Notes (Abolish DP)

1. The first T-violation here is the fact that its not a “Sentencing Reform”
2. According to the Ev below you must decrease the number of people in the system or decrease
the time spent there.
3. Here’s What I’m Thinking: The sqou kills people; taking them out of the system and making
their sentences shorter, which in a dark way better for the CJS.
4. This version goes like this:
 Cards that say Swap DP with LWOP
 Multiple Interps of Sentencing Reform
 Not T
 Voters
Sentencing=Reduce
 Overview
The Death Penalty when abolished is replaced with Life Without Parole- Empirical Examples

Amber Widgery, Karen McInnes. States and Capital Punishment, 2020, www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/death-
penalty.aspx.

In recent years, New Mexico (2009),

States and Capital Punishment 3/24/2020 Capital punishment is currently authorized in 28 states, by the federal government and the U.S. military.

Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), Maryland (2013), New Hampshire (2019) and Colorado (2020) have legislatively
abolished the death penalty, replacing it with a sentence of life imprisonment with no possibility for
parole. The Nebraska Legislature also abolished capital punishment in 2015, but it was reinstated by a statewide vote in 2016. Additionally, courts in Washington and Delaware recently ruled that the states' capital
punishment laws are unconstitutional. States across the country will continue to debate its fairness, reliability and cost of implementation. Recent State Enactments Since 2015, 25 states enacted 65 new laws addressing state
systems of capital punishment. Trends include expanding or limiting aggravating factors, modifying execution methods and procedures, changing trial and appellate procedures, modifying laws to comply with litigation outcomes
and repealing the practice all together. Search recent enactments by topic, state, year, and keyword with NCSL's Capital Punishment Enactment Database. Methods of Execution Lethal injection is currently the primary method of
execution in all 29 states that authorize executions. Texas was the first state to use the method, in 1982. Sixteen states also have a secondary method of execution authorized by statute. Laws in Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi,
New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah and Wyoming provide a secondary option if lethal injection is found to be unconstitutional and/or unavailable. Arizona*, Kentucky, Tennessee and Utah all have a choice
of secondary methods for offenders who were sentenced before the introduction of lethal injection. And Alabama, California*, Florida, Missouri, South Carolina, Virginia and Washington have other methods that are available if the
offender requests an alternative. Secondary methods of execution include electrocution, lethal gas, hanging, nitrogen hypoxia, and firing squad. *See case law in each state to determine the constitutionality of secondary methods.
For example, see La Grand v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144 (1999). The purple states only have a single method: lethal injection. Blue states have lethal injection and a secondary method. Click on those states to display details on
secondary methods. The gray states do not have capital punishment. *Note that Colorado has prospectively abolished capital punishment. The governor commuted the sentences of those on death row, but defendants with
pending cases at the time of abolition are still eligible for execution and the execution statute is still valid. The purple states only have a single method: lethal injection and blue states have lethal injection and a secondary method.
Click on those states to display details on secondary methods. The gray states do not have capital punishment.
ALAKAZARCACOCTDCDEFLGAHIILINIAKSKYLAMEMAMDMIMNMSMOMTNENVNHNJNMNYNCNDOHOKORPARISCSDTNTXUTVAWAWVWIWYVTIDPRASGUMPVI Significant Litigation Over the past decade, several U.S. Supreme Court
rulings have narrowed the death penalty’s application in the states. The court has abolished the death penalty for mentally disabled offenders (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002), juvenile offenders (Roper v. Simmons, 2005), and for those
convicted of raping a child where death was not the intended or actual result (Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2008) – each ruling states that the execution of such individuals is unconstitutional, violating cruel and unusual punishment. In
addition, the court has required that juries and not judges find facts that make a defendant eligible for capital punishment (Ring v. Arizona, 2002), and impose a sentence of death (Hurst v. Florida, 2016). State courts have also had
an impact. The Delaware Supreme Court issued a decision on August 2, 2016 striking down the state’s death penalty statute, ruling that it violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court decision Hurst v.
Florida. The Delaware attorney general announced that he will not appeal the decision of the state court and legislation would be required to reinstate capital punishment in the state. The Washington Supreme Court also recently
struck down the state's death penalty on October 11, 2018. This was the fourth time the court has ruled the state's capital punishment law unconstitutional, calling it "invalid because it is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased
manner." The Washington Supreme court issued a decision on October 11, 2018 striking down the state’s death penalty statute as applied. This decision was the fourth time the Washington Supreme Court has ruled the state’s
capital punishment law unconstitutional. The court wrote that the “death penalty is invalid because it is imposed in an arbitrary and racially biased manner,” and found that the law as applied violates Article I, Section 14 of the
state constitution because it fails to serve any legitimate penological goal. Atkins v. Virginia (2002) Ring v. Arizona (2002) Roper v. Simmons (2005) Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) Baze v. Rees (2008) Glossip v. Gross (2014) Hurst v.
Florida (2016) Overview of 2013-2016 US Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases Overview of 2017 US Supreme Court Death Penalty Cases Additional Resources NCSL Report: The State of Capital Punishment (2019) Criminal Justice
homepage State Legislatures Magazine: Debating the Death Penalty (2020) State Legislatures Magazine: Death Penalty on Trial (2019) New Hampshire Abolishes Capital Punishment on Legislature’s Veto Override (2019)
Washington Supreme Court Overturns Capital Punishment (2018) Nebraska Abolishes the Death Penalty (2015) Maryland Abolishes the Death Penalty (2013) Connecticut Abolishes the Death Penalty (2015) Re-Examining the Death
Penalty (2011) The Cost of Punishment (2011) Video of Death Penalty Session, Legislative Summit (2010) State Reports on Capital Punishment Issues
Interp of Sentencing Reform
 Reduce Time
Sentencing reform is reducing the amount of time spent in prison
Serano 18 [David A Serano is a Maui defense attorney " Passing Criminal Justice Reform Will
Congress Finally Pass Criminal Justice Reform?," David Serano blog,
https://www.davidserenolaw.com/passing-criminal-justice-reform/ Sentencing reform] nw

Sentencing reform refers to fixing the “front end.” It targets reducing the amount of people sent to prison and the amount
of time people spend in prison by changing what happens before they are locked up, meaning when offenders are arrested,
prosecuted, and sentenced. Sentencing reform aims to ensure the punishment fits the crime by reducing mandatory minimum sentences and
giving judges more discretion to give a sentence considering the offender’s history and circumstances surrounding the case instead of handing
out terms based on the charges.
Violation – the plan does not reduce the length of sentences, they increase them.

Limits and Ground – requiring the affirmative lower the length of sentences is key
to making this debate, “debatable” – any other interp makes the topic bidirectional,
which decimates neg generics. Independently, doing anything anywhere in the
criminal justice system allows and Infinite number of tiny affs about changing the food
in jails or officer’s uniforms, which ruins being neg on an already aff-bias topic.
 Reduce People

Sentencing reform reduces people in prison

Holley 18 --- Cary Holley, Brennan Center for Justice, “What’s Happening in Congress on Criminal
Justice Reform?”, Oct 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/whats-
happening-congress-criminal-justice-reform (BJN)
These two distinct problems call for two different solutions. Advocates now use the term “prison reform” to talk about bills that improve
conditions in prison and the term “sentencing reform” to talk about bills that reduce the number of people in
prison.

Criminal justice reform must reduce the population of jailed and/or incarcerated
individuals
Sothern Poverty Law Center
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM, https://www.splcenter.org/issues/mass-incarceration

We’re working to reform the criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems so
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
they operate fairly and equitably; to ensure the dignity and humanity of those interacting with these systems; and to reduce
the population of jailed, detained, and incarcerated juveniles and adults in the United States . Over the
past four decades, our country’s incarceration rate – the number of prisoners per capita – has more than quadrupled and is now
unprecedented in world history. Today, roughly 2.2 million people are behind bars in the United States, an increase of 1.9 million since 1972.
We have the world’s largest prison population – with one-quarter of its prisoners but just 5 percent of the total population. And, on any given
day, some 7 million people – about one in every 31 people – are under the supervision of the corrections system, either locked up or probation
or parole. This vast expansion of the corrections system – which has been called “the New Jim Crow” – is the direct result of a failed, decades-
long drug war and a “law and order” movement that began amid the urban unrest of the late 1960s, just after the civil rights era. It’s a system
marred by vast racial disparities – one that stigmatizes and targets young black men for arrest at a young age, unfairly punishes communities of
color, burdens taxpayers and exacts a tremendous social cost. Today, African-American men who failed to finish high school are more likely to
be behind bars than employed. We’re using litigation and advocacy to help end the era of mass incarceration, to root out racial discrimination
in the system, and to ensure humane, constitutional standards for prisoners: Reforming policies that lead to the incarceration of children and
teens for minor crimes and school-related offenses; Working to transform a juvenile system that subjects children to abuse and neglect without
providing necessary medical, mental health, educational and rehabilitative services. Ensuring that prisoners are not subjected to
unconstitutional, inhumane conditions and that they receive proper medical and mental health care. Seeking to stop the prosecution of
children in the adult criminal justice system and their incarceration in adult prisons and jails. Advocating for rational policies and laws that keep
communities safe while vastly shrinking the prison population and reducing the social and economic impact of mass incarceration on vulnerable
communities.

