G.R. No. 190969.

 January 30, 2013

BARON A. VILLANUEVA and the SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioners, vs. EDNA R. CAPARAS,
respondent.

FACTS:

An altercation occurred between Renato Caparas, husband of respondent Edna R. Caparas, and
Villanueva which altercation led to the death of Renato. Edna filed a criminal complaint for murder
against Villanueva. During the preliminary investigation, Edna submitted her affidavit which is the
affidavit of her neighbour who witness the incident and the autopsy report of the Philippine National
Police-Central Police District Crime Laboratory. On the other hand, Villanueva submitted his affidavit
which composed of affidavits from 3 witnesses and the Medico-Legal Division NBI opinion as to the
cause of Renato’s head injuries.

Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for homicide against Villanueva.
Villanueva sought reconsideration of the prosecutor’s resolution, but the prosecutor denied.

Before he could be arraigned, Villanueva filed a petition for review before the Department of Justice. The
DOJ Secretary set aside the prosecutor’s resolution and directed the prosecutor to move for the
withdrawal of the information.

With the Secretary’s denial of Edna’s motion for reconsideration, Edna sought recourse with the CA via a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

CA reversed the Secretary’s resolution and ordered the reinstatement of the prosecutor’s resolution and
the corresponding information.

Petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari with the SC .

ISSUE: Whether the CA correctly ruled that the Secretary exceeded the bounds of his jurisdiction when
he reversed the prosecutor’s resolution.

HELD:

YES. The SC held that that the Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he reversed the
prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause to charge Villanueva with homicide.

Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal information, pertains to facts and circumstances sufficient
to incite a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof. Only such facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondent are required, not
absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than
bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction.

The determination of probable cause is essentially an executive function, lodged in the first place on the
prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation on the offended party’s complaint. The
prosecutor’s ruling is reviewable by the Secretary who, as the final determinative authority on the matter,
has the power to reverse, modify or affirm the prosecutor’s determination. As a rule, the Secretary’s
findings are not subject to interference by the courts, save only when he acts with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; or when he grossly misapprehends facts.

In order to arrive at probable cause, the elements of the crime charged, should be present. In the case at
bar, all the elements of homicide is present, as adequately shown by the affidavits of Edna and her
witness and by the autopsy report.

G.R. No. 106632. October 9, 1997

DORIS TERESA HO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) and the SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.
G.R. No. 106678. October 9, 1997
ROLANDO S. NARCISO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of
the Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) and the SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division), respondents.

FACTS:
The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint  against
Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso and three others, who allegedly violated Section 3(g) of Republic
Act 3019 by entering legal justification into a negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous to the
National Steel Corp. (NSC) for the haulage of its products at the rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City to
Manila, despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed upon was much higher than those
offered by the by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI)
in the public bidding.

Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) recommended that an information for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A.
3019 as amended be filed against respondent Rolando S. Narciso before the Sandiganbayan and that the
case against the other respondents be DISMISSED.

After a review Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) recommended that both Rolando Narciso and Doris
Teresa Ho be charged. The resolution of GIO Labrador, as modified by the memorandum of SPO
Tamayo, was approved by Ombudsman petitioners were charged accordingly before the Sandiganbayan.
Attached to the information were the resolution of GIO Labrador and the memorandum of SPO Tamayo.

The Sandiganbayan issued warrant of arrests against Petitioners Ho and Narciso. Petitioner Ho initially
questioned the issuance thereof in a Motion for Reconsideration which was adopted by Petitioner Narciso.
They alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause merely relied on the information and
the resolution attached without other supporting evidence, in violation of the requirements of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied said motion via the challenged
Resolution.

Thus, this consolidated petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed with the SC.

ISSUE: May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and recommendation of the
investigating prosecutor?

HELD:
NO. The procedure it undertook contravenes the Constitution and settled jurisprudence. Respondent
Court palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest
on the sole basis of the prosecutor’s findings and recommendation, and without determining on its own
the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and recommendation.

“What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.”

The judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor’s bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order.