees as defendants.
Did Escueta file the correct remedy?
Escueta adopted the wrong remedy. In this case, the sub-lessees were
obliged under the compromise agreement to vacate the premises in January
2000. They refused to do so. Since, the obligation to vacate was due in
January 2000, the sub-lessees could be considered to have violated the
compromise only in January 2000. Before January 2000, Escueta could not
enforce the compromise agreement by the coercive power of execution.
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled:
“x x x, the time line in Section 417 should be construed to mean that if
the obligation in the settlement to be enforced is due and demandable on
the date of the settlement, the six-month period should be counted from the
date of the settlement; otherwise, if the obligation to be enforced is due and
demandable on a date other than the date of the settlement, the six-month
period should be counted from the date the obligation becomes due
and demandable.”
To rule otherwise, added by the Supreme Court, would be “in derogation
of the objective of Section 417 of the LGC. The law should be construed and
applied in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature and attain its
objective, and not to cause an injustice. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
aptly said, “courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of the
law where these words support a policy that goes beyond them. The Court
should not defer to the latter that killeth but to the spirit that vivifieth.”
Arbitration
Enforcement of award