Must REDUCE sentences—Cannot INCREASE sentences (otherwise, it’s neither

“substantial” nor “CJR”.)
NYT 16 – Editorial Board of the New York Times
NYT Editorial Board, Holding Sentencing Reform Hostage, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/opinion/sunday/holding-sentencing-reform-hostage.html

An opportunity to pass the most significant federal criminal justice reform in a generation may be slipping away — despite the
tireless efforts of many top Republicans and Democrats in Congress, as well as a rare exhortation from President Obama during last month’s
State of the Union address. The bill, known as the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, is the product of years of negotiation over
how best to roll back the imprisonment spree of the past four decades, a period in which the federal prison population grew from just under
25,000 to more than 195,000. Among other features, the act would reduce absurdly long mandatory minimum sentences for
many nonviolent drug crimes, give judges more control over the terms of punishment and provide inmates with more
opportunities to get out early by participating in rehabilitation programs. It has even won over Chuck Grassley, the chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, who has long been among the biggest skeptics of sentencing reform but who is a key sponsor of the legislation. So
what’s the problem? There are two, in fact — and both are serious threats to the bill’s chances of passage. First, some congressional
Republicans now say they will approve the bill only if it includes an across-the-board change in federal law that would make corporations and
their executives harder to prosecute for environmental or financial crimes by imposing a new intent, or “mens rea,” standard on these crimes.
There is absolutely no reason for this provision to be stuck into this criminal justice reform bill. In nearly all the time the bill was being
negotiated and debated, the issue of intent standards was never part of the discussion. But because criminal justice reform is one of the few
things in Congress that has bipartisan support, those pushing for the new standard — a mix of some congressional Republicans, corporate
interests and defense lawyers — decided it was a good vehicle for getting their measure through. These proponents have not identified any
specific laws that need fixing. If a change in intent standards is as important as they say, they should introduce it as a stand-alone bill to be
considered on its own merits. But they don’t want to do that out of fear that it might not withstand closer scrutiny. It is already very difficult to
prosecute corporate wrongdoers. A report released late last month by Senator Elizabeth Warren documented 20 cases from 2015 alone in
which corporations or their executives broke the law but got off with little or no punishment, even when people died as a result of the
violations. Speaking from the Senate floor on Wednesday, Ms. Warren called the push for the new intent provision “shameful because we’re
already way too easy on corporate lawbreakers.” The other obstacle to the reform bill’s passage is old-fashioned scaremongering about the
release of “violent criminals” into the streets. This is simply not true: Most of the provisions are focused on low-level, nonviolent drug
offenders, who make up nearly half of all federal inmates. Senator Ted Cruz is leading this attack on the new bill. Yet just last year he called
mandatory minimum drug sentences “unfair and ineffective,” and he sponsored reforms that would have reduced those sentences
even more than the current bill does. Running for president on a hard-right platform has, apparently, changed his mind. The sentencing reform
legislation is not perfect, but it represents remarkable progress in what is often a harsh, oversimplified debate about crime and punishment in
America. It should not be weakened, either by narrowing its reach or by sneaking in an unrelated mens rea provision. Throughout all of this, red
and blue states around the country continue to take big, bold steps to reduce state prison populations by shortening sentences and giving
inmates returning to society a real chance to succeed. Congress should be racing to catch up.
Violation – the plan doesn’t reduce the criminal justice system by lowering the
number of incarcerated people

Limits and Ground – requiring the affirmative get people out of jail is key to making
the debate stable – any other interp makes the topic bidirectional, which decimates
neg generics. Independently, doing anything anywhere in the criminal justice system
allows tons of tiny affs about changing the food in jails or officer’s uniforms, which
ruins being neg on an already aff-bias topic.
Sentencing Reform Reduces Confinement
 T --- CJR = Reduction --- Block Overview

Topical affs have to target for reduction incarceration rates --- extend Laliberte --- it’s a
universally agreed on definition --- prefer it;

First --- most contextual --- reform is broad but “criminal justice” modifies it in a single
direction --- it’s the most precise definition --- key to pre-tournament prep which turns
all their offense

Second --- ground and limits --- keeps the aff in a predictable stasis with lots of options
--- but excludes tiny affs

Here’s a caselist
CJP 18 --- Criminal Justice Programs, Providing information about over 75 careers in criminal justice,
“CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM AND WHY AMERICA NEEDS IT”, Published 10-4-2018,
https://www.criminaljusticeprograms.com/articles/3-reasons-the-criminal-justice-system-needs-
reform/ (BJN)

WHAT IS CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM? Criminal justice reform is working to end the sheer number of
prisoners in the justice system through both litigation and advocacy. By fighting for nationwide reform
at a variety of government levels, the nation can right wrongs before the problem becomes worse.

While no criminal justice system is entirely perfect, neither is that of the United States. Reform aims to
fix these errors, and there are a number of organizations involved in the movement in various ways,
including:

Reducing harsh prison sentences

Changing the drug sentencing policy surrounding the war on drugs

Decriminalizing certain laws, including drug policies

Prioritizing rehabilitation of offenders, especially juvenile offenders

Altering policies surrounding food assistance programs and voting rights for previous offenders

Changing minimum sentencing laws

No matter the area in which criminal justice reform works to change the system, it’s all about the people
affected by the prison systems. One of the main purposes, according to an article in USA Today, is the
need to offer offenders redemption and rehabilitation after their sentences end.
Our interpretation is the best middle ground --- reducing incarceration is a floor not a
ceiling --- TVA is their aff +
Edelman 17 --- Gilad Edelman, a Washington Monthly contributing editor, is a politics writer for
WIRED., “All Criminal Justice Reform Is Local”, Jan/Feb 2017,
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/januaryfebruary-2017/all-criminal-justice-reform-is-local/
(BJN)

District attorney elections have only recently emerged as a focus of the criminal justice reform
movement, spurred in part by outrage over the failure of prosecutors to bring charges against police for
killing unarmed black men. But district attorneys (sometimes known by other titles, like county
prosecutor or state’s attorney) have control over far more than prosecuting cops. The phrase “criminal
justice reform” encompasses many ideas, but at its heart is the goal of ending mass incarceration. The
U.S. prison population has risen meteorically since the late 1970s, only recently stabilizing, even though
crime has fallen dramatically since the early 1990s. America has easily the highest incarceration rate in
the world: 716 of every 100,000 residents are locked up, according to the most recent statistics, which
comes to about 2.3 million people in prison or jail any given day. (Compare that to 118 of every 100,000
Canadians.) We have one-twentieth of the world’s population but one-quarter of its prisoners. Black and
Hispanic people, about a third of the U.S. population, make up nearly 60 percent of prison inmates.
T --- Sentencing Reform --- Confinement --- 1NC
 We do not overlimit

Topical affs affect TYPES of sentencing

Wicharaya 95 --- Tamasak Wicharaya, Deputy Superintendent of Police Administration Section in the
Academic Section of the Police Cadet Academy, “Simple Theory, Hard Reality: The Impact of Sentencing
Reforms on Courts, Prisons, and Crime”, SUNY Press, Aug 10, 1995, Page 178,
https://books.google.com/books?id=ZCrzYuMFRZsC&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&dq=
%22Types+of+sentencing+reforms%22&source=gbs_navlinks_s (BJN)

This model hypothesizes that sentencing behavior is a function Of the type of sentencing reform policy,
controlling for previous vio- lent crime rates. The five sentencing reform types are mandatory minimum
sentencing laws, mandatory determinate sentencing laws, presumptive determinate sentencing laws,
presumptive sen- tencing guidelines, and voluntary sentencing guidelines. This spec- ification tests the
sentencing reform hypothesis that control over sentencing decision will increase the certainty Of
punishment, measured as the rate of new court commitments to state institu- tions per ten thousand
adult arrests charged with FBI indexed vio- lent offenses or the incarceration rate thereafter.

For reference --- heres what those mean- no death penalty

NCJRS 82 --- National Criminal Justice Reference Service, National Institute of Justice, July 1982,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/80919NCJRS.pdf (BJN)

1. Present sentencing type

States included in the report were classified first by recognizing whether any offenses on first or
subsequent conviction carried a mandatory prison sentence, and second by the underlying type of
sentencing for mandatory and non-mandatory situations. Mandatory sentencing for certain crimes can
be overlaid upon any type of sentencing and is thus a separate element or variable. For this report we
have adopted the following definition:

Mandatory Minimum Sentence: The minimum incarceration sentence that must be given by a judge or
jury on conviction, without an option for probation, suspended sentence, or immediate parole eligibility.

Four basic types of sentencing schemes are defined below for non-mandatory minimum sentencing.
Laws regarding mandatory minimums provide some exceptions for certain offenses, but the overall type
or structure is generally unchanged.

Determinate: Incarceration sentences are given with a fixed (flat) length of time. Time served nay be-
subject to "good time" or parole; and probation and suspension may be options. Legislation specifies a
maximum or a range of sentences.
Presumptive Determinate: As above, but legislation suggests a definite term with leeway up or down in
the event of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Guidelines - generally a form of presumptive with a grid to specify the sentence or a range for the
determinate sentence.

Indeterminate: Incarceration sentences are given with a minimum and maximum. Good time and
parole may be available to reduce either the minimum or maximum or both. Legislation may specify a
range or a maximum for the sentence.

.
***Substantial Negative***
 Must be 20%

T --- Substantial = 20% --- 1NC

CJR must reduce the incarceration rate

Laliberte 19 --- Vail Vail Laliberte, author for European Training Foundation, a European Union agency
that helps transition and developing countries harness the potential of their human capital through the
reform of education, training and labour market systems, “Lessons About Criminal Justice Reform”, Sept
2019,
https://connections.etf.europa.eu/blogs/EntrepreneurialInsights/entry/Lessons_About_Criminal_Justice
_Reform?lang=en_gb (BJN)

The word “reform” has different meanings to a lot of people when it comes to criminal justice, but there
is one definition that everyone seems to agree on. That meaning is reform when used in this context
should be the reduction of the number of incarcerated people. This reduction though, shouldn’t mean
putting public safety in jeopardy.

Substantial reform is 20%

Bedock 17 --- Camille Bedock, FNRS postdoctoral researcher in the Centre d'étude de la vie politique
(CEVIPOL) at the Université libre de Bruxelles, “Reforming Democracy: Institutional Engineering in
Western Europe”, Oxford University Press, 2017, Page 67-68, https://books.google.com/books?
id=70nADgAAQBAJ&source=gbs_navlinks_s (BJN)

In order to avoid subjectivity in the classification, as far as possible, a variety Of criteria were developed
for each of the dimensions included in the database using criteria developed by specialized secondary
sources (such as Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010) whenever possible. In
cases when the content of a given institutional reform could be described through quantifiable set-off
points (such as district magnitude, the number of seats in parliament, the number of citizens entitled to
vote, and so on), a threshold of 20 per cent was used to determine the scope of the reform, as proposed
by Lijphart in his dealings with electoral reforms (1994). Overall, reforms are classified as substantial
when they affect the national level (the whole country), have a direct impact on the relationship
between the citizenry and the political system, and between the actors within the political system, and
when their quantifiable dimensions meet the 20 per cent threshold (Appendix 2).

Topical affs must reduce incarceration by 440,000

Kann 19 --- Drew Kann, CNN, “5 facts behind America's high incarceration rate”, April 21, 2019,
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/28/us/mass-incarceration-five-key-facts/index.html (BJN)

Year after year, the United States beats out much larger countries -- India, China -- and more totalitarian
ones --Russia and the Philippines -- for the distinction of having the highest incarceration rate in the
world. According to a 2018 report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), nearly 2.2 million adults
were held in America's prisons and jails at the end of 2016. That means for every 100,000 people
residing in the United States, approximately 655 of them were behind bars.

Voter for limits and ground --- minor changes skirt the controversy --- explode research burden

“Substantially” needs to be given a quantitative meaning --- any other interpretation is more arbitrary
Webster’s 3 (Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, www.m-w.com)

Main Entry: substantial

b : considerable in quantity : significantly great <earned a substantial wage>

Even if a substantial increase isn’t precise --- you should still exclude their Aff for being tiny. Even
judges can make a gut check.
Hartmann 7 – Judge, Hong Kong (IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE
REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, 8/20, http://legalref.judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/ju_frame.jsp?
DIS=58463&currpage=T

 The word ‘substantial’ is not a technical term nor is it a word that lends itself to a precise
measurement.  In an earlier judgment on this issue, that of S. v. S. [2006] 3 HKLRD 251, I said that it is
not a word —

“… that lends itself to precise definition or from which precise deductions can be drawn.  To say, for
example, that ‘there has been a substantial increase in expenditure’ does not of itself allow for a
calculation in numerative terms of the exact increase.  It is a statement to the effect that it is certainly
more than a little but less than great.  It defines, however, a significant increase, one that is weighty or
sizeable.”

T --- Substantially---A2: No Impact

“Substantially” must be given meaning

Words and Phrases 60 (Vol. 40, State – Subway, p. 762)
“Substantial” is a relative word, which, while it must be used with care and discrimination, must
nevertheless be given effect, and in a claim of patent allowed considerable latitude of meaning where it
is applied to such subject as thickness, as by requiring two parts of a device to be substantially the same
thickness, and cannot be held to require them to be of exactly the same thickness. Todd. V. Sears
Roebuck & Co., D.C.N.C., 199 F.Supp. 38, 41.
Reform ≠ Abolish
Not abolition
1nc – not abolition
 1NC: Abolition

Reform is changing practices- not abolishing

Miller, ND (Chelsea Miller, writer for States of Incarceration, a program dedicated to exploring the
roots of mass incarceration, No Date, accessed on 6-26-2020, Statesofincarceration, "Prison
Reform/Prison Abolition | States of Incarceration", https://statesofincarceration.org/story/prison-
reformprison-abolition#:~:text=%E2%80%9CReforming%20the%20prison%20entails%20changing,to
%20the%20prison's%20very%20existence.%E2%80%9D)

“Reforming the prison entails changing its existing practices to make the system a better one. Abolishing
the prison entails dismantling it wholesale. Reformers object to how the prison is administered.
Abolitionists object to the prison’s very existence.” — Ruby C. Tapia, co-editor of Interrupted Lives:
Experiences of Incarcerated Women in the United States (2010). “A cage is a cage is a cage. We want
strategies that let people out of cages, not ones that are for building nicer or better cages.” —
Annotation in the meeting notes of the Statewide Harm Reduction Coalition (SHaRC) in Chicopee, MA,
2006. Activist work focusing on incarceration in Massachusetts has followed two distinct, yet sometimes
overlapping, philosophies: prison abolition and prison reform. Prison reformers have uniquely focused
on advocacy, policy change, and healthcare support for people already in the criminal justice system.
Prison abolitionists have advocated for policy change and community alternatives to incarceration,
including community centers, schools, and physical and mental health care resources. Where they
overlap, however, is in their work to expose the impacts of mass criminalization, to change public
perceptions of incarcerated men and women, and to serve as advocates for people who are
incarcerated.

Vote neg for ground- abolition is key neg ground- it’s the only real critique of reform.
Allowing the aff to claim the best neg ground makes it impossible to be neg
 2NC: Offense

Their interpretation destroy negative ground. Abolition is the only good critique of CJR
and their interp allows the aff to steal it. All our arguments are based on the “reform”
part of the resolution- there’s no other limiting term.

Only our interp solves predictability: reform versus revolution is the most predictable
division of ground for this topic. That turns education – the education in debate
doesn’t come from the other team lecturing you it comes from the discussion that
occurs within the round – if we win they make that discussion one-sided that’s a
reason they can’t solve any of their offense.
 2NC: Abolition

Abolition and defunding are distinct from reform

Lopez, 20 (Christy E. Lopez, professor at Georgetown Law School and a co-director of the school's
Innovative Policing Program, 6-7-2020, accessed on 6-26-2020, The Washington Post, "Defund the
police? Here’s what that really means.",
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/07/defund-police-heres-what-that-really-means/)

Defunding and abolition probably mean something different from what you are thinking. For most
proponents, “defunding the police” does not mean zeroing out budgets for public safety, and police
abolition does not mean that police will disappear overnight — or perhaps ever. Defunding the police
means shrinking the scope of police responsibilities and shifting most of what government does to keep
us safe to entities that are better equipped to meet that need. It means investing more in mental-health
care and housing, and expanding the use of community mediation and violence interruption programs.
Police abolition means reducing, with the vision of eventually eliminating, our reliance on policing to
secure our public safety. It means recognizing that criminalizing addiction and poverty, making 10
million arrests per year and mass incarceration have not provided the public safety we want and never
will. The “abolition” language is important because it reminds us that policing has been the primary
vehicle for using violence to perpetuate the unjustified white control over the bodies and lives of black
people that has been with us since slavery. That aspect of policing must be literally abolished. Still, even
as we try to shift resources from policing to programs that will better promote fairness and public safety,
we must continue the work of police reform. We cannot stop regulating police conduct now because we
hope someday to reduce or eliminate our reliance on policing. We must ban chokeholds and curb the
use of no-knock warrants; we must train officers how to better respond to people in mental health
crises, and we must teach officers to be guardians, not warriors, to intervene to prevent misconduct and
to understand and appreciate the communities they serve.

Reform is not abolition

Sudbury, 9 (Julia Sudbury is a Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College, Oakland, California
and editor of Global Lockdown: Race, Gender and the Prison-Industrial Complex

, April 2009, accessed on 6-26-2020, Crimeandjustice.org, "Reform or abolition? Using popular

mobilisations to dismantle the ‘prison-industrial complex' | Centre for Crime and Justice Studies",
https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/publications/cjm/article/reform-or-abolition-using-popular-
mobilisations-dismantle-%E2%80%98prison)

The US anti-prison movement is made up of a plethora of grassroots organisations, lobby groups, activist
collectives, prisoner associations and student groups (Sudbury, 2008). While the organisations that make
up the movement are diverse in their organising strategies, they share the common goal of ending the
use of imprisonment to respond to harm. The anti-prison movement differs from voluntary
organisations working for criminal justice reform in two key ways. First, rather than viewing
imprisonment as a necessary sanction that should perhaps be used with less frequency or made more
effective and humane, anti-prison activists view prisons and jails as a form of racialised state violence
that must be dismantled as part of a wider social justice agenda. Second, while voluntary organisations
provide important research, policy work, lobbying and direct services, their remit seldom includes
community organising or mass mobilisation. As a result, the non-profit model of organising is ill-
equipped to bring about radical social change (Incite!, 2007). Voluntary organisations can and do
influence government policy, but they cannot generate the people-power necessary to create the kind
of fundamental social and economic re-organization necessary to dismantle what has become a
multibillion-dollar industry. In addition, the non-profit model of social change may actually undermine
grassroots mobilising because it produces paid experts who are seen as having more legitimacy than
directly affected communities, and tends to eschew popular protest that may lead to conflict with the
state. In contrast, as anti-globalisation activist Arundhati Roy has stated: ‘Real resistance has real
consequences. And no salary’. To confront mass incarceration and its corollaries – the over policing and
criminalisation of poor and racialised communities – anti-prison activists in the US have come to believe
that a mass movement similar to the civil rights and anti-war movements is necessary. This movement
must involve the active participation and leadership of those from directly affected communities,
including low-income racialised youth.
Reform v. Abolish
Reform Excludes Abolition
 T --- Reform = Replace --- 1NC

Reform requires fixing the criminal justice system --- it is mutually exclusive with
abolishing it
Alti’s 13 --- Ana Smith Iltis, Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Director of the
Center for Bioethics, Health and Society at Wake Forest, “Institutional Integrity in Health Care”, Springer
Science & Business Media, Mar 9, 2013, Page 10, https://books.google.com/books?
id=pZFHBAAAQBAJ&dq=%22Reform+is+not+abolition%22+%22Criminal+justice
%22&source=gbs_navlinks_s (BJN)

Another inference gap problem should be noticed in the premise [A] (l). That premise rests on the
generalized claim that practices or institutions that are immoral ought to be abolished. In the case of
slavery that is indisputable, or at least it is in the case of forced slavery (contractual slavery may be
another matter, but not one I want to explore), but that is because slavery is a special case among
institutions. It may not be the case that most Other institutions in a society that may rightly be judged to
be immoral in very serious ways ought to be abolished. In this I depart from Singer's account. For
example, if I were to convince you that our institution of criminal justice is seriously flawed in very
fundamental ways from the moral point of view (because it is unfair to those from lower economic
classes), it does not follow that you must endorse abolishing the institution. You must, on pain of
inconsistency, be willing to endorse doing something to correct its faults, its moral deficiencies, that is,
reforming it, fixing it. But reform is not abolition. The same could probably be said of the institution of
medicine (understood, for example, in terms of health care delivery across the population). The reason
we cannot reform slavery to satisfy our principles of justice and fairness, particularly those that protect
human dignity, respect, and worth, is that were we to do so, the resulting institution would not be
slavery. So, though it does follow, when the moral status of slavery is unpacked, from "slavery is an
immoral institution" to "it must be abolished," such an inference cannot be generalized to all institutions
that are rightly assessed to be immoral or immoral with respect to some of their fundamental elements
or to some, perhaps significant, degree. What does follow is that something corrective, perhaps even
radical, must be done about the institution for it to pass moral muster.

Voter for ground and precision --- reform is the key point of stasis --- anything more is
neg ground
 T --- Reform = Fix --- Block Overview

Reform excludes abolition --- extend Iltis --- topical affs must correct faults --- distinct
from abolition --- vote neg;

First for precision --- Only our interpretation fives meaning to reform --- precision
turns all other impacts. The lit base dictates research --- reform is clearly defined in
the lit as distinct
Pinto 20 --- Nick Pinto, writes about police, criminal justice, and movements for The New Republic,
“Bailing Out”, The New Republic, April 6, 2020, https://newrepublic.com/article/156823/limits-money-
bail-fund-criminal-justice-reform (BJN)

Even the term “criminal justice reform” is itself fraught, and not just because more radical advocates
question whether “justice” is any sort of coherent goal within the mass-incarceration system. As
community activists, lawyers, and politicians continue to battle over the role of police, courts, and
prisons in advancing a carceral agenda, the seams in previously tenable alliances are coming under
strain. Reform-minded activists who believe that, with the right adjustments, these institutions can be
redeemed find themselves increasingly in conflict with abolitionists who believe that, whatever
intermediate steps may be necessary, the ultimate goal must always be their complete dismantling.
Reform, in this context, becomes a loaded term itself.

Second is ground --- abolition is core neg ground --- the central controversy of reform
is not “reform vs the status quo” --- but “reform vs abolition” --- defending “reform”
on the neg kills switch-side… which turns education --- and even if possible, is
unpredictable which turns their “lit checks abuse” framing
CHAMP 08 --- CHAMP network, a community HIV/AIDS Mobilization Project, the 2008 recipient of the
John M. Lloyd AIDS Project at Stony Point Center grant, Interim Report to the John M. Lloyd Foundation
The John M. Lloyd AIDS Project at Stony Point Center, May 16-18, 2008, http://johnmlloyd.org/archived-
site-2007-2012/docs/CHAMP_interim_report.pdf (BJN)

Within the current movement around “criminal justice,” there are existing tensions between people
working to reform different aspects of the prison system, and people who want to ultimately abolish our
society’s use of prisons and jails as a form of punishment. The debate often is referred to as “reform vs.
abolition.” To be sure, this philosophical debate directly or indirectly affected some of the discussion
during the weekend. But what at times appeared to be a debate about “reform vs. abolition” was also,
in fact, about longstanding personal and organizational tensions that have less to do with ideology than
personality conflicts.
 T --- Reform = Fix --- Ext --- Reform Excludes Abolition

Reform excludes abolition

Sudbury 09 --- Julia Sudbury is Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies at Mills College, Oakland,
California and editor of Global Lockdown: Race, Gender and the Prison-Industrial Complex (Routledge,
2005)., “Reform or abolition? Using popular mobilisations to dismantle the ‘prison-industrial complex'”,
Sept 09, https://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/publications/cjm/article/reform-or-abolition-using-
popular-mobilisations-dismantle-%E2%80%98prison (BJN)

Abolition exists in productive tension with efforts to reform the penal system. While abolitionists point
out that reform in isolation of a broader decarcerative strategy serves to legitimate and even expand the
prison-industrial complex, we also work in solidarity with prisoners to challenge inhumane conditions
inside. Described by Angela Y. Davis as ‘non-reformist reforms’, these efforts are assessed first in terms
of whether they contribute toward decreasing or increasing prison budgets and the reach of the criminal
justice system. For anti-prison activists, however, reform is not the primary objective. Rather we work
toward dual priorities. First, we aim to transform popular consciousness, so that people can believe that
a world without prisons is possible. Second, we take practical steps toward dismantling the prison-
industrial complex. These steps include campaigns for a moratorium on prison expansion, mobilising
community power to prevent the construction of proposed new prisons, shrinking the system through
decarcerative efforts and creating community-based alternatives to imprisonment.

Reform requires fixing --- excludes abolition

Regas 15 --- Rima Regas, Southern California-based writer and commentator with a passion for
progressive politics, and social and economic justice, “TAMIR RICE: A CHILDHOOD DENIED,
SUPREMACIST RULE PRESERVED, FOR NOW… | #BLACKLIVESMATTER ON BLOG#42”, Dec 2015,
https://www.rimaregas.com/author/rima-regasgmail-com/ (BJN)

It isn’t police or criminal justice reform that we need, for reform implies fixing. What is needed is the
demolition of what we have in place in favor of new institutions, based not on the perpetuation of
white supremacy, but the creation of a new foundation for an equal society. No institution should be
spared, especially not those that define how we manage our democracy, or how we pass down our
democratic traditions.
Impact
Framework Toolbox
 1NC Modules

Aikin and Talisse/Dialogue

External impact—the terms of the resolution create a meta-language that offers a rubric for evaluating
arguments under a deliberative framework. Responding to T with “but our discussion’s important” is a
rhetorical tactic straight out of Trump’s pocket—making the topic into a first-order question sidesteps
deliberative testing, which breeds dogmatic group polarization and trades argumentation for power
Aikin and Talisse, 17—Assistant Professor of Philosophy AND W. Alton Jones Professor of
Philosophy, Professor of Political Science, and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Vanderbilt
University (Scott and Robert, “Democracy, Deliberation, And The Owl Of Minerva Problem,” The
Critique, January/February 2017, dml)

To see this, consider that so many features of democratic political life depend for their intelligibility on
the aspirations of good argumentative culture. News is no longer simply read, but is presented in a
format of pro-and-con panel debate; journalists ask questions about reasons politicians have for
policies, and test politicians’ views for internal consistency; public debates are organized prior to
elections. These are all in the service of realizing a deliberative democracy, a mode of democratic
politics where public argument is a (perhaps the) central civic activity. Note further that the
deliberativist aspiration drives our criticism of what are generally taken to be democratically
degenerative forms of political communication. Bias, spin, derp, lying, flip-flopping, glad-handing, and all
the rest could hardly be regarded as deserving of political criticism except against the backdrop of the
ideals of deliberative democracy. These terms would not be accusatory were it not presumed that
democratic citizens are committed to a politics of epistemically sound public argumentation.

Though the deliberativist aspiration is widespread, and arguably constitutive of contemporary

democracy, it remains an aspiration. As we all know, public argumentation among democratic citizens is
at best a mixed bag. Attempts to deliberativize democracy are fraught with hazards. For one thing,
democratic citizens tend to discuss politics mainly with like-minded others. This occasions the
difficulties associated with the phenomenon known as group polarization: as like-minded people speak
to each other about their shared views, their positions shift towards more extreme versions. Put
otherwise, under conditions of doxastic homogeneity, deliberation produces extremism. And as one’s
views progress towards extremity, one grows increasingly unable to countenance the possibility of
reasoned, informed, and sincere disagreement. That is, group polarization feeds what Julian Sanchez
has described as epistemic closure, the incapacity to see views that run counter to one’s own as even
intelligible. And as one’s views become epistemically closed, one will increasingly find one’s critics to be
incompetent, insincere, dishonest, and ignorant. Their points will appear as mere noise or petulant
emoting. Eventually, one will see fit to simply stop listening to those who espouse opposing views. As a
result, there will be progressive all-around marginalization of unorthodox, unpopular, and unfamiliar
political views. Those already least likely to get a hearing will be increasingly regarded as incapable of
intelligible speech. Accordingly, the deliberativists’ central democratic mechanism seems to undermine
democracy.
Of course, these difficulties become only more pronounced once it is noticed that public political deliberation is of necessity largely mediated by various modern communicative technologies. No deliberative democrat explicitly
calls strictly for face-to-face discussions among citizens; public deliberation must be facilitated by intermediary institutions, such as social media, television news channels, websites, and online forums of many other kinds. Despite
the fact that these communication platforms all offer the potential for robust argumentative exchange among citizens who may be geographically and politically distant from one another, in practice, they tend to exacerbate the
vices outlined above. A casual survey of the comments thread of nearly any news site will show that polarization, closure, and marginalization are the norm. Well-run argument is beyond scarce on the internet.

The owl of Minerva flies only at dusk. Only after we have identified these pathologies and suffered their consequences can we think about how to mitigate them. There are many fixes on offer among theorists of democracy. Some
argue in favor of new and demanding civic duties that require citizens to read widely across the political spectrum. Others propose institutional interventions, ranging from the enactment of “equal time” laws for news outlets and
websites, to the creation of a new national holiday devoted to professionally-orchestrated public deliberation events. Empirically-minded theorists of deliberative democracy are working vigilantly on these matters. It is safe to say
that there is no easy way to inoculate deliberative democracy against these pathologies. But even if there were, we worry that another, even more foreboding difficulty lurks. There is reason to think that public argument itself,
even when institutional distortions do not pervert it, yields its own pathologies.

Consider the following. Some arguments fail because they run on false premises. Other arguments fail
because they draw an obviously unwarranted conclusion from their premises, much in the manner in
which a magician pulls a rabbit out of his hat. In such cases, it isn’t difficult to see that something has
gone awry. But some cases of the latter kind of failure aren’t so obviously failures. These are cases of
fallacious argument. Fallacies are arguments that we tend to regard as good, but in fact are not. We
have to work to see them as failures, and developing the ability to see them as failures requires us to
craft concepts with which to diagnose the ways in which they go wrong. This calls us to theorize
arguments. The task is notoriously difficult, as the proliferation of textbooks and college courses on
Critical Thinking suggests. One trouble is that the variety of seemingly good (but in fact bad) arguments
is considerably wider than the variety of diagnostic names we have for them. Moreover, this variety is
itself continually moving and growing. Our apparently endlessly creative linguistic capacities occasions a
similarly capacious field for the creation of new forms of fallacious argumentation. As a consequence, it
is often only in retrospect — after the debates are over, votes are cast, and decisions are made — that
the illusions can be revealed for what they are. And with the proliferation of communication outlets
and argumentative forums, argumentation theory can hardly keep up.

One reason why our theories have a hard time keeping up is that our best models of argument take
them centrally to be dialogues, between two people or parties, who exchange reasons, each with the
purpose of changing the other’s mind. But this dyadic (two-sided) model is no longer fitting. It leaves
out of its purview the fact that argumentative dialogues, especially when occurring by means of modern
technological mediation, are performed largely for the sake of onlooking audiences. The two discussants
may reply to each other, but their objective is actually to move the audience. Once we see this triadic
(three-sided) structure to political argumentation, many otherwise strange phenomena start to make
sense.
Consider the textbook straw man fallacy. In the case of the straw man, one takes one’s opponent’s view and restates it in a form that is more easily criticizable. One then goes after the new (and worse) version of the view with
justly critical lines about it. And then one closes the discussion. For sure, this would not convince the opponent, as they would only say that this criticized version of the view is not their own. But a straw man argument can move an
onlooking audience, those who may not be familiar with the issue under debate, who may not be particularly sympathetic with one side, or who may just be looking for a moment of easy clarity with the issue. The straw man
strategy gives them what they are looking for.

Consider, further, that much of the textbook vocabulary concerning fallacies has made it into the vernacular. One of particular note is that of the ad hominem, the fallacy of inferring that someone is wrong from the fact that they
exhibit some irrelevant personal vice. It is common to find in popular political discourse charges of the ad hominem. To be sure, the prohibitions on name-calling and insulting an interlocutor’s person in the midst of a debate is very
old; but now that we have a name for the prohibited strategy, we have a critical tool to invoke in the midst of argument. That the vocabulary of “ad hominem” and “straw man” has entered the political vernacular means that
public arguers have additional means with which to sort the good reasons from the bad.

But notice that when the argumentative strategy of invoking a fallacy name is used, it occurs as yet one
more move in the developing argumentative exchange. One invokes the straw man or the ad hominem
as a way of criticizing one’s interlocutor. So, when Donald Trump was criticized in the Republican
Primary debates for his use of the ad hominem, he interpreted the criticism simply as more naysaying to
contend with in the argument; he did not take the criticism to be targeting his style of engagement.
Three specific examples are of note. The first is when Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) chastised Trump for
insulting people for their looks. Trump responded, “I have never attacked Rand Paul on his looks . . . .
And believe me, there’s plenty of subject matter there”. The second is when Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX)
impersonated Trump to open the Iowa debates (Trump was absent). Cruz began: “Let me say that I’m a
maniac, and everyone on this stage is stupid, fat, and ugly. And Ben (Carson), you’re a terrible surgeon . .
. . And now that we’ve got the Donald Trump portion out of the way . . . . ”. Third and finally, at the very
late Texas primary debate, Trump acknowledged the effects his attacks on others, and noted, “So far, I
cannot believe how civil it’s been up here”.

What is troubling here is that in these moments the vocabulary for criticizing the mode of
argumentation has become merely one more tactic in the argument, one more way to discredit
another’s views. The whole point of developing the diagnostic language of fallacies is to create a
vocabulary with which we can argue about the argument itself, rather than the first-order claims at
issue within it. In particular, the Cruz moment is important, because, in accusing Trump of relying on the
ad hominem, Cruz is himself attacking Trump, the person. That is, the impersonation of Trump’s ad
hominem is itself a form of ad hominem. And so, instead of being a tool for evaluating the mode of the
debate, the fallacy-charge falls back into the debate itself; it becomes yet one more tactic internal to the
dispute. Trump obviously sees this point very clearly, as he plays with insulting (by not insulting) Rand
Paul, and goes out of his way to acknowledge and congratulate himself that he (and the others) haven’t
been name-calling in the Texas debate.

We argue in our natural languages, and so often when we argue, we argue over economies, animals,
environments, poverty, and so on. But arguments are structured collections of statements that are
alleged to manifest certain kinds of logical relations; consequently, they, too, can be the subject of
scrutiny and disagreement. And often in order to evaluate a claim about, say, poverty, we need to
attend specifically to the argument alleged to support it. In order to discuss arguments, as arguments,
we must develop a language about the argumentative use of language. That is, we must develop a
metalanguage. The objective in developing a metalanguage about argument is to enable us to talk
about a given argument’s quality without taking a side in the debate over the truth of its conclusion.
Accordingly, with the metalanguage in place, we can assess the quality of a given argument without
reference to our own view of the matter under dispute. Among other things, the metalanguage enables
us to criticize the arguments offered by people with whom we agree, and it similarly allows us to
recognize that sometimes a powerful argument can be produced for a conclusion that we know is false .
But perhaps most importantly, the metalanguage enables certain crucial self-critical assessments; it is
by means of the metalanguage that we can assess our arguments as lacking without thereby adopting a
skeptical stance with regard to our own first-order positions. Put more simply, it is by means of the
metalanguage about argument that we can stand above the fray of our first-order disputes , as it were,
and ascend to a relatively impartial plane from which to assess not the matter under dispute, but the
dispute itself. One might say that rationality itself depends upon our ability to competently wield a
metalanguage about reasoning, debate, and argument.

The problem is that when the concepts of the metalanguage are used as first-order tools in an ongoing
argument, the impartiality of the metalanguage is dissolved. And so with Trump, the language of
fallacies became for all involved in the debates yet one more competing view about which to wrangle.
The metalanguage for assessing the mode of dispute was dragged into the dispute itself, and,
predictably, the rationality of the exchanges dissolved precipitously.

The owl of Minerva flies only at dusk. Only after the day is done, after the argument is over, are the
tools of wisdom available. The tools of argument assessment, when applied in the midst of the
argument, are mistaken for, or are appropriated as, yet more first-order claims. They are entered into
the breach, and so can no longer assess it. Subsequent debate flies free of evaluative and rational
constraints. And what passes for argument then is mere power.

Advocacy Skills
Narrow definitions of Criminal justice reform are key to advocacy skills
Halpin et al 19, [Senior Fellow; Co-Director, Politics and Elections "25 Years After the 1994 Crime
Bill, Voters Back Criminal Justice Reforms," Center for American Progress Action,
https://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2019/09/10/174927/25-years-
1994-crime-bill-voters-back-criminal-justice-reforms] nw

The confusing nature of the term “criminal justice reform” also contributes to how voters rank this issue
compared with other more commonly understood priorities. The survey asked respondents to describe
in a few words what the term itself means to them. Responses varied widely, from ideas about
sentencing reform and the drug war to more abstract discussions about justice and fairness to more
counterintuitive opinions that the term meant increasing punishment and jail time for offenders.

Given these important, more qualitative findings, supporters of criminal justice reform need to spend
additional time defining the issue overall. And perhaps more importantly, they need to sharpen their
public arguments on what the debate about “criminal justice reform” substantively represents so that
voters understand what they mean.

Topic Education
Understanding criminal justice gives a broader perspective that makes you look for systems-oriented
solutions as opposed to quick fixes
Bailey 19 - Marc Bailey joined National University in 2016 after a 35-year career as an Emmy-winning news anchor, host,
and producer. He is also a veteran law enforcement professional, joining the San Diego Police Department in the late 1970s. He
currently volunteers as an El Cajon police reserve sergeant. Bailey earned a bachelor’s of business administration and a master’s
in organizational leadership from National University. As a professor, he has taught investigations, media and policing,
corrections, and juvenile justice, among other criminal justice courses. (Marc Bailey, 02-26-2019, "Why Is The
Criminal Justice System Important?," https://www.nu.edu/resources/ask-an-expert-why-is-criminal-
justice-important/) RK

A lot of law enforcement professionals naturally gravitate towards criminal justice because it most directly benefits
,

them and they can apply it in the field immediately. And that’s what we pride ourselves on in our classes . We want you to take what you

learned in class and that day take it out to work with you that day. But a degree in criminal justice can
be useful even if you don’t want to be a cop. Understanding the criminal justice system as the whole of
all these integrated parts gives you a broad perspective that most people don’t have. It makes you
look for integrated and systems-oriented solutions as opposed to quick fixes. That kind of systems
thinking and integrated problem-solving will serve you in any profession, anywhere in the world, in
anything that you do. We need new ways to look at problems and how to solve them. And if you decide
to go into the field of criminal justice, you’ll go in with your eyes wide open to the fact that it’s a whole
lot more complicated than people think.
 anti-blackness answers – bfhpr 2020

“Effect” Bad
Having a “big effect” doesn’t determine T, that’s a solvency question – T comes first
US Court of Appeals 1
Judge Edward J. Damich, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, September 19,
2001, EXXON RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee, 265 F.3d 1371; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20590; 60 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1272, Lexis

A decision holding a patent invalid for indefiniteness [**10] presents a question of law, which we
review de novo. See Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d 1374, 1378, 53 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA)
1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Despite a multitude of recent authorities stating that indefiniteness is a
question of law, see, e.g., S3 Inc. v. n VIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, slip. op. at 4 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Union
Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 692, 57 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1293, 1297 (Fed. Cir.
2001); [***1277] Process Control Corp. v. Hydreclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 n.2, 52 U.S.P.Q.2D
(BNA) 1029, 1034 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1377, 55
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000); and Personalized Media Communications, L.L.C. v. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 702, 48 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1880, 1886 (Fed. Cir. 1998), Exxon contends that
indefiniteness depends on underlying questions of fact. It argues that in this case there is a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the claims of the two patents at issue, read in light of their
specifications, reasonably apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the invention. For that [**11]
reason, Exxon asks us to reverse the summary judgment so that the Court of Federal Claims, sitting as a
fact-finder at trial, can decide the purported factual issues and reconsider its prior invalidity
determination.

We adhere to the principle that determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal conclusion that is drawn
from the court's performance of its duty as the construer of patent claims." Personalized Media
Communications, 161 F.3d at 705, 48 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1888; see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc.,
138 F.3d 1448, 1454-55, 46 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1169, 1172-73 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). In Cybor, we
reaffirmed that .although a court may consider or reject certain extrinsic evidence in resolving disputes
en route to pronouncing the meaning of claim language, "the court is not crediting certain evidence
over other evidence or making factual evidentiary findings. Rather, the court is looking to the extrinsic
evidence to assist in its construction of the written document . . . ." Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454, 46
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1173 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981, 34
U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1321, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [**12] (en banc)). We therefore reject Exxon's argument
that the issue of indefiniteness turns on an underlying factual dispute that should not have been
resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment.
How are you supposed to quantify that anyway? Ambiguity means err Aff.
US Court of Appeals 1
Judge Edward J. Damich, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, September 19,
2001, EXXON RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee, 265 F.3d 1371; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20590; 60 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1272, Lexis

The term "to increase substantially" in claim 1 of the '705 patent refers to the claimed increase achieved
by the invention in the relative productivity of the catalyst used in the Fischer-Tropsch process. The
specification defines "substantially increased" catalyst activity or productivity as an increase of at least
about 30%, more preferably an increase of about 50%, and still more preferably an increase of about
75%. '705 patent, col. 1, ll. 59-63. Based on that language from the specification, the trial court found,
and the parties agree, that the term "to increase substantially" requires an increase of at least about
30% in the relative productivity of the catalyst. Notwithstanding that numerical boundary, the trial
court found the phrase "to increase substantially" to be indefinite because the court concluded that
there were two possible ways to calculate the increase in productivity, the subtraction method and the
division method, and the patent did not make clear which of those ways was used in the claim.

An example from the specification will illustrate the difference [**14] between the two methods of
calculating the increase in catalyst productivity. The specification gives two examples showing the
relative productivity "before" and "after" super-activation according to the method of the invention. In
the experiment reported in Example 1, the "before" productivity was 60 and the "after" productivity was
100. In the experiment reported in Example 2, the "before" productivity was 25 [***1278] and the
"after" productivity was 100. The court found that the increase in relative productivity could be
calculated either by the subtraction method or the division method. That is, in Example 2 there would
be either a 75% increase (100 minus 25) or a 300% increase ([100 minus 25] divided by 25). The
difference in the numerical outcome produced by the two results is relevant because in certain
circumstances calculating relative productivity by the first method could produce an increase of less
than 30% in relative productivity, but using the second method could produce an increase of more than
30%. In such a case, the trial court explained, a person of skill in the art would not be able to determine
whether the claims of the '705 patent were infringed. That ambiguity, according [**15] to the court,
rendered the claims indefinite.
Overall System T
Criminal justice
 Subsets

1nc – T subsets

Substantial reform requires a wholesale approach to the overall criminal justice system
Norval Morris, 78 – professor of law at Harvard ( Reviewed Work(s): Denial of Justice: Criminal Process
in the United States by Lloyd L. Weinreb Review by: Norval Morris Source: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 91,
No. 6 (Apr., 1978), pp. 1367-1371, JSTOR //DH

It is often unfair, though common, to criticize a book for not being a different book; an author may
surely select his own topics. But in this case one cannot but regret the failure to offer at least a primitive
guide to the reformer's path. Few scholars take as holistic an approach to the criminal justice system as
Lloyd Wein- reb does in Denial of Justice. Undoubtedly, such an overarching perspective is essential to
serious and substantial reform of our present anarchic, inefficient, and unjust system; to leave the book
with a sense of a chapter or chapters missing, however, is a dis- appointment.

The truly difficult task in criminal justice reform is to define politically viable courses of legislative,
regulatory, and judicial conduct which are capable of avoiding the formidable ability of existing
institutions to swallow changes without affecting the overall system. There should have been at least
one long chapter, of this prescriptive nature, sketching the path between the diagnosis in the first five
chapters and Weinreb's utopian "alternative model." Am I condemning Weinreb for not writing a
different book? I think not. It may be true, as Weinreb argues, that fundamental change in our criminal
justice system is needed. But this does not necessarily imply that such a grand vision of a new goal
cannot be achieved by means of politically viable incremental steps. Weinreb, in neglecting (or rejecting)
this pos- sibility, fails to fulfill the promise of his earlier critical analysis of the criminal justice system and
leaves this book troublesomely incomplete.

--insert specific area definition--

Violation – the plan targets a subset of one of the areas specified in the resolution rather than changing
policy across the entire area
Voting issue to preserve predictable limits – they make it topical to decriminalize or
increase enforcement of any crime on the books– or they allow affs to focus on single
federal agencies enforcing or decriminalizing any crime or regulation, or allow
changing any small technique related to evidence collection – that’s tens of
thousands of affs
Excludes State Prison
 Excludes State Prisons
Criminal justice in the United States is split up into thousands of separate systems, the
USFG only controls one
Barkan & Bryjak 11 - Steven Barkan is an American sociologist, Professor and chairperson of the
Sociology department at the University of Maine. George J. Bryjak taught sociology at the University of
San Diego for 24 years before moving to the Adirondack Park region of New York state with his wife,
Diane. He is the co-author of three sociology textbooks and numerous scholarly articles. - (Barkan,
Steven E., and George J. Bryjak. Fundamentals of Criminal Justice: a Sociological View. Jones &amp;
Bartlett Learning, 2011, Google Books, books.google.com/books?
id=ZHAfpoCO5yMC&amp;printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false.) RK

The U.S. criminal justice system is only partly a “system" as that word is usually defined. “System"
implies a coordinated and unified plan of procedure, but criminal justice in the United States is only
partly coordinated and unified. The basic stages of criminal justice-police or law enforce- ment, courts
or judicial processing, and corrections-are the same throughout the nation, but the U.S. criminal justice
“system" really comprises thousands of smaller systems . For example, the federal government has
one system of criminal justice, each state has its own system, and each county and municipality has its
own system. Although each system's components-police, prosecutors, judges, corrections officials-work
together on occasion, they have separate budgets and work independently of one another for the most
part. Inevitably, they also often work at cross-purposes. Thus the police may crack down on drug
trafficking in a particular neighborhood by making mass arrests, only to have this flood of cases
overwhelm the prosecutor's office and judicial system. Or new legislation may require judges to put
more people in prison, only to find that prisons have too few cells to hold the newly convicted
individuals. This problem then forces prison officials to let out other inmates early, overcrowd their cells
further, or request funds for new prison construction.

The federal government cannot change state law concerning legality – either they fiat
the states and are extra T or there is terminal defense
Bodilly et al 89 (Susan Bodilly, Arthur Wise, Susanna Purnell, 10-27-1989, “The Transfer of Section 6
Schools" RAND Institute, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA213772.pdf) RK

Some problems are more amenable to federal influence than others. For instance: The federal
government can provide stable funding for LEAs through guaranteed payments other than Impact Aid or
through shared federal/state funding (the assisted transfer). The federal government can provide
construction funds to ensure that Section 6 schools meet state codes and are acceptable for transfer to
the LEA. Alternatively, the federal government can provide partial funding for the building of schools off-
base. Arrangements can be made between the LEA and base commander to satisfy the command
concern about security and control. Arrangements can be made to ensure parent participation in LEA
affairs, such as a base parent representative serving as an ex-officio member of the school board or
parent advisory boards. Arrangements can be made to ensure neighborhood schools for base children.
Other issues, not amenable to federal actions, fall under the control or purview of state and local
government. For instance: The federal government cannot change state law concerning the legality of
certain actions. The federal government cannot force states or LEAs to better the educational program
offerings.
 Excludes State Prisons – Empirics
The First Step Act doesn’t affect state and local criminal justice systems
Martinez 18 – Gina Martinez is a reporter for TIME magazine - (Gina Martinez, 12-20-2018, "The
Bipartisan Criminal-Justice Bill Will Affect Thousands of Prisoners. Here's How Their Lives Will Change,"
Timehttps://time.com/5483066/congress-passes-bipartisan-criminal-justice-reform-effort/) RK

A criminal justice reform effort known as the First Step Act is just one step — a signature from President
Donald Trump — away from becoming law and changing the lives of an estimated 30% of the federal
prison population over the next decade. The House voted Thursday to pass the Senate’s revisions by
358-36. And although Congress also faces the threat of a partial government shutdown, Trump has
signaled his willingness to sign the bill. It is estimated that some 53,000 of the 181,000 inmates
currently imprisoned in the federal system in the U.S. would be affected over the next 10 years,
according to the Congressional Budget Office. The bill would not cover state jails and prisons, which
account for the majority of the country’s prison population . The U.S. has the worlds highest total
prison population with over 2.1 million people incarcerated. Since the First Step Act was introduced
earlier this year, it has earned the support of both Democrats and Republicans, though some Democrats
say the bill doesn’t do enough in regards to sentencing laws that disproportionately affect minorities.
The legislation has also gotten support from groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and the
Fraternal Order of Police.

The First Step Act was criminal just reform in the United States
The White House 19 – From the White House official website - (The White House, 4-1-2019,
"President Donald J. Trump Is Committed to Building on the Successes of the First Step Act," White
House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-committed-
building-successes-first-step-act/) RK

Americans from across the political spectrum can unite around prison reform legislation that will reduce
crime while giving our fellow citizens a chance at redemption. President Donald J. Trump ACHIEVING
GROUNDBREAKING REFORM: The landmark First Step Act enacted commonsense criminal justice
reform that is helping prisoners gain a new lease on life and is making America safer. In December 2018,
President Donald J. Trump signed into law the First Step Act, marking the first major reforms to our
criminal justice system in over a decade. The First Step Act enacted commonsense reforms to make our
justice system fairer and help inmates successfully transition back into society. President Trump remains
committed to building on this success and continuing the great work achieved by this legislation.
 Excludes State Prisons – Precision
Federal influence over the states is limited to partnerships, best practices,
enforcement, grants, and assembling jurisdictions.
Obama 16 – former president Barack Obama - (Obama, Barack, "The President's Role in Advancing
Criminal Justice Reform" (2017). U.S. Department of Justice Publications and Materials. 31.) (Harvard
Law Review 130:3 (January 2017), pp 811-866.) (https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1031&context=usjusticematls) RK

Part III details the approaches that Presidents can take to promote change at the state and local level,
recognizing that the state and local justice systems tend to have a far broader and more pervasive
impact on the lives of most Americans than does the federal justice system. While the President and the
executive branch play a less direct role in these systems, there are still opportunities — as my
Administration’s work demonstrates — to advance reform through a combination of federal-local
partnerships, the promulgation of best practices, enforcement, federal grant programs, and
assembling reform-minded jurisdictions struggling with similar challenges

The federal government is limited to affecting the federal criminal justice system –
distinct from state and local levels
Obama 16 – former president Barack Obama - (Obama, Barack, "The President's Role in Advancing
Criminal Justice Reform" (2017). U.S. Department of Justice Publications and Materials. 31.) (Harvard
Law Review 130:3 (January 2017), pp 811-866.) (https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1031&context=usjusticematls) RK

II. REFORMING THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

Every week, I receive letters from people across the country urging me to address issues involving state
and local justice systems, about which there is often frustratingly little that anyone in the federal
government can do. State and local officials are responsible for most policing issues, and they are in
charge of the facilities that hold more than 90% of the prison population and the entire jail
population.45 Even at the federal level, there are important limits on the President’s authority .46 The
Constitution separates the executive, legislative, and judicial powers into three coequal branches of
government, all of which have independent roles in shaping the criminal justice system.47 And within
the executive branch, the President’s direct influence is subject to constraints designed to safeguard the
fair enforcement of the law. Nowhere are these limits more important than in the administration of the
criminal law. For good reason, particular criminal matters are not directed by the President personally
but are handled by career prosecutors and law enforcement officials who are dedicated to serving the
public and promoting public safety.48 The President does not and should not decide who or what to
investigate or prosecute or when an investigation or prosecution should happen. T o avoid even the
appearance of politicization, a series of internal White House rules and prudential practices sharply
restrict contact with the Department of Justice and other enforcement agencies on specific matters .49
These practices make things difficult when the public looks to the President to opine on a particular
case, but they are critical to ensuring the rule of law as well as the integrity and independence of the
justice system. Nevertheless, there is still much that Presidents can do to make the justice system
better serve the public. In my Administration, that has meant starting with the federal system — which
has not only directly affected those in federal custody, but also made federal practice a model that
can drive and accelerate change at the state and local levels . This Part shows how my Administration
has used the tools at its disposal to effect change at the federal level: from the legislative reforms we’ve
advanced, to the policies we’ve changed in the executive branch, to the second chances we’ve given to
those who received clemency, we have brought our system more in line with the values that define us.
 Excludes State Prisons – Topic Education
The federal government controls conditions for funding, providing consistency
between states, and ensuring constitutional rights – understanding the differences
between state and federal CJR is key to effective advocacy
FCNL 20 (Friends Committee on National Legislation, xx-xx-2020, "State and Federal Responsibilities for
Criminal Justice," https://www.fcnl.org/updates/state-and-federal-responsibilities-for-criminal-justice-
117) RK

The judicial system divides responsibilities for prosecution and incarceration between the local, state,
and federal levels. Advocacy and changes at each level are critical for ending mass incarceration. Most
crime legislation and prosecution is handled at the state level. However, the federal government can
get involved through its ability to set conditions for funding projects such as prison construction.
Additionally, some crimes, such as drug offenses, may violate both state and federal laws and may be
charged at either level. Federal involvement in criminal justice legislation has the potential to bring a
degree of consistency to a patchwork of state criminal justice codes . However, in recent years, federal
legislative involvement has had a negative effect on criminal justice, as Congress has passed laws
dictating mandatory minimum sentences, extending the death penalty, and limiting death penalty
appeals. The federal government is also responsible for ensuring that constitutionally-guaranteed
rights of all persons (convicts, defendants, and people on the street, alike) are not trammeled by the
criminal justice system. For example, The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable search and
seizure. The Fifth Amendment protects persons against double jeopardy and self-incrimination, and
provides for due process. The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants a speedy and public trial, the
opportunity to confront witnesses for the prosecution and to obtain witnesses for the defense, and to
have counsel. The Eighth Amendment protects against cruel and unusual punishments. The Fourteenth
Amendment assures equal protection of the laws for all in the U.S. The Supreme Court may be called on
to decide whether a particular practice violates one of these rights. However, when local or state
governments are accused of practices that selectively violate the civil rights of people of color, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) may get involved. The DOJ, which is responsible for enforcing federal anti-
discrimination legislation, may initiate an investigation, develop a corrective action agreement, or take
legal action against entities found guilty of discrimination. Thus, all three branches of the federal
government (legislative, judicial, and executive) may be involved in criminal justice activities at the
state/local level.

Sentencing is a discrete act not an ongoing process – the aff can’t apply to those who
have already been sentenced
William Robinson (Associate Justice of the Rhode Island Supreme Court) April 18, 2011 “STATE v.
Brandy GRAFF” majority opinion. No. 2010–3–C.A. https://caselaw.findlaw.com/ri-supreme-
court/1563969.html

“Every person convicted of a first violation shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not
less than five (5) years and for not more than fifteen (15) years, in any unit of the adult correctional
institutions in the discretion of the sentencing judge * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
The statute clearly and unambiguously vests the sentencing judge with discretion to sentence first-time
offenders under this statute to any unit of the ACI. In the instant case, it is undisputed that defendant
was not ordered to the work-release program at the time of her sentencing on June 18, 2007. A review
of the hearing justice's decision to grant defendant's motion to modify sentence, which decision was
announced almost two full years after her sentencing, suggests that it was predicated on a notion that
sentencing is not a singular event and on a belief that the judicial officer who is “the sentencing judge”
referred to in § 31–27–2.2 continues to have the discretionary powers accorded by that statute even
after the sentence has been meted out.11

We reject as erroneous the hearing justice's very expansive interpretation of sentencing and of § 31–27–
2.2. There is nothing in the statute that in any way suggests that sentencing is some sort of ongoing
process. Rather, sentencing is, in our view, a discrete act. We view “the discretion” that this statute
accords to “the sentencing judge” as unambiguously referring to a discretion that is exercisable when
the judge pronounces the sentence and that, except as otherwise explicitly provided for in Rule 35 of
the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, ceases to exist after that event takes place.12

Our understanding of the discrete nature of sentencing and of the meaning of the term “sentencing
judge” in § 31–27–2.2 is consistent with dictionary definitions of the English word “sentence.”13 For
example, the New Oxford American Dictionary 1591 (3d ed.2010) defines “sentence” in the legal context
as meaning “the punishment assigned to a defendant found guilty by a court” and as punishment “fixed
by law for a particular offense.” Similarly, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
1586 (4th ed.2006) defines the noun “sentencing” as: “1. The act of pronouncing a judicial sentence on a
defendant. 2. The sentence so pronounced.” Nothing in those definitions is even remotely suggestive of
an ongoing process. See also Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174, 84 S.Ct. 298, 11 L.Ed.2d 229
(1963) (“Final judgment in a criminal case * * * means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

We consider it noteworthy that Rule 35 (entitled, “Correction, decrease or increase of sentence”) is

replete with language that presupposes that the imposition of sentence is a discrete act and not a sort
of continuing process which (in addition to what is specifically authorized by Rule 35) the sentencing
judge may from time to time revisit. Significantly, the 120–day period within which most Rule 35
motions must be filed is measured from the date when “sentence is imposed.”

The hearing justice in the instant case had the authority to order the defendant to the work-release
program at the time of her sentencing on June 18, 2007, but he did not have the continuing authority to
thereafter grant the defendant's “Motion to Modify Sentence for Court Ordered Work Release.” In our
opinion, he erred in doing so.

Sentencing reform is a complex process that goes beyond focusing on one part of the
process – the aff cant limit their reform to a single domain
Jacqueline Cohen (Emeretus research professor at Carnegie Mellon University specializing in criminal
justice policy) and Michael H. Tonry (the McKnight Presidential Professor of Criminal Law and Policy at
the University of Minnesota Law School) 1984 “Federal Sentencing Revision” Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee of the Judiciary in the House of Representatives,
https://books.google.com/books?id=5T-Z5EQ6T7gC&pg=PA1393&lpg=PA1393&dq=
%22the+word+sentencing
%22+AROUND(15)+reform&source=bl&ots=EimTc0HdtT&sig=ACfU3U14BWFf6tzJ5_0x9pGezRvj05CezQ
&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjhscHf56bqAhUVZc0KHT90DB8Q6AEwCnoECAUQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=fals
e

The sentencing reform movement has forced us to look at the sentencing process whole. Until recently
the word sentencing usually evoked images of defendants in the dock. berobed judges, and high—
ceilinged courtrooms. The roles of police, prosecutors, and parole and prison professionals in sentence
outcomes very little attended to. Now, after a decade of ferment, most discussions of sentencing reform
address not the discretion of judges, but also that of prosecutors, parole boards, and sometimes other
officials. Sentencing is no longer commonly perceived as simply what a judge does, but rather as a
complex process in which various people make decisions that influence the quality and quantum of
punishment a defendant receives. Most sentencing reforms have focused on only one part of the
process. Maine, for abolished parole but addressed no other punishment power; the abolition of parole
without development of criteria and constraints for judges, however, gave little reason to expect that
sentences imposed by judging would algo change in some desired way. California “abolished” parole and
get detailed statutory criteria for judges imposing prison sentences on convicted offenders, raising the
possibility that much of the power in determining sentence outcomes would thereby be shifted to
prosecutors through the charging and plea negotiation processes. Illinois abolished parole, set loose
statutory sentencing criteria, and established “day-for-day” good time. Prisoners, however, have no
vented entitlement to accrued good—time credits, leaving corrections authorities with the power to
increase a prisoners nominal sentence by much as 100 percent by withdrawing credits to penalize
prisoner misconduct.

In view of this complexity, evaluations of the impact of sentencing reforms should not be limited to the
domain in which these schemes are implemented. To see the impact of parole guidelines, one must
consider not only the actions of the parole board, but also those of judges, lawyers, and prison officials.
To see the impact of sentencing guidelines, one must consider their implications for plea bargaining,
parole release decisions, and so on.
Sentencing Reform Excludes Diversion
 T --- Sentencing Reform --- Not Decrim --- Block Ext

Topical affs affect TYPES of sentencing

Wicharaya 95 --- Tamasak Wicharaya, Deputy Superintendent of Police Administration Section in the
Academic Section of the Police Cadet Academy, “Simple Theory, Hard Reality: The Impact of Sentencing
Reforms on Courts, Prisons, and Crime”, SUNY Press, Aug 10, 1995, Page 178,
https://books.google.com/books?id=ZCrzYuMFRZsC&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&dq=
%22Types+of+sentencing+reforms%22&source=gbs_navlinks_s (BJN)

This model hypothesizes that sentencing behavior is a function Of the type of sentencing reform policy,
controlling for previous vio- lent crime rates. The five sentencing reform types are mandatory minimum
sentencing laws, mandatory determinate sentencing laws, presumptive determinate sentencing laws,
presumptive sen- tencing guidelines, and voluntary sentencing guidelines. This spec- ification tests the
sentencing reform hypothesis that control over sentencing decision will increase the certainty Of
punishment, measured as the rate of new court commitments to state institu- tions per ten thousand
adult arrests charged with FBI indexed vio- lent offenses or the incarceration rate thereafter.

For reference --- heres what those mean

NCJRS 82 --- National Criminal Justice Reference Service, National Institute of Justice, July 1982,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/80919NCJRS.pdf (BJN)

1. Present sentencing type

States included in the report were classified first by recognizing whether any offenses on first or
subsequent conviction carried a mandatory prison sentence, and second by the underlying type of
sentencing for mandatory and non-mandatory situations. Mandatory sentencing for certain crimes can
be overlaid upon any type of sentencing and is thus a separate element or variable. For this report we
have adopted the following definition:

Mandatory Minimum Sentence: The minimum incarceration sentence that must be given by a judge or
jury on conviction, without an option for probation, suspended sentence, or immediate parole eligibility.

Four basic types of sentencing schemes are defined below for non-mandatory minimum sentencing.
Laws regarding mandatory minimums provide some exceptions for certain offenses, but the overall type
or structure is generally unchanged.

Determinate: Incarceration sentences are given with a fixed (flat) length of time. Time served nay be-
subject to "good time" or parole; and probation and suspension may be options. Legislation specifies a
maximum or a range of sentences.
Presumptive Determinate: As above, but legislation suggests a definite term with leeway up or down in
the event of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Guidelines - generally a form of presumptive with a grid to specify the sentence or a range for the
determinate sentence.

Indeterminate: Incarceration sentences are given with a minimum and maximum. Good time and
parole may be available to reduce either the minimum or maximum or both. Legislation may specify a
range or a maximum for the sentence.

Sentencing reform must change sentencing PRACTICES

Bradley 17 --- Mindy S. Bradley, Professor in the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice at the
University of Arkansas, “Handbook on Punishment Decisions”, Taylor & Francis, Oct 2017,
https://www.google.com/books/edition/Handbook_on_Punishment_Decisions/8yA6DwAAQBAJ?
hl=en&gbpv=0 (BJN)

I have used the term "sentencing reform" broadly to refer to legislative changes designed to change
sentencing practices. Tonry refers to the 1970s and early 1980s as the "sentencing reform" era, and the
mid-1980s to 1990s as the "tough on crime" era, when the emphasis shifted to making punishment
more certain and severe.
 Sentencing
Enacting substantial sentencing reform requires a holistic approach that changes the
way that laws and guidelines upon which excessive sentences are based
Carey Holley (intern in the Justice Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU Law) October 8,
2018 “What’s Happening in Congress on Criminal Justice Reform?”
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/whats-happening-congress-criminal-justice-
reform
Sentencing Reform Sentencing reform prioritizes changing the laws and guidelines that made prison sentences so long in the first place. Mandatory minimum laws set fixed minimum sentences for certain crimes, leaving judges with no choice but to impose a harsh penalty they may not
believe in. On the other hand, sentencing guidelines help judges use what little discretion they have left. These guidelines are not compulsory, but judges tend to closely adhere to them. These laws and guidelines helped create mass incarceration, and more and more prosecutors, judges
and lawmakers are recognizing that they need to be fixed to end it. Senators Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) and Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) have one plan to achieve that goal. In 2015 and again in 2017, they introduced a bipartisan and popular bill called the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act
(SRCA). This bill significantly reduces mandatory minimum sentences for several drug-related crimes and ensures that people who went to prison before 2010 can still benefit from the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which dramatically revised some drug sentences in an effort to reduce the
racial disparities caused by crack cocaine sentencing laws. SRCA would make a real dent in the prison population: Around 2,500 people entering prison each year would receive a sentence reduction of between 22 and 50 percent, and more than 6,000 currently incarcerated drug offenders
would be immediately eligible for a sentence reduction of nearly 30 percent. It also includes prison reform provisions such as increasing recidivism reduction programming and activities, and significantly limiting the use of juvenile solitary confinement. The Need for Both Types of Reform
Both prison reform and sentencing reform are critical to improving the criminal justice system. However, prison reform on its own, while improving conditions of confinement, does not meaningfully reduce our country’s unjustifiably large incarcerated population.

Sentencing reform, on the other hand, confronts the foundation of mass incarceration by changing the laws
upon which excessive sentences are based. To holistically address our country’s incarceration problem, we need to put an end to unnecessary incarceration through enacting sentencing reform and ensure that
the remaining prison population is treated with dignity through prison reform.
 1NC – T-Enact

Interpretation---enact means legislative

US Legal No Date, Legal information company, "Enacted Law and Legal Definition",
https://definitions.uslegal.com/e/enacted/

Enact or enacted means to make into law by authoritative act. For example, the statute was enacted in
the year 1945. It primarily means to perform the legislative act with reference to a bill which gives it
the validity of law. In short, a bill is enacted when it becomes a law that is when the Governor signs it
and makes it effective.

Violation---courts don’t enact law, they interpret it

Robert Alt 12, former visiting fellow, Heritage Foundation, 1/20/12, "What Is The Proper Role of the
Courts?", The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/what-the-proper-role-the-
courts

Accordingly, the
Founders vested the legislative power (the power to make the laws) in Congress, the
executive power (the power to enforce the laws) in the President, and the judicial power (the power to
interpret the laws and decide concrete factual cases) with the courts. But even these powers were not unfettered.
Federal courts, for example, can hear only “cases or controversies”: they cannot issue advisory opinions.
The courts cannot expound on a law of their choosing or at the request of even the President himself,
but must wait for a genuine case between actual aggrieved parties to be properly presented to the
court.

Vote Neg:
Limits---triples the caselist---every aff now has a courts congress and executive version
Ground---kills generics like federalism, politics, actor CPs
Precision---legal education is the most portable debate skill
 2NC – T-Enact – Interps

Enact means :
-to establish by law, which means legislative action
West 08, West's Encyclopedia of American Law, edition 2, 2008, “Enact”, The Free Dictionary by Farlax,
Legal Dictionary, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/enact

To establish by law; to perform or effect; to decree.

Enact, sometimes used synonymously with adopt, is generally applied to legislative rather than executive action.

-passing a bill
Merriam-Webster No Date, "enact", https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/enact
1: to establish by legal and authoritative act specifically : to make into law

enact a bill

-act or statute
Dictionary.com No Date, "enact", https://www.dictionary.com/browse/enact
to make into an act or statute:

Congress has enacted a new tax law.

 2NC – T-Enact – Precision

Precision is good---using proper terminology matters---it shapes our understanding of

the law
Bradley Shannon 02, Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law, “Action Is an Action Is an Action
Is an Action”, Washington Law Review, January 2002, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 65

The first answer to this question is, why

should we not care? If proper terminology (of whatever type) is readily
available and comprehendible, why should one not want to use it? Does one really need a reason for not
misusing any word, technical or otherwise? In other words, though many misuses of Rules terminology might
not seem to cause serious problems, surely that is not an argument in favor of a disregard of proper
Rules terminology, particularly where the cost of using proper terminology is negligible .79

The second answer to the question why we should care about the use of proper Rules terminology goes to the
cost of using improper
terminology even in seemingly trivial contexts. Understanding legal concepts is difficult enough without
the confusion created when an inappropriate term is used to represent those concepts. And this is true
regardless of how minor the misuse. In some sense, every misuse of legal language impedes the
understanding-and, consequently, the progress—of the law.
 2NC – T-Enact – AT: Procedural Rules

Courts can’t enact rules of procedure that affect substantive rights

Robert Francis Peckham 90, United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, "Memorandum To Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Re: The Civil Justice
Reform Act", https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/BB4-39-%20Memo%20Peckham%20to
%20Biden%205-23-90.pdf
B. Rulemaking Power Delegated to the Courts by the Rules Enabling Act

The Supreme court's, authority to enact rules of procedure is far more limited than Congress's power -- the Court has only that authority
delegated to it by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934. The
portion of the Rules Enabling Act delegating authority
to the Supreme Court -- and limiting that authority -- reads as follows:
"(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts…and courts of appeals. (b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right….” (28 U.S.C. Sec. 2072.)

There is general agreement among commentators that Congress empowered the Court in this provision
only to propose rules of procedure that have no substantive effect.
Under the present system, judicial rulemaking authority is triggered when the 3udicial conference of the United States transmits a draft rule to
the Supreme Court. If it chooses, the Supreme Court can then transmit the proposed rule to Congress I but must do so between the time
Congress begins a regular session and May 1. Congress then has until December 1 of that year to disapprove, modify, or further delay the
effective date of the proposed rule. If Congress takes no action, the proposed rule becomes effective on December 1.

Rules of court that are both substantive and procedural are beyond the limits of the Supreme Court's
delegated rulemaking authority. If the Supreme Court were to propose a rule that impacted upon a
substantive concern, that proposal would run afoul of the Rules Enabling Act's prohibition against rules
that “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”

Since Congress's power to enact rules of procedure is limited only by the Constitution, and not the Rules Enabling Act, Congress may
pass procedural rules that advance· substantive goals. Such rules define the area of court rulemaking
that is allowed to Congress, but prohibited to the Supreme Court under current law.
Congress has been careful to protect its exclusive rulemaking authority. In a 1985 report, the House Judiciary Committee commented on
legislation eventually enacted in 19B8 that amended the Rules Enabling Act. The 1985 House Report describes the exclusive rulemaking
authority retained by Congress as follows;

“[The Rules Enabling Act] is intended to allocate to Congress, as opposed to the Supreme Court
exercising delegated legislative power, lawmaking choices that necessarily and obviously require
consideration of policies extrinsic to the business of the courts ..... 11 (H.R. Rep. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 22
(1985).) Importantly, the report also refers to Conqress's exclusive power to enact procedural rules' that "affect its constituencies) \ in their out-
of-court affairs.” (Id.)

Courts adopt rules, Congress enacts laws

George Coppolo 08, Chief Attorney, Connecticut General Assembly, 12/30/08, "COURT RULES IN
OTHER STATES-LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL", OLR Research Report, https://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-
R-0430.htm
The Wyoming Constitution gives the Supreme Court general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as
may be prescribed by law (Wyo. Con. Art. 5, § 2). This authority gives the Supreme Court the right to prescribe rules of practice and procedure
in the courts (White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102 (1984), Squillace v. Kelly, 990 P.2d 497 (1999)). This right is limited only by reasonableness and
conformity to constitutional and legislative enactments that deal with substantive rights or a court's jurisdiction (Peterson v. State, 594 P.2d
978 (1979)). The Supreme Court has also ruled that “matters dealing with procedure, particularly in the minor courts, are entirely within” its
province (Peterson). Thus it appears that in Wyoming, the
Supreme Court has ultimate authority to adopt procedural
rules and the legislature has ultimate authority to enact laws that deal with “substantive rights.”
 2NC – T-Enact – AT: Courts Make Law

Courts don’t enact policy---they can’t be the lead player

Amanda Hollis-Brusky 15, assistant professor of politics at Pomona College, teaches courses in
American politics, constitutional law, and legal institutions, "The Constrained Court", Democracy Journal,
Summer 2015, No. 37, https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/37/the-constrained-court/
According to the “constrained court” view, there are four important institutional and political factors that limit the Supreme Court’s ability to
directly and powerfully influence social policy. The first is that unlikeCongress, courts are not self-starting institutions, so
they can rule only on cases and questions presented to them. Second, the issue must first be translated
into a statutory or constitutional-rights framework for the courts even to have the authority to rule on it,
which is actually a very limiting requirement (the Court could not, for example, address issues of sexual harassment and
workplace discrimination until these issues were successfully read into the language of the Civil Rights Act). Third, even if judges do
have the authority to rule on an issue, they can only do so in a piecemeal, case-by-case fashion. And finally,
their decisions are not self-executing—courts must depend on other entities or branches of government
to implement their rulings.

And even in the rare case that all of these constraints are overcome, courts still cannot enact a policy
agenda without the help of what Charles Epp referred to in 1998 as the “support structure” for legal change—i.e.,
the lawyers, legal institutions, funding sources, and legal strategies that enable judges and justices to
make and support their rulings. The essential point is that while the Supreme Court’s rulings can and do have
real consequences for real people, the Court can never be the lone or even the leading player in these
complex legal-political dramas. For better or for worse, it is only ever capable of playing a supporting role.